MeshPay: Offline Bitcoin Transactions via Incentivised Mesh Networks

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Abstract

We propose a protocol for enabling Bitcoin transactions in environments without direct Internet access, by leveraging Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) mesh networks with economic incentives. In this system, nodes lacking Internet connectivity can broadcast their transactions through peer devices ("beacons") that do have connectivity. Beacons periodically issue cryptographically signed *proof-of-internet* messages, attesting to the current blockchain state. Senders verify these proofs and construct transactions that include a small relay fee output paying the beacon. The beacon relays the transaction to the Bitcoin network only if the fee is present, aligning incentives. Our protocol requires no changes to the Bitcoin consensus rules and can be implemented using existing SPV wallets and BLE mesh technology. We detail the system architecture, transaction workflow, incentives, and security analysis, showing how offline Bitcoin payments can be achieved with this approach.

1   Introduction

Bitcoin provides a decentralised, peer-to-peer electronic cash system [1]. Transactions and blocks are propagated by a global network of nodes, and consensus is secured by proof-of-work. A key assumption is that participants have continuous Internet connectivity to broadcast and receive their transactions. However, in many scenarios (e.g., natural disasters, remote areas, or censorship environments), Internet access may be limited or absent. Without connectivity, users cannot broadcast transactions to the Bitcoin network and thus cannot spend their coins.

1.1   Related Works

Existing solutions only partially address this challenge. Layer-2 protocols such as the Lightning Network enable high-throughput, low-latency off-chain payments [2]. However, Lightning requires pre-funded payment channels and continuous or periodic online presence to monitor for channel breaches. Offline pay-

ments over Lightning therefore face inherent limitations, as nodes must either operate watchtower services or risk losing funds during extended disconnections.

A different line of work explores *offline Bitcoin transactions* directly at the protocol level. Dmitrienko *et al.* [3] proposed secure wallet-assisted offline payments with double-spender revocation, requiring tamper-resistant hardware to prevent fraud. Similarly, Takahashi and Otsuka [4] present a protocol for fully decentralised offline payments using lightweight tamper-proof wallets and partial blockchain fragments. These approaches demonstrate feasibility but rely on modification of the Bitcoin software, or specialised secure hardware, which limits deployability in practice.

Wireless mesh networking has also been explored as a means to propagate cryptocurrency transactions without the Internet. Myers [5] highlights the use of local mesh and alternative communication channels (e.g., radio, satellite) to sustain Bitcoin connectivity under censorship and disaster scenarios. More recently, Kurt *et al.* introduced LNMesh, a system for executing Lightning Network payments over Bluetooth and WiFi-based mesh networks [6]. While LN-Mesh shows promising performance, it inherits Lightning's channel-monitoring requirements, making long-duration offline use challenging.

Industry prototypes reinforce this research direction: the TxTenna project allows broadcasting Bitcoin transactions over the goTenna radio mesh [7], while Blockstream's satellite service delivers global Bitcoin block data without Internet access. Community-driven initiatives such as Bitchat [8] further exemplify the practical demand for uncensorable, mesh-based transaction relays.

1.2 Suggested Approach

This paper presents the *MeshPay* protocol. Our approach operates directly at the Bitcoin blockchain layer, requiring no channel setup, watchtower dependencies, or protocol changes. Users form a BLE mesh network, within which some nodes act as *beacons* with Internet access. Each beacon periodically broadcasts a signed *proof-of-internet* containing the latest block header and its address. Upon receiving this proof, a sender constructs a transaction that includes an additional output paying a small relay fee to the beacon's address. The beacon then forwards the transaction to the Bitcoin network only if this fee output is present. This incentive mechanism ensures beacons are compensated for relaying while avoiding the security complexities of off-chain payment channels. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the system design, Section 3 details the transaction workflow, Section 4 analyses economic incentives, Section 5 analyses security considerations, Section 6 discusses implementation aspects, and Section 7 outlines future work. We conclude in Section 8.

2 Architecture

The system comprises three types of nodes: *senders* (wallets with a transaction to broadcast, but no Internet), *beacons* (nodes with Internet connectivity that assist in relaying), and *relays* (nodes without Internet who forward messages within the mesh). All nodes participate in a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) mesh network, which supports many-to-many communication via a managed flooding protocol with a limited time-to-live (TTL) hop count [9]. We assume the mesh is connected and that messages eventually reach all nodes if relayed.

The mesh supports two classes of messages:

- **Proof-of-Internet (PoI) messages:** Each beacon periodically broadcasts a PoI containing the current chain tip's block header H and its own address A. Formally, the beacon sends $\{H \parallel A, \sigma\}$ where $\sigma = \mathrm{Sign}_{\mathrm{sk}_A}(H \parallel A)$ is a digital signature on the data using the beacon's private key. Receiving nodes verify that H is a valid block header (correct PoW) and that σ is valid for address A. Valid PoIs are rebroadcast until every node in the mesh has the beacon's recent proof.
- **Transaction messages:** Senders create Bitcoin transactions, T and broadcast them in the mesh. Each transaction includes standard inputs and outputs (recipient and change) *plus* one extra output of value f paying to a beacon's address A_i (or an `OP_RETURN` encoding A_i for zero-fee beacons). After signing T, the sender floods it into the mesh. Intermediate nodes forward all incoming transactions. When a beacon i receives a transaction, it checks whether T contains the expected fee output to A_i. If and only if the fee is present, the beacon broadcasts T to the Bitcoin network and confirms it has been relayed. Importantly, the beacon's payment is inherently *contingent* on the sender's transaction being successfully included in the Bitcoin blockchain.

Incentives are embedded directly in the protocol. Each transaction variant pays the beacon a small relay fee via the extra output. Because the beacon will only broadcast transactions that pay it, maliciously omitting the fee yields no benefit. Rational beacons are thus motivated to propagate the transaction into the Bitcoin network. If a beacon advertises "free" forwarding, the sender still includes its identity (e.g. in an `OP_RETURN`) so the beacon can recognise its transactions. In sum, no trusting is required: economic incentive and protocol rules enforce correct behaviour.

3 Transaction Workflow

The end-to-end process of making an offline payment proceeds as follows:

1. **Wallet synchronisation (online):** When a node has Internet access, it behaves like a standard SPV wallet: it downloads all block headers and queries a server (e.g. Electrum) for its wallet's UTXOs, using Merkle

proofs to validate their inclusion [1, 10]. This initial sync ensures the wallet knows the current chain tip and its own balance.

2. **Offline PoI collection:** When the sender is offline, it listens for PoI broadcasts from nearby beacons. For each PoI it receives, it checks:

   - *Timestamp freshness:* The block header's timestamp t_H should be recent (e.g. within 1 hour of the local clock) to guard against replaying stale proofs.
   - *Difficulty plausibility:* Let the wallet's last known header be H_0 (timestamp t_{H_0}, difficulty D_0) and the PoI header be H (difficulty D_H). By Bitcoin's rules, network difficulty adjusts only at discrete retarget intervals and cannot be made arbitrarily small without mining work; the sender checks that D_H is not implausibly low given the time elapsed since t_{H_0} and the number of retarget intervals passed [1]. This prevents an attacker from presenting a fake low-difficulty chain.
   - *Proof-of-work validity:* Verify that H's hash meets the target, proving it is a mined block.
   - *Signature validity:* Verify σ against address A. This proves the beacon indeed created the PoI.

   PoIs that pass all checks are accepted. The sender typically hears multiple beacons, gathering proofs from each.

3. **Transaction creation:** With valid proofs in hand, the sender constructs its Bitcoin transaction. The inputs and outputs to recipient and change are fixed. For each beacon A_i from which a PoI was received, the sender creates a transaction variant T_i that includes an extra output of value f sending to A_i (or an `OP_RETURN` for zero-value relay). The sender signs each T_i and prepares to broadcast them.

4. **Mesh propagation:** The sender broadcasts all signed T_i into the mesh. Relays simply forward them. Each beacon i filters incoming transactions and only rebroadcasts the variant T_i that contains its fee output to A_i. Other variants are ignored by that beacon. In this way, each beacon acts on the single transaction that compensates it.

5. **Broadcast and confirmation:** Any beacon receiving a valid T_i (with its fee) will then broadcast it to the Bitcoin P2P network and wait for miners. Eventually, one of the T_i will be mined into a block, or if none does (e.g. double-spends are resolved), the wallet will find out upon the next sync. Once a beacon's transaction is confirmed, it can propagate a Merkle inclusion proof (via the mesh) back to the sender, giving the sender confidence that the payment is on-chain.

This workflow inherently creates multiple conflicting transactions (different T_i with the same inputs). Bitcoin's consensus resolves these: at most one variant can confirm. The wallet treats all other variants as unconfirmed double-spends. **Critically**, the redundancy and potential conflict are contained *within* the local BLE mesh. The global Bitcoin P2P network is protected from spam by its

standard mempool policy: nodes reject and do not relay transactions that conflict with ones already in their mempool. Therefore, the *first* beacon to relay its version T_i to the Bitcoin network will have it propagate normally. Any subsequent beacon attempting to relay a different variant T_j (spending the same inputs) to any Bitcoin node will find that the node already has a conflicting transaction and will reject T_j, preventing its further propagation. This ensures that the protocol provides sender-side redundancy without imposing additional bandwidth costs on the Bitcoin network.

4   Incentive Analysis

The protocol's security relies on economic incentives. We analyse the game-theoretic structure in two stages: first the single-beacon case, then the multi-beacon scenario that characterises the actual protocol.

4.1   Single Beacon Analysis

The protocol's security relies on economic incentives. A game-theoretic analysis shows that the desired behaviour is a Nash Equilibrium. The players are the *Sender* (strategies: include fee or not) and a *Beacon* (strategies: relay or ignore). Let V_s be the value to the sender of a confirmed transaction, f the relay fee, and C_b the beacon's cost (bandwidth usage, and later cost to spend) to relay ($f > C_b$). The payoff matrix is:

	Beacon: Relay	Beacon: Ignore
Sender: Pay Fee	$(V_s - f,\ f - C_b)$	$(-f,\ 0)$
Sender: No Fee	$(V_s,\ -C_b)$	$(0,\ 0)$

The strategy pair (**Pay Fee**, **Relay**) is a Nash Equilibrium. Unilaterally, the sender would not deviate to *No Fee* (as the beacon would then ignore, yielding 0, which is worse than $V_s - f$). The beacon would not deviate to *Ignore* (as it would forfeit the profit $f - C_b$). No other strategy pair is stable. Therefore, rational actors are incentivised to follow the protocol, making it self-enforcing. The presence of multiple beacons reinforces this equilibrium through competition.

4.2   Multi-Beacon Analysis

The more realistic scenario involves n beacons. The sender includes a fee f for each beacon, creating a race. We model this as a symmetric simultaneous-move game among beacons, where the action is still binary: **Relay** or **Ignore**.

Model Assumptions

- Beacons are identical. The sender's transaction includes the fee for all.

- Each beacon has an equal *exogenous* probability $q = 1/n$ of being the first to successfully relay, based on network conditions (e.g., physical proximity, packet timing).

- The Bitcoin network's mempool policy ensures only the first transaction relayed to it is propagated. Other beacons that relay the same inputs have their transactions rejected as double-spends.

Beacon Expected Payoff

A beacon's expected payoff for choosing to relay is:

$$\mathbb{E}[\Pi_i \,|\, \text{Relay}] = \underbrace{q \cdot (f - C_b)}_{\text{P[Win]} \,\times\, \text{Profit}} + \underbrace{(1 - q) \cdot (-C_b)}_{\text{P[Lose]} \,\times\, \text{Cost}} = qf - C_b$$

Its payoff for choosing to ignore is always:

$$\mathbb{E}[\Pi_i \,|\, \text{Ignore}] = 0$$

Nash Equilibrium

A rational beacon will choose to relay if its expected payoff is positive:

$$\mathbb{E}[\Pi_i \,|\, \text{Relay}] > 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad qf - C_b > 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad f > \frac{C_b}{q}$$

Since $q = 1/n$ under symmetry, the condition becomes:

$$f > n \cdot C_b$$

Given that the relay cost C_b is often negligible, a small fee f is sufficient to ensure this inequality holds even for a large number of beacons (n). When this condition is met, **Relay** is a dominant strategy for every beacon. The unique, pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium is for **all beacons to relay**.

Equilibrium Properties

1. **Reliability:** The probability that *at least one* beacon relays is $1 - (1-r)^n$, where r is the probability a single beacon relays.

2. **Efficiency:** While all beacons attempt to relay, the inherent randomness of the network (q) and Bitcoin's double-spend rejection rule ensure that only one beacon's effort is ultimately consumed by the global network. The "waste" is contained to the local mesh, protecting the broader Bitcoin network.

3. **Competition:** The multi-beacon environment creates a competitive market. A sender can be confident that if their fee f is greater than $n \cdot C_b$, their transaction will most likely be relayed. This allows fees to stay low, **so long as** they exceed Bitcoin's own dust limits.

5 Security Considerations

5.1 Tampering of Proof-of-Internet

A potential attack vector involves an adversary intercepting a valid Proof-of-Internet (PoI) message, altering the beacon address field to its own, and re-signing the message with its own private key. While this would result in a cryptographically valid PoI, this action is ultimately futile and **does not** compromise the protocol's security. A sender who accepts this forged PoI will construct a transaction variant that includes a relay fee output paying the attacker's address. Yet, for this transaction to ultimately reach the Bitcoin network, it must be relayed by a node with Internet connectivity. The original, honest beacon, upon receiving T_{adv}, will detect the absence of a fee output to its own advertised address and will ignore it. No other rational beacon in the mesh has an incentive to broadcast a transaction that does not pay them. The only entity with any incentive to relay T_{adv} to the Bitcoin P2P network is the attacker itself. For the "attack" to succeed, the attacker must therefore already possess the two capabilities it sought to circumvent: **Internet connectivity and a willingness to relay transactions for a fee**. The attempt to hijack a fee simply results in the attacker legitimately claiming the fee for providing the relay service, which is the protocol's core economic mechanism.

5.2 Proof Replay Attacks

Replay of old PoIs could mislead a sender. We require PoI freshness checks (e.g. a 1-hour window). Bitcoin occasionally has blocks taking multiple hours; in such cases, the next honest PoI (when the block finally arrives) will override an older one. An attacker trying to replay a very old PoI would need to meet the freshness window or re-mine the block at current difficulty, which is infeasible. In summary, with regular PoI updates, stale replays will be ignored.

5.3 Mesh Partition and Sybil Attacks

If an adversary could partition the mesh or flood it with Sybil beacons, it could show different proofs to different segments. For instance, if one attacker is the only connector to a segment, it could present its own PoIs there. This is analogous to the classic network-partition problem and cannot be fully prevented without a global link; see the Byzantine coordination literature [11]. However, our protocol does not give the attacker any undue advantage beyond what Bitcoin's own network structure already suffers under partitioning. As long as some honest beacons reach each user eventually, those users will have correct proofs. Using multiple beacons and flood-based propagation also reduces the risk that one adversarial node can isolate a segment. Ultimately, like any distributed system, we rely on having at least one honest path to the real Bitcoin network.

5.4 Double-Spend and RBF

Our protocol deliberately constructs conflicting transactions T_i. Bitcoin's consensus rules treat them as double-spends. Only one can confirm; the others will be rejected. This is safe because the sender's wallet can detect which UTXO got spent. We recommend that senders prefer broadcasting enough fee (miner fee plus relay fee) to ensure confirmation of some variant. Standard SPV and Electrum checks upon reconnect will show that the transaction inputs were spent in exactly one way. This is no more risky than usual wallet behaviour (similar to replace-by-fee scenarios) [10].

5.5 Cryptographic Guarantees

The security of the protocol relies only on Bitcoin's existing cryptography. Beacons sign PoIs with their private keys (ECDSA or Schnorr over secp256k1); recipients verify via the published address. Block headers provide hash-based PoW. Transaction signatures and Merkle proofs are handled by the SPV wallet as usual. We have introduced no new cryptographic primitives beyond what Bitcoin uses, so all standard guarantees (unforgeability of signatures, immutability of PoW) apply directly.

6 Implementation Considerations

6.1 Hardware and Software

This protocol can be implemented on off-the-shelf devices (smartphones or IoT) with BLE radios. Modern smartphones support BLE advertisements and scanning, and BLE mesh libraries (or Bluetooth Mesh Profile implementations) can carry custom data. The wallet software is a standard SPV (Electrum-like) client, storing block headers (tens of MB) and UTXO data for the wallet's keys. We assume beacons have Internet via cellular or WiFi and run or access a full node or public server to broadcast transactions.

On Android/iOS, an application could use native BLE APIs or existing mesh SDKs to exchange PoIs and transactions. Beacons might be ordinary phones or dedicated gateways (e.g. Raspberry Pi with BLE and 4G). The overhead is modest: PoI messages might be on the order of a block header plus signature, and transactions are typically under 1 KB. Constant BLE advertising and scanning will consume battery, but infrequent PoIs (minutes apart) mitigate this.

6.2 BLE Mesh Specifics

Bluetooth Mesh (as standardised by the Bluetooth SIG) supports many-to-many messaging with managed flooding, TTLs, and sequence numbers for de-duplication [9]. Payload sizes are limited and messages may need to be chunked or efficiently encoded; in practice, PoIs and transactions can be segmented across

multiple mesh PDUs. Link-layer or application-layer encryption is available in Bluetooth Mesh but is orthogonal to the protocol described here.

Since BLE bandwidth is limited, we minimise chatter. Beacons should not flood PoIs too frequently (once per new block is sufficient). Transaction propagation can use short TTL (just enough hops to reach nearby beacons) instead of global flood to reduce load. A routing overlay that biases forwarding toward nodes likely to have Internet access can further reduce mesh traffic.

6.3   Scalability

On the Bitcoin side, scalability is unaffected: each payment still results in at most one on-chain transaction. The mesh network scales similarly to other BLE mesh deployments: it can handle local networks of dozens to hundreds of nodes depending on physical topology and radio environment. The main limits are radio range, airtime contention, and battery. In dense deployments, standard mesh de-duplication and backoff reduce collisions.

7   Discussion and Future Work

This protocol makes some assumptions: rational, fee-seeking beacons and reasonably synchronised clocks. If a beacon goes offline or becomes malicious mid-transaction, other beacons' fees still allow propagation (the sender broadcasts to all known beacons). If the sender remains offline indefinitely, it cannot learn final confirmation (as any SPV wallet); this is inherent in the offline model.

Potential improvements include adaptive fee selection and targeted routing. A dynamic fee schedule could adjust f based on beacon response times or competition. Optimising broadcast to target likely-beacon nodes first (e.g. based on signal strength or recent PoI freshness) could speed up confirmation. Privacy is a concern: broadcasting a transaction in cleartext tags the sender to the mesh. Future work might explore mixing, onion-like forwarding within mesh hops, or other privacy-preserving overlays, but the fundamental limitations imposed by the Two Generals / coordination problems remain [11].

While we focused on Bitcoin SPV, similar ideas could apply to other UTXO blockchains. Integrating this with higher-layer protocols (e.g. atomic swaps or cross-chain settlement) is another research direction.

8   Conclusion

We have presented a full protocol for broadcasting Bitcoin transactions without direct Internet, using an incentivised BLE mesh network. By having beacons provide signed proofs of Internet connectivity and embedding relay fees in the transaction, our scheme creates a self-enforcing overlay: senders pay beacons to forward their transactions, and beacons only forward transactions that pay

them. Bitcoin's own consensus handles double-spending resolution automatically. The design requires no changes to Bitcoin's consensus rules and uses well-understood SPV and BLE technologies. This work demonstrates a practical approach to extending Bitcoin's reach into offline environments, with potential applications in disaster relief, rural areas, and censorship resistance.

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