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|  | شماره سفارش:16587 |
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| تعداد کلمات: 96000 |
| لطفا در صورت وجود هر گونه سوال از طریق ایمیل *Tarjomano@Gmail.com* و یا شماره تلفن 09107660253 با ما در ارتباط باشید. |

**May 22, 1979 to June 21, 1979**

A review of the events of May 22, 1979 to June 21, 1979 shows the intensity and extent of the Iraqi Air Force flights over the borderline and inside Iran. The most important thing is the shooting and aerial bombing of the civilian regions and the martyrdom of a No. of defenseless people that actually proves the beginning of war by Iraq. However, a deterrent policy was not assigned to the air force to put the enemy in a passive position, and the defense diplomacy was a simple and basic operation in the face of freedom of action for the enemy. We will review an example of this period of time (quoted from the IRIAF Office of Command command and news from Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, SEMAJA):

1. At 04:00 on May 23, two Iraqi aircrafts raided at the border from the May-Tapan checkpoint to Salman Koshte in Iran and bombarded the border line twice.
2. Two fighter jets and four Iraqi helicopters attacked Hilala and Talkab checkpoints using rockets and machine guns[[1]](#footnote-1). To deal with it, the IRIAF put two aircraft coverage on its agenda.
3. On May 29, the Iraqi Army launched a ground and air strike (Artillery attacks) in the wake of its previous attacks on the city of Mehran. Twelve were martyred and 36 were wounded in the attack. The victims were all civilians.
4. On the same day (May 29), Iraqi helicopters re-bombed Mehran and border posts, which, upon receiving news, two armed fighter aircrafts (F-5s) launched to support and counteract the raids on the region.
5. At 11:00, other cases of armed conflict were reported at the border regions of Kermanshah and Ilam, during which several checkpoints were destroyed by the Iraqi army. At the same time, four Iraqi MiGs were flying the city of Mehran sky, which, supported by artillery and helicopters, bombarded the border checkpoints. Electricity and water were cut in the city of Mehran, and commander of Ilam regiments demanded immediate air support. The Fourth Airbase provided the full support and defense of the region.
6. Accoding to the letter No. 250, two F-5s flew from the Fourth Airbase on the Ilam region. According to the pilots there were shootings over a region which shows Hilala checkpoint coordinates. The result of the mission was reported through the letters Nos.1278 and 1282 to SEMAJA.

Note: the IRIAF From this date onwards, in addition to the clashes with the Iraqi Army mercenaries in the western part of the country, was simultaneously obliged to confront the apparent raids of the Ba'ath militant, which in some way signifies the mandatory entry of the air force into the arena of the war. The details are as the following:

From May 31, 1980 to June 12, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. According to the Commander of the Expeditionary Team of the Mehran Region, on May 31, 1980, two MiG Aircrafts were seen in the region[[2]](#footnote-2). A few moments later, the Fourth Airbase was asked to scramble. The request was made at 10:25 and two F-5s were deployed at the base for armed reconnaissance in the region of Mehran.
2. On June 2, 1980, Iraqi helicopters attacked the region of ​​Saleh Abad from 11:23 to 21:00.
3. At 23:00, two Iraqi aircrafts entered Iran's sky at penetrated to Tabriz Second Air Base. They were forced to flee by shooting of air defense units. Meanwhile, at 23:20 an unidentified object was observed for one hour in the sky of the city of Tabriz in the sky of Second Air Base.
4. At 07:00 on June 10, 1980, two fighter aircrafts were observed over the Nader checkpoint, then an explosion sound was heard and a large amount of smoke was seen, which was a sign of a fire.
5. Four Iraqi aircrafts and two helicopters bombed Hillala and Ney khazar (Mehran) regions checkpoints ​​on June 10, 1980.
6. At 09:35 on June 11, 1980, the fourth Air base, based on letter No. 3, launched an armed reconnaissance flight[[3]](#footnote-3) with F-5 aircraft from the Dehloran border to Khorramshahr. In this mission, the amount of ammunition used to deal with threats was 30 rockets and 679 cartridges.
7. On June 13, 1980, an unidentified aircraft passed Iran border in the south, which was forced to leave the region by an anti-aircraft gun at Abadan airport.
8. On June 12, 1980, two Iraqi Sukhoi aircraft bombed a village in the Uramanat suburb. The violations and suspicious air traffic in the southern region were reported.
9. At 17:15, on June 12, 1980 an unidentified airaircraft flew over the electronic information collection group site[[4]](#footnote-4) in the western part of the country, forced to leav the Iranian sky with the firing of the air defense group deployed on the site. The message sent from electronic information collection site was sent to the deputy operation.
10. As reported by the the IRIAF command post, four helicopters and five tanks were observed betwen (Bralan) and (Gheshlagh Ali Nabi) checkpoints around Maku, which immediately four F-5s in Second Airbase were assigned to scramble. The Second Airbase was required to receive new information every 15 minutes and report the latest situation.

Note: The above cases show a period of time that Iraqi aircrafts (helicopters and fighters) gradually focused on bombing operations and, in parallel, Air patrols in border regions and cities continued.

From June 13, 1980 to June 21, 1980, the following border raids by the enemy have been reported and recorded and appropriate measures have been taken to counteract them:

1. According to the Sixth Airbase the Air Navy Ptrol at 09:55 on June 13, 1980 was launched by one C-130 aircraft for 100 minutes on the "F" route (southwest of the Persian Gulf route) and two ships (a tanker ship and a cargo ship) were observed.
2. At 23:30 on June 13, 1980, an Iraqi airaircraft raided Iran sky, and launched several flares in the region of ​​“Tamrchin”. Given the increase in Iraqi airstrikes in recent nights, the IRIAF deputy of operations has explored the history and flight times of Iraqi aircrafts in the past few nights, in order to control its quantitative and qualitative trends for planning its flights.
3. the following were observed by F-5E aircrafts in turn reconnaissance flights at the Dehloran to Qasr-e-Shirin:

- A moving radar device owned by the Iraqi state;

- The Iraqi road was constructed in the westnorthern part of Mehran to the city of Mendeli, 50% of which was done

1. The Sixth Airbase in letter No. 52 issued an Air Patrol on route "A" (southeast of the Persian Gulf) and Russian ship carrying military equipment was seen. Meanwhile, a No. of photos of the ship was taken.
2. According to the Jolfa border guards report, the Soviet cargo train at 11:30 am carried 30 tanks, 14 vehicles, and 5 military carriages and wagons from west to east.
3. As reported by the Surface-to-Air Defense Group, located at Ilam, at 16:30, on June 14 and 15, 1980, during two shooting stages with a 23m machine gun and shooting 320 cartrudges they managed to make two Iraqi aggressor MiG-21 aircrafts flee.
4. On June 17, 1980, for the third day in succession, an Iraqi MiG aircraft flew over the site of Ilam, which was forced to flee with the shooting of forces stationed in the region.
5. On June 18, 1980, an enemy aircraft raided Iran sky, and launched two flares in the region of “Tamrchin”. The Tabriz Airbase was requested to launch reconnaissance flights in Piranshahr and Sardasht regions for three consecutive nights.
6. According to the above, the Shahrokhi Airbase (Hamedan) for three nights (June 18, 19 and 20, 1980) and during different times put reconnaissance flights on the cities of Piranshahr, Pasveh, Naghdeh and Baneh on their agenda.
7. Following the request by Armored Forces 94 about the Iraqi air strikes on Pyreneeshahr Jaldiyan district, the Second Airbase sent two F-5s for reconnaissance and support operations to Jaldiyan, Piranshahr and Pasveh regions.
8. The IRIAF Deputy of Operations at the mission to the commander of the Fourth Airbase issued a decree to carry out night flight with air refueling on June 18, 1980 using the F-4 aircraft expanded to that base[[5]](#footnote-5).
9. In the letter No. 309, the Fourth Airbase announced that on June 19, 1980, the reconnaissance flights were launched on Dehloran to Khorramshahr border line by a F-5I airaircraft.
10. The IRIAF Deputy of Operations issued the decree No. 14-04/8-201on June 17, 1980 to the Sixth Airbase command in Bushehr to carry out night patrol flight with air refueling on June 19, 1980.
11. The Second Airbase in the letter No. 88 on June 20, 1980 announced that at 11:00 am, the reconnaissance flight and air cover of the border of the two countries were carried out by two F-5 aircrafts armed with missiles and cartridges. No suspicious activity was detected.

Note: The review of the operational process on May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980 has been indicative of an increase in operational and preventive measures against the severity of air raids and the expansion of enemy forces for the following reasons:

A- The the Iraqi Ba'ath regime's suspicious movements and aircrafts activities have intensified during this period, so that the commanders of the Army put on the agenda in turn flights in order to carry out an armed reconnaissance mission and even overnight Air Combat Patrols to observe and monitor the enemy's actions from Shalamche to West Azerbaijan. These missions were performed by F-5s from the Second and Fourth Airbases or the F-4s from the Third Airbase, and pilots, although often reported no suspicious cases; however “for the first time on June 15, 1980” and three months before the start of the full-scale attack of the Ba'athist regime on Iran, a departed patrol from Dezful's fourth battalion has reported the following suspicious cases:

- A moving radar device owned by the Iraqi state;

- The Iraqi road was constructed in the westnorthern part of Mehran to the city of Mendeli, 50% of which was done.

Also on June 20, 1980, an expedition pilot from the Tabriz Second Airbase announced that at 8:00 am, during an air cover mission on the Oshnavieh-Baneh, a probably military camp was seen in a 20km to Iraq with estimated without 100 and 150 tents.

B) The order to launch night patrols with air refueling has been frequent at the Third, Fourth and Sixth Airbases in the final nights of this month (from May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980), due to the importance of the subject, the following page depicts an image of a relevant document.

C) The increased demand for air support missions by the 64th Orumieh Division and Kermanshah DASC of this month (from May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980), signaled an upsurge in the clashes between the army and other defenders of the Islamic Revolution with the enemy's deceived, counterrevolutionary and provoked forces. This fact is considered as another proof of the broad projection of the Ba'athist enemy to prepare the war (based on the examples provided, marine patrol flights also increased on this month (from May 22, 1980 to June 21, 1980).




Figure 2-1. The image of the IRIAF Deputy of Operations Letter to the Fourth Airbase on "Night Patrol" with Air refueling by F-4 Fighter on June 18, 1980

**C) Iraqi air raids and the IRIAF measures from June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980:**

Although the process of aggression is also showing increasing growth from June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980, however, some unexpected incidents to the air force have signaled serious and alarming warnings that, for various reasons, including political strife in the country, were less studied and analyzed, and despite the increasing frequency of other raids and unfortunate events, it was not considered as necessary.

Among these events, there can be tragic accidents on 1979 and 1980, the full description of which is presented in chapter six of the first volume.

Hence, the expeditionary teams from the IRIAF inspection closely examined the technical dimensions of these accidents, but only slightly analyzed the pathology of the subject and provided practical solutions (to prevent similar incidents). Apart from these issues, the design of a hijacking event should be considered as the major event of August and the captivity of Seyyed al-Usara Pilot Lashgari and Missed Zare Nemati as the main events of September (September 18, 1980), which again placed the Air Force in the spotlight of the media and public opinion. Until finally, on September 22, 1980, the airports of the country and the IRIAF Airbases were fully attacked by the enemy, and the process of these violations as well as the IRIAF measures on monthly basis as as follows:

**June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980**

With the onset of the summer of 1980, the Iraqi air raids began to intensify and, from the very first days, defensive measures continued as armed reconnaissance patrols and eye detection and Combat Air Patrols, the following refers to some of events on June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980 and increases in enemy air strikes:

1. The Second Airbase (Tabriz) announced that the Combat Air Patrols were carried out by two F-5s on the border line. In the final minutes of the mission, the Tabriz Radar detected a target at a low altitude across the border and assigned it to the patrol aircraft.
2. Kermanshah DASC requested that the announcement of the Scramble and the air coverage, as soon as possible, be informed before the flight of their aircraft, so that there would be enough time to inspect the fire of the self-defense and prevent the shooting the IRIAF aircrafts.the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases and operations management were informed.
3. June 25, 1980, the Fourth Airbase announced that the F5-E aircraft No. 7050 (which was deployed to the Armed Reconnaissance Mission in order to deal with enemy air raids) crashed in northern Khorramshahr, in the flood region with its pilot martyred[[6]](#footnote-6).

As far as the available documents are concerned, the following cases are noted for the F-5E aircraft crash to the first lieutenant Gholam Hossein Bastani:

* At 09:25 on June 25, 1980, a fighter jet, apparently identified as Iraqi, was maneuvered in the Khosrowabad Garrison Zone (in the region of ​​ The Iranian Gendarmerie). Moments later, the unit's gunships were pushed to this fighter and the aircraft was forced to retreat.
* According to the IRIAF inspection and flight safety, the aircraft was shot down during the Border Reconnaissance Mission (possibly), by Iran defensive armament and its pilot was martyred.

1. The IRIAF deputy of operation immediately sent a RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft to the crash site to announc the result after taking a photo. My First base station operations reported that the flight did not comply with the regulations because of the vicinity of the evnt with the border line. The pilot-colonel Jawad Fakori has said: "A mission must be carried out by flying in the border regions."
2. On June 28, 1980, a 214 helicopter was investigating the F-5 aircraft strike on the border line that was shot by Iraqi agents. As a result of a bullet hit by a gasoline tank, the helicopter landed compulsorily in 200 meters of the Khorramshahr-Shalamcheh road[[7]](#footnote-7). The helicopter, which patroles on the Iranian border line, was shot by the Iraqi border guard and hit with eight cartridges and was forced to land near the "Dorbant" checkpoint. The helicopter apparently did not suffer serious damage, and its passengers were reported healthy.

The following day, the Kayhan newspaper reported in Khorramshahr: "About 5:45 PM, Yesterday (June 28, 1980), Iraqi troops fired at an IRI helicopter.”

1. In order to prevent adverse events (shooting at Iranian aircrafts), the Kermanshah DASC offered to the Air Force Headquarters to inform them by predicted flights 12 hours earlier and unpredictable flights two hours before the flight.
2. According to the the Ilam Governorate, Iraqi aircraft repeatedly raided several times from 9:00 pm on July 5, 1980 to Iran's sky in the Ilam region (from Dehloran to Bostan).
3. According to the the Ilam Governorate, at at 12:05 am on July 5, 1980, the Gendarmerie checkpoint Samideh (located in Susangerd district) was surrounded by Iraqi forces and urgently needs to deploy forces. At 13:12, the IRIAF deputy of operation immediately orderd a scramble flight to the Fourth Airbase.
4. According to the Kermanshah DASC, between 15:24 and 16:00, on July 5, 1980 there was a reconnaissance flight over the "Ein Khosh" region by two F-5s aircrafts.
5. At 23:30, the intelligence “Sergeant. Lashkari" informed that the city of Saleh Abad near the site of Ilam was under the fire of the enemy and was attacked by Iraqi aircraft[[8]](#footnote-8). Due to the lack of interception of targets by Hamadan and Dezfoul radar and the Abdanan site, the order for scramble fly was issued to the Fourth Airbase. The Scramble aircraft flew to Ilam from Dezful Airbase [[9]](#footnote-9) at 23:55, and the site was informed that there would be no ground-to-air shooting until the end of the flight.
6. At 15:20 on July 5, 1980, two Iraqi helicopter equipped with artillery were found around a new information site near Kernd. The initial impression was that the site was detected by the enemy. The helicopters shot at native inhabitants tents around the site. Six innocent martyred and several others were wounded in the onslaught.
7. According to the announcement of the air defense and the report of the expeditionary team to Ilam at 22:35, on July 5, 1980 the site was attacked by two MiG Iraqi aircrafts, which anti-aircraft guns fired on them. Also at 22:45, an unidentified aircraft attacked the site, which was surrounded by defensive weapons and detonated from the aircraft above a light object and caused a fire after the collapse. The event was investigated by the gendarmerie of the region, and according to the site's staff it was likely the aggressive aircraft was hit by defense system weapons. In these clashes, 430 shotguns were used for 23mm cartridges and, The Oerlikon GDF was quickly deployed on the Ilam site upon the orders.
8. Eight Iraqi aggressor aircrafts raided the Sardasht region and a village about six kilometers west of this region, but astonishingly no scramble flight command was issued to cope with it.

 Further Details:

* Regardless of the overall state of alert of the Islamic Repluic of Iran Army on April 7, 1980, the ultimate intent and final upsurge of the enemy for the war and the great military attack to Iran was announced publicly and officially announced to the commanders of the Iraqi Ba'ath army on July 6, 1980 by Saddam Hussein. Gen. Hamdani, senior commander of the Iraqi Ba'ath army and commander of the Saddam's Presidential Guard, commented on the first rally of the Iraqi army for a national onslaught and the onset of the imposed war:

“The commanders of the Iraqi Army (ground, air and navy) were present at the operational briefing on July 6, 1980 (July 15, 1980) that the decision to invade Iran was definitively communicated, and that the next day, it was announced to all involved units that an assessment of preparedness with all deficiencies and requirements shall be decleared within 72 hours. This was done soon as possible and the army left the garrison to attack Iran”.[[10]](#footnote-10)

* Following it on July 9, 1980, the enemy's apparent air movement became more intense in the light of the apparent plot of the coup “neghab”. Given the above events, the IRIAF intelligence and reconnaissance commander in part of the book War History, wrote: “On July 9, 1980, the Iraqi Air Force severely violated the airspace of Ilamic Republic of Iran and Ilam site repeatedly asked for help from Dezfoul's Fourth Airbase, but did not receive effective support from the base. The day after, it turned out that the plot of the coup “neghab” was discovered at Noje Airbase and thus the lack of flight of the Dezful Airbase has been due to the same reason[[11]](#footnote-11).

Therefore, a preliminary examination of the intercepted information showed that the Iraqi Air Force had been aware of the coup process; therefore, and consistent with this plan, the subsequent raids on Iran's air borders, the red state would be announced at airbases and the subsequently, the armed fighters (available to the coup) would fly on the pretext of confronting the Iraqi Air Force according the Operation Alborz, but suddenly turn towards Tehran. Then, bombarded their targets, they would launch to the operational plan of the coup[[12]](#footnote-12).

1. On July 10, 1980, a flight named " Panther " on the fighters No. 7143 and 7150 (F-5 fighters) with flight crew "Ali Mohammad Naderi[[13]](#footnote-13)" and "Hadi Jorki[[14]](#footnote-14)" were mission on the navigation on Shush-Hamidieh-Vis which was according to letter No. 1980 was contrary to the notification procedure (without the permission of the headquarters). "This was a mistake of the base and responsible officials will be punished," they said.
2. In addition to the Baveysi region, there were also conflicts and fire exchanges between the Iranian and Iraqi forces in the "Shor-e Shirin, Anjira, and Kharneshkhan" regions. The Paveh district was in unrest that the Air Force was used to support.
3. At 15:00, at the command of the deputy commander, the Second, Third, and Fourth Airbases were notified that all flights should be approved by the Joint Staff (except for the requested support flight by DASC and the Scrambles), unless previously coordinated with the Joint Staff. The deputy operation commander command was notified to the Second, Third, and Fourth Airbases in the letter No. 1980 on July 10, 1980.

Note: Following the disclosure of the plot of the coup “neghab” (July 9, 1980), the control of flights by Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (SEMAJA) and revolutionary organs became more apparent.

1. At 14:00 on July 15, 1980, the Fourth Airbase announced that the prefectural officer of the Mehran region had requested help. In coordination with Col. Qaidian (Operation Commander) and Colonel Fakori, it was agreed that officers Nazer Mpghadam coordinate with the ground forces in the region, and if requested, they should be in line with that of the ground forces with informed the Joint Staff.
2. On July 15, 1980, the Gendarmerie informed that the Iraqi forces strengthened the checkpoints opposit the Somar Company and burned pastures around the Iraqi checkpoints and are moving towards Talkhab -Bazargan and Kani Sheikh. The Somar Company Gendarmerie Company requested support for these checkpoints. The Joint Staff ordered the air force to support threatened checkpoints by flying around the border.
3. On July 16, 1980, the IRIAF deputy of operation commander ordered the flight of a F-4 airliner equipped with a rocket and a cartridges from the region of ​​Saleh Abad-Mehran to the city of Naftshahr at low altitudes over border checkpoints. The issue was announced to the Fourth Airbase and the mission was executed according to Frag Order. Flames in some of the checkpoints signaled the severity of attacks.
4. On July 16, 1980, the Fourth Airbase, quoted from the aircrafts of this unit DASC (in the 92nd Armored Division of Ahwaz), announced that the are the possibility of air strikes on Musian, Ein Khosh, Dehloran, Fakkeh, Mehran, Hamidieh, Dasht Azadegan, Susangerd, The hills of Allah Akbar, Pushman and Fonireh.
5. At 10:05 am on July 17, 1980, the air force command was informed that five aircrafts attacked in the Ilam region, where the Hamadan radar commander also observed them in the radar display. So the scramble flight order was issued.
6. At 9:30 pm on July 21, 1980, the Fourth Airbase, quoting from Dehloran Radar, announced that a high-speed, high-altitude aircraft was observed by site staff. The site's defense launched a fire on the aircraft, which was not effective due to the high altitude of the aircraft. After 10 minutes, fire was repeated, which again did not work.




Figure 3-1 The radar control room that controls and guides the combat air patrol aircrafts or air surveillance within the country sky.

In the image of Shahid Sattari (standing) is watching and directing the battle scene.

**From July 23, 1980 to August 22, 1980**

The scale of the hostile aggression and the IRIAF main operational actions in two parts from July 23, 1980 to August 4, 1980 and from August 5, 1980 to August 22, 1980 are as follows:

1. The Zainalakesh checkpoint (Khan Lili) at the city of Naftshahr and Se-shian continued to be involved and under the fire of the enemy since morning to 15:30 on July 23, 1980. Officers stationed at the checkpoint, despite the ardent support of the Army also demanded air support because the Ba'ath army had entered the battle with heavy artillery fire and air support. Eventually, the IRIAF fighter aircrafts flew over the city of Naftshahr, the Somar, and the borderline and fled Iraqi aircrafts at 21:00.
2. At 03:05, a scamble order was issued to the Third Airbase to detect the unknown route seen in the Tabriz Radar, and a F-4 fighter aircraft known as “Bat” was launched to carry out the mission. According to the pilot, the object was a light object that could not be tracked.
3. On July 25, 1980, from the seventh transportation station, the air reconnaissance patrols were carried out on Abu Musa Island, and the nationality of the flag (Emirate flag) raised to the south of the island was identified.
4. According to The Navy of Islamic Republic of Iran Army (NEDAJA) report, on July 25, 1980 the CAP was carried out by "C 130" aircraft and the following were observed: two American carriers named “C-HARI-THINAS” of the class “Cox” and “BRISCOE” of the Class (Sparrow) moving 15 miles west of the Lesser Tunb Island (270 °) to unknown destination.
5. The Air Defense Command announced that, from the time of the historian, from 05:00 to 06:40, on July 25, 1980 numerous suspicious flights were found on the Iraqi airspace in the direction of Dezful's radar, but no border encroachments were found on the sky of Iran.
6. On July 27, 1980 the following suspicious movements and encroachments have been recorded:

A. An anti-aircraft missile has been deployed in the "Dehnock Village of Iraq" between "Modera" and "Zarbithea".

B. An anti-aircraft missile system has been deployed in the local region named Imam Reza (AS) north of the village of Dehnock.

C. There is an anti-aircraft fire battalion in Badr.

D – The IRIAF was urged to take care of themselves during the flight in those regions. The information was sent to the operational information and to the Bases Tactical Office as well as information and identification to determine the type of missiles and their exact location.

E - In the morning of July 27, 1980, the report was received on the reinforcement and expansion of the Iraqi Army's ground forces opposite the Nosod region, and at 16:10, the Baveysi region was bombed by an enemy aircraft[[15]](#footnote-15).

C - One Iraqi aggressor aircraft bombarded the Hwan region. Due to failure of communication devices, air support requests were not dispatched by the DASK Center located in Garde no region.

7- At 11:30 am on July 28, 1980, a F-4 aircraft was requested for close air support from the Bayangan region.

8) On July 29, 1980, the Iraqi forces burned Iran's oil facilities in the city of Naftshahr region. The Ilam site recorded flights of two Iraqi aircrafts in the border region of ​​Mehran and Ilam and reported that an Iraqi air force attack in the region in the near future is possible.

9) According to the Electronic Information and Reconnaissance Command at 11.30am, two Iraqi fighter aircrafts are carrying out reconnaissance operations between 270 and 192 degrees from the Ilam site. These aircrafts seem to be practicing in the region (counterpart to Ilam and Mehran) on their soil in order to carry out the operation on Iran's territory in the future[[16]](#footnote-16). A report was sent to the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, as well as to the radar sites and ground forces in the region for more precision and control of the regions mentioned.

1. Issue No. 183-06-201-15 Issued by the Joint Staff of Operations of the West Country. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The subject of the IRIAF operational deputy letter No. 1298; [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. In these flights, the aircraft is required to deal with any violation of the enemy in the border region armed. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. electronic information collection group then changed into electronic information collection command [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The decree No. 13-04/8-201 on June 16, 1980, which image is included in the following pages. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See the full description of the fighter crash and the process of martyrdom of the first lieutenant pilot Gholam Hossein Bastani in Volume I, Second Edition, "The History of the Battle of the Sacred Defense", pp. 3720-368. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Shooting from Iraqi forces to the helicopter, which flew on investigating the F-5 aircraft clash inside the country bordeers, is an indication of the readiness of the enemy and its state of alert. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Some analysts regard the content of the news in question a sign of presence of elements lacking expertise and competence in the Air Force command and control system in the command and control system of the air force regardless of the revolutionary conditions governing the country and the IRIAF. They argue: "There is no indication that what the source of the news broadcasted by the IRIAF intelgence and guidance and the sergeant was as well as his role or responsibility in the process of informing and making decisions on military news. And the radar sites of the region have not seen anything, but based on the position of a non-operational person or organization, the aircraft flies with the acceptance of danger and they will search the region with fuel consumption and depreciation. Finally, they conclude that such astonishingly unpleasant cases have occurred over the past twenty months (from the victory of the Islamic Revolution until the onset of the imposed war) imposed difficult conditions on the operational activities which, in total, each have somehow led to the degradation of the values in the air force that they have neglected from this point, which is sometimes due to the lack of the difference between some employees and revolutionary institutions should inevitably enter other areas in order to increase the effectiveness of defense systems. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. It is once again recalled and emphasized that on these sensitive days, on command of Maj. Gen. Bagheri, the current commander of the IRIAF, due to the air strikes of the enemy at night, the scramble aircraft system consisting of a number of F-4 fighter aircrafts capable to fly at night is expanded from Mehrabad First Airbase to Dezful's Fourth Airbase. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Woods, M Kevin et al., (2014) "The Iran-Iraq War from the perspective of Saddam's commanders: conversation with General Hamdani", Translation by Abdolmajid Heidari, Tehran: MarzBom Pub, p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Ref: the plot of the coup “neghab” in Volume I, Second Edition, "The History of the Battle of the Sacred Defense", pp. 317-328. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Brigadier Ali Mohammad Naderi was the commander and pilot of the IRIAF and the Brigadier Shahid Babaei fellow combatant. The pilot-in-chief, Abbas Babaei, at the noon of August 6, 1987, on the day of Eid Qorban (Friday), while his wife and his fellows were waiting him at Mecca, Kaaba, were shot in a F-5 aircraft rear cabin piloted by Amir Naderi on a reconnaissance mission. He was martyred and the aircraft safely landed at the Tabriz Airbase. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Martyr Lieutenant-Colonel Pilot Hadi Jorki was martyred on October 5, 1980 during a mission against the aggressive forces in the Dasht-e Abbas region. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Mahmoud Khordand et al., (1998) "Air Defense: On the Eight –Year Sacred Defense " Volume I, Tehran: Strategic Studies Office of the IRIAF [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. This type of operation is called Target Practice in which the fighter aircraft practices attack in counterpart to the target regions on their soil in order to be more prepared to attack in the future [↑](#footnote-ref-16)