



ASSURE DEFI®

THE VERIFICATION GOLD STANDARD

SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT



NAME: RIFTS PROTOCOL

STATUS: PASS

DATE: 04/01/2025



Risk Analysis

Vulnerability summary

Classification	Description
● High	High-severity issues can lead to direct loss of funds, unauthorized state changes, or permanent corruption of on-chain data . These vulnerabilities may allow attackers to drain program-owned accounts, bypass signer or ownership checks, or arbitrarily manipulate critical program logic.
● Medium	Medium-severity issues are generally more difficult to exploit or require specific conditions, but they can still negatively affect program security or correctness . Examples include insufficient account validation, missing constraints, or logic flaws that could enable unintended behavior under certain circumstances.
● Low	Low-severity issues typically relate to best-practice deviations, inefficient logic, or edge-case behavior that does not immediately threaten funds or program integrity. These findings generally have minimal impact on execution but may reduce code robustness or maintainability.
● Informational	Informational findings include code style issues, unused variables or instructions, documentation gaps, or general recommendations . These do not affect program security or execution and are provided solely to improve code clarity and long-term maintainability.

Executive Summary

According to the Assure assessment, the Customer's smart contract is **Secured**.

Insecure

Poorly Secured

Secured

Well Secured

SCOPE

Target Code And Revision

For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the Rift Protocol verifying both the functional logic and surface-level implementation of the program, with access to the underlying source code.

Target Code And Revision

Project	Assure
Language	Rust
Codebase	https://github.com/riftsprotocol/rifts-protocol-v2 Commit: 756ef8054bf719cd4c19b0d808f35a9034be75e9 Fix: 13de0d897390838849f52b516d78b150105d6362
Audit Methodology	Static, Manual

AUDIT OVERVIEW



HIGH

1. Fee distribution can be redirected to arbitrary token accounts (treasury + partner theft) [Fixed ✓]

Issue:

distribute_fees_from_vault (underlying fee vault)

Token program ownership + unpack succeeds, but do not enforce that:

- treasury_account is owned by rift.treasury_wallet
- partner_account is owned by rift.partner_wallet
- or that either is the correct ATA for (wallet, mint)

Evidence (line numbers from src/lib.rs):

- Treasury account validation only checks program owner + unpack (no owner/mint/ATA binding):
L3460–L3478
- Partner account validation only checks program owner + unpack (no owner/mint/ATA binding):
L3480–L3501

Transfers use whatever accounts are passed: L3572–L3608

Authorization allows creator OR partner OR treasury OR program authority to call distribution
(L3509–L3514).

A malicious (or compromised) creator can:

provide the real treasury_wallet pubkey (passes check at L3519–L3523),
but pass a treasury_account token account they control,
and the program will transfer the “treasury share” to the attacker-controlled account.



Recommendation:

Mandatory account binding checks before any transfer:

- Enforce treasury_account.owner == treasury_wallet and treasury_account.mint == underlying_mint
- Enforce partner_account.owner == partner_wallet and partner_account.mint == underlying_mint

Stronger: enforce ATA derivation:

- treasury_account.key() == get_associated_token_address(treasury_wallet, underlying_mint)
- partner_account.key() == get_associated_token_address(partner_wallet, underlying_mint)

Prefer Anchor constraints using associated_token::authority and associated_token::mint where possible (reduces manual parsing risk).

Fix: distribute_fees_from_vault now unpacks the destination token accounts (SPL or Token-2022) and enforces:

treasury_token_owner == rift.treasury_wallet

treasury_token_mint == rift.underlying_mint

(and same for partner).

So a malicious caller can no longer pass an attacker-controlled token account unless it is actually owned by the treasury/partner wallet.

2. Withheld-fee distribution (Token-2022) can also be redirected to arbitrary token accounts [Fixed]

 [✓]

Issue:

distribute_withheld_vault (RIFT withheld fee vault)

Evidence:

Treasury account validation checks only program owner (L3867–L3873) and later unpacks for balance checks but never asserts owner == treasury_wallet.

Partner account similarly is not bound to partner wallet (L3875–L3884).

Transfers send to passed accounts: L3982–L4019.

Recommendation:

Same as **1. Fee distribution can be redirected to arbitrary token accounts (treasury + partner theft)** (enforce owner/mint/ATA binding).

Fix: distribute_withheld_vault now enforces for both SPL and Token-2022 token accounts:

destination token account owner == rift.treasury_wallet / partner_wallet

destination token account mint == rift.rift_mint

This blocks redirecting withheld distributions to arbitrary accounts.

3. Oracle average logic can deadlock rebalance and related flows (“stale entry = hard fail”) [Partailly Fixed ✓]

Issue:

Rift::get_average_oracle_price() → get_average_oracle_price_with_options(false) (L5632–L5635)

get_average_oracle_price_with_options iterates stored oracle samples and returns error immediately if any sample is stale (unless allow_staleFallback=true):

Evidence:

Staleness logic: L5645–L5663

if age > MAX_ORACLE_AGE and allow_staleFallback == false → return Err(OraclePriceStale) (L5661–L5663)

MAX_ORACLE_AGE = 3600 seconds (L5642)

Recommendation:

Change the algorithm:

Skip stale samples in normal mode too, and require:

fresh_count >= MIN_FRESH_SAMPLES (for example, 3)

otherwise fallback (or fail with a clearer error)

Alternatively: store only the most recent sample + EMA, rather than a strict staleness constraint over a ring buffer.

Ensure update_manual_oracle calls get_average_oracle_price_with_options(true) if the purpose is to recover from deadlock (your comments suggest this intent).

Fix: Fixed for manual recovery: update_manual_oracle was changed to call get_average_oracle_price_with_options(true) (recovery mode), so it can proceed even if prices are stale.

Not fully fixed globally: in get_average_oracle_price_with_options, the non-recovery path still returns Err(OraclePriceStale) on the first stale sample (there's still an early return Err(...) when allow_staleFallback == false).

So any flows still calling average with false (e.g., get_average_oracle_price()) or rebalance paths if unchanged) can still deadlock when the ring contains stale entries



MEDIUM

1. Emergency withdraw can sign for PDAs derived from arbitrary pubkeys (broad “2-of-2 admin” drain surface) [Fixed ✓]

Issue:

admin_emergency_withdraw_vault signs with seeds derived from closed_rift_pubkey passed in instruction data (not inherently tied to the provided rift account).

Evidence (handler excerpt earlier in file + account struct):

Uses closed_rift_pubkey to derive vault_auth_seeds and signs CPI transfers.

Accounts struct AdminEmergencyWithdrawVault does not bind closed_rift_pubkey to rift.key() (see struct region around vault signer derivation).

Recommendation:

Bind emergency withdraw strictly to rift.key():

enforce closed_rift_pubkey == rift.key() (or remove parameter entirely and use rift.key()).

Add invariant checks that the vault being withdrawn is exactly rift.vault / rift.fees_vault (as applicable).

Use multisig / governance program for admin keys.

Fix: admin_emergency_withdraw_vault now enforces:

closed_rift_pubkey == ctx.accounts.rift.key()

ctx.accounts.vault.key() == ctx.accounts.rift.vault

So the signer seeds can't be derived from an arbitrary pubkey anymore, and the vault must match the rift.



2. Underlying mint authority/freeze risks (SPL Token path) [Acknowledge]

Issue:

In create_rift, SPL Token underlying mints are allowed even if:

mint authority exists,

freeze authority exists,

Token-2022 has explicit blacklisting of dangerous extensions (PermanentDelegate, TransferHook, NonTransferable, etc.), but classic SPL Token does not have equivalent protections.

Recommendation:

If the protocol assumes “safe underlyings only,” enforce:

- mint_authority == None
- freeze_authority == None

Or maintain an allowlist of acceptable underlying mints.

Note: The code explicitly keeps authority checks disabled and documents it as an “acknowledged risk” to support stablecoins and other trusted assets.

3. “95% threshold” leakage acceptance can hide meaningful losses for some tokens [Fixed]

Issue:

Both distribution functions accept actual_sent >= amount*95% style thresholds. This tolerates up to 5% leakage. If a token’s effective fee behavior deviates, the protocol may silently lose value (though you cap some underlying fee configs earlier).

Recommendation:

either enforce exact deltas, or enforce token-specific fee maximums based on mint configuration.

Fix: The tolerance was tightened from 95% to 98%, but it’s still a tolerance (not exact-delta enforcement). So “silent loss up to threshold” is reduced, not eliminated.

4. distribute fees from vault does not decrement rift.total_fees_collected [Fixed ✓]

Issue:

distribute_fees_from_vault transfers underlying out of fees_vault to treasury/partner but does not decrement rift.total_fees_collected. As a result, on-chain accounting diverges from actual fees_vault balances, and close_rift can be permanently blocked because it requires total_fees_collected == 0.

Recommendation:

After successful transfers, decrement total_fees_collected by the actual amount debited (use pre/post balance diffs on fees_vault, or compute actual_sent). Update state only after all CPIs succeed, and use checked math.

Fix: After distribution it now subtracts actual_sent from rift.total_fees_collected (using post-balance diff), so accounting tracks real debits even with fee-on-transfer behavior.

5. Internal fee routing can leak value on transfer-fee underlying mints (Token-2022) [Partially Fixed]

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Issue:

When the underlying mint is Token-2022 with TransferFeeConfig, protocol fee routing transfers (vault to fees_vault) inside wrap_tokens and unwrap_from_vault can themselves be charged transfer fees. This can (a) reduce backing in vault more than expected, (b) reduce the credited amount in fees_vault, and (c) break strict “backing == minted minus burned” accounting assumptions unless you measure actual deltas.

Recommendation:

Either:

Measure actual credited/debited amounts for internal fee transfers via pre/post balance diffs and account accordingly, or avoid internal transfers for transfer-fee underlyings (keep fees in vault and distribute using measured deltas), or disallow transfer-fee underlying mints if strict invariants are required.

Fix: Added balance-diff measurement (actual_fee_credited) for vault to fees_vault transfers, which detects fee-on-transfer behavior and can be used for correct accounting.

However, the shown accounting update adds both wrap_fee and actual_fee_credited (looks like double counting), so the fix is not clearly correct as written. Also, measuring credit doesn't prevent vault-side leakage it just makes it visible/accountable.

6. Incomplete Token-2022 extension validation for underlying mints (DoS risk) [Fixed ✓]

Issue:

Underlying mint validation blocks several extensions

(TransferHook/MemoTransfer/PermanentDelegate/NonTransferable/MintCloseAuthority) but effectively allows other extensions by default. Certain extensions (notably DefaultAccountState = Frozen, and other restrictive/confidential transfer extensions) can render vault token accounts unusable, permanently breaking wrap/unwrap even though rift creation succeeds.

Recommendation:

Switch to a deny-by-default policy for underlying Token-2022 mints:

- Explicitly allow only the minimal set you have audited and can support.
- Explicitly reject DefaultAccountState (Frozen), confidential transfer / transfer restriction extensions, and any hook/delegate-style extensions.
- Add a controlled allowlist (admin/multisig) only if you need broader mint support.

Fix: now explicitly block:

DefaultAccountState

ConfidentialTransferMint

ConfidentialTransferFeeConfig

This addresses the “frozen by default / confidential transfer unsupported” DoS class you called out.



LOW

1. Vanity seed slicing in account constraints can panic pre-handler [Acknowledge]

Issue:

CreateRiftWithVanityPDA derives PDA seeds using `&vanity_seed[..seed_len as usize]`. If `seed_len` is invalid, the slice can panic during account validation before instruction logic runs, causing a hard failure (DoS for that transaction and sharp edge for clients).

Recommendation:

Avoid slicing in account attributes. Enforce bounds using a fixed-length seed approach:

Use full `[u8; 32]` seed (no dynamic slice), or

Accept `Vec<u8>` and only use it after explicit length checks by deriving PDA inside the handler (or by providing a safe pre-validated seed field).



INFORMATIONAL

1. Comment/code mismatch around oracle recovery mode [Acknowledge]

Issue:

There are comments indicating recovery mode should skip staleness, but some call sites still use with_options(false). This is a future footgun and makes incidents harder to resolve.

2. Oracle change execution is permissionless after timelock (operational risk) [Fixed ✓]

Issue:

Once an oracle change is proposed and the delay has elapsed, any caller can execute the oracle switch. This is a common timelock pattern, but it may surprise operators expecting only the creator/admin to “pull the trigger,” and it can shift execution timing control.

Recommendation:

If intended: document clearly as “anyone can execute after delay.”

If not intended: require a signer (for example creator: Signer) and enforce rift.creator == creator.key() in the execute context/handler.

Fix: ExecuteOracleChange now requires creator: Signer and enforces rift.creator == creator.key(), so it's no longer permissionless.



Technical Findings Summary

Findings

Vulnerability Level	Total	Pending	Not Apply	Acknowledged	Partially Fixed	Fixed
HIGH	3				1	2
MEDIUM	6			1	1	4
LOW	1			1		
INFORMATIONAL	2			1		1

Assessment Results

Score Results

Review	Score
Global Score	90/100
Assure KYC	Not Completed
Audit Score	90/100

The Following Score System Has been Added to this page to help understand the value of the audit, the maximum score is 100, however to attain that value the project must pass and provide all the data needed for the assessment. Our Passing Score has been changed to 84 Points for a higher standard, if a project does not attain 85% is an automatic failure. Read our notes and final assessment below. The Global Score is a combination of the evaluations obtained between having or not having KYC and the type of contract audited together with its manual audit.



Audit PASS

The solana programs audit has identified critical vulnerabilities. As a result, the audit has not passed. All identified issues must be resolved and re-audited before the contract can be considered secure for production use. **After the development team's review, all critical vulnerabilities have been addressed/reviewed, and the audit results are satisfactory.**



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