|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **C:\Users\Armin\Desktop\Logo Web Motto.png** | شماره سفارش: ۱۶۵۸۷ |
| نوع ترجمه: خوب |
| تعداد کلمات: ۹۶۰۰۰ |
| لطفا در صورت وجود هر گونه سوال از طریق ایمیل *Tarjomanohelp@Gmail.com* و یا شماره تلفن 66469735-021 با ما در ارتباط باشید. |

* On August 4, 1980, the Deputy of Operation wrote on a workflow to the IRIAF command on the request by the air defense commander that "in the state of alert (A-3), all three artillery batteries from a Hawk Battalion should be in 30 minutes ready state of war and missile firing, that this leads to the exhaustion and severe depletion of generators in the heat of the region in the prolongation state of alert, suggested that only one artillery battery to be in 30 minutes state of alert, and the others two battalions be in a one hour state of alert. Inevitably, the IRIAF command has agreed on this offer on July 31, 1980. Following this, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation informed the "Air Defense Command" and all the IRIAF Airbases.
* In addition, the IRIAF's command on "state of alert of Sixth and Ninth Airbases to confront The US provocations in the Persian Gulf" was communicatesd by the Deputy of Operation, and the deputy provided Combat Air Patrol from the Second, the Third and the Fourth Airbases, and notified the IRIAF orders through a special office to the relevant Airbases:

From: The IRIAF Deputy of Operation (Special Office)

To - 6th and 9th Airbases Command

About – State of alert to confront The US provocations in the region

1- In accordance with national defense, the state of alert “A-3” is assigned to these units.

2- Given the circumstances, please, order the following actions:

A. Study the operational plan.

B. Pilots shall be fully justified in terms of ammunition calculations, and the setting of switches and missiles.

C. Airbase Support Command shall fully check their task...

D. The Airbase logistics deputy shall be now ready to produce the necessary sorties and acquire readiness to load ammunition and predictions about the needed ammunition.

E. Surface-to-air defense shall be fully prepared to deal with any aggression.

F. Take all necessary provisions to implement the plan “Derafsh” and defend the NEDAJA's port facilities.

G. the Airbase shall be exactly defended and the information and guidance of the bases shall precisely monitor the situation.

3. Please, order taking appropriate action in the implementation of the above,

The IRIAF Deputy of Operation

Colonel of Headquarter: Qaidian

* Following this decree, the IRIAF headquarters commander, the Kermanshah DASC Chief, in the letter No. 17, notified the IRIAF that on August 11 and 12, 1980, the possibility of the invasion of the Iraqi army and the counter-revolutionaries to the garrison and the city of Sardasht is projected. Therefore, two F-4 fighter-bomber aircrafts on the state of alert are need, so that they can arrive in the region for a maximum of half an hour, if necessary.
* Subsequently, the commander of the Air Support Center, in letter No. 19, stated the possibility of an Iraqi invasion along with counter-revolutionaries to Baneh and Sardasht regions. Therefore, four F-4 fighter-bomber aircrafts are needed to be sent to the region for predictable support as soon as possible.
* On August 17, 1980, the SEMAJA announced in a statement that it is likely that there will be a full-scale attack in the borderline in the next 24 hours. So it was announced to the Air Force Commander, the Air Defense Command, Deputy of Operation and Intelligence Command as well as Colonel Javad Fakoori, the IRIAF Commander. Finally, it was decided that the Airbases would be prepared. Meanwhile, it was announced to the NEZAJA commands to inform the relevant units.
* As reported, all combat units stationed in Basra province were on the state of alert "C", and all leaves were canceled until the second order was issued. Employees must participate in continuous training for further preparation.
* In these circumstances, it is reported that the Iraqi Army troops had come to the fore and that their troops in the "Nowsud" and the "Tavile" city of Iraq were moving eastward and intended to deploy at high altitudes in the Nowsud mountains. An investigation into the news suggests that 30 fighter-aircrafts intend to attack on Iran. The next news on August 21, 1980 confirmed the conflict in Qasr-e Shirin and plenty of people lying in wait around Nowsud and Do Ab, and deployed mortar shells in the mountains with the help of Iraqi helicopters. Apparently, Iraq intends to deploy forces in the “Palanganeh " region. The news was sent to the intelligent service.
* Eventually, on this date, SEMAJA 3 notified the armed forces of the country, including the IRIAF, on the attacks of the enemy army and counter-revolutionary forces to barracks located on the frontiers of the northwest, west and southwest of the country:

1. The Iraqi Army attaks on the Iranian borders, locally, limited or extensive.
2. given the gathering of about 2000 armed men from the fugitives and counter-revolutionaries in the district of Piranshahr, attacke on the town of Naghade from Oshnaviyah and after closing the connection road of Urmia attack on Jaldian, Pasveh and Piranshahr.
3. Operation such as above is possible in the provinces of Kermanshah, Ilam, Khuzestan and Kurdistan. Therefore, please order:
4. Subsidiary units shall be ready to implement defense plans, while avoiding surprised by the initiatives, and providing quick reaction against any possible operations.
5. the necessary predictions shall be appropriate for the protection of ammunition depots, places and important installations.

Note: from July 23, 1980 to August 22, 1980 borderline threats from the enemy became more severe and more serious and more indicative of the possibility of a massive and organized invasion, especially on the western borders of the country, nevertheless because of the problems and limitations raised, there was no significant change in the IRIAF state of alert, and the state of alert A-3 was insisted on. However, as a result of the IRIAF Deputy of Operation measures, the Combat Air Patrol "CAP" missions were ordered to the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases in accordance with the threats in the western border regions of the country. A selection of related correspondence has been provided in the previous sections.

**The IRIAF Combat Readiness from August 23, 1980 to September 22, 1980**

The operational and combat readiness process of the IRIAF from August 23, 1980 to September 22, 1980 is as follows:

- The IRIAF headquarters notified all the bases and units in the letter number 2640: on August 23 and 24, 1980 nights to be in100% operational state of alert and the full protection of units as well as the operational state of alert of radar and surface to air units.

- According to the pilot during the flight from the Fourth Airbase, on September 2, 1980, the Iraqi army arranged for an attack in the Shalamcheh and Khorramshahr regions[[1]](#footnote-1).

- On September 4, 1980 the Ba'ath regime's aggression was more evident and according to the SEMAJA-3 (operation) announcement, from September 6, 1980 onward, the attack of the Ba'ath regime on our country was more apparent and expected, according to the statement issued by the highest military official. As a result, an appropriate "B-3" state of alert was issued to the armed forces (the NEZAJA, the IRIAF, the NEDAJA, ZhAJA and ...).

- The state of "B-3" was notified to all bases and units but it failed to realize (due to the educational, procurement and maintenance limitations ...), once again on September 8, 1980, it was requeted by the IRIAF Deputy of Operation to reduce the state of alert to “A-3”[[2]](#footnote-2).

- Following the escalation of political tensions, dispersed conflicts and border conflicts between the two countries The Islamic Republic of Iran Army Ground Forces, commanded by the “Abuzar Defensive Order” (No. 1 on September 11, 1980), ordered the 84th Infantry Division and 81st and 92nd Divisions to change their expanding positions and settle in the defensive trenches in the western and southwestern regions of the country. Subsequently, the IRIAF also required to provide "air cover" and "close air support" (fire support) of the 81 and 92 divisions units and the 84th Infantry Divisionthrough the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases.

- On September 12, 1980, according to a secret Arabic conversation, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Iraqi Army, calls all sections and units to be be in full state of alert (type C)[[3]](#footnote-3).

- It is noteworthy that on September 14, 1980, the great architect of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini (PBUH), in a message to Hajj ritual occasion pilgrims unvailed Saddam's evil plan and global arrogance on war with the new Islamic Republic of Iran System, and explicitly mentioned the term "imposed war" as follows:

"The US is the main enemy of the poor and deprived people of the world ... Iran, which has asked to close its relations with this great devil in any way possible, today is caught up in this" imposed war. " The United States has forced Iraq to pour out the blood of our youth. "[[4]](#footnote-4)

- On September 15, 1980, the SEMAJA Headquarters notified close air support mission from the western regon with two F-5s equipped with rocket and shotguns. At 11:20 am, it was announced to the command post of the Fourth Airbase and emphasized that the mission is urgent and should be done as soon as possible. Also at 11:45 am the following information was notified to Colonel Tabeshfar (Commander of the Base) to carry out the mission:

According to the Ilam Governorate, the situation in the region is very severe, and it is recommended that the fighter aircrafts " CBU "(cluster bombs) to be deployed to the region. As a result, two F-5s flew into the region within 55 minutes of the mission announcement. In this regard, Colonel Tabeshfar said that since the aircrafts ground preparation works (up to the take-off), is done in the hangar, so the minimum time to deliver a flight is one hour from the moment of the announcement[[5]](#footnote-5).

- On September 16, 1980, with the escalation of threats from the Ba'athist army of Iraq, again, the operational readiness of the Hamedan and Dezful Air Base is emphasized. The Deputy of Operation (Colonel Qaidian), with the order of the head of the SEMAJA, was sent to the battlefield bases in the front line of the conflict, with the possibility of more intense fighting at any given moment, once again ordered to improve the state of alert (in these two bases) to “B-3”. Obviously, other units were still on state of alert “A-3”.



Figure 2.6 A F-5 Bomber Fighter Airplane Releasing Bombs

- On this day, F-5s belonging to Dezfoul's Airbase fought against the enemy tanks stationed on the western borders from Mehran to Khuzestan, especially the checkpoints in Fekkhah to Shalamcheh and Khorramshahr, 12 of which could complete missions in spite of the fire of anti-aircraft guns. Accordingly, on September 18, 1980, two F-5s of this Airbase withdrew, the full description of which is given in the first volume of the "the History of the Sacred Defense Air Battles".

**- Two days before the outbreak of the imposed war**

On September 20, 1980, two days before the full-scale invasion of the enemy, the SEMAJA in order to inform public opinion and to resolve some ambiguities and rumors about the reaction of the army to the attacks of the Iraqi Ba'ath army, issued its announcements No. 1 and II sequentially and described the situation of the fronts from September 1, 1980 to September 17, 198, the full text of which is given in the first volume of this collection. After the official release of these two announcements, the assumptions about the attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran became reality, until the outbreak of the imposed war (on Monday, September 22, 1980) the SEMAJA issued a public call, urging all officers, military rank holders and soldiers to the military service[[6]](#footnote-6).

Following the exacerbation of the enemy's air threats, on the same day on September 20, 1980, the air defense system in Jamaran was notified that the enemy air threats was serious and the full alert state changed from September 21, 1980 to September 20, 1980, at 09:00[[7]](#footnote-7).

Also on this day, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation notifed the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Airbases as well as frontline defnse system to increse the state of alert via the letter No. 42-1 / 06 -201 / dated September 20, 1980 as following:

"1. The state of alert “B-3” is assigned to the Third, the Fourth and the Sixth Airbases: (state of alert in other units is based on “A-3” state of alert orders).

2- The Second Airbase has been in the state of alert “A-3” , but it shall be more prepared for the Operation Alborz.

3- The Sixth Airbase shall be prepared for the Zulfiqar plan (Derafsh) and also with the readiness to launch the Maverick missile[[8]](#footnote-8).

Accordingly, the Sixth Airbase is ordered:

“The Airbase shall be ready to execute the Zulfiqar Battle Order and load surface-to-air Maverick missiles on their aircraft to counter the enemy's naval threats."

In the end, the Air Defense Command also announced the closure of the airport (runway) of the Fifth Airbase (Omidieh)[[9]](#footnote-9).

It is noteworthy that the " Zulfiqar Battle Order", also known as "Derafsh", has the task of providing air support, including "fire support", "air defense", "preliminary information and warnings", "combat support services" from naval vessels. At that time, air support in the "Joint Operations" included:

1- Air support or Close Air Support "CAS";

2) Combat Air Patrol “CAP”;

3. Collecting information and alerting the enemy air strikes;

4. Air defense against enemy air strikes;

5- Caring for air combat support.

Figure 7.2 A Maverick missile that was very valuable and effective in destroying land and sea targets.

Also a pilot officer under the title " forward controller[[10]](#footnote-10)" and a "  liaison officer[[11]](#footnote-11)" were deployed to the High Commander cruiser of Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.

Given the state of alert from August 23, 1980, it seemed that the authorities of The Islamic Republic of Iran Army (AJA) and the IRIAF considered the Iraqi invasion to be definitive; however, for the reasons mentioned and also some political considerations, only the Third (Hamedan), the Fourth (Dezful) and Sixth (Bushehr) Airbases were ordered the state of alert “B-3”, and the IRIAF other air bases were still in the state of alert "A-3". Despite the awareness of the Iraqi invasion and the observance of inactive defense components in all airbases threatened by enemy airspace, effective measures were not taken against the operational defenses of the Iraqi Ba'ath Armed Forces attack on September 22, 1980, the reasons for this include the prolongation of the state of alert, the weakness of radar systems, and some other external factors, such as the “Neghab” conspiracy, political considerations, and downsizing process in the army and the IRIAF. However, when taking into account the state of alert in the Army given the turmoil in those days, it is concluded that the IRIAF command system had reached a realistic understanding on the state of alert and methods of dealing with Iraqi Ba'ath militant air strikes and followed a rational decision-making process within the framework of organizational standards. However, it should be acknowledged that the state of alert process of transport and fighter aircrafts Airbases as well as air defense bases were highly complex, and, in addition to operational ones, there were other factors that contributed to its realization (regardless of political issues and also according to the description given in the preceding chapter of this chapter), there was a need for a comprehensive integration of employee accountability, continuous operational training, mastery over position, calculation of the capacity of peripheral threats and in time implementation of combat orders.

1. An officer deployed from the IRIAF to the Navy during combat or navy maneuvers to monitor and coordinate the forces and units’ interactions.

Some organizational failures in the circumstances of that day that have already been mentioned to inclue: the withdrawal of a significant number of experienced staff from the cycle of operational activities on one side and the involvement of personal and non-expert ideas in making sensitive decisions (which were underlined and pressed by some unknowing and sometimes deviant groups) on the other hand, somewhat affected the state of alert of the IRIAF Airbases. For example, in accordance with the flight rules, each pilot should fly tactical training flights in turn (weekly, monthly, 45-day, quarterly, six-month and annual) on the day or night so that they are always in full operational readiness.



Figure 8. 2 "Phantom -2" aircraft type "F-4D" in Chabahar Airbase

For example, at the beginning weeks of the war, commanders of the airbases (including the Sixth Airbase requested for carrying out "flight requirements" for their pilots. This was only possible if a number of operational aircrafts were deployed (and their allocated to training flights). Obviously, acceptance of such a request could subject the IRIAF to storm of accusations and negative thoughts. Failure to pay attention to the above requests also contributed to the lack of aircraft for training flight and operational readiness of the IRIAF pilots.

Since the announcement of the "Alborz state of alert order", the aircrafts on the Airbases were sufficiently planned in the combat orders, which in turn reduced the training requirements to the lowest level, and the commanders of the flight units were faced with particular concerns and problems. Now the commander must be accountable for the air strikes of the enemy, the incidents or air accidents, the provision of operational sorties, and on the other hand, for air support requested by other units (including air and ground, and even the transportation of staff of national institutions).

In such a circumstances, some commanders, with the understanding of the current crisis, tried to come up with constructive solutions that the pilot colonel Iraj Khorram[[12]](#footnote-12) is the successor (or supervisor) to the Sixth Airbase was one of them[[13]](#footnote-13).

He wrote about a "National Defense" state of alert and coming out of a possible crisis, in a letter to the IRIAF Deputy of Operation:

"Given the announced state of alert and assignment missions and in accordance with the staff downsizing plan, please order the compensation of this unit from the flight crew stationed at the First and Third Airbases."

Therefore, regardless of the state of affairs and political tensions in the country, as well as the specialization of the air force, many other factors have also been involved in the IRIAF units state of alert, which are highlighted in the prvious sections.

In this discussion, before paying attention to the pre-Iraqi air strike, in order to keep the readers aware, the latest "readiness status of various interceptor or fighter planes" F-14 "," F-4 "and" F-5 "and Transportation aircraft - B-747, B-707). Traffic or tactical transportation aircr(the IRIAF Special Command Headquarter).

In the letter, which was sent shortly before the outbreak of the war, a positive attitude of a commander in solving the existing challenges and his concern about the plan to downsize the personnel of the force and its implications for operational missions are observed.

**4- General state of alert of all kinds of the IRIAF aircrafts**

In this section, before addressing the full-scale surprise attacks of the Iraqi Army, we take a look at the latest state of alert of all types of the IRIAF fighter- interceptor aircrafts or fighter-bombers F-14, F-4, F-5 and transport-fueling B-747 and 707 aircrafts as well as heavy duty "C-130", semi-heavy duty F-27, and heavy-lifting helicopters of Shenukov, in three periods of March 21, 1978 to April 20, 1978, March 21, 1979 to April 20, 1978 and September on reports received from the Deputy Commander (Logistics)

It should be recalled that the enemy air force arrangement in terms of identity, capacity and extension is given in the third chapter, as well as the "combat readiness of aircrafts and pilots", based on what was recorded by the IRIAF Deputy of Operation in the IRIAF Headquarter from 1980 under the title " Combat state of alert ".

The chapter four presents statistics in tables titled "The IRIAF Airbases state of alert " in the final days of September 1979, along with the state of alert of the IRIAF Command, at the time of the Iraqi Army's invasion of the lands of our country. The chapter is titled "The IRIAF Organization General State before the outbreak of the imposed war (the IRIAF combat operational capability).

1. Source: Pilot report registered at the IRIAF command office on September 2, 1980. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. As in Volume I, the second chapter of the "Sacred Defense Air Combat Battles" series was described. Iraq invaded and deployed two Khan Lili and Mimak outposts on September 8, 1980 at the borders of Ilam province, the IRIAF in line with the command of the Supreme Commander went in war and a F-4 and an A / B-214 helicopter toppled on September 8 and 10, 1980, ... (pp. 411-420). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See: Iran-Iraq war on the World's Press" (2008) Tehran: Publication of the Sacred Defense Science and Education Research Center, Vol. I, First Edition, p. 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Sahifeh Nour, Vol. 13: p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. At this stage, carrying out non-operational defensive measures at the pre-emptive air bases in the western part of the country, combat operations carried out through hangars. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The Kayhan newspaper No. 11099 dated September 22, 1980 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. It should be noted that since September 1979, on the initiative of the martyr Fakori and the high efforts of the staff assigned to the command of the air force defense, Jamaran heights were identified by several helicopters, followed by an appropriate air defense system to protect the sky and the home of Imam Khomeini. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. A type of Air-to-surface (ground and sea) missiles designed for close-air support to target a range of tactical targets, including ammunition depots, air defense systems, vessels, land vehicles, fuel tanks and facilities, as well as refiners with high precision controlled by television guidance system. Although the Mavericks were designed half a century ago, however, its production and, of course, the advanced form began in 2007with the help of the US Navy, and now continues to record production of nearly 70,000 missiles. In the course of the imposed war, the Maverick launch with the F-4 Phantom aircraft, which was accompanied by speed and pilot skill in pointing the target, showed performance beyond the standards of the missile. Some historians and Sacred defense experts believe that one of the factors behind the stopping of enemy tanks in the land of Khuzestan and t\he rescue of Dezful was due to the Maverick launch. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Since, according to paragraph (6) of the coordination instructions under sub-paragraph (b), the operational order of the Operation Alborz Battle, if the Second Airbase of Tabriz's had been in the state of alert "B-3", the Commercial (civilian) flights could have been stopped given that it was located on Western Border Crossing; thus, until the day of the Iraqi full-scale invasion, the effort was e made not to put the Airbase in the state of alert “B-3”, except for a short time. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. In the pre-Islamic Revelution plans, the 5th Umidiah Airbase was established for the deployment of 80 of the 160 F-16 fighter-bomber aircrafts to be delivered to the Air Force in August 1980 (August 1980). It was stopped by the victory of the Islamic Revolution. (Vol. 1, Second Edition, p. 73) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. An officer who has sufficient information about the operational region and guides the pilot in approaching the target by deploying on the insider flight route. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Colonel Iraj Khorram was the pilot of the F-14, with F-4 and F-5 fighter aircrafts flight experiences in his service record. According to some reports, he was one of the two candidates for the command of the IRIAF (the other one was Colonel Hoshang Sediq) after the martyr Colonel Jawad Fakoori. This cheerful and experienced pilot died in 2006 due to a heart attack. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The subject of letter No. 4/6/06-201 dated April 7, 1980 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)