In line with the intensified the aggression of the enemy announced on September 7, 1980 by the SEMAJA, Colonel Mashallah Omrani (the late successor to the IRIAF commander) [[1]](#footnote-1)ordered state of alert “B-3” to the relevant units, and immediately carrying out operational flights, this force showed up its power against the enemy aggressions.

On September 10, 1980, a F-14 interceptor fighter- aircraft fired the first Phoenix missile, leading to overthrown a MiG-21 fighter aircraft owned by the Iraqi Air Force.

In the aftermath of these clashes, on the September 10 and 17, 1980, two other MiG-21 and Sukho-22 aircrafts and one helicopter were toppled by the IRIAF. Thus, two weeks before the outbreak of the imposed war, the Iranian Air Force had imposed on the enemy a relative superiority in the air with acceptable statistics[[2]](#footnote-2).

Therefore, despite the limitations and problems raised, it should be acknowledged that during the time of the responsibility of the martyred Javad Fakori, commander of the Air Force, the Air Force rejoiced with the adoption of appropriate policies and initiatives. In fact, by carefully scrutinizing many of the problems, the IRIAF in addition to being successful in maintaining the status quo and operational readiness, also managed to protect its valuable systems.

However, in spite of the endeavors made by the IRIAF, the enemy, on the one hand, by providing a comprehensive analysis of the collected data made preparations for its full-scale attack, and on the other hand, the IRIAF was in turn preparing itself to enter into an unwanted and all-out war according to the "Alborz Battle Order".

Thus, reference could be made to another example of the documents in the archives of the IRIAF Strategic Documentation Center.

For example, after receiving and communicating the "Alborz Operations Order ", numerous correspondence has been made on the ambiguities by the IRIAF headquarters staff at the time, in order to create better coordination, more favorable conditions for air support with the relevant units, especially the NEZAJA forces. A meeting held on September 10, 1980 in the SEMAJA-3 best illustrates these efforts outcomes. Given the importance of the issue, the full text of the meeting's agenda (unchanged in the literature) is presented as follows.

B. Reviewing “Alborz Order” at the meeting dated September 10, 1980, The SEMAJA-3

Description of the commission: at 9:00 am, “Alborz Operational Plan against Western Threat”, the IRIAF: Third Office - Room No. 76

At the request No. 52/4/06/201 dated July 27, 1980, by the IRIAF and The NEZAJA for the formation of the commission No. 100/08/201 on September 1, 1980

1. Determination and prioritization of the enemies’ critical hotspots, if destructed the enemies War Machine or Iraqi Economy would have paralyzed (notified by Alborz).
2. Effective and principled communication between the headquarters of the IRIAF, the SEMAJA, the NEDAJA, and the front lines divisions, in order to allow air traffic control, air support and fire coordination.
3. The necessary coordination and close communication between the headquarters of the IRIAF and the NEZAJA and how to use marine radars to cover more blind spaces and exchange information for air defense.
4. Determine staffing, communication facilities and providing them with training for multiple air traffic control posts to report unauthorized aircraft passage and reduce the insider aircrafts vulnerabilities.
5. The establishment of fast fire control centers and quick and accurate contact with the IRIAF command posts for the purpose of adapting insider fire to co-ordinate and determine the route and time of returning insider aircrafts in attacking the targets of the hostile country.
6. Elimination of communication deficits and support of the forward air controller teams and necessary coordination to guide insider aircrafts in attacking enemy positions using the NEZAJA helicopter and proposing its design at the Sixth Office (The SEMAJA -6) on September 14, 1980 (according to the commission).
7. The training of selected officers from the NEZAJA by the IRIAF as forward air controller and familiarity with the various types of aircrafts and related maneuvers, as well as the recognition of the limitations and practical implications. (About 100 employees of the NEZAJA have been trained so far that some are downsized and 29 have recently trained and it would be better to serve as apprentice with forward air controller officers).
8. Reducing the timing of urgent requests for close air support so that the type of ammunition and operation region are already identified and communicated by The SEMAJA. In this case, the IRIAF will determine the daily assigned sorties, and the command of the support team will be responsible for its implementation, and the SEMAJA and the IRIAF command will only be informed.
9. Given the significant shortage of "M-151" vehicles (used by the forward air controller teams) and how to provide it, the representatives of the NEZAJA and the SEMAJA agreed that the "M-151" vehicles available for the NEZAJA to be used for missions and special uses, such as BGM-71 TOW
10. The NEZAJA action to leveling landing bands in the region for future the IRIAF flights.
11. Transferring the ZU-23-2 to the IRIAF.
12. Anti-aircraft defense weapons are based on the IRIAF airplane and radar stations, and it reduces the defend power. (Only the IRIAF defenses limited in the Alborz plan).
13. Enemy overhearing and notification to remove additional conversations (or in the form of radio discovery) is not limited to one force, but will also endanger the operation of other forces.

**Recommendations**

A. In order to establish a close connection between the IRIAF and the NEDAJA headquarters and the use of tactical radars to cover the radar blind spots of the country, as well as the exchange of information on air defense, the two air and naval forces examine the issue and announce the result to the Joint Staff for further necessary coordination.

B. The SEMAJA 2 .....

C. How to use the NEZAJA helicopters...

D. Officers who have completed the forward air controller course collaborate in the relevant with the forward air controller units to prepare, and, at the same time, the IRIAF announces readiness for applying staff for the forward air controller training courses.

E. Ground Force …

F. Via the SEMAJA

G. To control overhearing.....

Figure 2.2. Tactical - communication vehicle (M-151) used by forward air controller officers for the close air support mission

Names and Signatures of Fellow Comrades:

A - Major Jamshid Ahmadi, the SEMAJA

B. Colonel Emadaldin Kiyani, the SEMAJA

C. Colonel Nasrallah Shahbazi, Deputy of Operations

D. Lieutenant Commander of the headquarters Ahmad Behzadnia, the NEDAJA

E. Lieutenant Commander Hussein Malekzadegan, the NEDAJA

F. Major Nasser Farhanakian, the IRIAF

G. Major Hussein Fatehi, the SEMAJA

H. Major Pilot Ghodratallah Kiyanjo, the IRIAF operation (martyred)

I. Capt. Seyyed Asghar Moarefi, the IRIAF Relations Managing Director

J. Colonel Faramarz Peakar, the SEMAJA

K. Colonel of Headquarters Akbar Nurolahi, the SEMAJA

L. Colonel of Headquarters Yousef Shafiee, the SEMAJA

The final pages of the book present an excerpt taken from the relevant documents to the above-mentioned.

3**) The process of operational readiness of the IRIAF from March 21, 1980 to September 21, 1980**

In this discussion, it is necessary to give a brief reference to the background of the subject prior to drawing out the readiness of the IRIAF fromMarch 21, 1980 to September 21, 1980.

The Ba'athist regime of Iraq, with the rise of the Islamic Revolution, has been thinking of taking advantages of revolutionary transitions. The Ba'ath Party, in conjunction with the political developments in Iran, continued to prepare and strengthen its army, especially the air force, and carried out dispersed aggressions in order to pursue a full-scale invasion strategy to Iran in an appropriate opportunity. This was evident since the eve of the Islamic Revolution victory in many ways. Below is a list of Iraqi readiness records and backgrounds:

1. According to the latest reports (on January 30, 1979) recorded at the army headquarters and in the last days of the life of Pahlavi II, the enemy was planning to expand its air force as the following:

“The Iraqi Air Force has strengthened its units and has exploited a new base in the Zubair province.”

1. On February 12, 1979: according to a report recorded at the same office, at 10:00 am local time, the Iraqi Air Force has been on state of alert (C) on all of its eleven airbases.

Given the frequent and suspicious movements of the enemy, the SEMAJA command center carried out a comprehensive review under the title of “Raid”[[3]](#footnote-3) from March 21, 1979 to June 21, 1979, studying the combat readiness and the actions of the Iraqi Ba'ath army.[[4]](#footnote-4) The key points of this review were all indicative of planning a strategic plot against the Islamic Revolution and the new Islamic system of Iran:

* Establishment and strengthening of several bases in the eastern border regions and the establishment of the Air Reconnaissance Information System
* Kut Air Base on state of alert (March 1979)
* Strengthening Shaibah Air Base (March 1978)
* State of alert and practicing and shooting with real ammunition by the 145th and 195th brigades of Surface to Air Missile system, SAM (from March 21, 1979 to April 20, 1979)
* Perform aeronautical maneuvers in Habbaniyah (March 26, 1979)
* State of alert of all units of the Iraqi Air Force (an March 28 and 31, 1979)
* State of alert of sea-air units in the Basra region (June 5, 1979)

At the same time, the Ba'ath militant aggression has increased and, as it was raised on the Iraqi invasions chapter, Iraq bombarded some of the border villages in the western part of the country in April. Inevitably, the commanders of Shahrokhi (Hamedan), Tabriz and Vahdati (Dezful) Airbases were notified by telephone to double the number of aircrafts on the state of alert and continue the Combat Air Patrol missions at the border. The next command decided that a state of alert aircraft flies the Combat Air Patrol per time.

Note: Following the bombardment of the defenseless villages of the western part of the country and the highlighted the combat readiness and suspicious movements of the enemy, the IRIAF deputy of operation ordered the Combat Air Patrol flights (CAP) from the Second Airbase of Tabriz[[5]](#footnote-5).

The Ba'ath army threats was significantly reduced, having provided air coverage by the IRIAF. The IRIAF deputy of operation sent a decree to all operational units and Airbases on December 24, 1979, calling for elaboration of a state of alert notification as well as an overview and re-drafting of the “outline of state of alert of the IRIAF” in order to counteract the Iraqi Ba'ath regime threats. Follow-up and conclusion of the above steps continued until the March 1980.

With such a background and for further clarity, we will take a glance at the levels of combat readiness in the air force culture: then the reader is provided with the state of alert and the analysis of its trend using existing documents (from March 21, 1980 to September 21, 1980 on a monthly basis) along with the image of some documents:

A - Levels of combat readiness in the IRIAF:

The combat readiness of the air force before the Sacred Defense, like other forces was classified into three degrees, as follows:

Level 1 readiness: alertness and search for the enemy;

Level 2 Readiness: Includes two main steps: “A” and “B”

In step " A ", the combatant is prepared for the combat and in the " B " the weapon is given to the combatant. For example, the pilot stands beside his aircraft and is ready to receive the flight order.

Level 3 readinesses: (combat) this state has three steps: “A” and “B” and “C”.

Step “A”: the alertness; in the sense that the enemy's air strike is coming soon.

Step “B”: the combatant is ready equipped with the weapon.

Step “C”: the “fire” stage that well-equipped and armed aircrafts fly to pre-selected targets.

Accordingly, the Tabriz and Hamedan Airbases, together with the command of the Air Defense Group, at these two bases included radar systems and surface-to-air units were at the stage (C-3) state of alert from March 1980 to the beginning of the war. Other Airbases, after receiving the "Alborz Battle Order", received the command to enter the state of “B-3” and during the full-scale attack of the enemy; they received the "Kaman-99" command and entered the step “C-3”.

B. Review the IRIAF combat state of alert from March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980

In these discussions, the combat state of alert to counteract the enemy from March 21, 1980 to June 21, 1980 are as follows:

The IRIAF state of alert from March 21, 1980 to April 20, 1980

The early days of Nowruz in 1980 were not yet passed that the Iraq Army's aggression became more and more frequent; thus, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation immediately took action and pursued the following measures:

- On March 21, 1980, the IRIAF Deputy of Operations[[6]](#footnote-6) called all bases for the expedition to prepare the "Implementation Plan for the Units" (instructions), to finalize the final outcome of the "General Plan of the IRI Air Force state of alert ".

- On 18/1/1359, in the wake of the announcement of a state of alert "A-3" by the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, for the first time, the IRIAF went on the state of alert stage “A-3”to deal with the widespread incursions of Iraq. Consequently, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation asked Airbases to verify their combat capability.[[7]](#footnote-7)

Accordingly, the IRIAF Airbases immediately examined their combat capabilities, for instance Mehrabad First Airbase reported the flying sorties production capability of this unit is as follows:

1. F-4 D. The number of 17 aircrafts, including the five waiting for a piece of cartridge, of which we are able to fly 12 sorties for the first period;
2. F-4 E. The number of 11 aircrafts, of which we are able to fly 8 sorties for the first period;
3. RF-4 E. The number of 8 aircrafts, of which we are able to fly 8 sorties for the first period;
4. F-5 E. The number of 7 aircrafts, of which we are able to fly 5 sorties for the first period;
5. RF-5. The number of 7 aircrafts, of which we are able to fly 5 sorties for the first period;

Due to the shortage of parts, especially tires, the second period is not predictable.

Commander of the First Airbase; Col. Pilot., Javad Fakori

The provisions of this decree are followed up by the IRIAF Deputy of Operation, and other Airbases have also announced their combat capability.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The details of these reports, along with the level of readiness of the air defense radar system, are included in chapter four of this book, titled “the IRIAF combat and operational capability porior to the outbreak of the imposed war."

- On April 8, 1980, according to the notification issued the day before by the SEMAJA ( on the state of alert "A-3"), the IRIAF deputy of operation notifies the units of the subsidiary headquarters, including the Air Defense Command, declaring:

From: The IRIAF Deputy of Operation (Special Office)

To: Recipients

About - the state of alert No. 12-1 / 06-201 / and 3 Dated April 8, 1980

1. From April 7, 1980, the state of alert “A-3” is announced to all Air Force units.
2. Please order to be on a state of alert based on the IRIAT state of alert system (1-58).

Deputy of Operation heasquarter of the IRIAT, Brigadier general Kimiyagar

Recipients: Air Defense Command, Logistics Command, Air Training Command, Central Support Command, Communications and Electronics Command, Logistics Department, Administrative Department, Plans and Budget Department, Operations Management (Training, Operations Information, Electronic Warfare and Communications) Department – GASHA, Inspection and flight safety, nursing for the knowledge and required action. Operations Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Piroz

Actor – Major Aghasi Beyk

- On April 10, 1980, it was decided to carry out border reconnaissance services on a daily basis until further notice and the result be notified to the Fourth Airbase[[9]](#footnote-9). The NEDAJA also requested a C-130 aircraft on a daily basis for the purpose of providing Bushehr Marine base with a naval patrol mission.

- On April 16, 1980, given the full state of alert of Kut Airbase in al-Amara province and Shaibah Airbase in Basra province of Iraq, mutually with the assistance of the IRIAF Deputy of Operation, the level of state of alert of the Third Airbase in Hamadan and the Fourth Airbase in Dezful, from this date, was increased to "B-3" and the SEMAJA-3 (Operation) was notified.

- On April 18, 1980 and following the announcement of the first anniversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, again due to the increased raids of Iraq in the western part of the country, the SEMAJA Commander declared state of alert "A-3" and emphasized all the IRIAF radar and air defense systems focus on the West[[10]](#footnote-10).

**The IRIAF state of alert from April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980**

There are no special documents and certificates about changing the state of alert from April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980; suggesting that Deputy of Operation has been following the "State of alert plan" of the Airbases, so that, the Bushehr Airbase command was notified of the deficiencies observed in the review of the regulatory plan and the necessary guidelines were communicated to the Airbase[[11]](#footnote-11).

A remarkable thing from April 21, 1980 to May 21, 1980 is to track the country's radar coverage defects due to weakness of the existing systems identified at the Tabas event (April 25, 1980). Accordingly, on December 19, 1979, a meeting was held in the fifth office of the SEMAJA (Plan and Budget) on the issue (the study of the exhaustion and defects of radar systems of the country, the lack of coordination in the system of command and control and communication with the administrative, military and law enforcement institutions etc.) and there was proposed to purchase the Bird Radar System! Following this, the NEDAJA also reported on the weaknesses of radar coverage in the Persian Gulf to the SEMAJA and the IRIAF; as a result, it was proposed to hold other meetings on the issue by Fourth Office of the SEMAJA attended by informed representatives. The meetings output was the proposed purchase of six to 15 defense radar devices from Western European Companies. Something that apparently did not conform to the realities of those days and was never realized!

**The IRIAF state of alert from May 22, 1980 June 21, 1980**

- On the May 25, 1980, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation notified the Third Office of the SEMAJA (Operation) to increase the state of alert of the Third and Fourth (Hamadan and Dezful) Airbases to “B-3”[[12]](#footnote-12) following the Iraqi Kut and Shaibah Airbases full state of alert.

- As a result, given the educational limitations, personnel and equipment burnout and ..., at this stage of state of alert, the IRIAF required to know the latest situation and developments of the Iraqi forces in order to take into account the appropriate state of alert[[13]](#footnote-13).

Given the importance of the issue, the full text of the letter is presented as follows:

From: The IRIAF Deputy of Operation (Special Office)

To: The SEMAJA 3 commander (Operation)

Subject: State of alert

No. and date: 12-1 / 06-201 / 3-4; May 25, 1980

1. As it is known, from April 6, 1980, in reference to the Letter No: 85-1227- dated April 16, 1980, the Second Office changes this force state of alert from “A-2” to “B-3” in response to the full state of alert on Kut and Shaibah Air Bases in Iraq to carry out combat operations.
2. In the state of alert plan of this force, the level of readiness “B-3” is set for the probable the enemy's aggression within the next 72 hours. So, in line with the Alborz Plan, at this stage, the aircrafts of the IRIAF responsible for carrying out retaliation operations loaded ammunition.
3. Given the fact that the readiness of the personnel and aircrafts in the mentioned stage (B-3) has caused the staff and equipment burnout, and on the other hand, the operational training capacity is reduced by 50%; therefore, please, determine the appropriate state of alert for the latest developments in the Iraqi forces in order to notify the relevant units.

Deputy of Operation Commander of the IRIAF, Brigadier general Kimiyagar

Actor – Major Aghasi Beyk

For further information and understanding, this document image is presented below.

Figure 2.3 the image of letter to SEMAJA 3 on “appropriate state of alert”

Following this, the SEMAJA -3 (in terms of "requesting the reduction of national security state of alert stages) from the series of troops as well as the prevention of the exhaustion of the units that are not involved in the operation" (the subject matter of the above letter), the NEZAJA, the IRIAF and the NEDAJA were requested to "submit their suggestions and comments to the third office (operation)"[[14]](#footnote-14).

-This month “from May 22, 1980 June 21, 1980”, deputy of operation continued to follow the "state of alert" of the units, so that he would call on the Air Defense Command (due to the problems of the Hogghs in state of alert mode " B-3") to deploy its authorized representative to re-examine the " the IRIAF state of alert scheme"; on June 1, 1980 to the special office. Then, the IRIAF Command, in the letter No. 14-1 / 06-201 dated June 7, 1980 and in response to the letter No. 47-06-201 / 2 dated June 3, 1980 by the SEMAJA on the "Air Force's suggestions and comments on national defense state of alert", write as follows:

1- The Supreme Council of National Defense is considered to be the most appropriate authority to decide on the establishment of various states of alert.

2- The prolonged state of alert problems, especially in stage 3 of readiness that reduces the overall operational efficiency of the unit, is as follows: discontinuing training courses, burnout of employees, depreciation of equipment, and resources, fatigue and indifference of employees to the level of combat readiness and failure to take it serious.

It was quite clear that the IRIAF is under pressure from the other army units. Operating aircrafts were loading ammunition and there was no possibility of educational exploitation. Defects of the “Alborz Operations Order” were to be resolved with the IRIAF Commanders.

Below is an example of this tactic that is similar to an operating plan and was sent by the IRIAF Deputy of Operation to one of the units under the authority of force:

"Along with the plan set out in the IRIAF state of alert system (1-58), the operational training of units at stages “A-3” and “B-3” will continue to run with 50% of the related activities compared to normal time. Given that the level of command's readiness has been announced in "A-3", the training mentioned above shall be applicable to the above recall with due observance of the established criteria. Also, please, order to conduct combat readiness correspondence with the classifications.

The IRIAF Deputy of Operation Commander

Brigadier general Pilot Vahid Kimiyagar

On June 21, 1980 (according to records in the daily records of events of the post of commander and commander Bagheri order, as well as by the commander Colonel Fakori order), the Third and Fourth Airbases and air defense were announced to prepare for the complete confrontation with the aggressive forces. Iranian aircrafts do not have the right to invade Iraqi territory and only defend against enemy aircrafts in the territory of Iran.

The Second and Third Airbases were announced for the first degree readiness.

In fact, at this stage, all the efforts of army and state officials have been self-restraint against aggression and an emphasis on a 100% defense strategy.

The last point is that, the IRIAF at the end of this month (from May 22, 1980 June 21, 1980), went on "night patrol" from Third, Fourth, and Sixth Airbases, the description of which had been provided in the previous chapter.

**B - The state of alert from** June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980

Here we discuss the state of alert from June 22, 1980 to September 22, 1980 leading to the outbreak of the imposed war on monthly basis:

1. This document reflects the fact that Martyr Fakori, two weeks before the official appointment to the IRIAF command, effectively controlled the command and control system of the Air Force alongside Maj. Gen. Bagheri, and even dated from June 7, 1980 he was referred to as the Commander of the Force (the Commander's Office records, vol. 7, p. 89).

The state of alert from June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980

On June 24, 1980, the command of the Hamedan Airbase in the letter No. 13-13-13-001 on the state of alert, asked assignments from the IRIAF (Deputy of Operation) included proposals for the dismantling of 50% of the fighter aircrafts loaded with ammunition and at least four daily training flight courses.

The Iraqi Ba'ath regime launched a general maneuver on June 27, 1980called "Saad". By carrying out this maneuver, the Iraqi Army's strategy was apparent, and in the report by the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Command, an air strike had been foreseen to Khuzestan province and its Airbases (several months later, July 22, 1980, this experience was launched under the title of “Qadisiyah” in a full-scale battle.

Note: According to the documents of the Commander's Office records, after the above maneuver, first Colonel Fakori ordered to the defense commander and the defense of all the Airbases to upgrade the state of alert to “B-3” for 72 hours on receiving this message. The letter No. 1954 dated July 6, 1980 was issued to the defense commander and the defense of all the Airbases.

- On the day of July 10, 1980, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation officially announced the state of alert “B-3” for the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases[[15]](#footnote-15), (In fact, the state of alert of the Second Airbase of Tabriz has increased one degree higher .

On July 11, 1980, the IRIAF command once again places all of its operational units in the “A-3” state of alert and asks them to make the predictions necessary to improve their readiness for a higher level. In fact, the level of operational readiness of the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases have been reduced to "A-3", like other units from stage "B-3".

Subsequently, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation on July 13, 1980 announced that the state of alert of all units have been reduced from "B-3" to "A-3", but at any moment they are ready to rise to a higher level. This change in state of alert is also communicated to the Air Defense Command. In fact, this decree was intended to inform the command of the Second, Third, Fourth Airbases, and air defense platforms which were in the "B-3" (by the command of the Air Force, the defense units state of alert extended for another 24-hour).

Of course, the changes and similar strategies were not limited to the IRIAF fighter-aircraft units or combat flights, and included the Defense Command, which will be addressed in the next chapter.

In the following, the message with the same written literature is included in Table 1-2

Table 1-2 List of recipients of the state of alert message

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Airbase | Commander | Time of notification |
| Khatami (Eighth) | Colonel Habib Sadeghpor, The Base Commander | 09:19 |
| Vahdati ( Fourth) | Colonel Ali Tabeshfar, The Base Commander | 09:11 |
| Shiraz (Seventh) | Colonel Mohammad Shalchiyan, The Base Commander | 09:28 |
| Shahrokhi (Third) | Major  Ghasem Golchin, The Base Commander | 09:15 |
| Tabriz (Second) | Colonel Morteza Farzaneh, The Base Commander | 09:16 |
| Bandar Abass (Ninth) | Colonel Mohammad Talebdost, The Base Commander | 09: 32 |
| Mehrabad (First) | Major Mohammadi, Command post officer | 09:16 |
| Bushehr (Sixth) | Major Mehdi Dadpey, The Base Commander | 09:37 |
| First Transport Base | Major Varasteh, Command post officer | 09:27 |

- On the sidelines of the events from June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980, other routines were taking place not less important than the main events of this period of time. Flying electronic information collection site of FASHA, known as "bat", silently were monitoring of the border issues between the two countries, and the Ba'athist movements, and provided a credible assessment of the capacity of existing threats. The relatively long "bat" flights in the western regions of the country (five to fourteen hours) and a bit distanced of the border did not attract the attention of the Iraqi radars, and the aircraft continued to perform intelligence and surveillance missions with sufficient freedom. The possibility of air strikes on the Second, Third and Fourth Airbases, included valuable information, obtained by analyzing the activities of the "bat" and the "FASHA" ground sites. On the importance of the presence of this aircraft for the IRIAF was enough to pay particular attention to the maintenance and repair of the aircraft and its interior equipment.

- On July 16, 1980, the Fourth Airbase, based on its DASC report in the 92th Armored Division of Ahwaz, declared the probability of air strike on the following regions:

"Mussain - Ein Khosh - Dehloran - Fakke - Mehran - Hamidiyeh - Dasht Azadegan - Susangerd - Tappeh Allah Akbar - Poshman-Hunayra".

Subsequently, on July 17, 1980, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation commander, with the explanation that "the flight order will be issued later," called for flight preparation at Third, Fourth and Sixth Airbases. The Air Force Commander would also reduce the number of Second and Third Airbases say and night patrols to the half.

- Among other issues to be considered from June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980, the announcement of the concern of the First Airbase on the disability to implement the "Alborz Battle Order". Due to the lack of flight personnel and the arrest of a number of pilots (charged with participating in the “Neghab” Coup), as well as the spread of F-4's fighters to the Dezful Airbase, which were involved in nightly alert operations. The First Airbase was a pivotal role in providing the defense needs of the force. This heavy responsibility made the commander of the base to explicitly reflect his problems to the air force command. The image and the full text of this letter are as the following:

"From: The First Airbase (Deputy of Operation) 43-3 / 01-201

To: the IRIAF (Deputy of Operation - Operations Manager) dated July 3, 1980

Subject: Flight staff shortage

Attached: a leaf

In reference to number: 20001- July 11, 1980 (the IRIAF Commander)

In reference to number: 21-1 / 06 / 201- and - June 30, 1980 (Special Office)

1. Some of the pilots of this unit have been arrested in connection with the July 10, 1980 plot, so the operational problems for this unit are as follows:

A. Due to shortage in pilot, that part of the Alborz plan that relates to this unit cannot be implemented and it is necessary to be revised in accordance with the opinion of this unit.

B. The number of F-4D pilots eligible for training is insufficient and the air defense preparedness plan cannot be sufficiently implemented. Currently, even the battalion commander is used to prepare the crew, and all existing pilots, including leaders (two), are busy on preparedness round o’clock. We will face sever difficulty in the next few days, if the facts are ignored.

C. F-4E pilots deployed to the Vahdati Airbase are busy carrying out air defenses at night and there is no possibility of their displacement due to the lack of a F-4 E pilot. Given that the pilots are far from their families and the lack of amenities, dissatisfaction among them is probable.

3. Recommendations

A. Assign Vahdati Airbase missions to other F-4 units so that this unit can carry out the First Airbase defense mission using F-4E aircrafts and pilots grounded at Vahdati Airbase.

B. As F-5E aircrafts are based in Mashhad and the Nojeh Airbase is located 135 miles from Mehrabad Airbase and is able to intercept possible targets, therefore, dismiss the readiness of the day or night of this unit.

Figure 2.4 the image of the letter of the First Airbase on the problems of the implementation of the Alborz Battle Plan due to operational engagements and staff shortages (flight crew)

In fact, the IRIAF Deputy of Operation calls for a reduction in the degree of “the IRIAF state of alert " due to operational, logistical and educational problems caused by the prolonged state of alert leading by interrupting operational training, maintaining pilots' skills in combat situations, wearing out parts and, above all, fatigue and exhaustion of staff. The full text of this request is as follows:

From: The IRIAF (Deputy of Operation - Operations Manager)

To: Directorate of the Third Office of the Joint Staff of the Army of IRI

Subject: Flight staff shortage

Attached: a leaf

In reference to number: 20001- July 11, 1980 (the IRIAF Commander)

In reference to number: 21-1 / 06 / 201- and - June 30, 1980 (Special Office)

Subject: State of alert

In reference to number:

Given the provisions contained in the references and the state of alert that has continued since April, the problems of the flight units of this force are announced as follows.

1. Given the prolonged state of alert of stage 3 and the ammunition loads on aircrafts, and because, in accordance with existing regulations, the aircrafts cannot be used for training, all the necessary trainings that will ensure the continuity of the pilots' readiness and maintaining their skills for war conditions is discontinued, and its impact and the resulting damage will inevitably be unrecoverable in the long run.

B) In terms of technical and maintenance principles, aircraft not flying at a given time will cause the wear and tear of parts and necessitates their replacement, which is certainly problematic in the current situation due to lack of spare parts. Therefore, maximum effort has to be made to prevent wear and tear of parts.

C) Fatigue of flight personnel and maintenance staff are other issues that are of particular importance and, extended the state of alert, especially in Stage 3, will reduce their efficiency.

2- Please note that, in order to minimize the damage, if possible, the level of state of alert reduced to lower levels from the current level, so that this force can, by carrying out the necessary training and flying aircrafts, maintain the skill of the pilots to an acceptable level and to prevent the depreciation of parts.

Commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army; Colonel Pilot of the Headquarters - Javad Fakori

Given the changes in the state of alert level from June 22, 1980 to July 22, 1980, it is concluded that the decision to reduce the state of alert level has been taken only for the continuation of the flight requirements (maintaining the skill level of the pilots), since in the "B-3 " state of alert, all the aircrafts in accordance with the inactive defense plan should be deployed in a hangar or shelter, and operational aircrafts should be loaded with ammunition (while conducting training flights with ammunition is not possible). But on the other hand, in those acute circumstances, the consequences of exposing the failed coup of "Neghab[[16]](#footnote-16)" on the combat readiness of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Air Force cannot be ignored.

Accordingly, the SEMAJA Command Center, based on reports from the Islamic Revolutionary Committee[[17]](#footnote-17), reminds in the following issue a comprehensive anti-national plot and a coup d'état such as that of August 18, 1953 by the United States, given the importance of the issue the full text is presented as follows:

From: SEMAJA 3 (Command Center) Number:

To: See Number: June 29, 1980

Attachment: one leaf

Confidential

In reference to the attached a photocopy sheet received by SEMAJA, please order:

1. The subject of notifications be announced to the unit / major organization subordinate to forces /organizations based on Leaders / Commanders: Forces / and Organizations so that only the personnel responsible for protection, facilities, airports, Airbases and barracks shall be aware of the issue.
2. the utmost precision and protection shall be exercised in notifying unit / major organization subordinate to forces /organizations so that the announcement does not find an induction effect and only to prepare for quick action against potential accidents and to allow the care and vigilance of the authorities protecting close supply and supplying critical infrastructure, which may be targeted by the conspiracy-plot.

3. The intelligence officials shall increase the volume of their intelligence activities to explore the networks included in the announcement (more committed, and influential staff shall be used more)

4. Received notification shall be announced.

The successor to SEMAJA- Brigadier general Valliullah Fallahi

Receivers:

THE NEZAJA Commander, the IRIAF Commander, THE NEDAJA Commander, ZHAJA Commander, SHAJA Commander

The IRIAF state of alert from July 23, 1980 to August 22, 1980

Given the exercises of a maneuver and the practice of shooting and bombing Iraqi units with real ammunition (on July 23, 1980) and unexpected expansion of Iraqi Ba'ath army units in the Somar region, the Third Office of SEMAJA, reports to the Islamic Republic of Iran Army including The IRIAF:

"In the day time reconnaissance operation in the western parts of the country, please carefully monitor the Somar region and report the results to SEMAJA and the NEZAJA as soon as possible." [[18]](#footnote-18)

Following these threats, the IRIAF deputy of operation commander announced to all the units that, considering the threats to the security of the country, the change in the level of readiness of the units were not in the interest of the country, and the state of alert (A-3) will remain unchanged. The IRIAF commander has communicated the "expansion of the units of the Iraqi state" and the following state of alert to the force deputy of operation, which also notified all the IRIAF units through the special office as follows[[19]](#footnote-19):

From: Deputy of Operation (Operations Management – Special Office)

To: Recipients (First, Second, Thirs, Fourth and ... Airbases Comands)

Subject: Expansion of the Iraqi Units

Given the expansion of the units of the Iraqi state in the Somar region, please order:

1. The aircraft “bat” fly on day time over the region and report the collected information as soon as possible;
2. Air Defense Command Commander in the full preparation of air traffic control for the area and to report transfers promptly;
3. Operational information quickly provides the bases with the collected information, and during the rapid inspection view pilots' awareness and target booklets;
4. Bases commanders return to their bases at the earliest opportunity at receiving this decree;
5. Extreme precision shall be made in the protection of the facility, the radar stations and the IRIAF bases;
6. all necessary actions and forecasts required in carrying out the above steps shall be taken into account.

Commander of The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force - Lt. Col. Javad Fakori

Figure 2.5 the image of letter from the Deputy of Operation Command on the recent expansion of the Iraqi Army and the Daily Flight Inspection decree

- On July 29, 1980, the IRIAF deputy of operation requested from the first transport base to prepare two aircrafts "Exploration and Identification C-130" and two F-27 identification aircraft within 24 hours (for observing aerial movements and suspicious movements of enemy units).

"From - Deputy of Operation (Transportation Management - Special Office)

To - Command of the First Transportation Base

Please, order two bat designs (C-130) and twoF-27s will be ready to operate immediately within 24 hours.

Announce the result.

The IRIAF Deputy of Operation

Colonel of Headquarter: Qaidian

- At 6:40 pm on 11/6/59, air patrol was conducted by a F-5 aircraft in the Khorramshahr region, and the pilot's report is as follows:

- There are a number of tanks and armored car bunkers and about 100-150 tanks and carrier units located at the Shalamcheh checkpoint in the Khorramshahr region on the borderline (dirt road).

1. He was one of the pilots with excellent record on flying F-86s, F-5s and F-4s, and in the final years of his service he was successor comander of the Air Force. By Colonel Javad Fakori's appointment to the Defense Department, Colonel Mashallah Omrani was practically monitoring the air force's sensitive and operational affairs. The experienced and qualified air force officer and former successor to the former commander passed away on May 3, 2014, at the age of 79, because of a heart attack and was buried in the Behesht Zahra cemetery, Salehan section. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See: Volume I, Second Edition, "The History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense ", entitled "The aggressive uprising of the Iraqi Army and the readiness of the Alborz Operations Order" pp. 388-391. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The previous chapter has presented the recorded enemy’s air strikes in a Table [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Source: the SEMAJA headquarter, Report No. 91, p. 98, dated July 9, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. According to the records of some personnel of the IRIAF, including Amir Brigadier general, the pilot Abbas Ramezani. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. In reference to the letter No. 19-1 / 06-201 / on January 23, 1980 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Subject of message No. 4-1 / 06-201 / 3 dated April 7, 1980 by the IRIAF Deputy of Operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The general the IRIAF state of alert is presented in the final section of this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The armed reconnaissance flights carried out in the southwest region with the F-5 fighter aircraft at a low altitude (about 500 feet) at speeds of around 350-400 nats, and pilots reported on mission observations. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. As mentioned in the first volume of the "Tabas events", the focus of radar coverage and the country's air defense systems on the west led US aggressor’s tougher operations from southern and southeastern Iran intending on attacking the embassy. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The subject of the letter No. 11-1 / 6-201 / 3 / dated May 16, 1980, the IRIAF deputy of operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The subject of the letter No.12-1 / 06-201 / 3 dated May 25, 1980, the IRIAF deputy of operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. It is noted that at the state of alert level B-3 the enemy raid is likely to cause in the next 72 hours. Therefore, all aircrafts and flight personnel, technical, defense and other operational units of the Air Force should be fully alert. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The subject of the letter No. 47-06-201 / 2 dated June 5, 1980. The SEMAJA -3. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The IRIAF Deputy of Operation decree No. 21-1/06-201/ [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See a full description of this conspiracy or seemingly coup in Volume I, Second Edition, "History of the Air Battle of the Sacred Defense", pp. 317-326. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. The subject matter of the letter (according to the report of the Islamic Revolutionary Committee of the Islamic Republic of Iran No. with the classification of the series), it is worth noting that after the collapse of the imperial system, the Islamic Revolutionary Committees as a revolutionary organization was formed by the leadership of the clergy in the first days of the revolution's victory and engaged into security affairs, by the end of the Sacred defense was merged with the police and the gendarmerie and continued as The Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, under the command of the Chief of the General Staff. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The subject of the letter No. 28-06-201 dated July 28, 1980, The Third Office of the SEMAJA. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The IRIAF decree No. 29-06 / 1-201 / 3 dated July 28, 1980, Deputy of Operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)