

Randomization is Optimal in the Robust Principal-Agent Problem*

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Abstract

A principal contracts with an agent, who takes a hidden action. The principal does not know all of the actions the agent can take and evaluates her payoff from any contract according to its worst-case performance. [Carroll \(2015\)](#) identified the principal’s optimal deterministic contract. I prove that the principal can strictly increase her payoff by randomizing over deterministic contracts.

1 Introduction

A principal writes an incentive contract for an agent. The agent takes a productive, but hidden, action. Unfortunately for the principal, she does not know all available actions. Which contract yields her the highest worst-case payoff?

In path-breaking work, [Carroll \(2015\)](#) sets forth a new paradigm to answer this question. He proves, very generally, that the optimal deterministic contract is linear—the agent receives a constant fraction of the output she produces. This simple contract contrasts with the more complicated, detail-sensitive contracts predicted by the standard, Bayesian principal-agent model.

I prove, at the same level of generality as [Carroll \(2015\)](#), that the principal can strictly increase her worst-case payoff by randomizing over deterministic contracts

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(Theorem 1). Hence, restricting attention to the study of deterministic contracts is *with* loss of generality, provided that the principal believes that randomization can alleviate her ambiguity aversion. (A more nuanced discussion of these preferences is contained at the end of the paper.)

Section 2 outlines the model, Section 3 states and proves the result, and Section 4 discusses the appropriate interpretation of the optimal deterministic contract.

2 Model

In what follows, any Euclidean space is equipped with the Euclidean topology and any product of topological spaces is equipped with the product topology. The set of Borel distributions on any topological space \mathcal{X} is denoted by $\Delta(\mathcal{X})$ and is always equipped with the topology of weak convergence.

2.1 Environment

There is a single principal and a single agent. The agent takes a costly, hidden action to produce stochastic, but observable, output. All parties are risk-neutral.

Let $Y \subset \mathbb{R}$ denote the set of possible output levels. It is assumed to be compact with $\min(Y) = 0$. To produce output, the agent chooses an action, a , which consists of a probability distribution, $F(a) \in \Delta(Y)$, and a cost of effort, $c(a) \in \mathbb{R}_+$. It is assumed that the set of actions available to the agents $A \subset \Delta(Y) \times \mathbb{R}_+$ is compact.

The principal can commit to a deterministic contract — a continuous function $w : Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ — or a randomization over deterministic contracts. Non-negativity of wages reflects agent limited liability. Let $\mathcal{A}(w, A)$ denote the (non-empty) set of optimal actions for the agent under the action set A given a deterministic contract w . It is assumed that if the agent is indifferent among several actions, she chooses the principal's most preferred action. Hence, the principal's payoff given w and A is

$$V(w, A) := \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}(w, A)} E_{F(a)}[y - w(y)].$$

2.2 Max-Min Problems

The principal knows only a compact subset of available actions to the agent $A_0 \subset \Delta(Y) \times \mathbb{R}_+$ when she writes a contract. She thus chooses one with the highest possible

payoff guarantee across all compact supersets of her knowledge $A \supseteq A_0$.

Let the set of all deterministic contracts be denoted by \mathcal{W} (equip it with the sup-norm topology). Let \mathcal{S} denote the set of all compact supersets of $A^0 \subset \Delta(Y) \times \mathbb{R}_+$ (equip it with the topology induced by the Hausdorff metric). [Carroll \(2015\)](#) solved the principal's deterministic max-min optimization problem:

$$V_D^* := \sup_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \inf_{A \in \mathcal{S}} V(w, A). \quad (1)$$

In particular, he showed that there exists a linear contract

$$w^*(y) := \alpha^* y \quad \text{for some } \alpha^* \in [0, 1]$$

that obtains

$$V_D^* = \max_{\alpha \in [0, 1], a_0 \in A_0} (1 - \alpha) \left(E_{F(a_0)}[y] - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} \right), \quad (2)$$

where if $\alpha = 0$ and $c(a_0) = 0$, $c(a_0)/\alpha$ is interpreted as 0, and if $\alpha = 0$ and $c(a_0) > 0$, $c(a_0)/\alpha$ is interpreted as $+\infty$. Given an optimal share $\alpha^* \in [0, 1]$, the bracketed expression corresponds to a tight lower bound on the agent's worst-case expected productivity.

It is assumed throughout that, under A_0 , there exists a solution to (2) in which $\alpha^* > 0$, i.e., that there is an optimal linear contract different from one always paying zero. This is the case, for instance, if there exists a known action generating strictly positive surplus (an assumption made by [Carroll \(2015\)](#)) and all known actions that generate strictly positive surplus are costly (the optimal share parameter is then $\alpha^* = \sqrt{c(a_0^*)}/\sqrt{E_F(a_0^*)[y]} > 0$ for some $a_0^* \in A_0$). Under this (weak) hypothesis, I consider the more general problem in which the principal can commit to a randomization over deterministic contracts:

$$V_R^* := \sup_{\tilde{w} \in \Delta(\mathcal{W})} \inf_{A \in \mathcal{S}} V(\tilde{w}, A), \quad (3)$$

where $V(\tilde{w}, A) := E_{\tilde{w}}[V(w, A)]$. I note that, by standard arguments, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to deterministic strategies for Nature; permitting Nature to randomize has no effect on the value of V_D^* or V_R^* .

3 The Result

The main result of the paper follows below.

Theorem 1

Randomization strictly increases the principal's worst-case payoff:

$$V_R^* > V_D^*.$$

The proof is constructive; I exhibit a random contract that strictly outperforms the optimal linear contract $w^*(y) = \alpha^* y$, $\alpha^* > 0$. Appendix A.3 illustrates the difficulties that arise when trying to establish the result using the minimax theorem.

For this purpose, consider a deterministic, linear contract that yields the agent a smaller share of output than optimal:

$$w_\epsilon^*(y) := (\alpha^* - \epsilon) y,$$

where $\alpha^* > \epsilon > 0$. I show that, for ϵ sufficiently small, a contract that uniformly randomizes over the optimal deterministic contract and this alternative, sub-optimal contract, i.e.,

$$\tilde{w}_\epsilon := \frac{1}{2} \circ w^* + \frac{1}{2} \circ w_\epsilon^* \in \Delta(\mathcal{W}),$$

yields the principal a strictly higher worst-case payoff than w^* . Intuitively, the agent's worst-case productivity under \tilde{w}_ϵ is the same as under the optimal deterministic contract w^* , but the principal extracts more rent by, sometimes, paying the agent a smaller share of the output she produces.¹

I first establish a lower bound on the principal's worst-case payoff from \tilde{w}_ϵ .

Lemma 1

The worst-case payoff from the random contract \tilde{w}_ϵ is bounded below by the value function of a screening problem:

$$\inf_{A \in \mathcal{S}} V(\tilde{w}_\epsilon, A) \geq \underline{V}(\tilde{w}_\epsilon),$$

¹A related intuition is explored in a team-production setting in [Kambhampati \(2022\)](#).

where

$$\begin{aligned}
\underline{V}(\tilde{w}_\epsilon) &:= \min_{a^*, a_\epsilon^* \in \Delta(Y) \times \mathbb{R}_+} \frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha^*)E_{F(a^*)}[y] + \frac{1}{2}(1 - (\alpha^* - \epsilon))E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] \\
&\text{subject to} \\
[IC_{w^*}] \quad &\alpha^* E_{F(a^*)}[y] - c(a^*) \geq \max_{a_0 \in A_0} \alpha^* E_{F(a_0)}[y] - c(a_0) \\
[IC_{w_\epsilon^*}] \quad &(\alpha^* - \epsilon)E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] - c(a_\epsilon^*) \geq \max_{a \in A_0} (\alpha^* - \epsilon)E_{F(a)}[y] - c(a) \\
[IC_{w^* \rightarrow w_\epsilon^*}] \quad &\alpha^* E_{F(a^*)}[y] - c(a^*) \geq \alpha^* E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] - c(a_\epsilon^*) \\
[IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}] \quad &(\alpha^* - \epsilon)E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] - c(a_\epsilon^*) \geq (\alpha^* - \epsilon)E_{F(a^*)}[y] - c(a^*).
\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Proof. See Appendix A.1. \square

The solution to (4) provides a lower bound on Nature's worst-case response to the contract \tilde{w}_ϵ . IC_{w^*} ensures that, relative to any known action, the agent prefers to take action a^* when receiving contract w^* . $IC_{w^* \rightarrow w_\epsilon^*}$ ensures that, relative to a_ϵ^* , the agent prefers to take action a^* when receiving contract w^* . Analogous statements hold for $IC_{w_\epsilon^*}$ and $IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}$.

I next establish properties that hold in any solution to (4).

Lemma 2

If $\epsilon > 0$ is sufficiently small, then the following properties hold in any solution to (4):

1. $IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}$ and IC_{w^*} bind.
2. $c(a^*) = c(a_\epsilon^*) = 0$ and $E_{F(a^*)}[y] = E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y]$.

Proof. See Appendix A.2. \square

The screening constraint $IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}$ prevents Nature from minimizing the principal's payoff contract-by-contract, i.e., Nature's worst-case response to the contract w^* constrains her worst-case response to w_ϵ^* . In particular, at any solution to (4), $IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}$ binds. In addition, when $\epsilon > 0$ is sufficiently small, there is pooling: $c(a^*) = c(a_\epsilon^*) = 0$ and $E_{F(a^*)}[y] = E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y]$. That is, an agent receiving contract w^* takes an action with payoff-identical properties as when she receives w_ϵ^* .

Pooling means that the agent's worst-case expected productivity under w_ϵ^* is no lower than her worst-case expected productivity under w^* . Moreover, the binding

constraint IC_{w^*} pins down

$$E_{F(a^*)}[y] = E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] = \left(\max_{a_0 \in A_0} E_{F(a_0)}[y] - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha^*} \right),$$

where the bracketed expression corresponds to the tight lower bound on worst-case productivity under the optimal deterministic contract (see (2)). These observations immediately yield that the solution to (4) results in a payoff for the principal strictly larger than V_D^* :

$$\underline{V}(\tilde{w}_\epsilon) = \frac{1}{2} [(1 - \alpha^*)E_{F(a^*)}[y]] + \frac{1}{2} [(1 - (\alpha^* - \epsilon))E_{F(a^*)}[y]] > (1 - \alpha^*)E_{F(a^*)}[y] = V_D^*,$$

where the inequality follows because the principal now, sometimes, pays the agent a share of output $\alpha^* - \epsilon$ instead of α^* .

Putting everything together, I have shown that if ϵ is sufficiently small, then

$$V_R^* \geq \inf_{A \in \mathcal{S}} V(\tilde{w}_\epsilon, A) \geq \underline{V}(\tilde{w}_\epsilon) > V_D^*,$$

where the first inequality is by definition, the second is proved in Lemma 1, and the third is a corollary of Lemma 2. Theorem 1 has thus been proven; the principal strictly benefits from randomization.

4 Discussion

In the spirit of [Raiffa \(1961\)](#)'s critique and in the tradition of the theory of zero-sum games, I have explored the possibility that randomization might be used to increase the principal's minimax payoff in the robust principal-agent problem of [Carroll \(2015\)](#). I proved that the principal does, in fact, achieve a strictly higher worst-case payoff by randomizing. Hence, restricting attention to the study of deterministic contracts is *with* loss of generality.

How should the optimal deterministic (linear) contract be interpreted? Building upon [Ellsberg \(1961\)](#), [Saito \(2015\)](#) argues that it might be reasonable for a decision maker to believe that randomization will not resolve her ambiguity aversion. In particular, the principal might believe that Nature moves only after a deterministic contract is realized. Hence, under such beliefs, the optimal deterministic contract

cannot be improved upon. The validity of restricting attention to deterministic contracts thus depends crucially upon the principal's beliefs about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.

In ongoing research, I study the optimality and structure of random contracts under varying beliefs that randomization can eliminate ambiguity aversion (preferences reflecting these attitudes have been axiomatized by [Saito \(2015\)](#)). It is my hope that this paper spurs related research at the intersection of the frontiers of decision theory and contract theory.

A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Lemma 1

Fix \tilde{w}_ϵ and take any strategy of Nature $A \in \mathcal{S}$. If w^* is realized, then the agent chooses an action $a^* \in \mathcal{A}(w^*, A)$, which necessarily satisfies

$$\alpha^* E_{F(a^*)}[y] - c(a^*) \geq \max_{a \in A} \alpha^* E_{F(a)}[y] - c(a).$$

Similarly, if w_ϵ^* is realized, then the agent chooses an action $a_\epsilon^* \in \mathcal{A}(w_\epsilon^*, A)$, which necessarily satisfies

$$(\alpha^* - \epsilon) E_{F(a^*)}[y] - c(a^*) \geq \max_{a \in A} (\alpha^* - \epsilon) E_{F(a)}[y] - c(a).$$

Because \hat{w}^* and \hat{w}_ϵ^* are realized with equal probability, if these two actions are taken, then the principal obtains an expected payoff of

$$\frac{1}{2} E_{F(a^*)}[y] + \frac{1}{2} (1 - \alpha^* - \epsilon) E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y].$$

It follows that

$$\inf_{A \in \mathcal{S}} V(\tilde{w}_\epsilon, A) \geq \hat{V}(w_\epsilon^*),$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{V}(w_\epsilon^*) &:= \frac{1}{2} \min_{A \in \mathcal{S}} (1 - \alpha^*) E_{F(a^*)}[y] + (1 - \alpha^* + \epsilon) E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] \\ &\text{subject to} \\ [IC_{w^*}] \quad &\alpha^* E_{F(a^*)}[y] - c(a^*) \geq \max_{a \in A} \alpha^* E_{F(a)}[y] - c(a) \\ [IC_{w_\epsilon^*}] \quad &(\alpha^* - \epsilon) E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] - c(a_\epsilon^*) \geq \max_{a \in A} (\alpha^* - \epsilon) E_{F(a)}[y] - c(a). \end{aligned}$$

To see why it suffices to replace $\hat{V}(w_\epsilon^*)$ with $\underline{V}(\tilde{w}_\epsilon)$, notice that any $A \in \mathcal{S}$ containing more than two “unknown” actions for the agent can be replaced with $A^0 \cup \{a^*, a_\epsilon^*\} \subset A$, where a^* is the agent’s action under w^* and a_ϵ^* is their action under w_ϵ^* . The resulting program has fewer inequality constraints. Therefore, its solution results in a (weakly) smaller payoff for the principal. It follows that $\underline{V}(\tilde{w}_\epsilon) = \hat{V}(w_\epsilon^*)$.

A.2 Proof of Lemma 2

I consider the properties of the solution to (4). I first prove that, in any solution, it must be that $c(a_\epsilon^*) = 0$. Towards contradiction, suppose that $c(a_\epsilon^*) > 0$ in some solution. I claim that the objective function can be strictly reduced if Nature replaces this action with the alternative action \hat{a} with cost $c(\hat{a}) = 0$ and with distribution satisfying

$$E_{F(\hat{a})}[y] = E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] - \frac{c(a_\epsilon^*)}{\alpha^* - \epsilon} < E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y].$$

Since the objective function is strictly increasing in $E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y]$, it suffices to show that \hat{a} is incentive compatible. By construction, $IC_{w_\epsilon^*}$ and $IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}$ are satisfied. As no change to a^* has been made, IC_{w^*} remains satisfied. Finally, $IC_{w^* \rightarrow w_\epsilon^*}$ is satisfied because

$$E_{F(a^*)}[y] - \frac{c(a^*)}{\alpha^*} \geq E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] - \frac{c(a_\epsilon^*)}{\alpha^*} > E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] - \frac{c(a_\epsilon^*)}{\alpha^* - \epsilon} = E_{F(\hat{a})}[y].$$

Given that $c(a_\epsilon^*) = 0$, it suffices to consider the following minimization problem:

$$\min_{E_F(a^*)[y], E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y], c(a^*) \geq 0} \quad \frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha^*)E_F(a^*)[y] + \frac{1}{2}(1 - (\alpha^* - \epsilon))E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y]$$

subject to

$$[IC_{w^*}] \quad E_F(a^*)[y] \geq \frac{c(a^*)}{\alpha^*} + \max_{a_0 \in A_0} \left(E_F(a_0)[y] - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha^*} \right)$$

$$[IC_{w_\epsilon^*}] \quad E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y] \geq \max_{a \in A_0} \left(E_F(a_0)[y] - \frac{c(a_0)}{(\alpha^* - \epsilon)} \right)$$

$$[IC_{w^* \rightarrow w_\epsilon^*}] \quad E_F(a^*)[y] - E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y] \geq \frac{c(a^*)}{\alpha^*}$$

$$[IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}] \quad E_F(a^*)[y] - E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y] \leq \frac{c(a^*)}{(\alpha^* - \epsilon)}.$$

I next observe that $IC_{w^* \rightarrow w_\epsilon^*}$ is implied by $IC_{w_\epsilon^*}$ and IC_{w^*} . To see why, subtract $IC_{w_\epsilon^*}$ from IC_{w^*} to obtain

$$E_F(a^*)[y] - E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y] \geq \frac{c(a^*)}{\alpha^*} + U_0 - U_0^\epsilon,$$

where

$$U_0 := \max_{a_0 \in A_0} \left(E_F(a_0)[y] - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha^*} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad U_0^\epsilon := \max_{a \in A_0} \left(E_F(a_0)[y] - \frac{c(a_0)}{(\alpha^* - \epsilon)} \right).$$

Since $U_0 - U_0^\epsilon \geq 0$ for any $\epsilon \geq 0$, it follows that $IC_{w^* \rightarrow w_\epsilon^*}$ must hold if $IC_{w_\epsilon^*}$ and IC_{w^*} hold.

Dropping $IC_{w^* \rightarrow w_\epsilon^*}$, I now inspect the solution to

$$\min_{E_F(a^*)[y], E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y], c(a^*) \geq 0} \quad \frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha^*)E_F(a^*)[y] + \frac{1}{2}(1 - (\alpha^* - \epsilon))E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y]$$

subject to

$$[IC_{w^*}] \quad E_F(a^*)[y] \geq \frac{c(a^*)}{\alpha^*} + U_0$$

$$[IC_{w_\epsilon^*}] \quad E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y] \geq U_0^\epsilon$$

$$[IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}] \quad E_F(a_\epsilon^*)[y] \geq E_F(a^*)[y] - \frac{c(a^*)}{(\alpha^* - \epsilon)}.$$

In any solution to this problem, IC_{w^*} must bind. If IC_{w^*} does not bind, then Nature

can reduce $E_{F(a^*)}[y]$ by a small amount while satisfying all incentive constraints and strictly reduce the objective function.

Eliminating $E_{F(a^*)}[y]$ from Nature's problem using the binding constraint yields

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y], c(a^*) \geq 0} \quad & \frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha^*) \left(U_0 + \frac{c(a^*)}{\alpha^*} \right) + \frac{1}{2}(1 - (\alpha^* - \epsilon)) E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] \\ \text{subject to} \quad & \\ [IC_{w_\epsilon^*}] \quad & E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] \geq U_0^\epsilon \\ [IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}] \quad & E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] \geq U_0 + \frac{c(a^*)}{\alpha^*} - \frac{c(a^*)}{(\alpha^* - \epsilon)}. \end{aligned}$$

Now, consider a relaxed problem without $IC_{w_\epsilon^*}$. I solve this program for $\epsilon > 0$ small and show that its solution satisfies $IC_{w_\epsilon^*}$. In any solution to this relaxed problem, the remaining constraint $IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}$ must bind. If not, then Nature could reduce $E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y]$ by a small amount and strictly reduce the objective function.

Substituting the binding constraint $IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}$ into the objective function, I solve for the optimal value of $c(a^*)$:

$$\min_{c(a^*) \geq 0} \quad \frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha^*) \left(U_0 + \frac{c(a^*)}{\alpha^*} \right) + \frac{1}{2}(1 - (\alpha^* - \epsilon)) \left(U_0 + \frac{c(a^*)}{\alpha^*} - \frac{c(a^*)}{(\alpha^* - \epsilon)} \right).$$

The objective function is strictly increasing in $c(a^*)$ if and only if

$$\frac{(1 - \alpha^*)(\alpha^* - \epsilon)}{(1 - \alpha^* + \epsilon)} > \epsilon.$$

If $\epsilon > 0$ is sufficiently small, then the inequality is satisfied (the right-hand approaches zero and the left-hand side approaches a strictly positive number). Hence, it is optimal to make $c(a^*)$ as small as possible, i.e., set $c(a^*) = 0$.

In summary, when $\epsilon > 0$ is sufficiently small, $c(a^*) = c(a_\epsilon^*) = 0$ and both IC_{w^*} and $IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}$ bind in the solution to the relaxed problem. IC_{w^*} and $IC_{w_\epsilon^* \rightarrow w^*}$ binding yields $E_{F(a^*)}[y] = U_0 = E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y]$. Hence, $IC_{w_\epsilon^*}$ is also satisfied:

$$E_{F(a_\epsilon^*)}[y] = U_0 \geq U_0^\epsilon.$$

It follows that the solution to the relaxed problem solves Nature's constrained problem and all properties stated in the Lemma have been proven.

A.3 Unsuccessful, Minimax Proof Approaches

Carroll (2015) observed that there is no saddle point in problem (1), i.e.,

$$V_D^* = \sup_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \inf_{A \in \mathcal{S}} V(w, A) < \inf_{A \in \mathcal{S}} \sup_{w \in \mathcal{W}} V(w, A) := \bar{V}_D. \quad (5)$$

He then remarked that this “suggests that [the principal] should be able to improve her worst-case guarantee by randomizing over contracts”, an intuition coming from von Neumann’s minimax theorem (von Neumann (1928)) and the existence of mixed-strategy saddle points in finite zero-sum games (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)). In particular, suppose that the following minimax equality holds:

$$V_R^* = \sup_{\tilde{w} \in \Delta(\mathcal{W})} \inf_{A \in \mathcal{S}} V(\tilde{w}, A) = \inf_{A \in \mathcal{S}} \sup_{\tilde{w} \in \Delta(\mathcal{W})} V(\tilde{w}, A) := \bar{V}_R, \quad (6)$$

where the principal’s strategy space is extended from \mathcal{W} to $\Delta(\mathcal{W})$. Then, the observation that $\bar{V}_R \geq \bar{V}_D$ yields $V_R^* > V_D^*$ by (5).

Unfortunately, the strategy spaces for the principal and Nature are infinite-dimensional and it is not clear that existing extensions of von Neumann’s minimax theorem can be used to establish (6). For instance, Sion’s minimax theorem (Theorem 3.4 of Sion (1958)) requires, among other conditions, that $V(w, \cdot)$ is lower semicontinuous. But $V(w, \cdot)$ is not lower semicontinuous, as demonstrated by the following example.²

Example 1. Suppose $A_0 = \{a_0\}$, with $E_{F(a_0)}[y] = \frac{1}{2}$ and $c(a_0) = \frac{1}{8}$, and $Y = \{0, 1\}$. Fix $w(y) = \frac{1}{2}y$. To show that $V(w, \cdot)$ is not lower semicontinuous, take a sequence of action sets (A_n) where $A_n := \{a_0, a_n\}$, with $c(a_n) = 0$ and $E_{F(a_n)}[y] = \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{n+1}$. For A_n , $\mathcal{A}(w, A_n) = \{a_n\}$ yielding the principal an expected payoff of $V(w, A_n) = \frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{n+1})$. Hence, $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} V(w, A_n) = \frac{1}{8}$. However, the limit of (A_n) in the Hausdorff metric is $A^* := \{a_0, a^*\}$, with $c(a_n) = 0$ and $E_{F(a_n)}[y] = \frac{1}{4}$. Under this action set, $\mathcal{A}(w, A_n) := \{a_0, a^*\}$. Principal-preferred action selection then leads the principal to choose a_0 , yielding her a payoff of $V(w, A^*) = \frac{1}{4} > \frac{1}{8}$. Hence, $V(w, \cdot)$ is not lower semicontinuous at A^* .³

²To avoid lower semicontinuity issues, one might instead invoke the Kneser-Fan minimax theorem (e.g., Theorem 4.2 of Sion (1958)). But to apply this theorem, one must establish that $V(\tilde{w}, \cdot)$ is convexlike, a nontrivial task. I have neither been able to prove that $V(\tilde{w}, \cdot)$ is convexlike, nor provide a counterexample.

³To fix this issue, one might assume principal least-preferred action selection. But then $V(\cdot, A)$ would not be upper semicontinuous, another necessary condition for Sion’s minimax theorem. Re-

A natural approach to obviate this issue and make Nature’s strategy space “well-behaved” is to extend it from \mathcal{S} to $\Delta(\mathcal{S})$. Then, the minimax equality becomes

$$V_R^* = \sup_{\tilde{w} \in \Delta(\mathcal{W})} \inf_{\tilde{A} \in \Delta(\mathcal{S})} V(\tilde{w}, \tilde{A}) = \inf_{\tilde{A} \in \Delta(\mathcal{S})} \sup_{\tilde{w} \in \Delta(\mathcal{W})} V(\tilde{w}, \tilde{A}) := \bar{V}_{RR}, \quad (7)$$

where $V(\tilde{w}, \tilde{A}) := E_{\tilde{w}, \tilde{A}}[V(w, A)]$. However, establishing (7) is insufficient to establish $V_R^* > V_D^*$ because it need not be the case that $\bar{V}_{RR} \geq \bar{V}_D$. Put differently, (7) can hold even when $V_R^* = V_D^*$.

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latedly, an optimal deterministic contract need not exist.