

ACME

*Benefits of deploying
an Internet security protocol
inside your corporate network*

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Hack.lu 2023 | October 18th, 2023





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Focus: security & network protocols



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Co-founder & organizer of Pass the SALT
Free Software & Security conference

But let's start **with a short poll**

about **ACME!** 😊





01 | The Problem

Private PKI fails to provide certificates to *all* apps

TL;DR version

Our internal web apps are **not all HTTPS accessed**.

(expired certs, self-signed certs, certs signed by custom PKI are not correct HTTPS, right?)


Our **private PKI** is part of the problem.



Longer story

80.000 colleagues.


**Connected, on site or remotely,
to a global private network.**



Many applications

Hundreds of internal web applications at national level.


And more at local level.




HTTPS

HTTPS required for internal web applications.


A private PKI available since 2008.




1 Private PKI, 2 Workflows




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
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
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
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
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
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What We Need



What We Need




What We Need




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What We Need



What We Need






02


Building a solution

Automated protocols to obtain TLS server certificates


Existing solutions in private PKI ecosystem




Existing solutions in private PKI ecosystem





But

- Security problems 


Existing solutions in private PKI ecosystem



But

- Security problems 
- Enrollment required 


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
But

- Security problems 
- Enrollment required 
- Clients 

TLS server certificates issuance on the Internet?



Let's Encrypt



- Free & automated public CA
- Issues TLS server certificates
- Launched in 2015.

Impact on Web traffic:

- 2014 ~ **27%** HTTPS
- 2023 > **80%** HTTPS


→ Powered by the **ACME protocol**

How ACME has changed the Web?

- **Fully automated protocol**
- **Open standard** (RFC 8555)
- **Secured protocol & robust implementation**




ACME : How does it work?




"Let's Encrypt: an automated certificate authority to encrypt the entire web" Aas et al. CCS'19. Figure 2. Src: <https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10222849>

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
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Private PKI: adding ACME



ACME adoption: what **our team** provides



API

PKI

ACME adoption: what **our team** provides

An **ACME proxy**, **open to all** on the private network
(based on **Serles***: an **open source ACME proxy**, written in Python)



* : <https://github.com/dvtirol/serles-acme>

ACME adoption: what **our team** provides

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A reference **ACME client** for Linux and Windows
(**lego****: an **open source ACME client**, written in Go)

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Support & evangelism:

- Documentation website ;
- Webinars ;
- Support to admins for installation & first usage ;
- Support to architects/projects for specific ACME clients or use cases.


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ACME adoption: what our users are also doing



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ACME adoption: what our users are also doing



Others ACME clients & platforms
(ex: *acme.sh* on AIX, network appliances ...)



Middlewares (**Caddy, Apache, Traefik...**) with
embedded ACME support



Getting **“client+server auth” certificate** during
VM/server creation (**Ansible ACME client**) in order to
do mTLS more easily.



ACME new use case

In 2022, a new RFC draft: draft-bweeks-acme-device-attest-01(*)

- **Goal:** obtaining a *client* certificate for a **device**
- **Condition:** validating some of its properties (device identity, certificate key protected by a secure cryptoprocessor)
- **New challenge:** device-attest-01, based on attestation.

(*) <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bweeks-acme-device-attest-01.html>

ACME new use case

In 2022, a new RFC draft: draft-bweeks-acme-device-attest-01(*)

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Early stage


For the moment, the RFC draft **does not:**

- say **how to validate** the attestation
- nor **how to trust** the device identity

Tasks are very platform-dependant.

(*) <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bweeks-acme-device-attest-01.html>

ACME new use case: how to get client certificate



First implementation (*): **Apple** in its **MDM solution** in 2022.

(*): <https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2022/10143/>

ACME in private networks

TAKE
AWAY

Upgrade your internal PKI

- With peace of mind
 - Secured domain validation
 - Automated protocol tested at scale



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ACME in private networks

TAKE
AWAY

Upgrade your internal PKI

- With peace of mind
 - Secured domain validation
 - Automated protocol tested at scale
- For everybody
 - PKI open to all
 - No enrollment
 - No need to change your PKI




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ACME in private networks

TAKE
AWAY

Automation


-  • Legacy | 140 applications switch to TLS in 2 months



ACME in private networks

TAKE
AWAY

Automation

-  **Legacy** | 140 applications switch to TLS in 2 months
- Devops** | **dedicated PKI** no more needed
- Devops** | Certificates **first class citizen**
- Security can be **easy** and **efficient**



ACME in private networks

TAKE
AWAY

Autonomy

- **Enforcing a protocol, not the tooling**
- **Diversity** in ACME tools helps a lot to get very diverse users (devs, netops, admins ...)
- ***“Already used on Internet”*** factor



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ACME in private networks

TAKE
AWAY

Capitalize on new use cases

- During server provisioning
 - Ansible ACME playbook
 - Certificate with server+client authentic key usage
 - Server has mTLS capability from the start
- New use cases are coming (RFC for client cert & TPM)
- Other challenges (DNS) available



“Eat ACME, it is good for your IT!”

Thanks! Questions?

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- [twitter: @cbrocas](#)
- [mastodon: @cbrocas@infosec.exchange](#)



**l'Assurance
Maladie**

Agir ensemble, protéger chacun