



# Security Assessment

## **GemPadLock**

Date: 21/12/2024

**Audit Status: PASS** 

Audit Edition: Advanced





## **Risk Analysis**

## **Vulnerability summary**

Classification	Description	
High	High-level vulnerabilities can result in the loss of assets or manipulation of data.	
Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities can be challenging to exploit, but they still have a considerable impact on smart contract execution, such as allowing public access to critical functions.	
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are primarily associated with outdated or unused code snippets that generally do not significantly impact execution, sometimes they can be ignored.	
Informational	Informational vulnerabilities, code style violations, and informational statements do not affect smart contract execution and can typically be disregarded.	

## **Executive Summary**

According to the Assure assessment, the Customer's smart contract is **Well secured.** 

Insecure	Poorly Secured	Secured	Well Secured

## Scope

### **Target Code And Revision**

For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the GemPadLock contracts followed by issue reporting, along with mitigation and remediation instructions outlined in this report.

### **Target Code And Revision**

Project	Assure
Language	Solidity
Codebase	First version: <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x06900552c7a">https://bscscan.com/address/0x06900552c7a</a> <a href="DB5ac198eBb2641057337FD9996bB#code">DB5ac198eBb2641057337FD9996bB#code</a> Fixed version: <a href="https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x37238663261acBC2805b82Ee4aCC9e4FFBFf7F8e#code">https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x37238663261acBC2805b82Ee4aCC9e4FFBFf7F8e#code</a>
Audit Methodology	Static, Manual

### Attacks made to the contract

In order to check for the security of the contract, we tested several attacks in order to make sure that the contract is secure and follows best practices.

Category	Item
Code review & Functional Review	<ul> <li>Compiler warnings.</li> <li>Race conditions and Reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions.</li> <li>Possible delays in data delivery.</li> <li>Oracle calls.</li> <li>Front running.</li> <li>Timestamp dependence.</li> <li>Integer Overflow and Underflow.</li> <li>DoS with Revert.</li> <li>DoS with block gas limit.</li> <li>Methods execution permissions.</li> <li>Economy model.</li> <li>Private user data leaks.</li> <li>Malicious Event log.</li> <li>Scoping and Declarations.</li> <li>Uninitialized storage pointers.</li> <li>Arithmetic accuracy.</li> <li>Design Logic.</li> <li>Cross-function race conditions.</li> <li>Safe Zeppelin module.</li> <li>Fallback function security.</li> <li>Overpowered functions / Owner privileges</li> </ul>

## **AUDIT OVERVIEW**



No high severity issues were found.



#### 1. Unrestricted Fee Setting in updateFee() Could Lead to Excessive Charges [Fixed ]

**Issue**: Within the updateFee() function, there is no cap on the fee parameters—projectCreationFee, lpTokenNormalLockFee, lpTokenVestingLockFee, normalTokenNormalLockFee, and normalTokenVestingLockFee. This means the contract owner can set arbitrarily high fees, potentially resulting in unfair or exploitative costs for users.

**Recommendation**: Enforce a maximum allowable fee by adding a require() statement. This will ensure that any fee adjustments remain within a reasonable range and protect users from excessively high costs.

**Update**: Fixed, limited to 1eth max.

#### 2. Potential Out-of-Gas with Large Inputs in multipleLock() and multipleVestingLock() [Fixed ]

**Issue**: The functions multipleLock() and multipleVestingLock() allow creating multiple locks within a single transaction. If the arrays owners and amounts are excessively large, the loop processing these arrays may consume too much gas, leading to a potential out-of-gas error.

**Recommendation**: Enforce a maximum array length for both owners and amounts to ensure that the transaction remains within gas limits. By imposing such a restriction, you prevent scenarios where excessively large inputs could cause the contract to run out of gas during execution.

**Update**: Fixed, limited to 200 address max.

#### 3. Insecure UUPS Upgrade Mechanism [N/A ]

**Issue**: The contract inherits from UUPSUpgradeable but does not implement an \_authorizeUpgrade() function. As a result, the standard UUPS "guard" is missing and may allow any external actor to call upgradeTo(...) or upgradeToAndCall(...)—depending on how the parent contract is structured. In many UUPS patterns, \_authorizeUpgrade() must explicitly restrict upgrades to only the contract owner or a trusted role.

**Recommendation**: Implement a properly secured \_authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation) that includes an authorization check (e.g., require(owner() == \_msgSender(), "Not authorized");). Also ensure any intended upgrade path is correctly integrated (such as calling \_\_UUPSUpgradeable\_init() if needed). If the contract does not need to be upgradeable at all, consider removing or disabling UUPS references to eliminate any exploit paths.

**Update**: UUPS library deleted, it was not used.



#### 1. Missing Zero-Address Check in updateAvailabilityForNFT() [Fixed ]

**Issue**: In the function updateAvailabilityForNFT(), there is no validation to ensure that the NFT address passed (nft) is not the zero address. Consequently, the contract owner can mistakenly (or maliciously) set the availability of a zero address, which is generally an invalid address for NFTs.

**Recommendation**: Add a require() statement to verify that the nft address is not zero.

**Update**: Fixed, 0 address check added.

#### 2. Excess ETH Fee Not Refunded [Fixed ]

**Issue**: When a user pays fees via \_payFee(), there is a require(msg.value >= \_fee, ...), but any excess ETH is not refunded. This could result in users accidentally overpaying fees and losing the difference if they send more ETH than required.

**Recommendation**: Consider adding logic to refund msg.sender any msg.value in excess of the required fee. For example, storing uint256 overpaid = msg.value - \_fee and then returning that amount to the sender.

**Update**: Fixed, overpaid fees are returned to the user.

#### 3. Lack of Fallback/Receive Function [Fixed ]

**Issue**: The contract does not define a fallback or receive function. In case a user or contract sends ETH accidentally (above the fee amount) or calls an unrecognized function, that ETH may become permanently stuck.

**Recommendation**: Although not critical, you might add a fallback or receive() function to handle unexpected ETH transfers. Alternatively, consider implementing a withdraw/claim function accessible by the owner (or a designated account) to rescue stuck ETH.

Update: Fixed, receive external payable was added and withdraweth() function to call it.

#### 4. Project Ownership Auto-Assignment [Acknowledge 12]

**Issue**: When someone locks a project token for the first time and projects[projectToken].owner == address(0), the contract sets projects[projectToken].owner = msg.sender. This might cause confusion if an unauthorized user is the first to lock tokens for that project. While not a vulnerability per se, it can lead to misunderstandings about who "owns" the project in this contract's context

**Recommendation**: Communicate clearly in documentation that the first caller to lock a token in this contract becomes the "project owner" for that token in the GempadLock system, or restrict the initial project owner assignment to ensure only the legitimate project owner can perform the first lock.

**Update**: Acknowledged. will be clearly documented on the gitbook.

#### 5. Upgradeable Path Not Implemented [N/A V]

**Issue**: The contract inherits UUPSUpgradeable references and uses OwnableUpgradeable, but \_authorizeUpgrade() is not clearly present. If future upgrades are intended, you must ensure \_authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation) is properly implemented. Otherwise, the upgrade mechanism may be non-functional or insecure.

**Recommendation**: If the intention is truly to be upgradeable, add and restrict \_authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation) to only the contract owner or a designated upgrader. If upgradeability is not required, consider removing UUPS references to avoid confusion.

Update: UUPS library deleted, it was not used.

#### 6. Locking Deflationary Tokens Will Revert [Fixed ]

**Issue**: The helper function \_safeTransferFromEnsureExactAmount(...) requires that the recipient's balance increases by exact amount. Many deflationary, reflection, or fee-on-transfer tokens will deduct a fee in-transit, causing the recipient's balance to increase by a smaller amount. This causes the lock to revert.

**Recommendation**: If supporting deflationary tokens is desired, remove or adjust the exact balance check. If it is an intentional design choice to not support deflationary tokens, document this limitation clearly.

**Update**: Fixed, \_safeTransferFromEnsureExactAmount has been replaced by \_safeTransferFrom(...) which calculates the actual difference transferred. Thus, if the token is deflationary, the difference does not trigger revert, and the amountIn received is adjusted.



No informational severity issues were found.

## **Testing coverage**

During the testing phase, custom use cases were written to cover all the logic of contracts. \*Check "Annexes" to see the testing code.

#### **GemPadLock contract tests:**

```
tests/test_gempad.py::test_multiple_lock RUNNING
Transaction sent: 0x86ec20dcadfb23e63a48f51dbe77lb44a85aa5b2b5399e843529a23021531ae8
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 0
ERC20Mock.constructor confirmed Block: 1 Gas used: 495827 (4.13%)
ERC20Mock deployed at: 0x3194cBDC3dbcd3Ella07892e7bA5c3394048Cc87
Transaction sent: 0x6994551dc37487455bf4ee92d7c7cc38be6le9423d79239591640a235f81382a
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 1
GempadLock.constructor confirmed Block: 2 Gas used: 5149710 (42.91%)
GempadLock deployed at: 0x602C7le4DAC47a042Ee7f46E0aee17F94A3bA0B6
Transaction sent: 0xf5f78ee2e3526e39b367e6d33d42206b709856296fc90aa64c8c9836c8700ec0
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 0
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed (Length mismatch) Block: 3 Gas used: 38556 (0
Transaction sent: 0x10891405ccf3feb7la28f3ececf155f518abdccd2e04f603617008ea15f57e3c
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 1
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed (TGE date should be set in the future) Block: 4 Gas used: 38227 (0.32%)
Transaction sent: 0xlad44be31b104cb02d97b5a05ld6af43lc8ldbb913a697a9ee5fa3b28le83a3f
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 2
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed (Invalid token) Block: 5 Gas used: 38045 (0.32%)
Transaction sent: 0x16e71d2ee1c5c9f4e1679a3b5eb6089e472db1b9f96da9ba0e2966fa674le72b
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 3
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed (The amount cannot be zero) Block: 6 Gas used: 38338 (0.32%)
Transaction sent: 0xd588631b672fc479ece87728bfa918f70d358dba72a6d89a30b82152e19dafbe
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 2
ERC20Mock.mint confirmed Block: 7 Gas used: 65511 (0.55%)
Transaction sent: 0x1714373726c54638c0b9192ebcc7cbb516e224a341b197bf00f2f0c2ad7033c6
    Gas price: 0.0 gwei    Gas limit: 12000000    Nonce: 4
    ERC20Mock.approve confirmed    Block: 8    Gas used: 43862 (0.37%)
Transaction sent: 0x7d9d433416d2c968899e860687dcca26c0c933b11ce809e8b1927488bf7ed990
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 5
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed Block: 9 Gas used: 474411 (3.95%)
Transaction sent: 0xbdbb515a2d7d789d2f6328878232375a95b87e6lb83b3lc9b4fb39c7a96a586d
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 3
ERC20Mock.mint confirmed Block: 10 Gas used: 50499 (0.42%)
Transaction sent: 0xafe8a8e39f9a27c3e7e02262a0616b7d5a8cbd79ca035d363139bab7dc66699f
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 0
ERC20Mock.approve confirmed Block: 11 Gas used: 43862 (0.37%)
Transaction sent: 0x028a993b3816ca04dee6f51c57053f6d4f00634cd92161bf01c6d1cf569a6005
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 1
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed Block: 12 Gas used: 329716 (2.75%)
Transaction sent: 0x6ca58124c3409826d3dc3776160a4b2f6125176f585610bded67c9f6f7a6d030
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 6
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed (This token is not the project token) Block: 13 Gas used: 66017 (0.55%)
tests/test_gempad.py::test_multiple_lock PASSED
```

```
tests/test_gempad.py::test_multiple_vesting_lock RUNNING
Transaction sent: 0xdb6d7a788c1f8b4e4df70d6dd03844325ab85d47c6c41eb65ea7185b0cd3978a
   Gas price: 0.0 gwe1 Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 4
ERC20Mock.constructor confirmed Block: 14 Gas used: 495827 (4.13%)
ERC20Mock deployed at: 0xe0aA552A10d7EC8760Fc6c246D391E698a82dDf9
Transaction sent: 0xcf4deb56c6ef3530f5bc99be53670bf65f5557392366076d1801922f1c36dela
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 120000000 Nonce: 5
GempadLock.constructor confirmed Block: 15 Gas used: 5149710 (42.91%)
GempadLock deployed at: 0x6b4BDe1086912A6Cb24ce3dB43b3466e6c72AFd3
Transaction sent: 0x046b502271e0ce1665433a94albd7cbbfad410e27dcle7elc093c178019803f6
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 7
GempadLock.multipleVestingLock confirmed (Invalid cycle) Block: 16 Gas used: 38717 (0.32%)
Transaction sent: 0x70c645afbdb223adcd04e37b5f4ccbfee649810113e55c980e056a78ff045bdb
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 8
GempadLock.multipleVestingLock confirmed (Invalid bips for TGE) Block: 17 Gas used: 38753 (0.32%)
Transaction sent: 0xdc7ld4ba4dba7la448f344e47c73cb99be6f0la14ecf16d26fd5la6c68217513
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 9
GempadLock.multipleVestingLock confirmed (Invalid bips for cycle) Block: 18 Gas used: 38830 (0.32%)
Transaction sent: 0x89caac1b731c58973c8c010d45094cc5971e6049ale1dfcc5a00d84430e045f8
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 10
GempadLock.multipleVestingLock confirmed (Sum of TGE bps and cycle should be less than 10000) Block: 19 Gas used: 38989 (0.32%)
Transaction sent: 0x44c9bb2e78c994ec7f319d349028f68ba0a75429d1a80284dc944d514e535fcd
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 6
ERC20Mock.mint confirmed Block: 20 Gas used: 65511 (0.55%)
Transaction sent: 0xb78f4e44c1l2dc342a967ba00900348e57e270f0ef0994004c7a296d4a57e5d9
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 11
ERC20Mock.approve confirmed Block: 21 Gas used: 43862 (0.37%)
Transaction sent: 0xbc74f591869569ebfa5644b697c6706b069024acf678a3db29bb305db48f0205
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 12
GempadLock.multipleVestingLock confirmed Block: 22 Gas used: 475506 (3.96%)
Transaction sent: 0xdebe827a20320338cf20199ce549bbe7c339ea49c655b8476ab07d617594b2c8
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 7
ERC20Mock.mint confirmed Block: 23 Gas used: 50499 (0.42%)
Transaction sent: 0x57f793245c8ee442fbb1f9f3751dee654e2838d0c6b6826ca42cafe5acbdf512
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 2
ERC20Mock.approve confirmed Block: 24 Gas used: 43862 (0.37%)
Transaction sent: 0x029695c8e49ee033ea28460273a2142ca4914f42c0ac7cd24dfdc044b4fbllcc
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 3
GempadLock.multipleVestingLock confirmed Block: 25 Gas used: 315823 (2.63%)
tests/test_gempad.py::test_multiple_vesting_lock PASSED
```

```
tests/test_gempad.py::test_unlock RUNNING
Transaction sent: 0xfa03ce8f2c2albled42ce160b3eff94028c4f13d5a61b895a2bc2e41ee0aa220
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 8
ERC20Mock.constructor confirmed Block: 26 Gas used: 495827 (4.13%)
ERC20Mock deployed at: 0x420b109989eF5baba6092029594eF45E19A04A4A
Transaction sent: 0x0fed4c834daddacccd3c8e5e46dlac805bd0c89d3a7aced796ce47e4674d312f
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 9
GempadLock.constructor confirmed Block: 27 Gas used: 5149710 (42.91%)
GempadLock deployed at: 0xa3853dDCd2E3fC28e8E130288F2aBD8d5EE37472
Transaction sent: 0x054480572842f3a7c65927681252c40649180cd4f74ea1001fcb477fd52dbalb
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 10
ERC20Mock.mint confirmed Block: 28 Gas used: 65511 (0.55%)
Transaction sent: 0x639df01725a7fc832fa9e9be66b837f0178lee5891fdf685858be858364a3855
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 13
ERC20Mock.approve confirmed Block: 29 Gas used: 43862 (0.37%)
Transaction sent: 0xcec3be04ade9d5c1d06df3dle39a40144cd4fe258ded017b668c0380b659aecd
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 14
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed Block: 30 Gas used: 474411 (3.95%)
Transaction sent: 0xfcc43b99a27eafc026a3ea0e8d4c587d7f30ab059020cceb9e908e78035bad8a
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 4
GempadLock.unlock confirmed (Invalid lock ID) Block: 31 Gas used: 22618 (0.19%)
Transaction sent: 0x309c49710bl1f0f2f6b59933047d1276744216d0d31e8b95d5eaa65947801176
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 5
GempadLock.unlock confirmed (You are not the owner of this lock) Block: 32 Gas used: 30273 (0.25%)
Transaction sent: 0x05d322ded74e693d28e5090417c7792f2ba8d55eeb4942b0d11b8b659a41c735
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas Limit: 12000000 Nonce: 15
GempadLock.unlock confirmed (The lock is not unlocked yet) Block: 33 Gas used: 32060 (0.27%)
Transaction sent: 0x99294c2ce0e85b4a29fef4de6fd208aa89c9143469946e4ae70a702a3b027808
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 16
GempadLock.unlock confirmed Block: 35 Gas used: 74253 (0.62%)
Transaction sent: 0xbbfe67b0739c54815aaa5c56067e288ec7066d9a3076af4cedlbfa61bca285b1
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 11
ERC20Mock.mint confirmed Block: 37 Gas used: 50499 (0.42%)
Transaction sent: 0x4126eebb5ec980dd2a90613778f7ladae69b32116d4ddalc630c46aa78383989
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 6
ERC20Mock.approve confirmed Block: 38 Gas used: 43862 (0.37%)
Transaction sent: 0xadc0e7ec528a10a07017c192be4f6d8b29b82c4777f8ba0c94724a1c38e9dc63
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 7
GempadLock.multipleVestingLock confirmed Block: 39 Gas used: 439310 (3.66%)
Transaction sent: 0x47ad6flc3075635a8a70dfeeb2444bb4d9bf7f5da85b9d49ec80687a3c641195
   Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas Limit: 12000000 Nonce: 8
GempadLock.unlock confirmed (You are not the owner of this lock) Block: 40 Gas used: 30285 (0.25%)
Transaction sent: 0x5a364ad57a84a79b75266b40bl16a91613e77b28df8f9c5b05f7479c61a64695
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 1
GempadLock.unlock confirmed Block: 43 Gas used: 97750 (0.81%)
tests/test_gempad.pv::test_unlock_PASSET
```

```
tests/test_gempad.py::test_update_fee RUNNING
Transaction sent: 0x8c8c03a99clc5eaa476e48db796e5d9e9e9e4bla78540b6f24989a0744f515e4
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 12
ERC20Mock.constructor confirmed Block: 44 Gas used: 495827 (4.13%)
ERC20Mock deployed at: 0x2c15A3156108fa5248E4CbCbd693320e9D8E03Cc
Transaction sent: 0xb30c5alffal26cbfa0eal1582047aaaf2e464allce04c1586753d226c8d10789
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 13
GempadLock.constructor confirmed Block: 45 Gas used: 5149710 (42.91%)
GempadLock deployed at: 0xe692Cf21B12e0B2717C4bF647F9768Fa58861c8b
 Transaction sent: 0x932505864ceadb14154d9d1f9708416c8424d789e3605134f46c9a03431cb53d
    Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 9
GempadLock.updateFee confirmed (reverted) Block: 46 Gas used: 23357 (0.19%)
 Transaction sent: 0xfldae0cb832e8f401c3a4c3fc8ebdfe5c5bde4d2380b3b27c15c43598783e6c5
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 14
GempadLock.initialize confirmed Block: 47 Gas used: 70389 (0.59%)
Transaction sent: 0xe55432lebf55c23ffb89925fe88854c98f373afle0d6558a82l3c1670bd3fcd3
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 15
GempadLock.updateFee confirmed Block: 48 Gas used: 125634 (1.05%)
 Transaction sent: 0x22745850cee0723aa0777e481145423affed0600ecd28f4b10fa7df333b15eca
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 16
ERC20Mock.mint confirmed Block: 49 Gas used: 65511 (0.55%)
 Transaction sent: 0x6fa506d51a3ce23804650507ce0d43699695efd8db7ea99cfbc7e11032003e8d
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 18
ERC20Mock.approve confirmed Block: 50 Gas used: 43862 (0.37%)
 Transaction sent: 0xcef87840c9fc2e8c5604f605lcd8756742d49be4f47c9869b0369a63b2le9abb
    Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 19
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed (Not enough funds for fees) Block: 51 Gas used: 36220 (0.30%)
Transaction sent: 0xbfa30af3f7487a6686affae468cde4b895288f8823703ca086cc8f40b8bcad98
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 20
GempadLock.multipleLock confirmed Block: 52 Gas used: 481111 (4.01%)
tests/test_gempad.py::test_update_fee PASSED
tests/test_gempad.py::test_update_availability_for_nft RUNNING
Transaction sent: 0xed7e7c5f5bc65e3c68739a7095e9c0a803f63e0d0e5d3dcb3d98e55d86d2650c
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 17
GempadLock.constructor confirmed Block: 53 Gas used: 5149710 (42.91%)
GempadLock deployed at: 0xFbD588c72B438faD4Cf7cD879c8F730Faa2l3Da0
Transaction sent: 0x9e79bd7ea77ce55a80beb13193efcb3aa1b5aa5a86abe3411fe126c7bd79a650
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 21
GempadLock.updateAvailabilityForNFT confirmed (reverted) Block: 54 Gas used: 22904 (0.19%)
 Transaction sent: 0x15cd4be57773cfc26c6a55dad7b9ae3ff131f61fae8bb6204de03500e5944407
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 18
GempadLock.initialize confirmed Block: 55 Gas used: 70389 (0.59%)
Transaction sent: 0xbf1fe3ab8c2e5e3dd978d0e52d2816d0ea111c6558122043d5af87c5bc653671
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 19
GempadLock.updateAvailabilityForNFT confirmed Block: 56 Gas used: 46049 (0.38%)
 Transaction sent: 0x5410c579b0b4c0443fc77697aefe2d3f5b57b643d47cac3d658db327aaca1086
    Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 12000000 Nonce: 20
GempadLock.updateAvailabilityForNFT confirmed (the same) Block: 57 Gas used: 23922 (0.20%)
tests/test_gempad.py::test_update_availability_for_nft PASSED
```

## **Annexes**

Testing code:

Test GemPadLock contract:

```
from brownie import (
    reverts,
from scripts.helpful_scripts import (
   ZERO_ADDRESS,
   DAY_TIMESTAMP,
   get_account,
   get_timestamp,
    increase_timestamp
from scripts.deploy import (
    deploy_erc,
    deploy_gempad
def test_multiple_lock(only_local):
   # Arrange
   owner = get_account(0)
   other = get_account(1)
    extra = get_account(2)
    token = deploy_erc(owner, "token", "TKN")
```

```
gempad = deploy_gempad(owner)
with reverts("Length mismatch"):
    gempad.multipleLock(
        [other, extra], token.address, False, [1e18],
        get_timestamp(1), "no_description", "no_metadata",
        token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
with reverts("TGE date should be set in the future"):
    gempad.multipleLock(
        [other], token.address, False, [1e18],
        1, "no_description", "no_metadata",
        token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
with reverts("Invalid token"):
    gempad.multipleLock(
        [other], ZERO_ADDRESS, False, [1e18],
        get_timestamp(1), "no_description", "no_metadata",
        token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
with reverts("The amount cannot be zero"):
    gempad.multipleLock(
        [other], token.address, False, [0],
        get_timestamp(1), "no_description", "no_metadata",
        token.address, other,
```

```
{"from": other})
token.mint(other, 5e18)
token.approve(gempad.address, 2e18, {"from": other})
tx = gempad.multipleLock(
        [other], token.address, False, [1e18],
        get_timestamp(1), "no_description", "no_metadata",
        token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['id'] == 0
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['owner'] == other
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['metaData'] == "no_metadata"
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['referrer'] == other
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['locker'] == other
token.mint(extra, 5e18)
token.approve(gempad.address, 1e18, {"from": extra})
tx = gempad.multipleLock(
        [extra], token.address, False, [1e18],
        get_timestamp(1), "no_description", "no_metadata",
        token.address, other,
        {"from": extra})
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['id'] == 1
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['owner'] == other
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['metaData'] == "no_metadata"
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['referrer'] == other
```

```
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['locker'] == extra
   with reverts("This token is not the project token"):
        gempad.multipleLock(
            [other], token.address, False, [1e18],
            get_timestamp(1), "no_description", "no_metadata",
            extra, other,
            {"from": other})
def test_multiple_vesting_lock(only_local):
   # Arrange
   owner = get_account(0)
   other = get_account(1)
   extra = get_account(2)
   token = deploy_erc(owner, "token", "TKN")
   gempad = deploy_gempad(owner)
   with reverts("Invalid cycle"):
        gempad.multipleVestingLock(
            [other], [1e18], token.address, False,
            get_timestamp(1), 500000, 0, 500000,
            "no_description", "no_metadata", token.address, other,
            {"from": other})
   with reverts("Invalid bips for TGE"):
        gempad.multipleVestingLock(
```

```
[other], [1e18], token.address, False,
        get_timestamp(1), 0, 10000, 5000000,
        "no_description", "no_metadata", token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
with reverts("Invalid bips for cycle"):
    gempad.multipleVestingLock(
        [other], [1e18], token.address, False,
        get_timestamp(1), 500000, 10000, 0,
        "no_description", "no_metadata", token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
with reverts("Sum of TGE bps and cycle should be less than 10000"):
    gempad.multipleVestingLock(
        [other], [1e18], token.address, False,
        get_timestamp(1), 500000, 10000, 600000,
        "no_description", "no_metadata", token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
token.mint(other, 5e18)
token.approve(gempad.address, 2e18, {"from": other})
tx = gempad.multipleVestingLock(
        [other], [1e18], token.address, False,
        get_timestamp(1), 500000, 10000, 500000,
        "no_description", "no_metadata", token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['id'] == 0
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['owner'] == other
```

```
assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['metaData'] == "no_metadata"
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['referrer'] == other
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['locker'] == other
   token.mint(extra, 5e18)
   token.approve(gempad.address, 1e18, {"from": extra})
   tx = gempad.multipleVestingLock(
            [other], [1e18], token.address, False,
           get_timestamp(1), 500000, 10000, 500000,
            "no_description", "no_metadata", token.address, other,
           {"from": extra})
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['id'] == 1
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['owner'] == other
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['metaData'] == "no_metadata"
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['referrer'] == other
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['locker'] == extra
def test_unlock(only_local):
   # Arrange
   owner = get_account(0)
   other = get_account(1)
   extra = get_account(2)
   another = get_account(3)
   token = deploy_erc(owner, "token", "TKN")
   gempad = deploy_gempad(owner)
```

```
token.mint(other, 5e18)
token.approve(gempad.address, 2e18, {"from": other})
tx = gempad.multipleLock(
        [other], token.address, False, [1e18],
        get_timestamp(1), "no_description", "no_metadata",
        token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
lock_id = tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['id']
with reverts("Invalid lock ID"):
    gempad.unlock(1, {"from": extra})
with reverts("You are not the owner of this lock"):
    gempad.unlock(lock_id, {"from": extra})
with reverts("The lock is not unlocked yet"):
    gempad.unlock(lock_id, {"from": other})
increase_timestamp(DAY_TIMESTAMP * 2)
tx = gempad.unlock(lock_id, {"from": other})
assert tx.events['Transfer'][0]['from'] == gempad.address
assert tx.events['Transfer'][0]['to'] == other
assert tx.events['Transfer'][0]['value'] == 1e18
assert tx.events['LockRemoved'][0]['id'] == lock_id
with reverts("Nothing to unlock"):
    gempad.unlock(lock_id, {"from": other})
token.mint(extra, 5e18)
```

```
token.approve(gempad.address, 1e18, {"from": extra})
   tx = gempad.multipleVestingLock(
            [another], [1e18], token.address, False,
            get_timestamp(1), 500000, 10000, 500000,
            "no_description", "no_metadata", token.address, extra,
           {"from": extra})
   lock_id = tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['id']
   with reverts("You are not the owner of this lock"):
        gempad.unlock(lock_id, {"from": extra})
   with reverts("Nothing to unlock"):
        gempad.unlock(lock_id, {"from": another})
   increase_timestamp(DAY_TIMESTAMP * 2)
   tx = gempad.unlock(lock_id, {"from": another})
   assert tx.events['Transfer'][0]['from'] == gempad.address
   assert tx.events['Transfer'][0]['to'] == another
   assert tx.events['Transfer'][0]['value'] == 1e18
   assert tx.events['LockRemoved'][0]['id'] == lock_id
def test_update_fee(only_local):
   # Arrange
   owner = get_account(0)
   other = get_account(1)
   extra = get_account(2)
   token = deploy_erc(owner, "token", "TKN")
   gempad = deploy_gempad(owner)
```

```
with reverts():
    gempad.updateFee(1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, {"from": extra})
gempad.initialize({"from": owner})
assert gempad.fee()[0] == 0
assert gempad.fee()[1] == 0
assert gempad.fee()[2] == 0
assert gempad.fee()[3] == 0
assert gempad.fee()[4] == 0
tx = gempad.updateFee(1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, {"from": owner})
assert gempad.fee()[0] == 1000
assert gempad.fee()[1] == 2000
assert gempad.fee()[2] == 3000
assert gempad.fee()[3] == 4000
assert gempad.fee()[4] == 5000
token.mint(other, 5e18)
token.approve(gempad.address, 2e18, {"from": other})
with reverts("Not enough funds for fees"):
    gempad.multipleLock(
        [other], token.address, False, [1e18],
        get_timestamp(1), "no_description", "no_metadata",
        token.address, other,
        {"from": other})
tx = gempad.multipleLock(
        [other], token.address, False, [1e18],
        get_timestamp(1), "no_description", "no_metadata",
```

```
token.address, other,
            {"from": other, "value": 5000})
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['id'] == 0
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['owner'] == other
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['metaData'] == "no_metadata"
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['referrer'] == other
   assert tx.events['LockAdded'][0]['locker'] == other
def test_update_availability_for_nft(only_local):
   # Arrange
   owner = get_account(0)
   other = get_account(1)
   random_nft = "0x29bc8ba7e29dF4868c35Cafb4caeE7BD3cEe9CEE"
   gempad = deploy_gempad(owner)
   with reverts():
        gempad.updateAvailabilityForNFT(random_nft, True, {"from": other})
   gempad.initialize({"from": owner})
   assert gempad.isAvailableNFT(random_nft) == False
   tx = gempad.updateAvailabilityForNFT(random_nft, True, {"from": owner})
   assert tx.events['NFTAvailableUpdated'][0]['nft'] == random_nft
   assert tx.events['NFTAvailableUpdated'][0]['isAvailable'] == True
   assert gempad.isAvailableNFT(random_nft) == True
   with reverts("the same"):
        gempad.updateAvailabilityForNFT(random_nft, True, {"from": owner})
```

## **Technical Findings Summary**

### **Findings**

Vulnerability Level	Total	Pending	Not Apply	Acknowledged	Partially Fixed	Fixed
High	0					
Medium	3		1			2
Low	6		1	1		4
Informational	0					

## **Assessment Results**

#### **Score Results**

Review	Score
Global Score	90/100
Assure KYC	Not completed
Audit Score	90/100

The Following Score System Has been Added to this page to help understand the value of the audit, the maximum score is 100, however to attain that value the project must pass and provide all the data needed for the assessment. Our Passing Score has been changed to 84 Points for a higher standard, if a project does not attain 85% is an automatic failure. Read our notes and final assessment below. The Global Score is a combination of the evaluations obtained between having or not having KYC and the type of contract audited together with its manual audit.

## **Audit PASS**

Following our comprehensive security audit of the token contract for the GemPadLock project, we inform you that the contract has not met the required standards and reported medium/low vulnerabilities must be reviewed prior to deployment. After reviewing the issues, the development team applies all necessary corrective measures.

#### **Disclaimer**

Assure Defi has conducted an independent security assessment to verify the integrity of and highlight any vulnerabilities or errors, intentional or unintentional, that may be present in the reviewed code for the scope of this assessment. This report does not constitute agreement, acceptance, or advocating for the Project, and users relying on this report should not consider this as having any merit for financial advice in any shape, form, or nature. The contracts audited do not account for any economic developments that the Project in question may pursue, and the veracity of the findings thus presented in this report relate solely to the proficiency, competence, aptitude, and discretion of our independent auditors, who make no guarantees nor assurance that the contracts are entirely free of exploits, bugs, vulnerabilities or deprecation of technologies. All information provided in this report does not constitute financial or investment advice, nor should it be used to signal that any person reading this report should invest their funds without sufficient individual due diligence, regardless of the findings presented. Information is provided 'as is, and Assure Defi is under no covenant to audit completeness, accuracy, or solidity of the contracts. In no event will Assure Defi or its partners, employees, agents, or parties related to the provision of this audit report be liable to any parties for, or lack thereof, decisions or actions with regards to the information provided in this audit report. The assessment services provided by Assure Defi are subject to dependencies and are under continuing development. You agree that your access or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies with high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives, negatives, and unpredictable results. The services may access, and depend upon, multiple layers of third parties.

