|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **C:\Users\Armin\Desktop\Logo Web Motto.png** | شماره سفارش: 16587 |
| نوع ترجمه: خوب |
| تعداد کلمات: 96000 |
| لطفا در صورت وجود هر گونه سوال از طریق ایمیل *Tarjomano@Gmail.com* و یا شماره تلفن 09107660253 با ما در ارتباط باشید. |

توضیحات:

1. انگلیسی منطقه بیفا در عراق رو نتونستم پیدا کنم. توی متن های لایت کردم.
2. توی متن ترجمه هر جا که یک ماه به عنوان یک دوره زمانی مطرح شده (آبان ماه) تاریخ به معادل انگلیسی تبدیل شده است.

However, a week after the air force's pre-emptive action and the continuation of Combat Air Patrol missions, the Iraqi Ba'ath regime stopped its ongoing threats and aggressions in an unexpected and suspicious event. This suspicious activity and other threats of the enemy were not taken seriously and were not even considered by the responsible authorities (Army and State Officials) and, like many events after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, were overlooked due to current obstacles; however, politically it implied that tensions between the two countries have redlved in particular from Iraq, and probably the enemy has retreated from its position. Therefore, at the end of the night of June 18, 1979, the order was issued to the IRIAF to stop night CAP flights[[1]](#footnote-1).

Of course, some analysts, in the light of the aformentioned, raise the question: How could such an unfounded analysis be of a kind? Is it an enemy who, by spending a lot of financial expense, obtaining valuable military information from the anti-revolutionary fugitives, providing counsel and arms assistance to rebel groups in Kurdistan, and forcing Iran's political involvement into Iraq's affairs following a major invasion into a neighbor's soil retreat from its position so easy?

Since a series of political reasons is involved in justifying the issue and their examination is inconsistent with the purposes for which this book was written, it is in this context that here the book refrains from discussing this topic and leaves final conclusions to scholars of this field and to those who are interested in.

But from the operational aspect, it should be said that apparently after a two-month-long tranquility on the borders, again on September 5, 1979, F-4 fighter aircrafts in Hamedan Airbase were deployed on combat mission as alert in the air to prevent the entry of tanks and armored vehicles of the Ba'ath regime into the borders of Iran. We will review the mission statement:

* A request was made for a F-4 armed aircraft to detect a number of tanks and military vehicles moved on the Sardasht-Qale Dize in Iraq, in which case defensive action would be taken. The command was communicated to Hamadan Airbase for execution.

We will continue to review some other documents on October- November[[2]](#footnote-2):

1. At 01:30 AM on October 31, 1979, an aircraft at a speed of 420 nautical miles and a flight altitude of 30,000 feet entered the sky of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the Beifa region in Iraq against the Achaemenid city of Ahwaz.
2. According to a report by the IRIAF Command Center on November 16, 1979, a request was made for "air support" to cover the six ships of Navy of Islamic Republic of Iran Army (NEDAJA), Region 1, as well as seafaring operations throughout the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea.

- In the meantime, since November 1979, as a result of increased air threats and even the navy of the Iraqi Army in the southern regions of the country, officially pilot officers traveled to the command centers of the NEDAJA and the first regions (Bandar Abbas), the second (Bushehr) and the third (Khorramshahr). Having entered, the requests were made for reconnaissance from ​​Arvandroud reigion, the aerial imaging by the RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft of Iraqi units based in Amel-Qasr, Basra, and other Persian Gulf regions, indicating continued suspicious movements of the Iraq regime and its domestic mercenaries in Khuzestan.

The Ba'athist regime seemed to have used the good opportunities that the political currents of the revolution in the Islamic Republic of Iran had created to best serve the assessment of the conditions and fulfillment of their intentions.

On Sunday, November 4, the US embassy in Tehran was occupied by students following the Imam's route, and the next day, Bazargan submitted his resignation to Imam Khomeini[[3]](#footnote-3). Iraq, which closely monitored Iran's political changes, has recognized the situation and added to its aggression process.

Basically, October 23 to November 21 may be taken into account as one of the most important time periods for analyzing the crisis situation in the two countries' relations. Since the very same time period, that the signs of war could have been seen, but its alarm and warnings events did not stimulated any action by decision-making athourities; including Iraqi government announced the need to review Algiers Agreement on October 30, and 11 months before the formal termination of Algiers Agreement.

After the incident of the US embassy occupation in Tehran, the Iraqi ambassador to Beirut in an interview with the newspaper Al-Nahar said, “the Agreement must be reformed and Iran must voluntarily return to us all Iraqi rights in Shatt al-Arab[[4]](#footnote-4)”.

Subsequently, the Ba'ath political leaders assured on one hand that the United States has cut off its support for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular the logistical support of the army and the IRIAF (due to the depth of dependency), so with more boldness completed their planning and increased air strikes.

On the other hand, the Iranian Air Force considers the impending attack on the country's sky as definite and, accordingly, revises previous plans and formulates the “Operation Alborz” plan. Of course, the revision of the above mentioned plan was important because some of the contents of previous plans were not compatible with the Islamic Republic's defense strategy, and the necessity of localizing its provisions with the principles and rules of war and defense in an Islamic country was necessary.

However, the air force, though faced with many domestic and extra-organizational problems (and, of course, with the backing of valuable experiences from the events of the past few decades), was still seeking to achieve the following objectives, since focusing on these issues could have provided the Air Force with a defensive mission patroling the sky of the country and holding the territory of the noble nation of Islamic Iran:

* Achieve optimal operational conditions and maintain combat readiness through the continuity of educational flights by fulfilling minimum flight requirements;
* Organize the critical process of aircraft maintenance with regard to the departure of advisers and the lack of supplies and spare parts;
* Eliminate air defense challenges, especially in the field of radar systems coverage
* Regular review of Operation Alborz for designing detailed commands;
* Cope with the challenge of discharged officers and experienced pilots, and re-employment of some of them.

- Bearing the aforementioned in mind, here are some Iraqi Air Force air strikes recorded on February 20, 1980 to March 19, 1980:

1. According to the report of the border guard of Qasr Shirin, at 12:30, on February 21, 1980, an olive colored Iraqi aircraft was seen flying at very low allttitute over the southeast of Khosravi checkpoint to the "Durandi Yuk" checkpoint, which apparently intended at reconnaissance and taking images of the region. Thus, the objections were stated to the relevant Iraqi authorities.

- Accordingly, Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army in the letter No. 227 on February 21, 1980 communicated the Air Force to report air defense measures taken and emphasized: "If the Air Force does not react strongly, the raids will continue." The above steps were notified to the Air Defense Command.

2. At 15:10, a suspicious aircraft on the Iraq-Iran border line raided Iran, and at 15:22 the same day (February 21) two F-5s from the fourth base were commanded to scramble, but the target disappeared from the radar, and the aircrafts returned to the base. It was announced to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the end of this discussion, in a general conclusion, it should be emphasized that: First, with the latest reports registered at the Army Headquarters Office (Major General Officers) on January 30, 1979, in the wake of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iraq was planning to strengthen its air force including the following activities:

“Recently, the Iraqi Air Force (Strengthening its units) has built and exploited a new base in the Zubair region.”

Second, according to the report of Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Headquarters under the title "raid" from March 21, 1979 to June 21, 1979[[5]](#footnote-5) , the following combat readiness actions were taken by the Iraqi Air Force, which included the establishment of a strategic plot against the Islamic Revolution and the emerging IRI system:

* Establishing and strengthening several bases in the eastern border regions and establishing the Air Reconnaissance Information System;
* Announced the state of alert at Kut Air Base (late March 1979);
* Strengthening Shuibei Air Base (late March 1979);
* Announced the state of alert and practicing and shooting with real ammunition by the 145th and 195th brigades of Surface to Air Missile (SAM) (March - April 1979);
* Carry out air maneuvers in Habbaniyah (March 26, 1979);
* Announced the state of alert to all Iraqi Air Force personnel (March 28 and 31, 1979);
* Announced the state of alert to Marine Corps Air Station in Basra (June 5, 1979).

In response to the above-mentioned measures and to prevent surprises attacks of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime to the western borders of the country, as indicated by the date June 4, 1979 records, the IRIAF command system started Combat Air Patrol flights in the border lines and doubled the number of ready-to-combat aircrafts in the bases adjacent to the western borders, such as the Hamedan Air Base since June 11, 1979 on, which ultimately apparently, put an end to the Iraqi army's air strikes.

Third, from June 24, to March1979, the Iraq air strickes on the Iranian sky continued. These flights, apparently aimed at reconnaissance and assessing the IRIAF defensive power ended in short time due to proximity to the border regions. Obviously, the rapid and effective response to the enemy's aggression was not apparent due to the lack of continued flying of the IRIAF fighter aircrafts (as Combat Air Patrols), as well as the lack of clear instructions for air defense systems (for tracking, reconnaissance and destroying targets).

Here we do not want to recall what has happened, but to attract the attention of interested people to the fact that the IRIAF from the beginning of 1979 despite the weakening of its command system and its hierarchy and other problems, including operational and logistics deficiencies was ready to dispose of enemy aggression, and operating instructions was the methods of interception and engagement with aggressive aircrafts, but the revolutionary atmosphere of the ruling state was such that the threats of the enemy were not taken seriously and, consequently, the power to act and make decisive decisions were somehow out of the IRIAF hands. Even Iraq's action in confusing the international community's minds with the Iranian hostile attitudes and intervention has not been able to capture the views of the country's political officials on the capabilities of the IRIAF (in the reduction of the crisis).

Therefore, valuable opportunities that could have at least be preventive (deterrence) disappeared easily so that the ambitious leader of Iraq would take bigger and more secure steps towards his aggressive intentions.

Hence, the IRIAF defensive and usual measures not only did not create fears at the heart of the Iraqi Ba'ath's autocrats, but did not deserve the powerful air force of a revolutionary country.

Accordingly, there is a list of enemy air strikes from March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1980 and is depicted in Table 1-1 and Figures 1-1 and 1-2, as well.

Table 1-1. Iraqi Ba'ath regime air atrikes on the Islamic Republic of Iran territory from March 21, 1979 to March 19, 1980

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| March 21, 1979 to April 20, 1979 | April 21, 1979 to May 21, 1979 | May 22, 1979 to June 21, 1979 | June 22, 1979 to July 22, 1979 | July 23, 1979 to August 22, 1979 | August 23, 1979 to September 22, 1979 | September 23, 1979 to October 22, 1979 | October 23, 1979 to November 21, 1979 | November 22, 1979 to December 21, 1979 | December 22, 1979 to January 20, 1980 | January 21, 1980 to February 19, 1980 | February 20, 1980 to March 20, 1980 |
| 4 | 6 | 15 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 11 |

Figure 1-1: Iraqi Ba'ath regime air atrikes from March 21, 1979 to September 22, 1979





Figure 2-1. Iraqi Ba'ath regime air atrikes from September 23, 1979 to March 19, 1980



It is worth mentioning that Tables and Figures of the Ba'ath army's dispersed raids to Iran territory have been presented at the end of this chapter.

**B. Air strikes and the IRIAF measures from March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980**

Since March 21, 1980, the Iraqi air threats and raids, along with some dismal and suspicious air movements from the Marxist regime of Afghanistan in the east and the movements of the United States in the south, appeared to be purposeful. On April 27, 1980, following the events of Tabas (May 25th), a seemingly Iraqi passenger aircraft (Antonov-12), which crossed the boundary line of "Horalouchi" and entered the Iranian sky, was intercepted by two Air Force F-5 aircrafts, and their occupants were arrested after the forced landing.

Given the importance of the subject and to the knowledge of readers and researchers, the crystallization and demonstration of Iraqi air raids from March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980 and the IRIAF command and control system measures in discovering, reconnaissance, neutralizing and preventing or counteracting (using available documents at the headquarters offices of the IRIAF and SEMAJA[[6]](#footnote-6) and other authoritative sources), are presented as the following. In the end, the monthly summary and the events are also presented, in the form of relevent Tables and Figures.

- March 21, 1980 to April 20, 1980

- Since March 21, 1980, the Iraqi air strikes became more serious and according to recorded documents the following threats and raids by the enemy were recored and appropriate measures were taken to deal with them:

- On April 1, 14, 17 and 18 the number of five aircrafts violated the sky of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

- On April 7, 1980, the first Iraqi air strike took place at the Bahram Abad customs in the city of Mehran. Since then, the dispersed and often unimportant encounters that have always been neglected turned into heavy clashes that were not only studied and analyzed, but also slightly increased the scope and depth of these encounters.

It should be noted that on the same day (April 7, 1980), after the apparent aggressions of the Iraq Ba'ath regime to Iran, The Islamic Republic of Iran Army went on the state of alert. The state of alert took a more serious form in the following days, and sometimes faced tactical combat operations. For example:

Vahdati Air Base (Dezful) reported from Abadan Air tower that at 23:10 pm, three helicopters were heading from Basra to Ahwaz. In the state of alert aircrafts scrambled from the Sixth Air Base (due to F-5 flight restrictions in Dezful at night), but did not see any particular case. In this regard, a HAWK missile was fired by air defense toward targets.

In the later case, the gradual entry of the IRIAF into the realm of conflict was more tangible, and five days after the announcement of the general stat of alert of the Army (from April 7, 1980), and receiving the following report, SEMAJA issued a new decision to the Air Force:

"Following the attack of an Iraqi fighter aircraft from the Somayeh base on Iran's teritory and reconnaissance of several wells and two oil units, the Air Force issued to conduct armed reconnaissance (as requested by SEMAJA) on a daily basis at 10:00 to 11:00 and 15:00 to 16:00, with the F-4 aircraft from Shahrokhi Airbase on Qasr-e Shirin  border line and one F-5 from the Vahdat base (Dezful) on the Khorramshahr border line and report the data and the result. "

It is noteworthy that, on March 21, 1980, according to the report No. 2/02/29/1701 by Dehloran radar station, Iraq has deployed a number of aircraft hangars and aircraft replicas at Shiyabeh, Nasiriyah and Habbaniyah Airbases protected by anti-aircraft as the false target.

April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980

Since April 21 to May 18, 1980, suspected Iraqi air raids on Iran sky followed a special arrangement. Increasing reconnaissance flights and gradually expanded the air strikes to our countries sky that crossed the border and penetrated into the depths of the country clearly signaled the development of a targeted scenario and an organized plan of action. From the operational and technical point of view, one can ask the question of what was the majority of these flights for or, in general, what they aimed?

One of the common and effective methods of conducting air strikes on the land of the target country (without loss or the minimum possible casualties of their forces and equipment) is to assess the response of the enemy air force and the strength of its propulsion systems. In the first volume of the series, it has been repeatedly emphasized that Iraqi commanders possessed relatively comprehensive information on combat readiness and airborne capabilities of the Iranian Air Force. But in practice, more tangible measures were needed to verify this information. Offensive flights could have played an important role for Iraq in a full-scale attack from two perspectives.

First, the assessment of the Iranian Air Force defensive system and reaction to the presence of enemy fighters (from the source base to the distances in the border regions)

Second, the analysis of public opinion especially residents of the border regions, from Iraqi air raids and the possibility of engaging in an inclusive war

In spite of the above, the most important event of April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980 must be sought on the fourth and seventh flights of this period of time. We overlook the fourth event of this period of time, because the Volume I provided the detailed "Tabas events". The only remarkable thing is the propaganda of the landing of American aircrafts in Tabas with the aim of weakening or destroying the image of the IRIAF in the country, which had left its mischief long in the minds of the public.

But the April 27, 1980 incident can be analyzed in some ways. On this day, an Iraqi aircraft (carrying a number of passengers) crossed the southwest border until it was intercepted by air force fighters at Vahdati Air Base.

How this aircraft was able to manage to penetrate to this distance still unknown, but the remarkable point of this event is the decisive performance of the IRIAF on landing the aircraft and the detainment of the occupants, indicating the vigilance and speed of the air force in implementing preventive missions.

However, in the military atmosphere and uncertainties of the time, the IRIAF did not hesitate to intercept this anonymous aircraft and, having relied on its inherent responsibility, did not miss the moment to watch and protect the sky of the country. The monitoring of the borders of the country was not limited to Western borders. At the same time, in addition to the "Tabas events," the occasional and racial attacks of the Marxist regime in Afghanistan were also on the agenda of the Air Force designers, which are detailed in the previous volume. The following is a brief summary of the upsurge in the Iraqi Air Force attaks and the IRIAF speed to intercept Iraqi aggressor aircrafts:

1. In the aftermath of the aggressions and movements of the enemy in the southwest of the country, on April 22, 1980, a F-5 aircraft was deployed from the Vahdati Airbase (Dezful) to conduct reconnaissance of the Khorramshahr boundary line, which, the pilot on after flight report announced that there was no military activity from Dehloran to the road to Abadan, but from the road to Abadan to 15 miles from Khorramshahr there was extensive enemy movements in the form of presence of two tanks and one armoured personnel carrier in every 5 miles.
2. At 03:20, 03:55 and 04:20, dated April 27, 1980, unknown aircraft were observed at an altitude of 2200 feet in the sky of Abadan and was shot at by the an artillery battery stationed at the refinery.
3. On the same day (April 27, 1980), a GPS-11 radar system was expanded to Chabahar in order to observe the possible re-entry of US forces, while eastern borders of the country were twice attaked by Afghan aircrafts.
4. At 11:00 am on April 27, 1980, an unidentified transport aircraft (Iraqi) flew in the Susangerd sky and was found near the Dezful Airbase. The aircraft was intercepted by two F-5E [[7]](#footnote-7) and a number of fighter aircrafts from the Dehloran radar and compelled to land. The seven passengers were sent to Tehran to be inspected by (the second-office of Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army).

**Further Details**:

1 - The documents of the Air Defense Command on the compulsory landing of the Iraqi aggressor aircraft read:

At 06:35 on April 27, 1980 in Greenwich Mean Time at 11:05 local time[[8]](#footnote-8), a target appeared on Dezful's radar screen, which Dezfoul's "Control and Reporting Center" also confirms. Two armed F-5s scrmmbled on warning alarm of the suspicious target were given warnings on the Guard communication channel[[9]](#footnote-9).

F-5 aircrafts, with repeated warning, tryed to drive the aggressor aircrafts (which belonged to Iraq) to one of the nearby airports (the Dezful or civilian Ahwaz airport) whose pilot does not comply with the order. Then, the fire command was given to Tiger aircrafts[[10]](#footnote-10) and the leader pilot fired. The Iraqi aircraft forced to land on a flat ground 98 miles from the fourth base on a radial of 190 degrees from the base, and all seven of its passengers were arrested. The incident comes at a time when Iraqi air force fighters continuously aircrew the aircraft and at the last minute they have also planned to engage in air strikes with F-5s that fail[[11]](#footnote-11).



Image 1-1 the Iraqi "Antonov-12"

The country's media broadcasted: “on April 27an Iraqi aircraft (Antonov-12) entered Iran's sky through the border line of The Hawizeh Marshes and was intercepted by two F-5 interceptor fighter aircrafts. The Iraqi pilot defied the F-5 fighter aircraft on landing in Iran, faced with Iranian machine gun strike. Part of the right wing of the aircraft was shut down and damaged, and the pilot eventually landed the aircraft and its occupants were all arrested.”

1. Although the purpose of this piece of writing is to draw the offense of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime's army, but for the sake of greater awareness of readers and scholars, another example of aggression has been presented in the foregoing. At the same time, the air force was faced with the threats of the Ba'ath regime and the dependent mercenaries and counterrevolutionaries in the west of the country, along with the US threats and even the ruling Marxist regime in Afghanistan (the former USSR). In fact, the general expectation at that time was to respond to all possible threats against the country. In the following, some of the enemy's aggression has been described:

* On April 28, 1980 the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. The ground force reported at 2:00 PM that two MiG-fighter aircrafts were raided in Iran and fled into Iraqi after being identified as Iraqi aircraft.
2. At 22:15, a helicopter raided the Iran sky, which flew away being fired by military forces stationed at Abadan airport with several firing bombs.

* On April 29, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. According to the report of the gendarmerie about the forced landing of an Iraqi airaircraft carried out by the Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran; Iraqi aircrafts are constantly flown over the checkpoint (where the aircraft landed) and harassed the agents.

* On May 6, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. At 10:38, two in a state of alert F-5s flew from Vahdati Airbase (Dezful). The target was detected by a radar station in the southwest, which disappeared after the scramble flight, and the aircrafts continued on Combat Air Patrol.
2. According to the report of the Gendarmerie of of the Islamic Republic of Iran at 12:15, an Iraqi waraircraft appeared at low altitude on the Dehloran city and soon returned to Iraqi territory.
3. The Gendarmerie of of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced to the IRIAF that at 21:00, three aircrafts flying around Arvandroud were shot by the guards.
4. The Shahrbani of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported that at 02:40, forces stationed at the Abadan airport fired an unidentified aircraft that had violated Iran's sky, which immediately left the region.

* On May 8, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. At 21:00 on May 8, 1980, three aircrafts flew near the Arvandrood (around Abadan) which were shot by the border guards.
2. According to the gendarmerie information, at 04:30, on May 10, 1980, an Iraqi aircraft entered Shalamcheh sky in Khorramshahr, which were shot by officers and forced to return to the country.
3. At 04:20 on May 13, 1980, two Iraqi aircrafts entered Iran sky from the Khorramshahr region, which were forced to flee by the shooting of the coastal artillery.
4. According to the published news, from midnight on May 15, 1980 to the morning of May 16, 1980, five foreign reconnaissanceaircrafts crossing the Karmshahr border violated Iran's sky, which were forced to leave the region by the Iranian forces fire.
5. The Navy reported that at 03:14, 03:30 and 04:00 an unidentified airaircraft was found near the Khorramshahr naval base that was shot, but was not hit due to the high flight altitute.
6. An unidentified jet was also seen at 11:00 by the Qasr-e Shirincentral police station (Ilam district) over the border line (Anjire border crossing). The State Department and the Air Force were informed.
7. At about 03:00, an Iraqi aircraft violated Iran's sky and was forced to leave the region by an anti-aircraft at the airport in Abadan[[12]](#footnote-12).

Note: Coincident with the US forces strike and after their failure in the Tabas desert, the Iraqi Ba'ath militant air raids have been rising and recorded more frequently. In turn, this trick was to divert the current operational focus and air defense systems toward the West and observe the movements of Iraq, and could in some way be the first indirect, unwritten cooperation of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime with world arrogance.

1. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army letter No. 117/03/29/1701 dated September 5, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. October 23 to November 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Bazargan in the letter submittted to Imam Khomeini writes: Following the repeated description of the past and considering that interference, disturbances, opposition, and dissent have made it impossible to carry out the duties assigned to me and my colleagues and the fact that for this part of time, in the present historical situation it is not possible to save the country and to achieve a revolutionary objectives without the unity of the word and the unity of management. Hereby I am giving my resignation. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. At the end of the same time period, a group of Saudi fanatics, led by Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani, seized the Masjid al-Haram and, despite having resisted Saudi Arabia Gurds for two weeks, were eventually arrested or killed, but the incident made Saudi more pessimistic about Iran and closer to Iraq. On the other hand, an individual (apparently Iraqi, but according to some rumors Iranian), known as Samir Noorali, attempted to assassinate Tariq Aziz by throwing a bomb at the University of Mestensiriyah, killing two Iraqi students. On the same day, Saddam Hussein, swearing implicitly to the Iranian government, that "the pure blood that was shed into the ground in Mustansiriyah will not remain unrevenged. We cut off the hands that encroach Iraq” Source: Parsa Doust, Manouchehr (2007)" We and Iraq from the past to the present ", Tehran: Publishing Co., Second Edition, p. 248- 253 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Headquarter; Report No. 91, p. 98, dated July 9, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The pilots of the two F-5E scrambe aircrafts, were the First Lieutenant Mahmoud Jadidi the leader of the group and the First Lieutenant Samad Ebrahimi as No. 2, respectively; both are the owner of the military orders, awards and decorations “Fatah” and the war heroes because of the great courage. In the next volumes will present some of their memories and epics. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The official time of the country is ahead according to the law of using the maximum brightness time, four hours and thirty minutes of the Greenwich (ZOLO or Z). The clock is set back for an hour at the March 21, and returns to the former situation at the September 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The 123 and 234 MHz frequencies: (VHF) and (UHF), respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The Metaphorical Name of the F-5 Aircraft [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Mahmoud Khorand et al (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: The IRIAF Office of Strategic Studies. (This collection includes some of the most important air force command activities on a daily basis that are currently available at the request of The IRIAF Office of Strategic Studies, currently compiled in 8 volumes and published at the Air Force Headquarters Press in 1998. The first volume of this collection was compiled by the efforts of Amir Brigadier Mahmud Khorand and the others seven volumes have been compiled by Brigadier Hossein Ali Saeedmehr and a group of pioneers from the Defense Forces Command. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army 3 Letter No. 2/1701/ 29/ 07/316 dated May 18, 1980 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)