**Preface**

The outbreak of the Islamic Revolution based on religious beliefs has affected all political, social and security-defense mechanisms. Therefore, it is desirable for thinkers and analysts to adopt this attitude taking into account any phenomenon, especially Post -Islamic Revolution events and developments.

The eight –year imposed war against the new system established by the Islamic Revolution may be considered as an event with specific regional and international impacts as well as domestic impacts on the both countries: Iran and Iraq.

Throughout this long battle, which gradually evoked the boundary between disbelief and faith in mind, the Iranian nation, on the one hand faced unbalanced combat with the Iraqi army and the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, and on the other hand, with the power of the world arrogance that had come to support Saddam Hussein. In this unequal war, people from all strata of society, along with armed forces with full authority began to defend the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the achievements of the Islamic Revolution.

The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force IRIAF was the first army military force joined the roaring waves of people believing in the school of the Prophets with a conscious uprising against the regime of oppression and fought at the forefront of confrontation with the enemy with the outbreak of the imposed war with a double sense of responsibility (and following the promulgation of Imam Khomeini's command to repulse aggression).

The full and thorough defense of this divine power, in addition to advanced disciplines and well-trained staff, provided a combination of faith, science, the power of innovation and initiatives, creating a new chapter in the history of Sacred Defense. And in different periods of time, the process of war changed for the benefit of the heroic nation and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The process of designing and executing aerial operations, such as some reconnaissance, patrol, standby and limited aerial bombardment operations against the dispersed attacks of the enemy to the border areas took on a regular and intensive pursuit with the onset of the invasion of the Ba'ath Party forces.

the Iranian air force conducted "first response" in the form of retaliatory action after the Ba'ath regime invasion in a fast-paced and harsh operation, in less than two hours after Iraqi attack, (in which Kut Air Base in Maysan Governorate and Shaibah Air Base in Basra Governorate were bombarded), that was the tooth breaking response to Ba'athist aggression.

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force enjoyed a comparative and appreciable advantage over the enemy Iraq Air Force at the outbreak of the imposed war (despite the sanctions)[[1]](#footnote-1).

Iraq managed to change this trend and gain aerial superiority in the battlefields with the advanced aircraft assignment and the use of intelligence satellites and the capabilities of the AEW & C (belonged to the Saudi Arabia). Over time, the deployment of modern offensive-defense systems and electronic warfare equipment along with chemical and biological weapons from the eastern and western superpowers to the ruling regime in Iraq led to profound changes in the process of the continuation of the war, considering most of the Arab countries on the Persian Gulf sided to Iraq; thus the imbalance of power during the war and the enemy's favor is clear.

But this was not the end. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force did take control and managed to overcome many of the shortcomings by managing sensitive flying systems and using the principle of “Saving Power”, and with the help of young commanders and committed personnel to confront the superiority of the Ba'ath regime. Following this strategy throughout the war led to the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force preservation of combat readiness in defense of the land and the vital facilities of the country.

Training specialist personnel with the aim of providing the required staff who follow the path of the martyrs and warriors of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force were among the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force priorities that originally are something to boast about by this “Divine Power” during the Islamic Revolution and the imposed war. The realization of this heavy process without dependence on the West as well as presence in flight missions increases the importance and magnitude of the issue. At the same time, The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force helped the country's civilian commercial airplane fleet through the assignment of experienced pilots to the airline of the country, which is truly praiseworthy.

In total, The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force with over 218 martyrs, 53 missed, and 53 released war prisoner pilots and dozens of veterans, have the title of the highest ratio of martyrs and released war prisoners to the total number of employees involved in the war (more than 60 percent)[[2]](#footnote-2). These figures, along with other martyrs of revolutionary and committed forces in ground combat and bombardment of the enemy (total 1614), represent a major task toward the Islamic system and the dear homeland.

The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, as an established and trusted entity by nation and Imam Khomeini, with its specialized capacities and operational capabilities, with its dedicated and revolutionary staff, was without exaggeration to establish an unparalleled role in adhering to the demands of the people, defending the Islamic Revolution aspirations and achieving the goal of self-sufficiency in the immortal course of the Sacred Defense. The main effective activities (which, along with other elements of the armed forces, have resulted in Saddam's failure to achieve an “easy” victory) are summarized as:

1. Revolutionary action of a large number of personnel of this force after joining the people under the leadership of the Imam Khomeini and breaking the backbone of the Shah's army and thus accelerating the process of victory of the Islamic Revolution;
2. Imam Khomeini’s escort when he arrived in Iran's sky and being responsible for protecting him, supplying helicopters and transferring them to designated destinations;
3. Historical parade of a number of employees of IRIAF on February 8, 1979, in the presence of Imam Khomeini and the uprising, along with violations of the Martial law by the personnel of the Air Force Training Center;
4. Confronting deceived and counter-revolutionary groups around the country, especially the Kurdistan region and helping to stabilize the Islamic Revolution;
5. Confronting domestic and international threats and observing the apparent violations of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime as well as their espionage activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran sky with the declaration of alert state;
6. Carrying out various missions of identification, patrol and standby and limited aerial bombardment in different parts of the border (in the weeks leading to September 1980), and the martyrdom of the first pilot on June 25, 1980 (Shalamcheh region) and captivated the first missed pilots of this force on October 19, 1980 (Mehran and Fakkeh regions);
7. Planning and implementation of the first retaliation operation called “First Response” on September 22, 1980 and then the operation “Kaman 99” (140 fighter-bombers) on September 23, 1980;
8. Carrying out numerous aerial operations in the form of action against the enemy’s Air Force, including offensive attacks on the vital and economic facilities of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime and the destruction of refineries and other economic centers with the aim of weakening the country's economy and gaining aerial superiority;
9. Providing the Ground and Navy Forces with close aerial support operations; and continued onslaught on armored units of the enemy's ground forces (known as Tank Wars) on a wider scale;
10. Conducting operations for the separation of the battlefield and the bombardment of connecting lines, bridges, depot centers and enemy standby forces stationed in garrisons in Iraqi territory and even operational regions and front lines;
11. Disrupting and stopping the advancement of enemy ground forces, as well as facilitating the alignment of Iranian ground forces against the enemy onslaught during the stabilization phase;
12. designing and implementation of independent aerial operations in the depths of Iraqi territory to the western borders of that country (to the point where was unthinkable for military experts, such as airstrike on Al-Walid Airbases (The H-3 airstrike) on April 4, 1981, which apparently was out of IRIAF fighter bomber aircrafts access;
13. Police and military missions, such as the strike on the al-Dawra refinery near the Non-Aligned Summit in Baghdad on July 21, 1982, in order to insecure the Iraqi space, as well as spread the flyers over major Iraqi cities in the form of soft warfare and psychological operations, as well as counteract operations in response to the cowardly Ba'athist attack on the defenseless people of Iran;
14. Air reconnaissance missions and collect boarding electronic information at anytime and anywhere in enemy territory;
15. Air and naval martial patrol and escort cargo ships and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and the continuation of export of oil and import of basic and industrial goods needed by the country;
16. Carrying out tactical air transportation operations and transfer and spread forces from the farthest parts of Islamic Iran to the operational regions of the south, west and northwest of the country under special conditions up to two or three times and even sometimes up to more than five times
17. Carrying out air fueling and air reconnaissance missions and rescue operations;
18. Active and effective company in all joint operations with other forces of the Army and Revolutionary Guard Corps;
19. Deploying volunteer staff to the Kurdistan region and the war fronts to assist the armed forces of the country;
20. Guard or escort aircrafts (main displacements), civilian aircraft and displacement of high level civilian and military officials;
21. Continuity of the training and supply of specialist and dedicated personnel of the armed forces and commercial air transport of the country with the assignment of experienced pilots (without the assistance of foreign and Arab countries);
22. Participating in the construction Jihad and the initiator of the industrial and technological self-sufficiency jihad in the country and ...;
23. Establish a network of air defense in defense of vital areas and facilities, including: Kharg, Sirri, Lavan, oil and petrochemical refineries, pumping stations, oil platforms in the Persian Gulf, power plants, industrial complexes, political centers of the country, such as Jamaran and ...

These activities, along with the tremendous effects on the battlefields, have always been the subject of attention by the various strata of the society, the patriotic people and the authorities of Islamic Republic of Iran. During the imposed war and after that, the leakage of some negative thoughts both inside and outside the country failed to diminish or eliminate the significant measures taken by the IRIAF. The use of the term “Divine Power” by the late founder of the Islamic system eliminated any ambiguity in the operational capabilities and loyalty of the IRIAF to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, so that the Iranian nation and society more than ever admire the dedication and courage of the IRIAF in line with the interests of the country and the system. Given the importance of the issue and the repeated emphasis of the Supreme Leader and the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolution on the institutionalization and use of the Sacred Defense treasury, there is no doubt that organizing, documenting, systematizing and writing these epics, along with creativity and innovation, self-reliance and pursuing the self-sufficiency Jihad during the glorious period of the Islamic Revolution, and especially the eight years of Sacred Defense is a tremendous task. Undoubtedly, the result of this collective effort will include strategic achievements for enthusiasts, scholars, researchers, curious young people, and future generations. Therefore, I would like to sincerely appreciate the efforts made by the group responsible for writing and compilation of the second volume of “Air Battles in the Sacred Defense” series, the honorable Amirs, Alireza Namaki Iraqi, Dr. Hossein Khalili, and Col. Aliraza Javaheri, who described the process of this volume as “The First Response: A Massive Air Operation in Response to Iraqi Pervasive Attack”; as well as Amir Technical Brigadier general Seyyed Mahmoud Yamini, Amir Brigadier general Dr. Reza Ramezani, Col. Mohsen Mirzakhani, Lieutenant colonel Amir Houshang Khadem Daghegh and Alireza Sharifipour, who worked hard on editing and reading the work. Certainly, this collective effort, with the help of pioneers and witnesses who were directly involved in the victories of the Islamic Revolution, the headquarters and battlefields, as well as the thought of a large number of scholars, experts, and strong support of the Amir of the commanding authority and IRIAF Board of Directors and all the staff deputies has become a coherent and attractive outcome, I express my sincere appreciation to all of these loved ones.

Head of the Center for Strategic Studies;

Gen. Pilot Dr. Nik Bakhsh Habibi

**Introduction**

The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, months before the official launch of the imposed war, was involved in identifying and assessing the enemy's ability simultaneously to confront the aggressions of the Ba'ath regime in Iraq. Although the observation of the enemy's actions and the speed of action eventually led to the overthrow of several Iraqi aggressor planes, in overcoming this difficulty, as it was mentioned in the first volume of this book, Iran also suffered a number of serious incidents some are recited in the following lines:

On June 25, 1980, on one of the air reconnaissance missions, Lieutenant Pilot Gholam Hossein Bastani was martyred and later on September 8, 1980, during the border clashes and confronting the occupation of Khan Lily and Mimak, the first IRIAF, F- 4 aircraft was attacked by an anti-aircraft fire, and the pilot of the rear cabin, Lieutenant Ali Ilkhani, was martyred. Two days later, at the same spot, one IRIAF helicopter was attacked, and in addition to the martyred its pilots (Captain Felizadeh and Lieuten Rashidi), Major Shamsi Beygi, commander of the battalion 31 of Shahid Nogheh military base in Hamadan, who was heading Direct Air Support Center (DASC) was martyred.

Then, on December 18, 1980, Lieutenant Pilot Hossein Lashgari[[3]](#footnote-3) was captured by the enemy and also Capt. Mohammad Zare Nemati was missed and yet no one has received any information from him. Eventually, the IRIAF faced with the full-scale enemy attacks on most air bases, radar stations, and some airports and border towns after a few days of relaxation, on September 22, 1980 at 2.00 PM.

Accordingly, in Volume I, the second edition of the series “Air Battles in the Sacred Defense” was devoted to the IRIAF history, its role in the consolidation of the Islamic Revolution, the pre-war events, all-round measures and defenses against overt and covert invasions of the enemy as well as plane crashes.

The second volume addresses a more detailed description of the hostile aggression, the alert state process in the IRIAF, the arrangement of the enemy air force, study of the status of the command system and major air defense units and the state of the IRIAF equipment and human readiness, as well as full-scale enemy attacks and the operation “First Response” as the supplement to Volume I and the continuation of the reciting of “Air Battles in the Sacred Defense” based on the documentary evidence, organized in the following six chapters, are presented below:

The first chapter represents the air strikes by the enemy, the second chapter is on the alert state process in the IRIAF and the process of Operation Alborz; the third chapter is about the Iraqi Air Force combat capability before the start of full-scale offense; the fourth chapter includes the IRIAF combat and operational capability before the start of the imposed war in two parts: 1- the operational status of the IRIAF Air Defense Command Commander, and 2- The general state of the IRIAF organization prior to the onset of the imposed warfare; Chapter 5, addresses the pre-emptive air strike and to the full –scale Iraqi invasion, and the sixth chapter is about the rigorous operation “First Response”, along with the elaborated and explained summary of the issues.

In the end, it is hoped that this effort, along with the confirmation of the Almighty God, will bring about the satisfaction of the great and noble nation of Iran, as well as bless the enthusiasts of the Air Force's proud operations and all its flight and technical staff, with Divine Success.

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**Chapter 1**

**The Enemy Air Strikes and The Measures taken by The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)**

The current chapter first provides the readers with a brief account concentrating on the implementation of a variety of Air Force combat missions and then the process of Iraqi air raids and signs of war in order to describe the Islamic Republic of Iran airspace and illustrate pre- imposed war atmosphere (especially the western borders of the country).

Then, the reader is provided with air strikes recorded in 1979 and 1980, using valid documents in turn (monthly), along with the continuation of the IRIAF operational activities to discover, identify and deal with them. In addition, each discussion is summed up in Tables and Figures.

The chapter ends up with a record of operational activities and the sortie rates of the IRIAF since the Islamic Revolution (February 12, 1979) to the outbreak of the imposed war (September 22, 1980), including fighter aircrafts, transport aircrafts and helicopters in Tables and Figures.

1. **How combat missions are carried out by the IRIAF**

Here we discuss Offensive Air Raid Missions, Aerial Operations against enemy ground forces and the IRIAF other martial missions in a row:

**A. Offensive Air Raid Operation**

The operation is intended to reduce the attacking or offensive power of the enemy by attacking its air bases, which could include attacking airport aprons (protected and non-protected), fuel tanks, ammunition depots, radar sites and defense systems including missiles and ground-to-air artillery, as well as attacks on gravity centers, vital areas, communication, command and control systems, enemy’s defense forces and infrastructures.

**B. Air Raid Operation against Enemy Ground Forces**

The operation includes Air- to -ground support and air –to- sea support (surface and subterranean) in the form of Close Air Support (CAS) missions, separating the battlefield and interrupting the connecting lines, as well as armed and unarmed reconnaissance executed upon requests by ground forces. The requests executive structure called the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) is comprised of independent headquarters and independent teams, and is a response to the need for ground forces.

Requests are usually anticipated in tactical plans of the ground troops against the enemy and the number of sortie required are responded to by the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) from the bases (some may be unpredictable in the demands of the ground forces, emergency case or with immediate preference). Such requests usually come to targets that appear suddenly in the “scene of operations” and are beyond the reach of ground forces weapons. In general, all requirements are given a positive response if necessary, and a quota may be allocated to them even before the operation.

The ground unit’s requests are responded by the IRIAF fighter-bomber aircrafts fire on the targets or in the form of reconnaissance flights to discern the military arrangement and the enemy's situation. Having set in special forms, requests will be sent to the Direct Air Support Center (DASC). There, analyzed and confirmed requests will be communicated to the bases capable of performing, through the command and control system. In fact, the Air Force's combat missions, being projected by the Force Commander, through the IRIAF command center is communicated to the centers or command post of the operational bases through the command and control system. The deputy for operations of each base, which owns at least two battalions[[4]](#footnote-4) of fighter aircrafts, acts as follows (although at the training bases, one of these battalions may be educational)[[5]](#footnote-5):

1. The base’s command center announces missions to the flight battalion. The operations commander and officer of the battalion, according to the suitability of the mission, select the pilots and execute the mission according to Frag Order. The base deputy of operations also requests the number of aircraft and ammunition according to the order form of the flight deputy and the logistical support for the mission.
2. The operating pilots are being provided with the explanations on how to conduct a mission by the fly leader in the flight briefing room in the pre-flight flying battalion. The flight leader explains all the issues related to the mission and answers all questions[[6]](#footnote-6). The base operations information officer also explains the enemy's defense systems in the mission area on the status map. Flight operator bodies responsible for bombing targets, included at least one battalion of two aircrafts to tens of two to four aircraft battalion of fighter-bomber aircrafts, varying in size depending on combat missions. In sufficient time and before the flight time, the battalion responsible for base maintenance provides the flight battalion with the number of requested aircraft equipped with the required weapons, in accordance with the aircraft's number[[7]](#footnote-7).

having received equipment for the flight (clothing and hat) the operating pilots, at least 45 minutes prior to the take-off, go to the designated parking site, and after the aerial view, sit in the cabin, start the aircraft and receive signs of the correct airplane status (motors, levels of equipment orders, ammunition, etc.) and declare their readiness to take off to flight leader using airplane radio. At the right time (usually a few minutes before the take-off), the flight leader informs the tower about flight readiness to take off from the runway by radio communication or the lamp sign. The tower issues permission to fly having coordinated and analyzed all the related aspects and the mission begins.

4- Shortly after take-off and, if necessary, the flight leader communicates with radar sites (based on the route); sometimes flight is made in full radio silence (avoiding surprise attacks or non-disclosure of the mission). Upon reaching the target, the flying group executes its mission in accordance with the clarified tactic, and then returns to the base based the previous arrangements.

It is worth mentioning that, in case of refueling required prior to reaching the target or after the mission completion, then, as explained above, air fueling operations would be carried out in the area in question, and the aircraft would eventually land while is in a radio contact with the tower. Having piloted and parked the aircrafts (at the place designated by the battalion), the pilots turn off the fighters and exit the cabin. Pilots fill up the aircraft form to record any trouble reported during a flight, the maintenance battalion will immediately remedy the defects so that aircrafts are prepared for the next flight.

5- Having returned to the flight battalion, the pilots will again attend the justification meeting and review the execution of the mission by the flight leader.

This meeting is necessary to evaluate and compare the conduct of the mission with the first session. Unpredictable issues, emergency situations and how to respond to them, and ultimately test and error prevention (in next flights) and gain valuable operational experience are the main points of the meeting. Finally, a mission report is sent to the Command Line. In execution of immediate requests, the aircraft with equipment and ammunition is in standby on its base to take off in 5, 10 and 15 minutes’ flight upon the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) order.

The same process is followed for all fighters and transport flights in combat and combat support missions. Air Force transport missions are also carried out in line with the inherent missions of the force (including air fueling, collecting signaling information from the target area, Air Force logistic support, or offshore missions such as logistic support for ground forces and operating troops). The procedure for implementation, if approved by the deputy for operations (in the same way as the fighter aircrafts), will be carried out on behalf of the Transportation Directorate of the deputy for operations, in the air transport battalion, under the auspices of the Air Transport Operations Deputy Commander and, ultimately, the Commander of the Base.

**C - Air Defense**

This type of operation is designed to defend against air strikes, enemy aircrafts and missiles, which can be air-based or ground-based air defense. All Combat Air Patrol missions, aerial escorts, aerial interception, electronic protection or anti-electronic measures, cleaning operations, and so on can be named as basic air defense missions.

Therefore, the instructions for conducting the IRIAF missions and support for combat operations, such as: air fueling, aerial transport, electronic reconnaissance of air surveillance, search and rescue, are communicated to the relevant bases by the air force deputy for operations.

Of course, in the course of the Islamic Revolution and the Sacred Defense, some missions were carried out directly through the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and directed by the IRIAF, but support missions were provided by the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) which were established in line with the Alborz Battle Plan in Kermanshah, Urmia, Ahvaz, and so on. Operating units such as:

* TAB 1 – Mehrabad International Airport Airbase for reconnaissance flights using "Araf-4" and "Arraf-5" aircrafts as well as transportation and fueling aircraft;
* TAB 2 – Tabriz Air Base, TAB 3 – Shahrokhi Air Base (Hamadan Mil), TAB 4 – Vahdati Air Base (Dezful), TAB 6 – Bushehr Airport, and ... To support the required fire of ground units using fighter –bomber aircrafts- F-4 and F-5;
* TAB 7 – Shiraz International Airport and TAB 8 – Isfahan International Airport bases using F-14 interceptor aircraft for escorting and providing air cover or Combat Air Patrol;
* TAB 1 – Mehrabad International Airport and TAB 7 – Shiraz International Airport, using the C-130s, F-27 and, if necessary, Boeing-707 and 747, provided transport communications missions. Of course, intelligence information missions were carried out with the special "IC-130" aircraft, known as the "Bat", from TAB 1 – Mehrabad International Airport, Transport Base and the Marine reconnaissance missions were carried using the P-3D surveillance aircraft located at Shiraz International Airport Transportation Base.

It should be recalled that in carrying out some missions, such as aerial photography, several aircrafts (other than targeting groups) joined from other bases to complete the mission. These missions were often carried out with the presence of fueling aircrafts, interceptors, collecting signal information (Bat), and so on. The coordination was also directed by the air force deputy for operations, under the operational command of the bases (coordinated with the command of the air defense and other systems). At runtime, communication between aircrafts was usually established through the command and control system of the air force.

At the end of this discussion, it should be noted that in the implementation of various combat missions, the air force is less dependent on the commander (compared with ground forces, armored personnel carriers, etc.), and basically the pilots and other professionals, in harmony with the advanced aeronautical equipment contributes to the realization of operational activities, which is one of the characteristics of the air force and distinguishes it from other forces in critical circumstances, which enables rapid response missions. This attribute is one of the important reasons that made it possible to immediately act against the enemy in the very early days of the war.

**2- The process of Iraqi invasions to the Islamic Republic of Iran Territory and signs of war**

On April 2, 1979, 50 days after the Islamic Revolution victory, the city of Mehran was bombed by the Iraqi Air Force. The next day, a group of Iraqi Ba’ath army raided Qasr-e Shirin, inflicted casualties on the local population. Also, on April 7, 1979, the Iraqi Ba'ath Army fired Artillery on the oil fields of this city.

Although, provoked the conflicts in the border areas especially in the western part and, to a lesser extent, the Khuzestan province slowed down the Iraqi air raids, while the Iraqi air force raids once again intensified by uncovering the conspiracies, in particular, the plot for the coup “Naghab” in July 1979 to blame The Divine Air Force by Bakhtiar-Saddam ominous and humiliating alliance, and the consistency of the new Islamic system. Eventually, at 14:00 on September 22, 1980, the Ba'ath military mass airstrike against most of the air bases, a number of radar stations, as well as some of the border towns and airports of the country led to the outbreak of an eight-year war of attrition!

This chapter presents the examples of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime's attacks on our country territory prior to the mass attacks (in accordance with Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force reports) in detail and on a daily basis. The chapter includes the first Iraqi invasion from April 1979 to the issuance of the first official announcement of Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army about Iraqi Ba'ath mass militant invasion and in the end of chapter the data is summarized all in relevant Tables and Figures:

**A. Iraqi Air Strikes and the Measures Taken by the IRIAF on 1979-1980**

This discussion presents the main Iraqi Ba'ath regime's Air Strikes as well as the Measures taken by the IRIAF on 1979-1980 to prevent, detect, identify and confront Air Strikes as follows:

According to the IRIAF official documents, the first Iraqi air raid to the air borders of our country was reported only two months after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, on April 12, 1979 1358, through the Dezful radar, with the target disappeared from radar before the interception.

Subsequently, according to a report filed by the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Third Administration Office, on May 1, the Iraqi Air Force launched a C combat state of alert at air bases. Two weeks later, on May 16, at 21:43, an Iraqi aircraft was observed at an altitude of 1,800 feet, at 360 nats, 45 miles west of Ahwaz, that immediately a F-4 aircraft from Hamedan Airbase was straightened out and scrambled to track Iraqi aggressor aircraft.

At this point of time, scattered Iraqi flights and sometimes airstrikes of Iraqi aircrafts on the Iran sky continued to persist until the first strike with aerial bombardments, as a sign of a flagrant violation of the principles of cooperation between the two neighboring countries, took place. On June 4, 1979, in an unexpected event, the defenseless villages of the west of the country (along with the crisis in some Kurdish regions) were targeted by a number of Iraqi aggressor aircrafts and wounded a number of indigenous inhabitants from the villages “Kani Zar”, “Tuzhal” and “Dasht-e-Kipeh”, on West Azerbaijan province.

Since the radar system of Tabriz, due to technical limitations, did not observe any targets in its field of activity, it seemed that the attack was:

(1) With the previous design, aircrafts flew at low altitudes to ensure Iraqi pilots' skills in targeting, releasing ammunition and in general assessing the process of tracking Iranian border radars at the low altitudes as well as weaknesses,

(2) It could be the beginning of subsequent enemy attacks to other parts of the country. However, with the continuation of the strikes and suspicious movements of the Iraqi Air Force, on June 11, the order to be on the state of alert with continuous flights (Combat Air Patrol) was commanded to TAB 2 – Tabriz Air Base, TAB 3 – Shahrokhi Air Base (Hamadan Mil) and TAB 4 – Vahdati Air Base (Dezful) with a precautionary approach (who should stand against the enemy). This measure and the operational decision are documented as follows:

* In accordance with the orders of Major General Khosravi (Air Force deputy), to the commanders of Shahrokhi (Hamedan), Tabriz and Vahdati (Dezful) Bases the number of aircrafts on the state of alert sorties doubled with border patrols started from June 11, 1979 on.

Accordingly, The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) Deputy of Operations communicated “Combat Air Patrol” missions in the west of the country from the second, third and fourth airbases (Tabriz, Hamedan and Dezful, respectively) from Sunrise to Sunset in the form of two aircrafts consisting of a fighter F-5, and the single-fighter F-4, followed by a command as:

* At General Kimiyagar command, it was decided that an Alert aircraft always flies.

In spite of the precautionary measures taken by The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) Deputy of Operations, the Iraqi Air Force continued its threats and strikes during the night, as well as distributing flyers and leaflets and bombardment of some defensive border villages during the day, some of which are referred to below:

1) According to the report of the Air Defense Operation Center officer of shift, at 22:32 (June 12, 1979), an Iraqi aircraft flew into Iran territory to a depth of 15 kilometers at a speed of 420 nats at an altitude of 18,000 feet from Iraq, and progressed up to 12 Miles to Dehloran Radar site and then returned to Iraq. A scramble flight followed the invading aircraft and the operation stopped because the invading aircraft left Iran territory.

2) Two Iraqi aircrafts distributed flyers in the border areas of Kurdistan from 14:00 to 15:00 on June 12, 1979, reading “if Jalall Talabani men are being resettled in Iranian border homes, they will be bombarded”. The IRIAF radars have also been able to detect hostile aircrafts.

3) According to the Marivan Barracks, several Iraqi aircrafts bombarded Iran-Iraqi border region: “Kani mast”. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government called troops stationed at the Pejman and Garmak around Panjwin at the state of alert and distributed flyers on the Paveh and Nawsud by helicopter.

4) At 21:00 the same day, an Iraqi MiG crossed the border of Bastam on high-altitude and returned to Iraqi territory.

5) Two Iraqi aircrafts flew over Iran at 9:00 on June 13, 1979 through Shiller and distributed flyers on this subject: "The region will be bombarded at any point in Iran's territory, if Kurds Peshmerga will be seen there."

6) Also on June 14, 1979 the Iraqi Air Force bombarded the outbound fronts of Anjire, Neh Khazar, and Helela in the west and south of the country.

The above events indicate that, in addition to increasing the enemy's air movement and violating the borders of our country, the Ba'ath regime, with the previous planning, on the one hand, distributed flyers in the Kurdistan border regions, supported the counter-revolutionary forces and, on the other hand, threatened the Jallal Talibani and his men in attempt to eliminate their opponents and pave the way for a major attack. Inevitably, the IRIAF managed in its operational plan a limited number of Combat Air Patrol flights and included five sorties of the Scramble flights to identify, counteract, and repel threats.

It should be recalled that in carrying out some missions, such as aerial photography, several aircrafts (other than targeting groups) joined from other bases to complete the mission. These missions were often carried out with the presence of fueling aircrafts, interceptors, collecting signal information (Bat), and so on. The coordination was also directed by the air force deputy for operations, under the operational command of the bases (coordinated with the command of the air defense and other systems). At runtime, communication between aircrafts was usually established through the command and control system of the air force.

At the end of this discussion, it should be noted that in the implementation of various combat missions, the air force is less dependent on the commander (compared with ground forces, armored personnel carriers, etc.), and basically the pilots and other professionals, in harmony with the advanced aeronautical equipment contributes to the realization of operational activities, which is one of the characteristics of the air force and distinguishes it from other forces in critical circumstances, which enables rapid response missions. This attribute is one of the important reasons that made it possible to immediately act against the enemy in the very early days of the war.

However, a week after the air force's pre-emptive action and the continuation of Combat Air Patrol missions, the Iraqi Ba'ath regime stopped its ongoing threats and aggressions in an unexpected and suspicious event. This suspicious activity and other threats of the enemy were not taken seriously and were not even considered by the responsible authorities (Army and State Officials) and, like many events after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, were overlooked due to current obstacles; however, politically it implied that tensions between the two countries have redlved in particular from Iraq, and probably the enemy has retreated from its position. Therefore, at the end of the night of June 18, 1979, the order was issued to the IRIAF to stop night CAP flights[[8]](#footnote-8).

Of course, some analysts, in the light of the aforementioned, raise the question: How could such an unfounded analysis be of a kind? Is it an enemy who, by spending a lot of financial expense, obtaining valuable military information from the anti-revolutionary fugitives, providing counsel and arms assistance to rebel groups in Kurdistan, and forcing Iran's political involvement into Iraq's affairs following a major invasion into a neighbor's soil retreat from its position so easy?

Since a series of political reasons is involved in justifying the issue and their examination is inconsistent with the purposes for which this book was written, it is in this context that here the book refrains from discussing this topic and leaves final conclusions to scholars of this field and to those who are interested in.

But from the operational aspect, it should be said that apparently after a two-month-long tranquility on the borders, again on September 5, 1979, F-4 fighter aircrafts in Hamedan Airbase were deployed on combat mission as alert in the air to prevent the entry of tanks and armored vehicles of the Ba'ath regime into the borders of Iran. We will review the mission statement:

* A request was made for a F-4 armed aircraft to detect a number of tanks and military vehicles moved on the Sardasht-Qale Dize in Iraq, in which case defensive action would be taken. The command was communicated to Hamadan Airbase for execution.

We will continue to review some other documents on October- November[[9]](#footnote-9):

1. At 01:30 AM on October 31, 1979, an aircraft at a speed of 420 nautical miles and a flight altitude of 30,000 feet entered the sky of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the Beifa region in Iraq against the Achaemenid city of Ahwaz.
2. According to a report by the IRIAF Command Center on November 16, 1979, a request was made for "air support" to cover the six ships of Navy of Islamic Republic of Iran Army (NEDAJA), Region 1, as well as seafaring operations throughout the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea.

- In the meantime, since November 1979, as a result of increased air threats and even the navy of the Iraqi Army in the southern regions of the country, officially pilot officers traveled to the command centers of the NEDAJA and the first regions (Bandar Abbas), the second (Bushehr) and the third (Khorramshahr). Having entered, the requests were made for reconnaissance from ​​Arvandroud reigion, the aerial imaging by the RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft of Iraqi units based in Amel-Qasr, Basra, and other Persian Gulf regions, indicating continued suspicious movements of the Iraq regime and its domestic mercenaries in Khuzestan.

The Ba'athist regime seemed to have used the good opportunities that the political currents of the revolution in the Islamic Republic of Iran had created to best serve the assessment of the conditions and fulfillment of their intentions.

On Sunday, November 4, the US embassy in Tehran was occupied by students following the Imam's route, and the next day, Bazargan submitted his resignation to Imam Khomeini[[10]](#footnote-10). Iraq, which closely monitored Iran's political changes, has recognized the situation and added to its aggression process.

Basically, October 23 to November 21 may be taken into account as one of the most important time periods for analyzing the crisis situation in the two countries' relations. Since the very same time period, that the signs of war could have been seen, but its alarm and warnings events did not stimulate any action by decision-making athourities; including Iraqi government announced the need to review Algiers Agreement on October 30, and 11 months before the formal termination of Algiers Agreement.

After the incident of the US embassy occupation in Tehran, the Iraqi ambassador to Beirut in an interview with the newspaper Al-Nahar said, “the Agreement must be reformed and Iran must voluntarily return to us all Iraqi rights in Shatt al-Arab[[11]](#footnote-11)”.

Subsequently, the Ba'ath political leaders assured on one hand that the United States has cut off its support for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular the logistical support of the army and the IRIAF (due to the depth of dependency), so with more boldness completed their planning and increased air strikes.

On the other hand, the Iranian Air Force considers the impending attack on the country's sky as definite and, accordingly, revises previous plans and formulates the “Operation Alborz” plan. Of course, the revision of the above mentioned plan was important because some of the contents of previous plans were not compatible with the Islamic Republic's defense strategy, and the necessity of localizing its provisions with the principles and rules of war and defense in an Islamic country was necessary.

However, the air force, though faced with many domestic and extra-organizational problems (and, of course, with the backing of valuable experiences from the events of the past few decades), was still seeking to achieve the following objectives, since focusing on these issues could have provided the Air Force with a defensive mission patroling the sky of the country and holding the territory of the noble nation of Islamic Iran:

* Achieve optimal operational conditions and maintain combat readiness through the continuity of educational flights by fulfilling minimum flight requirements;
* Organize the critical process of aircraft maintenance with regard to the departure of advisers and the lack of supplies and spare parts;
* Eliminate air defense challenges, especially in the field of radar systems coverage
* Regular review of Operation Alborz for designing detailed commands;
* Cope with the challenge of discharged officers and experienced pilots, and re-employment of some of them.

- Bearing the aforementioned in mind, here are some Iraqi Air Force air strikes recorded on February 20, 1980 to March 19, 1980:

1. According to the report of the border guard of Qasr Shirin, at 12:30, on February 21, 1980, an olive colored Iraqi aircraft was seen flying at very low altitude over the southeast of Khosravi checkpoint to the "Durandi Yuk" checkpoint, which apparently intended at reconnaissance and taking images of the region. Thus, the objections were stated to the relevant Iraqi authorities.

- Accordingly, Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army in the letter No. 227 on February 21, 1980 communicated the Air Force to report air defense measures taken and emphasized: "If the Air Force does not react strongly, the raids will continue." The above steps were notified to the Air Defense Command.

2. At 15:10, a suspicious aircraft on the Iraq-Iran border line raided Iran, and at 15:22 the same day (February 21) two F-5s from the fourth base were commanded to scramble, but the target disappeared from the radar, and the aircrafts returned to the base. It was announced to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the end of this discussion, in a general conclusion, it should be emphasized that: First, with the latest reports registered at the Army Headquarters Office (Major General Officers) on January 30, 1979, in the wake of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iraq was planning to strengthen its air force including the following activities:

“Recently, the Iraqi Air Force (Strengthening its units) has built and exploited a new base in the Zubair region.”

Second, according to the report of Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Headquarters under the title "raid" from March 21, 1979 to June 21, 1979[[12]](#footnote-12) , the following combat readiness actions were taken by the Iraqi Air Force, which included the establishment of a strategic plot against the Islamic Revolution and the emerging IRI system:

* Establishing and strengthening several bases in the eastern border regions and establishing the Air Reconnaissance Information System;
* Announced the state of alert at Kut Air Base (late March 1979);
* Strengthening Shuibei Air Base (late March 1979);
* Announced the state of alert and practicing and shooting with real ammunition by the 145th and 195th brigades of Surface to Air Missile (SAM) (March - April 1979);
* Carry out air maneuvers in Habbaniyah (March 26, 1979);
* Announced the state of alert to all Iraqi Air Force personnel (March 28 and 31, 1979);
* Announced the state of alert to Marine Corps Air Station in Basra (June 5, 1979).

In response to the above-mentioned measures and to prevent surprises attacks of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime to the western borders of the country, as indicated by the date June 4, 1979 records, the IRIAF command system started Combat Air Patrol flights in the border lines and doubled the number of ready-to-combat aircrafts in the bases adjacent to the western borders, such as the Hamedan Air Base since June 11, 1979 on, which ultimately apparently, put an end to the Iraqi army's air strikes.

Third, from June 24, to March1979, the Iraq air strikes on the Iranian sky continued. These flights, apparently aimed at reconnaissance and assessing the IRIAF defensive power ended in short time due to proximity to the border regions. Obviously, the rapid and effective response to the enemy's aggression was not apparent due to the lack of continued flying of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts (as Combat Air Patrols), as well as the lack of clear instructions for air defense systems (for tracking, reconnaissance and destroying targets).

Here we do not want to recall what has happened, but to attract the attention of interested people to the fact that the IRIAF from the beginning of 1979 despite the weakening of its command system and its hierarchy and other problems, including operational and logistics deficiencies was ready to dispose of enemy aggression, and operating instructions was the methods of interception and engagement with aggressive aircrafts, but the revolutionary atmosphere of the ruling state was such that the threats of the enemy were not taken seriously and, consequently, the power to act and make decisive decisions were somehow out of the IRIAF hands. Even Iraq's action in confusing the international community's minds with the Iranian hostile attitudes and intervention has not been able to capture the views of the country's political officials on the capabilities of the IRIAF (in the reduction of the crisis).

Therefore, valuable opportunities that could have at least be preventive (deterrence) disappeared easily so that the ambitious leader of Iraq would take bigger and more secure steps towards his aggressive intentions.

Hence, the IRIAF defensive and usual measures not only did not create fears at the heart of the Iraqi Ba'ath's autocrats, but did not deserve the powerful air force of a revolutionary country.

Accordingly, there is a list of enemy air strikes from March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1980 and is depicted in Table 1-1 and Figures 1-1 and 1-2, as well.

Table 1-1. Iraqi Ba'ath regime air strikes on the Islamic Republic of Iran territory from March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1980

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| March 21, 1979 to April 20, 1979 | April 21, 1979 to May 21, 1979 | May 22, 1979 to June 21, 1979 | June 22, 1979 to July 22, 1979 | July 23, 1979 to August 22, 1979 | August 23, 1979 to September 22, 1979 | September 23, 1979 to October 22, 1979 | October 23, 1979 to November 21, 1979 | November 22, 1979 to December 21, 1979 | December 22, 1979 to January 20, 1980 | January 21, 1980 to February 19, 1980 | February 20, 1980 to March 20, 1980 |
| 4 | 6 | 15 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 11 |

Figure 1-1: Iraqi Ba'ath regime air atrikes from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1979





Figure 2-1. Iraqi Ba'ath regime air atrikes from September 23, 1979 to March 19, 1980



It is worth mentioning that Tables and Figures of the Ba'ath army's dispersed raids to Iran territory have been presented at the end of this chapter.

**B. Air strikes and the IRIAF measures from March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980**

Since March 21, 1980, the Iraqi air threats and raids, along with some dismal and suspicious air movements from the Marxist regime of Afghanistan in the east and the movements of the United States in the south, appeared to be purposeful. On April 27, 1980, following the events of Tabas (May 25th), a seemingly Iraqi passenger aircraft (Antonov-12), which crossed the boundary line of "Horalouchi" and entered the Iranian sky, was intercepted by two Air Force F-5 aircrafts, and their occupants were arrested after the forced landing.

Given the importance of the subject and to the knowledge of readers and researchers, the crystallization and demonstration of Iraqi air raids from March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980 and the IRIAF command and control system measures in discovering, reconnaissance, neutralizing and preventing or counteracting (using available documents at the headquarters offices of the IRIAF and SEMAJA[[13]](#footnote-13) and other authoritative sources), are presented as the following. In the end, the monthly summary and the events are also presented, in the form of relevant Tables and Figures.

- March 21, 1980 to April 20, 1980

- Since March 21, 1980, the Iraqi air strikes became more serious and according to recorded documents the following threats and raids by the enemy were recored and appropriate measures were taken to deal with them:

- On April 1, 14, 17 and 18 the number of five aircrafts violated the sky of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

- On April 7, 1980, the first Iraqi air strike took place at the Bahram Abad customs in the city of Mehran. Since then, the dispersed and often unimportant encounters that have always been neglected turned into heavy clashes that were not only studied and analyzed, but also slightly increased the scope and depth of these encounters.

It should be noted that on the same day (April 7, 1980), after the apparent aggressions of the Iraq Ba'ath regime to Iran, The Islamic Republic of Iran Army went on the state of alert. The state of alert took a more serious form in the following days, and sometimes faced tactical combat operations. For example:

Vahdati Air Base (Dezful) reported from Abadan Air tower that at 23:10 pm, three helicopters were heading from Basra to Ahwaz. In the state of alert aircrafts scrambled from the Sixth Air Base (due to F-5 flight restrictions in Dezful at night), but did not see any particular case. In this regard, a HAWK missile was fired by air defense toward targets.

Basically, October 23 to November 21 may be taken into account as one of the most important time periods for analyzing the crisis situation in the two countries' relations. Since the very same time period, that the signs of war could have been seen, but its alarm and warnings events did not stimulate any action by decision-making authorities; including Iraqi government announced the need to review Algiers Agreement on October 30, and 11 months before the formal termination of Algiers Agreement.

After the incident of the US embassy occupation in Tehran, the Iraqi ambassador to Beirut in an interview with the newspaper Al-Nahar said, “the Agreement must be reformed and Iran must voluntarily return to us all Iraqi rights in Shatt al-Arab[[14]](#footnote-14)”.

In the latter case, the gradual entry of the IRIAF into the realm of conflict was more tangible, and five days after the announcement of the general state of alert of the Army (from April 7, 1980), and receiving the following report, SEMAJA issued a new decision to the Air Force:

"Following the attack of an Iraqi fighter aircraft from the Somayeh base on Iran's territory and reconnaissance of several wells and two oil units, the Air Force issued to conduct armed reconnaissance (as requested by SEMAJA) on a daily basis at 10:00 to 11:00 and 15:00 to 16:00, with the F-4 aircraft from Shahrokhi Airbase on Qasr-e Shirin  border line and one F-5 from the Vahdat base (Dezful) on the Khorramshahr border line and report the data and the result. "

It is noteworthy that, on March 21, 1980, according to the report No. 2/02/29/1701 by Dehloran radar station, Iraq has deployed a number of aircraft hangars and aircraft replicas at Shiyabeh, Nasiriyah and Habbaniyah Airbases protected by anti-aircraft as the false target.

April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980

Since April 21 to May 18, 1980, suspected Iraqi air raids on Iran sky followed a special arrangement. Increasing reconnaissance flights and gradually expanded the air strikes to our countries sky that crossed the border and penetrated into the depths of the country clearly signaled the development of a targeted scenario and an organized plan of action. From the operational and technical point of view, one can ask the question of what was the majority of these flights for or, in general, what they aimed?

This meeting is necessary to evaluate and compare the conduct of the mission with the first session. Unpredictable issues, emergency situations and how to respond to them, and ultimately test and error prevention (in next flights) and gain valuable operational experience are the main points of the meeting. Finally, a mission report is sent to the Command Line. In execution of immediate requests, the aircraft with equipment and ammunition is in standby on its base to take off in 5, 10 and 15 minutes’ flight upon the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) order.

The same process is followed for all fighters and transport flights in combat and combat support missions. Air Force transport missions are also carried out in line with the inherent missions of the force (including air fueling, collecting signaling information from the target area, Air Force logistic support, or offshore missions such as logistic support for ground forces and operating troops). The procedure for implementation, if approved by the deputy for operations (in the same way as the fighter aircrafts), will be carried out on behalf of the Transportation Directorate of the deputy for operations, in the air transport battalion, under the auspices of the Air Transport Operations Deputy Commander and, ultimately, the Commander of the Base.

One of the common and effective methods of conducting air strikes on the land of the target country (without loss or the minimum possible casualties of their forces and equipment) is to assess the response of the enemy air force and the strength of its propulsion systems. In the first volume of the series, it has been repeatedly emphasized that Iraqi commanders possessed relatively comprehensive information on combat readiness and airborne capabilities of the Iranian Air Force. But in practice, more tangible measures were needed to verify this information. Offensive flights could have played an important role for Iraq in a full-scale attack from two perspectives.

First, the assessment of the Iranian Air Force defensive system and reaction to the presence of enemy fighters (from the source base to the distances in the border regions)

Second, the analysis of public opinion especially residents of the border regions, from Iraqi air raids and the possibility of engaging in an inclusive war

In spite of the above, the most important event of April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980 must be sought on the fourth and seventh flights of this period of time. We overlook the fourth event of this period of time, because the Volume I provided the detailed "Tabas events". The only remarkable thing is the propaganda of the landing of American aircrafts in Tabas with the aim of weakening or destroying the image of the IRIAF in the country, which had left its mischief long in the minds of the public.

But the April 27, 1980 incident can be analyzed in some ways. On this day, an Iraqi aircraft (carrying a number of passengers) crossed the southwest border until it was intercepted by air force fighters at Vahdati Air Base.

How this aircraft was able to manage to penetrate to this distance still unknown, but the remarkable point of this event is the decisive performance of the IRIAF on landing the aircraft and the detainment of the occupants, indicating the vigilance and speed of the air force in implementing preventive missions.

The above events indicate that, in addition to increasing the enemy's air movement and violating the borders of our country, the Ba'ath regime, with the previous planning, on the one hand, distributed flyers in the Kurdistan border regions, supported the counter-revolutionary forces and, on the other hand, threatened the Jallal Talibani and his men in attempt to eliminate their opponents and pave the way for a major attack. Inevitably, the IRIAF managed in its operational plan a limited number of Combat Air Patrol flights and included five sorties of the Scramble flights to identify, counteract, and repel threats.

It should be recalled that in carrying out some missions, such as aerial photography, several aircrafts (other than targeting groups) joined from other bases to complete the mission. These missions were often carried out with the presence of fueling aircrafts, interceptors, collecting signal information (Bat), and so on. The coordination was also directed by the air force deputy for operations, under the operational command of the bases (coordinated with the command of the air defense and other systems). At runtime, communication between aircrafts was usually established through the command and control system of the air force.

At the end of this discussion, it should be noted that in the implementation of various combat missions, the air force is less dependent on the commander (compared with ground forces, armored personnel carriers, etc.), and basically the pilots and other professionals, in harmony with the advanced aeronautical equipment contributes to the realization of operational activities, which is one of the characteristics of the air force and distinguishes it from other forces in critical circumstances, which enables rapid response missions. This attribute is one of the important reasons that made it possible to immediately act against the enemy in the very early days of the war.

However, a week after the air force's pre-emptive action and the continuation of Combat Air Patrol missions, the Iraqi Ba'ath regime stopped its ongoing threats and aggressions in an unexpected and suspicious event. This suspicious activity and other threats of the enemy were not taken seriously and were not even considered by the responsible authorities (Army and State Officials) and, like many events after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, were overlooked due to current obstacles; however, politically it implied that tensions between the two countries have redlved in particular from Iraq, and probably the enemy has retreated from its position. Therefore, at the end of the night of June 18, 1979, the order was issued to the IRIAF to stop night CAP flights[[15]](#footnote-15).

However, in the military atmosphere and uncertainties of the time, the IRIAF did not hesitate to intercept this anonymous aircraft and, having relied on its inherent responsibility, did not miss the moment to watch and protect the sky of the country. The monitoring of the borders of the country was not limited to Western borders. At the same time, in addition to the "Tabas events," the occasional and racial attacks of the Marxist regime in Afghanistan were also on the agenda of the Air Force designers, which are detailed in the previous volume. The following is a brief summary of the upsurge in the Iraqi Air Force attaks and the IRIAF speed to intercept Iraqi aggressor aircrafts:

1. In the aftermath of the aggressions and movements of the enemy in the southwest of the country, on April 22, 1980, a F-5 aircraft was deployed from the Vahdati Airbase (Dezful) to conduct reconnaissance of the Khorramshahr boundary line, which, the pilot on after flight report announced that there was no military activity from Dehloran to the road to Abadan, but from the road to Abadan to 15 miles from Khorramshahr there was extensive enemy movements in the form of presence of two tanks and one armoured personnel carrier in every 5 miles.
2. At 03:20, 03:55 and 04:20, dated April 27, 1980, unknown aircraft were observed at an altitude of 2200 feet in the sky of Abadan and was shot at by an artillery battery stationed at the refinery.
3. On the same day (April 27, 1980), a GPS-11 radar system was expanded to Chabahar in order to observe the possible re-entry of US forces, while eastern borders of the country were twice attaked by Afghan aircrafts.
4. At 11:00 am on April 27, 1980, an unidentified transport aircraft (Iraqi) flew in the Susangerd sky and was found near the Dezful Airbase. The aircraft was intercepted by two F-5E [[16]](#footnote-16) and a number of fighter aircrafts from the Dehloran radar and compelled to land. The seven passengers were sent to Tehran to be inspected by (the second-office of Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army).

**Further Details**:

1 - The documents of the Air Defense Command on the compulsory landing of the Iraqi aggressor aircraft read:

At 06:35 on April 27, 1980 in Greenwich Mean Time at 11:05 local time[[17]](#footnote-17), a target appeared on Dezful's radar screen, which Dezfoul's "Control and Reporting Center" also confirms. Two armed F-5s scrmmbled on warning alarm of the suspicious target were given warnings on the Guard communication channel[[18]](#footnote-18).

F-5 aircrafts, with repeated warning, tryed to drive the aggressor aircrafts (which belonged to Iraq) to one of the nearby airports (the Dezful or civilian Ahwaz airport) whose pilot does not comply with the order. Then, the fire command was given to Tiger aircrafts[[19]](#footnote-19) and the leader pilot fired. The Iraqi aircraft forced to land on a flat ground 98 miles from the fourth base on a radial of 190 degrees from the base, and all seven of its passengers were arrested. The incident comes at a time when Iraqi air force fighters continuously aircrew the aircraft and at the last minute they have also planned to engage in air strikes with F-5s that fail[[20]](#footnote-20).



Image 1-1 the Iraqi "Antonov-12"

The country's media broadcasted: “on April 27an Iraqi aircraft (Antonov-12) entered Iran's sky through the border line of The Hawizeh Marshes and was intercepted by two F-5 interceptor fighter aircrafts. The Iraqi pilot defied the F-5 fighter aircraft on landing in Iran, faced with Iranian machine gun strike. Part of the right wing of the aircraft was shut down and damaged, and the pilot eventually landed the aircraft and its occupants were all arrested.”

1. Although the purpose of this piece of writing is to draw the offense of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime's army, but for the sake of greater awareness of readers and scholars, another example of aggression has been presented in the foregoing. At the same time, the air force was faced with the threats of the Ba'ath regime and the dependent mercenaries and counterrevolutionaries in the west of the country, along with the US threats and even the ruling Marxist regime in Afghanistan (the former USSR). In fact, the general expectation at that time was to respond to all possible threats against the country. In the following, some of the enemy's aggression has been described:

* On April 28, 1980 the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. The ground force reported at 2:00 PM that two MiG-fighter aircrafts were raided in Iran and fled into Iraqi after being identified as Iraqi aircraft.
2. At 22:15, a helicopter raided the Iran sky, which flew away being fired by military forces stationed at Abadan airport with several firing bombs.

* On April 29, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. According to the report of the gendarmerie about the forced landing of an Iraqi airaircraft carried out by the Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran; Iraqi aircrafts are constantly flown over the checkpoint (where the aircraft landed) and harassed the agents.

* On May 6, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. At 10:38, two in a state of alert F-5s flew from Vahdati Airbase (Dezful). The target was detected by a radar station in the southwest, which disappeared after the scramble flight, and the aircrafts continued on Combat Air Patrol.
2. According to the report of the Gendarmerie of of the Islamic Republic of Iran at 12:15, an Iraqi waraircraft appeared at low altitude on the Dehloran city and soon returned to Iraqi territory.
3. The Gendarmerie of of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced to the IRIAF that at 21:00, three aircrafts flying around Arvandroud were shot by the guards.
4. The Shahrbani of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported that at 02:40, forces stationed at the Abadan airport fired an unidentified aircraft that had violated Iran's sky, which immediately left the region.

* On May 8, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. At 21:00 on May 8, 1980, three aircrafts flew near the Arvandrood (around Abadan) which were shot by the border guards.
2. According to the gendarmerie information, at 04:30, on May 10, 1980, an Iraqi aircraft entered Shalamcheh sky in Khorramshahr, which were shot by officers and forced to return to the country.
3. At 04:20 on May 13, 1980, two Iraqi aircrafts entered Iran sky from the Khorramshahr region, which were forced to flee by the shooting of the coastal artillery.
4. According to the published news, from midnight on May 15, 1980 to the morning of May 16, 1980, five foreign reconnaissanceaircrafts crossing the Karmshahr border violated Iran's sky, which were forced to leave the region by the Iranian forces fire.
5. The Navy reported that at 03:14, 03:30 and 04:00 an unidentified aircraft was found near the Khorramshahr naval base that was shot, but was not hit due to the high flight altitude.
6. An unidentified jet was also seen at 11:00 by the Qasr-e Shirincentral police station (Ilam district) over the border line (Anjire border crossing). The State Department and the Air Force were informed.
7. At about 03:00, an Iraqi aircraft violated Iran's sky and was forced to leave the region by an anti-aircraft at the airport in Abadan[[21]](#footnote-21).

Note: Coincident with the US forces strike and after their failure in the Tabas desert, the Iraqi Ba'ath militant air raids have been rising and recorded more frequently. In turn, this trick was to divert the current operational focus and air defense systems toward the West and observe the movements of Iraq, and could in some way be the first indirect, unwritten cooperation of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime with world arrogance.

Turning to the process of suspicious movements and frequent air violations by various means to the borders and privacy of the country (comprehensive support for the counter-revolutionaries in the West and planning for a plot "Naghab" for the overthrow of the new system of Iran), the need to respond was inevitable to discover and defuse the leading threats by the armed forces of the country in particular the IRIAF. But a general overview of the events this month shows that the border regions have been undergoing a relatively quiet transition from August 23, 1980 to September 6, 1980.

In response to the above-mentioned measures and to prevent surprises attacks of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime to the western borders of the country, as indicated by the date June 4, 1979 records, the IRIAF command system started Combat Air Patrol flights in the border lines and doubled the number of ready-to-combat aircrafts in the bases adjacent to the western borders, such as the Hamedan Air Base since June 11, 1979 on, which ultimately apparently, put an end to the Iraqi army's air strikes.

Third, from June 24, to March1979, the Iraq air strikes on the Iranian sky continued. These flights, apparently aimed at reconnaissance and assessing the IRIAF defensive power ended in short time due to proximity to the border regions. Obviously, the rapid and effective response to the enemy's aggression was not apparent due to the lack of continued flying of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts (as Combat Air Patrols), as well as the lack of clear instructions for air defense systems (for tracking, reconnaissance and destroying targets).

Of course, some analysts, in the light of the aforementioned, raise the question: How could such an unfounded analysis be of a kind? Is it an enemy who, by spending a lot of financial expense, obtaining valuable military information from the anti-revolutionary fugitives, providing counsel and arms assistance to rebel groups in Kurdistan, and forcing Iran's political involvement into Iraq's affairs following a major invasion into a neighbor's soil retreat from its position so easy?

Since a series of political reasons is involved in justifying the issue and their examination is inconsistent with the purposes for which this book was written, it is in this context that here the book refrains from discussing this topic and leaves final conclusions to scholars of this field and to those who are interested in.

But from the operational aspect, it should be said that apparently after a two-month-long tranquility on the borders, again on September 5, 1979, F-4 fighter aircrafts in Hamedan Airbase were deployed on combat mission as alert in the air to prevent the entry of tanks and armored vehicles of the Ba'ath regime into the borders of Iran.

Hence, the expeditionary teams from the IRIAF inspection closely examined the technical dimensions of these accidents, but only slightly analyzed the pathology of the subject and provided practical solutions (to prevent similar incidents). Apart from these issues, the design of a hijacking event should be considered as the major event of August and the captivity of Seyyed al-Usara Pilot Lashgari and Missed Zare Nemati as the main events of September (September 18, 1980), which again placed the Air Force in the spotlight of the media and public opinion.

Here we do not want to recall what has happened, but to attract the attention of interested people to the fact that the IRIAF from the beginning of 1979 despite the weakening of its command system and its hierarchy and other problems, including operational and logistics deficiencies was ready to dispose of enemy aggression, and operating instructions was the methods of interception and engagement with aggressive aircrafts, but the revolutionary atmosphere of the ruling state was such that the threats of the enemy were not taken seriously and, consequently, the power to act and make decisive decisions were somehow out of the IRIAF hands. Even Iraq's action in confusing the international community's minds with the Iranian hostile attitudes and intervention has not been able to capture the views of the country's political officials on the capabilities of the IRIAF (in the reduction of the crisis).

Therefore, valuable opportunities that could have at least be preventive (deterrence) disappeared easily so that the ambitious leader of Iraq would take bigger and more secure steps towards his aggressive intentions.

Hence, the IRIAF defensive and usual measures not only did not create fears at the heart of the Iraqi Ba'ath's autocrats, but did not deserve the powerful air force of a revolutionary country.

The Iraqi air raids were less associated with shooting and bombing, and in contrast, most of the flights were in the form of reconnaissance of the region. Although Iraq started its martial targets slightly balanced in September, but in this regard, the astuteness of The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force may not be overlooked. By proving the seemingly hidden enemy intentions, the IRIAF began to make regular night-time flights from the beginning of the August 23, 1980. These flights, often AIMED AT reconnaissance, contained a message of authority and combat readiness of the IRIAF that in the defense of the sky of the country; a message that could have been meaningful and alarming for the Ba'ath party's command, but Iraqi commanders was unable to analyze such messages due to the enthusiasm for reaching a large part of the southern regions of Iran.

From September 6, 1980 to September 22, 1980 in an unexpected turn, the two sides are witnessing a semi-full-scale war. The gradual deployment of the Iraqi Army in the western and southern border forced the IRIAF to expand its operational range. The Iraqi air strike, then the ground invasion of Mehran and Saleh Abad, and the immediate presence of Iranian air force bombers over Iraqi forces, were the beginning of the crisis on September 22, 1980 onward. Eventually the promised moment came, and the Ba'ath Party's ambitious leader, who was impatiently waiting for a command of attack to his army, found the reason for the beginning of the war; an extremely worthwhile excuse that, in a sense, landed as heavenly mother in his filthy lap. On the afternoon of September 18, 1980, 1st Lt. Hossein Lashgari on a combat air patrol flight in the western part of the country (45 kilometers west of Abdanan) was fired by the nemy and being landed by parachute was captured by Ba'athist forces. Now, from the perspective of Saddam Hussein, Iran could have been introduced as the initiator of the war. Therefore, the last obstacle in the aftermath of a war of attrition was also removed, and after four days of propaganda abuse of Hussein Lashgari on the international level, Iraq began an all-out attack on Iran.

Third, from June 24, to March1979, the Iraq air strikes on the Iranian sky continued. These flights, apparently aimed at reconnaissance and assessing the IRIAF defensive power ended in short time due to proximity to the border regions. Obviously, the rapid and effective response to the enemy's aggression was not apparent due to the lack of continued flying of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts (as Combat Air Patrols), as well as the lack of clear instructions for air defense systems (for tracking, reconnaissance and destroying targets).

Here we do not want to recall what has happened, but to attract the attention of interested people to the fact that the IRIAF from the beginning of 1979 despite the weakening of its command system and its hierarchy and other problems, including operational and logistics deficiencies was ready to dispose of enemy aggression, and operating instructions was the methods of interception and engagement with aggressive aircrafts, but the revolutionary atmosphere of the ruling state was such that the threats of the enemy were not taken seriously and, consequently, the power to act and make decisive decisions were somehow out of the IRIAF hands. Even Iraq's action in confusing the international community's minds with the Iranian hostile attitudes and intervention has not been able to capture the views of the country's political officials on the capabilities of the IRIAF (in the reduction of the crisis).

Therefore, valuable opportunities that could have at least be preventive (deterrence) disappeared easily so that the ambitious leader of Iraq would take bigger and more secure steps towards his aggressive intentions.

Hence, the IRIAF defensive and usual measures not only did not create fears at the heart of the Iraqi Ba'ath's autocrats, but did not deserve the powerful air force of a revolutionary country.

**May 22, 1979 to June 21, 1979**

A review of the events of May 22, 1979 to June 21, 1979 shows the intensity and extent of the Iraqi Air Force flights over the borderline and inside Iran. The most important thing is the shooting and aerial bombing of the civilian regions and the martyrdom of a No. of defenseless people that actually proves the beginning of war by Iraq. However, a deterrent policy was not assigned to the air force to put the enemy in a passive position, and the defense diplomacy was a simple and basic operation in the face of freedom of action for the enemy. We will review an example of this period of time (quoted from the IRIAF Office of Command command and news from Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, SEMAJA):

1. At 04:00 on May 23, two Iraqi aircrafts raided at the border from the May-Tapan checkpoint to Salman Koshte in Iran and bombarded the border line twice.
2. Two fighter jets and four Iraqi helicopters attacked Hilala and Talkab checkpoints using rockets and machine guns[[22]](#footnote-22). To deal with it, the IRIAF put two aircraft coverage on its agenda.
3. On May 29, the Iraqi Army launched a ground and air strike (Artillery attacks) in the wake of its previous attacks on the city of Mehran. Twelve were martyred and 36 were wounded in the attack. The victims were all civilians.
4. On the same day (May 29), Iraqi helicopters re-bombed Mehran and border posts, which, upon receiving news, two armed fighter aircrafts (F-5s) launched to support and counteract the raids on the region.
5. At 11:00, other cases of armed conflict were reported at the border regions of Kermanshah and Ilam, during which several checkpoints were destroyed by the Iraqi army. At the same time, four Iraqi MiGs were flying the city of Mehran sky, which, supported by artillery and helicopters, bombarded the border checkpoints. Electricity and water were cut in the city of Mehran, and commander of Ilam regiments demanded immediate air support. The Fourth Airbase provided the full support and defense of the region.
6. According to the letter No. 250, two F-5s flew from the Fourth Airbase on the Ilam region. According to the pilots there were shootings over a region which shows Hilala checkpoint coordinates. The result of the mission was reported through the letters Nos.1278 and 1282 to SEMAJA.

Note: the IRIAF from this date onwards, in addition to the clashes with the Iraqi Army mercenaries in the western part of the country, was simultaneously obliged to confront the apparent raids of the Ba'ath militant, which in some way signifies the mandatory entry of the air force into the arena of the war. The details are as the following:

From May 31, 1980 to June 12, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. According to the Commander of the Expeditionary Team of the Mehran Region, on May 31, 1980, two MiG Aircrafts were seen in the region[[23]](#footnote-23). A few moments later, the Fourth Airbase was asked to scramble. The request was made at 10:25 and two F-5s were deployed at the base for armed reconnaissance in the region of Mehran.
2. On June 2, 1980, Iraqi helicopters attacked the region of ​​Saleh Abad from 11:23 to 21:00.
3. At 23:00, two Iraqi aircrafts entered Iran's sky at penetrated to Tabriz Second Air Base. They were forced to flee by shooting of air defense units. Meanwhile, at 23:20 an unidentified object was observed for one hour in the sky of the city of Tabriz in the sky of Second Air Base.
4. At 07:00 on June 10, 1980, two fighter aircrafts were observed over the Nader checkpoint, then an explosion sound was heard and a large amount of smoke was seen, which was a sign of a fire.
5. Four Iraqi aircrafts and two helicopters bombed Hillala and Ney khazar (Mehran) regions checkpoints ​​on June 10, 1980.
6. At 09:35 on June 11, 1980, the fourth Air base, based on letter No. 3, launched an armed reconnaissance flight[[24]](#footnote-24) with F-5 aircraft from the Dehloran border to Khorramshahr. In this mission, the amount of ammunition used to deal with threats was 30 rockets and 679 cartridges.
7. On June 13, 1980, an unidentified aircraft passed Iran border in the south, which was forced to leave the region by an anti-aircraft gun at Abadan airport.
8. On June 12, 1980, two Iraqi Sukhoi aircraft bombed a village in the Uramanat suburb. The violations and suspicious air traffic in the southern region were reported.
9. At 17:15, on June 12, 1980 an unidentified airaircraft flew over the electronic information collection group site[[25]](#footnote-25) in the western part of the country, forced to leav the Iranian sky with the firing of the air defense group deployed on the site. The message sent from electronic information collection site was sent to the deputy operation.
10. As reported by the the IRIAF command post, four helicopters and five tanks were observed betwen (Bralan) and (Gheshlagh Ali Nabi) checkpoints around Maku, which immediately four F-5s in Second Airbase were assigned to scramble. The Second Airbase was required to receive new information every 15 minutes and report the latest situation.

Note: The above cases show a period of time that Iraqi aircrafts (helicopters and fighters) gradually focused on bombing operations and, in parallel, Air patrols in border regions and cities continued.

From June 13, 1980 to June 21, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. According to the Sixth Airbase the Air Navy Ptrol at 09:55 on June 13, 1980 was launched by one C-130 aircraft for 100 minutes on the "F" route (southwest of the Persian Gulf route) and two ships (a tanker ship and a cargo ship) were observed.
2. At 23:30 on June 13, 1980, an Iraqi airaircraft raided Iran sky, and launched several flares in the region of ​​“Tamrchin”. Given the increase in Iraqi airstrikes in recent nights, the IRIAF deputy of operations has explored the history and flight times of Iraqi aircrafts in the past few nights, in order to control its quantitative and qualitative trends for planning its flights.
3. the following were observed by F-5E aircrafts in turn reconnaissance flights at the Dehloran to Qasr-e-Shirin:

- A moving radar device owned by the Iraqi state;

- The Iraqi road was constructed in the westnorthern part of Mehran to the city of Mendeli, 50% of which was done

1. The Sixth Airbase in letter No. 52 issued an Air Patrol on route "A" (southeast of the Persian Gulf) and Russian ship carrying military equipment was seen. Meanwhile, a No. of photos of the ship was taken.
2. According to the Jolfa border guards report, the Soviet cargo train at 11:30 am carried 30 tanks, 14 vehicles, and 5 military carriages and wagons from west to east.
3. As reported by the Surface-to-Air Defense Group, located at Ilam, at 16:30, on June 14 and 15, 1980, during two shooting stages with a 23m machine gun and shooting 320 cartrudges they managed to make two Iraqi aggressor MiG-21 aircrafts flee.
4. On June 17, 1980, for the third day in succession, an Iraqi MiG aircraft flew over the site of Ilam, which was forced to flee with the shooting of forces stationed in the region.
5. On June 18, 1980, an enemy aircraft raided Iran sky, and launched two flares in the region of “Tamrchin”. The Tabriz Airbase was requested to launch reconnaissance flights in Piranshahr and Sardasht regions for three consecutive nights.
6. According to the above, the Shahrokhi Airbase (Hamedan) for three nights (June 18, 19 and 20, 1980) and during different times put reconnaissance flights on the cities of Piranshahr, Pasveh, Naghdeh and Baneh on their agenda.
7. Following the request by Armored Forces 94 about the Iraqi air strikes on Pyreneeshahr Jaldiyan district, the Second Airbase sent two F-5s for reconnaissance and support operations to Jaldiyan, Piranshahr and Pasveh regions.
8. The IRIAF Deputy of Operations at the mission to the commander of the Fourth Airbase issued a decree to carry out night flight with air refueling on June 18, 1980 using the F-4 aircraft expanded to that base[[26]](#footnote-26).
9. In the letter No. 309, the Fourth Airbase announced that on June 19, 1980, the reconnaissance flights were launched on Dehloran to Khorramshahr border line by a F-5I aircraft.
10. The IRIAF Deputy of Operations issued the decree No. 14-04/8-201on June 17, 1980 to the Sixth Airbase command in Bushehr to carry out night patrol flight with air refueling on June 19, 1980.
11. The Second Airbase in the letter No. 88 on June 20, 1980 announced that at 11:00 am, the reconnaissance flight and air cover of the border of the two countries were carried out by two F-5 aircrafts armed with missiles and cartridges. No suspicious activity was detected.

Note: The review of the operational process on May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980 has been indicative of an increase in operational and preventive measures against the severity of air raids and the expansion of enemy forces for the following reasons:

A- The the Iraqi Ba'ath regime's suspicious movements and aircrafts activities have intensified during this period, so that the commanders of the Army put on the agenda in turn flights in order to carry out an armed reconnaissance mission and even overnight Air Combat Patrols to observe and monitor the enemy's actions from Shalamche to West Azerbaijan. These missions were performed by F-5s from the Second and Fourth Airbases or the F-4s from the Third Airbase, and pilots, although often reported no suspicious cases; however, “for the first time on June 15, 1980” and three months before the start of the full-scale attack of the Ba'athist regime on Iran, a departed patrol from Dezful's fourth battalion has reported the following suspicious cases:

- A moving radar device owned by the Iraqi state;

- The Iraqi road was constructed in the westnorthern part of Mehran to the city of Mendeli, 50% of which was done.

Also on June 20, 1980, an expedition pilot from the Tabriz Second Airbase announced that at 8:00 am, during an air cover mission on the Oshnavieh-Baneh, a probably military camp was seen in a 20km to Iraq with estimated without 100 and 150 tents.

B) The order to launch night patrols with air refueling has been frequent at the Third, Fourth and Sixth Airbases in the final nights of this month (from May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980), due to the importance of the subject, the following page depicts an image of a relevant document.

C) The increased demand for air support missions by the 64th Orumieh Division and Kermanshah DASC of this month (from May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980), signaled an upsurge in the clashes between the army and other defenders of the Islamic Revolution with the enemy's deceived, counterrevolutionary and provoked forces. This fact is considered as another proof of the broad projection of the Ba'athist enemy to prepare the war (based on the examples provided, marine patrol flights also increased on this month (from May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980).




Figure 2-1. The image of the IRIAF Deputy of Operations Letter to the Fourth Airbase on "Night Patrol" with Air refueling by F-4 Fighter on June 18, 1980

**C) Iraqi air raids and the IRIAF measures from June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980:**

Although the process of aggression is also showing increasing growth from June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980, however, some unexpected incidents to the air force have signaled serious and alarming warnings that, for various reasons, including political strife in the country, were less studied and analyzed, and despite the increasing frequency of other raids and unfortunate events, it was not considered as necessary.

Among these events, there can be tragic accidents on 1979 and 1980, the full description of which is presented in chapter six of the first volume.

The above events indicate that, in addition to increasing the enemy's air movement and violating the borders of our country, the Ba'ath regime, with the previous planning, on the one hand, distributed flyers in the Kurdistan border regions, supported the counter-revolutionary forces and, on the other hand, threatened the Jallal Talibani and his men in attempt to eliminate their opponents and pave the way for a major attack. Inevitably, the IRIAF managed in its operational plan a limited number of Combat Air Patrol flights and included five sorties of the Scramble flights to identify, counteract, and repel threats.

It should be recalled that in carrying out some missions, such as aerial photography, several aircrafts (other than targeting groups) joined from other bases to complete the mission. These missions were often carried out with the presence of fueling aircrafts, interceptors, collecting signal information (Bat), and so on. The coordination was also directed by the air force deputy for operations, under the operational command of the bases (coordinated with the command of the air defense and other systems). At runtime, communication between aircrafts was usually established through the command and control system of the air force.

At the end of this discussion, it should be noted that in the implementation of various combat missions, the air force is less dependent on the commander (compared with ground forces, armored personnel carriers, etc.), and basically the pilots and other professionals, in harmony with the advanced aeronautical equipment contributes to the realization of operational activities, which is one of the characteristics of the air force and distinguishes it from other forces in critical circumstances, which enables rapid response missions. This attribute is one of the important reasons that made it possible to immediately act against the enemy in the very early days of the war.

However, a week after the air force's pre-emptive action and the continuation of Combat Air Patrol missions, the Iraqi Ba'ath regime stopped its ongoing threats and aggressions in an unexpected and suspicious event. This suspicious activity and other threats of the enemy were not taken seriously and were not even considered by the responsible authorities (Army and State Officials) and, like many events after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, were overlooked due to current obstacles; however, politically it implied that tensions between the two countries have redlved in particular from Iraq, and probably the enemy has retreated from its position. Therefore, at the end of the night of June 18, 1979, the order was issued to the IRIAF to stop night CAP flights[[27]](#footnote-27).

Of course, some analysts, in the light of the aforementioned, raise the question: How could such an unfounded analysis be of a kind? Is it an enemy who, by spending a lot of financial expense, obtaining valuable military information from the anti-revolutionary fugitives, providing counsel and arms assistance to rebel groups in Kurdistan, and forcing Iran's political involvement into Iraq's affairs following a major invasion into a neighbor's soil retreat from its position so easy?

Since a series of political reasons is involved in justifying the issue and their examination is inconsistent with the purposes for which this book was written, it is in this context that here the book refrains from discussing this topic and leaves final conclusions to scholars of this field and to those who are interested in.

In fact, the "Operation Alborz Comprehensive Plan" was carrying the structure planned before the victory of the revolution, but undergone changes appropriate to the Islamic Republic's defense strategy and doctrine. The final announcement, in the form of an "operational order" to the Air Force bases on July 18, 1980 (two months before the outbreak of the war), is in some ways to be discussed, including:

"The Alborz Battle Order" was received by the IRIAF in the circumstances, that this force had been involved in intense intentions and hostile riot schemes in the west of the country months ago (about 20 months before the victory of the Islamic Revolution)[[28]](#footnote-28). It seems that the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, based on their existential nature and their intrinsic mission, must necessarily follow the trail of a targeted plot by an outside enemy in the west of the country, so that the activities of the forces under the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran command arranged in the proper direction on the revision of the defensive plan and in general, the combat readiness to prevent a national crisis.

But from the operational aspect, it should be said that apparently after a two-month-long tranquility on the borders, again on September 5, 1979, F-4 fighter aircrafts in Hamedan Airbase were deployed on combat mission as alert in the air to prevent the entry of tanks and armored vehicles of the Ba'ath regime into the borders of Iran.

Hence, the expeditionary teams from the IRIAF inspection closely examined the technical dimensions of these accidents, but only slightly analyzed the pathology of the subject and provided practical solutions (to prevent similar incidents). Apart from these issues, the design of a hijacking event should be considered as the major event of August and the captivity of Seyyed al-Usara Pilot Lashgari and Missed Zare Nemati as the main events of September (September 18, 1980), which again placed the Air Force in the spotlight of the media and public opinion. Until finally, on September 22, 1980, the airports of the country and the IRIAF Airbases were fully attacked by the enemy, and the process of these violations as well as the IRIAF measures on monthly basis as as follows:

**June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980**

With the onset of the summer of 1980, the Iraqi air raids began to intensify and, from the very first days, defensive measures continued as armed reconnaissance patrols and eye detection and Combat Air Patrols, the following refers to some of events on June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980 and increases in enemy air strikes:

1. The Second Airbase (Tabriz) announced that the Combat Air Patrols were carried out by two F-5s on the border line. In the final minutes of the mission, the Tabriz Radar detected a target at a low altitude across the border and assigned it to the patrol aircraft.
2. Kermanshah DASC requested that the announcement of the Scramble and the air coverage, as soon as possible, be informed before the flight of their aircraft, so that there would be enough time to inspect the fire of the self-defense and prevent the shooting the IRIAF aircrafts.the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases and operations management were informed.
3. June 25, 1980, the Fourth Airbase announced that the F5-E aircraft No. 7050 (which was deployed to the Armed Reconnaissance Mission in order to deal with enemy air raids) crashed in northern Khorramshahr, in the flood region with its pilot martyred[[29]](#footnote-29).

As far as the available documents are concerned, the following cases are noted for the F-5E aircraft crash to the first lieutenant Gholam Hossein Bastani:

* At 09:25 on June 25, 1980, a fighter jet, apparently identified as Iraqi, was maneuvered in the Khosrowabad Garrison Zone (in the region of ​​ The Iranian Gendarmerie). Moments later, the unit's gunships were pushed to this fighter and the aircraft was forced to retreat.
* According to the IRIAF inspection and flight safety, the aircraft was shot down during the Border Reconnaissance Mission (possibly), by Iran defensive armament and its pilot was martyred.

1. The IRIAF deputy of operation immediately sent a RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft to the crash site to announc the result after taking a photo. My First base station operations reported that the flight did not comply with the regulations because of the vicinity of the evnt with the border line. The pilot-colonel Jawad Fakori has said: "A mission must be carried out by flying in the border regions."
2. On June 28, 1980, a 214 helicopter was investigating the F-5 aircraft strike on the border line that was shot by Iraqi agents. As a result of a bullet hit by a gasoline tank, the helicopter landed compulsorily in 200 meters of the Khorramshahr-Shalamcheh road[[30]](#footnote-30). The helicopter, which patroles on the Iranian border line, was shot by the Iraqi border guard and hit with eight cartridges and was forced to land near the "Dorbant" checkpoint. The helicopter apparently did not suffer serious damage, and its passengers were reported healthy.

The following day, the Kayhan newspaper reported in Khorramshahr: "About 5:45 PM, Yesterday (June 28, 1980), Iraqi troops fired at an IRI helicopter.”

1. In order to prevent adverse events (shooting at Iranian aircrafts), the Kermanshah DASC offered to the Air Force Headquarters to inform them by predicted flights 12 hours earlier and unpredictable flights two hours before the flight.
2. According to the the Ilam Governorate, Iraqi aircraft repeatedly raided several times from 9:00 pm on July 5, 1980 to Iran's sky in the Ilam region (from Dehloran to Bostan).
3. According to the the Ilam Governorate, at at 12:05 am on July 5, 1980, the Gendarmerie checkpoint Samideh (located in Susangerd district) was surrounded by Iraqi forces and urgently needs to deploy forces. At 13:12, the IRIAF deputy of operation immediately orderd a scramble flight to the Fourth Airbase.
4. According to the Kermanshah DASC, between 15:24 and 16:00, on July 5, 1980 there was a reconnaissance flight over the "Ein Khosh" region by two F-5s aircrafts.
5. At 23:30, the intelligence “Sergeant. Lashkari" informed that the city of Saleh Abad near the site of Ilam was under the fire of the enemy and was attacked by Iraqi aircraft[[31]](#footnote-31). Due to the lack of interception of targets by Hamadan and Dezfoul radar and the Abdanan site, the order for scramble fly was issued to the Fourth Airbase. The Scramble aircraft flew to Ilam from Dezful Airbase [[32]](#footnote-32) at 23:55, and the site was informed that there would be no ground-to-air shooting until the end of the flight.
6. At 15:20 on July 5, 1980, two Iraqi helicopter equipped with artillery were found around a new information site near Kernd. The initial impression was that the site was detected by the enemy. The helicopters shot at native inhabitant’s tents around the site. Six innocent martyred and several others were wounded in the onslaught.
7. According to the announcement of the air defense and the report of the expeditionary team to Ilam at 22:35, on July 5, 1980 the site was attacked by two MiG Iraqi aircrafts, which anti-aircraft guns fired on them. Also at 22:45, an unidentified aircraft attacked the site, which was surrounded by defensive weapons and detonated from the aircraft above a light object and caused a fire after the collapse. The event was investigated by the gendarmerie of the region, and according to the site's staff it was likely the aggressive aircraft was hit by defense system weapons. In these clashes, 430 shotguns were used for 23mm cartridges and, The Oerlikon GDF was quickly deployed on the Ilam site upon the orders.
8. Eight Iraqi aggressor aircrafts raided the Sardasht region and a village about six kilometers west of this region, but astonishingly no scramble flight command was issued to cope with it.

 Further Details:

* Regardless of the overall state of alert of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army on April 7, 1980, the ultimate intent and final upsurge of the enemy for the war and the great military attack to Iran was announced publicly and officially announced to the commanders of the Iraqi Ba'ath army on July 6, 1980 by Saddam Hussein. Gen. Hamdani, senior commander of the Iraqi Ba'ath army and commander of the Saddam's Presidential Guard, commented on the first rally of the Iraqi army for a national onslaught and the onset of the imposed war:

“The commanders of the Iraqi Army (ground, air and navy) were present at the operational briefing on July 6, 1980 (July 15, 1980) that the decision to invade Iran was definitively communicated, and that the next day, it was announced to all involved units that an assessment of preparedness with all deficiencies and requirements shall be declared within 72 hours. This was done soon as possible and the army left the garrison to attack Iran”.[[33]](#footnote-33)

* Following it on July 9, 1980, the enemy's apparent air movement became more intense in the light of the apparent plot of the coup “neghab”. Given the above events, the IRIAF intelligence and reconnaissance commander in part of the book War History, wrote: “On July 9, 1980, the Iraqi Air Force severely violated the airspace of Ilamic Republic of Iran and Ilam site repeatedly asked for help from Dezfoul's Fourth Airbase, but did not receive effective support from the base. The day after, it turned out that the plot of the coup “neghab” was discovered at Noje Airbase and thus the lack of flight of the Dezful Airbase has been due to the same reason[[34]](#footnote-34).

Therefore, a preliminary examination of the intercepted information showed that the Iraqi Air Force had been aware of the coup process; therefore, and consistent with this plan, the subsequent raids on Iran's air borders, the red state would be announced at airbases and the subsequently, the armed fighters (available to the coup) would fly on the pretext of confronting the Iraqi Air Force according the Operation Alborz, but suddenly turn towards Tehran. Then, bombarded their targets, they would launch to the operational plan of the coup[[35]](#footnote-35).

1. On July 10, 1980, a flight named " Panther " on the fighters No. 7143 and 7150 (F-5 fighters) with flight crew "Ali Mohammad Naderi[[36]](#footnote-36)" and "Hadi Jorki[[37]](#footnote-37)" were mission on the navigation on Shush-Hamidieh-Vis which was according to letter No. 1980 was contrary to the notification procedure (without the permission of the headquarters). "This was a mistake of the base and responsible officials will be punished," they said.
2. In addition to the Baveysi region, there were also conflicts and fire exchanges between the Iranian and Iraqi forces in the "Shor-e Shirin, Anjira, and Kharneshkhan" regions. The Paveh district was in unrest that the Air Force was used to support.
3. At 15:00, at the command of the deputy commander, the Second, Third, and Fourth Airbases were notified that all flights should be approved by the Joint Staff (except for the requested support flight by DASC and the Scrambles), unless previously coordinated with the Joint Staff. The deputy operation commander command was notified to the Second, Third, and Fourth Airbases in the letter No. 1980 on July 10, 1980.

Note: Following the disclosure of the plot of the coup “neghab” (July 9, 1980), the control of flights by Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (SEMAJA) and revolutionary organs became more apparent.

1. At 14:00 on July 15, 1980, the Fourth Airbase announced that the prefectural officer of the Mehran region had requested help. In coordination with Col. Qaidian (Operation Commander) and Colonel Fakori, it was agreed that officers Nazer Mpghadam coordinate with the ground forces in the region, and if requested, they should be in line with that of the ground forces with informed the Joint Staff.
2. On July 15, 1980, the Gendarmerie informed that the Iraqi forces strengthened the checkpoints opposit the Somar Company and burned pastures around the Iraqi checkpoints and are moving towards Talkhab -Bazargan and Kani Sheikh. The Somar Company Gendarmerie Company requested support for these checkpoints. The Joint Staff ordered the air force to support threatened checkpoints by flying around the border.
3. On July 16, 1980, the IRIAF deputy of operation commander ordered the flight of a F-4 airliner equipped with a rocket and a cartridge from the region of ​​Saleh Abad-Mehran to the city of Naftshahr at low altitudes over border checkpoints. The issue was announced to the Fourth Airbase and the mission was executed according to Frag Order. Flames in some of the checkpoints signaled the severity of attacks.
4. On July 16, 1980, the Fourth Airbase, quoted from the aircrafts of this unit DASC (in the 92nd Armored Division of Ahwaz), announced that they are the possibility of air strikes on Musian, Ein Khosh, Dehloran, Fakkeh, Mehran, Hamidieh, Dasht Azadegan, Susangerd, The hills of Allah Akbar, Pushman and Fonireh.
5. At 10:05 am on July 17, 1980, the air force command was informed that five aircrafts attacked in the Ilam region, where the Hamadan radar commander also observed them in the radar display. So the scramble flight order was issued.
6. At 9:30 pm on July 21, 1980, the Fourth Airbase, quoting from Dehloran Radar, announced that a high-speed, high-altitude aircraft was observed by site staff. The site's defense launched a fire on the aircraft, which was not effective due to the high altitude of the aircraft. After 10 minutes, fire was repeated, which again did not work.




Figure 3-1 The radar control room that controls and guides the combat air patrol aircrafts or air surveillance within the country sky.

In the image of Shahid Sattari (standing) is watching and directing the battle scene.

**From July 23, 1980 to August 22, 1980**

The scale of the hostile aggression and the IRIAF main operational actions in two parts from July 23, 1980 to August 4, 1980 and from August 5, 1980 to August 22, 1980 are as follows:

1. The Zainalakesh checkpoint (Khan Lili) at the city of Naftshahr and Se-shian continued to be involved and under the fire of the enemy since morning to 15:30 on July 23, 1980. Officers stationed at the checkpoint, despite the ardent support of the Army also demanded air support because the Ba'ath army had entered the battle with heavy artillery fire and air support. Eventually, the IRIAF fighter aircrafts flew over the city of Naftshahr, the Somar, and the borderline and fled Iraqi aircrafts at 21:00.
2. At 03:05, a scamble order was issued to the Third Airbase to detect the unknown route seen in the Tabriz Radar, and a F-4 fighter aircraft known as “Bat” was launched to carry out the mission. According to the pilot, the object was a light object that could not be tracked.
3. On July 25, 1980, from the seventh transportation station, the air reconnaissance patrols were carried out on Abu Musa Island, and the nationality of the flag (Emirate flag) raised to the south of the island was identified.
4. According to The Navy of Islamic Republic of Iran Army (NEDAJA) report, on July 25, 1980 the CAP was carried out by "C 130" aircraft and the following were observed: two American carriers named “C-HARI-THINAS” of the class “Cox” and “BRISCOE” of the Class (Sparrow) moving 15 miles west of the Lesser Tunb Island (270 °) to unknown destination.
5. The Air Defense Command announced that, from the time of the historian, from 05:00 to 06:40, on July 25, 1980 numerous suspicious flights were found on the Iraqi airspace in the direction of Dezful's radar, but no border encroachments were found on the sky of Iran.
6. On July 27, 1980 the following suspicious movements and encroachments have been recorded:

A. An anti-aircraft missile has been deployed in the "Dehnock Village of Iraq" between "Modera" and "Zarbithea".

B. An anti-aircraft missile system has been deployed in the local region named Imam Reza (AS) north of the village of Dehnock.

C. There is an anti-aircraft fire battalion in Badr.

D – The IRIAF was urged to take care of themselves during the flight in those regions. The information was sent to the operational information and to the Bases Tactical Office as well as information and identification to determine the type of missiles and their exact location.

E - In the morning of July 27, 1980, the report was received on the reinforcement and expansion of the Iraqi Army's ground forces opposite the Nosod region, and at 16:10, the Baveysi region was bombed by an enemy aircraft[[38]](#footnote-38).

C - One Iraqi aggressor aircraft bombarded the Hwan region. Due to failure of communication devices, air support requests were not dispatched by the DASK Center located in Garde no region.

7- At 11:30 am on July 28, 1980, a F-4 aircraft was requested for close air support from the Bayangan region.

8) On July 29, 1980, the Iraqi forces burned Iran's oil facilities in the city of Naftshahr region. The Ilam site recorded flights of two Iraqi aircrafts in the border region of ​​Mehran and Ilam and reported that an Iraqi air force attack in the region in the near future is possible.

9) According to the Electronic Information and Reconnaissance Command at 11.30am, two Iraqi fighter aircrafts are carrying out reconnaissance operations between 270 and 192 degrees from the Ilam site. These aircrafts seem to be practicing in the region (counterpart to Ilam and Mehran) on their soil in order to carry out the operation on Iran's territory in the future[[39]](#footnote-39). A report was sent to the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, as well as to the radar sites and ground forces in the region for more precision and control of the regions mentioned.

10) According to The Gendarmerie reports a No. of high-altitude Iraqi aircrafts appear in the sky of Mehran each night, between 20:00 and 24:00, on July 30, 1980, which last time it was disappeared by firing air defense units deployed in the region.

11) At midnight on July 31, 1980, Iraqi aircrafts attacked the village of Shamshir on the Ilam province. The local people delivered bombs to the Shirvan checkpoint. The enemy apparently intended to bombard the checkpoint.

12) On these days, the Sixth Airbase conducted in turn patrols in the region in order to know the quantitative and qualitative status of the enemy's threats.

An investigation into the process of aggression on these days shows that Iraqi aircraft fly at high altitudes over western regions at different hours of the night. Due to the absence of Iranian flights during this time, the enemy can detect and shoot aerial photos without any hindrance. The Air Defense Command and the Third and Fourth Airbases were informed that to carry out measures needed to deal with aggressive aircraft in line with current regulations and announce the outcome. Accordingly, the explored and expanded F-14 aircraft was put on agenda[[40]](#footnote-40).

13) At 22:30 on August 3, 1980, from the Fourth Airbase informed the IRIAF command headquarter that Iraqi helicopters attacked the region of ​​Mehran and are engaed in bombardment of the positions. It was announced that if helicopters were exposed, they would be shot by anti-aircraft guns in the region.

14) At 23:56 on August 3, 1980, the Scramble Fighter fought with an Iraqi MiG aircraft. The second scramble aircraft flew from the Fourth Airbase at 00:04 on the intended mission.

15) On August 4, 1980, the regions of Ilam and Mehran were attacked by Iraqi helicopters. The Fourth Airbase was requested scrumble flight, and minutes later, the mission was carried out by two F-4s from the same Airbase. According to pilots, several enemy aircraft flew at 30 to 50 miles at a low altitude inside the Iraqi border, which did not require any chasing or fighting.

The Iraqi air raids and operational actions by IRIAF from August 5, 1980 to August 22, 1980 are as follows:

- The occurrence of an unexpected and harmful event for the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)

1) On August 5, 1980, a F-27 transport aircraft disappeared from the Tabriz Radar[[41]](#footnote-41) during educational flight and hours later:

 "The Iraqi government officially announced that the aircraft had fled to that country and applied for asylum. The Ba'ath government has agreed with the refugee aircrafts and the aircraft is currently stationed at Baghdad International Airport. "

Eventually, at 21:30, Baghdad TV showed the aircraft to the public.

(2) At 15:30 on August 11, 1980, four Iraqi MIG aircrafts were flying over a Khorramshahr region, shooting was not possible due to the high altitude.

3) According to the commander of the Air Support Center (Letter No. 19, dated August 11, 1980), there is the possibility of the Iraqi invasion of the country alongside the counter-revolutionaries in the Baneh and Sardasht regions.

Four F-4s should be ready to support Iranian forces.

4) On August 12, 1980, the Iraqi Army was tasked 1200 of its most accomplished military personnel and one MIG aircraft to attack the Javanrood, Khalkhi, Bazmır Abad and Thallat regions. Apparently, sometime ago, the region was identified by Iraqi aircraft.

5) On August 12, 1980 a Soviet aircraft landed in Saqez and immediately flew. SEMAJA asked for a quick review.

6) From 22:00 to 24:00, on August 13, 1980, a RAF-4 reconnaissance aircraft photographed the region between 40 miles west of Dezful to 60 miles south of Kermanshah on the borderline.

7) On August 14, 1980, six Iraqi MIGs flew over the military positions in Mehran in low altitude forced to flee with the fire of the army and the Revolutionary Guards.

A full-scale Iraqi attack is likely in the next few days on the Illam border. The air force and all bases were informed.

8) The Air Force Chief Command announced that counterrevolutionary forces with the support of Iraqi helicopters intend to raid on the Orumiyeh. Therefore, it was requested that from 03:30 am on August 15, 1980, to provide armed air cover support over the Urumia region until further notice. The command of the Second and Third Airbases were announced to carry out air cover and air defense, also, Radar stations of Tabriz and Hamadan were commanded to be coordinated in order to fully be inform and prepared.

9) The following day (August 16, 1980), at 21:15, an Iraqi aircraft entered on the Iranian soil from Khorramshahr's naval base, which immediately shot by the Artilleryunits. The aggressive aircraft was redirected to Abadan, which was forced into the Iraqi territory by firing of "Naghdi" carrier and units located at the airport.

10) On the same date (August 16, 1980) and according the announcement of the Navy, an Iraqi aircraft raided Iran's sky at 21:26 that was fired by the Alvand Air Force Air Defense units at Khoramshahr and later by the Baynder carrier. The aggressive aircraft inevitability escaped to Iraqi territory.

11) On August 19, 1980, the Army report showed ground and air preparation, and the expansion of Iraqi forces and the displacement of heavy weapons. These changes were often accompanied near “Tape rash”, and by the construction of several observation posts, as well as the spreading of Iraqi surface to air artillery.

At the same time, the Islamic Republic of Iran Army launched a Joint Operation Headquarters in the western part of the country and a issued an "announcement" on the likelihood of Iraqi army attack in three provinces of Kermanshah, Ilam and Kurdistan.



Figure 4-1 The F-4s are carrying out an armed surveillance mission and moments after air refueling (the fuel receiving valve on the body is still open)

On the same day, 70 Iraqi soldiers were killed in frontier districts. The IRIAF has been flying over the three provinces around the clock, and the fire has provided close air support from the ground forces.

12) On August 19, 1980, the Iraqi Ba'ath army forces were moving on the Noosud border and the Iraqi city of Tavileh towards Noosud and intended to settle in the Noosud mountains.

13) The news is that Iraq plans to attack Iran with 30 aircrafts. During the conflict in the Qasr-e-Shirin region on August 21, 1980, a large number of people settled around the Noosud and Doab and settled in the mountains with mortar bombs. Iraqi aircrafts and helicopters have also provided them with munitions and intend to deploy forces in the "Mala Palangane"[[42]](#footnote-42)

14) On August 20, 1980, The Islamic Republic of Iran Army Ground Forces, (NEZAJA) announced that the Iraqi government carried out transfers along the path of the Klisin to Hajji Imran (Tamarchin) on the borderline, which required 20 kilometers deep, visual and photographic reconnaissance. So, the support request was sent to the IRIAF.

15) According to the Revolutionary Guards of the West, 30 warhead jets have been placed at the Iraqi Kurdistan Air Base to carry out a coup or air strike by Shapur Bakhtiar (the last prime minister of the Pahlavi regime). In addition to being fully alert to all the Revolutionary Guards units in the region, all the Air Force was also asked to be in the state of alert. In this regard, a reconnaissance flight was also performed on the borderline.

16) According to the "Operational Headquarters of the West of the Country", on August 20, 1980, the Iraqi Army forces moved to Noosud in Noosud and the Iraqi city of Tavileh, and they intend to deploy in Noosud.

The Iraqi troops were on the state of alert and the news confirms that there are 30 aircrafsts plan to launch an air strike on Iran.

Note: since August 6, 1980, due to the unpredictable disclosure of the plot “Neghab”, although the intensity and upward curve of Ba'athist enemy movements and raids apparently continued the regime's actions in deceiving some fugitive soldiers (after the discovery of a coup designed at the Third Airbase and Asylum of a F-27 airliner to Iraq) indicate that there will be more acute events in the future.

In addition, the process of enemy movements this month made the data collected by the intelligence unit more accurately analyzed.

“The Iraqi army has deployed and expanded its news and intelligence networks across the border to gain information, and 12 wiretapping posts have captured 38 people across the shared boundaries for collecting information. Meanwhile, a total of 3 fishing boats report hearing activities on 451, 452 and 453 MHz.”

The F-14's radar automatically announced the appropriate time for firing, as it has signs. In short, we arrived at the time when the missile was firing, and I said to Pashapur: Mr. Pashapur, fire. He also complimented and said: “you fire”.

Image 10-1 Major Mohammad Reza Ataei: The first pilot who succeeded in overthrowing an Iraqi Air Force aircraft on September 10, 1980 during an attack on Mimak with a Phoenix rocket.

So I pressed the release button and rocket launcher from the cabin! Until then, nobody had shot the Phoenix in the real battleground[[43]](#footnote-43). Even the manufacturer of this semi-strategic intercept aircraft country (The US) itself; we pressed the button anyway.

To cut it short, we fired (I shot), I thought that the rocket dropped down, so I drove the aircraft and saw the smoke of rocket firing. Until then, I had not fired Phoenix, and nobody else had practical experience in the battlefield. After the rocket launches, the display screen inside the front and rear cabin of the F-14, it shows that the rocket will hit the target in a few seconds. The screen read five seconds and started counting down to four, three, two, one, and zero, and the target disappeared from the radar screen.

And we were waiting for the rocket to launch immediately. We saw something fell below the aircraft. I did not remember how to shoot Phoenix at that time. Having been launched, the Phoenix first cut off from its base on the aircraft and fells down, then its engine starts and moves to the target.

Usually we carried two Phoenix rockets. After the rocket launches, it begins to soar and, given the speed and altitude of the aircraft, the computer itself will tell the missile how much to soar and you see it easily in front of the aircraft, then it drops at high speed and usually the pilot no longer sees it.

The target being disappeared from the radar screen means that the rocket had hit the target, and also the radar informed: hit the target and confirmed it. Later, however, they said that he had fainted from the emotion he had.

Because there was no longer an opportunity and there was little gasoline, I quickly turned to Dezful and kept telling the radar to tell Dezful that the F-14 would come up to land in and tell the defenses comrades not fire on us because the situation was red, I repeated this quite frequently that radar said I swear to the Prophet that everyone is being informed. Finally, we landed in Dezful and then, Mr. Yazdanshenas was the deputy of operations of the Airbase, and the fellow comrades approached our aircraft and carried pilots on hands and left to flying battalions.

In the afternoon, the Dezful Airbase fellow comrades were operating. I told Major Yazdanshenas, "This has happened and it is likely that the Iraqis will attack the base, be cautious," said Major Yazdanshenas. "If I permitted, I will destroy all Iraqi soil."

Reviewing and summarizing the content of this information signaled the beginning of a war that the transnational powers and their regional allies, in turn, fueled it. Thus, the IRIAF degree of readiness was rising day by day in spite of the current problems, and the air force prepared to defend against a massive aggression.

- Among the remarkable actions of Iraqi forces on this period of time was a target practice using real ammunition inside the border, which could be a sign of another hostile intention in Iran.

- Already at this period of time, the IRIAF, while defusing the repeated violations of Iraqi aircrafts in the west and south and carrying out tactical operations, identified the aircrafts in the radar system, and, with the help of the scramble aircrafts and air combat patrol succeeded in defeating their missions.

**- From August 23, 1980 to September 22, 1980**

Given the suspicious movements and aggression of the enemy, and given the events of the previous months, it was very natural that the period of August 23, 1980 to September 22, 1980 differs far from previous months. At the end of this period of time, finally, the sweet dreams of the rulers of Baghdad came to fruition, and in the hope of a great conquest, Iraq launched the full-scale attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the pages below, briefly provide the events of August 23, 1980 to September 22, 1980as follows:

Threats, raids and defensive measures (From August 23, 1980 to September 5, 1980):

1) The IRIAF headquarters (according to the information received) sent letter No. 2640 to all bases and units: "The August 23 and 25, the security of the radar shall be ensured and operational, and the ground-to-air defense shall be 100% ready.”

(2) Two Iraqi helicopters were identified and patrolled on a low altitute flight on August 23, 1980in the checkpoint region (25km west) conducting reconnaissance.

3) One day later, two MiG aircrafts flew over Qasr-e-Shirin to allow Iraqi air strikes. State of alert is required on air defense units and Airbases.

4) On August 25, 1980, the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth bases (due to American threats) were notified to be on a state of alert for the scramble.

5) On August 27, 1980, two F-4s (after the establishment of an Airborne Provisional Officer) were currently being deployed by the IRIAF to provide close air support for Paveh region and 72 kilometers west of Sanandaj.

6) On August 27, 1980, on the coordination of the navy and air forces it was supposed to carry out marine patrol on two occasions in the morning and afternoon.

7) On August 28, 1980, at the request of Kermanshah DASC, a Third Airbase deployed a F-4 aircraft equipped with a shotgun and a bomb, but the pilot (due to lack of contact with the Airborne Provisional Officer) did not succeeded on throwing ammo. So, at the expense of the rules, he left the bombs in region (the protected region of ​​shooting and aerial bombardment) and returned to the base. Kermanshah DASK again requested a bomber, but with sunset and flight restrictions at night, arming of the aircraft was not possible. So, in coordination with the director of the Kermanshah DASC, an aircraft was sent with a rocket and a shotgun, and the result of the mission was announced to SEMAJA.

8) According to the announcement of the second office at 21:30 on August 29, 1980, four Iraqi aircrafts raided Iran's sky in the region of ​​Susangerd and returned to Iraq.



Figure 5-1 Two F-4 fighter jets equipped with Maverick missiles and external fuel tank

9) On August 30, 1980, SEMAJA authorized the Air Force to stop the Iraqi Air Force raids and to inform the Ground Force defense that they would shoot Iraqi aircrafts in the event of striking on Iran sky.

10) On September 1, 1980, three Iraqi Army reconnaissance aircrafts infiltrated Iran's air borders from last night to dawn. Subsequently, the heavy bases of the naval base and other units based in Khorramshahr came into action and the aircrafts had to leave the sky of Iran.

11) On September 2, 1980, an air patrol was conducted by F-5 aircraft in Khorramshahr region. Pilot reports indicate that:

“A number of trenches have been constructed on the borderline (dirt road) facing Shalamcheh checkpoint in Khorramshahr region, and about 100-150 tanks and carrier have been deployed”.

12 ) On September 3, 1980, the head of the Joint Staff, based on the experience of recent conflicts in the border regions, states:

“Iraqi aircrafts flew freely and shot or bombed in the border regions, and commanders of the air forces are not able to respond tactically due to the need for time in making calls and obtaining orders. Therefore, from the time that this command is announced and without the assignment, if you discover any enemy air raid, try to counteract and take tactical action”[[44]](#footnote-44).

13) On September 4, 1980, the rules of silence will be enforced in the city of Basra and refineries in the region.

14 ) At 21:40 on September 4, 1980, the command post informed that: "Mehran and Saleh Abad were attacked by air and ground forces."

15) On September 4, 1980, a shooting aircraft shot the western part of the country at ultrasonic speed.

From September 5, 1980 to September 8, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. On September 5, 1980, a RAF-4 shooting aircraft and a F-4 fighter jet flew as escort to take shot from the western region from Mehrabad Airbase and having completed the mission landed in Mehrabad.
2. On September 5, 1980, the "3-B" state of alert was issued and LAME DUCK[[45]](#footnote-45) plan and the aircrafts flight of insider units were examined and analyzed[[46]](#footnote-46).
3. SEMAJA approved the shooting mission of the western border line and called for its prompt action. Meanwhile, in coordination with the Air Force Operations Deputy Commander, I was issued to the First Airbase reconnaissance battalion for the implementation.
4. The invasion of Iraqi forces in Mehran, which began on September 4, 1980, continued until the next day. The airspace airlift officer reported on the movement of Iraqi tanks to the border and requested air support. This support began at 9:00 AM by the Air Force (Fourth Airbase) and the Iraqi forces stopped.
5. According to reports, it is possible that several Iraqi helicopters attack targets in Iran between Sardasht and Piranshahr, so that a sramble flight order per 1hour and a half was issued to fighter aircrafts.
6. The 81st Armored Division of Kermanshah requested the deployment of four F-4 aircrafts to support Mehran-based units subjected to fire by Iraqi forces, on September 7, 1980.

“On September 7, 1980, the Seventh Airbase (equipped with F-14 Interceptor aircrafts) offers the following to the headquarters: "Since the radar-guided Phoenix missiles must be launched from above 30 miles from the target and the pilot at that distance is not able to identify the target with eye visibility, it is therefore preferable for ground radars to measure the distance, allowing firing for the pilot”.[[47]](#footnote-47)

1. On September 7, 1980, the command post informed that Qasr-e-Shirin is under fire from enemy helicopters. The Third Airbase was ordere to fly aircrafts equipped with ammunition.
2. On September 7, 1980, it was announced that Ilam was attacked from the ground and air and requested support for the Third Airbase. After contacting the Ilam governor and verbally verifying the news of, the Third and Fourth Airbasees were issued to take action.
3. According to the announcement of the Revolutionary Guards on September 7, 1980, six Iraqi helicopters bombed the army base in Nazarabad (Qasr-e-Shirin), resulting in three military personnels martyrs and a number of injured.
4. Three Iranian helicopters clashed with Iraqi helicopters in “Tang Huan” on September 7, 1980 and an Iraqi helicopter crashed.
5. At 16:30 on September 7, 1980, several Iraqi helicopters attacked the Qassir Shirin Radio and Television Station with rocket, resulting in two military personnels martyrs and 24 others wounded.
6. Iraqi air strikes intensified and expanded on September 7, 1980. The enemy's helicopters flew in the sky to the western borders and blew up the identified regions. In this operation, an Iraqi helicopter was overthrown by the fire of Iranian forces. The blown up region was in Nasrabad District of the city of Naftshahr.
7. On September 8, 1980, four F-4 fighter aircrafts were launched at four sorties for close air support of Khan Lili and Mimak checkpoints, as well as four other F-4s were deployed to the Tonkab naw and Takab-e Khohneh regions.
8. An Iraqi checkpoint near Gilan-e Gharb (five miles into Iraqi territory) was destroyed by a Maverick missile (launched from a F-4 aircraft).
9. According to the IRIAF announcement, at 16:44, on September 8, 1980, a F-4 aircraft sent hit by Iraqi air-to-air missiles on the way to Tangab checkpoint but airaircraft safely landed at the base.
10. At 13:25, the Third Airbase informed that the F-4 aircraft No. 6591 piloted by Major General Mahmud Eskandari (belated) had been trapped.



Figure 6-1 A group of F-5s aircrafts flying on combat-educational mission at the Dezful Airbase

From September 9, 1980 to September 11, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. At 6:50 pm, on September 9, 1980, the Phantom Fighter (F-4) fired on the positions of the Iraqi Army's aggressive trenches and tanks near the city of Naftshahr and broke the sound barrier in the region.
2. According to the Revolutionary Guards, at 16:00, on September 9, 1980, an Iranian Phantom aircraft destroyed an Iraqi MiG and killed its pilot at Nasrabad region of Qasr-e-Shirin.
3. At 16:50, the Third Airbase command post informed that as soon as possible, one F-14 airaircraft flew from the 8th Airbase and Qasr-e-Shirin and the border line for air cover, while observing the enemy aircrafts work on cooperating with insider flights operating in the region. The dispatches were sent to the 8th Airbase and the First transportation base on message No. 3072 on September 9, 1980.
4. At 17:25 pm, on September 9, 1980, Qasr-e-Shirin region close air reconnaissance and support was accomplished by a F-14 airaircraft. The pilot's observations were as follows: “The city of Naftshahr is burning in fire and Iraqi MiG aircraft at 500 feet attacks Iranian forces”.
5. At 18:39 on September 9, 1980, close air support was provided by two F-4s in the Qasr-e-Shirin region, and 20 tanked camps were attacked with 152 rockets.
6. At 10:07 on September 10, 1980, a IRIAF helicopter crashed in the northern region of ​​Qasr-e-Shirin with six occupants with all passengers’ martyrs.
7. According to the IRIAF, at 19:20 on September 11, 1980 a number of 26 enemy tanks were seen opposite Anjireh checkpoint by the F-4s pilots launched to the region, and seven or eight of them were targeted, but the aircraft had to leave the site as a result of defense of enemy ground forces and the probability of depletion of gasoline.
8. According to Defense Information at 12:22 on September 10, 1980, an Iraqi aircraft was seen by a F-14 aircraft at a distance of 5 miles across the border, and the pilot asked if he could target it. Colonel Omarni (successor) was informed, he said: "Do not fire"; Colonel Golchin again said:

“The order is that the IRIAF aircrafts to attack any aircraft, whether inside or outside of the border.”

It was told to Colonel Omrani, after coordinating and checking the subject with the operation, he said: “If the order is issued by the commander of the force, act upon the order”. It was requested to record order number.

Note: At this point of time, due to increased raids in the West, the Hamadan Airbase has actually entered the conflict, and the F-14 interceptor is also used to fight the enemy. A full description of these incidents and the F-4 aircraft crash is presented in Volume I.[[48]](#footnote-48)



Image 7-1 Colonel Pilot Mohammad Reza Ataei and Lieutenant Behrouz Pashapur the launcher of the first air-to-air destruction with Phoenix missile in the history of air battles

At 13:40, Major General Ataei, from Vahdati Airbase (Dezful) command post informed that I was an F-14 pilot officer who launched the Phoenix missile to the Iraqi aircraft on Mehran with the following information:

* The very low altitude of the enemy aircraft, very close to the ground
* Speed, 450 nats
* Direction, 120°
* Distance to the insider aircraft (F-14), 47 miles
* Position, north east of Mehran Band
* The altitude of the insider aircraft, 15,000 feet.

It was reported to SEMAJA to declare whether the enemy aircraft crashed or not? It was the first Phoenix (AIM -54) missile in Iran to be fired by an F-14 aircraft[[49]](#footnote-49).

It is worth noting that from this date onwards, the documents of the Office of the Operations Deputy of the Eighth Airbase of Esfahan, as well as the flight office of most of the pioneers of the base[[50]](#footnote-50), a F-14 interceptor –fighter aircraft launched on Combat Air Patrol missions every day using air-to-air refueling systems in the western part of the country.

At the end of this chapter, a selection of memories by Amir Brigadier Mohammad Reza Ataei, who succeeded in defeating an enemy MiG-21 fighter by firing the first Phoenix missile, is presented[[51]](#footnote-51).

10) Iranian-Iraqi air and ground warfare took place on several fronts: Iran's phantoms aircrafts cover fled the Iraqi MiGs on the border and only Iraqi helicopters often fly over the city of Naftshahr and Sumar. In total, eight Iraqi aircraft and helicopters were crashed.

11) On September 11, 1980, Ilam governor made a call, saying: "An Iraqi MiG aircraft attacked the site of Nakhjir and one or six individuals are martyred." At the time of the event, two F-5s were in the region and two others were flown. Meanwhile, Nakhjir site was asked to inform the event of when making a call.




Image 8-1 the appointment of Colonel Fakori (Commander of the IRIAF on that point of time) to the Minister of Defense.

From September 12, 1980 to September 14, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. On September 12, 1980, it was reported that Ilam had been attacked. Upon confirmation by the Third Airbase Command Officer, the deputy ordered the Air cover aircrafts be headed to Ilam and also a F-14 aircraft was deployed from the 8th Airbase to the region. Because the F-14 was in fueling operation, so a F-4 scrambled from the Fourth Airbase.
2. At 21:24, the above news is again confirmed (the flight of Iraqi aircrafts on the Ilam region); based on the decision made by the IRIAF deputy of operations “one phantom aircrafts carry out the air-to-air refueling and the other support". The F-14 has flown to Ilam. At 21:40, the Defense Command Officer reported that two F-4s had been blocked during the gasoline operation. Two other F-4s were scheduled to be deployed instead of them.
3. At 22:47 on September 13, 1980, the First Transport Airbase was informed that at 08:00 am two tankers flight scheduled for refueling aircrafts in the designated region.

Eventually, the Ilam governor states: "F-4s and F-14s are perfectly fine and well-functioning, so that the targets are still burning and asking for encouragement from the pilots.

2) At 06:00 on September 13, 1980, the insider aircrafts destroyed the enemy's positions and tanks at the Ney Khazar Heights, and the Anjire and Shor-e Shirin checkpoints were tightly placed under the fire of the enemy's artillery.

3) On on September 13, 1980, the air force's intelligence estimates indicate that the enemy has been intensifying its forces and using surveillance systems for the past two years, and for this purpose they used three frigates and 12 ground posts (with Russian equipment) on the border line and an advanced electronic information station (with French equipment) in the western part of the Ali region[[52]](#footnote-52).

4) According to the IRIAF: The following aircrafts have conducted operational flights in order to carry out close air support and counteract the raids of the enemy to the west of the country:

- A number of 12 F-4 aircrafts;

- A number of 21 F-5 aircrafts;

- A number of 8 F-14 aircrafts;

- A number of six Tanker aircrafts (Boeing-707), sent to the region for fueling F-14s and F-4s.

Note -1: the Iraqi news agency on the severity of the border clashes between Iran and Iraq and the raids of the Ba'athist regime's air force from Khosravi to the Khan Lili checkpoints, as well as the severe attacks that Iran began on Iraq's positions around the Khosravi border reported that Iraqi Air Defense overthrew two IRIAF aircrafts (which certainly was nott true)[[53]](#footnote-53).

Note -2: After months of self-restraint, finally, on September 14, 1980, during two security briefings with the presence of the President (Bani Sadr), Prime Minister (Shahid Mohammad Ali Rajae), commanders of the armed forces and gendarmerie for 12 hours, it was announced that the Iranian government had decided to act (counter-attack) against the attacks of the Iraqi army[[54]](#footnote-54).

- Given the permit to counteract such acts, from September 14, 1980 to September 16, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1) On September 14, 1980, a heavy air conflict broke out among theIranian phantoms and the Iraqi Ba'ath Air Force fighter aircrafts, the site of the conflict was over the villages of “Garde naw”, “Bishegan” and “Sarpol-e Zahab”. In this confrontation and close combat, Two Iraqi MiG-21 aircrafts were toppled in a way that their pilots were killed in the smoke and fire caused by the aircraft's explosion and their bodies were transferred to the Qasr-e-Shirin morgue.

2) Iraqi aircraft attacked on helicopters carrying government delegation: “When the country's authorities were visiting the border line, an Iraqi aircraft fired on helicopters carrying the presidency and the prime minister and his companions, accompanied by several Cobra helicopters. These attacks were neutralized by timely response of the pilots and the rapid intervention of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts and the enemy fighters were forced to flee. Therefore, the president and fellows were saved from a certain danger”.



Image 9-1 of the High Commanders Council meeting on September 14, 1980

Note: The Iraqi Ba'thist news agency claimed that the Iraqi Air Force bombed some parts of Iran, especially the city of Naftshahr, the Diyala distric and the Iranian garrison in Sarpol-e Zahab, and that the the Iraqi Air Force could manged to topple a F-4 fighter aircraft and a helicopter carrying Iranian high-ranking officials[[55]](#footnote-55).

3) During this course of time, the following aircrafts have conducted operational flights in order to carry out close air support in the west of the country:

- A number of 4 F-4 aircrafts;

- A number of 15 F-5 aircrafts;

- A number of 3 F-14 aircrafts;

- A number of 2Tanker aircrafts[[56]](#footnote-56).

4) Since September 15, 1980, from the northernmost point to the southern coast, the IRIAF conducts armed air patrol. Thus, two F-5s, from the Fourth Airbase, one F-4 from the First Airbase, one F-14 from the Eighth Airbase and one fuel tanker, continuous patroed suspicious movements and air raids special in the western sky of the country, and some in the were in scramble state of alert ready to fly and battle[[57]](#footnote-57).

5) SEMAJA approved a request for close air support mission in the western region with two F-5s equipped with a rocket and shotgun. On September 15, 1980, it was announced to the command post of the Fourth Airbase and emphasized that the mission is urgent and should be carried out as soon as possible. A few minutes later, two F-5Es flew to the region due to the deteriorating situation in the Ilam region.

6) SEMAJA once again sent a near-air support mission from the West with two F-5Es equipped with rocket and cartridges, which was announced at 11:20 to the command post of the Fourth Airbase and emphasized that the mission is urgent and should be carried out as soon as possible. Also, at 11:49, the subject was notified to "Colonel Tabeshfar" for further speed. He stated that, in line with the Ilam Governor's announcement, the situation was very severe and suggested that aircrafts equipped with CBE: Cluster Bomb Unit[[58]](#footnote-58) be deployed to the region.

Two F-5s flew 55 minutes after the mission was launched. Col. Tabeshfar said that since the task of preparing (to take off) the aircrafts is carried out in the hangar, the minimum time to fly is one hour from the moment of the announcement.

7) According to the report of the Fourth Base the activity of the base against the enemy has been as follows since September 15, 1980[[59]](#footnote-59).

- Approximate destruction of 40 tank units;

- Approximate destruction of 20 cars with forces inside;

- Approximate destruction of the facilities of the three Airbases;

- Destruction of ammunition depots.

8) An illuminated object (like an aircraft) flew over Ilam Saleh Abad's checkpoint on the night of September 16, 1980. The Ilam border guards shot down their machine guns, after which it fled away from the checkpoint sky[[60]](#footnote-60).

From September 17, 1980 to September 19, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. In the letter No. 92/5913 on September 17, 1980, the request for the "FRAG”[[61]](#footnote-61) was submitted to the deputy of operation. Requested regions were "Fakkeh" and “Tavusiyeh “of Iraq.
2. On September 17, 1980, the Fourth Airbase and Khuzestan DASK aked readiness on the pincer movement attack was on Doweiraj checkpoint. The base notified that so far, six aircrafts have been assigned to three missions. The Eighth Airbase was also commissioned to fly three F-14 aircrafts in order of priority.
3. According to the IRIAF, at 10:30 on September 17, 1980, one Iraqi MiG (Sukhoi -22) aircraft was toppled in the western part of the country.

Note -1: At this point of time, the “FRAG” or detailed command on counteracting the invasion of the Iraqi Ba'ath army and the attack on checkpoints was formally issued and communicated to the pilots. Also on this day, Saddam Hussein terminated Algiers agreement unilaterally, the Iraqi National Assembly, as a sign of support for its decision, declared: "If Iran does not retreat from the borderlands (from Arvand), the Iraqi Army uses the force to regain them.”

Note - 2: Short memories of Amir Brigadier general Farajollah Baratpour, the operational assistant of Hamedan's Airbase and the leader of the attack on "H-3", will be presented in the next section.

1. According to The Islamic Republic of Iran Army Ground Forces (NEZAJA), at 08:00 on September 18, 1980, the “Dowaeiraj” and “Fakkeh” checkpoints (Mosian and Mehran) were attacked by the Iraqi Artillery. Meanwhile, a number of 70 Iraqi tanks intend to attack the checkpouints that close air support is being requested[[62]](#footnote-62).
2. According to the gendarmerie on September 18, 1980, Iranian aircrafts inflicted huge damage in the enemy forces on Fakkeh -Samida and Dowaeiraj - Safariyah checkpoints, and since the Iraqi Air Force did not react, the attack on the Dezful Airbase is probabile.
3. According to the gendarmerie, at 08:00 approximately 60 tanks with the support of the Artillery attacked Fakkeh and Dowaeiraj checkpoints that forced to retreat by forces stationed at the checkpoints and air support. In the clash, three enemy tanks were destroyed.
4. According to IRIAF, from September 18, 1980 until the next day, 10 sorties of Fighter aircrafts were deployed to air support Orumieh Division 64.

Note: On September 18, 1980 (four days before the Ba'ath regime's full-scale attack), the fall of two F-5E fighter aircrafts by enemy combat in two different flight classes of martyrdom of Capt. Mohammad Zare Nemati), and the captivity of Seyyed al-usarra Martyr Hossein Lashgari created changes in the history of sacred defens[[63]](#footnote-63).

From September 19, 1980 to September 21, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. Several Iraqi aggressor aircrafts were observed by Tabriz Radar at 13:30 on September 19, 1980, over the Oshnavieh sky, and the two F-5s scrambled from a Second Airbase to fight them[[64]](#footnote-64).
2. One F-4 aircraft was deployed to destroy a pedestrian column near Ilam, where the mission was successfully completed.

This month the process of Ba'ath militant aggression accelerated exponentially. The Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army instructed on September 20, 1980 two formal announcements, the full text of which is presented in the first volume of the same series.

1. On September 21, 1980, the Hamadan radar reported that six aircrafts were located in the city of Naftshar and the Somar radar. At 12:19, again, the Defense announced that eight aircrafts were seen in the city of Naftshar and the Somar region and the Third Airbase was ordered scramble flight, and at 12:30, two F-4s scrambled.
2. On September 21, 1980, four F-4s were dispatched to the region to destroy the Iraqi Corps (Zulfiqar or Darafsh project) located at the mouth of Arvandroud. An Uza frigate was shot and destroyed by Maverick missle, as reported by the expedition aircraft.
3. On September 21, 1980, the international air routes known as "B-51", "G-55", "V-3" and "V-11" that are part of the Iraqi air strike threat closed to all International flights[[65]](#footnote-65).

Turning to the process of suspicious movements and frequent air violations by various means to the borders and privacy of the country (comprehensive support for the counter-revolutionaries in the West and planning for a plot "Naghab" for the overthrow of the new system of Iran), the need to respond was inevitable to discover and defuse the leading threats by the armed forces of the country in particular the IRIAF. But a general overview of the events this month shows that the border regions have been undergoing a relatively quiet transition from August 23, 1980 to September 6, 1980.

In response to the above-mentioned measures and to prevent surprises attacks of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime to the western borders of the country, as indicated by the date June 4, 1979 records, the IRIAF command system started Combat Air Patrol flights in the border lines and doubled the number of ready-to-combat aircrafts in the bases adjacent to the western borders, such as the Hamedan Air Base since June 11, 1979 on, which ultimately apparently, put an end to the Iraqi army's air strikes.

Third, from June 24, to March1979, the Iraq air strikes on the Iranian sky continued. These flights, apparently aimed at reconnaissance and assessing the IRIAF defensive power ended in short time due to proximity to the border regions. Obviously, the rapid and effective response to the enemy's aggression was not apparent due to the lack of continued flying of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts (as Combat Air Patrols), as well as the lack of clear instructions for air defense systems (for tracking, reconnaissance and destroying targets).

Of course, some analysts, in the light of the aforementioned, raise the question: How could such an unfounded analysis be of a kind? Is it an enemy who, by spending a lot of financial expense, obtaining valuable military information from the anti-revolutionary fugitives, providing counsel and arms assistance to rebel groups in Kurdistan, and forcing Iran's political involvement into Iraq's affairs following a major invasion into a neighbor's soil retreat from its position so easy?

Since a series of political reasons is involved in justifying the issue and their examination is inconsistent with the purposes for which this book was written, it is in this context that here the book refrains from discussing this topic and leaves final conclusions to scholars of this field and to those who are interested in.

But from the operational aspect, it should be said that apparently after a two-month-long tranquility on the borders, again on September 5, 1979, F-4 fighter aircrafts in Hamedan Airbase were deployed on combat mission as alert in the air to prevent the entry of tanks and armored vehicles of the Ba'ath regime into the borders of Iran.

Hence, the expeditionary teams from the IRIAF inspection closely examined the technical dimensions of these accidents, but only slightly analyzed the pathology of the subject and provided practical solutions (to prevent similar incidents). Apart from these issues, the design of a hijacking event should be considered as the major event of August and the captivity of Seyyed al-Usara Pilot Lashgari and Missed Zare Nemati as the main events of September (September 18, 1980), which again placed the Air Force in the spotlight of the media and public opinion.

Here we do not want to recall what has happened, but to attract the attention of interested people to the fact that the IRIAF from the beginning of 1979 despite the weakening of its command system and its hierarchy and other problems, including operational and logistics deficiencies was ready to dispose of enemy aggression, and operating instructions was the methods of interception and engagement with aggressive aircrafts, but the revolutionary atmosphere of the ruling state was such that the threats of the enemy were not taken seriously and, consequently, the power to act and make decisive decisions were somehow out of the IRIAF hands. Even Iraq's action in confusing the international community's minds with the Iranian hostile attitudes and intervention has not been able to capture the views of the country's political officials on the capabilities of the IRIAF (in the reduction of the crisis).

Therefore, valuable opportunities that could have at least be preventive (deterrence) disappeared easily so that the ambitious leader of Iraq would take bigger and more secure steps towards his aggressive intentions.

Hence, the IRIAF defensive and usual measures not only did not create fears at the heart of the Iraqi Ba'ath's autocrats, but did not deserve the powerful air force of a revolutionary country.

The Iraqi air raids were less associated with shooting and bombing, and in contrast, most of the flights were in the form of reconnaissance of the region. Although Iraq started its martial targets slightly balanced in September, but in this regard, the astuteness of The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force may not be overlooked. By proving the seemingly hidden enemy intentions, the IRIAF began to make regular night-time flights from the beginning of the August 23, 1980. These flights, often AIMED AT reconnaissance, contained a message of authority and combat readiness of the IRIAF that in the defense of the sky of the country; a message that could have been meaningful and alarming for the Ba'ath party's command, but Iraqi commanders was unable to analyze such messages due to the enthusiasm for reaching a large part of the southern regions of Iran.

From September 6, 1980 to September 22, 1980 in an unexpected turn, the two sides are witnessing a semi-full-scale war. The gradual deployment of the Iraqi Army in the western and southern border forced the IRIAF to expand its operational range. The Iraqi air strike, then the ground invasion of Mehran and Saleh Abad, and the immediate presence of Iranian air force bombers over Iraqi forces, were the beginning of the crisis on September 22, 1980 onward. Eventually the promised moment came, and the Ba'ath Party's ambitious leader, who was impatiently waiting for a command of attack to his army, found the reason for the beginning of the war; an extremely worthwhile excuse that, in a sense, landed as heavenly mother in his filthy lap. On the afternoon of September 18, 1980, 1st Lt. Hossein Lashgari on a combat air patrol flight in the western part of the country (45 kilometers west of Abdanan) was fired by the nemy and being landed by parachute was captured by Ba'athist forces. Now, from the perspective of Saddam Hussein, Iran could have been introduced as the initiator of the war. Therefore, the last obstacle in the aftermath of a war of attrition was also removed, and after four days of propaganda abuse of Hussein Lashgari on the international level, Iraq began an all-out attack on Iran.

Therefore, the enemy, in order to achieve its goals and planning to surrender, compromise or transform the Islamic Revolution of Iran by obtaining the consent and protection of the East and West and global arrogance, began its invasion of Iran and thus began the eight- year imposed war against our beloved homeland. At the end of this topic, the enemy's aggression Table 2-1 illustrated the enemy air stikes from March 21, 1980 to September 22, 1980.

Table 2-1 Iraq air stikes on Iran (from March 21, 1980 March 21, 1980 to)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| March 21, 1980 to April 20, 1980 | April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980 | May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980 | June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980 | July 23, 1980 to August 22, 1980 | August 23, 1980 to March 21, 1980 to |
| 293 | 64 | 85 | 71 | 57 | 33 |

**D- Memories of Amir Brigadier Pilot Mohammad Reza Ataei and Amir Brigadier Pilot Farajollah Baratpour**

this section predents the first Phoenix missile launched in the history of the air strikes that resulted in the overthrow of the enemy MiG-21 fighter, as well as a review of the events of September 14, 1980 to September 20, 1980, quoted by two of the Sacred Defense pioneers (Amir Brigadier Mohammad Reza Ataei and Amir Brigadier, Farajollah Baratpour):

1. Amir Brigadier Pilot Mohammad Reza Ataei and firing the first Phoenix missile

Amir Brigadier Pilot Mohammad Reza Ataei was born in Hamedan on October 11, 1945. Having graduated from high school entered the Air Force technical unit on October 22, 1965, he and was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel. Then he entered the Pilot School in 1969, and in that same year he was sent to the United States on a jet piloting course, and on April 28, 1971, he was awarded a pilot's name and transferred to the Dezful Airbase. He initially served as the F-5s pilot with two thousand hours of flight and a thousand hours’ pilot training at Dezful Airbase. After a while, on February 3, 1977, he traveled to the United States for a F-14 flight training course, and at Horsiana's base passed advanced aircraft classes togather with pilots such as Martyr Brigadier General Hashem Al Agha, Amir Brigadier Shahram Rostami, Brigadier Abolfazl Houshyar, Yadollah Khalili, Khalil Dashti Zadeh and ... and returned to the country on September 2, 1977. After the Islamic Revolution victory, he was appointed to the command of the battalion of 81 battalions at the 8th Airbase on September 6, 1980 ranking Major until on 1981 when he was appointed as Support Assistant, and then on November 11, 1982 accepted the deputy of operation post at the 8th Airbase of Isfahan at the time when Shahid Abbas Babaei was commander of that Airbase.

He was promoted to the post of Colonel on December 1, 1983 and was appointed to the Commander of the Airbase, and then he was sent to Tehran on September 15, 1985 for one year to complete the "School of Command and Staff" courses. On September 6, 1986, he was appointed to the command of the Isfahan Airbase and was honored to the rank of second general on December 22, 1988. Brigadier Ataei was appointed to the Air Force Planning and Assistance Program on February 1, 1990 until he was reinstated in retirement on October 22, 1996; however, after several months, due to organizational needs reemployed as Advisor to General Dr. Firoozabadi in the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and eventually retired in 2000. This Amir of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army has flown over four thousand hours.

And firing the first Phoenix missile in Iran's sky

Amir Brigadier Pilot Mohammad Reza Ataei, in his memoirs, says:

... I'll get back a bit. After revolution some said that the F-14 is an expensive aircraft, and we do not need it, and we have to sell it, so they completely cut off the flights of this strategic aircraft, and we only were three or four pilots who had a sortie flight per week, the rest of us all landed.

To keep the pilots busy, we would tell all of them to go to the classroom. I said at the time I was a battalion commander, we sent the fellow pilots every two months on a 10 t0 15 days’ vacation, having finished the classes. And again when they were back I would ask them to attend the classroom.

The fellow pilots were completely up-to-date on the data, but did not fly, and it was about a year and a half that the pilots did not fly. It was about two months before the outbreak of war that some clashes occurred in the borderline and we thought of preparing the F-14 fighter as soon as possible. We checked each single pilot with the coordination of the Chief of Staff and send them to the war zones.

Given the changes in the state of alert level from June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980, it is concluded that the decision to reduce the state of alert level has been taken only for the continuation of the flight requirements (maintaining the skill level of the pilots), since in the "B-3 " state of alert, all the aircrafts in accordance with the inactive defense plan should be deployed in a hangar or shelter, and operational aircrafts should be loaded with ammunition (while conducting training flights with ammunition is not possible). But on the other hand, in those acute circumstances, the consequences of exposing the failed coup of "Neghab[[66]](#footnote-66)" on the combat readiness of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Air Force cannot be ignored.

At first we did not have a war experience at all. However, we began Combat Air Patrols in different regions.

In one of the missions, two F-4s launched to carry out on the frontier mission were to be covered by two F-14s, one of which was piloted by me and Pashapur was in the rear cabin. Amir Shahram Rostami was also on another aircraft.

The F-4s completed the mission and returned. We were on the way back when the radar announced that an aircraft was approaching our aircraft, and if we were ready for the conflict? I was the leader, I checked and there was enough gasoline, so announce our readiness. I said: “we will fight and then land in Dezful, and then the radar declared readiness.

Mr. Rostami, who was piloting the second aircraft, said that his aircraft gasoline was not in a very good condition. I told him you land, and I'll get involved. We found the target in our radar and it was moving towards us. We cut the speed so we can hit it inside our own soil. At the same time, two other aircrafts took off from the Kut Airbase, which we also observed at the aircraft radar.

Radar has announced that two other aircrafts took off on the runway to help the first aircraft and are flying towards you. I said again, we'll get involved in the fight. As they crossed the border and we flew towards them, the other two aircrafts also took off from Kut Airbase to help them (now they were five enemy aircrafts).

We had reduced the speed to give them more time to get into our soil. When we started to intercept, we had twenty-seven or twenty- eight miles away, but the aircrafts came to the borderline and returned.

We could easily hit the target even before, but according to the command, we waited them to get inside our soil.

Having returned the Iraqi aircrafts, I flew back to Isfahan. as I was flying to Isfahan, the radar informed me that there were four aircraft s chasing you, and since I flew a lot in Dezful and many times I flew inside Iraqi territory on educational flight and no aircrafts had dared to take off, on the same basis, I flew a bit further and thought they would return, the radar announced, there are still four chasing you.

I figured they should now be in our territory. I quickly told Pashapur to find them on the radar to align our direction with them, but the four aircrafts turned back.

I checked the gasoline and there was little, I asked the radar to coordinate with Dezful for landing there. As I was going down to Dezful, the radar said one an aircraft is approaching from behind, as I quickly returned that this one was not among those fours and probably they had planned to catch us.

I looked at the radar, and I saw a very low altitude flying aircraft. Perhaps they also told it to return, but he had not heard due to low altitude flight, and came forward, we approached it.

The F-14's radar automatically announced the appropriate time for firing, as it has signs. In short, we arrived at the time when the missile was firing, and I said to Pashapur: Mr. Pashapur, fire. He also complimented and said: “you fire”.

Image 10-1 Major Mohammad Reza Ataei: The first pilot who succeeded in overthrowing an Iraqi Air Force aircraft on September 10, 1980 during an attack on Mimak with a Phoenix rocket.

So I pressed the release button and rocket launcher from the cabin! Until then, nobody had shot the Phoenix in the real battleground[[67]](#footnote-67). Even the manufacturer of this semi-strategic intercept aircraft country (The US) itself; we pressed the button anyway.

To cut it short, we fired (I shot), I thought that the rocket dropped down, so I drove the aircraft and saw the smoke of rocket firing. Until then, I had not fired Phoenix, and nobody else had practical experience in the battlefield. After the rocket launches, the display screen inside the front and rear cabin of the F-14, it shows that the rocket will hit the target in a few seconds. The screen read five seconds and started counting down to four, three, two, one, and zero, and the target disappeared from the radar screen.

And we were waiting for the rocket to launch immediately. We saw something fell below the aircraft. I did not remember how to shoot Phoenix at that time. Having been launched, the Phoenix first cut off from its base on the aircraft and fells down, then its engine starts and moves to the target.

Usually we carried two Phoenix rockets. After the rocket launches, it begins to soar and, given the speed and altitude of the aircraft, the computer itself will tell the missile how much to soar and you see it easily in front of the aircraft, then it drops at high speed and usually the pilot no longer sees it.

The target being disappeared from the radar screen means that the rocket had hit the target, and also the radar informed: hit the target and confirmed it. Later, however, they said that he had fainted from the emotion he had.

Because there was no longer an opportunity and there was little gasoline, I quickly turned to Dezful and kept telling the radar to tell Dezful that the F-14 would come up to land in and tell the defenses comrades not fire on us because the situation was red, I repeated this quite frequently that radar said I swear to the Prophet that everyone is being informed. Finally we landed in Dezful and then, Mr.Yazdanshenas was the deputy of operations of the Airbase, and the fellow comrades approached our aircraft and carried pilots on hands and left to flying battalions.

In the afternoon, the Dezful Airbase fellow comrades were operating. I told Major Yazdanshenas, "This has happened and it is likely that the Iraqis will attack the base, be cautious," said Major Yazdanshenas. "If I permitted, I will destroy all Iraqi soil."

In the afternoon, the F-5 fellow comrades wanted to do the operation, they told me: "Are you flying as our top cover (air cover)?

I said, "In coordination with the IRIAF headquarters in Tehran, I will".

The IRIAF headquarters in Tehran did not agree and said that Ataei should be stationed in Dezful, we will fly "F-14" from Esfahan to top cover. That is all what went on! ....

Amir Brigadier, Farajullah Bartupour, Deputy Chief of Operations of Third Airbase

Here is a brief note of the memoirs of the aforementioned Amir referred to as "Heroes, Commanders of the Defense Air Battles, including the Leader of attack on “H-3”[[68]](#footnote-68), on the events before the start of the Iraqi full-scale invasion as follows:

"When the Iraq invaded our country on September 17, we were in a full readiness in the Air Force, and at that time I was responsible for the operational and logistical deputy of the Hamedan base (Shahid Nojeh), according to the forecast and the information of the past (were collecting data for about two months, perhaps three months, we collected different data, and the data increased on a daily basis on that Iraq builds trenches and settles forces. ...) and we had this information, and according to this information, our aircrafts were fully prepared from August 23, 1980 and we predicted that Iraq could raid at any moment. There were Air combat between us and the Iraqi aircrafts since August 23, 1980 and I remember that on September 8, 1980 one of our aircrafts was shot on Khosravi border by Iraqi anti-aircraft rockets and the rear cabin pilot was martyred[[69]](#footnote-69).

On September 15, 1980 Iraqi troops attacked Iran territory between the " Tangab Naw and Tangab Kohneh" from Qasr-e-shirin to "the city of Naftshahr and the Sumar"; there were heights that dominated the road, and the Iraqis seized there, while dominating the region, the road was closed by Iraqi forces and our forces could not move.

That day, given that the martyr Falahi, the martyr Fakori, the martyr Kolahdooz and the late Zahir Nejad were in the garrison of Sarpol Zahab. They asked me to go there. The martyr Fakori called me and I was in Hamedan, so I went there, they told me that they came and took this part and said:

“We want your aircrafts to come and bombard here”.

Given that I returned back from "Sarpul Zahab" at 4 o'clock, however, I arrived at the base and we took off six aircrafts on about 5:30 PM to 6 PM and bombe there with a variety of ammunition[[70]](#footnote-70).

Image 11-1 Maj. Farajollah Bartupour, Deputy Commander of the Third Airbase Shahid Nogheh (Hamadan), leader of the attack on "H-3" and of the prominent Heroes of the Sacred Defense

**3- An overview of attacks on Iran by Iraqi Ba'ath and other countries armies**

Here we first discuss the foreign countries army’s attacks on Iran sky, which is considered as a sign of their suspicious movements during the Islamic Revolution to the outbreak of imposed war in Tables 3.1 and 4.1, and then the raids of the Ba'ath regime's army in Table 5 .1, and, finally, the Iraqi invasions are displayed in 3.1 and4.1 figures to bring the minds of the readers.

1. **Foreign countries attacks**

Table 3.1. Afghanistan Air Raids to the Islamic Republic of Iran

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Date | Region | How to cross borders | Comments |
| 10/11/1358 | Modares checkpoint | About four kilometers to attack in Iran | - |
| 20/12/1358 | Between the border bars 61and 62 | A dual-engine aircraft with two red circles in the body returned to Afghanistan after two minutes of flight over the 64th bar. | Gazik checkpoint border guards report |
| 20/12/1358 | Between the border bars 60 and 61 | A gray dual-engine aircraft returned to Afghanistan after two minutes of flight at a height of 1500 feet from the border between the 64 and 65 border bars.. | Gazik checkpoint border guards report |
| 10/1/1359 | Between the border bars | A jet of Afghani entered the 2nd border bar and flew to Do Ab region, followed by a blast from inside Afghanistan. | The type of explosion and its cause were not determined |

Nevertheless, the Iraqi Army attacked Iranian borders for 637 times before its full-scale attack, 130 of airstrikes, 17 marine raids and 90 ground attacks[[71]](#footnote-71).

1. Table 4.1: Border air strikes and illuminated objects registered from February 12, 1979 to September 22, 1980

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| General Iraqi Airstrikes | The US Airstrikes | The Soviet Union Airstrikes | Afghanistan  Airstrikes | Illuminating objects | Unidentified Aircrafts |
| 717 | 71 | 83 | 34 | 102 | 17 |

In order to clarify the minds of enthusiasts and researchers, the Iraqi air raids from March 21, 1979 to the end of September 22, 1980 are presented in the following Tables and Figure on a monthly basis, along with general air strikes, marine raids and ground attacks[[72]](#footnote-72).

In general Figures, blue (gray) represents ground attacks, and red (dark) represents Air strikes and white represents marine cases.

Table 5 - 1 Recorded Violations of Iraqi Ba'athist Army before the outbreak of Imposed War on Iran

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Time period | The number of strikes |
| From  March 21, 1979 to June 21, 1979 | 14 |
| From June 22, 1979 to September 22, 1979 | 11 |
| From September 23, 1979 to December 21, 1979 | 26 |
| From December 22, 1979 to March 19, 1980 | 23 |
| From March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980 | 143 |
| From June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980 | 420 |

The above information and statistics also confirm the fact that the closer to the time of the full-scale Iraqi invasion, the Iraqi attacks are more intense and extensive.

**B- The Enemy Attacks Figure**

The enemy Air, Ground and Marine attacks including the Iraqi Ba'ath army attacks were shown in Figures 1.3 to 1.5 on monthly basis from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1980.

Figure 1.3 Iraqi Airstrikes from March 21, 1980 to September 22, 1979

Figure 1.4 the overall trend of the Iraqi Army's dispersed raids into the borders of the Iran during March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1979

Diagram 4-1 (Ground attacks: light and long; Airstrikes: dark; and Marine raids: white and short)

Diagram 1.5 the overall trend of the Iraqi Army's dispersed raids into the borders of the Iran during March 21, 1980 to September 22, 1980

(Ground attacks: light and long; Airstrikes: dark; and Marine raids: white and short)

By comparing Figures 1.4 and 1.5 with regard to the Iraqi Army's dispersed attacks from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1980, it is concluded that these raids were much more intense and more frequent from 1980, indicating the increased support of the great powers and Arab rulers from Saddam (especially from June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980); consequently, the Iraqi army, given the diplomatic moves of the country has had more freedom to carry out its offensive plans.

In order to provide a clear understanding of the depth of the enemy's raids, the Air, Ground and Marine attacks of ​​Iraq, border violations from March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1980 are shown in Figure 1.6, as well as the dispersal attacks of the Iraqi army from March 21, 1980 to September 22, 1980 is shown in Figure 1.7.

Figure 1.6. The Air, Ground and Marine attacks by the Iraqi Army against the land, air and sea borders of the IRI from March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1980

Figure 1.7: The trend of Iraqi Army attacks from December 22, 1979 to September 22, 1980

Looking at the above diagrams, we can see the growth of the raging raids of the Iraqi Ba'ath army from March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980 to September 22, 1980

Notably, it is the increase in the number of Iraqi air strikes during May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980, which is increasing more than during March 21, 1980 to April 20, 1980, and the ascending increase during August 23, 1980 to September 22, 1980, which is significantly higher than in June 22, 1980 to August 22, 1980.

In those days, the newly formed unit of the "Electronic Information and Reconnaissance Command", which was responsible for monitoring the electromagnetic spectrum of peripheral countries, was able to obtain valuable information about the purposes of the Ba'ath army forces and the intentions of its commanders[[73]](#footnote-73). According to the information received from the unit, the Iraqi Air Force had been in combat readiness since March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1980, and the general plan for military operations was likely to attack the airspace and land of the Islamic Republic of Iran (this probability took more definitive form during March 20, 1980 to March 19, 1981). Iraq also focused on its Air Force flight operations, and its radar systems have been seriously involved in conducting Iraqi air strikes in long-range bombing, intercepting and targeting. On the other hand, the data contained in the Alborz intelligence appendix indicated that the Iraqi Air Force, one year before the onset of the imposed war, had moved and expanded the MiG-23 from Al-Walid's base in the west to the eastern and border regions of Iran.

1. The expansion of the aircrafts to eastern bases was the evidence of an unexpected event that could be meaningful to the air force from a military point. The operation of this fighter, along with a variety of ground-based radar systems, has led to the creation of a protective loop on the border of Iraq. Hearing radio conversations from the enemy's commanders at the brigade-to-top levels also represents a predictable event and, in fact, was the beginning of a coordinated, heavy, and all-out strike. Factors such as the development of airborne aircrafts at all air bases (with the number of nearly 600 aircrafts and more than 160 helicopters), the deployment of missile defense units and anti-aircraft Artillery in all four vulnerable defense zones[[74]](#footnote-74) with a capacity of near 30 radar warning stations and more than 116 advanced tactical radar systems in 28 bases and focal regions and more importantly, a systematic program for training technical and flight personnel were among the undoubted reasons that led to the analysis by “Electronic Information and Reconnaissance Command” on the upcoming attack on Iranian soil.[[75]](#footnote-75)

The plan of missions before the imposed war

At the end of this chapter, a schedule of operational actions, missions and numbers of flying sorties of combat missions, Combat Air Patrols, and educational flights carried out from the first day of the Islamic revolution victory to the outbreak of the imposed war from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1980, divided into two sections of the fighter aircrafts and transport aircraft, is as follows:

**A) The number of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts missions**

1. The missions of the various types of fighters at the various the IRIAF Airbases, including combat and training, from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1980, has been the number of 13112 flying sorties or was estimated as follows:
2. From the first day of the Islamic Revolution victory up to the first day of the imposed war (from February 12, 1979 to September 22, 1980), the number of 1805 flying sorties or combat flights by types of fighter aircraft has already been recorded in the documents of daily events of command center of the IRIAF, all are listed in Table 1.6.

Table 1.6 Types of missions and fighter aircraft flights from the victory of the Islamic Revolution to the onset of the war.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Close air support | Visual Reconnaissance | Air Cover | Low altitude high speed flight |
| 967 sorties | 194 sorties | 146 sorties | 61 sorties |
| Air cover or Combat Air Patrol | Air support at the request of the Revolutionary Guards | Night patrol flight | Scramble |
| 62 | 10 | 42 | 188 |
| Escort flight | Expansion flight | Solidarity flight and air parade | Special flight + photography |
| 20 | 12 | 13 | 57+33=90 |

Note: The table above presents missions and flights that are often undertaken to strengthen the forces of self and counteract the aggression of the enemy or deceived counterrevolutionary agents, and basically current flights, training requirements and even some combat missions such as scrambles available to Defense Centers, or the display of power flights and ... not being recorded in the IRIAF headquarters records are not included in this table.

2) The total number of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts flights of various types according to the documents available at the Deputy of Training and Support of the Air Force Command, from March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1980, are 8651 sorties (4077 from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1979 and 4574 from September 23, 1979 to March 19, 1980 ), and from March 21, 1980 to September 22, 1980, 4461 sorties (A total of 13112 sorties), which are shown in Figures 1.8 to 1.10, respectively.[[76]](#footnote-76)

Figure 1.8 The operational activity of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts in term of flying sorties from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1979 (totaling 4077 sorties)

Figure 1.9 The operational activity of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts in term of flying sorties from September 23, 1979 to March 19, 1980 (totaling 4574 sorties)

Figure 1.10 The operational activity of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts in term of flying sorties from March 21, 1980 to September 22, 1980 (totaling 4461 sorties)

**B) The IRIAF various types of transport aircrafts mission and operations**

The IRIAF various types of transport aircrafts and helicopters mission and operations, including: combat service support, marine reconnaissance and air fueling, support routes, personnel movements, training, etc. from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1980, has been estimated the number of 10302 sorties (9792 transport and 510 Helicopters) as follows:

1. From the first day of the Islamic Revolution victory up to the first day of the imposed war (from 23/11/1357 to 31/6/1359), the number of 3125 flying sorties or combat flights by types of transport aircraft and 510 sorties by the IRIAF helicopters have already been recorded in the documents of daily events of command center of the IRIAF, all humanitarian mission’s flights and operations carried out through the transportation system are listed in Tables 1.7 and 1.8, respectively.

Table 1.7 Types of humanitarian missions for the IRIAF aircrafts and helicopters

2 161 4

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Support for Daylam flood victims | support flight for Qayin earthquake [[77]](#footnote-77) | Carrying money | Helping affected workers |
| 3 Sorties | 19 Sorties | 31 Sorties | 50 Sorties |
| Carry meat from overseas | Support for Sistan & Balochestan flood victims | Support for Fars flood victims | Support for Khozestan flood victims |
| 40 | 20 | 3 available helicopters | 219 |
|  | Helicopter flying to distribute flyers | Helicopter flying to support | Climbers Rescue helicopter |
|  | 2 | 161 | 4 |

Table 1.8 Types of missions carried out by the IRIAF transport aircrafts and helicopters from the Islamic Revolution victory to the onset of the imposed war.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Air transportation support | Marine patrol | Transportation of government officials and political leaders | Carrying force, load and grocery |
| 608 sorties | 188 sorties | 390 sorties | 500 sorties |
| Carry equipment | Carry ammunition | Carry prisoners | Air transportation support for the Revolutionary Guards |
| 102 sorties | 84 sorties | 50 sorties | 434 sorties |
| Carry blood | Carry martyred bodies | Carry wounded | Support for institutions |
| 7 | 153 | 95 | 194 |
| Transportation of Basij with equipment | Identification of Intelligence flight | Dispatched medical team | Parachute and unload |
| 2 | 8 | 34 | 28 |
| Transportation of forces based in Golan | (Damavand Plan) transportation and support of Oman-based forces | Educational flights | Counter-revolutionary arrested prisoners transportation |
| 8 | 20 | 176 | 7 |
| Transportation of medicine from Rasht to Zabol | Gendarmerie artifacts | Inactive Defense Assessment | Clerical Transportation + Air Fueling |
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 39=35+4 |

2) The total number of flights of the various transport types of the IRIAF aircrafts in accordance with the documents in the Deputy of Training and Support of the Air Force Command during the year 1358 are recorded as 4262 sorties (1955 sorties from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1979 and 2307 from September 23, 1979 to March 19, 1980) and from March 21, 1980 is the number of 2770 sorties (total 7032), shown in Figures 1.11 to 1.13, respectively[[78]](#footnote-78).

Figure 1.11 Operational activity of the various transport types of the IRIAF aircrafts in terms of flying sorties March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1979 (total 1955 sorties).

Figure 1.12 Operational activity of the various transport types of the IRIAF aircrafts in terms of flying sorties from September 22, 1979 to March 19, 1980 (total 2307 sorties).

Figure 1. 13 Operational activity of the various transport types of the IRIAF aircrafts in terms of flying sorties from September 22, 1980 to March 19, 1981 (total 2770 sorties).

3) The total number of operational flights of all types of the IRIAF helicopters, according to documents available in the Deputy of Training and Support of the Air Force Command, from March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1980, are 301 sorties (106 from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1979 and 195 from September 23, 1979 to March 19, 1980), and from March 19, 1980 to September 22, 1980, the number of 209 sorties and a total number of 510 operational flying sorties have been recorded March 19, 1980 to September 22, 1980 to the outbreak of the imposed war.

4) For all types of aircrafts, including all types of fighter-aircrafts, transport- aircrafts and helicopters, from the first day of the victory of the Islamic Revolution to the first day of the outbreak of the Sacred Defense in accordance with the Deputy of Training and Support of the Air Force Command documents equals to 20 654 flying sorties (excluding coefficients of air fueling and transport routes). In the first half of 1359, the number of 7440 operations was carried out at various the IRIAF Airbases[[79]](#footnote-79).

5) During the course of the aforementioned period, there were an average of 38 flying sorties per day, which is on average at least three operational flight per each one of the IRIAF nine operational Airbases!? And 13 flying sorties per both transport Airbases daily, namely on average six flying sorties per each. This has definitely affected the pilots' reduced flying skill.

Given the suspicious movements and aggression of the enemy, and given the events of the previous months, it was very natural that the period of August 23, 1980 to September 22, 1980 differs far from previous months. At the end of this period of time, finally, the sweet dreams of the rulers of Baghdad came to fruition, and in the hope of a great conquest, Iraq launched the full-scale attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the pages below, briefly provide the events of August 23, 1980 to September 22, 1980as follows:

Threats, raids and defensive measures (From August 23, 1980 to September 5, 1980):

1) The IRIAF headquarters (according to the information received) sent letter No. 2640 to all bases and units: "The August 23 and 25, the security of the radar shall be ensured and operational, and the ground-to-air defense shall be 100% ready.”

(2) Two Iraqi helicopters were identified and patrolled on a low altitute flight on August 23, 1980in the checkpoint region (25km west) conducting reconnaissance.

3) One day later, two MiG aircrafts flew over Qasr-e-Shirin to allow Iraqi air strikes. State of alert is required on air defense units and Airbases.

4) On August 25, 1980, the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth bases (due to American threats) were notified to be on a state of alert for the scramble.

5) On August 27, 1980, two F-4s (after the establishment of an Airborne Provisional Officer) were currently being deployed by the IRIAF to provide close air support for Paveh region and 72 kilometers west of Sanandaj.

6) On August 27, 1980, on the coordination of the navy and air forces it was supposed to carry out marine patrol on two occasions in the morning and afternoon.

7) On August 28, 1980, at the request of Kermanshah DASC, a Third Airbase deployed a F-4 aircraft equipped with a shotgun and a bomb, but the pilot (due to lack of contact with the Airborne Provisional Officer) did not succeeded on throwing ammo. So, at the expense of the rules, he left the bombs in region (the protected region of ​​shooting and aerial bombardment) and returned to the base. Kermanshah DASK again requested a bomber, but with sunset and flight restrictions at night, arming of the aircraft was not possible. So, in coordination with the director of the Kermanshah DASC, an aircraft was sent with a rocket and a shotgun, and the result of the mission was announced to SEMAJA.

**Chapter II:**

**The state of alert in the IRIAF and the process of implementation of the Alborz plan**

The first volume of this collection, “The History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense”, presents the most important operational measures against the foreign forces in the Kurdistan and western regions of the country and other post-revolutionary events, along with the aggressive actions of the enemy, the elaboration of the Alborz plan and the defensive measures taken by the IRIAF and the disasters[[80]](#footnote-80); the previous chapter dealt with the dispersed air raids of the Iraqi Army until the start of the full-scale air raids and the measures taken by the IRIAF to counteract them.

This chapter first addresses the instructions related to the combat operations in the army, along with the method of carrying out the combat and operational missions of the Air Force in brief, in order provide knowledge on the "general state of alert process in the IRIAF on days leading to the imposed war," first, then the operational readiness process of the IRIAF is explained using the "Operation Alborz Plan" and "Combat Commands based on it", based on credible documents and resources, along with the stages of the IRIAF combat operations on the Operation Alborz Plan and Command, and the problems ahead as well as related SEMAJA meetings. Then, some important parts of Operation Alborz Plan and the IRIAF state of alert from March 19, 1980 to September 22, 1980 are referred to. In the end, the combat power of the two Army forces of Iran and Iraq prior to the beginning of the war is being described in detail as well as the IRIAF overall state of alert of the various aircrafts. Before proceeding to the discussion, it should be recalled that after the conquest of the US Embassy in Tehran, the comprehensive plan of the "Alborz Battle" was revised and on November 18, 1979, it was sent to the relevant authorities being signed by the IRIAF command of the time.

Accordingly, the combat command "Alborz" was approved by the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, and was notified to the Air Force from March 21, 1980 to April 20, 1980 one of the items listed is to confront the movements of the Iraqi army's forces at the western borders of Iran.

1. **Commands related to combat operations and combat mission execution**

In general, in the military and in the planning of military operations, there are a variety of "operational orders” that are briefly presented below:

1. The Battle Order, which is adapted from the operational order and can be considered as an "operational order" alone.
2. The Combat Order, which is adapted from the battle order and this is also an "operational order" alone.
3. The Formation Order or "Battle Arrangement" or "Battlefield Arrangement", which is adapted from Combat Order and is still an "operational order" alone.
4. Tactic Order, which is adapted from Formation Order and is an "operational order" alone.
5. The Fire Order, which is adapted from Tactic Order and is still an "operational order".
6. The Fragmented Order, which are issued and approved by the commander of the unit or commander of the battlefield following each of the above orders and communicated to the units under the command. This is also an "operational order" alone.

For more familiarity with the military aviation skills, it is noted that if the "fire order" is executed at 10 o'clock in the morning, the commander of the received unit who intends to notify it to one of his commanders, justifies the commander on the mission only by sending a "fragmented order", and holds fire in the destruction of the target.

Now, with this brief awareness and attention to the process of implementing the types of missions as described in the header of the first chapter, the following describes in detail the IRIAF state of alert process in the pre-enemy pre-emptive strike phase.

1. **The state of alert and implementation process of the Operation Alborz**

Given the successive changes March 19, 1980 to September 22, 1980, and considering the importance of the IRIAF state of alert and a better understanding of the process of preparation, in this section, the subject matter was studied more carefully so that to provide readers and researchers with a more comprehensive understanding of the IRIAF state of alert, the trend and ups and downs in the air force.

From October 23, 1980 to November 22, 1980, after the Seizure of the U.S Embassy and the highlighting of the Iraqi military threats, initial actions were initiated by the IRIAF Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, measures were also taken to revise the operational plans and the unit’s state of alert, which on the November 17, 1979 the air defense command units were first announced the "A-3" state of alert, which meant the possibility of the outbreak of the war.

Until then on April 7, 1980, by announcing the first state of alert "A-3" by the head of SEMAJA, until the last state of alert on September 22, 1980, the premier air bases and the defense system quiet often were on "A-3" and "B-3" states of alert. In this section, to provide a clearer picture of the state of alert and the IRIAF measures, briefly, firstly, we discuss the problems of the Operation Alborz after the final determination of the enemy's invasion followed by the operational measures taken by the IRIAF, and in the end, we address the process of state of alert “A-3” to “B-3” and the changes made (daily or monthly) in accordance with the documents and sources available at the IRIAF Office of Strategic Studies.

1. **Operations Alborz Command and Challenges**

According to the "Alborz Combat Order" the state of alert “B-3” meant that bomber-fighter aircrafts of the Air Force were prepared to attack critical targets on the enemy's soil with a variety of conventional ammunition.

**The IRIAF state of alert from March 19, 1980 to September 22, 1980:**

With the increasing likelihood of the Iraqi invasion from April 7, 1980, the "A-3" defensive situation was communicated to the base by the Army's air force. However, third and fourth (Hamadan and Dezful) bases were in the "B-3" state of alert due to their central position. Although the Dezful, Tabriz and Hamedan bases were actually involved in the war with the enemy since the March 19, 1980 to September 22, 1980, the Air Force has not yet received a decisive order to implement the Operation Alborz Battle Command, and instead of a crossroads to enemy bases and installations, they defended the country's sky.

In fact, the "Operation Alborz Comprehensive Plan" was carrying the structure planned before the victory of the revolution, but undergone changes appropriate to the Islamic Republic's defense strategy and doctrine. The final announcement, in the form of an "operational order" to the Air Force bases on July 18, 1980 (two months before the outbreak of the war), is in some ways to be discussed, including:

"The Alborz Battle Order" was received by the IRIAF in the circumstances, that this force had been involved in intense intentions and hostile riot schemes in the west of the country months ago (about 20 months before the victory of the Islamic Revolution)[[81]](#footnote-81). It seems that the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, based on their existential nature and their intrinsic mission, must necessarily follow the trail of a targeted plot by an outside enemy in the west of the country, so that the activities of the forces under the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran command arranged in the proper direction on the revision of the defensive plan and in general, the combat readiness to prevent a national crisis. Of course, all the command elements in the army were aware of the unfortunate events in the West and had fairly detailed news of the subject. For example:

* Overthrowing a F-4E fighter in the Paveh region and the martyrdom of Major Mohammad Nojeh and 1st Lt. Bashiri Mousavi on August 16, 1979؛;
* The occurrence of two air crashes for the IRIAF, respectively, in March 1978 in Kurdistan and July 1979 at the border of Shalamche[[82]](#footnote-82);
* Development of two mechanized Iraqi forces on the border of Ilam on May 8, 1980;
* Iraqi airstrikes on parts of Ilam province and bombarded Saleh Abad village on the same day;
* Increased the number of Iranian deported from Iraq to the Islamic Republic of Iran on May 11, 1980
* Overthrow two fighter-bombers F-5E and captived Hossein Lashgari, along with the disappearance of Captain Mohammad Zare Nemati on September 18, 1980.

These events and similar events (before and after) with the continual aggression of Iraqi aircrafts to the Iran sky, the full description of which is given in the first chapter; all and all could in some way extract the possible solutions from the current instructions to first design and then execute (tactical) operations. Just like that and in the aftermath of the following days, the lack of appropriate and on time analysis of these events on the northwest, west, and southwestern borders of the country caused for a variety of reasons led to waste of time and delay in the transfer of battle orders to forces, including the air force, prior to the outbreak of the war.[[83]](#footnote-83)

Figure 2.1 the image of the MiG-23 fighter, known as the "flagger" made of the former Soviet Union, constituting the main body of the Iraqi Air Force.

It is once again recalled that at a critical time that the Alborz Battle Order issued to the Air Force, a significant number of experienced commanders and specialist staff were already redeemed or retired early, and as a result, the combat power of the IRIAF was reduced[[84]](#footnote-84).

Thus, the Air Force began to develop operational orders from the Operation Alborz Battle Guide, which, on the one hand, faced with training problems, and, on the other hand, although defending against the enemy's dispersed attacks (was clearly defined as the first mission of The Air Force in this order, however, because of the fundamental changes in this order and its adaptation to the provisions of the Islamic Revolution and the guidelines or defense doctrine, the freedom of the air force to select pre-emptive operations and practices was faced with limitations).

With such a background, as stated above, on January 18, 1/ 1359, the state of alert order is issued by from the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army. But, it was rightly clear at this point of time that raising the level of the state of alert from the "A-3" to “B-3" could put the forces that have been on the state of alert “B-3” for the past several months and are very worn out and with their efficiency is also failed under pressure. accordingly, the IRIAF Deputy of Operations Commander, in the letter No. 4-1 / 06-21 / 3, dated April 8, 1980, ordered all of his flight departments to:

“All bases provide the number of flying sorties for the logistic facilities, regardless of flight personnel, up to 11:00 am on April 8, 1980 so that the flight crew can be adjusted in the mission’s assignment”.

Thus, all the IRIAF Airbases declared their combat capability in terms of aircrafts and crews, which all are presented at the end of this chapter under the title "General condition of the readiness of all types of the IRIAF aircrafts."

In line with the military operational planning manual for defense against the enemy, it is once again emphasized that Brigadier Vahid Kimiyagar, deputy commander of the Air Force, in collaboration with Colonel Ghassemian, Colonel Pirouz and Col. Qaidian, all of whom are capable, intelligent, and skilled pilots began to study and plan with earnestness and came up with the "SEMAJA planning guide". This collective effort ultimately led to the formulation of the "Operation Alborz ", which was eventually announced on July 18, 1980 to the IRIAF subsidiary units.

In describing the importance of "fragmented orders", it is once again noted that following each of the above instructions from the commander of the unit or the commander of the battlefield, a special order, with details of the entry into the operation, was prepared and approved by the units and then notified to the units under command (the notification text can be considered as an "operational order" alone).

Anyway, how the air battle with the enemy was carried out with all its shortcomings and deficiencies[[85]](#footnote-85), was formulated based on the “Operation Alborz Order” and the other Combat Air Force Orders consistent with the mission of the force were extracted and made ready to be communicated to the unit under the command of the IRIAF.

At this point, it should be acknowledged that the Alborz Battle Guide (sent by the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army) was in many failings. At that critical time, a number of experienced staff in senior Amir and senior Officer Positions had been retired, and aeronautical knowledge in force was equally reduced. Therefore, the Air Force experts faced with many problems when determined to formulate the "Alborz Operations Order" based on a handover from SEMAJA.

One of the obvious drawbacks in setting this command was that instead of explaining critical operational points, it recalled flying techniques and training items (such as how to work with switches inside the cabin or the process of using timed bombs); of course not relevant to an operational order.

Among the six Air Forces missions that are briefly described, the Tactical Air Offensive mission enjoys a special operational position.

In this type of mission, disabling the enemy flight units and gaining air superiority is aimed through attack on enemy air bases, a good example could be “the one hundred and seventy aircraft operation” in the dawn of September 23, 1980 operation with the organization of more than 200 flying sorties against the bases and other sensitive Iraqi targets. Such flights were more intended by the designers of the "Alborz Battle Order".

The reason for this was (contrary to some of the prevailing perceptions that the Air Force has ignored the enemy's preemptive hostilities) was the policy of the Supreme Council of Defense in dealing with the threat.

In the first chapter, we noted that the conditions after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the political governing atmosphere of the country had created a kind of delayed attention to the seriousness of Iraqi threats and the Ba'athist's vicious goals in the minds of the military and civilian authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, in the “Alborz Battle Order”, the principle of defense and the halt of the enemy's dispersed attacks were set as an important part of the air force's mission, so that the process of revolution's growth and the revolutionary spirit of people would not even be affected by the fears of an external threat. Thus, regardless of political issues, the denial of the freedom of action of the Air Force to carry out deterrence was the first and foremost disadvantage in the "Alborz Battle Order". Another critically acclaimed case in the "above-mentioned order" (which could be considered a weakness in the prediction of the conditions and even the planning process) was the search and rescue plan for pilots who were emergently parachuted and landed in the enemy's soil land were coming. This Order did not clearly and precisely describe the techniques and methods of doing the work.

For example, a search helicopter is ordered to search for the pilot and save him from potential dangers (on the enemy's territory), but on the other hand, it stated that stop the operation if there is a slight risk to the helicopter and crew. Given the above considerations, some questions are raised, including:

* What are the risk threshold and its types?
* How did the pilot and crew of the helicopter carry out professional and specialized training for rescue operations, in order to continue to work in spite of the danger?
* Is there no perception (anxiety, temptation, hesitation) that with the first signs of danger, or the anticipation of an enemy's reaction, the decision would be made to stop the operation?

In fact, such inter-organizational and intra-organizational disagreements had not been overlooked by a hostile enemy which on the one hand, sought to create a historical identity for itself, and on the other hand in addition to the support of world arrogance, held information from a number of informant fugitives of the former regime.

Although the provisions of the "Alborz Battle Order" put the Air Force in a precautionary position and abandoned the opportunity to exploit the principle of surprise attack (one of the nine accepted principles of the war in the Iranian Army), but now the situation was different from that of the past. A major war was on the way, and the enemy had put the attack in the Islamic homeland on agenda since weeks ago. In these days and hours full of fears, the nation expected the air force to take the necessary urgent and demonstrative measure to exhibit its agility, flexibility and power against the enemy.

In order to accomplish this great goal, and in spite of the problems ahead, it was no longer possible to formulate its own operational plan and harmonize the conditions of the force with the "Alborz Battle Guide". The importance of this prominent action cannot be easily expressed in terms of words. In describing this measure, the indicator should focus on the IRIAF sensitive and dangerous situation of that time. The heightened consequences of the Western military boycott on the vital equipment of the force, the existence of shadows of distrust caused by a failed coup, the lack of coherence and combat readiness in other units under the Army Command, all impose heavy mental pressures on staff and command lines. On the other hand, the multipurpose mission of the Air Force required special attention to be paid to support the combat operations of other units of the Armed Forces: therefore, planning for the optimal use of offensive and defensive equipment and force (despite Security and Political Dilemma along with the shortcomings in the Alborz Battle Guide) is a measure rooted in the knowledge-based Air Force initiative.

In line with the intensified the aggression of the enemy announced on September 7, 1980 by the SEMAJA, Colonel Mashallah Omrani (the late successor to the IRIAF commander) [[86]](#footnote-86)ordered state of alert “B-3” to the relevant units, and immediately carrying out operational flights, this force showed up its power against the enemy aggressions.

On September 10, 1980, a F-14 interceptor fighter- aircraft fired the first Phoenix missile, leading to overthrown a MiG-21 fighter aircraft owned by the Iraqi Air Force.

In the aftermath of these clashes, on the September 10 and 17, 1980, two other MiG-21 and Sukho-22 aircrafts and one helicopter were toppled by the IRIAF. Thus, two weeks before the outbreak of the imposed war, the Iranian Air Force had imposed on the enemy a relative superiority in the air with acceptable statistics[[87]](#footnote-87).

Therefore, despite the limitations and problems raised, it should be acknowledged that during the time of the responsibility of the martyred Javad Fakori, commander of the Air Force, the Air Force rejoiced with the adoption of appropriate policies and initiatives. In fact, by carefully scrutinizing many of the problems, the IRIAF in addition to being successful in maintaining the status quo and operational readiness, also managed to protect its valuable systems.

However, in spite of the endeavors made by the IRIAF, the enemy, on the one hand, by providing a comprehensive analysis of the collected data made preparations for its full-scale attack, and on the other hand, the IRIAF was in turn preparing itself to enter into an unwanted and all-out war according to the "Alborz Battle Order".

Thus, reference could be made to another example of the documents in the archives of the IRIAF Strategic Documentation Center.

In addition, the process of enemy movements this month made the data collected by the intelligence unit more accurately analyzed.

“The Iraqi army has deployed and expanded its news and intelligence networks across the border to gain information, and 12 wiretapping posts have captured 38 people across the shared boundaries for collecting information. Meanwhile, a total of 3 fishing boats report hearing activities on 451, 452 and 453 MHz.”

The F-14's radar automatically announced the appropriate time for firing, as it has signs. In short, we arrived at the time when the missile was firing, and I said to Pashapur: Mr. Pashapur, fire. He also complimented and said: “you fire”.

Image 10-1 Major Mohammad Reza Ataei: The first pilot who succeeded in overthrowing an Iraqi Air Force aircraft on September 10, 1980 during an attack on Mimak with a Phoenix rocket.

So I pressed the release button and rocket launcher from the cabin! Until then, nobody had shot the Phoenix in the real battleground[[88]](#footnote-88). Even the manufacturer of this semi-strategic intercept aircraft country (The US) itself; we pressed the button anyway.

To cut it short, we fired (I shot), I thought that the rocket dropped down, so I drove the aircraft and saw the smoke of rocket firing. Until then, I had not fired Phoenix, and nobody else had practical experience in the battlefield. After the rocket launches, the display screen inside the front and rear cabin of the F-14, it shows that the rocket will hit the target in a few seconds. The screen read five seconds and started counting down to four, three, two, one, and zero, and the target disappeared from the radar screen.

And we were waiting for the rocket to launch immediately. We saw something fell below the aircraft. I did not remember how to shoot Phoenix at that time. Having been launched, the Phoenix first cut off from its base on the aircraft and fells down, then its engine starts and moves to the target.

Basically, October 23 to November 21 may be taken into account as one of the most important time periods for analyzing the crisis situation in the two countries' relations. Since the very same time period, that the signs of war could have been seen, but its alarm and warnings events did not stimulate any action by decision-making athourities; including Iraqi government announced the need to review Algiers Agreement on October 30, and 11 months before the formal termination of Algiers Agreement.

After the incident of the US embassy occupation in Tehran, the Iraqi ambassador to Beirut in an interview with the newspaper Al-Nahar said, “the Agreement must be reformed and Iran must voluntarily return to us all Iraqi rights in Shatt al-Arab[[89]](#footnote-89)”.

Subsequently, the Ba'ath political leaders assured on one hand that the United States has cut off its support for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular the logistical support of the army and the IRIAF (due to the depth of dependency), so with more boldness completed their planning and increased air strikes.

On the other hand, the Iranian Air Force considers the impending attack on the country's sky as definite and, accordingly, revises previous plans and formulates the “Operation Alborz” plan. Of course, the revision of the above mentioned plan was important because some of the contents of previous plans were not compatible with the Islamic Republic's defense strategy, and the necessity of localizing its provisions with the principles and rules of war and defense in an Islamic country was necessary.

However, the air force, though faced with many domestic and extra-organizational problems (and, of course, with the backing of valuable experiences from the events of the past few decades), was still seeking to achieve the following objectives, since focusing on these issues could have provided the Air Force with a defensive mission patroling the sky of the country and holding the territory of the noble nation of Islamic Iran:

* Achieve optimal operational conditions and maintain combat readiness through the continuity of educational flights by fulfilling minimum flight requirements;
* Organize the critical process of aircraft maintenance with regard to the departure of advisers and the lack of supplies and spare parts;
* Eliminate air defense challenges, especially in the field of radar systems coverage
* Regular review of Operation Alborz for designing detailed commands;
* Cope with the challenge of discharged officers and experienced pilots, and re-employment of some of them.

- Bearing the aforementioned in mind, here are some Iraqi Air Force air strikes recorded on February 20, 1980 to March 19, 1980:

1. According to the report of the border guard of Qasr Shirin, at 12:30, on February 21, 1980, an olive colored Iraqi aircraft was seen flying at very low altitude over the southeast of Khosravi checkpoint to the "Durandi Yuk" checkpoint, which apparently intended at reconnaissance and taking images of the region. Thus, the objections were stated to the relevant Iraqi authorities.

- Accordingly, Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army in the letter No. 227 on February 21, 1980 communicated the Air Force to report air defense measures taken and emphasized: "If the Air Force does not react strongly, the raids will continue." The above steps were notified to the Air Defense Command.

2. At 15:10, a suspicious aircraft on the Iraq-Iran border line raided Iran, and at 15:22 the same day (February 21) two F-5s from the fourth base were commanded to scramble, but the target disappeared from the radar, and the aircrafts returned to the base. It was announced to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the end of this discussion, in a general conclusion, it should be emphasized that: First, with the latest reports registered at the Army Headquarters Office (Major General Officers) on January 30, 1979, in the wake of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iraq was planning to strengthen its air force including the following activities:

“Recently, the Iraqi Air Force (Strengthening its units) has built and exploited a new base in the Zubair region.”

Usually we carried two Phoenix rockets. After the rocket launches, it begins to soar and, given the speed and altitude of the aircraft, the computer itself will tell the missile how much to soar and you see it easily in front of the aircraft, then it drops at high speed and usually the pilot no longer sees it.

The target being disappeared from the radar screen means that the rocket had hit the target, and also the radar informed: hit the target and confirmed it. Later, however, they said that he had fainted from the emotion he had.

Because there was no longer an opportunity and there was little gasoline, I quickly turned to Dezful and kept telling the radar to tell Dezful that the F-14 would come up to land in and tell the defenses comrades not fire on us because the situation was red, I repeated this quite frequently that radar said I swear to the Prophet that everyone is being informed. Finally, we landed in Dezful and then, Mr. Yazdanshenas was the deputy of operations of the Airbase, and the fellow comrades approached our aircraft and carried pilots on hands and left to flying battalions.

In the afternoon, the Dezful Airbase fellow comrades were operating. I told Major Yazdanshenas, "This has happened and it is likely that the Iraqis will attack the base, be cautious," said Major Yazdanshenas. "If I permitted, I will destroy all Iraqi soil."

Reviewing and summarizing the content of this information signaled the beginning of a war that the transnational powers and their regional allies, in turn, fueled it. Thus, the IRIAF degree of readiness was rising day by day in spite of the current problems, and the air force prepared to defend against a massive aggression.

For example, after receiving and communicating the "Alborz Operations Order ", numerous correspondence has been made on the ambiguities by the IRIAF headquarters staff at the time, in order to create better coordination, more favorable conditions for air support with the relevant units, especially the NEZAJA forces. A meeting held on September 10, 1980 in the SEMAJA-3 best illustrates these efforts outcomes. Given the importance of the issue, the full text of the meeting's agenda (unchanged in the literature) is presented as follows.

B. Reviewing “Alborz Order” at the meeting dated September 10, 1980, The SEMAJA-3

Description of the commission: at 9:00 am, “Alborz Operational Plan against Western Threat”, the IRIAF: Third Office - Room No. 76

At the request No. 52/4/06/201 dated July 27, 1980, by the IRIAF and The NEZAJA for the formation of the commission No. 100/08/201 on September 1, 1980

1. Determination and prioritization of the enemies’ critical hotspots, if destructed the enemies War Machine or Iraqi Economy would have paralyzed (notified by Alborz).
2. Effective and principled communication between the headquarters of the IRIAF, the SEMAJA, the NEDAJA, and the front lines divisions, in order to allow air traffic control, air support and fire coordination.
3. The necessary coordination and close communication between the headquarters of the IRIAF and the NEZAJA and how to use marine radars to cover more blind spaces and exchange information for air defense.
4. Determine staffing, communication facilities and providing them with training for multiple air traffic control posts to report unauthorized aircraft passage and reduce the insider aircrafts vulnerabilities.
5. The establishment of fast fire control centers and quick and accurate contact with the IRIAF command posts for the purpose of adapting insider fire to co-ordinate and determine the route and time of returning insider aircrafts in attacking the targets of the hostile country.
6. Elimination of communication deficits and support of the forward air controller teams and necessary coordination to guide insider aircrafts in attacking enemy positions using the NEZAJA helicopter and proposing its design at the Sixth Office (The SEMAJA -6) on September 14, 1980 (according to the commission).
7. The training of selected officers from the NEZAJA by the IRIAF as forward air controller and familiarity with the various types of aircrafts and related maneuvers, as well as the recognition of the limitations and practical implications. (About 100 employees of the NEZAJA have been trained so far that some are downsized and 29 have recently trained and it would be better to serve as apprentice with forward air controller officers).
8. Reducing the timing of urgent requests for close air support so that the type of ammunition and operation region are already identified and communicated by The SEMAJA. In this case, the IRIAF will determine the daily assigned sorties, and the command of the support team will be responsible for its implementation, and the SEMAJA and the IRIAF command will only be informed.
9. Given the significant shortage of "M-151" vehicles (used by the forward air controller teams) and how to provide it, the representatives of the NEZAJA and the SEMAJA agreed that the "M-151" vehicles available for the NEZAJA to be used for missions and special uses, such as BGM-71 TOW
10. The NEZAJA action to leveling landing bands in the region for future the IRIAF flights.
11. Transferring the ZU-23-2 to the IRIAF.
12. Anti-aircraft defense weapons are based on the IRIAF airplane and radar stations, and it reduces the defend power. (Only the IRIAF defenses limited in the Alborz plan).
13. Enemy overhearing and notification to remove additional conversations (or in the form of radio discovery) is not limited to one force, but will also endanger the operation of other forces.

**Recommendations**

A. In order to establish a close connection between the IRIAF and the NEDAJA headquarters and the use of tactical radars to cover the radar blind spots of the country, as well as the exchange of information on air defense, the two air and naval forces examine the issue and announce the result to the Joint Staff for further necessary coordination.

B. The SEMAJA 2 .....

C. How to use the NEZAJA helicopters...

D. Officers who have completed the forward air controller course collaborate in the relevant with the forward air controller units to prepare, and, at the same time, the IRIAF announces readiness for applying staff for the forward air controller training courses.

E. Ground Force …

F. Via the SEMAJA

G. To control overhearing....

Figure 2.2. Tactical - communication vehicle (M-151) used by forward air controller officers for the close air support mission

Names and Signatures of Fellow Comrades:

A - Major Jamshid Ahmadi, the SEMAJA

B. Colonel Emadaldin Kiyani, the SEMAJA

C. Colonel Nasrallah Shahbazi, Deputy of Operations

D. Lieutenant Commander of the headquarters Ahmad Behzadnia, the NEDAJA

E. Lieutenant Commander Hussein Malekzadegan, the NEDAJA

F. Major Nasser Farhanakian, the IRIAF

G. Major Hussein Fatehi, the SEMAJA

H. Major Pilot Ghodratallah Kiyanjo, the IRIAF operation (martyred)

I. Capt. Seyyed Asghar Moarefi, the IRIAF Relations Managing Director

J. Colonel Faramarz Peakar, the SEMAJA

K. Colonel of Headquarters Akbar Nurolahi, the SEMAJA

L. Colonel of Headquarters Yousef Shafiee, the SEMAJA

The final pages of the book present an excerpt taken from the relevant documents to the above-mentioned.

3**) The process of operational readiness of the IRIAF from March 21, 1980 to September 21, 1980**

In this discussion, it is necessary to give a brief reference to the background of the subject prior to drawing out the readiness of the IRIAF fromMarch 21, 1980 to September 21, 1980.

The Ba'athist regime of Iraq, with the rise of the Islamic Revolution, has been thinking of taking advantages of revolutionary transitions. The Ba'ath Party, in conjunction with the political developments in Iran, continued to prepare and strengthen its army, especially the air force, and carried out dispersed aggressions in order to pursue a full-scale invasion strategy to Iran in an appropriate opportunity. This was evident since the eve of the Islamic Revolution victory in many ways. Below is a list of Iraqi readiness records and backgrounds:

1. According to the latest reports (on January 30, 1979) recorded at the army headquarters and in the last days of the life of Pahlavi II, the enemy was planning to expand its air force as the following:

“The Iraqi Air Force has strengthened its units and has exploited a new base in the Zubair province.”

1. On February 12, 1979: according to a report recorded at the same office, at 10:00 am local time, the Iraqi Air Force has been on state of alert (C) on all of its eleven airbases.

Given the frequent and suspicious movements of the enemy, the SEMAJA command center carried out a comprehensive review under the title of “Raid”[[90]](#footnote-90) from March 21, 1979 to June 21, 1979, studying the combat readiness and the actions of the Iraqi Ba'ath army.[[91]](#footnote-91) The key points of this review were all indicative of planning a strategic plot against the Islamic Revolution and the new Islamic system of Iran:

* Establishment and strengthening of several bases in the eastern border regions and the establishment of the Air Reconnaissance Information System
* Kut Air Base on state of alert (March 1979)
* Strengthening Shaibah Air Base (March 1978)
* State of alert and practicing and shooting with real ammunition by the 145th and 195th brigades of Surface to Air Missile system, SAM (from March 21, 1979 to April 20, 1979)
* Perform aeronautical maneuvers in Habbaniyah (March 26, 1979)
* State of alert of all units of the Iraqi Air Force (a March 28 and 31, 1979)
* State of alert of sea-air units in the Basra region (June 5, 1979)

At the same time, the Ba'ath militant aggression has increased and, as it was raised on the Iraqi invasions chapter, Iraq bombarded some of the border villages in the western part of the country in April. Inevitably, the commanders of Shahrokhi (Hamedan), Tabriz and Vahdati (Dezful) Airbases were notified by telephone to double the number of aircrafts on the state of alert and continue the Combat Air Patrol missions at the border. The next command decided that a state of alert aircraft flies the Combat Air Patrol per time.

Note: Following the bombardment of the defenseless villages of the western part of the country and the highlighted the combat readiness and suspicious movements of the enemy, the IRIAF deputy of operation ordered the Combat Air Patrol flights (CAP) from the Second Airbase of Tabriz[[92]](#footnote-92).

The Ba'ath army threats was significantly reduced, having provided air coverage by the IRIAF. The IRIAF deputy of operation sent a decree to all operational units and Airbases on December 24, 1979, calling for elaboration of a state of alert notification as well as an overview and re-drafting of the “outline of state of alert of the IRIAF” in order to counteract the Iraqi Ba'ath regime threats. Follow-up and conclusion of the above steps continued until the March 1980.

With such a background and for further clarity, we will take a glance at the levels of combat readiness in the air force culture: then the reader is provided with the state of alert and the analysis of its trend using existing documents (from March 21, 1980 to September 21, 1980 on a monthly basis) along with the image of some documents:

A - Levels of combat readiness in the IRIAF:

The combat readiness of the air force before the Sacred Defense, like other forces was classified into three degrees, as follows:

Level 1 readiness: alertness and search for the enemy;

Level 2 Readiness: Includes two main steps: “A” and “B”

In step " A ", the combatant is prepared for the combat and in the " B " the weapon is given to the combatant. For example, the pilot stands beside his aircraft and is ready to receive the flight order.

Level 3 readiness’s: (combat) this state has three steps: “A” and “B” and “C”.

Step “A”: the alertness; in the sense that the enemy's air strike is coming soon.

Step “B”: the combatant is ready equipped with the weapon.

Step “C”: the “fire” stage that well-equipped and armed aircrafts fly to pre-selected targets.

Accordingly, the Tabriz and Hamedan Airbases, together with the command of the Air Defense Group, at these two bases included radar systems and surface-to-air units were at the stage (C-3) state of alert from March 1980 to the beginning of the war. Other Airbases, after receiving the "Alborz Battle Order", received the command to enter the state of “B-3” and during the full-scale attack of the enemy; they received the "Kaman-99" command and entered the step “C-3”.

B. Review the IRIAF combat state of alert from March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980

In these discussions, the combat state of alert to counteract the enemy from March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980 are as follows:

The IRIAF state of alert from March 21, 1980 to April 20, 1980

The early days of Nowruz in 1980 were not yet passed that the Iraq Army's aggression became more and more frequent; thus, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation immediately took action and pursued the following measures:

- On March 21, 1980, the IRIAF Deputy of Operations[[93]](#footnote-93) called all bases for the expedition to prepare the "Implementation Plan for the Units" (instructions), to finalize the final outcome of the "General Plan of the IRI Air Force state of alert ".

- On 18/1/1359, in the wake of the announcement of a state of alert "A-3" by the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, for the first time, the IRIAF went on the state of alert stage “A-3”to deal with the widespread incursions of Iraq. Consequently, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation asked Airbases to verify their combat capability.[[94]](#footnote-94)

Accordingly, the IRIAF Airbases immediately examined their combat capabilities, for instance Mehrabad First Airbase reported the flying sorties production capability of this unit is as follows:

1. F-4 D. The number of 17 aircrafts, including the five waiting for a piece of cartridge, of which we are able to fly 12 sorties for the first period;
2. F-4 E. The number of 11 aircrafts, of which we are able to fly 8 sorties for the first period;
3. RF-4 E. The number of 8 aircrafts, of which we are able to fly 8 sorties for the first period;
4. F-5 E. The number of 7 aircrafts, of which we are able to fly 5 sorties for the first period;
5. RF-5. The number of 7 aircrafts, of which we are able to fly 5 sorties for the first period;

Due to the shortage of parts, especially tires, the second period is not predictable.

Commander of the First Airbase; Col. Pilot., Javad Fakori

The provisions of this decree are followed up by the IRIAF Deputy of Operation, and other Airbases have also announced their combat capability.[[95]](#footnote-95)

The details of these reports, along with the level of readiness of the air defense radar system, are included in chapter four of this book, titled “the IRIAF combat and operational capability porior to the outbreak of the imposed war."

- On April 8, 1980, according to the notification issued the day before by the SEMAJA ( on the state of alert "A-3"), the IRIAF deputy of operation notifies the units of the subsidiary headquarters, including the Air Defense Command, declaring:

From: The IRIAF Deputy of Operation (Special Office)

To: Recipients

About - the state of alert No. 12-1 / 06-201 / and 3 Dated April 8, 1980

1. From April 7, 1980, the state of alert “A-3” is announced to all Air Force units.
2. Please order to be on a state of alert based on the IRIAT state of alert system (1-58).

Deputy of Operation heasquarter of the IRIAT, Brigadier general Kimiyagar

Recipients: Air Defense Command, Logistics Command, Air Training Command, Central Support Command, Communications and Electronics Command, Logistics Department, Administrative Department, Plans and Budget Department, Operations Management (Training, Operations Information, Electronic Warfare and Communications) Department – GASHA, Inspection and flight safety, nursing for the knowledge and required action. Operations Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Piroz

Actor – Major Aghasi Beyk

- On April 10, 1980, it was decided to carry out border reconnaissance services on a daily basis until further notice and the result be notified to the Fourth Airbase[[96]](#footnote-96). The NEDAJA also requested a C-130 aircraft on a daily basis for the purpose of providing Bushehr Marine base with a naval patrol mission.

- On April 16, 1980, given the full state of alert of Kut Airbase in al-Amara province and Shaibah Airbase in Basra province of Iraq, mutually with the assistance of the IRIAF Deputy of Operation, the level of state of alert of the Third Airbase in Hamadan and the Fourth Airbase in Dezful, from this date, was increased to "B-3" and the SEMAJA-3 (Operation) was notified.

- On April 18, 1980 and following the announcement of the first anniversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, again due to the increased raids of Iraq in the western part of the country, the SEMAJA Commander declared state of alert "A-3" and emphasized all the IRIAF radar and air defense systems focus on the West[[97]](#footnote-97).

**The IRIAF state of alert from April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980**

There are no special documents and certificates about changing the state of alert from April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980; suggesting that Deputy of Operation has been following the "State of alert plan" of the Airbases, so that, the Bushehr Airbase command was notified of the deficiencies observed in the review of the regulatory plan and the necessary guidelines were communicated to the Airbase[[98]](#footnote-98).

A remarkable thing from April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980 is to track the country's radar coverage defects due to weakness of the existing systems identified at the Tabas event (April 25, 1980). Accordingly, on December 19, 1979, a meeting was held in the fifth office of the SEMAJA (Plan and Budget) on the issue (the study of the exhaustion and defects of radar systems of the country, the lack of coordination in the system of command and control and communication with the administrative, military and law enforcement institutions etc.) and there was proposed to purchase the Bird Radar System! Following this, the NEDAJA also reported on the weaknesses of radar coverage in the Persian Gulf to the SEMAJA and the IRIAF; as a result, it was proposed to hold other meetings on the issue by Fourth Office of the SEMAJA attended by informed representatives. The meetings output was the proposed purchase of six to 15 defense radar devices from Western European Companies. Something that apparently did not conform to the realities of those days and was never realized!

**The IRIAF state of alert from May 22, 1980 June 21, 1980**

- On the May 25, 1980, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation notified the Third Office of the SEMAJA (Operation) to increase the state of alert of the Third and Fourth (Hamadan and Dezful) Airbases to “B-3”[[99]](#footnote-99) following the Iraqi Kut and Shaibah Airbases full state of alert.

- As a result, given the educational limitations, personnel and equipment burnout and ..., at this stage of state of alert, the IRIAF required to know the latest situation and developments of the Iraqi forces in order to take into account the appropriate state of alert[[100]](#footnote-100).

Given the importance of the issue, the full text of the letter is presented as follows:

From: The IRIAF Deputy of Operation (Special Office)

To: The SEMAJA 3 commander (Operation)

Subject: State of alert

No. and date: 12-1 / 06-201 / 3-4; May 25, 1980

1. As it is known, from April 6, 1980, in reference to the Letter No: 85-1227- dated April 16, 1980, the Second Office changes this force state of alert from “A-2” to “B-3” in response to the full state of alert on Kut and Shaibah Air Bases in Iraq to carry out combat operations.
2. In the state of alert plan of this force, the level of readiness “B-3” is set for the probable the enemy's aggression within the next 72 hours. So, in line with the Alborz Plan, at this stage, the aircrafts of the IRIAF responsible for carrying out retaliation operations loaded ammunition.
3. Given the fact that the readiness of the personnel and aircrafts in the mentioned stage (B-3) has caused the staff and equipment burnout, and on the other hand, the operational training capacity is reduced by 50%; therefore, please, determine the appropriate state of alert for the latest developments in the Iraqi forces in order to notify the relevant units.

Deputy of Operation Commander of the IRIAF, Brigadier general Kimiyagar

Actor – Major Aghasi Beyk

For further information and understanding, this document image is presented below.

Figure 2.3 the image of letter to SEMAJA 3 on “appropriate state of alert”

Following this, the SEMAJA -3 (in terms of "requesting the reduction of national security state of alert stages) from the series of troops as well as the prevention of the exhaustion of the units that are not involved in the operation" (the subject matter of the above letter), the NEZAJA, the IRIAF and the NEDAJA were requested to "submit their suggestions and comments to the third office (operation)"[[101]](#footnote-101).

-This month “from May 22, 1980 June 21, 1980”, deputy of operation continued to follow the "state of alert" of the units, so that he would call on the Air Defense Command (due to the problems of the Hogghs in state of alert mode " B-3") to deploy its authorized representative to re-examine the " the IRIAF state of alert scheme"; on June 1, 1980 to the special office. Then, the IRIAF Command, in the letter No. 14-1 / 06-201 dated June 7, 1980 and in response to the letter No. 47-06-201 / 2 dated June 3, 1980 by the SEMAJA on the "Air Force's suggestions and comments on national defense state of alert", write as follows:

1- The Supreme Council of National Defense is considered to be the most appropriate authority to decide on the establishment of various states of alert.

2- The prolonged state of alert problems, especially in stage 3 of readiness that reduces the overall operational efficiency of the unit, is as follows: discontinuing training courses, burnout of employees, depreciation of equipment, and resources, fatigue and indifference of employees to the level of combat readiness and failure to take it serious.

It was quite clear that the IRIAF is under pressure from the other army units. Operating aircrafts were loading ammunition and there was no possibility of educational exploitation. Defects of the “Alborz Operations Order” were to be resolved with the IRIAF Commanders.

Below is an example of this tactic that is similar to an operating plan and was sent by the IRIAF Deputy of Operation to one of the units under the authority of force:

"Along with the plan set out in the IRIAF state of alert system (1-58), the operational training of units at stages “A-3” and “B-3” will continue to run with 50% of the related activities compared to normal time. Given that the level of command's readiness has been announced in "A-3", the training mentioned above shall be applicable to the above recall with due observance of the established criteria. Also, please, order to conduct combat readiness correspondence with the classifications.

The IRIAF Deputy of Operation Commander

Brigadier general Pilot Vahid Kimiyagar

On June 21, 1980 (according to records in the daily records of events of the post of commander and commander Bagheri order, as well as by the commander Colonel Fakori order), the Third and Fourth Airbases and air defense were announced to prepare for the complete confrontation with the aggressive forces. Iranian aircrafts do not have the right to invade Iraqi territory and only defend against enemy aircrafts in the territory of Iran.

The Second and Third Airbases were announced for the first degree readiness.

In fact, at this stage, all the efforts of army and state officials have been self-restraint against aggression and an emphasis on a 100% defense strategy.

The last point is that, the IRIAF at the end of this month (from May 22, 1980 June 21, 1980), went on "night patrol" from Third, Fourth, and Sixth Airbases, the description of which had been provided in the previous chapter.

**B - The state of alert from** June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980

Here we discuss the state of alert from June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980 leading to the outbreak of the imposed war on monthly basis:

1. This document reflects the fact that Martyr Fakori, two weeks before the official appointment to the IRIAF command, effectively controlled the command and control system of the Air Force alongside Maj. Gen. Bagheri, and even dated from June 7, 1980 he was referred to as the Commander of the Force (the Commander's Office records, vol. 7, p. 89).

The state of alert from June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980

On June 24, 1980, the command of the Hamedan Airbase in the letter No. 13-13-13-001 on the state of alert, asked assignments from the IRIAF (Deputy of Operation) included proposals for the dismantling of 50% of the fighter aircrafts loaded with ammunition and at least four daily training flight courses.

The Iraqi Ba'ath regime launched a general maneuver on June 27, 1980called "Saad". By carrying out this maneuver, the Iraqi Army's strategy was apparent, and in the report by the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Command, an air strike had been foreseen to Khuzestan province and its Airbases (several months later, July 22, 1980, this experience was launched under the title of “Qadisiyah” in a full-scale battle.

Note: According to the documents of the Commander's Office records, after the above maneuver, first Colonel Fakori ordered to the defense commander and the defense of all the Airbases to upgrade the state of alert to “B-3” for 72 hours on receiving this message. The letter No. 1954 dated July 6, 1980 was issued to the defense commander and the defense of all the Airbases.

- On the day of July 10, 1980, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation officially announced the state of alert “B-3” for the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases[[102]](#footnote-102), (In fact, the state of alert of the Second Airbase of Tabriz has increased one degree higher .

On July 11, 1980, the IRIAF command once again places all of its operational units in the “A-3” state of alert and asks them to make the predictions necessary to improve their readiness for a higher level. In fact, the level of operational readiness of the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases have been reduced to "A-3", like other units from stage "B-3".

Subsequently, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation on July 13, 1980 announced that the state of alert of all units have been reduced from "B-3" to "A-3", but at any moment they are ready to rise to a higher level. This change in state of alert is also communicated to the Air Defense Command. In fact, this decree was intended to inform the command of the Second, Third, Fourth Airbases, and air defense platforms which were in the "B-3" (by the command of the Air Force, the defense units’ state of alert extended for another 24-hour).

Of course, the changes and similar strategies were not limited to the IRIAF fighter-aircraft units or combat flights, and included the Defense Command, which will be addressed in the next chapter.

In the following, the message with the same written literature is included in Table 1-2

Table 1-2 List of recipients of the state of alert message

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Airbase | Commander | Time of notification |
| Khatami (Eighth) | Colonel Habib Sadeghpor, The Base Commander | 09:19 |
| Vahdati ( Fourth) | Colonel Ali Tabeshfar, The Base Commander | 09:11 |
| Shiraz (Seventh) | Colonel Mohammad Shalchiyan, The Base Commander | 09:28 |
| Shahrokhi (Third) | Major  Ghasem Golchin, The Base Commander | 09:15 |
| Tabriz (Second) | Colonel Morteza Farzaneh, The Base Commander | 09:16 |
| Bandar Abass (Ninth) | Colonel Mohammad Talebdost, The Base Commander | 09: 32 |
| Mehrabad (First) | Major Mohammadi, Command post officer | 09:16 |
| Bushehr (Sixth) | Major Mehdi Dadpey, The Base Commander | 09:37 |
| First Transport Base | Major Varasteh, Command post officer | 09:27 |

- On the sidelines of the events from June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980, other routines were taking place not less important than the main events of this period of time. Flying electronic information collection site of FASHA, known as "bat", silently were monitoring of the border issues between the two countries, and the Ba'athist movements, and provided a credible assessment of the capacity of existing threats. The relatively long "bat" flights in the western regions of the country (five to fourteen hours) and a bit distanced of the border did not attract the attention of the Iraqi radars, and the aircraft continued to perform intelligence and surveillance missions with sufficient freedom. The possibility of air strikes on the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases, included valuable information, obtained by analyzing the activities of the "bat" and the "FASHA" ground sites. On the importance of the presence of this aircraft for the IRIAF was enough to pay particular attention to the maintenance and repair of the aircraft and its interior equipment.

- On July 16, 1980, the Fourth Airbase, based on its DASC report in the 92th Armored Division of Ahwaz, declared the probability of air strike on the following regions:

"Mussain - Ein Khosh - Dehloran - Fakke - Mehran - Hamidiyeh - Dasht Azadegan - Susangerd - Tappeh Allah Akbar - Poshman-Hunayra".

Subsequently, on July 17, 1980, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation commander, with the explanation that "the flight order will be issued later," called for flight preparation at Third, Fourth and Sixth Airbases. The Air Force Commander would also reduce the number of Second and Third Airbases say and night patrols to the half.

- Among other issues to be considered from June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980, the announcement of the concern of the First Airbase on the disability to implement the "Alborz Battle Order". Due to the lack of flight personnel and the arrest of a number of pilots (charged with participating in the “Neghab” Coup), as well as the spread of F-4's fighters to the Dezful Airbase, which were involved in nightly alert operations. The First Airbase was a pivotal role in providing the defense needs of the force. This heavy responsibility made the commander of the base to explicitly reflect his problems to the air force command. The image and the full text of this letter are as the following:

"From: The First Airbase (Deputy of Operation) 43-3 / 01-201

To: the IRIAF (Deputy of Operation - Operations Manager) dated July 3, 1980

Subject: Flight staff shortage

Attached: a leaf

In reference to number: 20001- July 11, 1980 (the IRIAF Commander)

In reference to number: 21-1 / 06 / 201- and - June 30, 1980 (Special Office)

1. Some of the pilots of this unit have been arrested in connection with the July 10, 1980 plot, so the operational problems for this unit are as follows:

A. Due to shortage in pilot, that part of the Alborz plan that relates to this unit cannot be implemented and it is necessary to be revised in accordance with the opinion of this unit.

B. The number of F-4D pilots eligible for training is insufficient and the air defense preparedness plan cannot be sufficiently implemented. Currently, even the battalion commander is used to prepare the crew, and all existing pilots, including leaders (two), are busy on preparedness round o’clock. We will face sever difficulty in the next few days, if the facts are ignored.

C. F-4E pilots deployed to the Vahdati Airbase are busy carrying out air defenses at night and there is no possibility of their displacement due to the lack of a F-4 E pilot. Given that the pilots are far from their families and the lack of amenities, dissatisfaction among them is probable.

3. Recommendations

A. Assign Vahdati Airbase missions to other F-4 units so that this unit can carry out the First Airbase defense mission using F-4E aircrafts and pilots grounded at Vahdati Airbase.

B. As F-5E aircrafts are based in Mashhad and the Nojeh Airbase is located 135 miles from Mehrabad Airbase and is able to intercept possible targets, therefore, dismiss the readiness of the day or night of this unit.

Figure 2.4 the image of the letter of the First Airbase on the problems of the implementation of the Alborz Battle Plan due to operational engagements and staff shortages (flight crew)

In fact, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation calls for a reduction in the degree of “the IRIAF state of alert " due to operational, logistical and educational problems caused by the prolonged state of alert leading by interrupting operational training, maintaining pilots' skills in combat situations, wearing out parts and, above all, fatigue and exhaustion of staff. The full text of this request is as follows:

From: The IRIAF (Deputy of Operation - Operations Manager)

To: Directorate of the Third Office of the Joint Staff of the Army of IRI

Subject: Flight staff shortage

Attached: a leaf

In reference to number: 20001- July 11, 1980 (the IRIAF Commander)

In reference to number: 21-1 / 06 / 201- and - June 30, 1980 (Special Office)

Subject: State of alert

In reference to number:

Given the provisions contained in the references and the state of alert that has continued since April, the problems of the flight units of this force are announced as follows.

1. Given the prolonged state of alert of stage 3 and the ammunition loads on aircrafts, and because, in accordance with existing regulations, the aircrafts cannot be used for training, all the necessary trainings that will ensure the continuity of the pilots' readiness and maintaining their skills for war conditions is discontinued, and its impact and the resulting damage will inevitably be unrecoverable in the long run.

B) In terms of technical and maintenance principles, aircraft not flying at a given time will cause the wear and tear of parts and necessitates their replacement, which is certainly problematic in the current situation due to lack of spare parts. Therefore, maximum effort has to be made to prevent wear and tear of parts.

C) Fatigue of flight personnel and maintenance staff are other issues that are of particular importance and, extended the state of alert, especially in Stage 3, will reduce their efficiency.

2- Please note that, in order to minimize the damage, if possible, the level of state of alert reduced to lower levels from the current level, so that this force can, by carrying out the necessary training and flying aircrafts, maintain the skill of the pilots to an acceptable level and to prevent the depreciation of parts.

Commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army; Colonel Pilot of the Headquarters - Javad Fakori

Given the changes in the state of alert level from June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980, it is concluded that the decision to reduce the state of alert level has been taken only for the continuation of the flight requirements (maintaining the skill level of the pilots), since in the "B-3 " state of alert, all the aircrafts in accordance with the inactive defense plan should be deployed in a hangar or shelter, and operational aircrafts should be loaded with ammunition (while conducting training flights with ammunition is not possible). But on the other hand, in those acute circumstances, the consequences of exposing the failed coup of "Neghab[[103]](#footnote-103)" on the combat readiness of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Air Force cannot be ignored.

Accordingly, the SEMAJA Command Center, based on reports from the Islamic Revolutionary Committee[[104]](#footnote-104), reminds in the following issue a comprehensive anti-national plot and a coup d'état such as that of August 18, 1953 by the United States, given the importance of the issue the full text is presented as follows:

From: SEMAJA 3 (Command Center) Number:

To: See Number: June 29, 1980

Attachment: one leaf

Confidential

In reference to the attached a photocopy sheet received by SEMAJA, please order:

1. The subject of notifications be announced to the unit / major organization subordinate to forces /organizations based on Leaders / Commanders: Forces / and Organizations so that only the personnel responsible for protection, facilities, airports, Airbases and barracks shall be aware of the issue.
2. the utmost precision and protection shall be exercised in notifying unit / major organization subordinate to forces /organizations so that the announcement does not find an induction effect and only to prepare for quick action against potential accidents and to allow the care and vigilance of the authorities protecting close supply and supplying critical infrastructure, which may be targeted by the conspiracy-plot.

3. The intelligence officials shall increase the volume of their intelligence activities to explore the networks included in the announcement (more committed, and influential staff shall be used more)

4. Received notification shall be announced.

The successor to SEMAJA- Brigadier general Valliullah Fallahi

Receivers:

THE NEZAJA Commander, the IRIAF Commander, THE NEDAJA Commander, ZHAJA Commander, SHAJA Commander

The IRIAF state of alert from July 23, 1980 to August 22, 1980

Given the exercises of a maneuver and the practice of shooting and bombing Iraqi units with real ammunition (on July 23, 1980) and unexpected expansion of Iraqi Ba'ath army units in the Somar region, the Third Office of SEMAJA, reports to the Islamic Republic of Iran Army including The IRIAF:

"In the day time reconnaissance operation in the western parts of the country, please carefully monitor the Somar region and report the results to SEMAJA and the NEZAJA as soon as possible." [[105]](#footnote-105)

Following these threats, the IRIAF deputy of operation commander announced to all the units that, considering the threats to the security of the country, the change in the level of readiness of the units were not in the interest of the country, and the state of alert (A-3) will remain unchanged. The IRIAF commander has communicated the "expansion of the units of the Iraqi state" and the following state of alert to the force deputy of operation, which also notified all the IRIAF units through the special office as follows[[106]](#footnote-106):

From: Deputy of Operation (Operations Management – Special Office)

To: Recipients (First, Second, Third, Fourth and ... Airbases Commands)

Subject: Expansion of the Iraqi Units

Given the expansion of the units of the Iraqi state in the Somar region, please order:

1. The aircraft “bat” fly on day time over the region and report the collected information as soon as possible;
2. Air Defense Command Commander in the full preparation of air traffic control for the area and to report transfers promptly;
3. Operational information quickly provides the bases with the collected information, and during the rapid inspection view pilots' awareness and target booklets;
4. Bases commanders return to their bases at the earliest opportunity at receiving this decree;
5. Extreme precision shall be made in the protection of the facility, the radar stations and the IRIAF bases;
6. all necessary actions and forecasts required in carrying out the above steps shall be taken into account.

Commander of The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force - Lt. Col. Javad Fakori

Figure 2.5 the image of letter from the Deputy of Operation Command on the recent expansion of the Iraqi Army and the Daily Flight Inspection decree

- On July 29, 1980, the IRIAF deputy of operation requested from the first transport base to prepare two aircrafts "Exploration and Identification C-130" and two F-27 identification aircraft within 24 hours (for observing aerial movements and suspicious movements of enemy units).

"From - Deputy of Operation (Transportation Management - Special Office)

To - Command of the First Transportation Base

Please, order two bat designs (C-130) and twoF-27s will be ready to operate immediately within 24 hours.

Announce the result.

The IRIAF Deputy of Operation

Colonel of Headquarter: Qaidian

- At 6:40 pm on 11/6/59, air patrol was conducted by a F-5 aircraft in the Khorramshahr region, and the pilot's report is as follows:

- There are a number of tanks and armored car bunkers and about 100-150 tanks and carrier units located at the Shalamcheh checkpoint in the Khorramshahr region on the borderline (dirt road).

1. At the outbreak of the imposed war the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force was armed with 440 different types of fighters, while the Iraqi Air Force was armed with more than 340 heavy fighter and bomber aircrafts, with 2,000 ground-to-air launchers and guided anti-aircraft guns. During the war, the Iraqi Air Force was exponentially organized and equipped with advanced aircrafts such as MiG-25, MiG-29, Sukho-24, Mirage F1, rented Super Étendard aircraft, advanced ground-to-air missiles and anti- radar radiation missiles, and ... by the Western and Eastern supporters of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime. Although during the imposed war, a total of 400 Iraqi military aircrafts were overthrown in various forms (training, defense, by self, technical, etc.), at the end of the war it was equipped with a capacity of more than 600 different types of military aircrafts. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The number of active pilots in the Joint Base System in The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force that directly participated in the Sacred Defense is estimated to be 500 individuals. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. To learn more about the events mentioned above and to get acquainted with the process of captivity and biography of martyr Hossein Lashgari, see the book "6410" of Martyr memoirs. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Each battalion capacity at the base is usually between 8-12-16 and 25 aircrafts, depending on the type of plane. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. During the war, these battalions also carried out missions in a tactical way. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Time to take off and reach the target; bombardment tactics, speed direction and altitude during the round-trip; how to deal with enemy interceptor aircraft and ground-air defense system in the target area and how to escape from them, carry out electronic warfare operations; if necessary, air-to-air refueling during the round-trip, issues related to the emergency situation of the aircraft and how to resolve them and in brief dozens of other related issues leading to a successful and protected mission. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. In the northwest area, missions are also requested or carried out in a single-flight manner. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army letter No. 117/03/29/1701 dated September 5, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. October 23 to November 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Bazargan in the letter submittted to Imam Khomeini writes: Following the repeated description of the past and considering that interference, disturbances, opposition, and dissent have made it impossible to carry out the duties assigned to me and my colleagues and the fact that for this part of time, in the present historical situation it is not possible to save the country and to achieve a revolutionary objective without the unity of the word and the unity of management. Hereby I am giving my resignation. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. At the end of the same time period, a group of Saudi fanatics, led by Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani, seized the Masjid al-Haram and, despite having resisted Saudi Arabia Gurds for two weeks, were eventually arrested or killed, but the incident made Saudi more pessimistic about Iran and closer to Iraq. On the other hand, an individual (apparently Iraqi, but according to some rumors Iranian), known as Samir Noorali, attempted to assassinate Tariq Aziz by throwing a bomb at the University of Mestensiriyah, killing two Iraqi students. On the same day, Saddam Hussein, swearing implicitly to the Iranian government, that "the pure blood that was shed into the ground in Mustansiriyah will not remain unrevenged. We cut off the hands that encroach Iraq” Source: Parsa Doust, Manouchehr (2007)" We and Iraq from the past to the present ", Tehran: Publishing Co., Second Edition, p. 248- 253 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Headquarter; Report No. 91, p. 98, dated July 9, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. At the end of the same time period, a group of Saudi fanatics, led by Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani, seized the Masjid al-Haram and, despite having resisted Saudi Arabia Gurds for two weeks, were eventually arrested or killed, but the incident made Saudi more pessimistic about Iran and closer to Iraq. On the other hand, an individual (apparently Iraqi, but according to some rumors Iranian), known as Samir Noorali, attempted to assassinate Tariq Aziz by throwing a bomb at the University of Mestensiriyah, killing two Iraqi students. On the same day, Saddam Hussein, swearing implicitly to the Iranian government, that "the pure blood that was shed into the ground in Mustansiriyah will not remain unrevenged. We cut off the hands that encroach Iraq” Source: Parsa Doust, Manouchehr (2007)" We and Iraq from the past to the present ", Tehran: Publishing Co., Second Edition, p. 248- 253 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Letter No. 117/03/29/1701 dated September 5, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The pilots of the two F-5E scramble aircrafts, were the First Lieutenant Mahmoud Jadidi the leader of the group and the First Lieutenant Samad Ebrahimi as No. 2, respectively; both are the owner of the military orders, awards and decorations “Fatah” and the war heroes because of the great courage. In the next volumes will present some of their memories and epics. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. The official time of the country is ahead according to the law of using the maximum brightness time, four hours and thirty minutes of the Greenwich (ZOLO or Z). The clock is set back for an hour at the March 21, and returns to the former situation at the September 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The 123 and 234 MHz frequencies: (VHF) and (UHF), respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The Metaphorical Name of the F-5 Aircraft [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Mahmoud Khorand et al (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: The IRIAF Office of Strategic Studies. (This collection includes some of the most important air force command activities on a daily basis that are currently available at the request of The IRIAF Office of Strategic Studies, currently compiled in 8 volumes and published at the Air Force Headquarters Press in 1998. The first volume of this collection was compiled by the efforts of Amir Brigadier Mahmud Khorand and the others seven volumes have been compiled by Brigadier Hossein Ali Saeedmehr and a group of pioneers from the Defense Forces Command. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army 3 Letter No. 2/1701/ 29/ 07/316 dated May 18, 1980 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Issue No. 183-06-201-15 Issued by the Joint Staff of Operations of the West Country. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The subject of the IRIAF operational deputy letter No. 1298; [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. In these flights, the aircraft is required to deal with any violation of the enemy in the border region armed. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. electronic information collection group then changed into electronic information collection command [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. The decree No. 13-04/8-201 on June 16, 1980, which image is included in the following pages. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army letter No. 117/03/29/1701 dated September 5, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See Volume I, Second Edition, “The History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense”, pp. 21-154. It is noteworthy that several days after the Islamic Revolution victory on February 19, 1979, the Mahabad Armybase was disarmed by the counter-revolutionary forces, and this was the starting point for the clash and interference of the army and, consequently, the request for air support from the IRIAF and the formation of the Kurdistan conflicts. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See the full description of the fighter crash and the process of martyrdom of the first lieutenant pilot Gholam Hossein Bastani in Volume I, Second Edition, "The History of the Battle of the Sacred Defense", pp. 3720-368. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Shooting from Iraqi forces to the helicopter, which flew on investigating the F-5 aircraft clash inside the country bordeers, is an indication of the readiness of the enemy and its state of alert. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Some analysts regard the content of the news in question a sign of presence of elements lacking expertise and competence in the Air Force command and control system in the command and control system of the air force regardless of the revolutionary conditions governing the country and the IRIAF. They argue: "There is no indication that what the source of the news broadcasted by the IRIAF intelligence and guidance and the sergeant was as well as his role or responsibility in the process of informing and making decisions on military news. And the radar sites of the region have not seen anything, but based on the position of a non-operational person or organization, the aircraft flies with the acceptance of danger and they will search the region with fuel consumption and depreciation. Finally, they conclude that such astonishingly unpleasant cases have occurred over the past twenty months (from the victory of the Islamic Revolution until the onset of the imposed war) imposed difficult conditions on the operational activities which, in total, each have somehow led to the degradation of the values in the air force that they have neglected from this point, which is sometimes due to the lack of the difference between some employees and revolutionary institutions should inevitably enter other areas in order to increase the effectiveness of defense systems. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. It is once again recalled and emphasized that on these sensitive days, on command of Maj. Gen. Bagheri, the current commander of the IRIAF, due to the air strikes of the enemy at night, the scramble aircraft system consisting of a number of F-4 fighter aircrafts capable to fly at night is expanded from Mehrabad First Airbase to Dezful's Fourth Airbase. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Woods, M Kevin et al., (2014) "The Iran-Iraq War from the perspective of Saddam's commanders: conversation with General Hamdani", Translation by Abdolmajid Heidari, Tehran: MarzBom Pub, p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Ref: the plot of the coup “neghab” in Volume I, Second Edition, "The History of the Battle of the Sacred Defense", pp. 317-328. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Brigadier Ali Mohammad Naderi was the commander and pilot of the IRIAF and the Brigadier Shahid Babaei fellow combatant. The pilot-in-chief, Abbas Babaei, at the noon of August 6, 1987, on the day of Eid Qorban (Friday), while his wife and his fellows were waiting him at Mecca, Kaaba, were shot in a F-5 aircraft rear cabin piloted by Amir Naderi on a reconnaissance mission. He was martyred and the aircraft safely landed at the Tabriz Airbase. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Martyr Lieutenant-Colonel Pilot Hadi Jorki was martyred on October 5, 1980 during a mission against the aggressive forces in the Dasht-e Abbas region. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. This type of operation is called Target Practice in which the fighter aircraft practices attack in counterpart to the target regions on their soil in order to be more prepared to attack in the future [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. At this point of time, there were two options to counteract the aggression of the enemy through the F-14 Interceptor-Fighting Aircrafts: first, the expansion of this type of fighter to the bases of Hamadan and Dezful. Second, the use of the Airfueling Tactics using Boeing's "707 and 747" fuel aircrafts, which actually the second option is on the agenda of the deputy of operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. The report of SEMAJA in the letter No. 2446/03/29/1701/18 (review of the contents of this event is described in Chapter III, "The Function of the Commander of the IRIAF Defense” [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. According to the Second Office of SEMAJA [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. As mentioned, Lieutenant Behruz Pashapur, a qualified teacher of the pilots in the rear cabin of the F-14, was previously considered the rear cabin master of the F-14 selected together with Major Pilot Mohammad Fahravar, at a US air base to carry out a test case shot a Phoenix rocket to a predetermined target, which was definitely effective in deciding and firing the first Phoenix rocket by the IRIAF. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. This word (LAME DUCK) means to creat a safe airspace for the landing of insider aircraft at its closest base in times of war and crisis in the absence of radio communication between the aircraft and the ground station [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. See Volume I, Second Edition, “Sacred Air Defense History ", pp. 368-372. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. The IRIAF Deputy Commander's Command Operations Center Shift records from December 24, 1979 to May 31, 1981. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Examples: Major Hassan Afghan Toloui / Lieutenant Mohammad Oghbaee, the "CAP" mission over the western region for five hours and fifteen minutes along with air refueling (Amir Brigadier General Mohammed Oghbaee flight records). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. The pilots of this flight, Major Mohammad Reza Ataei, the front cabin and Lieutenant, Behrouz Pashapur, rear cabin, fired the first Phoenix ultra-advanced rocket in the battlefield. Of course, according to the video of the flight lessons session of the 8th Airbase (Shahid Baba'i in Isfahan), and based on the memories of their brother in arms, Lieutenant Behruz Pashapur previously been selected as one of the professors of the rear cabin of the F-14, along with Major Pilot Mohammad Farahavar (of experienced pilots and prominent commanders) had launched a Phoenix rocket at a predetermined target and destroyed it on a test site in an Amircan Airbases. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Source: London, Asharq al-Awsat Newspaper on September 10, 1980, detailing the events ounder the headline “September 10, 1980 and the ground and air defeat of the enemy” which was also reflected under the title “The Great Fighting of Iranian Phantoms and Iraqi MiGs in border” in Kayhan Newspaper. This has already been mentioned in the first volume of Second Edition, “Sacred Air Defense History”, pp. 338. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. SEMAJA Headquarters, Report No. 177, p. 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. See: the first volume of Second Edition, “Sacred Air Defense History”, pp. 386-388 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. SEMAJA Headquarters, Report No. 176, p. 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. The Cluster Bomb Unit" or "CBU is a type of anti-personnel and armored vehicles combat armament, and is composed of a reservoir with a large number of grenades opened after being thrown by a fighter-bomber the tanks open with the grenades are spread over a wide region. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. The IRIAF Deputy Commander's Command Operations Center Shift records from December 24, 1979 to June 1, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Kayhan newspaper: September 16, 1980. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. FRAG: Special flight mission statement (bombardment, etc.) with detailed commands "FRAG" [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. SEMAJA Headquarters, Report No. 181, p. 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. See details of the events and the process of captivity of Martyr Hussein Lashkari and Mohammad Zare Nemati in the first volume of Second Edition, “Sacred Air Defense History”, pp. 421-438. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. According toavailable documents, including oral history by Brig. Gen. Azadeh Jamshid Oshal at the Office of Strategic Studies in the IRIAF Office in 2015, and Brigadier-General Hussein Khalili Flight Office, on the day after the fall of Hossein Lashkari (on Friday, September 19, 1980) who were present at the region, the aggressive aircrafts being intercepted fled to Iraq. In addition, Brig. Gen. pilot Hamid Najafi, who during these days accopained Shahid Lieutenant general Sayad Shirazi, as chief of officer in Baneh-Sardasht region continuously reported the aggressions of Iraqi fighters to the command center of the Tabriz Airbase. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. See a full description of this conspiracy or seemingly coup in Volume I, Second Edition, "History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense", pp. 317-326. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. As mentioned, Lieutenant Behruz Pashapur, a qualified teacher of the pilots in the rear cabin of the F-14, was previously considered the rear cabin master of the F-14 selected together with Major Pilot Mohammad Fahravar, at a US air base to carry out a test case shot a Phoenix rocket to a predetermined target, which was definitely effective in deciding and firing the first Phoenix rocket by the IRIAF. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. The biography and description of the services of this noted pilot and the champion of the sacred defense will be in the next volume. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. We will write more about this hero pilot, unique commander and the IRIAF pioneer in the upcoming Volumes. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Mohammad Hassan Bagheri, Shadab Asgari (2009), Imposed War an Opportunity to Revive Islamic Iran's Dignity, Tehran: Andesh-e Asr Publication, p. 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. In the first volume, the second edition of the "Sacred Defense Air Combat," briefly looked at the importance of “Electronic Information and Reconnaissance Command” and the attack on one of the sites in this command in Ilam. (P. 329). It was also noted that the unit was able to control and monitor the military-political movements of Iraq with the help of advanced electronic information gathering and trained personnel, and by analyzing the electromagnetic waves emitted from the country's electronic equipment intercepted and evaluated the enemy's combat capability and combat readiness with a high degree of reliability, as further explained in the following chapters. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Iraq has four defense zones and, in fact, four air and missile defense commands in the cities of Baghdad. Tikrit, Basra and Kirkuk, which was directly under Saddam's command, the command of the entire armed forces of Iraq, as detailed in chapter four. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Although Indian, Pakistani, Iraqi and Russian coaches were part of the training of the pilot school and the flight crews, the Ba'ath army, however sent pilot and technical students to the former Soviet Union, England, Pakistan, India, France and the Czech Republic. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. For more information, see: Nasrallah Zeinali (2015) " Air Training and Support (Logistics) in the Sacred Defense" Tehran: the IRIAF Publishing Strategic Center, Vol. I, p. 338 and p. 340 [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. At the command of the late commander (martyr Jawad Fakori), the entire Mehrabad Air Transportation Units was assigned to be at the service of Qayin earthquake support headquarters. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. For more information, see: Nasrallah Zeinali (2015) " Air Training and Support (Logistics) in the Sacred Defense" Tehran: the IRIAF Publishing Strategic Center, Vol. I, p. 339 and p. 341 [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. For more information, see: Nasrallah Zeinali (2015) " Air Training and Support (Logistics) in the Sacred Defense" Tehran: the IRIAF Publishing Strategic Center, Vol. I, p. 333 and p. 346 [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. See Volume I, Second Edition, “The History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense”, pp. 154-425 [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. See Volume I, Second Edition, “The History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense”, pp. 21-154. It is noteworthy that several days after the Islamic Revolution victory on February 19, 1979, the Mahabad Armybase was disarmed by the counter-revolutionary forces, and this was the starting point for the clash and interference of the army and, consequently, the request for air support from the IRIAF and the formation of the Kurdistan conflicts. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Ibid, pp.368-372, F-5 aircraft crash at nine miles northwest of Khorramshahr, which led to the martyrdom of 1st lieutenant Gholam Hossein Bastani. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. As in Volume I, Second Edition, The History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense, pp. 368-335. It should not be forgot to note that in the Alborz Battle Plan, it was forbidden to carry out pre-emptive operations that were in the nature of the Air Force, and should have been in a position to defend itself with retaliation to deal with the enemy. It should be acknowledged that this strategy was very wise due to the regional and international ruling space of politics and propaganda. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. By September 22, 1980 a total of 27 the IRIAF aircraft and helicopters had been traumatized and a significant number of efficient and experienced staff had been lost. In addition to cruel sanctions and logistical problems, with 4% to 5% reduction in aircrafts and about 30% of trained human forces, The IRI entered the war with the enemy, although on the eve of the full-scale aggression of the enemy the wise decree of martyred, Colonel Javad Fakori prevented the removal of a number of the IRIAF pilots, and some others volunteered to return to work. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Among these deficiencies is the non-renowned term "revenge", or, in the proper sense, "retaliation," which is mentioned in the final discussion of the chapter five of this book. However, from September 1980 on, with the decisive attack by the enemy, the response order was received from Commander-in-Chiefا [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. He was one of the pilots with excellent record on flying F-86s, F-5s and F-4s, and in the final years of his service he was successor comander of the Air Force. By Colonel Javad Fakori's appointment to the Defense Department, Colonel Mashallah Omrani was practically monitoring the air force's sensitive and operational affairs. The experienced and qualified air force officer and former successor to the former commander passed away on May 3, 2014, at the age of 79, because of a heart attack and was buried in the Behesht Zahra cemetery, Salehan section. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. See: Volume I, Second Edition, "The History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense ", entitled "The aggressive uprising of the Iraqi Army and the readiness of the Alborz Operations Order" pp. 388-391. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. As mentioned, Lieutenant Behruz Pashapur, a qualified teacher of the pilots in the rear cabin of the F-14, was previously considered the rear cabin master of the F-14 selected together with Major Pilot Mohammad Fahravar, at a US air base to carry out a test case shot a Phoenix rocket to a predetermined target, which was definitely effective in deciding and firing the first Phoenix rocket by the IRIAF. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. At the end of the same time period, a group of Saudi fanatics, led by Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani, seized the Masjid al-Haram and, despite having resisted Saudi Arabia Gurds for two weeks, were eventually arrested or killed, but the incident made Saudi more pessimistic about Iran and closer to Iraq. On the other hand, an individual (apparently Iraqi, but according to some rumors Iranian), known as Samir Noorali, attempted to assassinate Tariq Aziz by throwing a bomb at the University of Mestensiriyah, killing two Iraqi students. On the same day, Saddam Hussein, swearing implicitly to the Iranian government, that "the pure blood that was shed into the ground in Mustansiriyah will not remain unrevenged. We cut off the hands that encroach Iraq” Source: Parsa Doust, Manouchehr (2007)" We and Iraq from the past to the present ", Tehran: Publishing Co., Second Edition, p. 248- 253 [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. The previous chapter has presented the recorded enemy’s air strikes in a Table [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Source: the SEMAJA headquarter, Report No. 91, p. 98, dated July 9, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. According to the records of some personnel of the IRIAF, including Amir Brigadier general, the pilot Abbas Ramezani. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. In reference to the letter No. 19-1 / 06-201 / on January 23, 1980 [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Subject of message No. 4-1 / 06-201 / 3 dated April 7, 1980 by the IRIAF Deputy of Operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. The general the IRIAF state of alert is presented in the final section of this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. The armed reconnaissance flights carried out in the southwest region with the F-5 fighter aircraft at a low altitude (about 500 feet) at speeds of around 350-400 nats, and pilots reported on mission observations. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. As mentioned in the first volume of the "Tabas events", the focus of radar coverage and the country's air defense systems on the west led US aggressor’s tougher operations from southern and southeastern Iran intending on attacking the embassy. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. The subject of the letter No. 11-1 / 6-201 / 3 / dated May 16, 1980, the IRIAF deputy of operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. The subject of the letter No.12-1 / 06-201 / 3 dated May 25, 1980, the IRIAF deputy of operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. It is noted that at the state of alert level B-3 the enemy raid is likely to cause in the next 72 hours. Therefore, all aircrafts and flight personnel, technical, defense and other operational units of the Air Force should be fully alert. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. The subject of the letter No. 47-06-201 / 2 dated June 5, 1980. The SEMAJA -3. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. The IRIAF Deputy of Operation decree No. 21-1/06-201/ [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. See a full description of this conspiracy or seemingly coup in Volume I, Second Edition, "History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense", pp. 317-326. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. The subject matter of the letter (according to the report of the Islamic Revolutionary Committee of the Islamic Republic of Iran No. with the classification of the series), it is worth noting that after the collapse of the imperial system, the Islamic Revolutionary Committees as a revolutionary organization was formed by the leadership of the clergy in the first days of the revolution's victory and engaged into security affairs, by the end of the Sacred defense was merged with the police and the gendarmerie and continued as The Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, under the command of the Chief of the General Staff. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. The subject of the letter No. 28-06-201 dated July 28, 1980, The Third Office of the SEMAJA. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. The IRIAF decree No. 29-06 / 1-201 / 3 dated July 28, 1980, Deputy of Operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)