

Robust Performance Evaluation^{*}

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Abstract

A principal provides nondiscriminatory incentives for identical and independent agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown that any worst-case optimal contract, i.e. the contract with the highest profit guarantee over all unknown actions, exhibits *joint performance evaluation* — each agent's pay is strictly increasing in the performance of another. Moreover, it is *nonlinear* in team output. Common group incentive schemes, such as nonlinear team bonuses and employee stock options, thus have intrinsic value and are justified even in the absence of task interdependence or correlation in individual performances.

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Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Related Literature	4
2	A Simple Example	6
3	Model	9
3.1	Environment	9
3.2	Contracts	9
3.3	Principal's Problem	11
4	Analysis	11
4.1	Main Result	12
4.2	Preliminaries: Supermodular Games	13
4.3	Proof of Main Result	14
4.3.1	Suboptimality of Linear and Related Contracts	14
4.3.2	RPE Cannot Outperform IPE	16
4.3.3	JPE Worst-Case Payoffs	17
4.3.4	Existence of a Calibrated JPE Outperforming IPE	21
4.3.5	Existence and Uniqueness	22
4.4	Optimal Wages	23
5	Discussion	23
6	Extensions	25
7	Final Remarks	26
A	Proofs	27
B	Online Appendices	OA-1

“The incentive compensation scheme that is “correct” in one situation will not in general be correct in another. In principle, there could be a different incentive structure for each set of environmental variables. Such a contract would obviously be prohibitively expensive to set up; but more to the point, many of the relevant environmental variables are not costlessly observable to all parties to the contract. Thus, a single incentive structure must do in a variety of circumstances. The lack of flexibility of the piece rate system is widely viewed to be its critical shortcoming: the process of adapting the piece rate is costly and contentious.”

— Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983)

1 Introduction

In the canonical moral hazard in teams model, a principal chooses a contract to incentivize a group of agents. Individual actions are unobservable, but stochastically affect observable individual performance. The optimal (Bayesian) contract thus exploits the statistical relationship between actions and performance indicators.

In many applications, however, the principal is concerned that her knowledge of the set of actions available to the agents is incomplete. Moreover, she may not possess a well-defined prior belief about the actions she does not know to be available. In these cases, it is reasonable for her to choose a contract that is guaranteed to perform well across a wide range of production environments.

This paper establishes new principles of optimal contracts under this alternative perspective. In the model proposed, a risk-neutral principal chooses a nondiscriminatory contract to provide incentives for identical and independent risk-neutral agents. The principal knows some actions the agents can take and can monitor individual performance. However, she is concerned that her knowledge of the agents’ action set is incomplete and, thus, evaluates each contract according to its guaranteed performance across all action sets consistent with her knowledge. It is shown that any optimal contract with respect to this criterion exhibits *joint performance evaluation* — each agent’s pay is strictly increasing in the performance of another. Moreover, it is *nonlinear* in total output.

The importance of this result is two-fold. First, it provides novel foundations for

team-based incentive pay. In the Bayesian contracting paradigm, the Informativeness Principle holds that only signals that are statistically informative about an agent’s action have value (Shavell (1979), Holmström (1979), Holmström (1982)). This implies that, when agents are independent, incentive schemes based solely on individual performance can never be improved upon. Under worst-case evaluation of contracts, however, interdependent incentive schemes are shown to have strictly positive value.

Second, it demonstrates that robustness considerations need *not* lead to the optimality of linear contracts, a marked departure from recent results in a growing literature on robust contracting (e.g. Carroll (2015), Dai and Toikka (2018), and Walton and Carroll (2019)). This difference arises from the imposition of constraints on the principal’s uncertainty set— she assumes that the agents she compensates are identical and independent. But such assumptions are natural in applications. Just as economists make stylized assumptions about the nature of a firm’s production technology, so too do real-world managers, even if they acknowledge that the world is more complex than their models and are ambiguity averse.

To understand the basic intuition, consider the compensation of two identical and independent salespeople. A typical (optimal) piece rate scheme pays each salesperson a commission, $w^* > 0$, if they make a sale and zero otherwise. The key observation is that it is possible to construct a joint performance evaluation contract that has the same incentive properties as w^* , while reducing expected wage payments in worst-case scenarios. In particular, suppose that the commission of a salesperson is increased when both succeed, but reduced when only one succeeds. If this adjustment keeps each salesperson’s (expected) commission equal to w^* when both play their part in a targeted (known) action profile, then each agent’s incentive to deviate to a less productive, unknown action remains the same. However, if the salespeople actually take such an unknown action — the situation that determines the contract’s worst-case performance, then the principal pays them less in expectation. Each is punished for the other’s poor performance.

The logic in the preceding paragraph is new. Economists have traditionally justified “team bonus” schemes by highlighting their role in encouraging cooperation (Itoh (1991)) or discouraging sabotage (Lazear (1989)). The analysis of this paper illuminates a darker advantage unrelated to task interdependence; these schemes allow a profit-maximizing principal to flexibly extract rent. I isolate this idea in Section 2 using a simple example in which each agent has a single known and unknown action.

The baseline model of Section 3 generalizes the example to the setting in which the agents have any number of known and unknown actions. This extension is of particular interest because, with many unknown actions, joint performance evaluation is vulnerable to a pernicious free-riding problem. In particular, the worst-case payoff for the principal is obtained in the limit of an n -sequence of dominance solvable games with n unknown actions. In each game in this sequence, agents “undercut” each other as dominated strategies are eliminated, taking progressively less costly and less productive actions.

In spite of these drawbacks, Theorem 1, the main result of the paper, establishes that any worst-case optimal contract is a nonlinear JPE contract. The proof, outlined in Section 4, proceeds by successively improving upon suboptimal contracts. First, it is shown that any contract rewarding failure with strictly positive wages can be improved upon by a contract that does not reward failure (Lemma 3 and Lemma 4). The remaining contracts exhibit either relative performance evaluation (RPE), independent performance evaluation (IPE), or nonlinear joint performance evaluation (JPE). Second, a ranking among optimal contracts within each class is established. It is shown that there does not exist an RPE contract that yields the principal a strictly larger payoff than the optimal IPE contract (Lemma 5), but that there *does* exist such a JPE contract (Lemma 7).

To exhibit this improvement and to prove existence of an optimal nonlinear JPE, I identify a closed-form solution for the principal’s worst-case payoff from any such contract. I first observe that JPE induces a supermodular game between the agents and that equilibria in these games are solvable using best-response dynamics (Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). Exploiting this observation, I establish a tight lower bound on the probability of success generated by any action in any best-response path.¹ This bound, in turn, leads to a closed-form expression for the principal’s worst-case payoff. Using this expression, I then prove that a local perturbation of the optimal IPE contract in the direction of JPE always strictly increases the principal’s payoff; the rent-extraction benefits of JPE outweigh their efficiency costs.

In Section 5, I develop a Bayesian intuition for the main result. In particular, I study the optimal form of *incomplete* contracts, i.e. those that cannot depend on non-verifiable reports, when the principal has Bayesian uncertainty about the agents’

¹This amounts to identifying and solving a differential equation characterizing worst-case best-response dynamics (Lemma 6), a technical result that may be of independent interest.

action set. While the predictions of this model are indeterminate, I exhibit priors under which there are JPE contracts that outperform the optimal IPE contract. These contracts maintain the incentive properties of the IPE contracts to which they are calibrated, i.e. they implement the same actions for every (realized) action set, while reducing the principal’s expected wage payments when less productive actions are taken. The max-min approach draws attention to these adversarial realizations, providing unambiguous foundations for nonlinear JPE.

Finally, while I focus on a simple model to isolate the main ideas, I show in Section 6 that the techniques in the paper can be used to establish principles of worst-case optimal contracts in a variety of extensions. For example, if there are $n \geq 2$ agents, then there always exists a “team bonus” contract that yields the principal a strictly higher worst-case payoff than what is obtained from offering each agent the optimal IPE.² Moreover, any worst-case optimal contract is nonlinear. The main results also extend under various modifications of the assumptions; I show that the equilibrium selection assumptions maintained in the baseline model can be relaxed and that JPE can outperform IPE even when agents are not known to be identical.

1.1 Related Literature

This paper makes two main contributions to the literature (see Section 7 for a broader discussion). First, it establishes a fundamentally new channel leading to the unique optimality of joint performance evaluation. In the Bayesian contracting paradigm, the Informativeness Principle of [Holmström \(1979\)](#) and [Shavell \(1979\)](#) prescribes independent performance evaluation whenever one agent’s performance is statistically uninformative of another’s action. Hence, the literature has sought justification for interdependent incentive schemes, such as relative performance evaluation and joint performance evaluation, by introducing productive and/or informational linkages between agents.³ The model studied in this paper explicitly rules out these channels in

²In fact, locally improving upon the optimal IPE becomes easier with more agents.

³In the absence of productive interaction, joint performance evaluation may be optimal if agents are affected by a common, negatively correlated productivity shock ([Fleckinger \(2012\)](#)). In the absence of a common shock, joint performance evaluation may be optimal if efforts are complements in production ([Alchian and Demsetz \(1972\)](#)), if it induces help between agents ([Itoh \(1991\)](#)) or, alternatively, if it discourages sabotage ([Lazear \(1989\)](#)). Finally, joint performance evaluation may be optimal if agents are engaged in repeated production and it allows for more effective peer sanctioning ([Che and Yoo \(2001\)](#)). See [Fleckinger \(2012\)](#) for a comprehensive analysis of the Bayesian version of the model I study, and [Fleckinger and Roux \(2012\)](#) for an excellent survey of the above literature.

order to isolate the effect of robustness considerations. The results thus rationalize empirical evidence documenting firms’ preference for joint performance evaluation, such as team bonuses, in cases in which the production and information technologies are independent (Rees, Zax, and Herries (2003)). They also provide a theoretical foundation for the use of stock options to compensate members of start-ups.⁴

Second, to my knowledge, this paper is the first to conduct a formal analysis of a principal-many agents model in which the principal has bounded, non-quantifiable uncertainty about the agents’ production technology.⁵ The pioneering work of Carroll (2015) considers a principal-single agent model in which the principal has non-quantifiable uncertainty about the actions available to the agent. His main result is that there exists a worst-case optimal contract that is linear in individual output. The model and analysis in this paper enrich that of Carroll (2015) by introducing a seemingly irrelevant agent and showing that multiple agents lead to the optimality of joint incentive schemes.⁶

Dai and Toikka (2018) extend the analysis of Carroll (2015) to multi-agent settings, but consider a model in which the principal deems *any* game the agents might be playing plausible. In this setting, they find that linear contracts are worst-case optimal. This result is driven by the finding that any contract that induces competition between agents is non-robust to prisoners’ dilemma-type games, leading the

⁴Understood through the Informativeness Principle, such schemes are puzzling given the premise that all members exploit the same underlying technology. If anything, this seems to suggest success should have positive conditional correlation, leading *relative performance evaluation* to be optimal. Fleckinger (2012) develops this point further and offers another explanation based on effort-controlled noise.

⁵Related work not discussed here include the papers of Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978), Garrett (2014), and Frankel (2014), who consider contracting with unknown preferences; Rosenthal (2020) who considers contracting with unknown risk preferences; Marku and Ocampo Diaz (2019), who consider a robust common agency problem; and Chassang (2013) who studies the robust performance guarantees of a different class of calibrated contracts than those considered here in a dynamic agency problem. At the intersection of computer science and economics, see also Dütting, Roughgarden, and Cohen (2020), who study near-optimal contracts in principal-agent relationships and Babaioff, Feldman, Nisan, and Winter (2012) who study how the agents’ production technology affects whom the principal contracts with, as well as the principal’s loss of profits due to moral hazard.

⁶Building upon Carroll (2015)’s single-agent model, Antic (2015) imposes bounds on the principal’s uncertainty over unknown actions (see also Section 3.1 of Carroll (2015), which studies lower bounds on costs). In particular, Antic (2015) posits a lower bound on the distribution over output given any unknown technology. In contrast, the model studied here places no restrictions on the technology available to each agent in isolation beyond those of Carroll (2015). Instead, the restrictions concern the relationship between the agents. See Dütting, Roughgarden, and Talgam-Cohen (2019), who also considers a robust single-agent model in which the principal knows only the first moment of each action’s distribution over output.

principal to a worst-case payoff of zero. In contrast to Dai and Toikka (2018), I consider a setting in which the principal *knows* that success is independently distributed across agents. This has the immediate effect of ruling out such games and ensuring that linear contracts are suboptimal. It also necessitates new techniques to analyze the principal’s worst-case payoffs.⁷ In spite of these differences, the results of this paper complement Dai and Toikka (2018) in terms of their management implications. Agents in Dai and Toikka (2018)’s model are a “real team” in the sense that they work together to produce value for the principal, while agents in the model of this paper are best thought of as “co-actors” given the assumption of technological independence (Hackman (2002)). Yet, in either case, joint performance evaluation is optimal. What changes is the particular form of the optimal joint performance evaluation contract — in the case of a real team, optimal compensation is linear in the value the team generates for the principal, while in the case of co-acting agents it involves nonlinear bonus payments that reward agents when all succeed.

2 A Simple Example

A simple example illustrates the framework and result.

A risk-neutral manager compensates two identical, risk-neutral agents that perform independent tasks. That is, it is common knowledge that their successes or failures are statistically independent, conditional on the actions they take, and that they cannot influence each other’s productivity. Successful completion of a task yields the manager a profit of one and failure yields her a profit of zero.

The manager knows that each agent can take one of two actions, “work” or “shirk”. She knows that “work” results in successful task completion with probability $p_0 > 0$ at effort cost $c_0 \in (0, p_0)$. Moreover, she knows that shirking entails zero effort cost. On the other hand, she is uncertain about the productivity of shirking, i.e. the probability $p^* < p_0$ with which it results in successful task completion.⁸

The manager contemplates using one of two contracts, each of which respects agent limited liability:

⁷For instance, the worst-case payoff of the principal at the optimal contract is achieved by a sequence of games in which the number of actions grows to infinity, rather than one additional action for each agent as in Dai and Toikka (2018).

⁸To be clear, in this example, the principal “knows” that there are precisely two actions, even if she does not know the value of p^* . In the baseline model, this hypothesis will be relaxed.

	work	shirk
work	$p_0w - c_0, p_0w - c_0$	$p_0w - c_0, p^*w$
shirk	$p^*w, p_0w - c_0$	p^*w, p^*w

Figure 1: *Game induced by IPE w given p^* .*

1. Independent Performance Evaluation (IPE):

Pay each agent $w \in (c_0, 1)$ for individual success. Pay each agent 0 for failure.

2. Nonlinear Joint Performance Evaluation (JPE):

Pay each agent a wage

$$w_0 \in [0, w)$$

for individual success and a team bonus

$$b = \frac{w - w_0}{p_0}$$

for joint success. Pay each agent 0 for failure. Any such contract is calibrated to the contract-action pair (w, work) in the following sense: If an agent succeeds at her task, then her expected wage payment remains equal to w *conditional on the other agent working*. That is,

$$w_0 + p_0b = w.$$

The manager evaluates any contract according to the same criterion. First, for each value of p^* , she computes her expected payoff in her preferred Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the contract she offers. Second, she computes the infimum value of her expected payoff over all values of $p^* < p_0$. The resulting payoff is called her *worst-case payoff*. Can JPE yield the manager a higher worst-case payoff than IPE?

The IPE contract w , together with an actual value of p^* , induces the game between the agents depicted in Figure 1. A naïve intuition is that the worst-case scenario for the principal occurs when $p^* = 0$; if agents take a shirking action with this success

	work	shirk
work	$p_0w - c_0, p_0w - c_0$	$p_0(w + p^*b), p^*w$
shirk	$p^*w, p_0(w_0 + p^*b)$	$p^*(w + p^*b), p^*(w_0 + p^*b)$

Figure 2: *Game induced by JPE (w_0, b) given p^* .*

probability, then the principal obtains an expected payoff of zero. But, this logic ignores incentives, as pointed out by [Carroll \(2015\)](#). In particular, each agent has a strict incentive to shirk if and only if she obtains a higher expected utility from doing so. Hence, (work, work) is a Nash equilibrium whenever

$$p^*w \leq p_0w - c_0 \iff p^* \leq p_0 - \frac{c_0}{w},$$

yielding the principal a payoff per agent of

$$p_0(1 - w).$$

The principal's worst-case payoff is instead obtained as p^* approaches $p_0 - \frac{c_0}{w}$ from above. Along this sequence, (shirk, shirk) is the unique Nash equilibrium and the principal's payoff per agent becomes arbitrarily close to

$$V_{IPE}(w) = (p_0 - \frac{c_0}{w})(1 - w).$$

Now, consider the calibrated JPE contract (w_0, b) . The game between the agents for a given value of p^* is depicted in Figure 2. Observe that, as under the IPE contract w , (work, work) is a Nash equilibrium whenever

$$p^* \leq p_0 - \frac{c_0}{w}.$$

And, again, the principal's worst-case payoff is obtained as p^* approaches $p_0 - \frac{c_0}{w}$ from above. (Along this sequence, (shirk, shirk) is the unique Nash equilibrium.) However,

a simple calculation shows that

$$(p_0 - \frac{c_0}{w})(1 - (w_0 + p^*b)) > (p_0 - \frac{c_0}{w})(1 - w) = V_{IPE}(w),$$

where the inequality follows from $w_0 + p^*b < w_0 + p_0b = w$. Hence, JPE outperforms IPE.

The intuition is simple. Calibration ensures that worst-case productivity is no lower under the JPE contract than under the IPE contract. But, under the JPE contract, the principal pays agents less in expectation. Each is punished for the shirking of the other. We proceed to analyze the model with any number of known and unknown actions.

3 Model

3.1 Environment

A risk-neutral principal again writes a contract for two risk-neutral agents, indexed by $i = 1, 2$. Each agent i now chooses an unobservable action, a_i , from a common, finite set $A \subset \mathbb{R}_+ \times [0, 1]$ to produce individual output $y_i \in \{0, 1\}$, where $y_i = 1$ indicates “success” and $y_i = 0$ indicates “failure”. Each action a_i is identified by its cost, $c(a_i) \in \mathbb{R}_+$, and the probability with which it results in success, $p(a_i) \in [0, 1]$. There are no informational linkages across agents:

$$Pr(y_i, y_j | a_i, a_j) = Pr(y_i | a_i, a_j) Pr(y_j | a_i, a_j).$$

There are no productive linkages across agents:

$$Pr(y_i | a_i, a_j) = Pr(y_i | a_i) = \begin{cases} p(a_i) & \text{if } y_i = 1 \\ 1 - p(a_i) & \text{if } y_i = 0 \end{cases}.$$

3.2 Contracts

A **contract** is a quadruple of non-negative wages,

$$w := (w_{11}, w_{10}, w_{01}, w_{00}) \in \mathbb{R}_+^4,$$

where the first index of each wage indicates an agent's own success or failure and the second indicates the success or failure of the other agent.⁹ It will be useful to classify contracts according to the typology of [Che and Yoo \(2001\)](#).¹⁰

Definition 1 (Performance Evaluations)

A contract w is

- an **independent performance evaluation (IPE)** if $(w_{11}, w_{01}) = (w_{10}, w_{00})$;
- a **relative performance evaluation (RPE)** if $(w_{11}, w_{01}) < (w_{10}, w_{00})$;
- and a **joint performance evaluation (JPE)** if $(w_{11}, w_{01}) > (w_{10}, w_{00})$,

where $>$ and $<$ indicate strict inequality in at least one component and weak in both.

A JPE is **linear** if

$$w_{y_i y_j} = \alpha(y_i + y_j) \text{ for some } \alpha \in (0, 1]$$

and **nonlinear** otherwise.

Agent i 's ex post payoff given a contract w , action profile (a_i, a_j) , and realization (y_i, y_j) is

$$w_{y_i y_j} - c(a_i),$$

while her expected payoff is

$$U_i(a_i, a_j; w) := \sum_{y_i} \sum_{y_j} Pr(y_i, y_j | a_i, a_j) w_{y_i y_j} - c(a_i).$$

Let $\Gamma(w, A)$ denote the normal form game induced by the contract w and $\mathcal{E}(w, A)$ denote its (non-empty) set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria.

⁹I impose the assumption that contracts are symmetric throughout, postponing a discussion of asymmetric contracts to Section 6 and Online Appendix B.7.

¹⁰While this typology is non-exhaustive (for instance, when $w_{11} > w_{10}$ and $w_{01} < w_{00}$ there is JPE “at the top” and RPE “at the bottom”), I will show later that it is without loss of generality to consider contracts for which $w_{01} = w_{00} = 0$ (Lemma 4). Within this class of contracts, it is exhaustive.

3.3 Principal's Problem

The principal's ex post payoff given a contract w and realization (y_1, y_2) is

$$y_1 + y_2 - w_{y_1 y_2} - w_{y_2 y_1},$$

while her expected payoff is

$$V(w, A) := \max_{\sigma \in \mathcal{E}(w, A)} E_{\sigma}[y_1 + y_2 - w_{y_1 y_2} - w_{y_2 y_1}].$$

Notice that the principal can select her preferred Nash equilibrium in case of multiplicity. This minimizes the distance between the model studied here and the literature discussed in Section 1.1. However, many results persist under weaker selection assumptions as discussed in Section 6.

When the principal writes a contract for the agents, she has limited knowledge about the game the agents play. In particular, she knows only a non-empty subset of actions available to them $A^0 \subseteq A$. In the face of her uncertainty, the principal evaluates each contract on the basis of its performance across all finite supersets of her knowledge. The **worst-case payoff** she receives from a contract w is thus given by

$$V(w) := \inf_{A \supseteq A^0} V(w, A).$$

The principal's problem is to identify a contract w^* for which

$$V(w^*) = \sup_w V(w).$$

Call such a contract a **worst-case optimal contract**.

4 Analysis

To rule out uninteresting cases, I make the following assumption about A^0 in the subsequent analysis.

Assumption 1

The known action set A^0 has the following properties:

1. *(Non-Triviality) There exists an action $a_0 \in A^0$ such that $p(a_0) - c(a_0) > 0$.*

2. (*Known Actions are Costly*) If $a_0 \in A^0$, then $c(a_0) > 0$.

The first assumption ensures that the principal can possibly obtain a strictly positive worst-case payoff from contracting with the agents. The second ensures that the principal’s supremum payoff is never approached by a sequence of contracts converging to the contract that always pays zero.¹¹

4.1 Main Result

The main result follows below.

Theorem 1

Any worst-case optimal contract is a nonlinear JPE. There exists a worst-case optimal contract.

The key intuition behind the result is that by judiciously calibrating a JPE to a benchmark IPE, any efficiency losses such contracts generate can be made approximately the same as those of the benchmark contract. Thus, the reduction in expected wage payments the principal obtains when agents take less productive actions causes JPE to outperform the benchmark contract. Of course, to show that only nonlinear JPE can be worst-case optimal, I must also prove strict suboptimality of contracts other than IPE, including those that exhibit RPE and those that reward agents with positive expected wages when they fail.

The proof has five steps. First, I show that no linear contract can outperform the best IPE (Lemma 3) and that, more generally, any contract rewarding failure with strictly positive wages can be improved by a contract w for which $w_{01} = w_{00} = 0$ or yields a worst-case payoff smaller than that of the best IPE (Lemma 4). Consequently, to identify a worst-case optimal contract, it suffices to consider those which are either RPE ($w_{11} < w_{10}$), IPE ($w_{11} = w_{10}$), or JPE ($w_{11} > w_{10}$). Second, I show that there does not exist an RPE that yields the principal a strictly larger payoff than the best IPE (Lemma 5). Third, I compute the principal’s worst-case payoff given any JPE (Lemma 6). Fourth, I show that there exists a (calibrated) JPE that yields a strictly

¹¹While the first assumption is necessary for the main result, the second is not. In particular, as long as the principal does not “target” any zero-cost action, the result goes through. I maintain this assumption due to its ease of interpretation and because it eliminates some nuisance cases in the proof.

higher payoff than the best IPE (Lemma 7). Fifth, I establish existence of a worst-case optimal nonlinear JPE and that no other class of contracts can be optimal. The remainder of this section outlines these steps.

4.2 Preliminaries: Supermodular Games

The proof will utilize some results from the theory of supermodular games, which I review now. Equip any action set A with the total order \succeq : $a_i \succeq a_j$ if either $p(a_i) > p(a_j)$, or $p(a_i) = p(a_j)$ and $c(a_i) \leq c(a_j)$.¹² In words, a_i is higher than a_j if a_i results in success with a higher probability or if it results in success with the same probability, but at a lower cost. Then, (A, \succeq) is a complete lattice; all subsets of A have both a maximum and a minimum. A supermodular game may thus be defined as follows.¹³

Definition 2 (Supermodular Games)

The game $\Gamma(w, A)$ is **supermodular** if U_i exhibits increasing differences: $a'_i \succeq a_i$ and $a'_j \succeq a_j$ implies

$$U_i(a'_i, a'_j; w) - U_i(a_i, a'_j; w) \geq U_i(a'_i, a_j; w) - U_i(a_i, a_j; w).$$

It is **submodular** if U_i exhibits decreasing differences: $a'_i \succeq a_i$ and $a'_j \succeq a_j$ implies

$$U_i(a'_i, a'_j; w) - U_i(a_i, a'_j; w) \leq U_i(a'_i, a_j; w) - U_i(a_i, a_j; w).$$

The important property of supermodular games that I exploit is that best-response dynamics converge to their maximal and minimal equilibria. In particular, let a_{\max} and a_{\min} denote the maximal and minimal elements of A , and $\overline{BR} : A \rightarrow A$ and $\underline{BR} : A \rightarrow A$ denote the maximal and minimal best-response functions for the agents.¹⁴ Then, the following Lemma holds.

¹²It is easy to verify that this relation is antisymmetric (if $a_i \succeq a_j$ and $a_i \preceq a_j$, then $a_i = a_j$), transitive (if $a_i \succeq a_j$ and $a_j \preceq a_k$, then $a_i \succeq a_k$), and complete ($a_i \succeq a_j$ or $a_j \preceq a_i$).

¹³As all games considered in this paper are finite, I need not introduce any continuity requirements in the definition. See Vives (1999) for a textbook treatment of supermodular games and Vives (2005) for a survey.

¹⁴Formally, if $a_i = \overline{BR}(a_j)$, then a_i is a best-response to a_j and $a_i \succeq a'_i$ for any other best-response a'_i . Similarly, if $a_i = \underline{BR}(a_j)$, then a_i is a best-response to a_j and $a_i \preceq a'_i$ for any other best-response a'_i . Both \overline{BR} and \underline{BR} are well-defined by Corollary 4.1 of Topkis (1978).

Lemma 1 (Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990))

Suppose \bar{a} (\underline{a}) is the limit found by iterating \overline{BR} (\underline{BR}) starting from a_{\max} (a_{\min}). If $\Gamma(w, A)$ is supermodular, then it has a maximal Nash equilibrium (\bar{a}, \bar{a}) and a minimal Nash equilibrium $(\underline{a}, \underline{a})$; any other equilibrium (a_i, a_j) must satisfy $\bar{a} \succeq a_i \succeq \underline{a}$ and $\bar{a} \succeq a_j \succeq \underline{a}$.

A similar property holds for two-player submodular games. Define the mapping

$$\begin{aligned} \widetilde{BR} : A \times A &\rightarrow A \times A \\ (a_i, a_j) &\mapsto (\overline{BR}(a_j), \underline{BR}(a_i)). \end{aligned}$$

Then, the following Lemma holds.

Lemma 2 (Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990))

Suppose (\bar{a}, \underline{a}) is the limit found by iterating \widetilde{BR} starting from the action profile (a_{\max}, a_{\min}) . If $\Gamma(w, A)$ is submodular, then both (\bar{a}, \underline{a}) and (\underline{a}, \bar{a}) are Nash equilibria and any other Nash equilibrium action must be smaller than \bar{a} and larger than \underline{a} .

4.3 Proof of Main Result

Say that a contract w is **eligible** if $V(w) > 0$.¹⁵ It is without loss of generality to restrict attention to eligible contracts; Carroll (2015) already identifies that

$$V_{IPE}^* := \sup_{w: w \text{ is an IPE}} V(w) = 2 \max_{w \in [0,1], a_0 \in A^0} \left[(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w})(1 - w) \right] > 0$$

by an argument that generalizes the one sketched in Section 2. Hence, any contract w for which $V(w) \leq 0$ cannot be worst-case optimal.

4.3.1 Suboptimality of Linear and Related Contracts

I provide a simple proof that any linear contract cannot outperform the best IPE. A slightly longer argument establishing that the best IPE *strictly* outperforms any linear contract can be found in Online Appendix B.3. (That argument applies to any production environment with $n \geq 2$ agents and any compact set of output levels.)

¹⁵This definition implies eligibility in the sense of Carroll (2015), who requires that, in addition, $V(w)$ yields a higher worst-case payoff than the contract paying zero wages for all pairs (y_i, y_j) . By the assumption of costly known actions, such a contract yields the principal a worst-case payoff of zero.

Lemma 3 (Suboptimality of Linear Contracts)

For any linear contract w , $V(w) \leq V_{IPE}^*$.

Proof. Suppose w is a linear contract with parameter $\alpha \in (0, 1]$. Consider an alternative IPE contract w' which puts $w'_{11} = \alpha$, $w'_{01} = 0$, and which is otherwise equal to w . I claim that this contract weakly increases the principal's worst-case payoff. First, observe that, for any $A \supseteq A_0$, the incentives of the agents are unchanged; a constant shift in an agent's payoff holding fixed the action of the other does not affect her optimal choice of action. Hence, $\sigma \in \mathcal{E}(w, A)$ if and only if $\sigma \in \mathcal{E}(w', A)$. Second, observe that, for any equilibrium $\sigma \in \mathcal{E}(w, A) = \mathcal{E}(w', A)$, the principal's expected payoff under w' is weakly larger than under w ; her expected wage payments decrease and each agent's productivity is unchanged. Hence, $V(w', A) \geq V(w, A)$ for any $A \supseteq A^0$. It follows that

$$V(w) = \inf_{A \supseteq A^0} V(w, A) \leq \inf_{A \supseteq A^0} V(w', A) = V(w') \leq V_{IPE}^*.$$

□

More generally, any eligible contract w with $w_{00} > 0$ or $w_{01} > 0$ can be improved upon by another contract w' with $w'_{00} = w_{01} = 0$ or, alternatively, cannot yield a payoff higher than V_{IPE}^* . The following Lemma is proved in Appendix A.1.

Lemma 4 (Suboptimality of Positive Wages for Failure)

For any eligible contract w with $w_{00} > 0$ or $w_{01} > 0$, there either exists a contract w' with $w'_{01} = w'_{00} = 0$ and $V(w') \geq V(w)$, or $V_{IPE}^* \geq V(w)$.

The proof is nontrivial and builds upon ideas sketched in the remainder of this section. The interested reader is thus encouraged to skip the proof on first reading and to review it after.

An immediate corollary of Lemma 4 is that to find a worst-case optimal contract it suffices to consider nonlinear JPE satisfying $w_{11} > w_{10}$, IPE satisfying $w_{11} = w_{10}$, and RPE satisfying $w_{11} < w_{10}$. I next establish a ranking among the classes of JPE, IPE, and RPE contracts, exploiting the following observation.

Observation 1

If w is an RPE for which $w_{00} = w_{01} = 0$ and $A \supseteq A^0$, then $\Gamma(w, A)$ is a submodular game. If w is a JPE for which $w_{00} = w_{01} = 0$ and $A \supseteq A^0$, then $\Gamma(w, A)$ is a supermodular game.

4.3.2 RPE Cannot Outperform IPE

I now establish that no RPE can yield a higher payoff than the best IPE.

Lemma 5 (IPE Outperforms RPE)

No RPE with $w_{01} = w_{00} = 0$ can yield the principal a higher worst-case payoff than V_{IPE}^ .*

I sketch the proof for the case in which there is a single known action, i.e. $A^0 := \{a_0\}$. Suppose each agent has available a single additional zero-cost action a^* that results in success with probability $p(a^*) < p(a_0)$. Then, a^* is a strict best response to a^* if and only if

$$\underbrace{p(a^*) (p(a^*)w_{11} + (1 - p(a^*))w_{10})}_{\text{Payoff } a^* \text{ against } a^*} > \underbrace{p(a_0) (p(a^*)w_{11} + (1 - p(a^*))w_{10}) - c(a_0)}_{\text{Payoff } a_0 \text{ against } a^*} \iff$$

$$p(a^*) > p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{p(a^*)w_{11} + (1 - p(a^*))w_{10}}.$$

This condition also ensures that a^* is a strictly dominant strategy because any RPE induces a submodular game between the agents. Intuitively, if a^* is a strict best response to a^* , which is less productive than a_0 , then it must also be a strict best response to a_0 ; the marginal benefit of shirking against a more productive action is higher (because $w_{10} > w_{11}$). The principal's payoff as p^* approaches the value at which the incentive constraint binds is therefore

$$\underbrace{2(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{p(a^*)w_{11} + (1 - p(a^*))w_{10}})}_{\text{Probability Success}} \times \underbrace{[1 - (p(a^*)w_{11} + (1 - p(a^*))w_{10})]}_{\text{Conditional Expected Surplus}}.$$

Letting $\hat{w} := p(a^*)w_{11} + (1 - p(a^*))w_{10}$, it is immediate that she can do no better than V_{IPE}^* :

$$2(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\hat{w}})(1 - \hat{w}) \leq 2 \max_{w \in [0,1]} \left[(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w})(1 - w) \right] = V_{IPE}^*.$$

The proof for general known action sets is in Appendix A.2 and invokes a fixed-point argument to identify the existence of a worst-case equilibrium (a^*, a^*) .

4.3.3 JPE Worst-Case Payoffs

Within the class of contracts setting $w_{00} = w_{01} = 0$, the only contracts left to consider are nonlinear JPE for which $w_{11} > w_{10}$.¹⁶ Lemma 6 states the principal's worst-case payoff guarantee from any contract of this form. Its proof is in Appendix A.3.

Lemma 6 (JPE Worst-Case Payoffs)

Suppose w is a JPE with $w_{00} = w_{01} = 0$ and, for each $a_0 \in A^0$, $\hat{p}(\cdot|a_0) : [0, \hat{t}(a_0)] \rightarrow [0, p(a_0)]$ is the unique solution to the initial value problem

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}'(t) = f(\hat{p}(t)) &:= \frac{-1}{\hat{p}(t)w_{11} + (1 - \hat{p}(t))w_{10}} \quad \text{with} \\ \hat{p}(0) &= p(a_0), \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $[0, \hat{t}(a_0)] \subseteq [0, c(a_0)]$ is the largest interval on which $\hat{p}(t) > 0$ for all $t \in [0, \hat{t}(a_0))$. Then,

$$V(w) = 2 \min\{1 - w_{11}, \bar{p} [\bar{p}(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - \bar{p})(1 - w_{10})]\}, \tag{2}$$

where

$$\bar{p} := \max_{a_0 \in A^0} \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0)|a_0).$$

The principal's worst-case payoff, $V(w)$, is two times the minimum of two terms. The first term

$$1 - w_{11}$$

is the principal's payoff from each agent when the worst-case action set induces a game between the agents in which there is a unique equilibrium in which both succeed with probability one. The second term

$$\bar{p} [\bar{p}(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - \bar{p})(1 - w_{10})]$$

is the principal's payoff when the worst-case action set induces a game between the agents in which, in the maximal equilibrium induced by the contract, each succeeds with a probability \bar{p} as low as possible. (Both are required because, for high enough w_{11} , the principal may prefer the “shirking equilibrium”.) Rather than outlining the entire proof of Lemma 6, I instead describe the sequence of games that leads to the

¹⁶Such contracts can be re-written in the form described in Section 2 by defining $w_0 := w_{10}$ and $b := w_{11} - w_{10}$.

worst-case distribution \bar{p} , focusing on why the “one unknown action” construction of Section 2 is insufficient.

The Worst-Case Sequence of Games. For simplicity, suppose there is a single known action a_0 with success probability $p(a_0) = 1$ and cost $c(a_0) = \frac{1}{4}$. The optimal IPE puts $w^* = w_{11} = w_{10} = \frac{1}{2}$. Given w^* , the worst-case success probability approaches

$$p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w^*} = \frac{1}{2}.$$

Now, suppose I reduce w_{10} to zero, but keep all other wages the same. This contract is (trivially) calibrated to w^* and the known action a_0 :

$$\underbrace{p(a_0)}_{=1} \underbrace{w_{11}}_{=\frac{1}{2}} + \underbrace{(1 - p(a_0))}_{=0} w_{10} = \underbrace{w^*}_{=\frac{1}{2}}.$$

So, according to the analysis in Section 2, there is ostensibly *no* efficiency loss generated by this modification.

In particular, if I consider only the class of games with action sets of the form $A^1 := A^0 \cup \{a_1^1\}$, for some action a_1^1 with success probability $p(a_1^1) < p(a_0)$, then the worst case for the principal occurs as $p(a_1^1)$ approaches the value at which the best-response condition binds:

$$\begin{aligned} p(a_1^1) [p(a_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_0))w_{10}] - c(a_1^1) &= p(a_0) [p(a_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_0))w_{10}] - c(a_0) \\ \iff p(a_1^1) &= p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0) - c(a_1^1)}{p(a_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_0))w_{10}} \geq \frac{1}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

See Figure 3 for a geometric representation of this argument.

But what if there are two unknown actions? Consider the action set $A^2 := A^0 \cup \{a_1^2, a_2^2\}$, where a_1^2 has a positive cost of $c(a_1^2) = \frac{c(a_0)}{2} = \frac{1}{8}$ and $c(a_2^2) = 0$. A simple calculation shows that for a_1^2 to be a strict best-response to a_0 , it must be the case that

$$\begin{aligned} p(a_1^2) [p(a_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_0))w_{10}] - c(a_1^2) &> p(a_0) [p(a_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_0))w_{10}] - c(a_0) \\ \iff p(a_1^2) &> p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0) - c(a_1^2)}{p(a_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_0))w_{10}} = \frac{3}{4}. \end{aligned}$$




Figure 3: A^1 best-response path.

Figure 4: This figure depicts the best-response response path starting from the known (maximal) action a_0 . The dashed line may be interpreted as an indifference curve with slope $-1/(p(a_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_0))w_{10})$ and intercept $p(a_0)$: each action on the line, a , is identified by its cost relative to $c(a_0)$, $x = c(a_0) - c(a)$, and its success probability, $y = p(a)$. Since the slope of the indifference curve is negative, the maximal reduction in success probability occurs when the cost reduction is as large as possible, i.e. when $c(a_1^1) = 0$ so that $x = \frac{1}{4}$. As $p(a_1^1) \downarrow \frac{1}{2}$, the worst-case probability is achieved.

Furthermore, for a_2^2 to be a best-response to a_1^2 , it must be the case that

$$p(a_2^2) > p(a_1^2) - \frac{c(a_1^2) - c(a_2^2)}{p(a_1^2)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_1^2))w_{10}} = p(a_1^2) - \frac{1}{4p(a_1^2)}.$$

If $p(a_1^2)$ is close to $\frac{3}{4}$ and $p(a_2^2)$ is close to $p(a_1^2) - 1/(4p(a_1^2))$, then, in addition, a_1^2 is the unique best-response to a_0 and a_2^2 is the unique best-response to a_1^2 . Hence, best-response dynamics under the operator \overline{BR} converge to (a_1^2, a_1^2) starting from the maximal action in A^2 , a_0 . Since $\Gamma(w, A^2)$ is a supermodular game (Observation 1), Lemma 1 thus implies that (a_1^2, a_1^2) is the maximal Nash equilibrium.¹⁷ In it, each agent's success probability can be made arbitrarily close to

$$\frac{3}{4} - \frac{1}{4^{\frac{3}{4}}} = \frac{5}{12} < \frac{1}{2}.$$

See Figure 5, which continues the geometric argument.

I now generalize this construction to drive the equilibrium probabilities of success

¹⁷A similar argument shows that best-response dynamics under the operator \underline{BR} converge to (a_1^2, a_1^2) starting from the minimal action in A^2 , a_1^1 . Hence, it is in fact the unique Nash equilibrium.




Figure 5: A^2 best-response path.

even lower. Let $A^n := A^0 \cup \{a_1^n, \dots, a_n^n\}$ be an action set with $c(a_k^n) = (n - k) \frac{c(a_0)}{n}$, so that costs are evenly distributed on a grid between zero and $c(a_0)$. For each $k = 1, \dots, n$, choose $p(a_k)$ so that a_k is a best-response to a_{k-1} , i.e. set

$$p(a_k) = p(a_{k-1}) - \frac{\epsilon(n)}{p(a_{k-1})w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}))w_{10}} + \rho(n), \quad (\text{E})$$

where $\epsilon(n) := \frac{c(a_0)}{n}$ and $\rho(n) > 0$.¹⁸ For $\rho(n)$ small, a_k is a maximal best-response to a_{k-1} for all k . It follows that the maximal Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma(w, A^n)$ is (a_n^n, a_n^n) , found again by iterating best-responses. Hence, the per-agent probability of success can be reduced to $p(a_n^n)$.

It turns out that \bar{p} is the limit of $p(a_n^n)$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$. To prove this, I observe that Equation E is an Euler approximation of Equation 3, where $\frac{c(a_0)}{n}$ is the step size of the approximation and $\rho(n)$ is a “rounding error”. Hence, as n grows large, if the rounding error $\rho(n)$ approaches zero at an appropriately fast rate relative to $\epsilon(n)$, agents’ best-response dynamics are well-described by the solution to Equation 3, $\hat{p}(\cdot|a_0)$, under the interpretation that time t is “cost-reduction relative to a_0 ”.¹⁹ In

¹⁸To see why this is an equivalent condition, multiply both sides of the equation by $p(a_{k-1})w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}))w_{10}$.

¹⁹See, for instance, Theorem 6.3 of [Atkinson \(1989\)](#) and the proceeding discussion.




Figure 6: $p(a_n^n)$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

the example considered here, the limit is

$$\bar{p} = \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0)|a_0) = \hat{p}(c(a_0)|a_0) = \hat{p}(0.25|a_0) = 0,$$

as depicted in Figure 6. As zero profits are obtained in this limit, the so-constructed JPE cannot outperform the optimal IPE to which it was calibrated.

4.3.4 Existence of a Calibrated JPE Outperforming IPE

While I demonstrated by example in the previous section that not *every* calibrated JPE outperforms the optimal IPE, I prove that there must exist one that does.

Lemma 7 (JPE Outperforms IPE)

There exists a JPE with $w_{00} = w_{10} = 0$ yielding the principal a strictly higher worst-case payoff than V_{IPE}^ .*

I illustrate the proof, which can be found in Appendix A.4, using the running example with a single known action a_0 for which $p(a_0) = 1$ and $c(a_0) = \frac{1}{4}$. As previously pointed out, the optimal IPE given this action puts $w^* = w_{11} = w_{10} = \frac{1}{2}$. Now, consider the calibrated JPE setting $w_{10} = \frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$ for $\epsilon > 0$ and $w_{11} = \frac{1}{2}$.

I show that this contract strictly increases the principal's worst-case payoff if ϵ is sufficiently small. Integration reveals that the solution to the differential equation

defining \bar{p} in Lemma 6 is

$$\bar{p}(\epsilon) := \frac{\sqrt{\frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon)} - (\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon)}{\epsilon}.$$

By L'Hôpital's rule, as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+$, so that the wage scheme I constructed approaches the optimal IPE, $\bar{p}(\epsilon)$ approaches $\frac{1}{2}$, the worst-case equilibrium probability of success given the optimal IPE. Differentiating $\bar{p}(\epsilon)$ and taking its limit as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+$, I identify a local calibration effect on the worst-case probability of success:

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \bar{p}'(\epsilon) = -\frac{1}{4}.$$

I now compute the local effect of calibration on the principal's *profit* from each agent in the shirking equilibrium.²⁰ For any $\epsilon > 0$, the principal's payoff per agent in the shirking equilibrium is

$$\pi(\epsilon) := \underbrace{\bar{p}(\epsilon)}_{\text{Expected Task Value}} \times \underbrace{[1 - (\bar{p}(\epsilon)w_{11} + (1 - \bar{p}(\epsilon))w_{10})]}_{\text{Conditional Expected Surplus}}.$$

Using the chain rule and taking limits,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \pi'(\epsilon) &= \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \underbrace{\bar{p}'(\epsilon) (1 - (\bar{p}(\epsilon)w_{11} + (1 - \bar{p}(\epsilon))w_{10}))}_{\text{Efficiency Loss}} + \underbrace{\bar{p}(\epsilon) (1 - \bar{p}(\epsilon)/p(a_0) - \epsilon\bar{p}'(\epsilon)/p(a_0))}_{\text{Gain in Rents}} \\ &= -\frac{1}{4} \times \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} > 0. \end{aligned}$$

This establishes the desired result.

4.3.5 Existence and Uniqueness

To establish existence of a worst-case optimal contract, I simply observe that the search for an optimal JPE with $w_{00} = w_{01} = 0$ can be recast as a maximization problem of a continuous function over a compact set. To establish that any worst-case optimal contract must be a nonlinear JPE with $w_{00} = w_{01} = 0$, I need only strengthen the proof of Lemma 4 to show that any contract w with either $w_{00} > 0$ or

²⁰As the principal's profit in the shirking equilibrium at the optimal IPE is strictly lower than in the equilibrium in which both agents succeed probability one, it suffices to show that the principal benefits from such a decrease to exhibit a strict increase in the principal's payoff.

$w_{01} > 0$ is either weakly outperformed by an IPE or RPE, or strictly outperformed by a JPE. I leave these last details to Appendix A.5, thereby completing the proof of Theorem 1.

4.4 Optimal Wages

To conclude the analysis of the baseline model, I observe that optimal values of w_{11} and w_{10} can be found by solving the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{w_{11} > w_{10} \geq 0} \min\{1 - w_{11}, \bar{p} [\bar{p}(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - \bar{p})(1 - w_{10})]\},$$

where \bar{p} is the solution to the initial value problem in the statement of Lemma 6. For any eligible contract $w = (w_{11}, w_{10}, 0, 0)$ targeting a known action a_0 , \bar{p} is strictly larger than zero and hence given by the closed-form solution

$$\bar{p} = \frac{\sqrt{(p(a_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_0))w_{10})^2 - 2c(a_0)(w_{11} - w_{10})} - w_{10}}{w_{11} - w_{10}}.$$

In the running example with $p(a_0) = 1$ and $c(a_0) = \frac{1}{4}$, the optimal wages are $w_{11} = \frac{2}{3}$ and $w_{10} = w_{01} = w_{00} = 0$; the principal increases w_{11} above the optimal IPE wage, $\frac{1}{2}$, to mitigate efficiency losses. In Online Appendix B.1, I demonstrate via numerical optimization that optimal compensation depends on aggregate output only, i.e. $w_{11} > w_{10} = 0$, whenever the surplus generated by the team, $p_0 - c_0$, is sufficiently large. On the other hand, when $p_0 - c_0$ is sufficiently small, monitoring individual output has value, i.e. $w_{11} > w_{10} > 0$ at the optimal wage scheme.

5 Discussion

The principal's problem can be re-phrased as follows: If she must use the same contract, i.e. mapping from successes and failures into wages, given any set of actions the agents might have available, which one does the best in the sense of yielding the highest payoff guarantee? The solution to the problem is a positive description of how a principal might write a contract in the face of structured uncertainty about the agents' environment.

Two implicit assumptions underlie this formulation. First, contracts are *incom-*

plete; they can only depend on observable successes and failures and not on the technology of the agents. Second, in line with [Carroll \(2015\)](#), the principal does not possess a Bayesian prior over the agents' unknown technology.²¹

If contracts were to be complete, then it is well known that the manager could implement the Bayesian optimal contract technology-by-technology. For instance, she could ask agents to report the true technology and, if reports disagree, punish them with a contract that always pays zero. The resulting mechanism is incentive compatible and its optimality does not depend on whether the principal has Bayesian or max-min uncertainty about the agents' technology. The interpretation taken in this paper, however, and in the rest of the literature on robust contracting, is that such a mechanism violates the spirit of the robustness exercise. The principal would like to avoid changing the contract she offers as the agents' environment varies, as suggested in the introductory quotation.²²

On the other hand, there are no general, existing results on the form of optimal *incomplete* contracts under *Bayesian* uncertainty.²³ In Online Appendix [B.2](#), I show that predictions in such a setting are indeterminate. In particular, I consider a moral hazard problem in which a principal incentivizes the agents to take a costly, surplus-generating action, a_0 , instead of a zero-cost shirking action, a_\emptyset , that results in failure with probability one. I posit, however, that there is another costless action, a^* , with intermediate productivity that is available to the agents with probability $\mu \in (0, 1)$. If μ is sufficiently large and a^* is sufficiently productive, then it is impossible to improve upon the IPE contract that always pays the agents zero. However, if μ is sufficiently small, then the optimal IPE implements a_0 when a^* is unavailable and a^* when it is available. In such cases, calibrating a JPE to the optimal IPE strictly increases the principal's payoff: these contracts enjoy the same incentive properties as the IPE contracts to which they are calibrated, i.e. they implement the same actions, while reducing expected wage payments in the scenarios in which a^* is taken. This

²¹This assumption can be justified using the axiomatic framework of [Gilboa and Schmeidler \(1989\)](#). A broader perspective is discussed in [Carroll \(2019\)](#).

²²To the still unpersuaded reader, it is useful to observe that the main results continue to hold under the more pessimistic assumption that agents play the principal's least-preferred equilibrium within the set of Pareto Efficient Nash equilibria (see Online Appendix [B.5](#)). Under this selection assumption, more complicated, multi-stage mechanisms must be used to implement the Bayesian optimal contract.

²³[Nalebuff and Stiglitz \(1983\)](#) do consider such a model, finding conditions under which relative performance evaluation is optimal, but their production setting is not analogous the one considered in this paper.

result provides an alternative, Bayesian foundation for nonlinear JPE that has not previously appeared in the literature.²⁴

6 Extensions

The baseline model is kept deliberately simple in order to isolate the key intuition behind the optimality of joint performance evaluation. However, the arguments in the main analysis can be used to identify principles of worst-case optimal contracts in a variety of other extensions:

- In Online Appendix B.3, I show that if there are n agents, then there always exists a “team bonus” scheme that outperforms the optimal IPE. Under this scheme, each agent is paid a base wage for individual success and a bonus if and only if all agents succeed.
- In Online Appendix B.4, I show that if there are n agents and any compact set of individual output levels, then any optimal contract is nonlinear.
- In Online Appendix B.5, I observe that if agents play a Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium, but the principal cannot choose her most preferred equilibrium in this set, then any worst-case optimal contract cannot be an IPE and must be nonlinear.
- In Online Appendix B.6, I show that the findings in Section 2 hold even when the productivity of shirking actions can differ across agents.
- Finally, in Online Appendix B.7, I identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which the optimal nondiscriminatory JPE outperforms any IPE, potentially discriminatory.

These extensions demonstrate that the basic logic of the main result persists under more “realistic” assumptions and that the analytical tools developed in the main text are of use in the analysis of more complicated multi-agent incentive problems.

²⁴It should be made clear, however, that the model studied in the Appendix is not formally analogous to the max-min model studied in the main text; the max-min problem does *not* possess a saddle point. Hence, maximizing over nature’s worst-case responses yields strictly lower profits than the worst expected payoff of the principal over all feasible production environments. The advantage of the max-min model is the sharpness of its prediction.

7 Final Remarks

This paper identifies a new economic force in a canonical moral hazard in teams setting. In particular, if a principal does not know all of the actions the agents can take, but must provide them with incentives, then joint performance evaluation can approximate the incentive properties of any nontrivial independent performance evaluation contract, while flexibly reducing her expected wage payments in worst-case scenarios. Hence, interdependent incentive schemes have intrinsic value.

I conclude by commenting on a broader theme in the literature. Over the last decades, a growing number of papers have investigated the “robustness” of classical game-theoretic predictions and mechanisms to various relaxations of the agents’ environment.²⁵ While these papers make important methodological contributions, the uncertainty faced by the designer (or modeler) in these settings is *too extreme* for many applications. This paper contributes to a small, but growing, research agenda exploring the robustness of predictions and mechanisms in the “intermediate” cases between fully Bayesian and fully Knightian uncertainty.²⁶ It demonstrates that the modeling predictions in such cases can differ markedly from those at the extremes, but are nevertheless illuminating and warrant further consideration.

²⁵For instance, [Bergemann and Morris \(2005\)](#) consider robust implementation across all type spaces; [Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong \(2017\)](#) propose a metric on the Universal Type Space to capture the strategic impact of relaxing higher-order beliefs in *all* possible games the agents might play; and, as discussed, [Dai and Toikka \(2018\)](#) study moral hazard in teams in a robust contracting setting in which the principal deems all possible unknown action profiles to be plausible.

²⁶For recent work in this spirit, see [Antic \(2015\)](#) and [Dütting, Roughgarden, and Talgam-Cohen \(2019\)](#), who study single-agent robust principal-agent models in which the principal has prior knowledge about some features of the distribution over output implied by the agent’s actions; [Auster \(2018\)](#), who considers a bilateral trade setting; [Ollar and Penta \(2019\)](#), who consider robust implementation in the case in which it is common knowledge that agents’ types are identically distributed; [Gensbittel, Peski, and Renault \(2020\)](#), who consider robustness to higher-order beliefs within the class of zero-sum games; and [Malenko and Tsoy \(2020\)](#), who study optimal project financing when the financier has bounded, non-quantifiable uncertainty about a project’s cash flows.

A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Lemma 4

If $w_{11} > w_{01}$ ($w_{10} > w_{00}$), setting $w'_{11} = w_{11} - w_{01}$ and $w'_{01} = 0$ ($w'_{10} = w_{10} - w_{00}$ and $w'_{00} = 0$) shifts each agent's payoff by a constant. Similarly, if $w_{11} < w_{01}$ ($w_{10} < w_{00}$), setting $w'_{01} = w_{01} - w_{11}$ and $w'_{11} = 0$ ($w'_{00} = w_{00} - w_{10}$ and $w'_{10} = 0$) shifts each agent's payoff by a constant. It follows that any Nash equilibrium under w is also a Nash equilibrium under w' . Since the principal's ex post payment decreases, these adjustments must (weakly) increase her worst-case payoff.

The argument in the previous paragraph immediately establishes that if $w_{11} > w_{01}$ and $w_{10} > w_{00}$, then there exists an improved contract w' for which $w'_{00} = w'_{01} = 0$. There are three other cases to consider: (i) $w_{01} > w_{11}$ and $w_{00} > w_{10}$ (in which case it suffices to set $w_{11} = w_{10} = 0$); (ii) $w_{11} > w_{01}$ and $w_{00} > w_{10}$ (in which case it suffices to set $w_{01} = w_{10} = 0$); and (iii) $w_{01} > w_{11}$ and $w_{10} > w_{00}$ (in which case it suffices to set $w_{11} = w_{00} = 0$). I discuss each case in turn.

$w_{01} > w_{11} = 0$ and $w_{00} > w_{10} = 0$

If $w_{01} > 0$ and $w_{00} > 0$, then w cannot be eligible. To wit, consider the action set $A := A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}$ where $p(a_\emptyset) = 0 = c(a_\emptyset)$. Then, a_\emptyset is a strictly dominant strategy and so $(a_\emptyset, a_\emptyset)$ is the unique Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the principal obtains a payoff $-2w_{00} < 0$.

$w_{11} > w_{01} = 0$ and $w_{00} > w_{10} = 0$

Under this contract, agent i 's payoffs satisfy increasing differences in (a_i, a_j) . Hence, any game this contract induces is supermodular. Moreover, fixing a_j , (a_i, w_{00}) satisfies decreasing differences. Theorem 6 of [Milgrom and Roberts \(1990\)](#) then implies that the maximal equilibrium of any game $\Gamma(w, A)$, $A \supseteq A^0$, is decreasing in w_{00} . Since the principal's worst-case payoff either occurs when both agents succeed with probability one or in a region in which increasing the maximal equilibrium action increases the principal's payoffs, the contract w' with $w'_{00} = w'_{01} = w'_{10} = 0$ and $w'_{11} = w_{11}$ must be such that $V(w') \geq V(w)$.

$$w_{01} > w_{11} = 0 \text{ and } w_{10} > w_{00} = 0$$

In this case, agent i 's payoff from an action profile (a_i, a_j) is

$$\begin{aligned} U_i(a_i, a_j; w) &= p(a_i)(1 - p(a_j))w_{10} + (1 - p(a_i))p(a_j)w_{01} - c(a_i) \\ &= p(a_i)[w_{10} - p(a_j)(w_{10} + w_{01})] + p(a_j)w_{01} - c(a_i), \end{aligned}$$

which satisfies decreasing differences. I show that the principal's payoff under such a contract cannot exceed V_{IPE}^* .

Let a_\emptyset be the action satisfying $c(a_\emptyset) = p(a_\emptyset) = 0$. Let a_ϵ^* be an action for which $c(a_\epsilon^*) = 0$ and for which $p(a_\epsilon^*)$ is a fixed point of

$$T_\epsilon(p) := \begin{cases} \max_{a \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}} \left[p(a) - \frac{c(a)}{w_{10} - p(w_{10} + w_{01})} \right] + \epsilon & \text{if } w_{10} - p(w_{10} + w_{01}) > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},$$

where $\epsilon > 0$ is small. To see that T_ϵ has a fixed point, notice that, for any $p \in [0, 1]$, $T_\epsilon(p)$ is larger than zero (because $a_\emptyset \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}$) and less than one if ϵ is small enough (because A^0 does not contain a zero-cost action that results in success with probability one by the assumption of costly known productive actions). Hence, T_ϵ is a continuous function mapping $[0, 1]$ into $[0, 1]$. By Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, it thus has at least one fixed point.

By construction, $(a_\epsilon^*, a_\epsilon^*)$ is a Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma(w, A_\epsilon)$, where $A_\epsilon := A^0 \cup \{a_\epsilon^*, a_\emptyset\}$. Now, consider a sequence of strictly positive values $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \dots$ that converges to zero and for which there is a convergent sequence of fixed points $p(a_{\epsilon_1}^*), p(a_{\epsilon_2}^*), \dots$ of the mappings $T_{\epsilon_1}, T_{\epsilon_2}, \dots$. Since $[0, 1]$ is a compact set, such a convergent sequence must exist. Moreover, the limit of the sequence is the distribution

$$p^* := \max_{a \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}} \left[p(a) - \frac{c(a)}{w_{10} - p^*(w_{10} + w_{01})} \right].$$

I show that the principal's worst-case payoff in the limit can be no larger than what she obtains from the optimal IPE. If p^* equals zero, then the principal attains less than zero profits and so lower profits than under the optimal IPE. Otherwise, let \hat{a}_0 denote a maximizer of $p(a) - \frac{c(a)}{w_{10} - p^*(w_{10} + w_{01})}$ over $A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}$, let $\hat{\alpha} := (1 - p^*)w_{10}$,

and notice that the principal attains a payoff of

$$\begin{aligned}
2 \left[(p^*)^2 + p^*(1 - p^*)(1 - w_{01} - w_{10}) \right] &= 2 \left[p(\hat{a}_0) - \frac{c(\hat{a}_0)}{(1 - p^*)(w_{10} + w_{01})} \right] [1 - (1 - p^*)(w_{10} + w_{01})] \\
&\leq 2 \left[p(\hat{a}_0) - \frac{c(\hat{a}_0)}{(1 - p^*)w_{10}} \right] [1 - (1 - p^*)w_{10}] \\
&= 2 \left[p(\hat{a}_0) - \frac{c(\hat{a}_0)}{\hat{\alpha}} \right] [1 - \hat{\alpha}].
\end{aligned}$$

But,

$$\begin{aligned}
2 \left[p(\hat{a}_0) - \frac{c(\hat{a}_0)}{\hat{\alpha}} \right] (1 - \hat{\alpha}) &\leq 2 \max_{\alpha \in [0,1], a_0 \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}} \left[(1 - \alpha) \left(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} \right) \right] \\
&= 2 \max_{\alpha \in [0,1], a_0 \in A^0} \left[(1 - \alpha) \left(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} \right) \right] \\
&= V_{IPE}^*,
\end{aligned}$$

where the inequality follows because $p(\hat{a}_0) - \frac{c(\hat{a}_0)}{\hat{\alpha}} \geq 0$ for all $\hat{\alpha} \geq 0$ and the equality follows because setting $\alpha = 1$ yields the principal a payoff of zero given any action in A^0 , the payoff attained from choosing a_\emptyset and any $\alpha \in [0, 1]$.

The previous argument establishes that if there exists a K such that, for all $k \geq K$, $(a_{\epsilon_k}^*, a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ is the unique Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma(w, A_{\epsilon_k})$, then the principal's worst-case payoff is no higher than V_{IPE}^* . But, other pure and mixed strategy equilibria may exist, even as k grows large. I now address this issue. First, consider the case in which the limit of $(a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ is a_\emptyset . If multiplicity arises, then there exists an action $a_0 \in A^0$ that results in success with strictly positive probability and is a weak best response to any action that succeeds with zero probability; if not, then, by Lemma 1, there would exist a K such that for all $k \geq K$, $(a_{\epsilon_k}^*, a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ is the maximal Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma(w, A_{\epsilon_k})$ and hence the unique Nash equilibrium. If $p(a_0) \leq \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10} + w_{01}}$, then the principal's payoff in any equilibrium in which such an action is played with positive probability is less than zero. This follows from

$$p(a_0)(1 - w_{10} - w_{01}) \leq \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10} + w_{01}} - w_{10} < 0.$$

If, on the other hand, $p(a_0) > \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10} + w_{01}}$, then I can add to each A_{ϵ_k} the action a'_0 for which $c(a'_0) = 0$ and $p(a'_0) = p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w_{10}}$ if $p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w_{10}} > \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10} + w_{01}}$ and $p(a'_0) =$

$\frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}} + \epsilon_k$ otherwise. In the first case, the principal attains a payoff of

$$\left[p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w_{10}} \right] (1 - w_{10} - w_{01}) \leq 2 \max_{\alpha \in [0,1], a_0 \in A^0} \left[(1 - \alpha) \left(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} \right) \right] = V_{IPE}^*.$$

In the second case, there exists a K such that for all $k \geq K$, the principal's payoff in the equilibrium $(a'_0, a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ is less than zero because the inequality in the previous displayed equation is strict. Finally, no mixed equilibria can exist in any of the cases considered since a_\emptyset is a strict best response to any action larger than $\frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}}$ (the marginal benefit of producing succeeding with higher probability is less than zero).

Second, consider the case in which the limit of $(a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ is $p^* > 0$. Any other pure or mixed Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma(w, A_{\epsilon_k})$ must involve one agent succeeding with probability $\hat{p} \geq \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}} > p^*$. If not, then $p(a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ would be a best-response to the distribution \hat{p} and, if $p(a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ is played, then any distribution \hat{p} could not be a best-response.²⁷ However, any equilibrium in which one agent generates a distribution \hat{p} must have the other play either a_\emptyset (if $\hat{p} > \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}}$), $a_{\epsilon_k}^*$ (only if $\hat{p} = \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}}$), or a mixture between the two (again, only if $\hat{p} = \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}}$); known productive actions are costly and the marginal benefit of succeeding with higher probability is less than zero (strictly so if $\hat{p} > \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}}$). It suffices to consider the case in which $\hat{p} > \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}}$. In the other two cases, introducing an action that has the same productivity as the most productive action in the support of the player's strategy that succeeds with probability \hat{p} , but an (arbitrarily) smaller cost, reduces the problem to this case, or alternatively, results in the equilibrium $(a_{\epsilon_k}^*, a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$. So, consider any action, $a_0 \in A^0$, satisfying $p(a_0) \geq \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}}$ in the support of the strategy succeeding with probability $\hat{p} > \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}}$. Mirroring the argument in the previous case, I can add to each A_{ϵ_k} the action a'_0 for which $c(a'_0) = 0$ and $p(a'_0) = p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w_{10}} + \epsilon_k$ if $p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w_{10}} > \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}}$ and $p(a'_0) = \frac{w_{10}}{w_{10}+w_{01}} + \epsilon_k$ otherwise. These adjustments ensure that a'_0 is the unique best response to a_\emptyset for every k and so, mirroring the steps in the proof of the previous case, the principal attains a payoff no larger than V_{IPE}^* .

²⁷The first statement follows because $p(a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ has zero cost, profits would still be increasing in the probability with which the agent succeeds, and there are strictly decreasing differences. The second follows because $p(a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ is a strict best-response to $p(a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ by construction.

A.2 Proof of Lemma 5

Let a_\emptyset be the action satisfying $c(a_\emptyset) = p(a_\emptyset) = 0$. Let a_ϵ^* be an action for which $c(a_\epsilon^*) = 0$ and for which $p(a_\epsilon^*)$ is a fixed point of

$$T_\epsilon(p) := \max_{a_0 \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}} \left[p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{pw_{11} + (1-p)w_{10}} \right] + \epsilon,$$

where $\epsilon > 0$ is small.²⁸ To see that T_ϵ has a fixed point, notice that, for any $p \in [0, 1]$, $T_\epsilon(p)$ is larger than zero (because $a_\emptyset \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}$) and less than one if ϵ is small enough (because A^0 does not contain a zero-cost action that results in success with probability one). Hence, T_ϵ is a continuous function mapping $[0, 1]$ into $[0, 1]$. By Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, it thus has at least one fixed point.

Now, define an action space $A_\epsilon := A^0 \cup \{a_\epsilon^*, a_\emptyset\}$. If A^0 contains an action producing $y_i = 1$ with probability one, consider the least costly among all of them, \bar{a}_0 , and add to A_ϵ the action \bar{a}_ϵ , where $c(\bar{a}_\epsilon) = c(\bar{a}_0) - \gamma(\epsilon)$ and $p(\bar{a}_\epsilon) = 1 - \frac{\gamma(\epsilon)}{2}$ for $\gamma(\epsilon) := \frac{\epsilon(p(a_\epsilon^*)w_{11} + (1-p(a_\epsilon^*))w_{10})}{2}$. Then, \bar{a}_ϵ strictly dominates \bar{a}_0 (and so any other action producing $y_i = 1$ with probability one is as well) and a_ϵ^* is a strictly better reply to a_ϵ^* than \bar{a}_ϵ .

I show that $(a_\epsilon^*, a_\epsilon^*)$ is the unique Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma(w, A_\epsilon)$. Notice, by construction, $(a_\epsilon^*, a_\epsilon^*)$ is a strict Nash equilibrium. Now, remove all actions producing $y_i = 1$ with probability one since they are strictly dominated by \bar{a}_ϵ . Upon removing these actions, a_ϵ^* strictly dominates any action smaller than it in the order \succeq . So, remove any actions in $\Gamma(w, A_\epsilon)$ below a_ϵ^* and denote the resulting action space by \hat{A} . Now, consider the profile (\bar{a}, a_ϵ^*) , where \bar{a} is the largest element of \hat{A} . Since a_ϵ^* is the unique best response to a_ϵ^* (because $(a_\epsilon^*, a_\epsilon^*)$ is a strict Nash equilibrium), the maximal best-response to a_ϵ^* is a_ϵ^* . This also implies that a_ϵ^* is the minimal best-response to \bar{a} ; if not, there exists some $\hat{a}_0 \in \hat{A}$ such that $\hat{a}_0 \succ a_\epsilon^*$ and

$$U_i(\hat{a}_0, a_0; w) - U_i(a_\epsilon^*, a_0; w) \geq U_i(\hat{a}_0, \bar{a}; w) - U_i(a_\epsilon^*, \bar{a}; w) > 0 \quad \text{for any } a_0 \in \hat{A},$$

where the first inequality follows from the property of decreasing differences and the second from a_0 being the smallest best-response to \bar{a} . Hence, \hat{a}_0 strictly dominates a_ϵ^* , contradicting the previous observation that a_ϵ^* is a best response to a_ϵ^* . As $(a_\epsilon^*, a_\epsilon^*)$ is

²⁸Interpret $-\frac{c(a_0)}{pw_{11} + (1-p)w_{10}}$ as zero if the denominator is zero and $c(a_0) = 0$ and $-\infty$ if the denominator is zero and $c(a_0) > 0$.

a fixed point of \widetilde{BR} , $(a_\epsilon^*, a_\epsilon^*)$ is the limit found by iterating \widetilde{BR} from (\bar{a}, a_ϵ^*) or (a_ϵ^*, \bar{a}) in $\Gamma(w, \hat{A})$. By Lemma 2, it follows that $(a_\epsilon^*, a_\epsilon^*)$ is the unique Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma(w, \hat{A})$ and hence of $\Gamma(w, A_\epsilon)$.

Now, consider a sequence of strictly positive values $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \dots$ that converges to zero and for which there is a convergent sequence of fixed points $p(a_{\epsilon_1}^*), p(a_{\epsilon_2}^*), \dots$ of the mappings $T_{\epsilon_1}, T_{\epsilon_2}, \dots$. Since $[0, 1]$ is a compact set, such a convergent sequence must exist. Moreover, its limit is the distribution

$$p(a^*) = \max_{a_0 \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}} \left[p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{p(a^*)w_{11} + (1 - p(a^*))w_{10}} \right].$$

Let $\hat{a}_0 \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}$ denote the maximizer on the right-hand side and define $\hat{\alpha} := p(a^*)w_{11} + (1 - p(a^*))w_{10}$. The principal's payoff in the unique equilibrium $(a_{\epsilon_k}^*, a_{\epsilon_k}^*)$ of $\Gamma(w, A_{\epsilon_k})$ as k grows large becomes arbitrarily close to

$$2[p(a^*)][p(a^*)(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - p(a^*))(1 - w_{10})] = 2 \left[p(\hat{a}_0) - \frac{c(\hat{a}_0)}{\hat{\alpha}} \right] (1 - \hat{\alpha}) \leq 2 \max_{\alpha \in [0, 1], a_0 \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}} \left[(1 - \alpha) \left(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} \right) \right],$$

where the inequality follows because $p(\hat{a}_0) - \frac{c(\hat{a}_0)}{\hat{\alpha}} \geq 0$ for all $\hat{\alpha} \geq 0$ and so I need only consider values of α between zero and one to maximize $(1 - \alpha)(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha})$ for any $a_0 \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}$. But,

$$2 \max_{\alpha \in [0, 1], a_0 \in A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\}} \left[(1 - \alpha) \left(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} \right) \right] = 2 \max_{\alpha \in [0, 1], a_0 \in A^0} \left[(1 - \alpha) \left(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} \right) \right] = V_{IPE}^*$$

because setting $\alpha = 1$ yields the principal a payoff of zero given any action in A^0 , the same payoff attained from choosing a_\emptyset and any $\alpha \in [0, 1]$.

A.3 Proof of Lemma 6

Comparative Statics in Principal's Payoff

Suppose agent i succeeds with probability p_i . The principal's payoff given (p_i, p_j) is

$$\pi(p_i, p_j) := p_i p_j (2 - 2w_{11}) + [p_i(1 - p_j) + (1 - p_i)p_j] (1 - w_{10}).$$

The principal's payoff is therefore increasing in p_i if and only if

$$\frac{\partial \pi(p)}{\partial p_i} = p_j(2 - 2w_{11}) + (1 - 2p_j)(1 - w_{10}) \geq 0 \iff$$

$$p_j \leq \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1 - w_{10}}{w_{11} - w_{10}} \right].$$

Monotonicity of $\pi(p_i, p_j)$ on $[0, 1]$ thus depends on w : (i) if $w_{10} \geq 1$, then π is decreasing on $[0, 1]$ in p_i and p_j ; (ii) if $w_{10} < 1$ and $w_{11} \leq \frac{1+w_{10}}{2}$, then $\pi(p)$ is increasing on $[0, 1]$ in p_i and p_j ; and, (iii) if $w_{10} < 1$ and $w_{11} > \frac{1+w_{10}}{2}$, then $\pi(p)$ is increasing in p_i if $p_j \in [0, \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1-w_{10}}{w_{11}-w_{10}} \right]]$ and decreasing in p_i if $p_j \in [\frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1-w_{10}}{w_{11}-w_{10}} \right], 1]$.

In case (i), π is minimized when $p_i = p_j = 1$, yielding the principal a payoff of

$$2 - 2w_{11}.$$

This payoff can be achieved exactly: Consider the action set $A := A^0 \cup \{\hat{a}\} \supseteq A^0$, where $p(\hat{a}) = 1$ and $c(\hat{a}) = 0$. Then, because $w_{11} > w_{10} \geq 1$, \hat{a} is a strictly dominant strategy and so the unique Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma(w, A)$ is (\hat{a}, \hat{a}) . In case (ii), π is minimized when the probability with which the maximal equilibrium action of $\Gamma(w, A)$ succeeds with strictly positive probability, for any $A \supseteq A^0$, is as small as possible (by Observation 1 and Lemma 1 there always exists such an action). Letting \bar{p} denote the greatest lower bound on such probabilities, the principal's payoff is

$$\bar{p}^2(2 - 2w_{11}) + \bar{p}(1 - \bar{p})(2 - 2w_{10}).$$

In case (iii), the principal's payoff is the minimum of the payoff in case (i) and case (ii),

$$V(w) = \min\{2 - 2w_{11}, \bar{p}^2(2 - 2w_{11}) + \bar{p}(1 - \bar{p})(2 - 2w_{10})\}.$$

I identify \bar{p} to complete the proof of the Lemma.

Defining \bar{p}

Consider an arbitrary action $a \in A$ with cost $c(a)$ and probability $p(a)$. Let $\hat{p}(\cdot|a)$ be a solution to the initial value problem

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{p}'(t|a) &= f(\hat{p}(t|a)) := \frac{-1}{\hat{p}(t|a)w_{11} + (1 - \hat{p}(t|a))w_{10}} \quad \text{with} \\ \hat{p}(0|a) &= p(a)\end{aligned}$$

on $D = [0, \hat{t}(a)] \times [0, p(a)]$, where $[0, \hat{t}(a)] \subseteq [0, c(a)]$ is the largest interval on which $\hat{p}(t|a) > 0$ for all $t \in [0, \hat{t}(a))$. Notice, $\hat{p}'(t|a)$ exists on $(0, \hat{t}(a))$, $\hat{p}'(t|a) < 0$, and $\hat{p}''(t|a) < 0$. So, $\hat{p}(\cdot|a)$ is strictly decreasing and strictly concave. Now, define

$$\bar{p} := \max_{a_0 \in A^0} \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0)|a_0).$$

\bar{p} is a lower bound

I show that \bar{p} is a lower bound on the probability of the maximal equilibrium action of any game $\Gamma(w, A)$, where $A \supseteq A^0$. I begin with the following claim.

Claim 1 (Lower Bound of a \overline{BR} Path)

Fix some game $\Gamma(w, A)$, where $A \supseteq A^0$. Let (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) be the path starting from the maximal element of A , a_1 , to the maximal equilibrium action, a_n , obtained by iterating \overline{BR} . If $a = a_\ell$ for some $\ell = 1, \dots, n$, then

$$p(a_n) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a)|a).$$

Proof. Consider the truncated path starting at $a = a_\ell$ and ending at a_n . Notice that $a_k \in \overline{BR}(a_{k-1})$ for $k = \ell + 1, \dots, n$ only if $p(a_{k-1}) > p(a_k)$ and,

$$p(a_k) [p(a_{k-1})w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}))w_{10}] - c(a_k) > p(a_{k-1}) [p(a_{k-1})w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}))w_{10}] - c(a_{k-1})$$

$$\iff p(a_k) > p(a_{k-1}) - \frac{c(a_{k-1}) - c(a_k)}{p(a_{k-1})w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}))w_{10}}.$$

Hence, $\epsilon_k := c(a_{k-1}) - c(a_k) > 0$ for any $k = \ell + 1, \dots, n$. This implies that $\sum_{k=\ell+1}^n \epsilon_k \leq c(a)$, since $c(a_n) \geq 0$.

To show that $p(a_n) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a)|a)$, it suffices to consider the case in which $f(t, \hat{p}(t)|a)$ exists for all $t \in [0, c(a)]$ (it must always be the case that $p(a_n) \geq 0$). To show this,

I need only show that $p(a_n) \geq \hat{p}(\sum_{k=\ell+1}^n \epsilon_k | a)$ because $\hat{p}(\cdot | a)$ is decreasing and so $\hat{p}(c(a) | a) \leq \hat{p}(\sum_{k=\ell+1}^n \epsilon_k | a)$.

I prove the inequality by induction. For the base case, recall that $p(a_{\ell+1})$ must satisfy the best-response condition

$$\begin{aligned} p(a_{\ell+1}) &\geq p(a_\ell) - \frac{\epsilon_1}{p(a_\ell)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_\ell))w_{10}} \\ &= \hat{p}(0 | a) + \hat{p}'(0 | a)\epsilon_1 \\ &\geq \hat{p}(\epsilon_{\ell+1} | a), \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality follows because $\hat{p}(\cdot | a)$ is concave.

For the inductive step, suppose $\hat{p}(\sum_{k=\ell+1}^m \epsilon_k | a) \leq p(a_m)$ for $m = \ell + 1, \dots, K$. I show that $\hat{p}(\sum_{k=\ell+1}^K \epsilon_k + \epsilon_{K+1} | a) \leq p(a_{K+1})$. Once again, a_{K+1} is a best-response to a_K only if,

$$\begin{aligned} p(a_{K+1}) &\geq p(a_K) - \frac{\epsilon_{K+1}}{p(a_K)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_K))w_{10}} \\ &\geq \hat{p}\left(\sum_{k=\ell+1}^K \epsilon_k | a\right) + \hat{p}'\left(\sum_{k=\ell+1}^K \epsilon_k | a\right)\epsilon_{K+1} \\ &\geq \hat{p}\left(\sum_{k=\ell+1}^K \epsilon_k + \epsilon_{K+1} | a\right), \end{aligned}$$

where the second inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the last follows because $\hat{p}(\cdot | a)$ is concave. \square

Consider any finite set $A \supseteq A^0$. Let \tilde{c} be the maximal cost of any action in A and \tilde{p} be the maximal probability. For any action $a \in A$, let $\tilde{p}(\cdot | a)$ be the solution to the initial value problem,

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{p}'(t | a) &= f(\tilde{p}(t | a)) = \frac{-1}{\tilde{p}(t | a)w_{11} + (1 - \tilde{p}(t | a))w_{10}} \\ \tilde{p}(\tilde{c} - c(a) | a) &= p(a), \end{aligned}$$

on $D = [0, \tilde{t}(a)] \times [0, \tilde{p}]$, where $[0, \tilde{t}(a)] \subseteq [0, \tilde{c}]$ is the largest interval on which $\hat{p}(t | a) > 0$ for all $t \in [0, \tilde{t}(a))$. Notice that $\tilde{p}(\tilde{c} - c(a) + t | a) = \hat{p}(t | a)$ for any $t \in [0, \tilde{t}(a)]$, $\tilde{p}'(\cdot | a) < 0$ for all $t \in [0, \tilde{t}(a))$, and $\tilde{p}''(\cdot | a) < 0$ for all $t \in [0, \tilde{t}(a))$. Moreover, the following “no crossing” property holds; its proof is immediate upon observing that the solution to the initial value problem is unique on any interval $[0, \bar{t}]$ for $\bar{t} < \tilde{c}$, since $f'(\hat{p}(t | a))$ is

bounded and exists.²⁹

Claim 2 (No Crossing)

If $\tilde{p}(t|a) > \tilde{p}(t|a')$ for some $t \in [0, \tilde{t}(a)] \cap [0, \tilde{t}(a')]$, then $\tilde{p}(t'|a) \geq \tilde{p}(t'|a')$ for any other $t' \in [0, \tilde{t}(a)] \cap [0, \tilde{t}(a')]$ and so $\hat{p}(\hat{t}(a)|a) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a')|a')$.

Suppose, towards contradiction, that there was a game with a maximal equilibrium action distribution p satisfying $p < \bar{p}$. Then, there must exist a finite path of actions in A , (a_1, \dots, a_n) , for which (i) a_1 is the maximal element of A and $p(a_n) = p$, (ii) $p(a_1) > \dots > p(a_n)$, and (iii) $a_k \in \overline{BR}(a_{k-1})$ (so that $c(a_1) > \dots > c(a_n)$) for $k = 2, \dots, n$. It suffices to consider the case in which $\bar{p} > 0$, so that for any $\bar{a}_0 \in \arg \max_{a_0} \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0)|a_0)$, $\tilde{p}'(\cdot|\bar{a}_0)$ is defined on $[0, \tilde{c}]$. Otherwise, it could never be that $p < \bar{p}$.

Now, let a_k be the first action in the path (a_1, \dots, a_n) at which $c(a_k) < c(\bar{a}_0)$. Such an action must exist. If not, then $c(a_n) \geq c(\bar{a}_0)$. So, if $p = p(a_n) < \bar{p} < p(\bar{a}_0)$, then (a_n, a_n) could not be a Nash equilibrium; \bar{a}_0 would be a strict best-response to a_n .

Consider the case in which $k = 1$, so that $c(a_1) < c(\bar{a}_0)$. Then,

$$\tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(a_1)|a_1) = p(a_1) \geq p(\bar{a}_0) = \tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0) > \tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(a_1)|\bar{a}_0),$$

where the first inequality follows because a_1 is maximal in A and the second because $\tilde{p}(\cdot|\bar{a}_0)$ is strictly decreasing. But then, $\hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_1)|a_1) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0)$ by Claim 2. Hence, by Claim 1,

$$p = p(a_n) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_1)|a_1) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0) = \bar{p}.$$

Consider the case in which $k > 1$. Then, there exist two actions a_{k-1} and a_k for which $c(a_{k-1}) \geq c(\bar{a}_0) > c(a_k)$. Notice, $p(a_{k-1}) \geq p(\bar{a}_0)$; if not and $k = 2$, then a_{k-1} could not have been a maximal element and, if $k > 2$, then a_{k-1} could not have been a best response to a_{k-2} because \bar{a}_0 would have yielded a strictly higher payoff. Notice also that it must be the case that

$$p(a_k) < \tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(a_k)|\bar{a}_0) \leq \tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0) = p(\bar{a}_0).$$

If the first inequality did not hold, then $\tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(a_k)|\bar{a}_0) \leq p(a_k) = \tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(a_k)|a_k)$, in which case Claim 2 implies that $\hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_k)|a_k) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0)$. Hence, by Claim 1, it must

²⁹See, for instance, Theorem 2.2 of [Coddington and Levinson \(1955\)](#).

be that $p = p(a_n) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_k)|a_k) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0) = \bar{p}$. The second inequality follows because $\tilde{p}(\cdot|\bar{a}_0)$ is decreasing.

I show that \bar{a}_0 is a weakly better response to a_{k-1} than a_k , contradicting the claim that $a_k \in \overline{BR}(a_{k-1})$ (since $\bar{a}_0 > a_k$). This is equivalent to showing that,

$$p(\bar{a}_0) [p(a_{k-1})w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}))w_{10}] - c(\bar{a}_0) \geq p(a_k) [p(a_{k-1})w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}))w_{10}] - c(a_k),$$

$$\iff - \left[\frac{p(\bar{a}_0) - p(a_k)}{c(\bar{a}_0) - c(a_k)} \right] \leq - \left[\frac{1}{p(a_{k-1})w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}))w_{10}} \right].$$

Notice that,

$$- \left[\frac{p(\bar{a}_0) - p(a_k)}{c(\bar{a}_0) - c(a_k)} \right] \leq \frac{\tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0) - \tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(a_k)|\bar{a}_0)}{(\bar{c} - c(\bar{a}_0)) - (\bar{c} - c(a_k))} \leq \tilde{p}'(\bar{c} - c(a_k)|\bar{a}_0),$$

where the first inequality follows because $p(a_k) < \tilde{p}(\bar{c} - c(a_k)|\bar{a}_0)$ and the second inequality follows because $\tilde{p}(\cdot|\bar{a}_0)$ is concave. Further,

$$- \left[\frac{1}{p(a_{k-1})w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}))w_{10}} \right] \geq - \left[\frac{1}{p(\bar{a}_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(\bar{a}_0))w_{10}} \right] = \tilde{p}'(\bar{c} - c(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0),$$

where the first inequality follows from $p(a_{k-1}) \geq p(\bar{a}_0)$. But, since $c(\bar{a}_0) \geq c(a_k)$,

$$\tilde{p}'(\bar{c} - c(a_k)|\bar{a}_0) \leq \tilde{p}'(\bar{c} - c(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0),$$

again by concavity of $\tilde{p}(\cdot|\bar{a}_0)$.

\bar{p} is the greatest lower bound

I need only exhibit a sequence of action spaces (A_n) for which $A_n \supseteq A^0$, \bar{a}_n is the maximal Nash equilibrium action of $\Gamma(w, A_n)$, and,

$$p(\bar{a}_n) \rightarrow \bar{p} \quad \text{as } n \rightarrow \infty.$$

Let \tilde{c} be the maximal cost of any action in A_0 and \tilde{p} be the maximal probability. Then, define $\tilde{p}(\cdot|a)$ as before. Finally, let $\bar{a}_0 \in \arg \max_{a_0} \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0)|a_0)$ be chosen so that $\tilde{t}(\bar{a}_0) \geq \tilde{t}(a_0)$ for all $a_0 \in A^0$.³⁰

³⁰Intuitively, $\tilde{p}(\hat{t}(a_0)|a_0)$ may equal zero for many $a_0 \in A^0$. The selection of \bar{a}_0 ensures that $\tilde{p}(\cdot|\bar{a}_0)$ hits zero at the largest time and therefore, invoking Claim 2, is always above the differential equations associated with other known actions.

Suppose first that $f(t, \tilde{p}(t|\bar{a}_0))$ exists for all $t \in [0, \tilde{c}]$ so that $\tilde{p}'(\cdot|a)$ and $\tilde{p}''(\cdot|a)$ are bounded:

$$|\tilde{p}'(t|a)| \leq \left| \frac{p'(t|a)(w_{11} - w_{10})}{(\hat{p}(\hat{t}|a)w_{11} + (1 - \hat{p}(\hat{t}|a))w_{10})^2} \right| := \kappa_1 > 0,$$

and,

$$|\tilde{p}''(t|a)| \leq \left| \kappa_1 \frac{(w_{11} - w_{10})}{(\hat{p}(\hat{t}|a)w_{11} + (1 - \hat{p}(\hat{t}|a))w_{10})^2} \right| := \kappa_2 > 0.$$

Now, consider a sequence of action spaces (A_n) , with $A_n := \{a_1^n, a_2^n, \dots, a_n^n\} \cup A^0$. Set $a_1^n = \tilde{p}(\underline{t}|\bar{a}_0)$, where $\underline{t} \in [0, \tilde{c}]$ is such that $\tilde{p}(\underline{t}|\bar{a}_0) = 1$, and $\bar{a}_n := a_n^n$ for each n . Set $c(a_{k-1}^n) - c(a_k^n) = \frac{\tilde{c}}{n} := \epsilon(n)$ for $k = 2, \dots, n$, $\rho(n) := \frac{1}{n^2} \frac{\tilde{c}}{w_{11}+1}$, and

$$p(a_k^n) = p(a_{k-1}^n) - \frac{\epsilon(n)}{p(a_{k-1}^n)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}^n))w_{10}} + \rho(n) \quad (\text{E})$$

for $k = 2, \dots, n$. Notice,

$$-\frac{1}{n} \frac{c(a)}{p(a_{k-1}^n)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_{k-1}^n))w_{10}} + \frac{1}{n^2} \frac{c(a)}{w_{11} + 1} < 0,$$

for $k = 2, \dots, n$ so that $a_1^n > a_2^n > \dots > a_n^n$. Equation E approximates $\tilde{p}(t|\bar{a}_0)$ on $[\underline{t}, \tilde{c}] \times [0, \bar{p}]$ using Euler's method with rounding error term $\rho(n)$. By the rounding error analysis of [Atkinson \(1989\)](#) (see Theorem 6.3 and Equation 6.2.3), since $\tilde{p}'(\cdot|a)$ is bounded by $\kappa_1 > 0$, and $\tilde{p}''(\cdot|a)$ is bounded by $\kappa_2 > 0$, it must be the case that

$$|p(\bar{a}_n) - \tilde{p}(\tilde{c}|\bar{a}_0)| \leq \left[\frac{e^{c(a)\kappa_1} - 1}{\kappa_1} \right] \left[\frac{\epsilon(n)}{2} \kappa_2 + \frac{\rho(n)}{\epsilon(n)} \right].$$

Since $\epsilon(n) \rightarrow 0$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$ and $\frac{\rho(n)}{\epsilon(n)} = \frac{1}{n} \frac{1}{w_{11}+1} \rightarrow 0$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$, the right-hand side approaches zero. Hence, $p(\bar{a}_n)$ becomes arbitrarily close to $\tilde{p}(\tilde{c}|\bar{a}_0) = \bar{p}$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

I need only argue that (a_n^n, a_n^n) is the maximal Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma(w, A_n)$. For any $a_0 \in A^0$, $\hat{p}(\hat{t}(\bar{a}_0)|\bar{a}_0) \geq \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0)|a_0)$. Claim 2 thus ensures that $\tilde{p}(t|\bar{a}_0) \geq \tilde{p}(t|a_0)$ for any $t \in [\underline{t}, \tilde{c}]$ for which both $\tilde{p}(t|\bar{a}_0)$ and $\tilde{p}(t|a_0)$ are defined. Hence, $a_1^n = \bar{a}_0$ is the maximal element of A_n ; if there is another action in A^0 that succeeds with probability one, it must have a higher cost. Finally, as Euler's method approximates $\tilde{p}(\cdot|\bar{a}_0)$ from above and there does not exist an element $a_0 \in A^0$ for which $\tilde{p}(t|a_0) > \tilde{p}(t|\bar{a}_0)$ for any $t \in [\underline{t}, \tilde{c}]$, $a_k^n \in \overline{BR}(a_{k-1}^n)$ for each n and $k = 2, \dots, n$. This implies that a_n^n is the maximal Nash equilibrium action of $\Gamma(w, A_n)$.

In the case in which $f(t, \tilde{p}(t)|\bar{a}_0)$ does *not* exist for all $t \in [0, \bar{c}]$, there exists some $\bar{t} \in [0, \bar{c}]$ at which $\hat{p}(\bar{t}|\bar{a}_0) = 0$, where $\tilde{p}(\bar{t}|\bar{a}_0)$ is the solution to the differential equation on $[0, \bar{t}] \times [0, p(a)]$. For any interval $[0, \hat{t}]$ such that $\hat{t} < \bar{t}$, I can mirror the argument in the case in which $f(t, \tilde{p}(t)|\bar{a}_0)$ is well-defined for all $t \in [0, \bar{c}]$ by setting $c(a_{k-1}^n) - c(a_k^n) = \frac{\hat{t}}{n} := \epsilon(n)$ for all $k = 1, \dots, n$ and $\rho(n) := \frac{1}{n^2} \frac{\hat{t}}{w_{11}+1}$ to show that $p(a_n^n)$ approaches $\tilde{p}(\hat{t}|\bar{a}_0)$ as n goes to infinity. But \hat{t} can be chosen arbitrarily close to \bar{t} , in which case $\tilde{p}(\hat{t}|\bar{a}_0)$ becomes arbitrarily close to $\tilde{p}(\bar{t}|\bar{a}_0) = 0$. Hence, for any $\epsilon > 0$, there exists a sequence of games with a maximal equilibrium action distribution $p(a_n^n)$ converging to a point in $[0, \epsilon)$ as n approaches infinity. This establishes that $\bar{p} = 0$ is the greatest lower bound.

A.4 Proof of Lemma 7

Let

$$(w^*, a_0^*) \in \arg \max_{w \in [0,1], a_0 \in A^0} (1 - w)(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w}),$$

$p^* := p(a_0^*)$, and $c^* := c(a_0^*)$. By the assumption of non-triviality, $p^* > c^*$ since choosing any action in A^0 that does not satisfy this property results in at most zero profit. By the assumption that known actions are costly, $c^* > 0$ and so $w^* = \sqrt{\frac{c^*}{p^*}} \in (0, 1)$. Moreover,

$$V_{IPE}^* = (1 - w^*)(p^* - \frac{c^*}{w^*}) < 1 - w^*.$$

Now, consider the JPE setting $w_{10} = w^* - \epsilon$, for $\epsilon > 0$ small, and

$$p^* w_{11} + (1 - p^*) w_{10} = w^*.$$

I show that the principal obtains a strictly higher profit than V_{IPE}^* . Since $V_{IPE}^* = (1 - w^*)(p^* - \frac{c^*}{w^*}) < 1 - w^*$, I need only show that the principal obtains a higher payoff in the worst-case shirking equilibrium.

Elementary methods show that the solution to the differential equation in Lemma 6 associated with a_0^* evaluated at c^* is:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{p}(\epsilon) &:= \frac{\sqrt{(p^* w_{11} + (1 - p^*) w_{10})^2 - 2c^*(w_{11} - w_{10})} - w_{10}}{w_{11} - w_{10}} \\ &= \frac{\sqrt{(w^*)^2 - 2\frac{c^*}{p^*}\epsilon} - (w^* - \epsilon)}{\epsilon/p^*}. \end{aligned}$$

Moreover,

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \bar{p}(\epsilon) = p^* - \frac{c^*}{w^*},$$

and

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \bar{p}'(\epsilon) = -\frac{1}{2}p^*w^*.$$

Notice, if both agents choose an action that results in success with probability $p(\epsilon)$, the principal's payoff from each agent in the shirking equilibrium is

$$\pi(\epsilon) := \bar{p}(\epsilon) [1 - (\bar{p}(\epsilon)w_{11} + (1 - \bar{p}(\epsilon))w_{10})]$$

and

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \pi(\epsilon) = (p^* - \frac{c^*}{w^*})(1 - w^*),$$

the least upper bound payoff the principal obtains from each agent within the class of IPE. Since \bar{p} (as defined in Lemma 6) is weakly larger than $\bar{p}(\epsilon)$ for every $\epsilon > 0$ and profits are strictly increasing in the probability with each worker succeeds when $\epsilon > 0$ is small, I need only show that $\pi(\epsilon)$ increases in ϵ at zero to demonstrate the existence of an improvement in the principal's payoff.³¹

It suffices to show that

$$\partial_+ \pi(0) > 0,$$

where ∂_+ is the right derivative of $\pi(\epsilon)$ at 0. For $\epsilon > 0$, the derivative of π is well-defined and equals

$$\pi'(\epsilon) = \bar{p}'(\epsilon)(1 - (\bar{p}(\epsilon)w_{11} + (1 - \bar{p}(\epsilon))w_{10})) - \bar{p}(\epsilon) (\epsilon \bar{p}'(\epsilon)/p(a_0) + \bar{p}(\epsilon)/p(a_0) - 1).$$

³¹Simply observe that, for $\epsilon > 0$ small,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial p} [p(1 - w^*) + p(1 - p)\epsilon] = (1 - w^*) + (1 - 2p)\epsilon > 0,$$

since $w^* < 1$.

Hence,

$$\begin{aligned}
\partial_+ \pi(0) &= \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \pi'(\epsilon) = \left(\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \bar{p}'(\epsilon) \right) (1 - w^*) + \left(\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \bar{p}(\epsilon) \right) w^* \\
&= \left(-\frac{1}{2} p^* w^* \right) (1 - w^*) + \left(p^* - \frac{c^*}{w^*} \right) w^* \\
&= \frac{1}{2} (p^* w^* - c^*) \\
&> 0.
\end{aligned}$$

A.5 Proofs for Section 4.3.5

Existence

A worst-case optimal JPE with $w_{10} = w_{00} = 0$ is one that solves following maximization problem:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\max_{w_{11}, w_{10}} \min \{1 - w_{11}, \bar{p} [\bar{p}(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - \bar{p})(1 - w_{10})]\} \\
&\text{subject to} \\
&\bar{p} = \max_{a_0 \in A^0} \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0; w_{11}, w_{10}) | a_0; w_{11}, w_{10}), \\
&w_{11} > w_{10} \geq 0.
\end{aligned}$$

where $\hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0; w_{11}, w_{10}) | a_0; w_{11}, w_{10})$ is defined in the statement of Lemma 6 (I now make explicit the terms that depend on the wage scheme). I argue that the solution set of the latter problem coincides with that of the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\max_{w_{11}, w_{10}} \min \{1 - w_{11}, \bar{p} [\bar{p}(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - \bar{p})(1 - w_{10})]\} \\
&\text{subject to} \\
&\bar{p} = \max_{a_0 \in A^0} \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0; w_{11}, w_{10}) | a_0; w_{11}, w_{10}) \\
&1 \geq w_{11} \geq w_{10} \geq 0.
\end{aligned}$$

I may bound w_{11} above by 1 without altering the solution set because any larger wage cannot be eligible (it yields the principal a profit of at most zero by the first argument of the objective function). I may relax the strict inequality between w_{11} and w_{10} to be a weak relationship without altering the solution set since I have already shown that for any wage scheme setting $w_{11} = w_{10}$ there exist wages $w_{11} > w_{10}$ that yield the principal strictly higher profits.

As $\mathcal{D} := \{(w_{11}, w_{10}) : 0 \leq w_{10} \leq w_{11} \leq 1\}$ is a closed and bounded subset of \mathbb{R}^2 , it is compact. Moreover, the function

$$f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

$$(w_{11}, w_{10}) \mapsto \min\{1 - w_{11}, \bar{p} [\bar{p}(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - \bar{p})(1 - w_{10})]\},$$

with

$$\bar{p} = \max_{a_0 \in A^0} \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0; w_{11}, w_{10}) | a_0; w_{11}, w_{10}),$$

is continuous.³² Hence, the Weierstrass Theorem (Theorem 3.1 of [Sundaram \(1996\)](#)) ensures the existence of a solution.

Uniqueness

The proof of Lemma 4 shows that any contract that is not a JPE and does not set $w_{11} > 0$, $w_{00} > 0$, and $w_{10} = w_{01} = 0$ is weakly improved upon by an IPE or RPE. Lemma 5 and Lemma 7 then establish that such contracts are strictly suboptimal. So, all that is left to show is that any contract setting $w_{11} > 0$ and $w_{00} > 0$ (with $w_{10} = w_{01} = 0$) is strictly suboptimal. For this, it suffices to observe that the characterization of the principal's worst-case payoff given a JPE identified in Lemma 6 holds when replacing the law of motion in Equation 3 with

$$\hat{p}'(t) = f(\hat{p}(t)) := \frac{-1}{\hat{p}(t)w_{11} - (1 - \hat{p}(t))w_{00}}$$

and setting

$$V(w) = 2 \min\{1 - w_{11}, \bar{p}^2(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - \bar{p})^2(-w_{00})\}.$$

The proof of Lemma 4 establishes that setting $w_{00} = 0$ yields a weak improvement for the principal. It also establishes that this improvement is strict if, given this adjustment, the principal's payoff (from each agent) in the shirking equilibrium is smaller than $1 - w_{11}$. So, I need only consider the case in which $1 - w_{11}$ is strictly

³²This follows from continuity of $\hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0; w_{11}, w_{10}) | a_0; w_{11}, w_{10})$ (see Theorem 4.1 of [Coddington and Levinson \(1955\)](#)), which in turn implies that \bar{p} is continuous (since the maximum of continuous functions is continuous), which in turn implies that $\bar{p} [\bar{p}(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - \bar{p})(1 - w_{10})]$ is continuous. As $1 - w_{11}$ is continuous and the minimum of two continuous functions is continuous, the result follows.

smaller than the principal’s payoff in the shirking equilibrium. In this case, the resulting contract is strictly suboptimal; the principal could reduce w_{11} by a small amount and strictly increase her payoff (because \bar{p} is continuous in w_{11}). Hence, the original contract with $w_{00} > 0$ is strictly suboptimal as well.

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B Online Appendices

B.1 Optimal JPE: Numerical Optimization




Figure 7: *Optimal values of w_{11} (orange surface) and w_{10} (blue surface). x -axis: $c(a_0)$. y -axis: $p(a_0)$. z -axis: values.*

Figure 7 depicts optimal wages $w_{11} > w_{10} \geq 0$ found by numerical optimization in Mathematica. In particular, I use the closed-form expression for the principal's payoff identified in Lemma 6 as the objective function and vary the parameters of the targeted action, a_0 . The region in which the surplus generated by the targeted action, $p(a_0) - c(a_0)$, is large corresponds to the area surrounding the bottom-right vertex of the image box. In this region, the optimal JPE sets $w_{00} = 0$ (corresponding to the blue surface) and $w_{11} > 0$ (corresponding to the orange surface). Economically, monitoring individual output is of no value to the principal as she optimally bases compensation only on aggregate output. On the other hand, when $p(a_0) - c(a_0)$ is sufficiently small, both w_{11} and w_{10} become positive. Hence, monitoring individual output is of strictly positive value.

B.2 Incomplete Contracts and Bayesian Uncertainty

In this section, I study a simple model in which the principal has Bayesian uncertainty over the set of actions available to the agents. In particular, the agents have two

actions, a_\emptyset and a_0 , available with probability $\mu \in (0, 1)$ and three actions, a_\emptyset , a_0 , and a^* , available with probability $1 - \mu$. a_\emptyset results in success with zero probability at zero cost. a_0 results in success with probability $p_0 > 0$ at cost $c_0 \in (0, p_0)$. a^* results in success with probability $p^* \in (0, p_0)$ at zero cost. The manager contemplates using one of two classes of contracts:

1. Independent Performance Evaluation (IPE):

Pay each agent $w \geq 0$ for individual success. Pay each agent 0 for failure.

2. Joint Performance Evaluation (JPE):

Pay each agent a wage $w_0 \geq 0$ for individual success and a team bonus $b > 0$ for joint success. Pay each agent 0 for failure.

I prove the following result.

Theorem 2 *1. If μ is sufficiently small and p^* is sufficiently close to p_0 , then the optimal IPE yields the principal strictly higher expected profits than any JPE.*

2. If μ is sufficiently large, then there exists a JPE that yields the principal strictly higher expected profits than the optimal IPE.

Proof. I make some preliminary observations about the optimal IPE. Observe that the optimal IPE that implements a_\emptyset when the action set is $\{a_\emptyset, a_0\}$ and a^* when the action set is $\{a^*, a_\emptyset, a_0\}$ is the zero contract. The optimal IPE implementing a_0 when the action set is $\{a_\emptyset, a_0\}$ and a^* when the action set is $\{a^*, a_\emptyset, a_0\}$ is

$$w^* = \frac{c_0}{p_0}.$$

Finally, the optimal IPE always implementing a_0 is

$$\hat{w} = \frac{c_0}{p_0 - p^*}.$$

Any other implementation is either infeasible or suboptimal. I now separately consider the cases in which μ is small and μ is large to establish the results.

1. If μ is sufficiently small and p^* is sufficiently close to p_0 , then

$$(1 - \mu)p^* > \max\left\{\left(\mu p_0 + (1 - \mu)p^*\right)\left(1 - \frac{c_0}{p_0}\right), p_0\left(1 - \frac{c_0}{p_0 - p^*}\right)\right\}.$$

Hence, the optimal IPE puts $w^* = 0$, yielding the principal a per-agent payoff of

$$(1 - \mu)p^*.$$

On the other hand, for a given JPE, (w_0, b) , the principal obtains a per-agent payoff no larger than

$$(1 - \mu)(p^*(1 - (w_0 + p^*b))),$$

when μ is sufficiently small. Because $p^*b > 0$, this means the principal can do no better than the optimal IPE.

2. If μ is sufficiently large, then

$$(\mu p_0 + (1 - \mu)p^*)(1 - \frac{c_0}{p_0}) > \max\{p_0(1 - \frac{c_0}{p_0 - p^*}), (1 - \mu)p^*\}.$$

Hence, in these cases, w^* is the optimal IPE. Now, consider a calibrated JPE setting $w_0 = w^* - \epsilon$ and $b = \frac{w - w_0}{p_0}$. The principal's per-agent payoff from this contract is

$$\begin{aligned} & \mu(p_0(1 - w^*)) + (1 - \mu)(p^*(1 - (w_0 + p^*b))) > \\ & \mu(p_0(1 - w^*)) + (1 - \mu)(p^*(1 - (w_0 + p_0b))) = p_0(1 - \underbrace{\frac{c_0}{p_0 - p^*}}_{\text{Payoff } w^*}). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, there exists a JPE that strictly outperforms the optimal IPE if μ is sufficiently large.

□

B.3 Multiple Agents

Suppose there are finitely many agents $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$. A contract in this model is a function

$$w : Y^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+.$$

The improvement argument in Section 4.3.3 immediately establishes that any worst-case optimal contract must link the incentives of at least two of the agents. Building upon the analysis in Section 4.3.3, I prove here a stronger result that a common form of team-based incentive pay outperforms the optimal IPE. It will be useful to re-define

the worst-case payoff of the best IPE,

$$V_{IPE}^* := \sup_{w: w \text{ is an IPE}} V(w) = n \max_{w \in [0,1], a_0 \in A^0} \left[\left(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w} \right) (1 - w) \right] > 0.$$

Theorem 3

If there are n agents, then there exists a contract in which failure is not rewarded,

$$w(0, y_{-i}) = 0,$$

and a bonus is paid if and only if all workers succeed,

$$w(1, y_{-i}) = \begin{cases} \bar{w} & \text{if } y_j = 1 \text{ for all } j \neq i \\ \underline{w} & \text{if } y_j = 0 \text{ for some } j \neq i \end{cases} \quad \bar{w} > \underline{w},$$

that yields the principal a strictly higher worst-case payoff than V_{IPE}^ .*

Proof. Since the contract proposed in the statement of the Theorem again induces a supermodular game between the agents, the principal's payoff can be no lower than her payoff in the worst-case maximal equilibrium. It follows that her worst-case payoff can be no lower than the minimum of

$$n(1 - \bar{w}),$$

the principal's payoff when all agents succeed with probability one, and

$$n\bar{p}(1 - (\bar{p}^{n-1}\bar{w} + (1 - \bar{p}^{n-1})\underline{w})),$$

where \bar{p} is the probability with which each agent succeeds in the worst-case “shirking” equilibrium.

Let $\hat{p}(\cdot|a_0) : [0, \hat{t}(a_0)] \rightarrow [0, p(a_0)]$ be the unique solution to the initial value problem

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}'(t) = f(\hat{p}(t)) &:= \frac{-1}{\hat{p}^{n-1}(t)\bar{w} + (1 - \hat{p}^{n-1}(t))\underline{w}} \quad \text{with} \\ \hat{p}(0) &= p(a_0), \end{aligned}$$

where $[0, \hat{t}(a_0)] \subseteq [0, c(a_0)]$ is the largest interval on which $\hat{p}(t) > 0$ for all $t \in [0, \hat{t}(a_0)]$.

Repeating the steps in the proof of Lemma 6, it can be again established that

$$\bar{p} = \max_{a_0 \in A^0} \hat{p}(\hat{t}(a_0)|a_0).$$

The closed-form solution to the initial value problem for a given known action a_0 is defined implicitly through the equation

$$(\bar{w} - \underline{w}) \left(\frac{p^n(a_0) - \hat{p}^n(t)}{n} \right) + \underline{w}(p(a_0) - \hat{p}(t)) - t = 0. \quad (3)$$

Notice that if $\bar{w} = \underline{w}$, i.e. the contract is an IPE, then this equation can be solved explicitly and $\hat{p}(t) = p(a_0) - \frac{t}{\underline{w}}$.

Now, let

$$(w^*, a_0^*) \in \arg \max_{w \in [0,1], a_0 \in A^0} (1 - w)(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{w}),$$

so that w^* is the optimal IPE targeting a_0^* . Consider the JPE setting $\underline{w} = w^* - \epsilon$, for $\epsilon > 0$ small, and

$$p^{n-1}(a_0^*)\bar{w} + (1 - p^{n-1}(a_0^*))\underline{w} = w^*.$$

I show that the principal obtains a strictly higher profit than V_{IPE}^* for ϵ sufficiently small.

Since $V_{IPE}^* = n(1 - w^*)(p(a_0^*) - \frac{c(a_0^*)}{w^*}) < n(1 - w^*)$, I need only show that the principal obtains a higher payoff in the worst-case shirking equilibrium. Under the calibrated contract, (3) reduces to

$$\frac{\epsilon}{n} \left(p(a_0^*) - \frac{\hat{p}^n(t)}{p^{n-1}(a_0^*)} \right) + (w^* - \epsilon)(p(a_0^*) - \hat{p}(t)) - t = 0. \quad (4)$$

To identify the effect of an increase in the calibration parameter ϵ on the solution to this equation $\hat{p}(t)$, I use the implicit function theorem:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{p}(t)}{\partial \epsilon} = - \left(\frac{1}{n} \left(p(a_0^*) - \frac{\hat{p}^n(t)}{p^{n-1}(a_0^*)} \right) - (p(a_0^*) - \hat{p}(t)) \right) \left(-\epsilon \frac{\hat{p}^{n-1}(t)}{p^{n-1}(a_0^*)} - (w^* - \epsilon) \right)^{-1}.$$

When $t = c(a_0^*)$, the right-derivative with respect to ϵ evaluated at 0 is thus equal to

$$\left(\frac{1}{n} p(a_0^*) \frac{(1 - (1 - w^*)^n)}{w^*} - p(a_0^*) \right).$$

(Notice that when $n = 2$, this expression reduces to $-\frac{1}{2}p(a_0^*)w^*$ as in the proof of Lemma 7.) Following the steps in the proof of Lemma 7, the effect of a small increase in ϵ on the principal's profit is thus

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \bar{p}'(\epsilon) \right) (1 - w^*) + \left(\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \bar{p}(\epsilon) \right) (1 - (1 - w^*)^{n-1}) = \\ & \frac{p(a_0^*)}{n} \frac{(1 - (1 - w^*)^n)}{w^*} - \frac{p(a_0^*)}{n} (1 - (1 - w^*)^n + n(1 - w^*)^n). \end{aligned}$$

This expression is strictly positive if and only if

$$\sqrt{\frac{p(a_0^*)}{c(a_0^*)}} - 1 > \frac{n(1 - w^*)^n}{1 - (1 - w^*)^n}.$$

This expression holds for any $n \geq 2$; it holds when $n = 2$ by the proof of Lemma 7 and holds for any larger n since the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in n . \square

B.4 Multiple Levels of Output

Now, suppose there are finitely many agents $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ and individual output belongs to a compact set $Y \subset \mathbb{R}_+$ with $\min(Y) = 0$. Each action is now described by an effort cost and probability distribution over Y . A **linear** contract in this model is a function

$$\begin{aligned} w : Y^N &\rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \\ (y_1, \dots, y_n) &\mapsto \alpha \sum_{i=1}^n y_i, \end{aligned}$$

for some value $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. I modify the proof of Lemma 3 to establish that linear contracts cannot be optimal.

Theorem 4

If there are n agents and output belongs to any compact set Y with $\min(Y) = 0$, then no worst-case optimal contract can be linear.

Proof. I first argue that any eligible linear contract must have $0 < \alpha < 1$. If $\alpha \geq 1$, then the assumption of costly known actions ensures that w cannot guarantee the principal more than zero in the game $\Gamma(w, A^0 \cup \{a_{\delta_1}\})$, where $p(a_{\delta_1}) = 1$ and $c(a_{\delta_1}) = 0$. (In this game, each agent has a strict incentive to choose a_{δ_1} , yielding the principal a payoff of $2 - 2\alpha \leq 0$.)

For any linear contract with $0 < \alpha < 1$, define a nonlinear contract w' with $w'(y_i, y_{-i}) = \alpha y_i$, where y_i is an agent's own output and y_{-i} is the output vector of all other agents. I claim that this contract strictly increases the principal's worst-case payoff. First, observe that, for any $A \supseteq A^0$, the incentives of the agents are unchanged; a constant shift in an agent's payoff holding fixed the actions of the others does not affect her optimal choice of action. Hence, for any $A \supseteq A^0$, an equilibrium under w is also an equilibrium under w' . Moreover, by eligibility of w , along any sequence of action sets $A^n \supseteq A^0$ and corresponding sequence of principal-preferred equilibria, (σ_n) with $\sigma_n \in \mathcal{E}(w', A^n)$, $y = 1$ is produced by at least one agent with non-vanishing probability. In addition, since $\alpha < 1$, if one agent produces $y = 1$ with positive probability, then in any principal-preferred equilibrium *all* agents must produce $y = 1$ with positive probability (each agent has the same available set of actions and the principal's payoff is increasing in each agent's productivity when $\alpha < 1$). But, conditional on all agents producing $y = 1$, the principal's wage payment strictly decreases. Hence, her expected wage payments must strictly decrease along the sequence and in any worst-case limit. It follows that $V(w) < V(w') \leq V_{IPE}^*$. \square

B.5 Pessimistic Equilibrium Selection

In this section, I consider the solution to the principal's problem under *worst-case* equilibrium selection. However, I impose the requirement that agents play a Pareto-Efficient Nash equilibrium. As non-IPE contracts tie the incentives of agents together, agents might benefit from discussing their strategies with one another, even if they cannot make binding commitments. Such communication would deem equilibria that are strictly Pareto dominated implausible, i.e. equilibria $\sigma \in \mathcal{E}(w, A)$ for which there exists another equilibrium $\sigma' \in \mathcal{E}(w, A)$ that makes each agent strictly better off. Denote the set of (weakly) Pareto Efficient Nash equilibria by $\mathcal{E}_P(w, A)$.

In contrast to the model analyzed in the main text, let the principal's expected payoff given a contract w and action set $A \supseteq A^0$ be given by

$$V(w, A) := \min_{\sigma \in \mathcal{E}_P(w, A)} E_\sigma[y_1 + y_2 - w_{y_1 y_2} - w_{y_2 y_1}].$$

Notice that the principal assumes the agents will play her least-preferred equilibrium.

As before, the principal's worst case payoff from a contract w is

$$V(w) := \inf_{A \supseteq A^0} V(w, A).$$

In analyzing the nature of the solution to the principal's problem, I will need one additional definition. If $\Gamma(w, A)$ is a supermodular game and $U_i(a_i, a_j; w)$ is strictly increasing in $p(a_j)$ when $p(a_i) > 0$, then $\Gamma(w, A)$ is said to exhibit **strictly positive spillovers**. The following result has been previously established in the literature.

Lemma 8 (Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990))

Suppose \bar{a} (\underline{a}) is the limit found by iterating \overline{BR} (\underline{BR}) starting from a_{\max} (a_{\min}). If $\Gamma(w, A)$ is supermodular, then it has a maximal Nash equilibrium (\bar{a}, \bar{a}) and a minimal Nash equilibrium $(\underline{a}, \underline{a})$; any other equilibrium (a_i, a_j) must satisfy $\bar{a} \succeq a_i \succeq \underline{a}$ and $\bar{a} \succeq a_j \succeq \underline{a}$. If, in addition, $\Gamma(w, A)$ exhibits strictly positive spillovers, then (\bar{a}, \bar{a}) is the unique Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium.

Notice that, if w is a JPE for which $w_{00} = w_{01} = 0$ and $A \supseteq A^0$, then $\Gamma(w, A)$ is a supermodular game exhibiting strictly positive spillovers. Hence, the principal assumes agents will play the maximal equilibrium in any game the agents play. I use this to establish the following result.

Theorem 5

Under pessimistic equilibrium selection, any worst-case optimal contract is nonlinear and cannot be an IPE.

Proof.

1. The proof of Lemma 6 in Section A.3 holds as written under worst-case Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium selection. Hence, there exists a JPE w with $w_{00} = w_{01} = 0$ for which $V(w) > V_{IPE}^*$. It follows that no worst-case optimal contract can be an IPE.
2. I show that, for any linear contract w , $V(w) < V_{IPE}^*$. I first argue that any eligible linear contract must have $0 < \alpha < 1$. Towards contradiction, suppose $\alpha = 0$. Then, the assumption of costly known actions ensures that w cannot guarantee the principal more than zero in the game $\Gamma(w, A^0 \cup \{a_\emptyset\})$, where $p(a_\emptyset) = c(a_\emptyset) = 0$. (In this game, each agent has a strict incentive to choose a_\emptyset

yielding the principal a payoff of zero.) If $\alpha \geq 1$, then the assumption of costly known actions ensures that w cannot guarantee the principal more than zero in the game $\Gamma(w, A^0 \cup \{a_{\delta_1}\})$, where $p(a_{\delta_1}) = 1$ and $c(a_{\delta_1}) = 0$. (In this game, each agent has a strict incentive to choose a_{δ_1} , yielding the principal a payoff of $2 - 2\alpha \leq 0$.)

Let $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ parameterize the eligible linear contract w . Let $a_0 \in A^0$ be each agent's maximal equilibrium action when $A = A^0$ (since any linear contract is a JPE, such an action exists by Lemma 8). In the game $\Gamma(w', A^0 \cup \{a_\epsilon^*\})$, where $p(a_\epsilon^*) = p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} + \epsilon$, $c(a_\epsilon^*) = 0$, and $\epsilon > 0$ is small, (a^*, a^*) is the maximal Nash equilibrium. As ϵ approaches 0, the principal's payoff in this equilibrium approaches

$$\begin{aligned}
& 2 \left[\underbrace{\left(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} \right)}_{> 0 \text{ by eligibility of } w} (p(a_\epsilon^*)(1 - \alpha) + (1 - p(a_\epsilon^*))(-\alpha)) \right] \\
& < 2 \left[\left(p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{\alpha} \right) (1 - \alpha) \right] \\
& \leq V_{IPE}^*.
\end{aligned}$$

Hence,

$$V(w) \leq \inf_{\epsilon > 0} V(w, A^0 \cup \{a_\epsilon^*\}) < V_{IPE}^*.$$

□

The rest of the proofs in the main text other than that of Lemma 4 hold under this alternative selection criterion as well. I conjecture that Lemma 4 holds, too, but have not been able to prove it (the key challenge is that constant shifts in agents' payoffs can potentially affect the set of Pareto Efficient Nash equilibria).

B.6 Asymmetric Unknown Actions

In a final extension, I show that the assumption that agents share a common production technology does not appear to drive the main result. For instance, if there is a single known action and a single unknown action for each agent, potentially heterogeneous across agents, then a simple extension of the arguments in the main text

establishes that any optimal contract is a nonlinear JPE.

Let $\mathcal{E}(w, A_1, A_2)$ denote the set of Nash equilibria in the game induced by the contract w and action sets A_1 and A_2 . In addition, let

$$V(w) := \min_{a_1^*, a_2^* \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times [0,1]} \max_{\sigma \in \mathcal{E}(w, \{a_0, a_1^*\}, \{a_0, a_2^*\})} E_\sigma[y_1 + y_2 - w_{y_1 y_2} - w_{y_2 y_1}].$$

Then, the following result holds.

Theorem 6

Suppose there is a single known action a_0 with $p(a_0) > c(a_0) > 0$ and agents have heterogeneous action sets A_1 and A_2 . Then, there exists a nonlinear JPE, w , for which $V(w) > V_{IPE}^$.*

Proof. Suppose w is a nonlinear JPE with $w_{00} = w_{01} = 0$. Then, $V(w)$ is the minimum of

$$2 - 2w_{11},$$

the principal's payoff when both agents succeed with probability one, and

$$p_1 p_2 (2 - 2w_{11}) + (p_1(1 - p_2) + p_2(1 - p_1))(1 - w_{10}),$$

where

$$p_1 := p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{(p(a_0)w_{11} + (1 - p(a_0))w_{10})}$$

and

$$p_2 := p(a_0) - \frac{c(a_0)}{(p_1 w_{11} + (1 - p_1)w_{10})}.$$

The second expression corresponds to the principal's payoff in the limit of a sequence of games in which iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies first removes a_0 for worker 1 and, second, removes a_0 for worker 2, leading to a unique Nash equilibrium in which worker 2 is even less productive than in the symmetric worst-case limit.

I establish the existence of a calibrated JPE, w , for which $V(w) > V_{IPE}^*$. Let $w^* = \sqrt{c(a_0)/p(a_0)}$ be the optimal IPE. Put $w_{10} = w^* - \epsilon$, for $\epsilon > 0$, and

$$w_{11} = \frac{w^* - (1 - p(a_0))w_{10}}{p(a_0)}.$$

It suffices to show that the right-derivative of profits with respect to ϵ evaluated at zero is strictly positive to establish the existence of a nonlinear JPE that outperforms the best IPE. For $\epsilon > 0$, the derivative of profits is well-defined and equals

$$p(a_0)w^* - \frac{c(a_0)}{(1 - \epsilon)^2}.$$

Hence, the right-derivative evaluated at zero is strictly positive whenever

$$p(a_0)w^* - c(a_0) > 0 \iff p(a_0) > c(a_0),$$

which always holds. \square

Extending the result to the case of any number of unknown actions requires extending the characterization of worst-case payoffs of arbitrary JPE contracts in Lemma 6. I conjecture that the result continues to hold, though its proof appears nontrivial.³³

B.7 Discriminatory Contracts

I identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which the optimal contract identified in the baseline model outperforms any IPE, asymmetric or symmetric. Formally, an **asymmetric contract** is a quadruple $w^i = (w_{11}^i, w_{10}^i, w_{01}^i, w_{00}^i) \in \mathbb{R}_+^4$ for each agent $i = 1, 2$, where the first index of each wage indicates agent i 's success or failure and the second indicates agent j 's success or failure. It is an **independent performance evaluation (IPE)** if $w_{y1}^i = w_{y0}^i$ for each agent $i = 1, 2$ and success or failure $y \in \{0, 1\}$.

Recall that the analysis of the optimal symmetric contract yields

$$V(w^*) := \max_{w_{11} > w_{10} \geq 0} \min\{1 - w_{11}, \bar{p}[\bar{p}(1 - w_{11}) + (1 - \bar{p})(1 - w_{10})]\},$$

where \bar{p} is the solution to the initial value problem in the statement of Lemma 6. The worst-case payoff from a general IPE can be identified as the value of an appropriately defined max-min problem:

³³Instead of a differential equation, free-riding dynamics would instead be characterized by a nonlinear dynamical system.

$$\begin{aligned}
V_{IPE}^{**} := & \max_{w_{11}^1 \geq w_{11}^2 \geq 0} \min_{a_1^*, a_2^*} [p(a_1^*)(1 - w_{11}^1) + p(a_2^*)(1 - w_{11}^2)] \\
& \text{subject to} \\
& p(a_1^*)w_{11}^1 - c(a_1^*) \geq \max_{a_0 \in A^0 \cup \{a_1^*, a_2^*\}} [p(a_0)w_{11}^1 - c(a_0)] \\
& p(a_2^*)w_{11}^2 - c(a_2^*) \geq \max_{a_0 \in A^0 \cup \{a_1^*, a_2^*\}} [p(a_0)w_{11}^2 - c(a_0)] .
\end{aligned}$$

The constraints in the minimization problem ensure that each agent i has an incentive to take a worst-case unknown action a_i^* . No other constraints are required since one agent's optimal action is unaffected by the chosen action of the other. I thus obtain the following result.

Theorem 7

The optimal nondiscriminatory contract strictly outperforms any IPE, potentially asymmetric, if and only if

$$V(w^*) > V_{IPE}^{**}.$$

In the example in Section 4.3.3, this inequality is satisfied. However, this need not always be the case; discrimination can help the principal if agents are known to share a common action set because the worst-case action for one agent constrains the worst-case action for the other. Of course, this advantage is eliminated once the common action set assumption is relaxed.

An important and influential literature on discriminatory incentives also deserves mention here (e.g. [Segal \(2003\)](#), [Winter \(2004\)](#), and [Halac, Lipnowski, and Rapoport \(2021\)](#)). This paper takes as an axiom that the principal is constrained to use symmetric contracts. This is not without justification: Any asymmetric contract is *discriminatory* in the sense of treating equals unequally. Hence, such contracts may be ruled out by legal considerations or — if the principal randomizes — ex post fairness considerations. On the other hand, discrimination has been shown to be of value in settings in which the principal has no uncertainty about the agents' available actions and demands the contract she uses induces her preferred strategy profile as a unique Nash equilibrium. For instance, [Winter \(2004\)](#) shows that asymmetric contracts can be optimal even when agents are symmetric. As [Winter \(2004\)](#) points out, however, if agents are assumed to play a Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium, then

there is always an optimal contract that is a symmetric IPE. This is *not* the case in the setting considered here, as discussed in Section 6 and shown in Online Appendix B.5.