GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS



Institutions of the Global South

Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner

Institutions of the Global South

Asian, African, and Latin American states have often pursued a strategy of banding together either regionally or globally in order to achieve certain goals and to lower their transaction costs while doing so. In this book, Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner clearly assesses the achievements, performance, and responses of major global south institutions to show how and why such arrangements are critical to the south's efforts to call the international community's attention to their concerns and to resolve their special problems.

The book:

- offers a rationale for the institutional development of the global south
- elaborates on the scope of membership, structure, aims, and problems facing such institutions
- assesses the utility of tricontinental political and economic organizations
- examines the history and activities of region-wide organizations
- evaluates the potential of subregional integration arrangements
- analyzes the applicability of various theories, and makes suggestions with respect to the study of global south institutions.

The lack of a comprehensive and accessible compilation of the institutions that are of key importance to the global south in the postwar period makes this book essential reading to students and scholars in the fields of international organization, international politics, foreign policy, international development, and global south public policies.

Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner is Professor of Political Science at The City College, and at The Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York. She is a specialist in foreign policy and international development with an area studies focus on the Caribbean small states and the global south.

Routledge Global Institutions

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and Rorden Wilkinson
University of Manchester, UK

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The Global Institutions Series is designed to provide readers with comprehensive, accessible, and informative guides to the history, structure, and activities of key international organizations. Every volume stands on its own as a thorough and insightful treatment of a particular topic, but the series as a whole contributes to a coherent and complementary portrait of the phenomenon of global institutions at the dawn of the millennium.

Books are written by recognized experts, conform to a similar structure, and cover a range of themes and debates common to the series. These areas of shared concern include the general purpose and rationale for organizations, developments over time, membership, structure, decision-making procedures, and key functions. Moreover, current debates are placed in historical perspective alongside informed analysis and critique. Each book also contains an annotated bibliography and guide to electronic information as well as any annexes appropriate to the subject matter at hand.

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Foreword

The current volume is the twenty-ninth in a dynamic series on "global institutions." The series strives (and, based on the volumes published to date, succeeds) to provide readers with definitive guides to the most visible aspects of what we know as "global governance." Remarkable as it may seem, there exist relatively few books that offer in-depth treatments of prominent global bodies, processes, and associated issues, much less an entire series of concise and complementary volumes. Those that do exist are either out of date, inaccessible to the non-specialist reader, or seek to develop a specialized understanding of particular aspects of an institution or process rather than offer an overall account of its functioning. Similarly, existing books have often been written in highly technical language or have been crafted "in-house" and are notoriously self-serving and narrow.

The advent of electronic media has helped by making information, documents, and resolutions of international organizations more widely available, but it has also complicated matters. The growing reliance on the Internet and other electronic methods of finding information about key international organizations and processes has served, ironically, to limit the educational materials to which most readers have ready access—namely, books. Public relations documents, raw data, and loosely refereed web sites do not make for intelligent analysis. Official publications compete with a vast amount of electronically available information, much of which is suspect because of its ideological or self-promoting slant. Paradoxically, a growing range of purportedly independent web sites offering analyses of the activities of particular organizations has emerged, but one inadvertent consequence has been to frustrate access to basic, authoritative, critical, and well researched texts. The market for such has actually been reduced by the ready availability of varying quality electronic materials.

For those of us who teach, research, and practice in the area, this access to information has been particularly frustrating. We were delighted when Routledge saw the value of a series that bucks this trend and provides key reference points to the most significant global institutions. They know that serious students and professionals want serious analyses. We have assembled a first-rate line-up of authors to address that market. Our intention, then, is to provide one-stop shopping for all readers—students (both undergraduate and postgraduate), negotiators, diplomats, practitioners from nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and interested parties alike—seeking information about the most prominent institutional aspects of global governance.

Institutions of the global south

International institutions have been profoundly important for those countries that we now refer to as the "global south," but that earlier went by a number of other names. "All terms used to denote countries needing 'development' have shortcomings," notes Maggie Black. "Axis descriptors—developing/developed, non-industrialized/industrialized, rich/poor—are crude and value-laden."[1] This may partially explain the continued popularity of "North" and "South," which have the fewest pejorative connotations.

Many developing countries pursued membership of the United Nations (UN) as one of the very first post-independence acts as a means of signaling their arrival as autonomous political entities as well as securing, in as much as it is possible, their claims to sovereignty under the provisions of the equality of member states under article 2 of the UN Charter. Many newly independent countries also rushed to join organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and institutions like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the hope that by doing so they could cement their statehood together in a way that was more problematic separately.

Yet, for all their enthusiasm for international institutions, developing countries have not been best served by their number. For instance, despite being active in the GATT from the institution's creation, developing countries were not well served by its trade liberalizing activities,[2] and indeed the lack of progress was one reason that they eventually banded together to call for the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).[3] IMF and World Bank policies towards the global south have been heavily criticized for their incongruity with the needs of developing countries.[4] And the self-interest of the dominant powers has ensured that the UN has failed in its self-stated aim to assist the peoples of the world in times of crisis in the global south: the Rwandan genocide is perhaps the most poignant example, but the current crisis in Darfur is of equal significance.

The response to the failings of global institutions to address their needs led developing countries to create key organizations of their own. Indeed, the original motivation for the April 1955 conference in Bandung that would lead to the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was to find a way to steer between the Soviet Union and the United States within the confines of the United Nations.[5] Specifically, many newly independent countries were fed-up with the logjam resulting from their inability to secure UN membership, which had become enmeshed in the rivalry between the two superpowers.

Working in parallel with the NAM but concentrating on economic issues, another conglomeration of developing countries became known as the "Group of 77."[6] The G77 was named after two new members joined the original 75 members (which included New Zealand) in a working caucus to prepare for the first UN Conference on Trade and Development. The numbers continued to grow and New Zealand left. Although their numbers now are over 130, the label stuck.[7]

While it is certainly the case that organizations like the NAM, the G77, and UNCTAD enabled states like Egypt (under Gamal Abdel Nasser), India (under Jawaharlal Nehru) and Yugoslavia (under Josip Tito) to bolster their positions as regional powers, they also provided important forums for developing countries to raise issues of concern and to form alliances with like-minded and not so like-minded states. Moreover, although none of these institutions has come to rival the better financed and more powerful actors, they have nevertheless ensured, though their lobbying activities, that institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and GATT (and now the World Trade Organization) have at least adjusted their policies such that they take account of the needs of the developing world.[8]

The politics within the institutions of the global south is crucial. Not only, as mentioned above, were these bodies used in an instrumental fashion by leading developing states to consolidate their power base, they have also been arenas in which the principal issues affecting the developing world have been played out: HIV/AIDS, poverty, debt, state collapse, natural disaster, colonialism, among many others.

Our series regarding the contemporary role of global institutions would have been incomplete without a book that puts into historical and political context the various institutional manifestations of the global south. And so, we could not have found a person better able to undertake this task than Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner. Since 1984, she has taught international relations at the City College of New York, and since 1986, also at The Graduate Center of the City University of New York. She is a specialist in foreign policy and international development, with an area studies focus on the Caribbean small states, Caribbean–Latin American, and Caribbean–Asian relations,[9] who has served as president and vice-president of the Caribbean Studies Association. As part of her wide-ranging interests, she has also developed a special interest in institutions of the global south,[10] which is why we are delighted that Jacquie accepted our challenge to write the current volume for this series.

The book exudes authority yet is accessible. As readers will quickly become aware, the book is an invaluable resource and clearly deserves to be read by all interested in the history, politics, and law of global governance. We heartily recommend it; and, as always, we welcome comments from readers.

Thomas G. Weiss, The CUNY Graduate Center, New York, USA
Rorden Wilkinson, University of Manchester, UK
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JBW

Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group
AEC	African Economic Community
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFESD	Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
ALADI	*Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración* (Latin American Integration Association)
ALALC	*Área Latinoamericano de Libre Comercio* (Latin American Free Trade Area)
ALBA	*Alternativa Bolivariana para América*, Bolivarian Alternative for America
AMU	Arab Mahgreb Union
ANCOM	Andean Community
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Forum)
APTA	Asia Pacific Trade Agreement
ARF	Asian Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BADEA	Arab Bank for Economic Development
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
CACM	Central American Common Market
CAN	*Communidad Andina* (Community of Andean Nations)
CARIFTA	Caribbean Free Trade Area
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CEAO	*Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (West African Economic Community)
CEDEAO	*Communauté Économique des États de l'' Afrique de l'Ouest* (Economic Community of West Africa)

CEEAC *Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale* (Economic Community of Central African States)
CEMAC *Communauté Économique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale* (Central African Economic and Monetary Community)
CEN-SAD Community of Sahelo-Saharan States
CEPGL *Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs* (Great Lakes Economic Community)
COMESA Common Market for East and Southern Africa
CSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa
EAC East African Community
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring and Observer Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (of IMF)
GA General Assembly of the UN
GAB General Agreements to Borrow
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GSP Generalized System of Preferences
GSTP Global System of Trade Preferences among developing countries
G24 Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development
G77 Group of 77
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IDA International Development Association
IMF International Monetary Fund
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IGADD Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (now IGAD)
IsDB Islamic Development Bank
LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Area
LAIA Latin American Integration Association
LAS League of Arab States
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL *Mercado Común del Sur* (Southern Common Market)
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM Non-Aligned Movement

NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODECA	*Organización de Estados Centroamericanos* (Organization of Central American States)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PACER	Pacific Agreement on Closer Relations
PAFMESCA	Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa
PARLACEN	Central American Parliament
PARLATINO	Latin American Parliament
PICTA	Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (of the IMF)
PTA	Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States
REC	Regional Economic Community (of the AEC)
REPAC	*Réseau des Parlementaires de la CEEAC* (Network of Parliamentarians of CEEAC)
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	African Development Coordination Conference
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SELA	*Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe* (Latin American and Caribbean Economic System)
SICA	*Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana* (Central American Integration System)
SIECA	*Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana* (Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration)
SPARTECA	South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Agreement
SPF	South Pacific Forum
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UAM	*Union Africaine et Malgache* (African and Malagasy Union)
UDEAC	*Union Douanière et Économique de L'Afrique Centrale* (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa)

UEMOA	*Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine* (West African Economic and Monetary Union)
UN	United Nations Organisation
UNASUR/UNASUL	Union of South American Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction
Multilateralism and the global south

While a bilateral relationship between any two countries is clearly entered into in order to produce some direct, tangible, military, economic, or cultural gain, the benefits to be derived from a state's participation in multilateral arrangements are often far less obvious. Especially when resources are scarce, decision makers will often wonder if the time and money spent at the United Nations or in regional organizations is well spent, and whether the pursuit of the collective global or regional interest will present unacceptable limitations and barriers to the satisfaction of their country's primary developmental and security ambitions.

As can be seen from a cursory examination of the *Yearbook of International Organizations*,[1] the countries of the global south tend to be multilateralists, if multilateralism is measured in terms of membership in international organizations. Indeed one of the tenets of the comparative foreign policy literature that proliferated in the 1970s was that small—either small-sized or simply "developing"—states are more focused than their larger counterparts on participation in international and regional organizations.[2] Why is this so? What do these countries expect to gain from joining and creating international organizations of various kinds? Is their motivation any different from the motivations of the developed countries? The answer, as will be seen, is *both* yes and no; but first, we need to clarify what is meant by the term "global south" itself.

The global south

The "global south" or sometimes "the south" has for some time been the preferred term for what used to be called the "third world." Yet, like "third world," the term is not descriptively rigorous, and must be used elastically. The term "third world" evolved, since its coinage by the Frenchman Alfred Sauvy in 1952, as a reference to that bloc of nations that professed nonalignment or non-involvement in the antagonisms between the (Western) democratic first world and the communist second world. Although this interpretation is the predominant one, it should be noted that Mao Zedong, who sought to make China a leader of the third world, had a slightly different view: to him, the first world comprised the two "imperialist" powers (the USSR and United States) and the second world Japan, Canada, and Europe. He identified the third world as simply those people—and by default countries—that possessed true revolutionary potential.

Both interpretations of the term "third world," however, shared the following: "third world" referred to the Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans, that is the people of the countries located roughly in three southern continents and sharing a history of underdevelopment and colonialism. Almost all of these populations were also multiethnic and multicultural.[3] Common histories and traits generated postcolonial modernizing upheavals in most of these societies between the 1960s and the 1980s, and at the international level, this was translated as well into a common effort to alter the international rules of the game economically as well as politically. The North–South conflict based on development differences became intertwined with the more prominent East–West ideological divide as the "West" and "East" both competed to grant favors to their respective political allies in the south.

The term "third world," as well as its successor the "global south," should not be equated with the membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) because not all third world countries joined the NAM. (Incidentally, the NAM also had European membership, with Yugoslavia and Cyprus being founding members, and Malta becoming a member in 1973.) The place of China in the third world has also long been the subject of debate. Some observers used to highlight China's nuclear status as a criterion differentiating it from the rest of the third world, but India and later, Pakistan, became members of the nuclear club. A sounder argument against viewing China as a third world member is that it is a global power that belongs to the exclusive club of states with veto power in the UN Security Council. On the other hand, China shares with the third world many traits, including relative economic underdevelopment and the experience of imperialism. For these reasons, China has long played a highly supportive leadership role in the third world. For most purposes, therefore, it suffices to note that China continues to adopt positions in global relations that are generally sympathetic to the global south, particularly in the economic sphere where it pointedly allies itself with the Group of 77 (G77), the developing country caucus within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In none of the institutions described in this book is China an integral member. Yet China is an influential observer in most of them.

The fading of the term "third world" can be dated to the global changes of the 1990s that eliminated the second world as an analytical concept, but as far back as the 1970s, dissatisfaction had already surfaced over the stagnation and inequality that could be read into terms such as "third world" and "less developed." Thus the term "south" began to appear more frequently in UN documentation by the 1970s. In the economic arena, the preferred term "developing" was adopted in the 1970s over the more static "less developed." Of course the "developing" were always a differentiated group—ranging in income and social development from upper middle to low income and from highly to least developed.

By the 1980s, the newly industrializing East Asian countries were reaping the rewards of robust trade and were being emulated by other leading regional nations. By the 1990s, with the global push for liberalization, "third world" finally lost its essence. The economic and political diversity of the Afro-Asian-Latin American group—always an issue but one covered up by larger concerns—began to appear more sharply in the post–cold war world as the overarching anti-imperial, nonaligned priorities faded. The "global south" has now become an acceptable term to refer to these nations in a relatively neutral way that still recognizes their rough geographical status as well as a general sense of common global problems and aims. To recognize a continuing commonality is not to deny that the differentiation among southern countries keeps growing: one need only look at the proliferation of categories devised by international agencies to address the needs of specific groups of countries, including "countries in transition," (for those former Eastern Bloc as well as developing countries moving from command to market economies), advanced developing countries, highly indebted poor countries, and small island developing states. Although most of the countries in transition are in Eastern Europe, not the south, they share a number of economic commonalities with developing nations and some have even joined southern international institutions. Despite these nuances, the term "global south" is a useful handle by which to analyze a group of countries that—notwithstanding the forces of globalization and the aspirations of liberalism and forms of cosmopolitanism—continue to see their problems, and to construct their narratives, quite differently from those of the developed nations of Europe, North America, and Asia.

What does the global south want from institutions?

Historically, on the one hand, the creation of international organizations was a response to the most practical of needs. Thus one of the earliest, the European Commission for the Control of the Danube, was created in 1856 only to deal with navigation issues regarding the Danube River. The emergence of global organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union and the Universal Postal Union in the late 1880s responded to the need for worldwide regulation of commerce and communications. In other words, organizations were created to permit states to manage the grit of international affairs, especially commercial affairs. Not surprisingly, then, the more interdependent nations became, the more institutions were needed to manage and regulate their interaction.

The theory of functionalism emerged in the 1930s to capture this practical and rational dimension, while also adhering to a liberal ideal in expecting technical cooperation to spill over into the political realm. Functionalists asserted that the development of a network of technical organizations would bind states in such a way as to make war unacceptable. However, the renewal of war (that is, the onset of World War II) put paid to functionalist hopes, and led to a reconceptualization of functionalism in the 1960s in the form of neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalists recognized both the trend toward regionalism that had emerged first in Europe in the late 1950s, and the inseparability of politics and economics. As interdependence grew, so did the institutional networks that cemented it, and so did the study of why states, though presumably power-conscious and self-interested according to the dominant realist school of thought, still found it so useful to engage in collective action.

In their focus on the potential for cooperation among states under anarchy, the neoliberals, who became prominent in the 1980s, pointed out that institutions are important to self-interested states because they tend to be information-rich (thus reducing uncertainty) and because they reduce transaction costs. Focusing on regimes (defined as sets of practices and expectations), Robert Keohane elaborates the latter by pointing out that not only do regimes make violations of agreements and rules more costly but in a more mundane sense, they make it cheaper for governments to get together to negotiate agreements (by providing meeting forums and establishing principles that do not need to be constantly renegotiated), and they allow for the clustering of issues so that side-payments can be facilitated.[4] Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal add that the reasons why all states, including powerful ones, join international organizations (IOs) are because "the value of … [IO] functions outweighs the costs, notably the resulting limits on unilateral action."[5] That is, giving up some of their sovereignty may be efficacious for states if IOs provide such positive functions as "facilitating the negotiation and implementation of agreements, resolving disputes, managing conflicts, carrying out operational activities like technical assistance, elaborating norms, [and] shaping international discourse … " Moreover,

> IOs allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus. These increase the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization's ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states … IO independence … can increase efficiency and affect the legitimacy of individual and collective actions.[6]

Not only do IOs provide efficient and legitimate mechanisms for collective action, but they also allow states to elaborate norms and shape international discourse, as the authors point out. Others point out that they also generate new knowledge and ideas. Ernst Haas, for example, points to the way in which changes in scientific knowledge have influenced the way politics is conducted. For example, he notes that the World Bank changed its basic "trickle down" philosophy of development to one focusing on basic needs when economists and other development specialists proffered new techniques to help the poor more directly.[7] In turn, IOs expose members to these new ideas, an exposure that is particularly important for states that are poor in both financial and human resources. They are thus able to learn about innovations and participate as well in debates and discussions about new ways of thinking and doing. Much of the literature also assumes that international institutions *socialize* states into appropriate forms of behavior, in essence making them good citizens of the global community.[8] While the success of such socialization varies, depending particularly on domestic receptivity, institutions can certainly be agents of change at all levels.

These rational and normative reasons for joining institutions apply to the global south states as well as to all other states. However, there are also peculiar reasons why global south states put faith in international institutions. Scholars have noted the particular importance of IOs to smaller, weaker states. IOs allow them to pool their resources and achieve economies of scale. One of the most obvious examples is at the

United Nations where global south participation not only provides tangible economic and social gains but even more importantly, provides *diplomatic* advantages in allowing them a cost-effective way to have a voice in world affairs. The forum also serves a very practical purpose: it is a place to meet the diplomats of the world without the additional expenditure of official visits and resident diplomatic missions.

There is another important use for international institutions: IOs allow the less powerful states of the world to build coalitions against the stronger countries. As Keohane and Joseph Nye noted in the 1970s, a time when the global south had risen to exceptional prominence,

> International organizations are frequently congenial institutions for weak states. The one-state-one-vote norm of the United Nations system favors coalitions of the small and powerless. Secretariats are often responsive to Third World demands. Furthermore, the substantive norms of most international organizations, as they have developed over the years, stress social and economic equity as well as the equality of states …
>
> International organizations also allow small and weak states to pursue linkage strategies … [9]

"Linkage strategies" refers to the use of organizational channels by global south nations to develop a collective identity among states which share similar circumstances and goals, and to transform this identity into counterdependent stances. For although realist international relations scholars have stressed anarchy as the main determining characteristic of state behavior in the international arena, global south academics as well as policymakers have tended to focus on the impact of a hierarchical international system in which the southern states are subordinate to their northern counterparts. Thus Johan Galtung described the international system of the late 1960s as "feudo-imperial" with peripheral states interacting almost exclusively with metropolitan centers and on unequal terms.[10] Prominent neo-Marxist academic approaches later developed in the south, namely the dependency and the world-systems approaches, have, not surprisingly, taken hierarchy as a central explanatory factor;[11] and contemporary critical theorists have emphasized the hegemonic structure of the international order, the unequal material, ideational, and social foundations of global relations aggravated in many ways by globalization, and thus the need for sweeping (emancipatory) change.[12] Even neoliberalists recognize that the international regimes that foster global cooperation are deficient by cosmopolitan moral standards; they do not focus on redistributing resources equally or justly across the world.[13] In this respect, then, certain forms of multilateralism have been employed by the global south as a strategy to counter the adverse effects of hierarchy, hegemony, inequality, and exclusion.

Multilateralism, whether at the global or at the regional level, enables global south states to share strategic information and ideas, to draw global attention to their particular concerns, to reduce the costs or penalties for noncooperation with dominant northern partners via the assumption of collective stances (what can be described as an instrumental or convenient solidarity), and to facilitate adoption of alternative courses of action that would be less likely to work if states adopted them singly. Regionalism can be seen as a particular form of multilateralism in which cultural and geographic commonalities should theoretically allow for even greater cooperation among global south states.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, with the Western and socialist blocs in continual competition and the number of independent global south nations growing, the ability of the global south to build a strong coalition facilitated gradual changes in existing international rules and regimes. Developing states were able to bring about institutional change through the use of confrontation tactics that grew out of a consciousness of their common inequality and vulnerability. As discussed in the next chapter, from the Bandung conference of 1955 through the mid-1980s, the global south helped in this way to legitimize new norms (for example, anticolonialism and antiracialism) and to reform many international institutions. For example, it was southern pressure that led to the increase in the membership of both the UN Security Council and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Moreover, as discussed in the next two chapters, the global south nations collaborated with existing UN agencies and also established new groupings (notably their own Group of 77 as well as regional integration arrangements) in their search for fresh responses to the problems of underdevelopment.

By the 1970s, however, the international system was moving away from the strict feudo-imperial hierarchy described by Galtung, and toward an incipient interdependence. The successful actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) encouraged other forms of cartelization in the south, and the nations of the south began to see some small success in their promotion of diversification strategies and south–south cooperation. However, the 1970s were also a time of increased differentiation among the southern countries themselves. OPEC nations vaulted into a wealthier category than most other nations of the south; the Asian newly industrializing countries moved up to the “semi-periphery”; and various regional states were elevated to “middle power” status.

The differentiation among the supposedly similar less developed units of the south continued to be reinforced during the 1980s when many southern countries suffered from high debt and severe economic decline, and reached its peak in the post–cold war 1990s when developing countries found themselves competing vigorously among themselves for trade, aid, and foreign investment as they sought to liberalize in accordance with new systemic priorities. While liberalization and globalization—a product of increased informational and technological interdependence—brought benefits to the more industrialized and competitive economies, weaker economies were threatened with marginalization. Bilateral and bi-regional arrangements between northern and southern nations were strengthened as were nonstate linkages, thus blurring the previous global hierarchy and hampering the south’s efforts to maintain a solid front. In the post–cold war world, absent the glue of anti-communism, the northern countries too have assumed differentiated stances on political and economic issues, even while continuing to share a common commitment to the basic norms of political and economic liberalism.

These changes have had their impact on global south multilateralism. In particular, while there remain issues of hierarchy and dependence that in the eyes of southern nations need to be addressed collectively (for example, the south is very concerned about the democratic deficit in the United Nations, about new forms of conditionality imposed on trade and aid, and about the lack of agreement by the north on special and differential treatment for developing countries in global trade negotiations), broad multilateral approaches are now seen as less effective than regional approaches that take into account the particular and differing circumstances of each group of nations, as well as the potential for varied partnerships with like-minded groups of northern nations.

In the following chapters, then, not only are the main older global south institutions described, but also the changing approaches that these have had to adopt, as well as the newer face of regionalism. It should be noted that although the policy literature tends to treat organizations and institutions as near-synonymous, the academic literature has differentiated these in viewing organizations as “palpable entities with headquarters and letterheads, voting procedures, and generous pension plans,”[14] whereas institutions are more broadly conceived, based on their sociological meaning, as “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations."[15] While all the organizations described here are physical entities, the book also aims to describe the key rules and norms that provide a basis for collective identities and behavior within these entities. Similarly, although the traditional view of multilateralism as the coordination of relations among three or more states is retained, almost all the institutions discussed here also meet a more stringent criterion of incorporating norms based on expectations of reciprocated conduct, not simply bilateral intent.[16]

Social constructivists remind us that international structures are not stagnant; they are the product of social, not just material, processes, and should be studied in relationship to the development of international society and the ideas and norms that influence state identity, interests and preferences, and ultimately behavior.[17] Every organization or institution described in the book is the product of an idea, sometimes indeed a broad vision, for some level of unity, shared either among the near-universe of global south nations or among appropriate historically and culturally linked groups and subgroups. How the idea has been operationalized across time is the major focus of the descriptions and analyses that follow.

Plan of the book

This book deals only with the organizations and institutions that have been established by state actors. The important and growing role of nonstate actors, in particular nongovernmental organizations, cannot for reasons of space be dealt with here. The institutions considered are divided organizationally in terms of both the breath of membership and of goals (political/multifunctional or single function). First the two main tricontinental political and economic groupings, the NAM and the G77, are discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Both date to the 1960s, reaching the height of their influence in the 1970s when the global south countries engaged in vigorous promotion of a reformist postcolonial agenda. Both organizations have been forced to adapt since then to a more conservative global environment. In Chapter 3, a third tricontinental organization is added, but what differentiates this one from the first two is that it is a single function grouping. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries began with similar transformational (or counterdependent) aims as the NAM and G77, and some of its members would still like to see the organization in this light. It has instead become a market-oriented grouping, one whose members are increasingly cognizant of the need to work with consumer nations to ensure global energy security. Nevertheless, its success continues to depend on a variety of domestic, regional, and global political factors that are discussed in the chapter.

Chapters 4 through 6 address some longstanding, broad, regional institutions that represent the physical (albeit imperfect) embodiment of high ideals. Since the late 1960s, some political scientists have used the term "regional subsystem" to refer to the pattern of interrelations found among collectivities of nations that are normally geographically proximate. Because relations at the global level are primary, regional interaction is automatically subordinate to the dominant pattern of relationships. Although most scholars find geographic proximity to be an important identifier of regionalism (along with internal and external recognition of the region as distinctive),[18] some scholars have argued that geographical proximity is not a necessary characteristic of a region. In 1967 Bruce Russett, for example, used factor analysis to cluster nations on various common aspects and as a result identified a Western Community that included Argentina, Japan, and Israel and a Latin America that included the Philippines![19] Much more recently, constructivists have argued that regions are social constructions and that close proximity is not essential to a common identity.[20] The opposite may also be true: "the proposed sub-system units [in a contrived region based merely on geographic convenience, may] have nothing more than their proximity in common."[21]

The view adopted here is one of regions as subsystems in the sense of patterns of regularized interaction (in this case at the institutional level). This view is combined, however, with the constructivist stress on identity reflected in the cultural and historically influenced commonalities among the members of the region. In this sense, regionalism is taken to blend the concepts of consciousness and identity with that of cohesion.[22] The institutions described, three of which happen also to be well recognized historically as regional institutions, are reflective of a sense of shared common values and a common identity among the member states and peoples (although less so in the case of the Organization of American States.) The one institution that is less well-recognized is not geographically based but is still subsystemic in scope. This Organization of the Islamic Conference is based on the ideal of pan-Islam cooperation, and is particularly important as a counterpoint to the secular pan-Arab ideal. The institutions discussed are all multifunctional, aiming to achieve both security and socioeconomic goals. However, their chief differentiating characteristic is their breath of membership, that is, they attempt to incorporate all states that share a similar history, culture, and values.

Chapters 7 through 9 reflect the emphasis today on another form of regionalism—(sub)regionalism as a means of integrating and strengthening the global south both economically and, to some extent, politically. Beginning in the 1960s and following the pattern of the European Economic Community, developing countries established a number of integration schemes, usually on the urging and with the support of the UN functional regional commissions. This regional economic integration was seen as an effective strategy to reduce dependence on variable and protectionist developed country markets, and to gain alternative markets for their incipient manufactures. In the 1970s, regional integration was prioritized within the framework of "collective self-reliance," one of the strategies promoted by the global south as part of the program of action aimed at establishing a New International Economic Order (see Chapter 2). By the 1980s, however, most regional integration arrangements had stumbled. At the national level, political will was often lacking, as leaders closely guarded their nation's sovereignty, and as petty nationalisms, inter-state rivalries, and physical conflicts—sometimes aggravated by cold war ideological differences—prevented significant progress. At the same time, the international shock of the oil price increases of the 1970s also had an adverse impact on most regional schemes in that as countries searched for much-needed foreign exchange, they tended to sacrifice regionalism for foreign markets. In turn the global recession that arrived in the 1980s aggravated domestic economic weaknesses. National economies became mired in debt as markets for commodities as well as manufactures slumped. As attention turned inward toward applying structural adjustment policies during this "lost decade" of the 1980s, the enthusiasm for regionalism waned.

In addition to these global and national factors, there were weaknesses built into the regional process itself. In particular, almost every scheme suffered from unequal distribution of the benefits between developed and less developed members, even where some protections for the latter were built into the agreement. In addition, often technical provisions proved to be unnecessarily complex and difficult to implement. Thus the ambition of many integration arrangements far outweighed the probability of successful operationalization.

In 1992, the European Community, itself having experienced periods of backward as well as forward progress in integration over the years, finally moved determinedly toward strengthening the arrangement, in particular by establishing monetary union. This coincided with the beginning of the post–cold war period when global attention turned away from prior military preoccupations and toward economic and social issues. As liberalization norms spread from developed to developing areas of the world, it was not surprising that the global south also turned to reviving old integration schemes and establishing new ones.

Many authors have highlighted the differences between the old and new efforts at regional integration: whereas the older efforts were inward-looking, that is, oriented toward expanding regional trade to compensate for the lack of global access (which therefore required limitations to be placed on foreign access to regional markets), the new efforts are outward-looking, intended still to expand regional markets but also to strengthen regional economies in tandem with global integration. Today, a key common market strategy involves reductions in the common external tariff along with the necessary removal of internal tariffs. Since the early 1990s, talks on reducing all types of tariffs have been taking place in both regional forums and under the global umbrella of the World Trade Organization. Although earlier doubts about the compatibility of regional and global free trade strategies have been somewhat assuaged, it should be noted that many global south countries are still wary of entering into what they see as unequal arrangements with northern partners or opening their economies too quickly to competition at the global level.

In Chapters 7 through 9, the key subregional communities of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa (including North Africa), and Asia (South, Southeast, and West) are analyzed with a view to comparing developments and strategies used in the 1960s and 1970s with those employed in the changed environment of the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, in keeping with the neofunctionalist recasting of functionalism (mentioned earlier) to emphasize a role for political factors, regional integration arrangements are assessed in terms of the extent to which they are adopting some supranational and political elements. Neofunctionalists define integration as the process by which "political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting states."[23] To them, integration in one sector, should "spillover" into other sectors, possibly culminating in full-scale political integration. While, with few exceptions, the creation of new political unions is not anticipated in the global south in the immediate future, in almost all regional communities, it will be noted that some political spillover toward deeper integration has been occurring.

The final chapter, Chapter 10, concludes with some thoughts on the creation and impact of institutions on the global south, and the prospects for the future.

1 Tricontinental diplomacy

The Non-Aligned Movement

The institutions of the global south have tended to be established in the context of a mix of visionary and practical aims. One of the major aims of the global south nations has been to challenge the perceived inequality of the international status quo, achieve visibility for their concerns, and reduce their economic and political dependence on the north. To attain these ends, they have had to establish channels for the promotion of alternative norms and strategies. It is in this context that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) came into being.

The Non-Aligned Movement

The most ambitious institutional arrangement designed by the countries of the global south has been the NAM, which was established primarily to foster third world identity and solidarity through the articulation of common views and aspirations. The precursor of the NAM was the famed "Bandung" conference of 1955. What brought Asians and Africans together in this Afro-Asian summit held in Indonesia was a shared commitment to anticolonialism and antiracialism at a time when the imperial powers were retreating from both regions. Postcolonial states as well as those close to independence also wanted to share ideas about development strategies as they confronted the reality of governing nations that were very underdeveloped.

At the time the conference was held, the colonial countries, which were excluded from participation in the conference, were highly suspicious of this gathering of newly emergent nationalist and anticolonial countries. Cold war tensions were high, and the Soviet Union and the United States made great efforts to at least prevent any loss of influence in the new south by forestalling any moves by the assembled countries to favor the one superpower over the other. In this respect, the conference is often viewed as having cemented China's relations with the third world, in that, much to the alarm of the Western nations, the Chinese premier Chou en Lai played a prominent and successful role in influencing the conference agenda and the final communiqué.

The Bandung conference built on two Asian relations conferences held in New Delhi in 1947 and 1949, and it was strongly promoted by the leaders of Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, countries constituting what was then known as the Colombo Group.[1] The 29 participants in Bandung crossed ideological lines, ranging from the communist People's Republic of China to Turkey and Iraq, which had just signed on to the pro-West Baghdad Pact, and Pakistan which had also signed on to the pro-West Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Six African nations attended: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Sudan, and Ghana which was approaching independence.[2]

To understand the impact of this gathering, it is worth recalling that at that time the international system was characterized by strong vertical (top-down) relations between colony and metropole, and little interaction among colonies, especially colonies of different metropoles.[3] That is to say, until World War II brought colonies and their inhabitants together to fight a common cause, there was little sense of commonality across southern regions. The coming together of African, Arab, and Asian countries at Bandung was the first attempt at third world solidarity in the postcolonial period. The "Bandung spirit" came to signify a time of exhilarating solidarity, a shorthand reference used by global south leaders since then to anchor foreign policies of noninterference and nonalignment.

But it is widely acknowledged that the conference was long on rhetoric and short on specific outcomes. Although Bandung participants focused on substantive anticolonial, antiracial, disarmament, and economic development concerns, most assessments of Bandung correctly laud it mainly for what the Indian delegate termed at the time the "imponderables"—the fact that "we have met and gathered here from thousands of miles, conferred together, seen each other, and in spite of all manner of differences and arguments, made friends with each other."[4] The outcome of the conference was a declaration of solidarity and cooperation that included ten foundational principles which continue to guide many aspects of global south relations today:

1 Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter;
2 Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
3 Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small;

4 Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country;
5 Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the UN Charter;
6 (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers, and (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries;
7 Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;
8 Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement or other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the UN Charter;
9 Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation;
10 Respect for justice and international obligations.

Plans for a second Bandung conference, heavily promoted by Indonesia's leader Achmed Sukarno and scheduled to be held in Algiers in 1965, were scuttled because the Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella was deposed ten days before the conference. However, differences between the pro-China Sukarno and India's Jawaharlal "Pandit" Nehru (as well as others who like Nehru favored an unaligned position) had already developed. As a result, Nehru joined with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Josip Broz "Marshal" Tito of Yugoslavia to hold the first meeting of the nonaligned nations in Belgrade in 1961. After all, India considered itself to be a great power in its own right; Yugoslavia had escaped the grasp of the Soviets through the immense popularity of Tito; and Nasser was interested in elevating the Arab "nation," with Egypt at its head. The 1961 meeting marked the real beginning of the NAM, which came to completely overshadow the Afro-Asianism of 1955. Twenty-five states—including one Latin American country, Cuba—attended the conference in Belgrade. (Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador attended as observers.) Attendance was only partial because of differences between moderate and radical Arab and African states, resulting in the participation mainly of the more radical nationalists.

The conference focused primarily on problems of colonialism and disarmament. Invitations were sent out on the basis of the following criteria: espousal of a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with differing political and social systems and nonalignment or a trend in favor of such a policy; consistent support for movements of national independence; and noninvolvement in military alliances concluded "in the context of Great Power conflicts."[5] Thus the criteria specified denoted not passive neutrality but active support for peaceful coexistence, decolonization, and noninvolvement in cold war pursuits. Military alliances with great powers were not actually prohibited, only those concluded in a cold war context. However, this aspect of nonalignment became quite controversial: subsequent nonaligned conferences called for the abolition of foreign bases and the dissolution of great power alliances,[6] but this was placed on the backburner as countries as diverse as Somalia, the Philippines, and Cuba offered their territories for the location of various military bases without leaving the NAM.

In any description of the evolution of the NAM, a few key dates or periods must be highlighted. First, the 1970 Zambia summit is considered to have been very important. Although a second NAM summit had been held in 1964, the movement had gone into a period of decline as a result of the death of Pandit Nehru; the deposing of important leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Ben Bella of Algeria; continuing ideological splits in the African group (discussed in Chapter 5); and the preoccupation of Arab states with the 1967 war with Israel and its aftermath. Yugoslavia's Tito was responsible for the revival of the movement, a role he went on to play a number of times. As a result of his efforts, the conference in Zambia not only represented the first time the nonaligned were meeting in six years, but also marked the revival of enthusiasm for the organization, reflected in its institutionalization. It was agreed then that conferences would be held every three years, and that a Coordinating Bureau would be established (this was accomplished in 1973). Not long after, a United Nations caucus began operating, a news agency pool was established, and a solidarity fund for Southern Africa, Laos, and Vietnam as well as various economic centers were established.[7] In addition, Zambia marked the turn away from the prioritization of decolonization to that of economic nationalism. This in turn enabled an important expansion of the NAM's membership: Latin American states which had felt that nonalignment had little to offer them as nations that had gained their independence since the nineteenth century, now identified with the anti-neocolonial economic stances. By the early 1980s, Cuba had been joined by Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Panama as full members, while Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela were attending meetings as observers. Venezuela wanted to join but its application for membership in 1983 was vetoed by Guyana, which was a very active member with a longstanding border dispute with Venezuela. Venezuela was finally admitted to membership in 1989.

A second important period came in the late 1970s. By this time, the organization had become more identified with the Soviet Union and its allies than with the West. This was not surprising because the Soviet Union did not have a colonial record—even if many of its component states, independent today, might have said otherwise—and it had devoted many resources, in its own self-interest, to supporting the third world's economic and political goals from the 1960s through the 1980s. It should be understood that the anti-West stances of the NAM were not necessarily a sign of support for the Soviet Union but rather constituted a coincidence of agreement on anti-neocolonialism. Even among third world states that called themselves "socialist"—countries such as Libya, Tanzania, Vietnam, Chile, or Nicaragua—leaders took pride in defining their socialism as indigenous versions suited to their own national conditions, even if they welcomed the Soviet assistance that was forthcoming. Still, the leftward movement of the NAM grew troublesome for many members, including those leaning more toward the West, as well as those that espoused true independence and self-reliance, those like Libya that wanted to spread their own brand of socialism, and those that preferred China's view of the "two imperialisms." The differences were compounded by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the first time the Soviets had intervened militarily in a third world country. The summit of 1979, therefore, held in Cuba, was another very crucial one. Cuba, as chair for the summit, intended to steer the movement closer to its patron the Soviet Union, but once again, it was the well respected Tito, now physically failing, who vigorously urged a return to "true" nonalignment, that is to say independence from both superpowers. NAM members chose to heed this call and return the movement to its roots. The succession of India to the chairmanship the following year eased the movement away from a preoccupation with ideological divisions.

Moreover, as the organization turned its attention more and more to the economic problems of the 1980s, by also diluting its emphasis on military and ideological criteria it avoided some internal political squabbling. While external critics—and some non-member developing nations—argued over the incongruity of aligned states, whether pro-West ones such as Saudi Arabia or pro-East ones such as Vietnam or North Korea, belonging to a "nonaligned" group, members generally saw themselves simply as a caucus of like-minded states on the key issues of economic development and concerns about vertical (if not always horizontal) disarmament and anti-imperialism.

Much changed with the end of the cold war that brought a third important era. Even before the end of the cold war, the movement had been suffering from a malaise in that certain newly industrializing and liberalizing countries—Argentina and Chile for example—were intent on moving up to first world status, and saw the nonaligned movement as of decreasing utility. Bilateralism and regionalism rather than global multilateralism of the type represented by the NAM had become more effective strategies for countries seeking to position themselves to increase their trade and attract investment in a highly competitive global arena. The NAM's focus on neocolonialism seemed passé in a liberal interdependent world, and its emphasis on nonalignment seemed equally dated in a world of only one superpower. Thus in this post–cold war era, the organization was divided between members wishing to work within the new status quo and other states that wanted to continue to engage in antihegemonic activity. This division was reflected in 1989 when Cuba, Iran, and Iraq absented themselves from the summit held in Belgrade. In fact, this summit marked a change in the tone of the NAM, from traditional confrontation to a cautious accommodation to global changes.

Once again, leading members, guided by willing leaders who not only still saw a place for the NAM but also saw prestige to be gained from playing a leadership role, were at the forefront of the revitalization of the NAM that took place throughout the 1990s, continuing into the 2000s. Although Tito had long passed away and Yugoslavia had disintegrated, Egypt, India, and Indonesia continued to play leading roles in the organization. They were joined by Malaysia whose leader Mahathir Mohamad focused on various lingering anti-north resentments as host of the 13th summit in 2003. For the first time in its history, a South American country, Colombia, under an enthusiastic president Ernesto Samper, hosted a NAM summit, in 1995. A very important addition to the membership was South Africa, which emerged from apartheid in 1994, joined the movement, and hosted the 12th summit in 1998. There has in fact been a continuing growth in membership in the post–cold war period, facilitated somewhat ironically by the end of the East–West divisions that often hampered the effectiveness of the NAM. Even though Argentina, Cyprus, and Malta left the NAM, the first in 1995 maintaining that membership in the movement was no longer in its national interest, and the last two because they joined the European Union, many other countries have joined since 1989 including Brunei, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mongolia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines (which was allied with the NAM in the 1970s), Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Thailand, Timor Leste, and the east European states Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Other former Soviet states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and Ukraine, have been granted observer status. (See Box 1.1 for total membership.)

Box 1.1 Membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (2007)

Afghanistan,* Algeria,* Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,* Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo,* Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba,* Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,* Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,* Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,* Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,* Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India,* Indonesia,* Iran, Iraq,* Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon,* Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,* Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco,* Mozambique, Myanmar,* Namibia, Nepal,* Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia,* Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia,* South Africa, Sri Lanka,* Sudan,* Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,* Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen,* Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Observer countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, El Salvador, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Paraguay, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine, Uruguay.

Observer organizations: African Union, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, League of Arab States, New Movement for the Independence of Puerto Rico, Organization of the Islamic Conference, United Nations.

* Indicates members present at the first summit in 1961. Cyprus and Yugoslavia also attended the 1961 conference. Egypt was at the time joined with Syria in the United Arab Republic which broke apart shortly thereafter.

Membership notes

In 1980 founding member Burma withdrew, dissatisfied with the NAM's ideological stance, but it returned in 1992. Kampuchea's seat was the subject of a representational dispute and was left empty for a time during its civil conflict. Chile never formally left but did not attend meetings during the Augusto Pinochet era. Argentina left in 1995. Cyprus and Malta ceased to be NAM members in 2004 after joining the EU. The Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was suspended at the ministerial meeting in 1992 but returned as an observer, Serbia and Montenegro, at the 2003 summit in Malaysia.

Web site in 2007: www.cubanoal.cu/ingles/index.html (web site of Cuba, chair of the Non-Aligned Movement for 2006–9).

As noted earlier, the confrontational approach of the NAM during the cold war changed to a somewhat more accommodating one in the 1990s, an approach that recognized the loss of influence of the global south in an era of liberalization that has been promoted forcefully by northern nations. On the other hand, new threats were perceived by the global south arising from globalization as well as from the unipolar world structure. In essence, these were seen as mostly new manifestations of some of the same problems encountered in the 1960s and 1970s, and thus the NAM was able to reformulate and expand its agenda to focus on these concerns. This reformulation can be seen in a comparison of the final documents issued during the NAM's summits of 1961–70 with those issued at the conclusion of summits in 2003 and 2006.[8] In the first years, the NAM highlighted the following driving concerns: colonialism and self-determination; racial equality; peaceful coexistence between states with differing social and political systems; nonuse of force and respect for sovereignty of states; the right of all peoples to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance; respect for human rights; general and complete disarmament; equitable representation within, and the strengthening of the role of the nonaligned in the United Nations; and support for a variety of economic measures in aid and trade, including commodity stabilization, regional integration, south–south cooperation, and greater financial transfers from north to south.

Today the corresponding NAM agenda includes most of the same concerns but has expanded to include, among other things:

- *New aspects of colonialism*: support for the return of cultural properties as well as a request for compensation for human and material losses suffered under colonial rule or occupation;
- *Racialism*: promotion of a dialogue among civilizations and support for a culture of peace based on respect for sovereignty;
- *Respect for sovereignty*: rejection of unilateralism and awareness of the dangers of unipolarity; rejection of the "right" of humanitarian intervention; unequivocable condemnation of all acts of terrorism but rejection of the attribution of terrorism to religion, nationality, or civilization; rejection of all attempts to use the issue of combating terrorism as a pretext to pursue political aims; opposition to unilateral preparation of lists accusing countries of allegedly supporting terrorism;
- *The right of states to pursue their own path*: rejection of attempts to impose or prolong the application of sanctions to achieve political ends; non-recognition of unilateral extraterritorial measures of coercion and of laws imposing sanctions on companies and individuals belonging to other countries;
- *Respect for civil and human rights:* support for the restoration of constitutional legality in states whose governments have come to power unconstitutionally; recognition of the right to food and the right to development as universal human rights, support for gender rights and the rights of migrants, among others; condemnation of crimes against women and children; and respect for international humanitarian law;
- *Disarmament*: support for nonproliferation, for a comprehensive test ban, and for a ban on chemical and biological weapons; establishment of nuclear free zones; peaceful uses of nuclear technology; measures against the illicit traffic in small arms; and measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction;
- *Equitable representation*: strengthening, restructuring, revitalizing, and democratizing the United Nations, including reform of the Security Council (the NAM would like to have an increase in membership by at least 11); ensuring that the UN maintains its primary role for the maintenance of peace and security *vis-à-vis* regional organizations, and that humanitarian assistance is neutral and impartial and independent of political or military action;
- *Economic and social measures*: the need to establish an open, rule-based, accountable, transparent, predictable, just, secure, equitable,

> development-oriented and nondiscriminatory global trade system; the need to address the uneven benefits of globalization; support for human security and for A New Global Human Order; revitalization of international development cooperation; support for the Millennium Development Goals; promotion of special and differential treatment for developing countries and accession of developing countries to the World Trade Organization; support for debt relief and for highly indebted poor countries, and special attention to Africa.

These are just some of the many issues that the NAM continues to address, and some of the strategies and solutions that NAM members are seeking to have adopted. Further details on economic measures are provided in the next chapter on the Group of 77.

While the NAM continues to seek revitalization, there has been a revival of sorts of Afro-Asianism as well. The Second Asian-African Conference was held in Jakarta in April 2005, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the original Bandung conference. (There were, however, low-key commemorations in 1985 and 1995.) This second Asian-African Summit was co-chaired by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia and President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The continuing global south interest in the ideals of the first conference was reflected in the large number of attendees: 89 heads of state or government and their special envoys attended, along with representatives of 10 regional organizations, 20 other countries and 11 international organizations. After two days of meetings, in addition to various side events, the participants adopted a Declaration on a New Asian-African Strategic Partnership, formally launched after 43 leaders reenacted the historic walk of the original Bandung participants from the Savoy Homman Hotel to the Merdeka building where the original conference was held. The agenda of this second conference was, in keeping with global changes, more limited and pragmatic than the agenda of 1955. Whereas the first Bandung conference had been a political effort, namely an attempt by independent Asia to reach out to Africa which was beginning to be decolonized, AAS2, as the jubilee conference is known, was oriented toward socioeconomic concerns. Held at a time when Asians have made enormous economic strides even as Africa tries to avoid further marginalization, the conference led to the inauguration of an Asian-African Strategic Partnership, with cooperation expected in areas ranging from trade, industry, investment, and tourism to energy, health, and water resources. Plans were drawn up to hold both Asian-African summits and business conferences every four years. On the other hand, AAS2 referred only briefly to political concerns: references were made to continuing Asian-African support for self-determination, particularly of the Palestinians, as well as to antiracism, and to an expanded definition of human rights.[9]

Main institutions of the NAM

Since the 1970s, the NAM has continued to be governed by a rather lean structure suitable to a diverse club-like organization, an organization in which members are equal in all respects. Every three years the Conference of Heads of State and Governments, the highest decision-making body, takes place. The host of this conference, chosen on a regionally rotating basis, becomes the chair of the NAM for the following three years, and is responsible for promoting NAM initiatives during that time. Decisions, which are all made by consensus, are reviewed, and preparations are made for the next summit at a ministerial conference held 18 months later. The NAM's foreign ministers meet to coordinate views before the UN General Assembly every year, while other ministerial committees meet as necessary. In the early 1970s the NAM established the Coordinating Bureau comprised of representatives from all component regions, based at the UN headquarters in New York, to discuss major issues and prepare for the summits. Membership in the bureau, initially limited to 25 states, is now open to all member states. There are also a number of specialized committees, working groups, and task forces overseen by the coordinating bureau and ultimately, by the current chair. In the mid-2000s, these include groups working on disarmament, peacekeeping operations, Palestine, human rights, General Assembly revitalization, and Security Council reform.

Some additions to the structure specifically address the need for institutional expansion as well as reform. In the mid-1990s the NAM established a Ministerial Committee on Methodology composed of all members, which meets regularly to discuss ways to enhance the efficiency of the organization. The NAM and the G77 (and China) have deepened cooperation through establishment of a Joint Coordinating Committee established in 1994. An additional discussion group, a troika of current, past and future chairs, was established in 1997. Given the increased importance of the UN Security Council after the cold war, coordination between the NAM bureau and the nonaligned members of the Security Council was intensified. New chapters have also been formed: in 2003, a Vienna NAM chapter was established to deal mainly with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard issues, and another was formed in Geneva to deal with disarmament, human rights, and labor issues.[10] Coordination at The Hague, particularly on chemical weapons issues, was also initiated. In 2007 a chapter in Paris, which originally had formed around UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) debates in the 1970s, was revitalized in recognition of the growing link between human resource and cultural issues and development.[11] A chapter in Nairobi, home of the UN Environmental Programme as well as UN-Habitat, has also been revitalized.

An assessment

In terms of the global south's continued perception of the need for collective action to promote longstanding principles and to confront new threats, the NAM must be seen as still relevant in the post–cold war period. For NAM members have continued to find benefits in remaining within the global south's biggest club. Beginning in the 1990s, NAM committed itself to revitalization, and its members have continually reaffirmed the relevance of the movement. Thus in the "Call from Colombia" issued enthusiastically at the 1995 summit in Cartagena, participants declared: "The validity of the Non-Aligned Movement and its fundamental principles are fully preserved. Under the current circumstances, the Movement today constitutes a forum which provides us with a basic framework to coordinate our interests and positions in the international environment."[12]

It bears repeating that membership in the NAM is based on normative considerations—that is, prior acceptance of broad but globally significant basic norms that guide the group's actions in specific spheres. As Indian prime minister Manohan Singh noted in 2006, "Non-alignment is a state of mind, to think independently about our options, to widen our developmental choices."[13] If NAM membership is chosen primarily for normative purposes, then states are free to conduct their individual policies in their own interests, as long as they adhere to the basic values of the organization. This should not negate the value of the organization as the only meeting ground and policy coordination mechanism (outside of the United Nations General Assembly) for states from all three global south continents. It does, however, continue to introduce tensions into the organization. The earlier differences between pro-East and pro-West members have today been transformed into differences between some leaders who wish to challenge the new order—most prominently the leaders of Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela—and the majority who prefer a reformist or accommodationist posture. In this regard, the position of founding member India is always particularly watched: India's rapprochement with the United States in the mid-2000s, which has brought agreement on nuclear issues as well as Indian distancing from "rogue" nations such as Iran, at least on nuclear issues, has led some to conclude that India is abandoning the NAM. However, the government has continually reiterated its commitment to the *ideals* of nonalignment.[14]

One measure of the NAM's solidarity or divisiveness is the extent to which its members vote as a cohesive bloc in the UN General Assembly. In this respect, the United States has long been concerned about the anti-US tilt of the NAM and the coordination of NAM positions in the General Assembly. US statistics show that the NAM average voting agreement with the United States has come full circle from 16.7 percent in 1986, to 45.6 percent in 1997, declining to 14.8 percent in 2006. If, as a rough measure of NAM cohesion with regard to US interests, the percentage of members voting plus or minus five points above or below the average percentage coincidence with the United States is taken to suggest relatively close intragroup voting patterns, then the NAM went from an average intragroup cohesion of 56 percent in 1986 to a low of 27.7 percent in 1997 and back to 56.6 percent in 2006. In other words, the dissension experienced by the NAM in the 1990s has been stemmed in the 2000s, and it is easy to infer that this is attributable mainly to increased anti-US sentiment after 2001. On the other hand, it may surprise some to know that NAM cohesion has never been all that high to begin with. An examination of voting records prior to the 2000s (that is, in the 1980s and 1990s) shows that generally only a third to one half of NAM members have voted together *vis-à-vis* the United States.[15] Not unexpectedly, the Latin American and European members have tended to have a higher voting agreement with the United States than the African, Arab, and Asian states.

Despite the fact that the NAM is not a particularly cohesive organization, it can boast of a number of achievements over the years. The nonaligned brought about structural changes in two main UN organs: in 1965 the Security Council was expanded to 15 from the original 11 members, and the Economic and Social Council was expanded from 18 to 27 and later (in 1973) to 54. The NAM brought about the widespread acceptance of the right of countries under colonial rule to become independent, and global south countries have dominated the Committee of Twenty-Four which has implemented the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514/15 of 14 December 1960). The NAM has been instrumental in focusing attention on global racial and cultural issues, especially with regard to the apartheid system in South Africa. In that case, the nonaligned group pushed successfully if laboriously for mandatory sanctions against South Africa, for investigative missions to monitor conditions in that country as well as in neighboring Southwest Africa, for the UN's acceptance of the African National Congress (ANC) as an observer, and for the ban on South Africa's participation in the General Assembly. The NAM also established its own Fund for Assistance to Frontline Countries. It is true that changes in the global and regional environments as well as changes in leadership were as instrumental as UN pressure in changing the South African system between 1990—when Nelson Mandela was released from prison—and 1994 when free elections were held. Nevertheless, the nonaligned group's principled stances against apartheid kept the issue on the global front burner.

The recognition of the ANC was also the result of the general acceptance by the global community of the right to resort to anticonstitutional action against resistant colonial powers. In this regard, nonaligned efforts led to the acceptance as well of the Patriotic Front fighting for independence in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the Southwest People's Organization (SWAPO) fighting in Southwest Africa (now Namibia) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), among others. The nonaligned commitment to the Palestinian cause has been consistent: the PLO, formed in 1964, attended NAM meetings as an observer in 1970 and was granted full membership in 1976, having also by that time been granted observer status at the United Nations.

The NAM continues in its strong commitment to antiracialism. The group was instrumental in getting the United Nations to hold a long-awaited first World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa, in August to September 2001. Despite the fact that the conference was widely judged as of mixed success in view of the competition for prioritization among the diverse set of participants, the conference declaration managed to define a broad range of affected communities needing global attention, including African people and African descendants, migrants, refugees, indigenous peoples, Palestinians, and victims of sex trafficking.[16] Subsequent NAM summit documents have made sure to include declarations compatible with the results of the WCAR.

In the economic arena, the nonaligned countries pushed hard for the establishment of an appropriate institutional structure to carry out international economic reform. Successes were experienced in the normative as well as organizational realms even if concrete results have been few (see next chapter). In 1962 nonaligned representatives meeting in Cairo to discuss economic problems proposed initiatives that eventually led to the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in 1964. Another major achievement was the creation in 1965 of the United Nations Development Programme out of the previously existing Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. The nonaligned countries pushed for approval of a charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States as well as for the establishment of a New International Economic Order, both focused on assuring greater economic equality and respect between north and south. They succeeded in getting the UN's commitment to the concept of successive "development decades," anchored by the establishment of a formal guideline requiring that 0.7 percent of gross national product be transferred in official assistance from the developed countries to the developing countries. Along with the development of mechanisms to facilitate fairer trade, the NAM promoted the idea of south–south cooperation as an alternative to the traditional south–north linkages developed through colonialism. The NAM is working today with the G77 to continue to develop economic alternatives.

By the late 1980s, the idea of sustainable development had taken hold and the nonaligned countries worked to expand the concept to include human security, centering on a broad array of social development policies, including improvements in health and education, poverty alleviation, habitat, gender empowerment, and other key areas. The nonaligned nations have also pressed somewhat successfully for the conceptualization of human rights to include social and economic rights. The NAM's work on development issues has been facilitated by the establishment of an influential intergovernmental think tank, the South Center, in 1995, that offers policy advice to the NAM and G77. The successor to the independent South Commission established in 1987 which prepared *The Challenge to the South*, an influential report on development problems in the south, the South Center's aim is to promote south solidarity and cooperation, collaboration in international forums, networking and information exchange.[17]

The NAM has also failed in a number of areas. Although members have had a rhetorical commitment to both vertical and horizontal disarmament, they have had little success in persuading the nuclear powers to disarm. The progress that was made in US–Soviet disarmament resulted from the initiatives of the involved countries as well as changes in global conditions, not from any pressure from the nonaligned group. Moreover, although the nonaligned can boast that most of their members have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and other such efforts to denuclearize their regions, key members of the group—India, Pakistan, and North Korea—have developed their own nuclear weapons capabilities while most others have continued to spend considerable amounts on conventional military acquisitions.

The NAM has also been too divided on important political issues to play a major role in conflict resolution. NAM final communiqués normally have expressed support for Cuba, Cyprus, South Africa, Palestine, the Polisario in Western Sahara, and allies in other fairly clear-cut political situations, but major civil conflicts in member states have paralyzed the organization, which has no built-in conflict resolution mechanism and is hindered in its ability to mediate by the inevitable intragroup divisions. Thus NAM's attempt to mediate in the long Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s was unsuccessful; its approach to disintegrating Yugoslavia was merely to condemn Serbian efforts at ethnic cleansing; and it fell back on proclamations of general support for territorial integrity in the context of the Gulf wars. In the many civil conflicts in Africa, the NAM has tended to issue declarations of support for ceasefires and dialogue but to leave it up to individual leading NAM members, South Africa for example, as well as the United Nations and regional agencies, to take the lead in attempting to resolve disputes.

In the 1970s the NAM also undermined its bargaining position on economic issues by adopting strident rhetoric, rigid stances, and a penchant for setting goals that had little chance of approval by the northern countries. Rhetorical confrontation reached its peak in the late 1970s, leading to a decline in the already limited northern support for global south economic initiatives. Rhetoric also helped to sideline the NAM's efforts to create a new information order in the 1970s. The attempt to disseminate "good" news about developing countries, however well intended, seemed to the Western countries and indeed to some in the NAM itself (for example, Singapore) to be a mask for assaults on press freedom. The withdrawal in the 1980s of the United States, Britain, and Singapore from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, a prime proponent at the time of this "developmental journalism," derailed the south's effort to assert journalistic control. However, one positive result was the creation of a number of regional news agencies to counter the dominance of the four Western agencies—Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Agence France-Presse. A Nonaligned News Agency Pool (NANAP) was formed in the 1980s but has not been well supported. In 2006 Malaysia proposed to host the most modern infrastructure for a Non-Aligned News Network by way of the Internet. According to the Malaysian information minister, the idea is to have a credible news agency, so that "ultimately even the West will come to us to get credible news about us from our own perspective."[18] This has generated concern on the part of the northern countries that the global south is seeking to reintroduce the old development journalism in the proposed New World Information and Communication Order.

Finally, in the aftermath of the cold war the NAM was slow to adjust to environmental changes. The longstanding ambivalence of some Latin American nations toward the Afro-Asian movement was reflected in the fact that the Argentinian and Chilean diplomatic establishments quickly began to vigorously debate the usefulness of NAM. Argentina left the NAM in 1995 but Chile has remained a member. As already noted, revitalization efforts did not begin until the mid-1990s. Members agreed then that "the core of [the Movement's] philosophy has endured and its underlying principles remain unchanged. There is no disputing the continued validity of its principles and objectives … "[19]

At that crucial time, former Colombian president Ernesto Samper stated:

> I don't think that NAM needs to be changed. The Movement has proved its usefulness for more than 35 years now, it has been a moral force in the international arena. What has to be changed, or more exactly, adapted, is the agenda of the Movement. The priorities of action are different now than 35 years ago. When we met in Belgrade, our main preoccupation was the possibility of a war between the superpowers. Today, when we approach the 21st century, our main concern is to eliminate poverty and to develop economically and socially our citizens. The current international agenda is a social agenda, although we still have to strive to achieve other goals as the nuclear disarmament.[20]

In sum, the NAM would seem to still have a *raison d'être* as a forum for tricontinental diplomacy. The initial optimism that bilateralism and regionalism would be sufficient to achieve southern goals faded as the new unipolar and liberal order brought new challenges to the general interests of all global south states. Instead, it is agreed that all three types of strategy—bilateralism, regionalism, and globalism—are necessary if the global south countries are ever to achieve substantial system change.

2 Tricontinental functionalism
The Group of 77

While the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) began as a primarily political organization that refocused more and more on economic issues in the 1970s, the global south countries also established a separate economic caucus to interact and negotiate with the developed countries on economic and related technical issues. With a narrow functional agenda, and broad cross-continental membership linked by a common sense of deprivation and inequality, this Group of 77 (G77) was expected to make a strong case to the industrial countries for reform of the international economic system. However, the G77 has had mixed success as a negotiating body. In this chapter, the agenda of the group, as well as the environmental changes that have helped or hindered its success, are analyzed.

The Group of 77

As described in the last chapter, as more Asian and African countries emerged to independence, the attention of the nonaligned—as well as others not formally nonaligned—was deflected to economic problems. There was a realization that while political self-determination had been achieved, the global economy was dominated by the same northern metropolitan countries from which the southern countries had just gained their freedom. The "development gap" between north and south was a wide one by statistical standards: development analysts calculated that the average per capita gross national product in the industrialized nations in 1960 was $1,407 whereas for the developing nations it was a mere $132![1] Moreover, the legacy of colonialism was reflected in monoproduct economies based on raw material production and export, dependent on the markets of the former "mother" countries, and highly vulnerable to the vagaries of global supply and demand as well as the effects of climatic and ecological conditions. In 1960, 88.4

percent of the exports of developing market economies consisted of primary products, compared with 35.9 percent of the exports of their developed country counterparts. Conversely, 64.3 percent of developed country exports were manufactures, but only 11.2 percent of developing country exports fell into that category.[2] Figures on commodity concentration, measured at the time as the percentage contribution of the three major commodities in total merchandise exports, were similarly imbalanced: except for a few manufacturing or agriculturally diverse countries, commodity concentration was generally above 50 percent.[3] Similarly, 68 percent of the exports of developing countries went to developed countries in 1960.[4] In sum, developing countries were faced with both undiversified economies based on a handful of commodities, and external trade dependence on a small number of developed country partners.

In the last chapter, the growing clout of the members of the NAM in the 1960s was highlighted. By the early 1960s, these and other southern countries were pressuring their northern industrial counterparts to sit down with them in a global forum to talk about economic issues. They argued on the eminently practical ground that the northern countries needed healthy developing country markets for their own gain. In the UN General Assembly, for example, they argued that

> a new international division of labour with new patterns of production and trade, is necessary. Only in this way will the economic independence of the developing countries be strengthened and a truly inter-dependent and integrated world economy emerge. The development of the production and the increase in productivity and purchasing power of the developing countries will contribute to the economic growth of the industrialised countries as well, and thus become a means to world-wide prosperity.[5]

At first, the industrial countries resisted these pleas for talks. However, with the support of a Soviet Union eager to gain influence in the third world, southern countries eventually succeeded in bringing about the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. At this conference, held in Geneva, 77 developing countries were represented, thus forming what became a permanent caucusing group that, even with considerable membership expansion later, maintained the name “Group of 77.” This G77, with a membership today of 133 (see Box 2.1), has gone on to become the chief interlocutor of the “south” at all relevant UN forums. China generally joins in endorsement of the group’s positions.

Box 2.1 **Members of the Group of 77**

Afghanistan, *Algeria*,[*+] Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, *Argentina*,[*+] Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, *Benin*, Bhutan, *Bolivia*, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, *Brazil*,[*+] Brunei Darussalam, *Burkina Faso*, *Burundi*, *Cambodia*, *Cameroon*, Cape Verde, *Central African Republic*, *Chad*, *Chile*,[+] China, *Colombia*,[*+] Comoros, *Congo*,[*] *Costa Rica*, Côte d'Ivoire,[*] Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, *Democratic Republic of Congo*,[*] Djibouti, Dominica, *Dominican Republic*, *Ecuador*, *Egypt*,[*+] *El Salvador*, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, *Ethiopia*,[*] Fiji, *Gabon*,[*] Gambia, *Ghana*,[*] Grenada, *Guatemala*,[*] *Guinea*, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, *Haiti*, *Honduras*, *India*,[*+] *Indonesia*,[+] *Islamic Republic of Iran*,[*+] *Iraq*, *Jamaica*,[+] *Jordan*, *Kenya*,[+] *Kuwait*, *Lao People's Democratic Republic*, *Lebanon*,[*] Lesotho, *Liberia*, *Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, *Madagascar*, Malawi, *Malaysia*,[+] Maldives, *Mali*, Marshall Islands, *Mauritania*, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, *Morocco*, Mozambique, *Myanmar*, Namibia, *Nepal*, *Nicaragua*, *Niger*, *Nigeria*,[*+] Oman, *Pakistan*,[*] Palestine, *Panama*, Papua New Guinea, *Paraguay*, *Peru*,[*+] *Philippines*,[*] Qatar, Romania, *Rwanda*, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, *Saudi Arabia*, *Senegal*,[+] Seychelles, *Sierra Leone*, Singapore, Solomon Islands, *Somalia*, South Africa,[*] *Sri Lanka*,[*+] *Sudan*, Suriname, Swaziland, *Syrian Arab Republic*,[*] *Thailand*, Timor-Leste, *Togo*, Tonga, *Trinidad and Tobago*,[*] *Tunisia*, Turkmenistan, *Uganda*, United Arab Emirates, *United Republic of Tanzania*, *Uruguay*, Vanuatu, *Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela*,[*+] *Viet Nam*, *Yemen*, Zambia, Zimbabwe.[+]

- Special observer: People's Republic of China.
- *Italics*: indicates members attending UNCTAD I, 1964. Cyprus, Mexico, Republic of Korea, and Yugoslavia were also original members. In 2004 Cyprus left to join the EU; Mexico left in 1994 to join the OECD. Spain and New Zealand were parties to the original Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries made at the 18th session of the UN General Assembly, 11 November 1963.

* Members of the Group of 24. Mexico is also a member.

\+ Members of the Group of 15. Mexico is also a member.

Web sites: www.g77.org; www.g24.org; www.g15.org

The first UNCTAD conference established an agenda for G77 negotiations on trade that has remained the focus throughout the years. At the time, the Group of 77 countries summarized their trade problems concisely:

> The existing principles and patterns of world trade still mainly favour the advanced parts of the world. Instead of helping the developing countries to promote the development and diversification of their economies, the present tendencies in world trade frustrate their efforts to attain more rapid growth. These trends must be reversed. The volume of trade of the developing countries should be increased and its composition diversified; the prices of their exports should be stabilized at fair and remunerative levels, and international transfers of capital should be made more favourable to those countries so as to enable them to obtain through trade more of the means needed for their economic development.[6]

Three areas were identified as of major importance: the need for the stabilization of commodity prices and widening of market access; the need for assistance in support of developing country industrial efforts; and provision of adequate financing related to trade. The developing countries also sought assistance in what are called "invisibles," primarily technical assistance in shipping and transportation areas, the minimization of the cost of insurance and reinsurance, and commitments to the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries. The following sections detail the G77 agenda historically, that is first in terms of the 1960s to 1980s, and then moving forward to the 2000s.

The G77 agenda, 1960s–1980s

Commodity issues

At UNCTAD I, developing countries expressed the wish to secure prices for commodities that were equitable, stable, and remunerative, as well as to improve the trend of the commodity export earnings of their countries. Because developing countries relied on low-cost, labor-intensive agricultural production rather than higher-cost and more price-inelastic manufactures (which they imported), they suffered from chronic trade deficits and declining terms of trade—meaning that the ratio of export prices to import prices continued to deteriorate. Between the 1950s and 1970, industrial countries were estimated to have seen a 9 percent positive change in their terms of trade whereas the developing countries experienced a decline of 12 percent (6 percent for major oil exporters).[7] According to the G77, then, these problems could be addressed by widening the access of developing country products to the markets of the industrial nations through the reduction or removal of import duties and quantitative restrictions, or elimination of governmental subsidies to uneconomic production of primary commodities in industrial countries—for example, beet sugar, which was heavily subsidized by the then European Economic Community (EEC).[8]

What did the G77 achieve in this regard? In the ensuing years, individual members negotiated many bilateral and bi-regional preferential schemes that widened their access to developed country markets. For example, the EEC negotiated successive agreements with African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries that had banded together after the entry of Britain to the community. Under these four "Lomé" accords (1975–80, 1980–85, 1985–90, 1990–2000, the last having been extended in 1995), named after the capital of Togo where they were first negotiated, the community granted non-reciprocal duty-free access to all industrial, and most agricultural products of the ACP countries. Certain sensitive products—bananas, sugar, rum, and beef/veal—were covered by additional protocols that established quantitative and price arrangements. Another product, rice, was also covered by special quota, tariff, and financial aid arrangements. The Lomé convention not only came with development assistance from a European Development Fund (EDF) but also incorporated two commodity stabilization schemes—STABEX, an export stabilization system, and SYSMIN, a mineral product support system, under which the community granted financial assistance to ACP members experiencing commodity earnings shortfalls. Another narrower preferential scheme was established under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act passed by the United States in 1982. Although some aid provisions were included (specifically $350 million in emergency economic aid), the centerpiece of the act was trade provisions allowing Caribbean and Central American countries to send most of their products duty-free to the United States for 12 years. The exceptions were petroleum, textiles and footwear. The act was renewed in 1990 with exclusions removed, except for apparel, and was later converted into a permanent program.

However, the G77's most crucial success was at the tricontinental level, specifically the negotiation under UNCTAD auspices of a global scheme of preferences called the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Under this scheme, established in 1968 and initiated in all developing countries by 1975, industrial countries agreed to eliminate import duties on most products—commodities not under quotas as well as manufactures—from the developing world. True, developing countries had sought a comprehensive non-discriminatory system, rather than the one adopted which allowed each developed country to make product and country exclusions that were often used against politically unfriendly or economically uncooperative countries. However, the GSP was still a major achievement and one that has become a permanent feature of the international trade structure. Developed countries have reviewed and renewed the GSP many times since it was first initiated, but countries are graduated from the program as their economies improve.

G77 countries were also somewhat successful with regard to the institution of global mechanisms to stabilize commodity prices. In an era favorable to managed trade as well as an era of increasing concerns about commodity shortages and general market volatility, international commodity agreements (ICAs) sought to stabilize export earnings by establishing quotas, reserve stocks, and contracts fixing prices.[9] A number of commodity agreements were already in place by the time of UNCTAD I, including arrangements in tin, wheat (later changed to grains), coffee, cotton, and olive oil. In addition to bringing these under its umbrella along with existing consultative bodies on copper, lead, and zinc, UNCTAD facilitated the negotiation of fresh agreements on sugar, cocoa, jute, tropical timber, and rubber. Most agreements were sponsored by the Integrated Program in Commodities, initially proposed in 1976 at the fourth UNCTAD conference in Nairobi, Kenya, and eventually established in 1980.

The ICA strategy was, however, only mildly successful: commodity prices fluctuated and then mostly declined in the 1980s, and debt burdens increased as a result of high energy prices brought on by the actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As the economies of commodity producing countries deteriorated, the negotiation of new ICAs declined and many existing ICAs collapsed. While blame tended to be cast on the northern countries, which had never warmed to the idea of managing trade through these arrangements, developing producers themselves often sought to maximize their individual positions to the detriment of the collective. The competitive climate led to much disagreement on issues such as the price structure, the size of buffer stocks, and the relative importance of reserve stock vis-à-vis informational mechanisms.

An important aspect of the Integrated Commodities program was the establishment of a common fund to finance buffer stocks in certain commodities. It was hoped that the fund, approved in 1980, would be highly capitalized at $6 billion, but negotiations proved difficult amid uncertainties as to the exact role of the fund and how funding would be disbursed. In the end, the G77 scored a success in having two "windows" established: initial funding was set at $400 million for buffer stocks and another $350 million was set aside mainly in voluntary contributions for commodity marketing and product research in developing countries.[10] However, since the parties to the common fund were to be international commodity agreements (ICAs) only, and there was a decline in negotiated ICAs during this period, the fund's operations proved to be quite restricted.

The other proposal of the G77 in response to commodity problems was for the removal of subsidies. North American and European governments as well as Japan have traditionally heavily subsidized their agricultural sectors, providing guaranteed prices for farmers in order to ensure a stable supply and to protect farmers from external competition. The heaviest subsidies have been paid within the European Community (now the European Union, EU) under its Common Agricultural Policy initiated in 1962. In the case of Japan, Japan's farmers, especially rice farmers, have historically been a powerful political constituency, despite their declining numbers. In the United States, farmers have traditionally benefited heavily from export credits, in addition to domestic subsidies. It is generally recognized, however, that while subsidies may have been needed in the postwar period to stem declines in the agricultural sector, over time even the World Bank and other international economic institutions have deemed them to be inefficient, often resulting in overproduction, costly to consumers who must pay more than the market rate for protected products, favorable to big agribusiness rather than the small farmers they were intended to help, and a drain on the economy as a whole. However, social and political considerations have hindered any major overhaul of existing systems. These subsidies have been costly for developing countries whose products are unable to compete fairly with those of the north. Subsidies harm developing countries "by boosting domestic production of the supported products, depressing international prices, exacerbating the volatility of world prices by insulating domestic markets, and reducing the scope for contesting markets."[11]

G77 efforts for the removal of subsidies were unsuccessful right up to the 2000s. Producer support estimates for the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have kept rising over the years, reaching $279.8 billion in 2005 or an estimated $385.3 billion for total subsidies.[12] As discussed later, this issue has returned to the forefront of global discussions in the 2000s.

Manufactures

Industrialization loomed large on the developing countries' agenda in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Rapid industrialization was seen as a way to stem the declining terms of trade experienced primarily because of the low prices for agricultural products. In seeking help in this area, the G77 scored some successes. The creation of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in 1966 provided a separate agency to advise developing countries, first on import substitution industrialization (ISI), and later on export promotion. Unfortunately, UNIDO was seen as unnecessary by many northern countries and was never a funding priority for them. In terms of broader responses to the problems of the G77 in manufacturing, the negotiation of the GSP was clearly also important since it brought more market access for most products from the developing countries. But perhaps the main strategy of the G77, one supported by the NAM countries, was the espousal of south–south cooperation or "collective self-reliance," also known as economic cooperation among developing countries (ECDC). This was envisaged as subregional and regional in scope as well as interregional, and involved efforts at collaboration in trade, technical assistance (TCDC), financial assistance, transportation, information and communications, and investment, as well as non-economic areas such as peaceful nuclear energy, sports, and other suitable fields.[13]

In the 1960s regional economic integration was a popular strategy, seen as a way to expand national markets and supplement the industrial markets which were still heavily protected. These subregional initiatives are discussed in Chapters 7–9. It suffices here to say that in the 1960s and early 1970s intraregional trade in most global south regions grew considerably in absolute value terms, but only moderately in percentage terms. For example, within the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) exports grew from $259 million in 1960 to $124 billion in 1980 and $165 billion in 2005. In percentage terms ASEAN intraregional trade went from 13 percent of total trade to 17 percent in 1980 and 26 percent in 2005.[14] However, regionalism was adversely affected by, among other things, political dissension among regional partners, distributive imbalances, economic deterioration in member states, the limitations of regional market size, and the consequent pull of extraregional markets, especially after the oil price increases of the 1970s. There followed two decades of decline and stagnation in the south before regionalism was again viewed as a key global south strategy.

The decline of regionalism was at least partly responsible for the slow growth in south–south collective self-reliance throughout the 1980s.

UNCTAD figures show that developing countries as a whole increased their intra-exports from 19.1 percent of the total in 1970, to 25.6 percent in 1980, and 31.9 percent in 1990.[15] However, trade accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s, reaching a proportion of 44 percent in 2005. On the other hand, the figures do not do justice to the major increases in cross-continental trade in *absolute* value terms over the earlier period and continuing today. For example, Brazil went from a mere $12 million in exports to Africa in 1960 to more than $1 billion in the 1980s and some $4 billion today.[16] India saw a similar rise in trade with non-Asian countries, and both countries, along with China, have become major providers of technical expertise to their less developed counterparts since the 1970s.

A significant achievement of the G77 in their promotion of collective self-reliance has been the negotiation of the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) among developing countries whereby developing countries grant each other preferential treatment. Unlike other global schemes or negotiations, the GSTP, initially proposed in the 1970s, specifically takes due regard of differing interests and differing levels of development. It was negotiated between 1982 and 1988, when the first round was completed. The second round of negotiations ended in 1998. The GSTP came into force in 1989 with 41 signatories, and three more countries joined in the 1990s.[17] The GSTP is funded by voluntary contributions, although it originally benefited from an UNCTAD trust fund, the Perez-Guerrero fund. On the negative side, adherence to the GSTP has been relatively weak in an era first of structural adjustment, and then competition from other bilateral and bi-regional arrangements.

The G77 has also promoted and instituted mechanisms for the advancement of technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC). In 1974, a TCDC unit was established within the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Furthermore, between 1980 and 1981, a high-level General Assembly committee (HLC) was established to strengthen technical exchanges between more developed and less developed southern countries in areas such as energy, information, and science and technology.

Financing for trade and development

Since the 1960s the G77 have worked within UNCTAD as well as in the UN as a whole to increase financing for both trade and development, the latter being conceived in both economic and social or human terms. At the first UNCTAD, the G77 asked for assistance to meet shortfalls in export earnings through soft loans or other forms of concessionary financing. But the issue of financing for *development* is much broader than that of financing shortfalls, even if developing countries agree that trade is the engine of economic growth.

One of the broad concerns of developing countries has been not only the low levels of official aid given by donors in the north but also the *conditionality* of that aid, both bilateral and multilateral. Of course, private aid disbursed through banks is also conditional, but that is lent only to creditworthy countries and is not the focus here. Official aid is often tied to political considerations as well as economic criteria, most recently governance reform, environmental sustainability, and economic reforms in line with the predominant liberal development model. Although bilateral assistance tends to be most encumbered—one reason why the developing countries prefer multilateral assistance—loans from the main international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) can also be strictly conditioned. In the case of the IMF, in particular, loan terms can involve currency devaluations, curbs in spending, reductions in the size of the bureaucracy, reductions in outlays of social programs, cutbacks in imports, lowering the price of exports, and other actions that have caused social and political disruption in borrowing countries. Another developing country complaint is that tied aid has increased their dependence on imports as well as their debt burdens. Much bilateral as well as multilateral lending, for example through the basic lending facilities of both the IMF and the World Bank, is done at market rather than concessional rates.

One result of the immediate G77 call for commodity financing was the establishment of the UNCTAD-supervised Common Fund discussed earlier. The developing countries also received assistance over the years from bilateral and regional sources, of which the EC/EU's funding of the ACP must be noted. But aid from the Bretton Woods institutions was a particular focus of the G77. With regard to the IMF, a Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) was put in place in 1963 prior to the first UNCTAD, to compensate developing countries for shortfalls in their export earnings caused by fluctuations in commodity prices The facility was expanded after the first oil shock and again in 1979, with the limit on drawings raised to meet shortfalls resulting from high energy prices. A Buffer Stock Financing Facility was also established in 1969. In 1974 the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was established to give longer loans to meet balance-of-payments problems; these loans were extended for a three-year period with repayment four to ten years later. Also in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, the IMF established an oil facility to help ease the payments shortfall of developing countries, and a fund to subsidize the interest rates on such loans. Other arrangements that helped the developing countries during this period were expanded allocations of special drawing rights (often called "paper gold," an artificial reserve currency created in 1969); the establishment of a Supplementary Financing Facility to help countries correct deficits; auctions of gold and the creation of a trust fund from unused proceeds; establishment of the Enlarged Access Policy, funded heavily by Saudi Arabia, allowing countries to borrow annually up to 150 percent of their quota (which is based on their contribution to the fund); and the grant of access by developing countries to the General Agreements to Borrow (GAB), which Saudi Arabia had augmented considerably. This last, however, was never used.

In the 1980s, the IMF turned to its far less welcomed structural adjustment programs, lending under the Structural Adjustment Facility established in 1986, and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility established in 1987 and enlarged in 1993. The latter became the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1989, a "window" that lends to low-income countries at concessional rates of 0.5 percent with repayment from 5 years to 10 years after disbursement. (The facility has been financed to some degree by IMF sales of gold.)

A boost for the G77 came in the form of the establishment in 1960 of the International Development Association (IDA), to serve as the World Bank's agency for concessional lending to low-income countries. The IDA provides loans or "credits" at no interest with grace periods of 10 years, maturing in up to 40 years (reduced in 1987 from 50 years). But in the 1980s the World Bank drew criticism from the G77 as it moved closer to the IMF in introducing structural adjustment lending and demanding IMF approval before a borrower could get bank assistance. The bank's policy of graduating countries from the IDA as well as the bank itself has also been a source of complaint by developing countries, which maintain that the focus on income levels masks other inequities in their economies and societies, even though the bank's statistical procedures do take some of these issues into account. On a more positive note, in the 1970s and 1980s the World Bank initiated various guarantees to cap repayments of poorer and highly indebted countries, increased its lending for energy, and established programs in agriculture and rural development, education, nutrition, and other areas intended to help the rural poor. This last came partly in response to nongovernmental critics of its funding of large-scale projects that tended not to "trickle down" to, or in many cases, were seen as harmful to the poor and the indigenous populations, As part of the first development decade of the 1960s, G77 and non-aligned efforts had led to the UN's adoption in 1970 of a target goal of the transfer of 0.7 percent of GNP annually as official development assistance (ODA) from developed to developing countries. The G77's original request had been for a transfer of 1 percent of national income but this was lowered to 0.7 percent. Over the years, developing countries continued to be disappointed that this target was regularly missed by most countries. Only the Scandinavian countries and the OPEC during the 1970s reached or exceeded the goal (see Table 2.1). In fact, aid percentages actually fell from the 1960s into the 1990s, even though international pressure on capital-surplus Japan in the 1980s succeeded in bringing about a huge increase in that country's absolute contribution. At the time, Japan joined the United States as the largest donors overall.

Table 2.1 Trends in official development assistance

Development assistance committee donor country	*Aid as percentage of gross national product/income*[1]					
	1965	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*[2]	*2005*	*2006*[3]
Australia	0.11	0.59	0.48	0.34	0.25	0.30
Austria	0.02	0.07	0.23	0.11	0.52	0.48
Belgium	0.60	0.46	0.50	0.46	0.53	0.50
Canada	0.19	0.41	0.43	0.44	0.34	0.30
Denmark	0.13	0.38	0.74	0.94	0.81	0.80
Finland	0.02	0.06	0.22	0.65	0.46	0.39
France	0.76	0.66	0.63	0.60	0.47	0.47
Germany	0.40	0.32	0.44	0.42	0.36	0.36
Greece	–	–	0.00	–	0.17	0.16
Ireland	0.0	0.0	0.16	0.16	0.42	0.53
Italy	0.10	0.16	0.15	0.31	0.29	0.20
Japan	0.27	0.23	0.32	0.31	0.28	0.25
Luxembourg	–	–	0.12	0.21	0.84	0.89
Netherlands	0.36	0.61	0.97	0.92	0.82	0.81
New Zealand	–	0.23	0.33	0.23	0.27	0.27
Norway	0.16	0.32	0.87	1.17	0.94	0.89
Portugal	–	–	–	0.24	0.21	0.21
Spain	–	–	–	0.20	0.27	0.32
Sweden	0.19	0.38	0.78	0.91	0.94	1.03
Switzerland	0.09	0.15	0.24	0.32	0.44	0.39
United Kingdom	0.47	0.41	0.35	0.27	0.47	0.52
United States	0.58	0.32	0.27	0.21	0.22	0.17

Notes:
1 GNP prior to 1990.
2 Data include forgiveness of non-ODA claims.
3 Preliminary data.

Private investment is also a large part of financing for trade. Here, transnational corporations (TNCs) have played a major role, but one that was not always seen as beneficial to developing countries. In the 1970s the G77 call was for investment to be properly regulated so as to ensure, among other things, that developing countries are not subjected to political interference or decapitalized by the repatriation of profits, and that the transfer of technology and skills to local managers really takes place. In this regard, G77 countries were successful in obtaining in 1974 the establishment of a Center on Transnational Corporations whose role was to disseminate information on the activities of corporations as well as to organize programs of technical cooperation. A supervisory forum, the Commission on Transnational Corporations, was also created, whose main focus was the development of a code of conduct for TNCs. A draft code was drawn up and discussion ensued on the provisions of the code as well as on the merits of a mandatory versus voluntary code. There was never any agreement on these issues, however, and the commission's activities were eventually transferred to UNCTAD. In keeping with a General Assembly resolution in 1980, UNCTAD also worked on a broader code governing restrictive business practices that restrain developing country exports. By the 1990s, however, the regulatory concerns of the G77 members had been superseded by more liberal approaches.

Finally, beginning in the 1960s, G77 countries also sought greater participation in global economic decision making. In both the IMF and the World Bank, voting power is based on quota size, giving northern countries a great deal of influence over the decisions made by these agencies. In the IMF the United States has had the largest quota (20 percent in the 1980s, down to 17.4 percent in 2006) and with France, Germany, and Japan have constituted the largest bloc of voting power. Similarly, in the World Bank the United States holds about 16 percent of voting power. The United States, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom have individual seats for their appointed directors on the executive board of the international financial institutions, whereas other countries have representatives elected on a regional basis. (However, representatives from every member country serve on the main decision-making body, the Board of Governors.)

In the postwar monetary system established by the IMF, the Group of Ten—Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States—together have exerted power over monetary arrangements as members of the General Agreements to Borrow (GAB), initiated in 1962. It should be noted that it is the *central banks* of Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland that are formal members. Switzerland became an observer in the GAB in 1964 and formally joined in 1983 so that the Group of Ten is really a group of 11. Moreover, the Group of Seven (G7) industrial countries or the G8, with Russian association in the post–cold war period, has assumed coordination and oversight over global economic arrangements as a whole since 1975.[18] As the IMF considered reform in the 1970s after the United States moved off the gold standard, some developing countries participated in a review Committee of Twenty set up in 1972 that concluded operations in 1974 after proposing, among other things, that there should be more flexible interest rates and an increase in the use of SDRs.[19] That committee was replaced by the Interim Committee which continued to discuss issues of reform until the 1990s when it was replaced by the advisory International Monetary and Financial Committee.

Perhaps of more importance to the developing countries was the creation, pursuant to the recommendations of the Committee of Twenty, of the Development Committee in 1974. The committee advises both the IMF and the World Bank on a range of development issues. It has focused on the oil shocks in the 1970s, debt and adjustment in the 1980s, and liberal arrangements since then.[20] Its members are the ministers of finance or development of the same states that are members of the executive board of the IMF or World Bank at any given time; membership alternates between the two boards. Apart from Saudi Arabia which has its own director, there are usually 11 developing country members in addition to China serving on this 24-member committee.

An even more important development for the G77 was the creation in 1971 of a Group of 24 (G24, or officially the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development) by the developing countries themselves to lobby for their interests. The group has, however, had little success in getting the fund to increase developing country quotas or to change its voting structure. At one point in north–south global negotiations, the group even proposed giving decision-making power on economic issues to a UN-type central body—an idea that was quickly rejected. In fact, in the 1980s the UN itself was forced to reform its own budgetary process to accommodate greater US control. However, in 1981 Saudi Arabia, having made substantial loans to the IMF, the GAB, and the Enlarged Access Facility, moved up from thirteenth to sixth place in terms of quota size and therefore voting power. This made Saudi Arabia the most influential developing country in the IMF, and today its quota remains at slightly above 3 percent. Another significant development for the G77 was the creation in 1989 of the Group of Fifteen (G15) as a counterpoint to the G7. The G15 sees itself as a "dialogue partner" for the G7, and also promotes programs for south–south cooperation and the overall development in the south.[21]

Normative advances in global negotiations

The demands of the G77, as well as the nonaligned, were comprehensively stated in the 1974 Declaration and Action Program on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, two resolutions adopted without a vote by the UN General Assembly at its sixth special session on raw materials held at the urging of the nonaligned. All the demands and suggestions already described were encompassed within this declaration. The broad philosophical principles that were expected to govern the new order included: respect for the sovereign equality of states; their full and effective participation in solving economic problems in the common interest of all countries; acceptance of the exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources; the regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational corporations; the establishment of a just and equitable relationship between the prices of the exports and imports of the developing countries; the reform of the international monetary system to promote the development of the developing countries; the granting of preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries; the promotion of the transfer of technology and the development of indigenous technology for the benefit of the developing countries; the conservation of natural resources; the establishment and strengthening of producers' associations; and the strengthening of economic cooperation among developing countries.[22]

G77 philosophies were also reflected in another major document, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the General Assembly at its regular session in 1974. Among other things, the charter endorsed the right of every state to choose its own economic and political systems, to control its natural resources, and to regulate foreign investments, including by way of appropriately compensated nationalizations and expropriations. Disputes would be settled by domestic courts except where there was mutual agreement on other means. Not unexpectedly, many developed countries opposed the lack of a guarantee of compensation, as well as the resort to domestic remedies rather than arbitration, and were also wary of the trade management measures restated in this document. The charter was adopted but without a consensus.[23]

After 1974, the "North–South dialogue" or global negotiations continued in a new forum, the Conference on International Economic

Cooperation held between 1975 and 1977. There northern and southern countries continued to discuss a range of topics including energy, raw materials, finance, and development, but no agreement on the fundamentals was ever reached. In 1980 a commission headed by former (West) German chancellor Willy Brandt and appointed by the World Bank, issued a report that sought to move negotiations forward while agreeing with many G77 demands for economic and monetary reform. That helped generate a subsequent North–South summit, but the conference, held in Cancún, Mexico in 1981, was limited to selected nations only.[24] It, too, failed to come up with concrete solutions but it did—albeit not deliberately—usher in a new era of bilateralism rather than global initiatives. As the United States in particular became ever more strongly focused on bilateralism and liberalism, developing countries were forced to turn their energies to addressing domestic economic problems, and adopting the very same liberal approaches that soon transcended the nationalist drive of the 1970s.

The G77 agenda in the 1990s and 2000s

The rise of liberalism, the end of the cold war, and the onset of the new era of globalization brought major changes in G77 strategizing. Above all, with the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), successor to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), developing countries, which had never warmed to the free trade-promoting GATT, now found it necessary to join the WTO or else risk marginalization in a world in which free trade was accelerating and being promoted globally as the preferred strategy for development. Moreover, the world was no longer strictly divided between northern industrial nations and raw material-producing southern nations. Instead, technological integration has been rapidly occurring as northern industries move all or parts of their operations south to take advantage of cheaper means of production, and as the more advanced developing countries and China have also accelerated their industrial production and overall exports. All of this means that the G77 and its institutions have had to change quite fundamentally to meet the new demands.

For a while the developing country-oriented UNCTAD seemed to have lost its importance and focus but by the late 1990s it had retooled to a degree. Another agency, UNIDO, rooted in the policies of import substitution industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s, almost collapsed in the mid-1990s when the United States and Australia left because of the perceived slowness of budgetary and other reforms. The United Kingdom also threatened to leave, but the organization survived by completing reforms that allowed it to promote a more market-oriented approach.[25]

Commodities

A review of changes in some of the areas emphasized by the G77 in the 1960s and 1970s shows that despite some progress, some issues remain as problematic as ever and new ones have arisen as well. To begin with, commodity issues can be placed in the category of "very little change." In the liberalized 2000s developing countries have certainly increased their overall exports and, according to available statistics, have also experienced relatively stable export prices overall. Nevertheless, prices for non-fuel primary commodities have continued to fluctuate: after rising moderately in the 1970s, they were depressed for most of the 1980s, before rising again somewhat in the early to mid-1990s. Thereafter they again suffered declines, although a fairly sharp rise has been experienced in 2005–7.[26] But it is precisely these fluctuations that have preoccupied commodity producers over time As the movement for trade liberalization has grown, artificial efforts to manage prices (such as ICAs) have been replaced by more knowledge-based measures as well as the encouragement of private sector involvement and the strengthening of national capacities for sustainable development. These efforts, however, have yet to produce real results.

After being brushed aside on the global agenda for many years, the commodity issue gained renewed visibility as arguments over subsidies roiled WTO negotiations. In 2003, developing country representatives, confronted by the north's refusal to deal adequately with cotton and other subsidies, walked out of the global talks. In 2004, ruling in a case brought by Brazil, the WTO agreed that US subsidies to cotton farmers were illegal, a ruling upheld in 2005. Even though both Europe and the United States have since committed to reducing subsidies, they have been unable to agree on the exact level of reduction. As a result, WTO talks under the so-called Doha round had not yet restarted as of 2007.

Stabilizing commodity prices is not only a matter of subsidies but also hinges on broader tariff and non-tariff reductions. Of particular concern to commodity exporting developing countries is the fact that older preferential arrangements offered to the south by northern countries are in the process of being phased out. Thus, for example, in the wake of the creation of the WTO, the entire EU system of preferences was deemed incompatible with the principles of global free trade. Under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000, a twenty-year accord, the EU agreed to continue preferences to the ACP until 2007 and to guarantee duty-free access of "everything but arms" to the least developed, but this was a temporary measure while the EU negotiated WTO-compliant Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with designated regions. As of December 2007, however, EPA negotiations with the separate regions were in disarray, as developing countries were becoming increasingly alarmed about the prospect of liberalizing without concrete aid commitments and other concessions.

The G77 has linked the attainment of what are called the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the issue of commodities. The MDGs were established at a special session of the United Nations in 2000 and include the goals of halving poverty and achieving targets for aid, trade, and debt relief by 2015.[27] The Common Fund and developing countries have piggybacked on the MDGs, maintaining that that there is a direct relationship between commodity prices and poverty alleviation. Fluctuations in commodity prices adversely affect the small producer, in particular. According to the Common Fund,

> real commodity prices for agricultural raw materials and for minerals stood in 2001 at only 65% of their level in 1979/81.This has led to a deterioration of the terms of trade and thereby a reduction of growth, keeping many developing countries' producers in a poverty trap … Given this scenario it comes as no surprise that the majority of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) are strongly commodity dependent.[28]

Still, a 2004 proposal to form an International Task Force on Commodities that would provide information and mobilize resources to help commodity producers had not been established as of 2007 because of the lack of financing.

The WTO

Beyond commodity trade, in trade as a whole the UNCTAD secretariat as well as the G77 have turned toward helping the G77 countries join and deal with difficult WTO requirements. But in contrast to their dominance within UNCTAD, the G77 have not occupied positions of leverage within the WTO. Developing countries are generally wary of the probable adverse effect of opening up their economies and financial systems too quickly and risking a loss of competitiveness. For the less advanced developing countries especially, the need seems apparent for "special and differential treatment" that would enable countries to adapt to the new global economic system gradually and in accord with their differing levels of development. Northern countries have, however, not been receptive to this idea, preferring instead to offer technical assistance to developing countries to enable them to better meet WTO goals.

Collective self-reliance

One area of relative success in the 2000s is that of collective self-reliance. At the general bargaining level, southern countries, concerned about possible marginalization in the new millennium, re-dedicated themselves to achieving their development goals, including having a greater say in global economic decision making, at the first South Summit held in 2000 in Havana, Cuba, and attended by G77 representatives and China. A second summit, held in 2005 in Doha, Qatar, issued a comprehensive plan of action calling for G77 countries to "work towards a common strategy for securing national policy space for developing countries in all areas particularly in trade, investment, financial and industrial policy … " Specific measures to support commodities, liberalize trade in an equitable manner, attack poverty, increase aid and investment, and promote science and technology education and research were detailed in the plan which called for both south–south and north–south strategies.[29]

In addition to the rhetoric, there has been some concrete progress. The GSTP started its third round in 2004, amid greater optimism based on the considerable expansion of trade among developing countries. The G77 have been embracing a new "open" or outward-looking regionalism in the 1990s, one intended to help them integrate successfully into the world economy. Earlier inward-looking experiments that ended in arguments over the unequal distribution of benefits, have been refreshed and revived and new blocs have also been formed. The heightened regionalism has spearheaded the intensification of efforts at south–south cooperation. In 1990 trade among developing countries, which had stayed at around 20 percent of their total trade since 1960, jumped to 31.9 percent, climbing to over 40 percent in 2005. While the impact is most reflective of the success of the renewed regionalism, improvement has been seen as well in interregional trade. In addition, in recent years, the rather slow progress on technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC) has accelerated. In view of the fact that deficiencies in information and resources, and the lack of effective institutional mechanisms are among the factors usually cited as hampering the drive for south–south cooperation, pivotal countries that have demonstrated a capacity and commitment to south–south cooperation have been identified, and countries have been urged to incorporate both the private sector and nongovernmental organizations in their efforts.[30] A key institutional change was made so that both the HLC and the UNDP unit now attend not only to TCDC but also to ECDC efforts. The Special Unit for South–South Cooperation is both UNDP's focal point and the UN system coordinator on south–south cooperation.

Financing for development

In terms of financing for development, progress toward the goal of the annual transfer of 0.7 percent of GNP from developed to developing countries continues to be slow, and only Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden met or exceeded the goal in 2005 and 2006 (Table 2.1). However, at the same time all donors except Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States have established timetables to meet the transfer goal by 2015. Moreover, absolute levels of aid, including aid from the United States—especially debt relief to Africa—rose strongly in 2005 before declining again slightly in 2006.[31] The increased aid has in large measure been attributable to the incorporation of aid transfers into the MDGs. The 2000 Millennium Summit was also followed by a global conference, long awaited by the developing nations, on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002. At that conference, participants agreed in principle to a number of actions intended to mobilize both domestic and external financial resources for development. These included—with a new focus on the domestic level—greater transparency, sound macroeconomic policy planning, investment in social services, and encouraging microfinance initiatives, and—at the external level—encouraging foreign investment flows and the transfer of technology, promoting initiatives by regional and international institutions, strengthening financial support for export diversification and other trade-related initiatives, a substantial increase in ODA (given the alarming decline over the years), external debt relief, and effective participation of developing countries as well as economies in transition in international institutional processes. Along with the 0.7 percent target, a target for ODA transfer for least developed countries, which had already been renegotiated at a conference on least developed countries in 2001, was set at 0.15 percent to 0.20 per cent of GNP.[32]

With respect to foreign investment, in keeping with new global realities, the G77 focus on controlling foreign direct investment in the nationalistic 1970s has given way to a general welcoming of investment as long as it involves "good corporate citizenship." In 1992, the activities of the UN's Center on Transnational Corporations were taken over by a Transnational Corporations and Management Division (TCMD) created within the economic and social division of the secretariat, followed in 1973 by the transfer of the TCMD to UNCTAD's Division of Investment, Technology, and Enterprise Development. Similarly, the Commission on TNCs was absorbed by UNCTAD's Commission on Investment, Technology, and Enterprise Development. These moves signaled a changed agenda, in that UNCTAD's work in the area is now focused on helping countries to promote international investment and implement capacity-building programs to encourage the use of new technologies.[33] Nevertheless, there is still some attention being paid to the responsibilities of TNCs, but outside of UNCTAD, in human rights fora.[34] The G77 has also institutionalized cooperation with business stakeholders through the establishment of a Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Developing Countries (G-77CCI), a network of business organizations interested in south–south cooperation. Nevertheless, some global south countries still remain cautious about inviting foreign investment into all areas of the economy. Negotiations over intellectual property rights have also brought some tension to north–south negotiations. Apart from copyright violations, a point of contention was the reluctance of northern pharmaceutical companies to allow companies from the advanced developing countries to produce and market cheaper generic drugs to needy third world populations. A settlement was eventually reached on the production of AIDS drugs, but there are other potential points of conflict on pharmaceuticals as well as other types of intellectual property issues.

The G77 countries have continued to press the international financial institutions for more, and better terms of, aid. In the late 1980s and 1990s, new concessional facilities quite different from traditional IMF lending, were put in place. The PRGF, already mentioned, was enhanced in 2005 by an Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF), established to deal with countries affected by natural disasters and conflicts. Of particular importance, however, has been the HIPC Initiative established in 1996 (and enhanced in 1999) to relieve the debt burden of the poor countries. This initiative was later transformed into the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) which allows for 100 percent debt relief by three multilateral institutions—the IMF, the IDA, and the African Development Fund (AfDF)—for countries completing the HIPC process.[35] The World Bank, too, has begun to focus on MDGs, and in this it works in tandem with the IMF and other international institutions.

The IDA participates in the IMF debt reduction programs, and the bank works with the United Nations Environmental Program and the UNDP as implementing agencies for the Global Environment Facility established in 1991 to lend concessional assistance for environmental purposes. Another program of interest is the World Bank's Special Program of Assistance to Africa which was initiated in 1987 to provide quick-disbursing highly concessional assistance to low income countries. It is now called the Strategic Partnership for Africa, reconstituted to incorporate new donor tracking procedures.[36] In 2003, the bank also established a rather unique grant facility to provide funds for projects initiated and managed by indigenous peoples in developing countries. More recently (in 2005) it established a trust fund to support governance reforms and strengthen social service delivery in "Low Income Countries under Stress."

Finally, the G77, still searching for more voice and influence in decision-making bodies, continues to work through the G24, the G15, and the Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF as well as an informal group, the Group of 22, formed during WTO negotiations.[37] However, they continue to participate only in lesser degree on the executive boards of the World Bank and IMF, and the various advisory committees. (In the WTO, decisions are taken by consensus and all members participate via their ministers or ambassadors.) Given the changes at the United Nations that have left developing countries on the margins of economic decision making, the G77 countries are justified in seeing themselves as far less influential today than in the 1970s.

Main institutions of the G77

The Office of the Chairman of the G77 is at UN headquarters in New York where the group meets in ministerial session before the General Assembly begins every year. The chairperson is chosen from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, on a rotating basis. Over time, a number of G77 chapters have been established in places where key international organizations are located: initially in 1964, in Geneva, the headquarters of the UNCTAD; in 1969 in Paris, the site of UNESCO; in 1972 in Washington DC (this is the G24 chapter); in 1974 in Rome, home of the Food and Agricultural Organization; in 1978 in Nairobi, site of the UN Environmental Program and UN-Habitat, this being the only location in a developing country; and in 1998 in Vienna, site of UNIDO as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency which has been playing a pivotal role with regard to developing country activities in the nuclear sphere. The G77's activities are funded by voluntary member contributions, and in keeping with its primary focus on south–south collaborative activities, a special trust fund was established, the Perez-Guerrero Trust Fund, in 1986. Such activities are also reviewed biennially by a committee of senior officials, the Intergovernmental Follow-up and Coordination Committee on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries. Like the NAM, the G77 also benefits from the advisory work of the South Center, which serves as an intergovernmental think tank offering policy advice to both organizations.

The G24 is based in Washington DC, where representatives meet to coordinate policy before the spring and fall meetings of relevant IMF/World Bank committees. China is a special observer in this organization. The group is run by a bureau comprising a chair and two vice chairs, each elected from one of the regions (Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean). The office of the chair is regionally rotated. Secretariat services are provided by the IMF/World Bank, and by staff from the bureau members.

The G15's secretariat is in Geneva and the day-to-day coordination of activities is done by Personal Representatives of member states. The group's main decision-making body is its annual summit of heads of state and government, held on a rotational basis in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. Foreign ministers meet twice a year to prepare for the summit, in which they are guided by a troika comprising former, present, and future foreign ministers of summit hosting countries. Like the G77 itself, the group has affiliated itself with the private sector (members' Chambers of Commerce formed into a Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Services) in order to further its economic development goals.

A general assessment of the G77

In evaluating the performance of the G77, one must take into account the difficulties faced by any large group in seeking to incorporate the concerns of diverse constituencies. The G77 has had to advocate for newly industrializing countries as much as for primary producers, for landlocked countries, for Small Island Developing States, Highly Indebted Poor Countries, and least developed states. The need to deal with so many constituencies has resulted in comprehensive plans of action that are difficult to achieve in reality. Since the developing countries divide into groups with different goals, it has sometimes been difficult to ensure solidarity and develop common negotiating strategies. The G77 has also had to be careful to avoid politicization of its agenda: although an economic caucus, the group's members naturally have distinct political positions and perceptions, and the group itself cooperates with the NAM. Formal interventions on behalf of the group are made on a wide range of socioeconomic, ecological, and global governance issues that while increasingly pragmatic in tone, are still colored by vexations over global injustice and inequity.

On balance, the G77 has been effective in bringing the concerns of the south to global attention, though the record is mixed with respect to its ability to actually negotiate solutions. In the 1980s the group lost ground by continuing for too long to espouse rhetorical positions that were out of step with the changing global climate and the movement of many members to adopt more liberal policies. As with the NAM, division rather than unity set in as countries adopted bilateral and regional trade strategies in keeping with their own national interests and levels of development. As time went on, however, the group found its voice, arguing that liberalization had produced more poverty and inequality than ever. According to Guyana's foreign minister on the occasion of Guyana's assumption of the chair of the G77 in 1999:

> The *raison d'être* of the Group of 77 and China—the largest association of developing countries in the world today—has at no time been more patently vindicated than now, at the dawn of a new era, when the priorities of the South continue to be subsumed by the imperatives of the North. The dialogue between the North and the South has fallen silent for some time now, and international development issues have been all but eliminated from multilateral negotiating agendas. The global economic outlook is at best bleak. Three and a half decades into our existence as a deliberative group, the G77 countries remain on the periphery of policy and decision making in the global economic system. As globalization has taken hold, and its philosophy has taken root, the South has lost ground in the global arena, not only in economic terms, but equally in the placement of its priorities on multilateral negotiating agendas.[38]

In terms of the south's multilateral priorities, the year 2003 is viewed as a turning point in WTO negotiations. The refusal of southern representatives to debate the "Singapore" issues (focused on investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation) before working out a solution to the problem of subsidies, stymied further progress in global negotiations and gave the south, led by India, Brazil, and South Africa, somewhat more negotiating power. WTO rulings in 2004 in favor of Brazil against US subsidies and credits in cotton, and in favor of Brazil, Thailand, and Australia against EU subsidies in sugar increased the perception of leverage of the developing countries somewhat, but also led to inevitable worries about the fate of small producers versus the larger.

Overall, changes in the global system have thus had both negative and positive impacts on the G77 as a group. On the negative side, the G77's protectionist agenda and its power as a single bargaining unit were diluted by the adoption of the once-disliked liberal agenda, the decline of UNCTAD *vis-à-vis* the WTO, as well as by the attendant breakdown of southern cohesion. On the positive side, the industrial countries' forceful push for global liberalization also brought G77 countries together again to press for attention to their economic and social concerns, and to ensure that free trade is also fair trade. As globalization continues to heighten the economic and social vulnerabilities of the developing countries, there are signs that G77 cooperation may again deepen.

3 Tricontinental single-issue functionalism

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

Even as the G77 as a whole provides the broadest representation of south–south functional efforts, it is not surprising that, in view of the south's sheer diversity, south–south outreach across continents has also spawned a large number of highly specific, issue-based cooperative endeavors oriented toward increasing the south's bargaining power. Perhaps the most well known cross-continental institutional effort of this sort has been the cartel of oil producers that is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The market role of OPEC

The OPEC was formed in 1960, largely on the basis of an idea promoted by the Venezuelan oil minister, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, who then succeeded in convincing the Arab producers of the potential benefits of producer collaboration. The initial members of the organization were Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Qatar joined in 1961, Indonesia and Libya joined in 1962, Abu Dhabi in 1967 (succeeded by the United Arab Emirates in 1974), Algeria in 1969, Nigeria in 1971 and Ecuador and Gabon in 1973 and 1975 respectively. Ecuador stopped participating in OPEC in 1993 and Gabon in 1995, both because they were unwilling to abide by quotas limiting their exports. Indonesia became a net importer of crude oil in 2004 and has continued to experience declining production and investment accompanied by increasing domestic demand. It was considering leaving OPEC in 2007. On the other hand, in that same year Angola joined the organization, and Ecuador, now under a highly nationalist government, resumed its participation.

Together OPEC countries controlled more than 50 percent of the world oil market in the 1960s. In 1968, Arab oil producers formed their own subgroup, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OAPEC), to coordinate their oil policies and promote the development of petroleum-related industries. OAPEC expanded in membership from only the major producers Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—all of which joined between 1968 and 1972—to include the small producers Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia. Egypt was suspended between 1979 and 1989 because of its decision to pursue a separate peace with Israel and Tunisia left in 1982 because it had become a net oil importer.[1]

OPEC gained visibility in the 1970s as a result of a combination of uniquely favorable factors. Over the years, oil had become an indispensable source of energy for industrial, military, commercial, and residential use. By the early 1970s, Japan was dependent on imports for almost 100 percent of its petroleum needs, and Western Europe only slightly less so. The US dependence on the external market had also grown to more than 40 percent of its needs. Moreover, 80 percent of Western European and Japanese oil imports, and 15 percent of those of the United States, came from the Middle East and North Africa.[2] Along with this dependency, the fact that the 13 members of OPEC controlled most of the world's exports enhanced their ability to manipulate the market, provided that producers maintained a high level of cohesion.

In a climate of increasing third world nationalism, Libya became the first country to successfully confront the foreign oil companies that dominated oil exploration and export.[3] In 1970, the government of Muammar Qaddafi negotiated an increase in the price of oil and additional taxes as well. Between 1970 and 1973 OPEC as a group followed suit and by mid-1973, the price of Persian Gulf oil had risen from $1.80 to a little over $3.00 a barrel. Negotiations with the oil companies broke down in October 1973 and the Gulf states, followed by the rest of OPEC, then unilaterally instituted price increases. The oil price increased to almost $12.00 a barrel in 1974.

Energy politics has underscored the difficulties, uncovered by earlier functionalists, of trying to separate technical areas from political influences. Arab producers used oil as a weapon to pressure supporters of Israel after the Yom Kippur war of 1973: the Arab oil producers cut off oil supplies completely to the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan, and reduced supplies by 25 percent to other European nations, leading to new price increases of more than 100 percent. A helpful factor was the division among the western countries themselves, for while the United States was less vulnerable and therefore could be less accommodating to Arab demands, the European countries were forced to take extreme conservation measures to deal with the scarcity of energy. Oil prices continued to rise throughout the 1970s, as royalties and taxes paid by the oil companies were increased. A second oil crisis was experienced in 1979 when supply shortages resulting from other political events, the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the subsequent Iran–Iraq war, led to pressures on the spot or unofficial market. Instead of a unified price, a ceiling price of $41 a barrel was set for premium crudes. Saudi Arabia, however, assuming the role of moderator that it has played since, refused to raise its price beyond $32 a barrel and instead increased its production in order to bring prices down. Eventually the Saudis agreed to bring the price up to $34, which then became the official price of oil per barrel.

Despite the shortages induced by the continuing Iran–Iraq war, the 1980s saw prices fall as many OPEC members began producing above the established ceiling in order to bring in much-needed revenue. Prices were also undercut by non-OPEC producers, in particular the North Sea producers Britain and Norway, which both reduced their prices. Moreover, the industrial countries had increased their stockpiles and had begun by then to adapt through conservation measures as well as by turning to alternative sources of energy. OPEC therefore reduced the benchmark price per barrel and eventually abandoned its formal price structure. Thereafter the focus turned to production quotas, but cheating was often a problem.[4] Saudi Arabia became the de facto "balancer," often overproducing to bring other producers back in line. A 1988 attempt to coordinate policy with non-OPEC producers failed, and prices dipped to below $12 a barrel by the end of the Iran–Iraq war in 1988, rising somewhat thereafter.

New problems occurred in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, ostensibly to settle its border dispute with that country but, not incidentally, after expressing dissatisfaction with the OPEC's weak quota system as well as vexation over Kuwait's overproduction. Faced with possible shortages as a result of a global embargo on Iraq, OPEC supported Saudi Arabian overproduction. Still, despite OPEC's successive production manipulations, prices remained relatively depressed for most of the 1990s due to the world recession, to continued over-quota production, competition from non-OPEC producers, and the limited return of Iraq to the market under the UN's "oil for food" program. In 1997 to 1998 the financial crisis that swept through rapidly liberalizing Asian countries affected the price of oil which slipped to $12.80 a barrel in 1998 and under $10 early in 1999. To help stem the decline, non-OPEC producers Mexico, Norway, Oman, and Russia agreed to reduce their production, and as a result, prices rebounded, holding to an OPEC target range of $25 to $28 a barrel thereafter.

Another major political event, the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, roiled the oil market in 2001. As air travel declined, global demand for oil weakened and the price of oil fell to below $17 a barrel. Production cuts eventually restored a favorable price of around $30, and prices began a relentless increase thereafter. Among the factors contributing to this increase were the strong world demand fueled by rapid growth in energy consumption in China, continuing supply disruptions in Iraq since the US invasion in 2002, shortages caused by periodic industrial action and anti-oil company activism in Nigeria, and strikes in the oil industry in Venezuela followed up by actions by the nationalist Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez to control and limit foreign oil operations in the country. Episodic events also took their toll, including terrorist attacks on oil installations in Saudi Arabia in 2004, the destruction of the offshore oil infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico after a major hurricane, Katrina, struck the region in 2005, and to some degree, war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006, and a lengthy standoff between Iran and the United States and Europe over Iran's refusal to cease enriching nuclear fuel. Notwithstanding occasional production increases initiated by OPEC to stabilize the market, prices soared above $50 a barrel by the end of 2004, above $60 in 2005, above $75 in 2006, and above $100 in 2008. Limited refinery capacity, speculation caused by middlemen, and increased taxes were also cited as contributing to persistently high prices. On the positive side, however, the coming onstream of new energy suppliers, including Angola and the Caspian nations, as well as the development of new alternative sources of energy such as ethanol were expected to eventually lower prices.[5] Natural gas exploitation has also been stepped up around the world, although 40 percent of those reserves lie in the Middle East.[6] Still, it may be that the floor price of oil will remain quite high, given the new acceptance of a price level far beyond the $22–28 band once considered desirable.[7]

Main institutions of OPEC

OPEC's headquarters are in Vienna, Austria. The highest decision-making body is the conference of oil ministers which meets twice a year to coordinate oil policy. A secretariat provides administrative support and houses departments devoted to research, administration and human resources, public relations and information, data services, and energy studies and petroleum market analysis. The secretary-general, who is appointed for a renewable three-year term, works in cooperation with a board of governors consisting of selected member state representatives who serve for two years. The board's mandate includes drawing up the budget, implementing resolutions of the conference, and submitting to it reports and recommendations. An economic commission comprising the secretary-general, the director of research and national representatives assists in promoting oil market stabilization. A ministerial monitoring committee (1982) and subcommittee (1993) monitor oil production and exports. Except for the addition of the ministerial committees, the organization's structure has remained stable over the years.

Box 3.1 Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

- Founding members (1960): Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
- Others: Algeria (1969), Angola (2007), Ecuador (1973),* Indonesia (1962), Libya (1962), Nigeria (1971), Qatar (1961), United Arab Emirates (1974).*
- Former member: Gabon (1975–January 1995).
- Headquarters: Vienna, Austria.

* Ecuador suspended its membership in December 1992 but returned in December 2007; the United Arab Emirates is the successor to Abu Dhabi, which joined in 1967.

Web site: www.opec.org

An assessment

Has OPEC accomplished what it was designed to do, which is to use collective action in order to help members gain greater benefits from their main natural resource? To a certain degree this is so. The cartel has been at least partly responsible—uncontrollable events being also a key factor—for an increase in the price of oil from a mere $1.80 in 1970 to $100 in 2007. Prices were particularly high in the 1970s. As one analyst notes, the high prices today, when adjusted for inflation, are actually lower than prices in the 1970s.[8] The organization has also helped members increase their share of the income from oil *vis-à-vis* the oil companies which, hard as it is now to believe, initially retained 90 percent of such income.[9] Oil producers have also benefited indirectly by being able to take control of many downstream operations. Moreover, over the years, the organization has begun to operate less like a cartel and more in tune with the realities of interdependence, that is, with a view to accommodating consumers, by becoming more concerned about the potential effect of supply problems on the global economy and therefore on themselves. This cooperative approach has also resulted from OPEC's awareness of its declining proportion of the world market, down from 55 percent in 1973 to 30 percent in 1985, 38.3 percent in 1990, and rising to about 40 percent in the early to mid-2000s.[10] Of course, OPEC nations still hold three-quarters of the world's proven crude oil reserves.[11]

On the other hand, the cartel's history is also one of divisiveness and infighting among the members. Saudi Arabia, with its comfortable reserve cushion of 264.3 billion barrels in 2004,[12] and its pro-US approach, has been more often than not at odds with other producers, especially the more militant countries of Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Nigeria (which produces heavy crude), and Venezuela, all of which have balked at lowering prices and manipulating production while trying to gain as much revenue as possible from the oil spigots. Venezuela tended to overproduce in the 1980s and 1990s, but it became more disciplined after President Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999. In addition, Saudi Arabian dominance has been occasionally challenged, especially by Iran. Indeed, it is generally known that OPEC members as whole have not displayed a high level of discipline in adhering to their production quotas, and have generally placed their self-interests above the collective interest except when prices have plunged badly.

As already described, although OPEC is an economic organization, its fortunes have been quite intertwined with domestic, regional, and global politics. Since the 1970s when it embraced a political role by cutting off oil supplies to Israel's allies, it has not been itself politically oriented but rather has focused on the market, seeing its mission as that of "securing the efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, with a steady and reasonable income to the petroleum resource-owning producers and a fair return on capital to those investing in the petroleum industry."[13] In this spirit, the organization rejected Iraq's request to intercede with the United Nations to lift the Iraqi oil embargo in 1990, as also Iraq's proposal in 2002 for the use of oil as a weapon to pressure Israel and the West to deal with the Palestinian issue.[14]

Still, politics have inevitably intruded on the technical operations of OPEC in a number of ways. In the 1980s, during the Iran–Iraq war, Iraq refused to accept a lower quota than Iran, while Iran continually overproduced—more than twice its assigned quota in 1982—and sold its oil at lower prices to finance the war effort. Tensions were high between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, all supporters of Iraq. Then in 1990, before embarking on his invasion of Kuwait, Iraq's Saddam Hussein threatened to use military means to force countries to produce within their quotas. OPEC responded to these political threats by agreeing to revise quotas, but Iraq's subsequent invasion of Kuwait forced OPEC to disregard their revisions.[15] Moreover, domestic political problems inevitably have their effect on the energy supply: for example, in recent years, oil companies have struggled to maintain supply amid popular agitation in the Delta region of Nigeria. Finally, for some countries, notably Iran and Venezuela in the 2000s, the organization is still viewed as a valuable instrument to project global south economic and political power *vis-à-vis* the north. This provides, for example, the context for Venezuela's vigorous promotion of higher oil prices as well as its proposal to establish more OPEC financing mechanisms for poorer nations that have not been served well by the traditional international financial institutions.

This brings to the forefront another evaluative question: to what extent has OPEC been helpful to the global south as a whole? With respect to south–south relations, OPEC's interactions with global south non–oil producers have brought mixed results. Developing countries have been harmed by high oil prices and by the ensuing periodic world recessions even more than have their developed country counterparts. In the 1970s, many southern nations thought that they might piggyback on OPEC's newfound leverage and increase their own commodity-based revenues through cartelization. Attempts were made to manipulate the prices of bauxite, copper, and even bananas. However, problems of member cohesion apart, the demand for these slumped as a result of the global recession of the 1970s.[16] Subsequently, non–oil producing countries such as India and the poorer African countries complained, sometimes openly, about the lack of OPEC attention to their plight. OPEC members then increased their bilateral and multilateral financial commitments to affected countries, but their aid tended to be targeted quite narrowly, to their own friends and allies.

Among the bilateral funding agencies established were the Nigerian Trust Fund established in 1976, and administered by the African Development Bank; the Arab Oil Fund set up by Algeria and administered by the African Development Bank (it is no longer in operation); two Venezuelan trust funds managed by the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank respectively (in 2001

Venezuela's aid operations were incorporated into the newly formed Venezuelan Bank for Social and Economic Development); the San José Accord of 1980, a preferential energy agreement between Venezuela and Mexico on the one hand, and Central American and Caribbean countries on the other; the Venezuelan Special Fund for the Caribbean established in 1980; the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development founded in 1971, originally focusing on assistance to only Arab states but later broadened to include other developing countries; the Iraq Fund for External Development established in 1974 (but no funds have been lent since 1982); the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development established in 1961 and broadened in 1974 to include aid to non-Arab developing countries; and the Saudi Fund for Development of 1974.[17] Libya and Iran also established smaller bilateral aid-granting institutions. Iran's Organization for Investment, Economic and Technical Assistance, established in 1975, is still in operation.

At the multilateral level, funds were channeled through a number of agencies including the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa founded in 1973; the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development established in 1971; the Arab Monetary Fund started in 1976; the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to Africa and Arab Countries, an institution incorporated into the Arab League in 1974 and now renamed the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African Countries; the Islamic Development Bank established in 1973; the OAPEC Special Account to Ease the Burden of Arab Oil-Importing Countries (which disbursed aid between 1974 and 1976); the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development created in 1976; the Arab Gulf Fund for United Nations Development Organizations established in 1981 to support humanitarian development projects through UN agencies; the OPEC Fund for International Development founded in 1976, with the majority of its funding targeted to the least developed countries and highly indebted poor countries (this fund was created as a direct result of the complaints of the non–oil producers mentioned earlier); and the First Arab Development Decade Account created by the Gulf states on behalf of the least developed Arab countries. The UN's International Fund for Agricultural Development should also be mentioned: established in 1977, it was the first UN agency to be funded heavily by OPEC as well as Western donor countries.

Overall, in the 1970s and 1980s OPEC concessional aid exceeded the 0.7 percent target set by the United Nations for aid transfers from developed to developing countries. In 1976, 2.3 percent of gross national product (GNP) was transferred through OPEC agencies, and in 1980, 1.85 percent. However, aid as a percentage of GNP declined thereafter, to a mere 0.6 percent in 1985, and down to 0.19 by 1990. The corresponding figures for OAPEC are 4.2 percent in 1976, 3.2 percent in 1980, down to 1.39 in 1985, and 1.8 percent in 1990.[18] Assessments of Arab aid as a whole, which have primarily been supplied by the Gulf states, show that in the 1970s and 1980s these oil producers provided almost 60 percent of the total official development assistance (ODA) to Arab countries. However, figures on the allocation of Arab funds also indicate that far more aid was allocated to lower middle- and upper middle-income countries in the early 1980s, than to their low-income counterparts. After peaking during the first Gulf war, inter-Arab flows declined considerably, before rising moderately in the 2000s when fresh attention began to be paid to aid transfers as part of the global commitment to the Millennium Development Goals. Thus in 2004 the ratio of aid to gross national income for both top donors, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was 0.8 percent.[19]

On the other hand, according to one UN report, this does not mean that on average more ODA per capita has been targeted to the Arab least developed countries (LDCs) in the 2000s than in previous periods. In fact, "the majority of the poorest countries in the region have received less ODA per capita in absolute terms than during the 1980s and 1990s. What caused the observed [higher ODA/GNI percentage] is the fact that average ODA per capita to the relatively richer countries declined more than average ODA per capita to the poorest countries."[20]

In 2007, the third summit of OPEC leaders was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (previous summits were held in Algiers in 1975, and in Caracas in 2000). The leaders prioritized the eradication of poverty and "energy poverty" in the developing countries, pledged to continue development assistance, especially to the poorest, and, in a newer focus, also committed themselves to addressing global environmental concerns such as climate change, in the context of the sustainable use of energy resources.[21]

4 Regional visions

Pan-Americanism

In this chapter and the two that follow, some well known, multi-functional, regional institutions, distinguished by their breath of membership, are described in detail. A subsytemic view of regions as patterns of regularized interaction (in this case at the institutional level), subordinate to global interrelations, is combined with the constructivist stress on the common history and shared identities of the members of the particular grouping. In other words, these institutions, which happen also to be well recognized historically as regional institutions, are reflective of a sense of shared common values and a common identity among the member states and peoples.

The Organization of American States (OAS)

Pan-Americanism is the vision that informs the work of the OAS. It refers to the idea of American continental unity that was originally the dream of the continent's most famous liberator, Simón Bolívar. Institutionally, however, it developed not just as a relationship among Latin American states, but as one with the United States as well, which offered its protection to the newly independent Latin American states. This differentiates pan-Americanism from the other institutional arrangements discussed in the next two chapters. The membership of the superpower makes the institution a hybrid north–south entity that, however, still bears a Latin American stamp.

Simón Bolívar succeeded in uniting Venezuela with Colombia, which at the time included Panama, and incorporating Ecuador loosely into this "Gran Colombia" which lasted from 1819 to 1830. These countries had previously been united into the colonial viceroyalty of New Granada. In 1826 at the Congress of Panama, the first of several early American conferences,[1] Bolívar proposed the establishment of a Latin American League of Nations, but the idea was considered too far reaching at the time. It is noteworthy that Bolívar looked (if a bit warily) to powerful Britain, not to the United States, for protection for the fledging republics. The United States had already displayed antagonism toward the first independent republic, Haiti, which declared its independence in 1804, and had also managed to acquire Florida from Spain in 1821. Suspicious of a United States whose interests in Latin America seemed conditional on its own self-interest, Bolívar noted: "The United States seems destined by Providence to plague America with misery in the name of liberty."[2] As it turned out, however, it was the United States that became the de facto protector of Latin America, recognizing the republics and enunciating a doctrine of continental separation from the Old World in President Monroe's statement to Congress in 1823. Of course, the United States was itself a young republic and could do little to actually help the Latin American countries at the time. However, by the late 1800s the Monroe Doctrine had acquired more significance as the United States began to respond politically and militarily to European interventions that were usually undertaken to promote and protect trade interests or to settle economic debts. As the United States became a global power, it was not exactly surprising that it too would use its power to intervene in these nations for its own purposes, that is, to protect its own economic interests and to maintain political stability in the hemisphere. This development has had lasting effects on the main institution that continues to link it with the Latin Americans, the OAS.

The OAS, established in 1948, institutionalized the earlier system of inter-American cooperation begun in 1889 when the first conference of American states was held in Washington, DC At that time a Bureau of American Republics was established, which changed its name in 1910 to the Pan-American Union (PAU). The PAU was primarily concerned with cooperation in nonpolitical fields and utilized a system of ad hoc conferences. However, in the wake of World War II, the American states expanded their cooperation into the security arena: a collective security arrangement, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (known as the Rio Treaty or Rio Pact), was drawn up in 1947. The treaty provided that in the event of an attack or aggression from within or without the hemisphere, all the members would come to the aid of the attacked party until relevant OAS bodies or the UN Security Council could meet to decide on a suitable response. In 1948, the OAS became a formal organization, the PAU became the General Secretariat, and the Rio Treaty was formally linked to the new OAS charter. In addition, an American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Pact of Bogotá) was formulated, pledging signatories to resort to regional procedures of good offices and mediation, investigation, and conciliation, judicial settlement, and arbitration before going to the United Nations.

The original 21 Latin American members were joined later in the 1960s by the newly independent English-speaking Caribbean nations, first Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in 1967, then Jamaica in 1969, and other eastern Caribbean countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Dutch-speaking Suriname joined in 1977. (See Box 4.1). Belize and Guyana were originally refused membership because the charter prohibited membership for any state which had an unsettled border dispute with a founding member—in these cases, Guatemala and Venezuela respectively. A 1985 charter amendment that came into effect in 1988 removed the provision, and both nations were accepted as members in 1991. In the post–cold war climate of 1990, Canada, which had chosen to remain outside the organization as a way to retain its neutrality *vis-à-vis* the United States, finally became a full member of the OAS, bringing the membership to 35 countries. (Canada had been particularly concerned about appearing to rubber-stamp US foreign policy after the 1982 Falklands war and the 1983 US invasion of Grenada.)[3] However, as discussed later in the section on "assessment," Cuba was suspended from participation in 1962 on the grounds of ideological incompatibility.

With respect to the Rio Treaty, 24 states signed and ratified the pact. However, Mexico withdrew in 2002—effective 2004—after its president,

Box 4.1 Members of the Organization of American States

Antigua and Barbuda, *Argentina*, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, *Bolivia*, *Brazil*, Canada, *Chile*, *Colombia*, *Costa Rica*, *Cuba*,* Dominica, *Dominican Republic*, *Ecuador*, *El Salvador*, Grenada, Guyana, *Guatemala*, *Haiti*, *Honduras*, Jamaica, *Mexico*, *Nicaragua*, *Panama*, *Paraguay*, *Peru*, Saint Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, *United States of America*, *Uruguay*, and *Venezuela*.

- Headquarters: Washington, DC

* Since 1962, the current government of Cuba has been excluded from participation in the OAS.

- *Italics:* original members.

Web site: www.oas.org

Vicente Fox, proclaimed the pact to be obsolete in a world in which security has been redefined as a multidimensional concept. Fewer countries, 14, ratified the Pact of Bogotá, reduced to 13 when El Salvador denounced it in 1973.[4] The pact's relative unpopularity is attributable primarily to members' reservations concerning the treaty's insistence on the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, as well as on resort to arbitration. States have also maintained that the pact is redundant since there are already provisions for peaceful settlement of disputes in both the OAS charter and Rio Treaty.

Main institutions of the OAS

In the initial OAS charter, the Inter-American Conference and the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, called into special session to deal with security issues, were the two main decision-making bodies.[5] Another body, the Council of the OAS (COAS) was composed of the permanent representatives or ambassadors of each member state and was responsible for day-to-day operations and for acting as the Meeting of Consultation until a full meeting could be called. The Pan-American Union was entrusted to provide staff and secretariat services. The COAS had three organs: the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC), the Inter-American Council of Jurists, and the Inter-American Cultural Council. The COAS also oversaw the Specialized (technical) Conferences which were in turn linked to a number of Specialized Organizations and Special Agencies and Commissions, including the Pan-American Health Organization and the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (now the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, with branches in most member states).

In 1967 the Charter was revised by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. This protocol abolished the Inter-American Conference and created the annual General Assembly as the main decision-making body. The assembly oversees the Inter-American Juridical Committee, a merger of the earlier Council and its subordinate Inter-American Juridical Committee. The second tier of decision making comprises the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (which had previously been a specialized organ), and three councils: the Permanent Council (serving as a preparatory committee for the Assembly and supervising a new Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement), the IA-ECOSOC (elevated from being under COAS), and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture. The Pan-American Union was renamed the General Secretariat of the OAS, and the secretary-general's term was reduced from ten to five years.

The amendments of 1985 did not change this structure but the secretary-general received new powers to bring security threats to the attention of the Permanent Council, and the council's role in this area was also strengthened. Then in the post–cold war climate of political liberalization, the charter was amended again (in 1992, with effect from 1997) by the Protocol of Washington which called for suspension from participation of any member whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force. Suspension would be approved by a two-thirds vote of the members in the General Assembly and only after diplomatic initiatives have been exhausted. Finally in 1993, with effect in 1996, by the Protocol of Managua the IA-ECOSOC and the Inter-American Council on Education, Science, and Culture were streamlined into the Inter-American Council for Integral Development (CIDI). Other special agencies and entities added at that time were the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism.

The OAS is less sovereignty-guarding than many other global south organizations in that decisions of the assembly are taken by majority vote except for budgetary issues, membership issues, and a decision to remove the secretary-general. However, when the Permanent Council acts as a mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes, decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority.

Assessment: meeting charter goals

Political and security goals

The amended OAS charter emphasizes two principles that continue to be prioritized by Latin American states because of their contentious history: these are the renunciation of war, and noninterference in one another's affairs. Regarding the first, wars of aggression are expressly condemned in the charter and require appropriate collective response under the Rio Treaty. Countries have committed themselves to peaceful settlement of disputes in the charter, in the Pact of Bogotá, and in the Rio Treaty (article 2 of this last also commits countries to exhaust regional procedures before going to the United Nations). In the event of armed attack on an American state, measures can be taken in collective self-defense until the OAS Organ of Consultation (that is, the ministers of foreign affairs) can meet. In the case of non-armed aggression against an American state or if any American state is affected by an extracontinental or intracontinental conflict, the Organ of Consultation meets immediately. The Organ is also invoked in the Pact of Bogotá as the arena for settling disputes arising out of noncompliance with a judicial or arbitral award, before states resort to the United Nations.

The renunciation of war has uniquely Latin American origins that complement the general international legal provisions. In the wake of the Bolivia–Paraguay war over Chaco territory (1932–35), an Argentine initiative led to the formulation of the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, also known as the Saavedra Lamas Treaty, which condemned wars of aggression, called for pacific settlement of disputes, and for the non-recognition of territorial arrangements brought about by force. The treaty drew, among other things, on the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition enunciated by the United States in 1932.

Regarding the second principle, nonintervention, this is particularly important to Latin American states that have frequently in the past been the target of interference by European states as well as by their large northern neighbor. The principle was first embodied in the Drago Doctrine formulated by Argentine foreign minister Luis Drago after England, Germany, and Italy blockaded Venezuela in 1902 to enforce payment of claims based on debts and indemnities or wrongs done to their nationals. The doctrine was taken up at the landmark Second International Peace Conference of 1907 held in The Hague, and adopted in modified form as a convention named after Drago and Horace Porter, a former US ambassador. The Drago-Porter Convention compelled states to resort to arbitration prior to any use of force.

With many mechanisms in place, the OAS should have been quite effective in resolving disputes among its members. Indeed the organization helped resolve a number of disputes among the smaller Central American and Caribbean states in the 1950s and 1960s. These included disputes between Costa Rica and Nicaragua (1948, 1955, and 1959), Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Guatemala (1949), Honduras and Nicaragua (1957)—a territorial dispute in which an inter-American peace force was used to supervise the boundary demarcation as well as to assist in the transfer of inhabitants wishing to retain their nationality—and the Dominican Republic and Haiti (1963). A dispute between Panama and the United States in 1963 over Panama Canal sovereignty was resolved with OAS help, as was the "Football War" of 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras. This was a war that began as fighting between soccer fans, and ended as full-scale conflict. Finally, in 1960 sanctions were imposed on the Dominican Republic because of the involvement of the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo in an assassination attempt on Venezuela's president Rómulo Betancourt. In all these disputes the Rio Treaty was invoked.

At the same time, the organization could do little, and in fact was often manipulated by the United States, in conflicts involving cold war concerns. In the case of the US-backed invasion of Guatemala in 1954 to get rid of the leftwing Arbenz regime, Guatemala sought the support of the United Nations but the Security Council bowed to US preferences and sent the case back to the OAS. The OAS then established an investigatory mission with which Arbenz refused to cooperate. In the 1965 US invasion of the Dominican Republic, the OAS complied with a *post hoc* request by the superpower to establish an inter-American peace force based largely on its own 22,000-strong troop contingent already in place. In 1962 the OAS upheld the US blockade of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the same year the United States sought a total trade and diplomatic embargo of Cuba. The organization did not fully comply but instead declared communism to be incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system, and voted for an *arms* embargo as well as the suspension of Cuba from participation in the organization. (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico abstained on this.) But in 1963, stronger sanctions were imposed after Cuba was implicated in subversive activities in Venezuela; all countries save Mexico then broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. However, in the climate of détente of the early 1970s countries began to renew their relations with Cuba. This led to an OAS vote in 1975 to remove the sanctions, although Cuba remained a nonparticipating member of the organization.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the OAS became increasingly ineffective as a channel for resolving conflicts and confined itself to simply passing resolutions of support or disapproval of various issues. As the superpower competition aggravated emerging civil wars throughout Central America, conflict resolution activities fell to the United Nations and to groups of concerned states. The OAS threw its weight behind the "Contadora Group" comprising Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, and Mexico, which sought to resolve these crises. Similarly, in 1981, and again in 1995, when Ecuadorian and Peruvian military forces clashed in a disputed area of the border, the OAS referred the dispute to the four guarantors—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States—of a 1942 agreement that was supposed to have settled the issue. (The dispute was definitively resolved in 1998.)

In 1982 in the Falklands (or Malvinas) war between Britain and Argentina, the majority of OAS members opposed the US position in support of Britain. The OAS seemed so lacking in capability, however, that there were suggestions at the height of the crisis that Latin American states should establish their own alternative to the organization. Members did meet under the Rio Treaty but all they could do was pass a resolution in support of Argentina. (Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago joined the United States in abstaining.) The United States, torn between obligations to Britain under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and obligations under the Rio Treaty, in the end opted for its partnership with Britain.

With the end of the cold war, the first test of the new era came in the form of the US invasion of Panama, undertaken to remove dictator Manuel Noriega whom the United States charged with drug trafficking and money laundering. For the first time in its history, the OAS, which had been engaged in unsuccessful mediation efforts after Noriega had discounted unfavorable election results and resorted to violence against his opponents, managed to pass a resolution condemning the United States. (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Venezuela abstained.) Although no stronger action was taken, the vote was indicative of a growth in Latin American frustration that could possibly presage a new era. Indeed in the 1990s, the OAS began to chart new territory in keeping with global and regional changes. The organization, in cooperation with the United Nations, involved itself in peacemaking and peace building efforts in the region. Thus in Central America the end of the civil wars was followed by joint UN/OAS observation of elections and help in demobilizing former anti-government guerrillas. In Haiti, the OAS took the lead in condemning the coup against President Aristide in 1991, and in negotiating with the army on terms for his return during the first year after the coup. Later, after the United Nations became involved, the OAS continued to work in partnership with the global community, instituting sanctions against the military regime, and, after the UN-backed, US-led invasion of 1995, participating in elections observation and human rights oversight. In fact in the 1990s, the OAS regularly sent elections observation missions throughout democratizing Latin America.

These peacemaking activities have been undertaken with an eye on a new goal adopted by the OAS in 1990 and 1991. In 1990 a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy was established within the secretariat, and in 1991 an important resolution was passed reiterating the members' commitment to representative democracy (as reflected in article 2 of the charter). The resolution called for immediate action to be taken in the case of any interruption in the democratic process in any of the member states.[6] Further, in 1992 OAS members adopted the Protocol of Washington, which came into effect in 1997. It allowed for the suspension from participation of any member whose democratically constituted government is overthrown by force.

The OAS role in promoting democracy was further affirmed at the start of the Summit of the Americas process in 1994. The first summit was called to begin to deal with the establishment of a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The outcome was a declaration that gave the OAS the major institutional role not only in providing technical support for trade promotion but also in strengthening democracy, protecting human rights, and dealing with multidimensional security threats. Later, in 2001, the third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City adopted a democracy clause establishing that "any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state's government in the Summits of the Americas process."[7] The summit charged the OAS with formulating a democracy charter that was later adopted as the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The charter reaffirms once again members' commitment to democracy both in its representative form and as it relates to integral development (that is, social and economic development).[8] Related to the promotion of democracy has been the organization's own progress in including civil society in its deliberations: in 1999 a Committee on Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities was established and guidelines were drawn up for nonstate participation at OAS meetings as well as in Summit of the Americas activities. However, civil society members have since complained that they are excluded from important summit deliberations and have expressed dissatisfaction about the lack of inclusion of their views in the final documents.

In addition to these programs in the area of democracy, the OAS has been active in the promotion of human rights. Here the activities of the OAS are as old as those of the United Nations itself. In 1948, six months before the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American states adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Then in November 1969 OAS member states adopted the American Convention on Human Rights, which entered into force in 1978.[9] Companion human rights institutions are the seven-member Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, established in 1959 (based in Washington, DC), which monitors human rights conditions in member states and also hears petitions from individuals and groups; and the seven-member Inter-American Court of Human Rights established in 1980, based in Costa Rica, which heard its first case in 1987. However, neither institution worked well during the 1970s and 1980s, eras of mass human rights violations in Latin America. Finally, the OAS's Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism established in 1999 has seen its role of cooperation and information heightened since the attacks on New York's World Trade Center in 2001.

Social and economic goals

One of the strengths of the OAS charter is its specificity with regard to social and economic development, primary goals of any organization comprised mainly of developing countries. In 1959 the Inter-American Development Bank, headquartered in Washington, DC, was founded by OAS members as an autonomous agency to provide multilateral financing for precisely such development. In 1967, the commitments of the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy's aid program to combat communism and promote development in Latin America, which were being supervised by the organization's Economic and Social Council, were incorporated into the OAS charter. Social and economic rights and responsibilities were thus given equal attention to political goals. Among the goals stressed were per capita growth, equitable distribution of income, rural development, popular education, nutrition and health, housing and employment opportunities, and labor rights. Among strategies that have long been emphasized are regional integration, support for fair trade, and broad inter-American cooperation in social, economic, financial, technical, and scientific areas.[10] In 1975, the Rio Pact too was amended to include the concept of collective *economic* security, in accord with the third world movement to address global economic inequities.

Economic and social areas were grouped under the concept of "integrated development" in the charter revision of 1985. Later, in 1992, the Protocol of Washington amended the charter to include a number of references to the prioritization of poverty alleviation. In 1996, in keeping with the Protocol of Managua amending the OAS charter, the Council for Integrated Development (CIDI) was established, focusing on the coordination of OAS development cooperation in social and economic, cultural, scientific, technological, environmental, and tourism fields as well as the strengthening of member states' democratic institutions. Since the 1980s the OAS has focused on research, information, and advisory activities regarding drug trafficking and abuse through its Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) established in 1986. In the 2000s, CICAD's programs have been strengthened by the development of a multilateral evaluation mechanism by which members' progress is assessed in two-year cycles.

Gender issues and anti-corruption measures are other key foci of the OAS in the 2000s.

One of the goals of CIDI is to support regional integration, which in the 1990s moved beyond subregional initiatives to incorporate support for the creation of a hemispheric free trade area by 2005. In 1994, the first Summit of the Americas concretized the idea and began the process by establishing committees to work in trade, investment, services, intellectual property rights, and dispute settlement, among other areas. Negotiations progressed slowly over the years as the reluctance of the US Congress, contagion from the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998, the effects of 9/11, difficult global trade negotiations, and the differing expectations and needs of such a diverse group of countries, all slowed progress toward hemispheric unity. In particular, the countries of the southern cone, members of the thriving Southern Common Market created in 1992 (detailed in Chapter 7), became increasingly more reluctant to open their economies to competition from the north. The result was that by 2005 the FTAA had been pushed to the backburner in most Latin American countries, supplemented instead by various bilateral arrangements. By 2007, prospects were slim for a timely revival of the FTAA process.

An assessment

The OAS is really the institutional face of inter-Americanism, not Latin Americanism. However, there is no comparable, purely Latin American organization to date, and so the OAS remains the primary formal meeting arena for the full Latin American and Caribbean membership. Purely Latin American institutionalism is best reflected in two groups with near-universal membership, the Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA, the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System), founded in 1975 which helps coordinate regional policy and engages in research and informational activities to promote economic development;[11] and the Rio Group, formed in 1986, which grew out of the Contadora process mentioned earlier, and is now a major channel for political coordination among Latin American states.[12] Over the years, however, support for SELA has weakened whereas participation in the Rio Group has been strengthened. The group, formally called the Permanent Mechanism of Political Consultation and Coordination (originally the "Group of Eight"), meets in summit session every year, and has coordinated policy with the European Union, Canada, Japan, and China. Nevertheless, neither of these groups can be described, like the OAS, as multipurpose, universal, and broadly institutionalized.

On the other hand, the OAS has suffered from a number of significant problems. As is to be expected in an organization dominated by a superpower, that dominant power, which provides 59 percent of the regular assessed budget as well as significant funding for other programs, has also played an influential role in the organization's decision making and in shaping its broad agenda. The subordination of the OAS to US national interests has been reflected most visibly in the decisions taken during key security crises already described, as well as in the area of office holding. Regarding the latter, US candidates have traditionally been automatically elected to the main positions, including the post of secretary-general. When in 2005 the vote for secretary-general was highly contentious and resulted in the election, not of the preferred US candidate but of a compromise candidate from Chile, the news was given widespread media coverage and the results were viewed by many as a sign that the United States was finally losing some influence among the Latin Americans.[13] Any such loss of influence is merely relative, however, given the fact that the organization depends so much on US financial support. Moreover, the basic goals and strategies of the organization, in particular the commitment to hemispheric security, democracy, human rights, and other aspects of governance as well as the commitment to market economics, have all been designed to be compatible with US interests.

At the same time, while this US dominance has generally impacted decision outcomes, it has never precluded debate within the organization. For example, even as most countries shared or went along with US policies during the cold war, others clearly expressed their dissatisfaction. Specific cases include the reluctance of many to back the United States during the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic, and also the initial lack of support for the US attempt to impose total sanctions on Cuba. Moreover, the charter includes a number of Latin American concerns and ideas that are not necessarily favored by or favorable to the United States, including the repeated admonitions against intervention, the Calvo clause, the Drago doctrine, the right of every state to determine its own political, economic, and social policies, the importance of economic and social rights, and the prioritization of development. In fact, development and democracy goals have sometimes been at odds with each other in the Latin American context.

Again, as with any organization with wide membership, OAS members are a diverse group in terms of size, level of development, and political ideologies. Cold war differences have given way in the 2000s to differences over liberalization strategies inasmuch as the region, while generally embracing free trade, ranges in membership from Mexico, a member of North American Free Trade Area, to the Central Americans, Chile, and Peru which have negotiated free trade agreements with the United States, to more reluctant countries such as Brazil and Argentina, and on to countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela whose leaders espouse antiliberal and anti-globalization views. Differing size and levels of development also lead to differing priorities in trade: the small, less competitive countries, most still dependent on primary products, are unable to compete not only at the global level but also at the regional level, and do not feel that their concerns are being addressed even at the lower level. Meanwhile, the small countries themselves compete with one another. For example, in the "banana dispute" that divided Caribbean and Central American producers in the 1990s, Central Americans successfully opposed the European Union's preferential treatment of Caribbean bananas.

In political areas, smaller Caribbean and Central American states used to complain about discrimination in office holding within the OAS. Thus until 1968, the post of secretary-general was occupied by the larger Latin countries, and the post of assistant secretary-general by US nationals. These posts were subsequently opened up to smaller nations, Ecuador in the case of the secretary-general, and to a both Central American and Caribbean Community members in the case of the assistantship. On the other hand, as is the case at the United Nations, the larger countries found it somewhat vexing to have to accommodate to the disproportionate voting effect of the small states, once the English-speaking Caribbean members entered into the organization in the 1960s and 1970s. The Caribbean countries were successful in pushing for charter changes that led to the membership of Belize and Guyana, helped to reincorporate Cuba into the hemisphere, and helped as well to focus the attention of the organization on the specific problems of small and small island states.

Finally, the financial dependence of the OAS on the United States, already noted, coupled with the financial difficulties of some member states, have often placed the organization on shaky financial ground. While the organization has expanded its programs in the post–cold war world, the ability to sustain this expansion financially remains unclear.

The OAS, like its counterparts in Africa and Asia described later, remains a product of its time—that is, an organization that is wedded to the concept of Westphalian sovereignty. It is not in any way supranational. Neither has it come close to achieving the foundational Bolivarian vision of political unity. When viewed, however, as an organization with the limited aim of responding to the desires and needs of its members for political, functional, and cultural cooperation, it has certainly been moderately successful.

5 Regional visions
Pan-Africanism

Like the Organization of American States (OAS) described in the previous chapter, the African Union (AU) is a broadly inclusive and multi-purpose organization embedded in an idealist vision of pan-African unity. Unlike the OAS, substantial change has occurred in the institutional operationalization of the pan-African vision over the years. This chapter describes these structural and normative changes, as well as the environmental factors that have impacted institutional developments.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU)–African Union (AU)

Because of the slave trade, early visions of African unity centered not just on the unification of the African continent but on the pan-African collaboration of continental Africans with diasporic Africans scattered primarily throughout the Americas.[1] Pan-Africanist sentiment was first developed in a series of conferences held between 1900 and 1945 focusing on racial solidarity among peoples of African descent. At first these meetings were dominated by intellectuals from the Caribbean and North America, but as the concentration on Africa grew, African nationalists including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Hastings Banda of Nyasaland (now Malawi) joined the movement. There were two other key currents of pan-Africanism in these early years: Garveyism, led by the US-based Jamaican Marcus Garvey who advocated the return of slave descendants to Africa, and the cultural and literary current *négritude*, promoted by Afro-French writers such as Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas. In 1956, a World Conference of Black Writers and Artists brought together the French- and English-speaking groups for the first time.

With the emergence to independence of African states, pan-African leaders became advocates for continental unity. Kwame Nkrumah took the lead, hosting the first Conference of Independent African States in

1958 to discuss colonialism and the potential for African unity. However, while Nkrumah favored continental political union, other countries such as Nigeria favored a gradual approach. Indeed, as was the case regarding Simón Bolívar's vision for Latin America, political union for Africa proved to be an elusive ideal. Partial attempts were made but all failed. These included a proposal for a North African Federation (made in 1958) which never got off the ground; the union of Ghana with Guinea in 1959, which Mali joined in 1960 but which did little and ended when the OAU was formed in 1963; a proposed union of Central African republics in 1960 that collapsed in the wake of the opposition of the Ivorian president Houphouet-Boigny; and the Federation of Mali established in 1959, comprising Senegal, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin) and Mali (then French Soudan), which Senegal left after only two months.

Instead of political union, by the 1960 Second Conference of Independent African States held in Addis Ababa, it was clear that economic cooperation was seen as a more pressing concern. As a result, what Africans achieved at the continental level was not political union but the formation of a multipurpose functional organization, the OAU, in 1963. Despite these more limited ambitions, the establishment of the OAU signified an important milestone in inter-African awareness and cooperation.

Foreshadowing some of the difficulties that the organization would later face, the OAU was a merger of two antagonistic groups, the Brazzaville/Monrovia group and the Casablanca group. Ideological differences between the groups came to the fore during the post-independence crisis that ravaged the Congo between 1960 and 1965. During this crisis, conflict broke out between Congo's left-leaning prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, and his conservative president, Joseph Kasavubu. The Brazzaville group, composed of Mauritania and the moderate or conservative former French colonies (excluding Guinea), supported President Kasavubu whereas the Casablanca group, comprising Morocco, Egypt, Libya (which later transferred to the Brazzaville group), Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and the Algerian Provisional Government allied with Prime Minister Lumumba. A year into the conflict, the Brazzaville group, which had founded the African and Malagasy Union (or the Union Africaine et Malgache, UAM), merged with the Monrovia group which included the majority of the former British territories as well as Liberia.[2] In 1962, the Casablanca and UAM/Monrovia groups settled their conflicts, and joined in forming the OAU. The UAM ended its political status but transformed itself into the African and Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation, which became the Common African and Malagasy Union in 1965.[3] A third group of states in east, central, and later, southern Africa also joined the OAU. These states had formed the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa, PAFMECA, in 1958, which was later expanded to include South Africa, thus becoming PAFMESCA (Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa).

The OAU was formed with the express aim of promoting unity and solidarity among the members, preserving African independence and territorial sovereignty, eradicating all forms of colonialism from Africa, promoting international cooperation having due regard to the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and encouraging socioeconomic cooperation among African states. Thirty-two states signed the original charter (see Box 5.1).

Box 5.1 Members of the African Union

Algeria, Angola, *Benin*, Botswana, *Burkina Faso*, *Burundi*, *Cameroon*, Cape Verde, *Central African Republic*, *Chad*, Comoros, *Congo*, *Côte d'Ivoire*, *Democratic Republic of Congo*, Djibouti, *Egypt*, Eritrea, *Ethiopia*, Equatorial Guinea, *Gabon*, The Gambia, *Ghana*, *Guinea*, Guinea-Bissau, *Kenya*, Lesotho, *Liberia*, *Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, *Madagascar*, Malawi, *Mali*, *Mauritania*, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, *Niger*, *Nigeria*, *Rwanda*, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, *Senegal*, Seychelles, *Sierra Leone*, *Somalia*, South Africa, *Sudan*, Swaziland, *Tanzania*, *Togo*, *Tunisia*, *Uganda*, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Headquarters: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Italics: Original members.

Note: Morocco, a founding member, withdrew in 1984 following the admission of the Sahwari Arab Democratic Republic.

Web site: www.africa-union.org

Despite its broadly stated goals, however, the organization achieved relatively little (see "assessment" section below). Perhaps most problematic was the fact that it was built on a platform centered on the preservation of territorial integrity and hard-won sovereignty that hindered effective action in resolving conflicts among the members. It was thus only amid the new global climate after the cold war that African states saw the need to retool the organization into one that was more attuned to the global demands for democratization and economic liberalization, even while maintaining African solutions to Africa's many problems. In 1999 at an OAU special summit, Libya's leader, Muammar Qaddafi, proposed the establishment of a federation of African states anchored by a pan-African parliament, a grand vision that was somewhat reminiscent of Bolívar's dreams for Latin America. More importantly, Libya was also willing to fund this project, providing more than $1 million to help the process of transition from OAU to AU.[4] Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Egypt were initially cautious, not quite trusting the motives of the Libyan leader, but eventually they came on board.

The goals of the AU are more expansive than those of the OAU. While solidarity, sovereignty, and international cooperation are still primary foci, the aims of peace and security, democracy and good governance, and the promotion and protection of human rights have been added, as well as, in the socioeconomic arena, the newer concept of sustainable development, the enhancement of regional and subregional integration, research in science and technology, and the promotion of good health.[5] Once again, as in the 1960s, there was some dissension among African states about the issue of gradual versus faster regional integration, but eventually all 53 OAU members signed the AU charter in 2001. The AU was formally launched in 2002 as the successor to the OAU.

Main institutions of the OAU and AU

Since it has evolved into a new organization, the OAU has obviously witnessed significant structural change over the years. This section includes not only a description of the basic organs but also of key mechanisms that have been developed to deal with global and regional changes.

Earlier it was noted that in 1960 Ghana's push for a stronger organization endowed with the power to formulate common political, military, and economic policies was rejected in favor of a looser structure. The main decision-making body of the OAU was the Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting annually and adopting decisions by a two-thirds majority—not the majority used as the working standard for the OAS but not the consensus adopted later by the AU. A Council of Ministers, comprising foreign ministers or other designated representatives, met twice a year to prepare for the summits and to carry out the assembly's decisions. Resolutions in that body were adopted by majority vote. Secretariat services were provided by the General Secretariat, headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The charter left the formation of a Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration to be dealt with by a separate protocol, and it also left room for the establishment of commissions while specifically including three specialized commissions: an Economic and Social Commission, an Educational, Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission, and a Defense Commission. Other commissions established included a Labor Commission, a Commission on Refugees, and a Commission of Jurists. Later, in 1981, after an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was adopted, entering into force in 1986,[6] the OAU also created an 11-member commission to investigate and promote civil and social rights. Outside of the OAU structure but cooperating with it, the African Development Bank was formed in 1964 under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Like other development banks, its mandate was and remains to coordinate internal as well as external funding of development projects and programs. The bank is headquartered in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast).

Like OAS states, OAU members committed themselves firmly to the principles of noninterference and the preservation of territorial sovereignty as well as to settling disputes by peaceful means. In terms of the last, the anticipated Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration was indeed established in 1964, composed of 21 persons with "recognized professional qualifications" (as demanded by article 2 of the commission protocol). The commission was intended to be the body to which disputes could be referred either by the parties involved, by the Council of Ministers, or by the OAU's assembly. However, the body was never operationalized, was downgraded to an ad hoc committee in 1970, and then was eliminated altogether in 1977 and replaced by an OAU Standing Committee on Disputes. This ad hoc committee was almost as ineffective as its predecessor. Factors contributing to the inadequacy of these agencies included the lack of mandatory jurisdiction coupled with African states' preference for flexible diplomatic rather than legal arrangements.[7] The commission was also hampered by financial and staffing problems.

Amid heightened intrastate conflict in the post–cold war period, the OAU adopted a new mechanism, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, in 1993. This mechanism, focused primarily on anticipating conflict,[8] was relatively well institutionalized: the primary responsibility for overall coordination was given to a Central Organ comprising the countries providing past, current, and future chairs of the OAU as well as the countries elected to the Bureau of the Assembly (altogether, 15 countries, three from each subregion). The mechanism met at head of state, ministerial, and ambassadorial levels, with implementation and operational activities resting with the general secretariat. Finally, a peace fund was established to provide financing out of the regular budget as well as from voluntary sources. As noted in the overall assessment later, the mechanism resulted in OAU engagement in several peacekeeping and peace building activities in tandem with the development of an early warning information system.

In 2000, the OAU adopted the principles of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), a multidimensional security and development process similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or the "Helsinki" process. The CSSDCA was first promoted by the nongovernmental African Leadership Forum in 1990 to 1991.[9] The process essentially focused on developing measures and benchmarks for ensuring national as well as OAU progress in such areas as confidence building, avoidance and resolution of border and interethnic conflict, counterterrorism, trafficking in small arms and narcotics, respect for human rights (including gender rights), the elimination of corrupt practices, and increased civil society and private sector participation. In economic and social areas, the process included attention to regional integration, and south–south as well as north–south cooperation devised in the spirit of African collective self-reliance. A Standing Conference was mandated to review progress in these areas every two years.

The AU Constitutive Act referred to certain guiding principles for the union, including the establishment of a common defense policy for the continent, the right of member states to request intervention from the union to restore peace, and the right of the union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (see article 4d, h, j). This represented a change from the OAU's traditional sovereignty-heavy declarations and required the AU to follow up with new institutions. The most important of these has been the Peace and Security Council. Composed of 15 member states drawn from the five African regions (Central, East, North, West, and Southern Africa), the council replaced the Central Organ of the 1993 mechanism outlined earlier. The protocol establishing the council entered into force in 2003 and the council became operational in 2004. It is mandated to take action to resolve African inter-state and intrastate conflicts, as well as humanitarian emergencies. The council is assisted by the Military Staff Committee composed of council members, and by an African Standby force, arrangements for which are scheduled to be completed in 2010. The force's mandate includes peacekeeping and peace building as well as lending humanitarian assistance in conflict areas and after major disasters. The peace fund and early warning system efforts of the OAU remain in place.

These peace and security efforts were endorsed in an important document, the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy adopted by AU heads of state meeting in Libya in 2004. The document stresses the indivisibility of security in terms of the linkages among African states, and the attendant need for collective responses to threats. Article 12(i) notes that "any threat or aggression on one African country is deemed to be a threat or aggression on the others, and the continent as a whole, that needs to be brought to the immediate attention of the Assembly of the Union or the Peace and Security Council for decision and action as appropriate, in conformity with the AU principles and objectives." Peace and security is to be fostered by the activities of a wide array of institutions, including the AU's assembly and commission, the Peace and Security Council, the regional economic communities (see Chapter 8), and the numerous African conventions covering topics ranging from refugees and children's welfare to nuclear weapon-free zones, terrorism, small arms, and drug trafficking. In addition to these initiatives, a mutual aggression treaty was opened for signature and ratification in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005. However, as of 2007 it had been ratified by only five states—Congo, Gabon, Libya, Senegal, and Togo—even though 32 states had signed it.[10]

The distinct recognition by both the AU and the linked CSSDCA process of the integration of development and traditional security concerns fits in as well with separate but linked institutional developments in the economic area. In the 1970s the OAU had held several meetings that culminated in the adoption in 1980 of the Lagos Plan of Action, a comprehensive set of suggestions for sectoral development, trade integration, and social progress, taken in the overall context of the thrust for individual and collective self-reliance and sustainability.[11] According to the Lagos Plan, an African Economic Community (AEC) was envisaged by the year 2000, with steps taken to strengthen regional economic communities (RECs) in the 1980s and to continue to harmonize policies in the1990s. In light of the limited progress in integration, however, the Lagos Plan was superseded by the Abuja Treaty of 1991, which proposed more concrete steps toward the establishment of the AEC. Like most economic communities, which pattern themselves along the lines of the European Union, the goal was for the free trade area to progress to a customs union and eventually a common market and community, and be accompanied by the development of new political organs, in this case a pan-African parliament, and a Court of Justice to deal with the interpretation and application of the treaty. With a nod to changing global institutional preferences, provision was made for civil society participation. Financing would come from the OAU's regular budget, and an African Solidarity, Development, and Compensation Fund of the Community was also established. Apart from trade integration, cooperation was promoted in numerous functional areas including agriculture, industrial development, energy, the environment, science and technology, transport and communications, tourism, social affairs, culture, and human resource development. The entire integration process was expected to take no more than 34 years.[12] The AEC came into force in 1994 and thus the OAU in effect became the OAU/AEC. Specialized technical committees on agriculture, finance, trade, science and technology, culture, and various social issues were also created.

In 2000 the new AU charter was opened for signature, and one of the AU's goals was listed as to "coordinate and harmonize policies between existing and future Regional Economic Communities" (article 3l), with responsibilities assigned primarily to the AU secretariat or commission. Another important economic program incorporated into the AU was the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) adopted in 2001 at the 37th OAU summit in Lusaka. The NEPAD, based on two separate plans put forward by the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria (called the Millennium African Program) and by the president of Senegal (the Omega Plan), calls for region-based implementation of programs in many areas, including agriculture, health and education, the environment, energy, infrastructure, market access, capital flows, security, democracy, political and private governance, and capacity building. In tune with this, in 2002 NEPAD adopted a Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance. A self-monitoring mechanism called the African Peer Review Mechanism was established to help member countries monitor standards, and in this they are assisted by a panel of distinguished persons as well as by the NEPAD secretariat based in South Africa.[13] NEPAD institutions include the secretariat, above which is a heads of state and government implementation committee, and a steering committee composed of personal representatives of the implementation committee.

The AU itself incorporated the AEC's pan-African parliament, based in South Africa, which became operational in 2004 and in which 46 countries participate as of 2007. Parliamentary members are drawn from the national legislatures and currently act only in an advisory capacity. The AU charter also made the Court of Justice, which has broad powers to rule on questions of international law, its principal judicial organ;

however, the protocol establishing the court is not yet in force, having received only 13 ratifications as of 2007. In contrast, the 1998 protocol establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights came into effect in 2004. Citing administrative and other issues, the AU has decided to merge the two courts. At first glance, a merger of a human rights court, designed to investigate abuses and with the capacity to hear complaints from individuals and nongovernmental organizations, with a state-focused court dealing with constitutional issues and dispute settlement, seems problematic. On the other hand, a human rights mandate was also written into the Court of Justice's protocol. The mechanisms for the merger, including procedural separation and the criteria for choosing judges, were still being deliberated in 2007.

As with the OAU, the AU's structure places the Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting at least once a year as the highest decision-making body. (The heads of state have, however, been meeting more frequently than this since 2004.) Substantive decisions are made by consensus or failing that, by a two-thirds majority. The former OAU Council of Ministers, composed of foreign ministers, was converted into the Executive Council, meeting twice a year and making decisions by the same procedure as the assembly. A Permanent Representatives Committee was created to work with the executive council. The secretariat, now renamed the Commission, took on more supranational functions, able not only to execute policy but also to initiate proposals. An important innovation was the establishment of a specific AU organ responsible for outreach to civil society, the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC, not to be confused with the earlier ECOSOC). The statutes of the ECOSOCC, which created a formal advisory role for 150 representatives of civil society, including diaspora representatives, were adopted in 2004. Finally, the AU organs include the same specialized technical committees as were established in the AEC treaty, as well as three financial institutions: the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African Investment Bank.

An assessment: meeting charter goals

Political and security goals

The OAU's most significant success was clearly the promotion and achievement of the charter's goal of decolonization. Not only did OAU members, organized also at the United Nations as the African Group, give consistent and strong support for UN efforts to eliminate colonialism and to promote decolonization as a global norm, but also the regional organization itself helped give legitimacy to guerrilla groups fighting anticolonial battles. In this respect, the organization's early establishment of an African Liberation Committee to channel aid to liberation movements was significant. When necessary, the organization, in tune with its diverse membership, supported the formation of a united front among the various groups that were fighting for independence in a particular country. This was, for example, the OAU's approach to the Patriotic Front alliance of the two major guerrilla groups in Zimbabwe (though unfortunately, the front collapsed after gaining power). The OAU also supported the government of national unity formed by three opposing groups in Angola, but the experiment also only lasted for a short while. The outcome notwithstanding, the OAU's support for the independence of these countries as well as Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Namibia helped keep those contentious issues on the global agenda. In these conflicts, the Frontline states—Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia—which were the most affected by the conflicts, played a major role in diplomatic negotiations that eventually brought an end to civil war. Moreover, the OAU also vigorously supported regional and global efforts against apartheid in South Africa, including the imposition of mandatory sanctions, the refusal to allow South Africa to participate in any regional organizations or to participate in the UN General Assembly, the initiation of human rights investigations, and the provision of UN social and economic assistance to black South Africans. The emergence of South Africa as an independent democratic nation in 1994 was a much welcomed culmination of these efforts.

On the other hand, the diversity of the organization also led to some bitter internal wrangling even on this issue of decolonization. Thus in the 1980s the attempt to legitimize the Popular Front for the Liberation of Seguia el Hamra and Rio (Polisario), which had been fighting against Morocco for control of the Western Sahara, virtually tore the OAU apart. The Western Sahara was bequeathed to both Morocco and Mauritania in 1975 but Mauritania dropped its claim in 1978. That left Morocco fighting with the Polisario for control of the territory. Algeria and Libya led other radicals or progressives in backing the admission of Polisario to the OAU, and were opposed in this by about 20 moderates. Coming at a time when the organization was also having a difficult time dealing with Libyan-backed intervention in Chad (described below), the dispute about support for the Polisario severely strained the political capacities of the OAU. Indeed, after the Polisario was admitted in 1982 as the Sahwari Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the organization had to postpone holding its regular Council of Ministers meeting scheduled for mid-1982 because of the continuing contention. It was only after the SADR agreed not to participate anymore that the meeting could be held. Then, at the OAU summit in 1984, the organization finally decided to follow through with seating the SADR, at which point Morocco withdrew from the organization. Morocco has not returned even as the OAU has been transformed into the AU.

Peaceful conflict resolution was another goal stated in the OAU charter, and in this some OAU successes can be cited:[14] In the 1960s, the organization was successful in reducing tensions in the border dispute that had erupted between Morocco and Algeria in 1963; in a dispute between Rwanda and Burundi in 1966–67 that was mediated at the OAU's request by President Mobutu of Zaire; and in settling Somali irredentist disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya in 1967. However, its efforts failed to bring peace to Nigeria during the Biafran war of secession, not least because some of its member states (specifically Tanzania, Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia, and Gabon) actively supported Biafra. OAU efforts at conciliation in the Congo crisis that divided the organization failed as well. In the unprecedented invasion of Uganda by Tanzania in 1978–79, the OAU was alarmed by the disregard for Uganda's territorial integrity, but its attempt to find a middle ground through mediation and reconciliation failed.

An important landmark in conflict resolution was reached in 1981 when the organization, known for its reluctance to violate the sovereignty of its members, sent in its first peacekeeping force to Chad. At the time, Chad's president Goukouni Oueddei, who had come to power in 1980 with the help of Libyan troops, had asked the Libyans to withdraw from his country. An African peace force comprising about 3,300 troops, primarily from Nigeria (which had intervened in Chad in 1979) but also including soldiers from Zaire and Senegal, was sent in to maintain order while efforts at reconciliation were being made between Goukouni and his powerful rival Hissen Habré. However, Goukouni did little to push forward the negotiations, and Habré then seized power. The African force, already financially strapped, withdrew from Chad even though Habré wanted it to remain. The organization then had to decide the issue of who was going to represent Chad. Moderate OAU members wanted to recognize Habré but others wanted a government of national unity inasmuch as the former president still controlled the north of the country. OAU efforts at reconciliation collapsed when Habré refused to meet his rival in person, leading Goukouni to pull out of talks as well.

As the cold war came to an end, African states had to adapt both to a new round of conflict, this time primarily intrastate, and to a changed international environment, one in which sovereignty was becoming more fluid. As noted in the outline of the institutional structure, the OAU and, later, the AU, adopted commitments to democratization as well as stronger mechanisms to deal with conflict, and abandoned the previously rigid noninterventionist principles. Thus the organization became involved in areas such as elections observation and an increasing number of mediation efforts, led by special envoys or presidents and former presidents—for example, Ethiopian president Meles Zanawi mediated Somalia's civil conflict in the early 1990s; South Africa's president Thabo Mbeki was involved in trying to settle civil conflicts in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire; Chad's Idris Déby has mediated still-ongoing conflict in Sudan (but his diplomatic intervention was terminated in 2006 after hostilities erupted between the two countries); former president Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique led talks between the opposition and government representatives in Zimbabwe; former Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda held similar talks in Togo after election irregularities there in 2005; and former Botswana president Ketimule Masire acted as mediator from 1999 in the Democratic Republic of Congo where civil conflict was aggravated by the partisan involvement of the neighboring countries Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. But arguably the most important post–cold war development has been the OAU/AU's more proactive stance with respect to sending in peacekeeping forces. The organization has been counted on to send forces into troublespots as a prelude to, or to complement, global peacekeepers.

The first post–cold war peacekeeping mission was sent to Rwanda in 1990 after the rebel Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front invaded the country from Uganda. The OAU sent in a Military Observer Team (MOT) in 1991 comprising observers from Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire. After a ceasefire agreement was negotiated in 1992, the MOT was replaced by the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG I) comprising about 40 observers from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zimbabwe, and later, by NMOG II, consisting of some 130 military observers from Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.[15] This mission was a temporary one, intended to keep the peace until a requested UN force could be mustered. That UN force, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UNAMIR, eventually took over operations in November–December 1993, although it was soon overwhelmed during the genocide of 1994 precipitated by the death of the Rwandan president in a plane crash. The OAU did not intervene during the genocide, but the original OAU observer presence is generally credited with helping to promote the relatively stable environment in which the Arusha peace accords of August 1993 were negotiated.

Meanwhile in neighboring Burundi (whose president was killed in the same crash that killed Rwanda's president), ethnic conflict led to the OAU's deployment of a small—29-member, later augmented to 47, and then to over 60—observer mission consisting of soldiers from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia. The mission engaged in confidence building and humanitarian efforts but was withdrawn after a military coup in 1996. Still, continuing efforts culminated in the signing of a ceasefire and reconciliation agreement in 2000. The new AU then sent in its first peacekeeping force, comprising about 2,500 personnel primarily from South Africa with smaller contingents from Ethiopia and Mozambique. The force, which depended on European and US funding, held on until 2004 when it was replaced by the UN Mission in Burundi.

In addition to these key post–cold war operations, a small OAU observer mission was also deployed in Comoros after secessionist activity there in 1997, but the observers were withdrawn after a military coup took place in 1999.[16] In 1998 the OAU was confronted by a more traditional inter-state conflict: war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea over contested areas of the frontier. In this case, the OAU intervened quickly and mediation led, in stages, to the signing of a ceasefire agreement and later, to a comprehensive peace agreement, both concluded in 2000. (Tension remains between the two countries, however.) The OAU then sent in its Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE), a small monitoring group complementing the UN's much larger operation, the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMEE. The 27 military and civilian personnel who took up duty in October 2000 were drawn from Algeria, Nigeria, Ghana, Tunisia, Kenya, and South Africa.[17]

The most significant conflict addressed by the young AU has been the crisis in Darfur, Sudan, where since 2003 lawless militias, backed by the government, have killed thousands and driven some 2 million people from their homes in reaction to anti-government rebellions. The conflict carries ethnic overtones in that the militias are Sudanese Arabs and the attacked villagers generally non-Arab. The AU has addressed the issue in several ways: it supported mediation attempts by neighboring Chad, which has borne the brunt of the ensuing refugee crisis, and these efforts led to a ceasefire agreement in 2004. The AU established the 80-person African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor the ceasefire. This group eventually grew into a military and civilian presence in excess of 7,000 personnel mandated not just to investigate and report ceasefire violations but to secure safe areas, protect returning internally-displaced persons, and monitor the attempts of the government to disarm the government-controlled militias. Troops have been supplied primarily by Nigeria and Rwanda, along with Senegal, South Africa, the Gambia, Kenya, Chad, and Egypt. As with the missions in Burundi and Rwanda, a UN force was expected to take over Darfur operations, but the Sudanese government balked at its deployment until mid-2007 when a large force (26,000) was approved, though its deployment was delayed. In addition to the anticipated troop deployment, the AU established a mediation team, headed by a special envoy, to work out with the Sudanese government and with rebel forces details regarding power sharing and wealth distribution. An agreement was reached with the main rebel groups in 2006 and 2007.

While these OAU/AU interventions have been a welcome departure from the organization's past reluctance to intervene, they have not been entirely successful. The mediation efforts of eminent persons have often been affected by accusations of partiality for example, (as in Botswana's mediation in the Congo and Ethiopia's in Somalia) and/or self-interest (as in the case of Chad in the Sudan), and the AU is also seen as partial to besieged incumbent governments. Even when ceasefire agreements have been achieved, they have rarely held for long. Again, OAU and AU troop deployments have been overstretched and underfunded, affected by size, resource, logistical, and training limitations in situations that, to be fair, represent some of the world's most complex emergencies. Notwithstanding new developments and new conventions, the AU still hesitates to trample on its members' sovereignty. However, AU operations, joined to international and subregional efforts such as those of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group which has dealt with major conflict in West Africa (see Chapter 8), are becoming indispensable for addressing the continent's security and humanitarian problems. At the same time, it must be noted that the very fact that major crises continue to erupt on the continent reflects the relative failure of African states to develop not just workable confidence building and conflict resolution mechanisms, but also a culture of democracy, good governance, and peaceful resolution of disputes that would reduce the necessity for *post hoc* solutions.

Economic and social goals

In the economic and human security arenas, the OAU and the African Group at the United Nations have to be credited with helping to turn global attention to development issues in the 1970s. The Lagos Plan of 1980 reflects all the economic nationalist concerns and strategies of that era, in particular the emphasis on correcting the terms of trade, on commodity stabilization, regional integration, and south–south collective self-reliance already discussed in Chapter 2. But in the 1980s Africa, like Latin America, entered into the "lost decade" of debt and economic stagnation, and even the continent's stronger economies, such as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, were forced to adopt structural adjustment policies and the attendant conditionalities imposed by the International Monetary Fund. As a result, the optimistic proposals of the Lagos Plan were never implemented.[18] Thus, for example, trade among African countries as a whole only rose by about 4 percent between 1960 (5.5 percent) and 2005 (8.5 percent).[19] Meanwhile Africa's share of world trade fell from 5.5 percent in the 1970s to 2.9 percent in 2005. Progress toward liberalization has been slow, and even the new vision of unity is phased in terms of increasing the continent's leverage rather than simply integrating into the global economy.[20] In fact, it is not yet clear that the liberal economic solutions offered by the AU and others are appropriate for addressing Africa's economic and social needs. The continent still hosts the largest number of least developed countries (34 out of 50) and most countries suffer from serious social problems, with health, particularly the incidence of HIV/AIDS infection, high on the agenda. In 2006 the adult prevalence of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa in 2006 was 5.9 percent, compared with a prevalence of about 1 percent or less in other regions.[21] While new emphasis is being placed institutionally on poverty alleviation as well as such important global foci as the environment and gender equality—one of the five representatives to the pan-African parliament must be female, for example—the reality is that general African progress in these areas has been hindered by the continuing prevalence of political conflict.

Overall, some point out that African countries remain nationalistic and xenophobic, that there are major perceptual differences among leaders, and that the sheer diversity of the continent in terms of size, levels of development, and ethnicity and culture make any prognosis of successful institutional cooperation extremely difficult.[22] In addition, despite AU efforts, the overlap between continental and subregional memberships (discussed in Chapter 8) needs to be rationalized as well. It is to be noted that in the case of North African countries, the problem of overlap also pertains to possible conflicting responsibilities resulting from membership in both pan-African and pan-Arab institutions.

6 Regional visions

Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islam

The vision of Arab unity goes as far back as the spread of Arab culture and religion throughout the Near East during the Arab invasions of the seventh century AD. Ottoman rule left Arab culture largely intact and Arab nationalist stirrings began to be formally expressed by the late nineteenth century. In 1913, Arab intellectuals met in Paris at the first Arab Congress and called for greater autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. World War I followed, during which Britain and France encouraged Arab nationalism in order to undermine their opponent, Turkey. After the war, however, Western colonial rule brought political disintegration as Near East countries were divided up between Britain and France. On the other hand, as events in Palestine unfolded, Arab nationalism was renewed in opposition to the influx of Jews and the eventual creation of Israel. Joint Arab efforts were exerted in the late 1930s for the purpose of devising common policies on the issue.[1] Two pan-Arab conferences were held in 1937 and 1938 following the Palestinian revolt of 1936, an uprising against the increased Jewish presence. These conferences represented the first concerted intergovernmental actions by the Arab states on behalf of the Arabs in Palestine,[2] and they foreshadowed modern pan-Arab institutionalism. The immediate sections that follow are devoted to discussing the League of Arab States (LAS), the institutional embodiment of the pan-Arab identity. The companion development of the geographically wider, religio-cultural identity that is Pan-Islam is analyzed at the end of this chapter.

The League of Arab States (LAS)/Arab League

During World War II, Germany and Italy expressed support for Arab independence, leading the British to also offer their support and later, to preserve their interests by openly backing negotiations on what became the Arab League, or officially, the League of Arab States (LAS). The creation of the organization was preceded by extensive consultations among the states, with Egypt playing a definitive role. A preparatory charter called the Alexandria Protocol was drawn up in 1944; after some further refinements, this was adopted as the charter of the league on 11 May 1945. The original members of the league were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan (Jordan), and Yemen, although Yemen did not attend the preparatory meetings and not all the members signed the agreement in May. Like the OAU discussed in the last chapter, the Arab League represented a compromise between sharply differing state positions and rivalries: in particular Saudi Arabia, whose founder Ibn Saud had ousted the Hashemite rulers from the Arabian peninsula, was highly distrustful of the ambitions and intent of Hashemite Iraq and Jordan. (The Hashemites had once controlled Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine as well.) In turn Iraq had its own priorities, in this case countering Egyptian ambitions. Furthermore, Lebanese Maronites were worried about the potential impact of the league on their relations with their domestic Muslim communities. Reflecting some of these concerns, before the conference Iraq and Jordan had considered various forms of union, and in response Ibn Saud had proposed a treaty of alliance with Egypt and Syria.[3] Neither of these were, however, formalized.

The Arab League was established in 1945, at a time when the Arab states were still under colonial management. The British in particular were kept informed of developments during the negotiations, and they even helped to facilitate certain compromises. Britain kept an eye also on rival French influence within the region, for the French were insisting on concluding treaties with Syria and Lebanon. As one scholar notes, "The League developed as a means for the formation of a united Arab front against French designs in Syria and Lebanon and against Zionist ambitions in Palestine." He adds, "It also developed as a means for the consolidation of the *status quo*."[4] Thus, like the OAU after it, the LAS was designed to preserve its members' territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. Despite the members' underlying desire for a level of Arab unity, national interest, not the collective interest, was the primary concern.

The seven original members of the LAS were joined by 15 others by 1980 (see Box 6.1). Given the centrality of the issue of Palestine to the Arabs, a Palestinian representative was invited to the preparatory meetings in Alexandria and to those directly leading up to the establishment of the league. It was agreed that the representative should take part in discussions related to Palestine but he did not participate actively. There was indeed much discussion at the various meetings about whether Palestine could be a full participant in the main institution, the League Council. Initially a text proposed by the Egyptian delegate established the right of the Palestinian delegate to participate "on an equal footing" with the founding members. However, with British prodding, this language was omitted in the annex that was eventually drawn up.[5] Still, the annex specifically allowed a Palestinian representative, chosen by the council, to take part in its work. The rationale was given that Palestine was no longer under the Ottoman Empire and was therefore autonomous, and that the League of Nations Covenant had anticipated its independence, even if for the moment this was not possible. In 1976, the Palestinians' formal organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), whose creation in 1964 had been facilitated by the Arab League, was finally admitted as a full member.

In 1979 Egypt signed a peace framework with Israel, allowing for the return of the Sinai which had been seized by Israel in the 1973 war, in exchange for the normalization of relations between the two countries. Egypt followed through with a visit by President Sadat to Israel and the establishment of diplomatic relations shortly afterward. Other Arab League states, led by the militant "rejectionists," viewed this as a "separate" peace and pressed for Egypt's suspension. At the same time the headquarters of the league, located in Cairo, was transferred to Tunis. In 1989 as the global and regional environment was changing, particularly as the PLO had begun the process of dialogue with Israel, Egypt was permitted to rejoin the LAS and the headquarters was

Box 6.1 **Members of the League of Arab States**

Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, *Egypt*,* *Iraq*, *Jordan*, Kuwait, *Lebanon*, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, *Saudi Arabia*, Somalia, Sudan, *Syria*, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, *Yemen*.

- Observer countries: Eritrea, Brazil, Venezuela; India has been invited to attend summits since 2005.
- Headquarters: Cairo, Egypt.
- *Italics*: original members.

* Egypt was suspended between 1979 and 1989 because of its rapprochement with Israel.

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relocated to Cairo. Then in 2002 to 2003, Libya's leader Muammar Qaddafi threatened to withdraw his country from the organization because of his dissatisfaction over the league's inaction in Iraq as well as the impasse that had developed regarding Palestine. Libya was persuaded to remain but its leader turned his attention to sub-Saharan matters soon after. As Box 6.1 shows, over the years the league has broadened its base to include several more North African and African members. Eritrea became an observer in 2003.

Institutions of the LAS

The LAS charter established a Council of Representatives of all member states as the principal organ, empowered to oversee all efforts at cooperation with "due regard" to cooperation in economic affairs, communications, cultural, consular, judicial, social and health matters; to approve the budget; to make appointments; and also to use mediation and arbitration and authorize action against any aggressors. In its efforts at mediation and arbitration, as well as its work on personnel, budgetary, and other administrative items, the council decides matters by a majority vote. In other matters, including collective action and expulsion (or what is termed "separation") of members, unanimity is required. Charter amendments as well as the appointment of the secretary-general are issues requiring a two-thirds majority.

The LAS established a rather controversial approach to decision making in asserting that majority decisions would be binding only on those who voted for them (article 7). This article further notes that "in either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member state according to its respective basic laws." These provisions were intended to preserve state sovereignty but they also meant that the league has little chance of developing as a supranational body.

The council meets twice a year, usually at foreign minister level. Regular summits of heads of state and government have also been held, but annual meetings only began in the 2000s, though they had been anticipated since 1990. The charter also established committees under the council's supervision to deal with social, cultural, and economic affairs, as well as a general secretariat led by a secretary-general to be headquartered in Cairo.

As happened in the OAS which was established around the same time, the LAS charter's provisions for action in cases of aggression was complemented by the drawing up of a separate Treaty of Joint Defense and Cooperation in 1950. In that treaty, members affirmed their commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes. It was also made clear that aggression against any one of the members should be considered to be aggression against all, that is, a classic collective security mechanism was included. The treaty provided for the creation of a supervisory Joint Defense Council reporting to the LAS council, as well as a Permanent Military Commission of Defense, composed of representatives of the general staffs of the armies of the member states, that would be responsible for formulating and implementing joint defense decisions. In a forward-looking stipulation, economic issues were also addressed directly in this treaty, and a connection was drawn between security and prosperity. An Economic Council was established to promote inter-Arab cooperation in conjunction with the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee of the Council of Representatives. Ministerial meetings in a variety of areas were then initiated. As is the case in other regional organizations, a number of specialized agencies and "other" entities were associated with the League from the 1950s on. These include(d) Arab agencies dealing with labor, industrial development, agricultural development, and telecommunications. An Arab Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization was created in 1964. In addition, a Permanent Arab Human Rights Commission was established in 1968, in the wake of global activities to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The commission prepared a draft of a human rights declaration that, however, was tellingly discarded for lack of support. The commission became inactive shortly thereafter.[6] A proposed Arab Court of Justice never materialized.

There have been relatively few structural changes in the LAS over the years. In the security arena, the Arab Unified Military Command, charged with the integration of strategy for the liberation of Palestine, was formed in 1964.[7] In the economic sphere, the most significant addition at the time—one that differentiated the league from the OAS and OAU—was the signing and ratification in 1957 of the Arab Economic Unity Agreement. This agreement built on the Treaty on Transit Trade of 1953 that sought to create a preferential tariff area for some agricultural and industrial products. The 1957 agreement called for freedom of trade and movement, and was ratified by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and the two Yemens (now unified Yemen). In 1964, an Arab Common Market agreement was signed by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, and later, by Libya, Yemen, and Mauritania. A Council of Arab Economic Unity was also established to implement and promote Arab economic unity. Then in 1981 economic unity was taken a step further with the adoption by the members of the Facilitation and Promotion of Inter-Arab

Trade Agreement which mandated tariff and non-tariff reductions on all goods.

In other economic areas, the LAS's Economic Council became the Arab Economic and Social Council in 1977.[8] The Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to Africa and Arab Countries was established within the league in 1974, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development (BADEA) was formed in 1974, becoming a specialized agency. Another specialized agency, the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation—which, as the name implies, insures private investment—was set up in 1974. Other agencies linked to the LAS today are the Arab Monetary Fund founded in 1976, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development which became effective in 1971, and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries founded in 1968. The league has an Investment Dispute Settlement Court that is mandated to deal with disputes arising between states, corporations, or individuals. The court was established in 1988 but became operational only in 2003.

In the 1990s, like other regional organizations, the Arab League adopted some newer institutional instruments, including a human rights charter, a convention against terrorism (calling for information exchange and legal cooperation against perpetrators of terrorist acts), and proposals for a pan-Arab parliament, a court of justice, and a common market. With respect to the first area, human rights, the Arab League council adopted a Charter on Human Rights in 1994 but that charter was widely criticized by human rights groups as inconsistent with human rights law. Among the concerns of these groups were the charter's provisions for derogation of obligations in times of emergency, what were seen as inadequate provisions regarding fair trials, the retention of the death penalty, and the lack of protection for the right to political participation, to freedom of expression, to women's rights, and judicial independence. The lack of a strong mechanism for the enforcement of rights was also noted by critics, inasmuch as the relevant committee would simply be able to examine reports submitted by states and report subsequently to the Permanent Commission on Human Rights.[9] Although the charter was eventually adopted, it was never ratified. Instead, a process of revision led to the adoption in 2004 of a revised charter that took into account suggestions from international and regional nongovernmental organizations. Political and legal rights were elaborated in this version, the equality of women was formally noted, judicial independence was supported, and social rights were expanded, including women's rights and the right to development (notably including the right to health, nutrition, and a safe and drug-free environment). Nevertheless, international concern continued to be expressed over, among other things, "provisions for death penalties to be passed and carried out on minors if allowed under national laws, and for the right to life to be subject to derogations in states of emergency. In addition, the Charter was silent on the subject of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment, although it contained a prohibition of torture."[10] Both documents called for creating a seven-member human rights committee of experts called the Arab Human Rights Committee, which would consider regular reports submitted by states on progress in human rights. However, the charter stopped short of giving strong investigative powers to this committee. By the end of 2007, the charter was not yet in force.

The LAS began to consider revitalization in both the political and economic spheres in the 2000s. A plan for a pan-Arab parliament was mooted, leading to a decision taken during the 2005 summit in Algiers to form an interim Arab parliament. This Transitional Arab Parliament, composed of four legislators from each of the member countries, held its first session in December 2005. A permanent institution is expected to replace the interim parliament in five years' time. Meanwhile, the interim parliament considers items referred to it by the LAS council rather than setting its own independent agenda. Plans for a court of justice and a security council to hear disputes have been set aside indefinitely.

In the economic sphere, the limited progress in freeing trade, coupled with the new realities of globalization, led to the revival of plans for a common market in the 1990s. In 1997, league members agreed to form an Arab free trade area by cutting customs duties by 10 percent a year over a 10-year period.[11] All countries signed on, except Algeria, Mauritania, Djibouti, and Comoros. The schedule for tariff reductions was accelerated in 2001 and completed in 2005, allowing members duty-free access for all industrial and agricultural products to regional markets. Algeria joined the free trade zone in 2004. Finally, in keeping with the new liberal approach, the LAS added a mechanism whereby private business groups, through the Union of Arab Chambers of Commerce, are expected to report to the league twice a year on the implementation of free trade.

An assessment: meeting charter goals

Political-security goals

The LAS was a rather timid effort at cooperation among states that were naturally distrustful of any infringement of their sovereignty. Despite strong Egyptian influence in the early days, there is no one power in this organization that might provide normative and practical leadership; rather, the league is reflective of the continuous competition and rivalry for power among the Arab states, aggravated by the lack of appropriate enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, writing in 1993, Muhammad Faour divided events in the Arab regional system into four conflict-filled periods: first, the 1945–67 period when the Arab states gained their independence but were plagued by territorial and other conflicts; second, the 1967–74 period when the states gained increasing legitimacy and there was greater inter-state cooperation but this was also the time of the rise of the pan-Islamic challenge and the Syria/PLO–Jordan conflict; third, the 1975–78 period during which Arab solidarity declined and Egypt separately signed the Camp David Accords, leading to its expulsion from the LAS and the relocation of the league's headquarters to Tunis; and fourth, the post-1978 period, a period of disarray and the "growing irrelevance of Arabism to state policies."[12] This disarray appears to be continuing today.

From the beginning of the league, Israel has been seen by members as the primary source of conflict and threat and thus the main issue on which there has had to be cooperation. The LAS championed the cause of the displaced Palestinians, accepted Palestine as an observer and later, as a full member, and channeled significant sums of money to help the Palestinian refugees, and (in the 1990s) the Palestinian Authority. In 1952 an Arab boycott bureau called the Central Boycott Office was established in Damascus, Syria, with responsibilities to enforce a trade boycott of Israeli goods that has been in effect since 1948. The bureau also enforced a prohibition, in place since 1951, on corporate or individual economic exchanges with firms that do business with Israel, a prohibition that is also applicable to third parties. Yet, despite many resolutions and declarations, the league has not been able to deal effectively with the issues involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict. As time wore on, the boycott was widely evaded, and by the mid-1990s, a number of countries that had normalized or were normalizing relations with Israel gave it up completely. These included Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, and the Gulf States. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia had never even enforced the boycott.[13] In fact, in the 1990s some countries even contemplated creating a Middle East/North African economic community that would include Israel, though the LAS itself favored an Arab-only zone.[14]

The league's conflict resolution efforts regarding Palestine have been similarly limited. When Israel, France, and the United Kingdom attacked Egypt during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the league's collective security mechanism was not even invoked. The LAS was unsuccessful in 1981 in persuading European governments not to participate in a multinational force sent to police Egypt's Sinai peninsula after Israel withdrew. In 1982 the organization did not intervene when Israel invaded Lebanon. Beginning in 1982, the league supported the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as the capital, but actual negotiations on the Arab–Israel issue were left to the United States, the United Nations, and other parties. In 1993, secret Norwegian mediation led to the Oslo Accords under which the Israel and the PLO recognized each other and agreed to further talks toward a permanent peace settlement—an agreement which the league clearly supported. But with negotiations slowed by political divisions, and after the outbreak of the second Palestinian uprising (intifada), Saudi Arabia offered a plan that was adopted by the league in 2002 and remained the league's position in 2007: the plan offers Israel full relations with the Arab world in return for a full withdrawal to the 1967 lines, the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and an agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. The league established a follow-up committee comprising the secretary-general along with representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen, Oman, Algeria, and Morocco, and subsequently the foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordan (countries which have diplomatic relations with Israel) paid their first visit to Israel as league representatives. But while the league's plan has been generally welcomed as a step forward, Arab–Israeli negotiations are being pursued under a "roadmap" for peace negotiated in 2003 by the so-called Madrid Quartet comprising the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations. Progress on this roadmap, which does envision a two-state solution, has been stymied by controversies including Israel's construction since 2002 of a separation barrier in the West Bank, the 2006 rise to legislative power of Hamas (replacing the moderate PLO), and Israel–Lebanon hostilities which led to war in 2006. A renewed commitment to peace efforts was made by all the relevant parties at a US-sponsored conference held in Annapolis (Maryland) in November 2007, a conference at which the Arab League's follow-up committee was represented. Significantly, Iran and Hamas both denounced the conference.

Hampering the league's ability to play a proactive role in resolving the Middle East conflict over the years have been the ideological divisions and antagonistic perspectives that separate countries such as Libya, Syria, and pre-2003 Iraq from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. Intra-league differences have sometimes been so strained that summits could not be held or were postponed or were skipped by leaders who sometimes opted instead to send lower-level officials. Moreover, since the beginning of the first intifada in 1988, LAS states have found their traditional national interest strategies challenged both by the rise of Islamism and by the increasingly insistent pan-Arab voice of their populations that are articulating growing criticisms of what are perceived to be ineffectual governmental pronouncements.[15] This has also been the case with respect to other Arab conflicts, especially the crises in Iraq.

In the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s, the league was handicapped by the fact that Syria and Libya supported Iran whereas the other countries cooperated with Iraq. Arab League mediation was unsuccessful; in any event, Iraq's Saddam Hussein opposed such mediation, arguing that Iraq was fighting on behalf of all Arabs. The 1990 and 2003 Gulf wars also severely divided Arab states: Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was condemned by all the Arab states, but while the majority supported the deployment of an Arab force to assist foreign troops in protecting Saudi Arabia, some members (specifically Jordan, the PLO, and Sudan) were sympathetic to Baghdad and others were hostile to the very idea of helping Western troops. As a result, only Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states participated in the US-led coalition against Iraq.

The US invasion of 2003 was, not unexpectedly, widely condemned by Arab states; however, again, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states gave logistical support to the operation, whereas at the other end of the scale, Libya threatened to withdraw from the league in protest. Another conflict that has stretched the league's conflict resolution capacities in the 1990s and 2000s has been the multifaceted conflict in Sudan, the Darfur conflict in particular. League efforts to promote negotiation between the Sudanese government and rebels have had limited results. In 2006 the league came out in support of Sudan's rejection of the deployment of a UN force in Darfur, and suggested instead that the African Union peacekeeping force already in Darfur should be boosted.

On the positive side, league members have contributed logistical, financial, and personnel support to operations in Iraq and in Darfur. These are not the only notable deployments in the league's history. In 1961, the league laudably prevented Iraq from taking over newly independent Kuwait by admitting Kuwait to the LAS and stationing a force there from 1961 to 1963. Units from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia participated in this force. Then in 1976 LAS troops, primarily from Syria but including units from Saudi

Arabia, Libya, and Sudan, succeeded in stabilizing Lebanon after serious civil conflict had erupted. Syria also received the league's support for its subsequent efforts to stabilize Lebanon. But these contributions seem dwarfed by the less successful LAS mediation attempts, including the failed mediation efforts during the civil war in Yemen in 1962 (even though similar action in 1979 was somewhat successful); unsuccessful mediation attempts in disputes between the United Arab Republic and Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria between 1958 and 1962; failed efforts in the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s; frustrating attempts to resolve factional civil conflict in Somalia in the 1990s and 2000s; and unsuccessful efforts in the already mentioned situation in Darfur. Furthermore, the LAS tried to support Libya in legal aspects of its case concerning the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, but ran into Libyan hostility over LAS unwillingness to defy sanctions imposed by the international community between 1989 and 1999.

In other political areas, recent efforts to incorporate democracy and human rights into the LAS agenda are noteworthy. Nevertheless, compared to other regions of the global south, Arab progress in these areas has been slow. Among other things, the spread of democracy is hampered by longstanding limitations placed on the opposition in many countries, especially limits placed on Islamist activity (as in Egypt), and by the reluctance of the hereditary monarchies and emirates to significantly expand political participation. These political limitations have an adverse effect on efforts to promote human rights as well as efforts to incorporate civil society into governmental decision making. The movement for greater human rights remains the preserve of nongovernmental groups that depend on international linkages for support and are often forced to operate in exile as well. Those groups operating at home must deal with domestic limits on their operations in a climate of political suspicion and cultural distrust.[16] The LAS itself has maintained only weak institutional structures in this regard, structures that do not permit nongovernmental or individual appeal. In the broader arena, it is notable that by 2007 only Algeria, Djibouti, and Libya had ratified the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allowing for individual petitions to the UN's Human Rights Committee. Despite the urging of national civil society groups, the LAS has not established a mechanism for formally incorporating the views of their societies into its policymaking by giving groups consultative status, as has happened in the United Nations and in some comparable regional groupings. Although it is true that civil groups are nevertheless forming linkages with the LAS, these are government-sanctioned bodies and traditional labor and business organizations. The pan-Arab parliament is similarly state-oriented, composed of legislative representatives, most coming from non-democratic member states to begin with.

Economic and social goals

In the economic sphere, the LAS must be lauded for including economic integration within its purview from the start. However, the publicly stated need for revitalization efforts reflects the limited progress achieved so far in promoting intraregional trade. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, trade among the West Asian countries—this excludes the North African countries—has gone up only marginally, from 8.7 percent in 1960 to 9.3 percent in 2005, the same level as for 1970.[17] The region's share of world trade was 2.7 percent in 1960 and 4.8 percent in 2005. Thus there is a need to accelerate exports both intra- and extra-regionally. Social development is also a continuing concern: the United Nations Development Programme's human development index in 2004 for all Arab states was a middling 0.68, with most individual LAS members falling into high or medium development categories. Nevertheless, the Comoros, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Mauritania are low on most measures of social development.[18] Moreover, the medium overall index masks relatively high levels of poverty and unemployment, as well technological deficiencies and gender inequality.[19]

Summing up, overall the LAS has been handicapped by the disharmony generated by deep political rivalries, and the seeming absence of the political will needed to strengthen the organization and advance its role toward a level of supranationalism. The retention of the provision that the league's decisions are binding only on those who accept them is illustrative. The lack of will is also reflected in the financial sphere where unpaid dues have hampered the ability of the organization to engage in reforms. In the 1990s, financial problems even caused the organization to close several foreign offices.[20] On the other hand, the fact that some new institutions have been put in place points to a recognition of the need to revitalize and modernize the agenda and the institutions of the LAS. Moreover, like the Non-Aligned Movement, the LAS is above all a community. As aptly noted by one of its ambassadors:

> Most challenges and problems [in the Arab world] now are of a regional nature. The league is the best organization able to deal with those challenges because it understands the issues and the

> root causes and it can play a role in trying to solve them. It is also the organization that provides a collective vision … It is an instrument that defends and protects Arab identity … The league is the organization that is best able to preserve and protect … [the] Arab image … [21]

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

From the seventh century Arab invasions through to the Ottoman Empire's expansion, Islam spread as a consequence of conquest. However, trade and discovery also played a role, fostering in particular the religious expansion into South and Southeast Asia, China, and Africa. Despite its growth and expansion, however, Islamic identity took second place to nationalism and anticolonialism during the centuries of imperialism. It was therefore not until the late 1960s that the pan-Islamic spirit was institutionalized. As one noted scholar of nationalism, Rupert Emerson, stated in 1960, even the birth of Pakistan as a Muslim nation did little to engender international Muslim solidarity. Emerson noted then: "Pan-Islam is not completely to be disregarded, but national considerations seem habitually to outweigh the injunctions of religious solidarity."[22] In many ways this remains so today, as Islamic countries establish foreign policies based on national interest rather than religion. However, the influence of Islam as a popular force has today impacted policymaking in a way that was unthinkable in 1960 when self-determination was the prime goal of the global south.

The late 1960s saw a resurgence in the spirit of Islamic cooperation. The Arab–Israeli "Six Day War" in which Arabs suffered a humiliating defeat is often viewed as a prime stimulus for the greater attention paid to Islam at both the popular and governmental levels. However, in practical terms the growth of Islamic cooperation also stemmed from the efforts of individual leaders, among them Libya's Muammar Qaddafi who stressed the revitalization of Islam and went to great lengths to support Islamic movements within and beyond the Arab world. At the height of his influence, before the isolation of Libya in the 1990s, Qaddafi—who incidentally also adhered to a particular brand of socialism—supported rebel Muslim movements in the Philippines, Eritrea, Cyprus, Indonesia, and Thailand as well as in various Arab countries. Libya was also one of the few countries to support Idi Amin, the dictator of Uganda from 1971 to 1979. Libya joined Syria in supporting Iran against secular Iraq in the long Iran–Iraq war. Moreover, oil-rich Libya funded the establishment of numerous

Islamic centers and organizations around the world. Clearly, Qaddafi's Islamic convictions were inseparable from his own expansionist ambitions as well as his strong anti-imperialist feelings *vis-à-vis* the West. His interventions in Chad exemplified this search for influence, and his determination to develop a nuclear program was a continual source of anxiety for the Western countries. It was not until the 2000s that global changes and the isolation fostered by UN and US sanctions led Libya to abandon its nuclear program and to substitute regional, pan-African ambitions for its previous global outreach.

In addition to Libya, Saudi Arabia, home of the religious sites Mecca and Medina, the bastion of Wahhabism, and rich in oil, was also a strong supporter of pan-Islamic cooperation. Saudi Arabia used its oil wealth to increase its own international visibility as well as to support conservative Muslim countries in the region. In fact, Saudi Arabia played the leading role in the founding of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1969.

The organization was established at a time when anti-Zionist sentiment was heightened after fire destroyed the third holiest Muslim shrine, the Al-Aksa mosque, which is also the site of the holiest Jewish shrine, the Temple Mount. The fire inflamed Arab and Muslim hostility toward Israel, which had incorporated East Jerusalem during the Six Day War of 1967. The first meeting of the OIC, held in Rabat, Morocco, was a summit of the leaders of 25 nations who focused on the Arab–Israeli conflict, calling for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and for the return of Jerusalem. By the 2000s, the OIC had widened to include 57 states from all around the global south, and the agenda of its meetings had expanded well beyond Israel to include free trade as well as OIC efforts to resolve an assortment of troublesome inter- and intrastate conflicts in Africa and Asia as well as the Middle East.

There have been some contentious membership issues in the OIC over the years: like the LAS, the OIC ejected Egypt after its separate peace with Israel, welcoming it back in 1984 in view of its rapprochement with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. (Syria, Libya, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen voted against readmission.) Afghanistan was similarly suspended after the Soviet invasion of 1979. After the Soviet withdrawal, guerrilla groups continued to fight against the regime of Mohammad Najibullah until it was removed and a new government was formed in 1992. Both the United Nations and the OIC then recognized that government which went on to sign agreements with other rebel groups in 1993. But after the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, the OIC, like the United Nations, opted to leave the issue of Afghan representation open. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban regime. The US invasion of Afghanistan after the events of 9/11 was not openly condemned by the OIC, and Afghanistan resumed its OIC seat in 2003 under the new government of Hamid Karzai.

Nigeria joined the OIC in 1986 but its membership has been a source of contention between Muslims and Christians in the country. It was only admitted to the OIC's Islamic Development Bank in 2005. Zanzibar was accepted as a member in 1992 but the application was withdrawn after Christian antagonism threatened the union with Tanzania. The Philippines' admission as an observer depends on continued implementation of the autonomy agreement of 1996 between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front, which has long been an observer. India's application for observer status has been denied by Pakistan, which cites in particular their continued dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.

Box 6.2 Members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

Afghanistan,* Albania, *Algeria*, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei-Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, *Chad*, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, *Egypt*,* Gabon, Gambia, *Guinea*, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, *Indonesia*, *Iran*, Iraq, *Jordan*, Kazakhstan, *Kuwait*, Kyrghyz Republic, *Lebanon*, *Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, *Malaysia*, Maldives, *Mali*, *Mauritania*, *Morocco*, Mozambique, *Niger*, Nigeria, Oman, *Pakistan*, *Palestine*, Qatar, *Saudi Arabia*, *Senegal*, Sierra Leone, *Somalia*, *Sudan*, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, *Tunisia*, *Turkey*, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, *Yemen*.

- Observer countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Kingdom of Thailand, Russian Federation, Turkish Cypriot state. The Philippine Moro National Liberation Front is also an observer.
- Headquarters: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
- *Italics*: Original members.

* Egypt was suspended between 1979 and 1984; Afghanistan was suspended between 1980 and 1989.

Web site: www.oic-oci.org

Main institutions of the OIC

At a meeting of foreign ministers held in Saudi Arabia in 1970, an OIC secretariat was established headquartered in Jeddah. A third foreign ministers' meeting held in Rabat (Morocco) in 1972 adopted a charter that called for Islamic solidarity among member states, support for the Palestinians, the safeguarding of the Holy Places, and cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural, and scientific fields. The main decision-making organ of the OIC is the Conference of Kings, Heads of State, and Government which meets every three years. The Conference of Foreign Ministers meets every year, making decisions by a two-thirds majority. The statute of an Islamic International Court of Justice, which, like the International Court of Justice, would render decisions regarding dispute settlement as well as advisory opinions, was adopted in 1987 but never implemented. The court would use Sharia law as a basis for its decisions. Finally, there is a general secretariat that oversees—along with departments dealing with politics, economics, information, legal affairs, science and technology, and other technical areas—a department dealing with Palestine affairs and a Bureau for the Islamic Boycott of Israel.

In 1970, it was agreed to establish an Islamic News Agency (effected in 1972), mandated to promote information exchange and contacts, and also an Islamic Development Bank (IsDB or IDB, in effect since 1975) to channel aid from the richer countries to those in need. Between 1974 and 1977, a broadcasting agency was established, an Islamic Solidarity Fund was set up to improve social and religious standards and to provide emergency and disaster relief, and a Research Center for Islamic History, Art, and Culture was founded to promote and research Islamic culture. The bank, news agency, and broadcasting agency were joined in 1981 by an Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, all serving as specialized organs of the OIC. The solidarity fund is a subsidiary organ of the OIC, as is a statistical center established in 1977 and a number of Islamic colleges and cultural institutes. In the 1970s as well, standing committees of member states were formed to handle cooperative efforts in culture and information, trade, and science and technology. An Al-Quds (Jerusalem) committee was established in 1975 to oversee the implementation of resolutions on the Arab–Israeli conflict. Also, over the years the OIC has approved many nongovernmental affiliates ranging from business groups to sports agencies. Of particular significance in this regard has been the affiliation of the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry, composed of national chambers of commerce, whose role has been heightened in recent times.

One important group of institutions is the specialized bodies that are in effect committees dealing with pertinent areas of conflict. The earliest committee established was one on the situation of Muslims in the Philippines. The Committee on Afghanistan was established in 1980. A Palestine committee was created in 1981 to monitor OIC sanctions against Israel, as was the committee for solidarity with the countries of the Sahel that were ravaged by drought in the 1970s. Other situations that the OIC has been addressing in committee are the status of Jammu and Kashmir, and more recently, events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. Finally, at the United Nations in New York OIC representatives meet as a committee to deal with UN reform.

As is the case with other institutions, in the 2000s the OIC has tried to adapt to newer trends in institutionalism, in particular the need to address concerns about terrorism, democracy, and human rights. In these areas OIC countries find themselves in the limelight inasmuch as older, more general, concerns about terrorism have been redirected toward the special case of Islamism, and inasmuch as well as many of its member states also display weak performance in democracy. In 1999, the OIC adopted a Convention on Combating International Terrorism (effective 2002) that is similar in most respects to one adopted by the LAS. In both, the importance of the Palestinian struggle is reflected in the explicit exemption of the acts of national liberation movements from being labeled terrorist.

One of the key conventions drawn up in recent years has been the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam adopted by the OIC during the 19th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1990. The declaration, harbinger of the subsequent Arab Charter on Human Rights already discussed, bases its provisions directly on Islamic Sharia regulations. Civil protections include the equality of all human beings, equality before the law, the right to life and security, freedom of expression (as long as this is not contrary to Sharia principles), the right to justice (in accord with Sharia), freedom of movement, the protection of civilians and fair treatment of prisoners in war, the equality of women, rights of the child, and the right of all to freedom from enslavement. Social and economic rights include the right to education including religious education, the right to work, to property, a clean environment, and to medical care. As elsewhere, the anticolonial struggle is supported, as well as the right of states to control their natural resources.[23]

In the 2000s the OIC has moved beyond expressions of cultural solidarity and aid and toward promoting stronger economic linkages among its members. The role of the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC) was, since 1981, to facilitate economic cooperation among member states, particularly intraregional cooperation. In the 2000s, the committee has been given a mandate to enhance this cooperation by facilitating the establishment of a preferential trade area leading to a common market among member states. In 2002 a Framework Agreement on a Trade Preferential System drawn up in 1997 entered into force; 18 countries had signed the agreement by mid-2007. In 2005, the Trade Negotiating Committee of COMCEC, comprised of members that have ratified the framework, completed the Protocol on the Preferential Tariff Scheme (PRETAS), outlining the schedule for tariff reductions and eventual elimination. The aim is to increase intra-OIC trade from 13 percent in the early 2000s to 20 percent in 10 years. As of 2007, 10 states had signed on with only two, Jordan and Malaysia, ratifying the agreement. Ten countries need to ratify the agreement for it to enter into force, an outcome hoped for by 2009.[24]

COMCEC is assisted by the Islamic Center for Development of Trade, a subsidiary organ established in 1981 that engages primarily in research and information activities, and the Islamic Development Bank already mentioned, which, along with its lending program, developed enhanced trade mechanisms in the 1990s. The bank also established some new institutions, including the independently-run Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (1994), the Corporation for Development of the Private Sector (a multilateral financial institution established in 1999, mandated to promote private sector development in member countries, according to the Sharia principles), and in 2005 an International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation to coordinate all trade financing activities, including helping member states access investment opportunities and international capital.[25]

An assessment: meeting charter goals

Political-security goals

The OIC is first and foremost an organization that promotes solidarity as well as cultural exchange. As such, the very fact that it has expanded its membership to include countries with relatively small Muslim populations (for example, only 10 percent of Guyana's population is Muslim) suggests that governments see the organization as important in assuaging and/or harnessing the goodwill of this domestic cultural group at a time when Islam is playing a key role in the global arena. It also suggests that the organization is seen as important as a networking arena as well as a source of financing for many global south countries. The OIC also has to be credited for its support and promotion of

Islamic cultural and religious unity despite the schisms within Islam. The organization has built and funded many Islamic colleges and cultural institutes and centers; it has also generally adopted a moderate tone in seeking a "dialogue of civilizations," and in seeking to inform the "West" about the positive elements of Islamic culture and to moderate growing "Islamophobia," even while keeping vigilant about what Muslims see as assaults, particularly in Europe, on the religion and culture.

On the other hand, the OIC's religio-cultural orientation does not always mingle well with Western concepts of human rights and democracy. Not unexpectedly, human rights groups have strongly criticized the OIC and its individual member states for their human rights performance. As for democracy, many member governments are simply not freely elected or representative, and an OIC democratic charter that would conform to Western standards is unlikely. Nongovernmental influence in the OIC is centered on groups formally initiated and approved by the OIC itself.

The OIC has been relatively active in conflict resolution efforts but with mixed results. In the first place, it is clear that the organization is a reflection of the member states' diverse political interests and this is reflected in its weaknesses in conflict resolution. The OIC charter (article 2b) sets forth certain guiding principles including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and noninterference in the domestic affairs of members. It also highlights the peaceful settlement of disputes and abstention from the use of force. But as has been the case with other global south organizations, strict adherence to the first set of principles has handicapped the organization in dealing effectively with violations of the second set of principles. There are no standing mechanisms for conflict resolution in the OIC and the proposed Islamic International Court of Justice has not come on stream.

As reflected in the list of committees described earlier, the OIC has been engaged in mediation efforts in a number of conflicts, both as a conference and in support of individual member efforts. The OIC has provided a channel for diplomatic and financial support for the Palestinians. In Afghanistan, after the Soviet invasion, the OIC supported the antigovernment Islamic groups, avoided giving direct support to the Taliban, and after 2001, it supported efforts to reconstruct the country. The organization tried unsuccessfully to mediate the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s, and also supported the separate mediation efforts of Pakistan, Algeria, and Guinea. It also endorsed Algerian efforts to mediate the hostage crisis between the United States and Iran in 1979. In the civil conflict in the Philippines, the conference's Ministerial Commission successfully facilitated the interim Tripoli agreement of

1976 as well as the final peace agreement of 1996 granting autonomy to Muslim areas. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia were active participants in this process. The OIC condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (with similar concerns arising as in the Arab League), and opposed the invasion and occupation of Iraq while allowing the postwar government to participate in the OIC. In Bosnia, the OIC was helpful in bringing global attention to Serbian ethnic cleansing and to the need for humanitarian assistance to the Muslim refugees. The OIC leaves it up to individual members to decide to participate in peacekeeping operations. Finally, the OIC's role in Darfur has perhaps drawn the most global criticism among all its other intervention efforts. An OIC fact-finding mission sent into Sudan in 2004 reported no gross human rights violations even as thousands were being killed. Moreover, the OIC has generally supported Sudan's position, including its opposition to the stationing of UN troops. Like the LAS, however, the OIC has also actively supported the peace process between the rebels and the government, and has also mediated the related problems between Sudan and Chad.

Overall, the OIC, like the LAS, has been hampered by its members' overzealousness in respecting each other's sovereignty, and by the resulting tendency to pursue harmony at the expense of substantive action that would, however, generate controversy and confrontation between members. While it is to be credited for pursuing diplomacy and moderation, the OIC's role in conflict resolution has to be seen as subordinate to its primary mission, that is, to develop and promote pan-Islamic linkages around the world.

Economic and social goals

In the economic sphere, the OIC's lending through the IsDB, its affiliation with other agencies, and its humanitarian relief solidarity program have all been intended to channel aid from the richer countries to the poorer members. The main contributors to the IsDB—which had about $21 billion in authorized capital in 2007—are Saudi Arabia which provides nearly 25 percent, Kuwait, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt. Between 1976 and 2004, the bank approved projects amounting to $38.3 billion.[26] This compares favorably to the lending of the African Development Bank (AfDB) which has many northern donors and, as of 2007, had $33 billion in authorized capital. The AfDB approved about $57.2 billion over a longer period, 1967–2005.[27] It also compares favorably with the smaller Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)'s total of $16.8

billion in commitments between 1974 and 2005.[28] The AFESD had $2.6 billion in capital in 2007.

The OIC, however, has as members a rather large proportion of the nations that are ranked as low in human development by the United Nations, including Cameroon, Djibouti, Yemen, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea, Senegal, Nigeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, and Niger—these represent a third of OIC membership. Only Brunei, Qatar, and Bahrain fall into the "high development" category. In fact, the IsDB's annual report for 2005 noted aptly:

> In Sub-Saharan African member countries, the proportion of the population living below $1 a day has not changed since 1990. Over the period 1995–2003 more than 50 percent of the population in Nigeria, Uganda and Niger are living on below $1 a day. Between 26 and 50 percent of the population in Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Mozambique are in the extreme poverty level, and in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon extreme poverty ranges from 11 to 25 percent. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt are classified as having an extreme poverty level of less than 10 percent of their population [data not available for other African countries]. On the other hand, the profile of extreme poverty is relatively less acute in other regions. In Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Yemen the percentage of the population living on less $1 a day ranges from 11 to 25 percent.[29]

Similarly, in terms of gross domestic product per capita alone, many members are low-income countries. These statistics suggest that the OIC's budgetary resources are bound to be strained.

In the 2000s, the OIC has moved toward establishing a free trade arrangement among the members. Indeed, one of the benefits seen to such an arrangement is the potential to strengthen the poorer countries and help them accede to the World Trade Organization. According to the IsDB, intra-trade among OIC member countries amounted 11.5 percent of exports and 13.1 percent of imports in 2002. Their share of world exports was 7.5 percent. Although the exports of the OIC members as well as the developing countries as a whole were rising, both in global and intraregional terms, the bank noted that OIC exports were low in proportion to other developing countries,

> despite the fact that the IDB member countries include in their group some of the major worldwide exporters of oil and a number of newly industrialized countries, including a number of high export performers

> globally. It is clear that in order to increase their collective share in world trade, they have to overcome the challenges raised by the small size of their economies, the relative lack of diversification in their output mixes and the ensuing limitations on their actual export levels.[30]

In 2004, the OIC share of world trade increased to 8.8 percent while intra-exports increased to 13.5 percent. The 13.5 percent average for the whole group was exceeded by 29 member countries. Intra-group imports also increased, to 16 percent, with 40 member countries having a percentage higher than the average.[31] Overall, therefore, the OIC shows some potential to improve its members' economic performance.

Conclusion

The organizations discussed in the last three chapters all had their beginnings in an ambitious pan-cultural idea, notwithstanding the US role in the inter-American system, and all still function on the assumption that there is a commonality of culture and values, if not always interest, among the members. These organizations all developed as multifunctional entities, but their prime goal was usually political and cultural, and economic cooperation has tended to be an "add-on" of the 2000s. A note is in order concerning the lack of an Asian body similar to the pan-American, pan-African, and pan-Arab organizations discussed. As elaborated in Chapter 1, the Asian solidarity of the 1940s was diverted into Afro-Asianism and nonalignment. The closest Asia has since come to a continental-type vision has been within the framework of the pan-Pacific cooperation that led to the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in 1989. However, the APEC joins developing Asia with developed Asia and America, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Latin American nations of Mexico and Chile, and thus cannot be considered to be an Asian, or more particularly, a global south Asian community. In fact, the very idea of a pan-Pacific community was initially put forward, not by southern countries but by Japanese academics and business persons, and then taken up and promoted by the governments of Japan, Australia, and the United States. The global south Asian region has, however, embarked on various subregional initiatives discussed in Chapter 9.

In the next few chapters, the discussion turns to institutions developed in the opposite way: they were formed with a primary economic intent and interestingly, have, in the 1990s and 2000s, spilled over into the political and security realm. These are the regional economic communities that are experiencing a revival in the era of liberalization.[32]

7 Subregional communities

Latin America and the Caribbean

The vogue for regional integration can be traced back to the 1960s when, following the pattern of the European Economic Community, developing countries established a number of integration schemes. This regional economic integration was seen as an effective strategy to expand markets and reduce dependence on the protectionist north. Regional integration became an essential component of the south's strategy of "collective self-reliance."

In the "lost decade" of the 1980s when high oil prices, high debt, low commodity prices, world recession, and inefficient economic management caused global south countries to turn inward in order to restructure their economies, the enthusiasm for regionalism waned. In fact, progress in regional integration had already been stymied by, among other things, arguments over the distribution of benefits, technical complexities, by petty nationalisms, inter-state rivalries, and lagging political will.

The impetus for the new and enhanced regionalism was the spread of liberalization in the wake of the end of the cold war. In 1992, the European Community moved toward economic union, and other countries followed suit. Global south countries feared marginalization were they not to adapt to the new trends, and one strategy that promised trade dividends was regionalism. The new regionalism was not inward-looking, but oriented toward strengthening regional economies within the context of global integration.

The formal process of economic integration, which is a focus in this book, follows Bela Belassa's five stages of economic integration: (1) a free trade area is formed focusing on the elimination of internal barriers; (2) a common external tariff is imposed to form a customs union; (3) countries move to establish a common market in which there is free movement of factors of production across borders; (4) this leads to an economic union in which there is harmonization of economic policies; and (5) finally the highest level, total economic integration, occurs when unification of policies and political institutions takes place.[1] At the higher levels, governments usually seek the establishment of a regional community that involves the harmonization of foreign policy, adoption of a common security and defense policy, and establishment of institutions for legal and political coordination.

The descriptions that follow seek to highlight first, the changes and progress being made in the functional and economic spheres, and second, the institutional spillover (if any) into a stronger structure and, in particular, political and security cooperation.

The Latin American Integration Association (*Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración* (ALADI))[2]

Beginning in the 1960s, the Latin American and Caribbean region was in the forefront of global south efforts to integrate regionally. In large part this was attributable to its relative modernization and higher levels of industrialization *vis-à-vis* the other southern regions. For example, by the early 1970s, the majority of Latin Americans lived in urban areas compared to less than a quarter of sub-Saharan Africans.[3] Moreover, during World War II, many Latin American countries had accelerated import substitution industrialization in order to compensate for products which they could not longer obtain from embattled Europe. Latin American strategy was also influenced by Argentine economist Raúl Prébisch, who served as the director of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA; later renamed the Economic Commission for Latin America *and* the Caribbean, ECLAC), and then as the secretary-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Prébisch is credited with developing the "terms of trade" argument that the price structure of international trade discriminates against the primary products exported by developing nations. Both import substitution and regional integration were among his main recommendations as solutions.[4]

The main economic integration arrangement formed in Latin America and encouraged by, but not integrated into, the Organization of American States, was the Latin American Free Trade Area, LAFTA (*Área Latinoamericano de Libre Comercio*, ALALC in Spanish), now known as the ALADI or the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). Although there were continental, that is pan-Latin American, economic aspirations for ALADI, it is considered here to be subregional, both because the pan-American vision morphed into an inter-American one, and because the Central American and the Caribbean states are not full members of the ALADI.

Map 7.1 UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

The LAFTA was formed in 1960 by seven Latin American nations: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia joined between 1961 and 1967. Like all integration movements of the era, LAFTA was profoundly statist and protectionist. The ALALC convention, the Treaty of Montevideo, envisaged a free trade area encompassing most of

Latin America through targeted tariff reductions in 12 years. Most Favored Nation procedures were to be applied among member states, and economic development would be promoted through import substitution industrialization and through harmonized fiscal and other incentives to investment. Importantly, the treaty recognized differences in members' levels of economic development, and so, among provisions called for were temporary measures to ease balance-of-payments problems in the less developed member countries and the provision of technical assistance to these nations.

Between 1960 and 1970, intra-trade in exports within ALALC doubled from a mere $600 million to $1,266 million, according to UNCTAD data, representing a 2 percent increase from 8 percent to 10 percent of total exports (see Table 7.1) But as with many such arrangements, difficulties soon arose and as a result, plans for a common market were continually postponed. Integration negotiations became bogged down in technicalities, and distributional inequities were a cause for complaint as the more developed countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, were perceived as benefiting at the expense of the less developed members. In 1969 the smaller Andean countries decided that they would be better off forming their own subregional group, even though they did not actually leave ALALC until 1978.

At the state level, self-interest and domestic considerations were prioritized over regional cooperation. Almost all Latin American countries adopted economically nationalist policies in the 1960s and 1970s, and were engaged in structural adjustment of their economies during the 1980s. Political systems too were hardly liberal: southern cone countries were under authoritarian rule for most of this period, and the Andean countries for some of it. As well, social unrest, coups, and threats of coups were common in much of Latin America during this time. In foreign policy, Argentina and Brazil were engaged in a competition for power that included military as well as nuclear rivalry. Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia were competing for influence in the Caribbean and in the third world; Argentina and Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru were embroiled in border controversies that sometimes erupted into open conflict. At the societal level, business groups with clientalistic relations with the state favored protectionist policies that preserved their privileges.[5] Global economic changes also hindered progress toward integration: the cold war aggravated regional rivalries and fostered domestic unrest; and in the 1970s the rise in oil prices led members to focus on boosting extraregional trade to gain much-needed revenue, a large part of which went to meet the high debt burden.

Table 7.1 Intra-trade of Latin American and Caribbean groups (in percentage and $US million)

Grouping			*1960*	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*	*2000*	*2005*
ALADI	Percentage	Imports	9.84	11.26	12.18	15.02	13.63	16.81
		Exports	8.21	9.92	13.92	11.56	13.16	13.34
	$US mn	Imports	689.73	1,377.33	10,682.12	13,959.24	48,045.14	78,797.18
		Exports	600.10	1,265.88	11,191.62	13,349.84	44,325.68	71,325.98
MERCOSUR	Percentage	Imports	6.89	9.69	8.27	14.21	19.75	18.92
		Exports	7.59	9.39	11.60	8.86	20.00	12.90
	$US mn	Imports	212.86	496.34	3,327.08	4,505.94	18,343.34	22,140.99
		Exports	190.2	451.4	3,423.7	4,127.1	17,828.7	21,117.7
CAN	Percentage	Imports	1.05	2.75	4.17	6.36	12.94	15.20
		Exports	0.69	1.79	3.79	4.14	8.74	8.23
	$US mn	Imports	23.51	105.90	955.75	1,145.04	5,507.92	10,740.04
		Exports	24.50	96.66	1,160.68	1,311.72	5,299.56	9,453.12
SICA	Percentage	Imports	6.43	24.24	19.58	9.66	12.56	11.24
		Exports	6.98	26.05	24.39	15.26	19.11	18.89
	$US mn	Imports	33.00	299.08	1,160.66	632.38	2,658.59	4,096.42
		Exports	30.90	287.05	1,173.73	667.41	2,586.21	4,063.57
CARICOM	Percentage	Imports	4.19	3.26	9.05	5.82	8.52	8.13
		Exports	3.56	4.14	5.44	8.04	14.60	11.66
	$US mn	Imports	28.80	61.94	558.29	482.07	1,206.54	2,202.56
		Exports	21.41	53.01	599.06	453.33	1,073.56	2,082.05

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of Statistics 2006* (online at www.stats.unctad.org/handbook), Table 4.1, "Intra-trade of regional and trade groups."

On the other hand, improving regional cooperation was also seen as important to boosting overall trade. Therefore in 1980, Latin American countries attempted to revive their integration scheme. Although Brazil and Mexico opposed the creation of an entirely new organization, the majority decided that a major change was indeed necessary. The new Treaty of Montevideo of 1980 (which came into effect in 1981) created the ALADI. The difference between the old treaty and this one was that more flexibility was built into free trade negotiations: multilateral agreements were downgraded to accommodate partial agreements and bilateral and subregional initiatives such as the Andean Pact as well as agreements with third parties such as the Central American and Caribbean countries. This *preferential* trade agreement contained no pre-established quantitative commitments. Moreover, there was more focus on the less developed countries, which were accorded special and differential treatment. LAIA recognized three categories of countries: "most developed" (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), "intermediate" (Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay, later joined by Cuba), and "least developed" (landlocked Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay). The last three enjoy differential tariff reduction arrangements as well as special cooperation programs and countervailing measures. The more developed have the fewest commodity exclusions while allowing more exceptions for their least developed counterparts. In 1989 cooperation was also extended to include a common market in the interchange of goods and services in cultural, educational, and scientific areas.

ALADI/LAIA's 12 members are the same as the ALALC/LAFTA's with the addition of Cuba, which became a full member in 1999. With the progress to ALADI, trade among the members increased from only $11.2 billion to $71.3 billion in 2005. However, because of the growth in extraregional exports, this represented a small decrease in percentage terms, from 13.9 percent of total exports in 1980 to 13.3 percent in 2005 (Table 7.1)

Main institutions of ALADI and spillover assessment

The original ALALC treaty created a Council of Foreign Ministers or other ministers responsible for integration as the highest decision-making and dispute-settlement body meeting annually; a conference of designated delegates meeting annually to evaluate progress in integration; and a Permanent Committee composed of representatives from each country whose task was to organize the council and conference meetings and work with an executive secretary on various administrative and research issues. In 1980 the structure was changed

Box 7.1 Members of Latin American and Caribbean communities

Latin American Integration Association/Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (LAIA/ALADI)

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

- Headquarters: Montevideo, Uruguay.

Web site: www.aladi.org

Southern Common Market/Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR)

Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay.

- Associates: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Andean Community.
- Headquarters: Montevideo, Uruguay.

Web site: www.mercosur.int

Andean Community/Comunidad Andina (ANCOM/CAN)

Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru.

- Associates: Argentina, Brazil, Chile Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Mercosur.
- Observers: Mexico, Panama.
- Headquarters: Lima, Peru.

Web site: www.comunidadandina.org

Central American Integration System/Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA)

Belize, El Salvador,* Honduras,* Nicaragua,* Guatemala,* Costa Rica, Panama.

- Associate state: Dominican Republic.
- Observers: Mexico, Republic of China, Spain.
- Headquarters: El Salvador.

Note: * Original signatory of Central American Common Market 1960. Costa Rica joined in 1962.

Web site: www.sica.int

Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

Antigua and Barbuda, *Bahamas*,* *Barbados*, *Belize*, *Dominica*, *Grenada*, *Guyana*, Haiti,* *Jamaica*, *Montserrat*,** *St Kitts-Nevis*, *Saint Lucia*, *St. Vincent and the Grenadines*, Suriname, *Trinidad and Tobago*.

- Associate members: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands.
- Observers: Aruba, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles,** Puerto Rico, Venezuela.
- Headquarters: Georgetown, Guyana.
- *Italics*: Original members.

* Not a member of the common market.

** Montserrat is a self-governing British colony; the Netherlands Antilles will be dissolved in December 2008 and Sint Maarten and Curaçao will become self-governing states.

Web site: www.caricom.org

so that the conference became the Conference on Evaluation and Convergence composed of ambassadors from all member states, whose task is to evaluate and carry forward the multilateralization process. The Permanent Committee became the Committee of Representatives which meets every 15 days and approves all decisions. The committee also calls the meeting of the council. A general secretariat was established in 1980, headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay. A number of consultative bodies or "auxiliary bodies" assist the committee, including commissions on financial and monetary issues, technical cooperation, transport, labor, and customs. Since the beginning of the hemispheric movement toward free trade in 1994 called the Summit of Americas process, ALADI has provided technical, statistical, and research support for the process. Decisions of the council, conference, and committee, except for amendments and certain technical and budgetary provisions, need a two-thirds majority to be adopted. All members must be present in the case of the first two, and two thirds must be so, in the case of the committee. This sets the bar relatively high, suggesting that members wish to retain control over the integration process.

ALADI does not have political goals; however, one of the non-economic organizations that has a cooperation agreement with ALADI is the independent Latin American Parliament (PARLATINO). The parliament dates back to 1964 when representatives of 13 countries meeting in Lima, Peru, decided to establish a parliament with the aim of promoting Latin American solidarity and integration. The parliament was institutionalized in 1987, relocated to São Paolo, Brazil, in 1992, and now has 22 members—that is, all the members of ALADI, and Aruba, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, and Suriname. The aims of the parliament as stated in its statute are, inter alia, to promote economic and social cooperation, integration, freedom, democracy and human rights, anticolonialism, and universal suffrage.[6] Guiding principles include democracy, nonintervention, self-determination, equality of states, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Members are drawn from the national parliaments (up to 12 for each country) but direct elections are anticipated eventually, and Venezuela introduced direct voting in the 2000s. The parliament meets yearly.

PARLATINO has debated and issued its opinion on a wide range of issues, achieving extraregional attention primarily because of its championship of the Latin American democratization process. As important is the fact that the parliament has made it a priority to assess and facilitate progress toward integration in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet PARLATINO is a weak organization that is not fully integrated into ALADI. As the authors of one study state: "PARLATINO is a symbolic rather than operative body … with no perspectives [*sic*] of becoming a decisional organ. … It lacks both political significance and social rootedness. Its main historical merits have been to constitute a reservoir of democratic aspirations and parliamentary procedures during the dark days of the Latin American dictatorships … "[7]

In sum, the ALADI is a rather loose preferential trading arrangement, and there is little to suggest that it will evolve into a higher form of integration association.

Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur, Mercosur)

Since its founding in 1991, Mercosur (or Mercosul in Brazil) has become the most visible integration arrangement in Latin America. The arrangement covers an area of more than 200 million people and includes Latin America's two largest countries and economies, with Brazil alone being the ninth largest economy in the world, having a gross domestic product of some $1.5 trillion in the 2000s. Mercosur trade constitutes a substantial portion of trade within LAIA—almost

30 percent in 2005, according to UNCTAD figures—and was 31 percent of LAIA's trade with the rest of the world.

For decades, tension had existed among the countries of the southern cone of South America. Brazil and Argentina were rivals, engaged in economic as well as military rivalry; relations between Chile and Argentina were traditionally cool, not least because of a serious conflict over ownership of islands in the Beagle Channel; and Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina argued over a hydroelectric dam on the Paraná river at the border. The last was settled in 1979, and in the 1980s relations between Brazil and Argentina warmed considerably. This rapprochement was certainly facilitated by the democratic opening in both countries as military rule gave way to democratization in 1983 in Argentina and 1985 in Brazil. Along with political liberalization came economic liberalization that accelerated in the 1990s. The creation of Mercosur was also a response to proposals for hemispheric free trade first put forward by the United States in its Enterprise for the Americas Initiative in 1990.

In 1980 and 1985 Brazil and Argentina agreed on nuclear nonproliferation and related safeguards. In 1990 and 1991 they pledged their commitment to use their nuclear potential solely for peaceful purposes, and established a mechanism for onsite inspections and accounting of nuclear materials.[8] Brazil, Argentina, and Chile joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco denuclearizing the hemisphere in 1994, and Argentina joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, followed by Brazil in 1997. Apace with these nuclear agreements, the two countries signed economic cooperation agreements: in 1986, they signed the Brazil–Argentina Program of Integration and Economic Cooperation, and in 1988 a Treaty of Integration, Cooperation, and Development establishing a free trade area and common market within 10 years. In 1990 the date for establishment of the common market was moved forward to 31 December 1990. The process expanded as Paraguay and Uruguay, closely linked geographically and economically to Argentina and Brazil, decided to adhere to the arrangement as well. Finally, in 1991 the Southern Common Market Treaty (termed the Treaty of Asunción) was signed, calling for creation of a customs union with a common external tariff, the adoption of a common trade policy in relation to third states or groups of states, and the coordination of positions in regional and international economic and commercial forums. Tariffs were to be reduced progressively from 47 percent in the first year to 100 percent by 31 December 1994, with reduction on some sensitive products prolonged to December 1995. An upper limit of 20 percent was placed on goods coming in from outside (that is to say, the common external tariff [CET] varied from 0 percent to 20 percent). The CET has been adjusted periodically, including increases between 1998 and 2003.

Chile became an associate member of Mercosur in 1996. While agreeing to intraregional arrangements, Chile did not wish to be bound by any external tariff *vis-à-vis* third parties. Although Chile began to negotiate full entry in 2000, talks were suspended after they opted to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States. Countries choosing to become associate members were Bolivia (in 1997), Peru (in 2003; in 2007 Peru created some tension by signing a trade agreement with the United States), and Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela (in 2004). In 2006, Venezuela was accepted as a full member and in 2007 Bolivia began to pursue full membership as well.

Main institutions of Mercosur and spillover assessment

Mercosur members sought initially to maintain a lean and unambitious institutional base, focused on the immediate economic task. However, as time went on, the organization was strengthened to meet new institutional needs. The Treaty of Asunción established the Common Market Council (CMC) composed of foreign and economic ministers as the highest decision-making body which would meet annually. Another body, the Common Market Group (CMG), was to be composed of four representatives and four alternates from the member foreign and economic ministries and the central banks, meeting when necessary. It would serve as the executive organ responsible for monitoring and implementing decisions under the direction of the ministers of foreign affairs. Issue-based subgroups, working groups, and “specialized meetings” were subsumed within the CMG. Decisions of Mercosur bodies were to be taken by consensus, with all parties present. Lastly, a secretariat was established in Montevideo, Uruguay. This Mercosur structure was formalized by the 1994 Protocol of Ouro Preto, when to the CMC, the CMG, and the secretariat were added the Mercosur Trade Commission (MTC), the Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC, anticipated in the Treaty of Asunción), and the Economic-Social Consultative Forum (ESCF). The Trade Commission, with a similar composition as the CMG, handles technical trade matters and reports on tariff issues to the CMG. It is also charged with resolving disputes related to the integration process. The JPC and ESCF are consultative and advisory groups, the first composed of representatives of the national parliaments, and the second comprising business and civil society representatives.

The creation of the JPC in particular could be seen as indicative of a move by Mercosur toward a higher level of integration, albeit not supranationalism. The JPC was mandated with the capacity to keep track of and promote the domestic legislative aspects of the regional process. In the adoption of its internal procedures, which became effective in 2000, its role was clarified to include broad powers to gather information, do research, offer recommendations, elaborate legislative policy, reach out to parliaments of third parties connected to Mercosur, and establish relations and cooperative agreements with national, regional, international, and supranational public and private organizations. The commission has seen itself as playing a vital role as a forum for the discussion and harmonization of interest among the various actors involved in the process of integration.[9] The commission is composed of up to 16 legislators from both the senates and congresses of each member country, and meets in plenary at least twice a year. Member states decide how to elect each delegation and for how long, although a term of no less than two years is suggested for the sake of continuity. The presidency of the JPC is rotated among member states every six months. The JPC can only meet and decisions can only be made when all delegates are present. There are nine ad hoc subcommissions working on different issues and a permanent administrative secretary is rotated every two years and based at Mercosur headquarters. However, with the proposed establishment of a Mercosur parliament, described later, the JPC will eventually cease to function.

In similar vein, Mercosur members have publicly adhered to the neofunctionalist concept that economic integration should also generate "a common political space" that is above national politics.[10] Since the organization was created in the climate of democracy of the 1990s, it is not surprising that democratic norms should be institutionalized. In 1998, the four core states as well as Bolivia and Chile signed the Protocol of Ushuaia on Democracy, rejecting unconstitutional changes of government as contrary to the progress of regional integration (the other associated states joined by 2007). They also agreed that the Mercosur area should be a zone of peace, free from nuclear activities, and dedicated to cooperation and consultation on issues of security and defense. In this context, a Forum of Consultation and Cooperation, composed of high-level foreign ministry representatives was created as an organ within the council.

In the 2000s, Mercosur moved to revitalize the movement toward a common market, which had slowed as a result of successive economic crises. Several important new institutions were created. In 2003, the Commission of Permanent Representatives was created within the council, composed of representatives from each member state and led by an eminent political personage (so far one ex-president and one former vice-president of Argentina). The commission provides for a permanent political presence and is mandated to assist the council and presidency, to present initiatives, and strengthen relations with the parliament and the economic and social forum. Another important change was the establishment in 2004 by the Protocol of Olivos signed in 2002, of a five-judge permanent tribunal called the Revision Tribunal to settle disputes. The tribunal handles cases of procedural review, special or urgent measures, and other controversies, and also gives pertinent advisory opinions. Before this, such matters were handled by the MTC, the CMG, and by ad hoc tribunals. In addition, Mercosur members created a Center for the Promotion of Law to analyze and strengthen democratic governance and law in the subregion. In the consultative arena, in 2004, a Consultative Forum of Municipalities, Federal States, Provinces, and Departments was formed as an organ within the council, in effect elevating a group that was one of many "specialized meetings" subsumed within the CMG. In addition, the Meeting of High Authorities on Human Rights was formed (coming into effect in 2005, replacing a previous ad hoc body) as another organ within the council, and its meetings were supervised by the Forum on Consultation. This body has since been debating a Charter on Human Rights in Mercosur.

In 2005, Mercosur presidents agreed to create a parliament that would replace the Joint Parliamentary Commission. The parliament, which was launched in December 2006, is a unicameral body with a similar mandate as the JPC but also a mandate to promote democracy and human rights The constitution calls for representation of 18 parliamentarians from each country, chosen by the national congresses through 2010, but to be directly elected by 2014.

In 2006 and 2007, Mercosur leaders also signed on to the establishment of a regional development bank, the Bank of the South, a project initiated by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez as a way to counter the region's dependence on the Washington-based international financial institutions. Differences surfaced between principals Venezuela and Brazil over the scope and funding of the bank,[11] but in December 2007 the bank was officially launched after Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay had joined Brazil and Venezuela in agreeing to participate.

Mercosur has clearly been trying to move beyond limited technical arrangements—which themselves have not been completely successful—toward closer policy and political integration. However, it should be noted that both the parliament and the consultative forum have advisory powers only, and that the requirement that decisions in Mercosur be adopted by consensus means that the state members continue to retain control of all policymaking.

Community of Andean Nations (Communidad Andina, CAN)

That the smaller Andean countries should seek to form their own grouping was not surprising, given the distributional imbalances within LAFTA as well as the economic and cultural commonalities among the Andean countries. The Andean countries felt that as a group they could accelerate the process of integration faster than allowed by LAFTA mechanisms. In 1969 therefore, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru negotiated the Cartagena agreement (officially, the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, also known as the Andean Pact), establishing a free trade area among themselves. Venezuela was somewhat ambivalent about joining but eventually joined in 1973. Despite initial concerns, LAFTA granted its approval for the formation of the Andean group and the members remained subject to LAFTA's customs regulations.

The agreement by which the free trade area was established sought to "promote the balanced and harmonious development of the member countries under equitable conditions, through integration and economic and social cooperation; to accelerate their growth and the rate of creation of employment; and to facilitate their participation in the regional integration process, looking ahead toward the gradual formation of a Latin American Common Market" (article 1). The emphasis was thus on both equity and development, with special attention paid to the distribution of benefits and also to the problems stemming from Bolivia's landlocked status. Bolivia as well as Ecuador were placed under a special regime that included favorable tariff treatment, industrial incentives, and financial and technical assistance. A customs union was envisaged within 10 years. As with most integration arrangements of the 1960s, industrial development by way of import substitution was prioritized, and foreign investment was to be sought for this purpose.

Between 1969 and 1973, however, the Andean Group assumed a more nationalistic stance, influenced both by third world initiatives and by political commonality among at least some of the leaders. The socialist government of Salvador Allende had taken power constitutionally in Chile in 1970; Ecuador was under the reformist authoritarian rule of Juan José Velasco Ibarra between 1968 and 1972; Peru was under the leftwing military rule of Juan Velasco Alvarado (in power from 1968 to 1975); Colombia was led by the modernizing

Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–74); and Bolivia by leftwing Generals Ovanda and Torres (although Torres was replaced by the conservative dictator Hugo Banzer in 1971). Thus in 1970 the Andean Group became the first regional integration movement to incorporate a code restricting foreign investment to nonreserved sectors and establishing 51 percent local ownership and control of such investment. Venezuela, then under the moderate Rafael Caldera, also joined the pact at that time, the government having overcome some domestic concerns. But political turnover in member countries soon resulted in a rise in internal tension as well as opposition to the pact's foreign investment code, which was revised several times and eventually abandoned in 1987. Before that, however, with the coup of Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1973 and Chile's subsequent adoption of a more open development model, Chile withdrew from the Andean Group in 1976. By that time, there had nevertheless been some progress toward a common market as internal tariffs were reduced, and a minimum external tariff was adopted by Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Between 1970 and 1980, UNCTAD figures show an increase in Andean intraregional exports from $97 million to $1.2 billion (Table 7.1).

However, like many similar arrangements, the Andean common market suffered as a result of the economic deterioration attributable mainly to the oil price rises of the 1970s. There was a serous imbalance between the oil producing members Venezuela and Ecuador, and the other members of the group. Perhaps more importantly, the inward-looking import substitution strategy and nationalistic economic strategies were reaching their limit. Moreover, democratization began to occur in the Andean countries and more liberal economic policies began to be adopted as well. In 1987 the Andean countries tried to adapt to changing circumstances by passing the Quito Protocol allowing for greater flexibility in the application of common market regulations. At the same time the Andean group left the LAIA umbrella. Trade remained stagnant, however.

In the 1990s the Andean common market took steps to revitalize the free trade movement in line with the outward-looking strategies of the post–cold war period. In 1991, members recommitted themselves by the Act of Barahona to establishing a free trade zone by 1 January 1992, and to the imposition of a common external tariff set at between 5 and 20 percent. Free trade was finally achieved in 1993 and the CET was established in 1995. Peru, which had temporarily suspended its obligations in 1992, was permitted a separate bilaterally negotiated regime, and it completed tariff reductions in January 2006. In 1996, the Cartagena Agreement was amended by the Protocol of Trujillo which created a network of agencies forming the Andean Community and Integration System or the *Communidad Andina*, CAN (see "Institutions," below). In 1997, the Protocol of Sucre was adopted (coming into effect in 2003) by which some mandates were added with regard to foreign relations and the promotion of trade in services. Countries that signed free trade treaties with the community were accepted as members at that time.

Venezuela withdrew from the Andean Common Market in 2006 in opposition to Colombia's and Peru's signing free trade agreements with the United States. According to the rules, Venezuela has to keep preferential trade arrangements in place for five years and a Memorandum of Understanding to that effect was signed in mid-2006. CAN was left with four members: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. On the other hand, Chile, which had remained an observer, rejoined the Andean group as an associate member in 2006 and there were indications that it might rejoin fully. Also in 2006 the CAN accepted Mercosur (the group) as an associate member.

Main institutions of CAN and spillover assessment

The initial Andean Pact created only a commission of ambassadorial representatives as the main decision-making organ, meeting three times a year and vested with dispute settlement functions, and a board charged with technical matters, preparing relevant proposals and participating in meetings of the commission, and acting as an administrative secretariat. In addition there were consultative councils of business and labor groups whose representatives were elected by the various national bodies. Financing was primarily provided by the Andean Development Corporation (CAF in Spanish) established in 1968, as well as the Andean Reserve Fund to be used for balance-of-payments purposes.

Significant institutional changes occurred in 1979, primarily signaling spillover to the political plane. First, the group established a Court of Justice which became effective in 1983. The court, which was incorporated into the organization as the body's judicial organ by the Quito Protocol and is headquartered in Quito, is composed of one judge from each country appointed from slates of three candidates each, submitted by each member country. The court therefore took over the commission's dispute settlement functions and also was granted strong powers of interpretation and nullification of decisions. Second, the Andean parliament was constituted—based in Bogotá—with powers to facilitate relevant domestic legislation as well as to review and recommend policies. However, like other parliaments, representatives were to be drawn from the national parliaments. Yet a third innovation was the introduction of a Council of Foreign Ministers whose mandate was to formulate a collective foreign policy for the community. This council was not, however, formally incorporated into the Andean Community until a fresh reorganization of the 1990s.

The Protocol of Trujillo of 1996 was an attempt to modernize the institutional structure to meet the demands of the changing global environment. The CAN was formally constituted around a network of agencies called the Andean Integration System. At the top of the decision-making system is the Presidential Council, created in 1990, that is, the heads of states meeting once a year to discuss and develop relevant policies. Decisions are taken by consensus. At the second level is the Council of Foreign Ministers, which meets twice a year to coordinate and implement external and subregional integration policy. Except for amendments and certain technical issues that require that no negative vote be cast, this council's decisions are adopted by an absolute majority. The commission remains responsible for all technical issues, sharing some functions with the foreign ministers' council. A general secretariat was introduced with powers to manage the integration process and offer proposals and suggestions to the councils and commission. The court and parliament make up the other main organs. The court was strengthened in 1996 by the Protocol of Cochabamba, which gave it powers of internal arbitration as well as the power to interpret the norms of the community. Likewise, the treaty establishing the parliament was amended in 1997 to include provisions for direct election of parliamentary representatives—five with two alternates each—within five years. As of 2006, Venezuela (before it withdrew), Ecuador, and Peru had introduced direct elections. Finally, in the financial arena, in 1988 (with effect from 1991) the Andean Reserve Fund became the wider Latin American Reserve Fund that drew on contributions from non-Andean countries as well. In addition the CAF continued to expand in membership beyond the original Andean zone.[12]

In 1997, by the Protocol of Sucre the presidents mandated the foreign ministers to develop a common foreign policy. The result was the adoption in 1999 of guidelines for collective action based on respect for international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, democracy and social justice, defense of human rights, and the promotion of solidarity, economic, and social development and integration among Andean countries. Multidimensional cooperation was to be promoted in political, economic, and social areas including extraregional relations, democracy and human rights, broad areas of security, sustainable development and various economic areas, intellectual property, social development and the preservation of the cultural heritage.[13] The task of implementing foreign policy cooperation is given to the member foreign ministries as well as the Andean embassies and missions in North America and Europe.

Between 1998 and 2000, Andean governments signed the Andean Commitment to Democracy, an additional protocol to the Cartagena agreement, declaring their commitment to strengthening democracy as a fundamental condition for the success of integration. In case of a disruption of the democratic order in a member country, that country can be suspended from participation in the Andean system and its related projects and facilities. In addition, in 2004 the Andean countries adopted guidelines for an external security policy that (re)commits them to, among other things, preservation of the rule of law and democracy, the promotion and protection of human rights, the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, observance of the collective security provisions of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, strengthening integration, and banning weapons of mass destruction.[14] In 2002, Mercosur and Andean countries joined with Chile, Guyana, and Suriname to declare South America to be a zone of peace and cooperation where nuclear, chemical, biological and toxic weapons activities are banned and countries commit themselves to peaceful dispute settlement and other confidence building measures.[15] In 2004, the Andean Community created its own peace zone with similar aims.[16] Like some other regional arrangements, the Andean countries have also adopted a Charter for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, recognizing both civil and economic and social rights including the right to development and the right to a safe environment, and extending protections to a wide variety of groups, including women, migrants, refugees, disabled persons and, of particular interest for Andean countries, indigenous groups. No human rights court has been established but ombudsmen in each member state are charged with monitoring progress.[17]

While business and labor groups have held advisory status with the Andean organization since the 1970s, the CAN has opened up more to civil society in the 2000s, inviting consultation from nongovernmental organizations and, in particular, indigenous groups. In addition, the Andean focus on social development is a strong current throughout much of its documentation and work, and an Integrated Social Development Program was approved in 2004 to address poverty, inequality, and social exclusion in the region.

Despite the preservation of consensual decision making, CAN is probably the most advanced integration movement in the region, at least on paper. Free trade and a common external tariff were achieved in a timely fashion. CAN's commitment to a higher level of integration is reflected in the institution of democratic norms, approval of guidelines on a common foreign and security policy, and the establishment of a court with relatively strong powers and a parliament that is, partially, directly elected.

Central American Integration System (*Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana*, SICA)

The oldest Latin American integration association was the Central American Common Market (CACM), signed into being in 1960. This regional movement was established on the basis of strong historical and cultural commonality among the small states of Central America, even though this proved to be no guarantee of success. Under Spanish rule, these states had formed part of one of the eight captaincies-general of Spain. In 1824 they formed a loose federal state called the Central American Union or Federation but the federation collapsed 14 years later, primarily because each state was bent on promoting its own identity and independence. In their more recent history, in 1951 the countries formed the Organization of Central American States (*Organización de Estados Centroamericanos*, ODECA), an organization dedicated to peaceful dispute settlement, economic integration, and social, cultural, legal, and political cooperation within the region. ODECA, which Panama joined in 1965, was strengthened institutionally in 1962 but never became an effective organization. It was unable to resolve various intraregional disputes, including major conflict between El Salvador and Honduras (discussed later), and became moribund during the Central American conflicts of the 1970s.[18]

However, as happened elsewhere in Latin America, the interwar period of the twentieth century cut Central America off from its export markets, prompting the initiation of industrialization using a model of import substitution The creation of the CACM, preceded by the negotiation of several treaties on free trade, tariff equalization, and industrial integration, was a response to the need to invest in manufacturing, expand the local market, and counter protectionism in the north. The CACM came into effect in 1961 for Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; in 1962 for Honduras; and in 1963 for Costa Rica.

The CACM was one of the more successful integration attempts in the early stages. According to UNCTAD statistics, trade among the members jumped from 7 percent of total exports in 1960 to 26 percent in 1970 (Table 7.1). By 1967, 95 percent of all goods traded within the region had attained duty-free status and 90 percent of traded goods were covered by the common external tariff.[19] However, like many other integration arrangements, the CACM soon suffered as a result of distributive arguments among what were essentially competitive economies. Costa Rica and Guatemala were clear beneficiaries of integration whereas poorer Honduras perceived little gain. In 1969 the "Football War," itself a reflection of these distributional problems, hastened the collapse of the arrangement. Ostensibly, the war between Honduras and El Salvador was fought over the outcome of the Central American soccer playoffs; however, the game was simply the catalyst triggered by frustrations felt by Honduras, the least advanced partner in the CACM, about labor immigration from smaller El Salvador. During the World Cup playoffs, the Salvadoran supporters complained of ill treatment in Honduras when their national team lost. In turn, when Hondurans visited El Salvador for the next game, in which the Honduran team lost, they were subjected to insults and indignities. What started out as a football brawl developed into a violent encounter between Hondurans and Salvadorans living in Honduras, with both governments then breaking off diplomatic relations. Full-scale war ensued, lasting four days. Diplomatic relations between the countries were not restored until the conflict was officially settled in 1980. But by then, the CACM had basically collapsed, first because Honduras withdrew from its CACM responsibilities as well as from ODECA after the war, and second, because of pressure from oil price rises that heightened unilateralist policies. During the next decade, Central America, like most of Latin America, was mired in debt and focused on economic adjustment. Moreover, since the countries in the region had long suffered from an exceptionally skewed distribution of wealth ignored by political oligarchies, it was only a matter of time before latent civil tension manifested itself in antigovernment activity, in this case Marxist-oriented. The subsequent rise of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua was countered by US intervention in the form of support for conservative guerrilla movements, and refugee pressures brought Honduras, Costa Rica, and neighboring Belize as well as Mexico into this cold war conflict.

The end of the cold war finally brought some stability to Central America. The Sandinistas lost power in 1990, and with UN help, guerrilla factions in El Salvador and Guatemala as well as Nicaragua gradually gave up their arms. In 1991, the presidents of the five republics joined by Panama met in Honduras and signed the Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of Central American States of 1962 (or

Protocol of Tegucigalpa) creating the Central American Integration System (in Spanish, *Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana*, SICA) as an umbrella grouping for all integration efforts. Then in 1993, the presidents signed the Central American Economic Integration Protocol (or Protocol to the General Treaty on Central American Integration of 1960, also known as the Protocol of Guatemala) calling for creation of a customs union and for eventual monetary union.

Main institutions of SICA and spillover assessment

The SICA network is the successor to both ODECA and the CACM. ODECA's organs consisted of the presidents meeting occasionally as the supreme organ, the meeting of ministers of external affairs as the main organ meeting every two years, the meeting of ministers of other divisions held when necessary, a Central American Office in San Salvador as the secretariat headed by a secretary-general appointed by the foreign ministers, an Economic Council that met at least once a year, and various subsidiary organs.[20] By the 1962 revision, ODECA's structure was expanded considerably: the occasional meeting of presidents became the regularized Meeting of Heads of State, and the meeting of foreign ministers became the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. A Cultural and Educational Council established in 1955 was incorporated into the structure and an Executive Council was created as a permanent organ. Also added were a Legislative Council, a Defense Council, and a new Court of Justice (a previous court established in 1907 having been dissolved by design in 1917). Subsidiary organs included councils on labor and social welfare, tourism, and public health.

The General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration of 1960 committed the members to form a common market and customs union in five years. Financial coordination was to be handled by a new bank, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE). The integration organs included a Central American Economic Council composed of the Ministers of Economic Affairs as a coordinating body, and an Executive Council composed of representatives from all the member states, charged with putting ministerial decisions into practice. In addition, a permanent secretariat (SIECA, *Secretaria de Integración Económica Centroamericana*) was established, headquartered in Guatemala. The economic and executive councils were given powers to help resolve disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty, and unresolved issues would be submitted to arbitration. The treaty, which prioritized industrial integration, was expected to last at least 20 years.

As already noted, the revival of Central American integration in the 1990s was highlighted by the adoption of the protocols of Tegucigalpa and Guatemala. The Guatemala Protocol reiterated support for economic integration, calling for progress toward free trade; the establishment of a customs union; free movement of labor and capital; progressive financial and monetary union; harmonized policies in agriculture, industry, and business sectors; and cooperation in various areas, including the environment, human resources, and science and technology. In view of existing developmental imbalances, Nicaragua was granted special financial and commercial treatment. As in the 1960s, a separate institutional structure for the economic subsystem was established: the annual meeting of presidents replaced the Economic Council as the highest body; the council and the executive committee were retained, becoming the Council of Ministers of Economic Integration and the Executive Committee of Economic Integration respectively. Added were an Intersectoral Ministerial Council, composed of ministers with various portfolios, and a Sectoral Council of Economic Ministers. As before, the Central American Bank continued (and continues) to play a key role as the principal financing mechanism for member states, and like similar banks, along with the traditional financing for more infrastructural projects, in the 1990s the bank moved to provide funding for more private sector initiatives, including export promotion and energy and tourism development.[21] With the renewed thrust toward economic integration, steady progress followed, and by 2007 a tariff structure was in effect ranging from 0 percent for capital goods as well as primary products produced outside the region to 15 percent for finished products. Moreover, with respect to the adoption of a common external tariff, 94.6 percent of products had been harmonized.

The creation of the integrated SICA by the Protocol of Tegucigalpa was an important institutional step for Central American integration. With Latin American governments now embracing democracy, the Protocol of Tegucigalpa stressed members' commitment to creating a region of "peace, liberty, democracy and development" (article 3), reflected in the members' respect for human rights, free elections, democratic participation of all social sectors, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for international organizational norms, and commitment to poverty eradication and sustainable development.

SICA's highest body is the Summit of the Presidents that meets at least twice a year and defines and directs Central American policy, harmonizes external relations, strengthens regional identity, handles reforms, and admits new members. A vice-presidents' meeting also convenes twice a year to assist the presidents. The Council of Ministers is composed of ministers representing different portfolios, and of these the ministers of foreign relations are key, in their role as the coordinating body responsible for security, democratization, and political issues. The economic affairs ministers are also important, responsible for carrying out economic integration policies. Decisions of the councils are adopted by consensus. The Executive Committee oversees the day-to-day implementation of decisions and ensures their efficient implementation. The General Secretariat (now called SG-SICA) headquartered in San Salvador, incorporates SIECA as well as social, educational, and environmental agencies and other specialized staffs.

An important focus of Central American states has been the development of mechanisms to bring nonstate actors into the SICA's decision making. In the Declaration of Nicaragua of 1997, Central America's presidents and Belize's prime minister spoke of SICA as a step toward a Central American Union in which "broad sectors of our people participate, whose opinion will be consulted and taken into account in order to support the development of an integrationist culture solidly rooted in the region's civil society."[22] While this goal was clearly idealistic, the Tegucigalpa Protocol established a mechanism for consultation through a consultative committee (called CC-SICA, formed in 1996) composed of civil society representatives. CC-SICA sees itself as an independent and autonomous organ aimed at strengthening integration, development,and democracy in the region. The committee's role is, however, advisory only. Similarly, in 2005 a committee of regional private sector organizations was created to play an advisory role *vis-à-vis* SIECA.

Another advisory organ is the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) whose creation dates back to the peace initiatives of the Contadora group—Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia supported also by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru—during the civil crises in the region in the 1980s. After a peace accord (called Esquipulas II) was signed, calling for democratization and reconciliation, a treaty was also drawn up establishing a parliament to be composed of directly elected party delegates from the member states. The parliament came into being in 1991 in Guatemala City. However, Costa Rica chose not to join and has been skeptical ever since about the value of the parliament, citing, among other things, its cost, the immunity granted by the fact that former presidents and vice-presidents are seated, and weaknesses inherent in seating political parties rather than national parliamentary delegates.[23] On the other hand, Panama joined the parliament in 1993, and the Dominican Republic was granted "special observer" status in 1998, a status that allows it to send a full number of delegates. The permanent observers are Puerto Rico, Mexico, and Taiwan which, until Costa Rica opted in 2007 to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, had long maintained its ties to all the Central American states. On paper at least, PARLACEN has fairly extensive functions: in addition to being a deliberative forum promoting broad cooperation among the member states, proposing treaties and agreements to be negotiated by the countries, and working to promote security, democracy, and respect for international law, the parliament is given the power to appoint and remove the highest bureaucratic representatives of the organs of SICA.

Finally, another core institution of SICA is the Central American Court of Justice (CCJ) located in Managua and incorporated into SICA by the Protocol of Tegucigalpa. The statute of the court was signed by the Central American states as well as Panama in 1992 but has been ratified only by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Not only is the court empowered to hear disputes among the member states and (importantly) between individuals and the member states, in particular problems arising from the integration process, but it is also mandated to act as a permanent consultative tribunal for all the region's supreme courts, it interprets the rules of the integration agreements both for member states and as an organ of consultation for SICA agencies, hears administrative appeals, and does comparative studies to ensure the harmonization of internal and regional legislation (article 22 of the statute of the court). The court has, however, been underutilized and there is some argument as to its authority at the national level.[24] After 2003, a more acceptable and quicker process of settling trade disputes was adopted. Now states have to make every effort to settle their disputes by bilateral diplomacy or with the help of third parties, after which they can submit their dispute to the Council of Ministers of Economic Integration if need be. If the council, with the assistance of experts, cannot resolve the matter, the issue will be taken to binding arbitration.

In addition to the SICA agencies, the spillover (or such intent) of Central American integration can also be seen in some key social as well as political agreements. Two of these were signed in 1995 by Panama and the other states: the Treaty of Central American Social Integration, and the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America. The first, building on a 1994 presidential declaration (with Belize's participation) adopting various economic, ecological, and cultural principles of sustainable development,[25] reiterated the members' support for democracy, nondiscrimination, respect for the environment, and the promotion of health, education, and cultural diversity, and established an institutional subsystem comprising two social councils, a secretariat, existing social agencies, and the development bank falling under SICA. A consultative committee composed of representatives from various social sectors was also established, linked with CC-SICA mentioned above.

The second treaty, acceded to by Belize in 2003, established a "security model" based, among other things, on principles of equal sovereignty, peaceful settlement, renunciation of the use of force, self-determination, collective security and indivisibility. The treaty had the specific aims of establishing an early warning system to prevent security threats, a reasonable balance between military and public security forces, a Central American Mechanism for Security Information and Communication, and measures to promote border settlement, law enforcement, and protection of the region's territorial, cultural, and ecological heritage (articles 26 and 27 of the treaty). Various aspects of human security were specifically endorsed. A decision-making structure was established, consisting of the summit of presidents, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and an implementation-oriented Security Commission composed of vice-ministers of foreign affairs or defense representatives.[26]

Like the CAN, the SICA has put in place a number of political institutions that suggest a movement toward a deeper form of integration. The court has been given expanded powers, the parliament is not drawn from the national legislatures, and some measures have been put in place to incorporate social actors. In practice, however, the court has been bypassed and the parliament has been critiqued as costly and ineffective. As elsewhere too, states have also clearly maintained control over the integration process by requiring that decisions be made by consensus.

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

Formed in 1965 as the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) and consolidated in 1968, this integration arrangement links together Suriname, Haiti, and all the English-speaking Caribbean countries, including Montserrat which is still an internally governed British colony. The small states of the West Indies were originally pushed into a federation by the colonial power, Great Britain, but the federation lasted only from 1958 to 1962 before collapsing amid arguments about the distribution of powers, finances, and institutions. As the Caribbean states moved on to independence, they sought to unite economically even as they eschewed further attempts at political integration. The result was a free trade arrangement formed on the initiative of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Guyana, the last of which had not been a member of the federation. In 1968, most of the remaining eastern Caribbean states, which at the time were British Associated States, joined the arrangement, and Belize joined in 1971.

Like the Central American Common Market, CARIFTA brought about immediate improvement in intraregional trade, as exports rose from 4 percent of the total in 1970 to 7 percent in the early 1970s. In 1973 the members agreed to form a common market and community (CARICOM), but already distributional differences were generating tension between the larger, more developed countries Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana, and the smaller states of the eastern Caribbean. The oil price increases of the 1970s aggravated these inequities inasmuch as oil producing Trinidad and Tobago was the only country to benefit, becoming in fact a major aid donor to the rest of the region. As countries tried to close their widening balance-of-payments gaps by trading outside the region, intraregional trade suffered. Moreover, in the 1970s the region experienced ideological polarization as some countries—specifically Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada—experimented with socialism whereas the eastern Caribbean states adopted very conservative policies. The overthrow of the autocratic Grenadian leader Eric Gairy in 1979, followed by the institution of a revolutionary socialist regime, was particularly polarizing because in a region known for relatively strong democracies, most countries opted not to recognize the Grenadian regime. As a result of all these difficulties, no heads of government summit, the highest decision-making body of Caricom, could be held between 1975 and 1982. By 1980 intraregional trade had declined to 4 percent of total exports. Implementation of a common external tariff, originally scheduled for 1981, was postponed indefinitely.

In 1982, CARICOM states tried to revive the integration movement and the heads of government agreed to work within the framework of ideological pluralism. However, in 1983 the United States, backed by most CARICOM states, invaded Grenada in the wake of a violent internal coup by a faction of the ruling regime. Because the Bahamas (which had joined the community but not the common market), Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago opposed the intervention, the region again became polarized and integration took a back seat once more. Finally in 1984, member states agreed to make yet another attempt to revitalize the movement. A few tentative steps followed, and between 1987 and 1992 the heads of government agreed to remove remaining tariff barriers, establish a common external tariff, create a regional stock exchange, and ease restrictions on regional labor mobility. This accelerated revitalization was made urgent by the approaching formation of the Single Economic Market in Europe as well as the end of the cold war and heightened globalization. Caricom thus moved both to deepen and widen integration, adding new institutions and accepting its first non–English speaking member, Suriname, in 1995. The second such member, Haiti, was accepted in 1997 after it had experienced its first peaceful change of government in 1996, but arrangements for its accession to CARICOM were not completed until 2002.

Main institutions of CARICOM and spillover assessment

The Treaty of Chaguaramas that established CARICOM contained two parts: provisions for a common market, and separate provisions for a community, the latter based on functional cooperation as well as on the harmonization of members' foreign policies. The main decision-making and dispute-settlement organ of the community was the heads of government annual conference. Various councils of ministers (health, education, labor, foreign affairs, finance, agriculture, and mines were specifically noted) were to make decisions and recommendations in their specific issue areas. Decisions in all the main institutions needed unanimous approval. Associated institutions included (among others) the regional universities of the West Indies and Guyana, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) established in 1969, and the Eastern Caribbean Secretariat and Common Market. The last is an integration movement and community embracing the smaller islands of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines, islands that are closely integrated economically, including sharing a common currency.[27] Finally a community secretariat (called the Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat) was headquartered in Guyana.

A separate treaty that became annex 1 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas was devoted to the common market. Here the main organ was the Common Market Council composed of relevant ministers. The council's role was to "ensure the efficient operation and development of the Common Market including the settlement of problems arising out of its functioning" (article 7). In settling problems, the council could make use of an ad hoc arbitration tribunal.[28]

The common market treaty contained several provisions intended to address inequities between the more and less developed states. Less developed members (LDCs) would phase in tariff reductions and adhere to more flexible provisions on the rules of origin; fiscal incentives would be harmonized in such a way as to favor agriculture and tourism in the LDCs; industrial cooperation would be done with an eye to the equitable distribution of benefits to the LDCs; and the more developed countries would cooperate with the LDCs financially and in technology and research.[29]

The Treaty of Chaguaramas specifically set aside the issue of labor mobility, normally an integral part of the movement toward a community. Article 38 noted that "Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as requiring, or imposing any obligation on, a Member State to grant freedom of movement to persons into its territory whether or not such persons are nationals of other Member States of the Common Market." Moreover, the treaty did not anticipate any higher political cooperation short of some coordination of foreign policies. However, in the changed environment of the 2000s, CARICOM countries made significant strides in facilitating labor mobility as part of the move toward a single market and economy. In the political sphere, they also established a regional implementation agency for crime and security that provides for regular coordination and intelligence sharing among various security agencies.

In 2001, a revised treaty was adopted, incorporating earlier additional protocols and reflecting the community's intent to move to the single market. The revised treaty promoted market-driven development and reflected the new global foci through support for microfinance, for development of the services sector, environmental protection and sustainable tourism, and protection of intellectual property rights. Institutionally, the Conference of Heads of Government became the supreme authority in both the economic and community spheres, and the Common Market Council was renamed the Council of Ministers charged with strategic planning and the overall coordination of integration initiatives. A proposal in favor of the establishment of a European Union-type executive commission had been mooted by an advisory commission established to look into CARICOM's revitalization, but the heads of government preferred instead to establish a bureau composed of the past, current, and future chairs, as a body intended to ensure that conference decisions are implemented and updated in a timely fashion. In addition to the conference and the council, four other ministerial councils were designated to assist the principal organs: the Council for Finance and Planning; the Council for Trade and Economic Development; the Council for Foreign and Community Relations, and the Council for Human and Social Development. These are all assisted by three committees: the legal affairs, budget, and central bank governors' committees. A number of region-wide institutions dealing with, among other things, health, disaster management, agricultural research, and meteorology, as well as a Caribbean Parliamentary

Assembly, also now form part of the community. The assembly was established in 1994 and is an advisory deliberative body composed of representatives elected or selected from the national parliaments. Finally, the CDB, the universities, and the Eastern Caribbean Secretariat are associated institutions. The Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat became the Community Secretariat.

The revised treaty elaborated a new mechanism for settlement of disputes that concern the interpretation and application of the treaty, one patterned along the lines of the World Trade Organization's mechanism. Disputes are to be settled by diplomatic negotiations and other peaceful settlement procedures but if not resolved, can be referred to arbitration or compulsory judicial settlement. For the last purpose, the Caribbean constituted a Court of Justice, located in Trinidad and Tobago, with both original jurisdiction on regional matters and appeal jurisdiction as a final court replacing—for the English-speaking countries—the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. The court was launched in 2005, most countries having enacted domestic legislation to give effect to the agreement. However, only Barbados and Guyana had accepted the court's appellate jurisdiction as of 2007.

Like other organizations, CARICOM also sought some outreach to civil society, and in 1997 the states endorsed a Charter on Civil Society, supporting democracy, good governance, civil and political rights, and social inclusion. They agreed to submit reports on their progress in these areas to the secretary-general and the conference every three years, and to consult with social partners in preparing their reports.

Overall, CARICOM has moved slowly forward on economic integration. A single market was launched in 2006 after many postponements. The only countries remaining outside the common market are the Bahamas which has opted not to join, Haiti which has not yet met the criteria, and Montserrat which still is awaiting UK approval. However, there has been little movement toward supranationalism in CARICOM: decisions require unanimity, foreign policy coordination has been relatively weak, a regional security structure is still being solidified, and the leaders have also declined to create any institutions that reduce state sovereignty. Mechanisms for the involvement of civil society are weak, the parliamentary assembly hardly meets, and a directly elected parliament is not anticipated.

General assessment/conclusion

Latin America and the Caribbean have been in the forefront of the regional integration movement in the global south, both in terms of the first stage of the 1960s, and in the second stage beginning in the 1990s. The region's experience thus holds some lessons for Africa and Asia. In the first place, the original ambition to create a continental common market was sidetracked by nationalistic impulses that led to the reversion toward smaller, but more efficient, subregional groupings. The larger arrangement, ALALC, adapted by becoming an umbrella group supporting a variety of integration arrangements, and helping to negotiate step-by-step integration of the continent. By the 2000s, ALALC subsumed seven regional scope agreements on liberalization mechanisms and technical and scientific cooperation; 11 free trade agreements including the Andean Community and the Southern Common Market; and 19 preferential trade agreements. Especially given the failure (as of 2008) of anticipated hemispheric free trade, ALALC remains the grouping with the widest scope in Latin America. The adaptability of the institution is reflected in the fact that Cuba has been incorporated into the arrangement and Mexico and Chile have remained in it, the former even after joining the North American Free Trade Area, and the latter after signing a preferential treaty with the United States in 2002. That set the stage for others that have since signed or are waiting to sign accords with third parties.

The smaller integration arrangements, begun enthusiastically in the 1960s, stalled in the 1980s, but were revitalized in the 1990s. In Latin America today, it is these subgroupings that are moving toward merging, at least on the narrow aspects of trade and functional cooperation. In particular, Mercosur and CAN have become closely linked, and in fact, they launched a South American Community of Nations in 2004. This fledging community was formally renamed the Union of South American Nations (Unasur or Unasul) in 2007.[30] If Unasur thrives, a continental common market could be achieved by 2019. Interestingly, this movement toward unity is occurring even as the US-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas has stalled. While the impetus for integration in Latin America, as in the rest of the global south, has long been strongly influenced by events in, and pressures from, the external environment, there seems to be a significant internal drive to the latest desires to unite.

Although Unasur is intended to be purely South American, the individual South American groupings are establishing links with Central America and the Caribbean as well. Mercosur has already negotiated an economic complementation agreement with Cuba (2006), and has begun negotiations with Central America and the Dominican Republic as well as the Caribbean nations. These talks are, however, complicated by issues of asymmetry and by Central American–

Dominican Republic obligations under their free trade arrangement with the United States which became operative in 2006–7. CAN also has been holding negotiations with SICA since 2004.

On the other hand, each subregional integration movement has also experienced highs and lows, and these must be taken into account in any consideration of future integration trends. Even though 90 percent of tariffs in Mercosur have been removed, there have also been problems stemming from Brazil's imposition of import controls, particularly during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s; its currency devaluations; trade tensions between Argentina and Brazil; Argentina's severe economic crisis in 2002 which derailed progress for a few years; and the persistent development gap between the more developed members and Paraguay and Uruguay. Meanwhile, CAN has succeeded in creating a common market but deeper progress has been threatened by low per capita growth in most member states,[31] by Peru's abrogation of democracy in 1992 under the presidency of Alberto Fujimori (a situation that led Venezuela to break off relations with Peru and prevented summits from being held until 1995); by border skirmishes between Ecuador and Peru in 1995; by anti-government guerrilla activity in Colombia; and by domestic instability in Ecuador and Bolivia. Changes in government in Venezuela and Bolivia in the 2000s led to their adoption of more nationalist stances and to the decision by the former to leave the CAN. Venezuela has been promoting its own version of Latin American integration, the Bolivarian Alternative for America (ALBA) with a social emphasis directly opposed to the US-promoted hemispheric free trade agenda.

Central American integration has at various times been hampered by national political crises that have spilled over regional borders; territorial and marine disputes (in particular, a boundary dispute between Guatemala and Belize and a Honduras–Nicaragua marine delimitation conflict remain unresolved); and differences in levels of development between Costa Rica and Panama, on the one hand, and Nicaragua, Honduras, and less so, Guatemala on the other. Panama has not yet joined SIECA although it has negotiated free trade agreements with its neighbors, and Costa Rica only agreed to join in the customs union in 2002. Neither state belongs to the court and therefore they do not accept its dispute settlement arrangements, but Panama participates in the parliament. SICA is also critiqued for its multiple layers of bureaucracy. In fact, a report by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Inter-American Development Bank found that the overlapping SICA/SIECA secretariats were wasteful and that a lack of technical expertise as well as problems arising from payments arrears were hampering progress.[32] Finally, CARICOM has confronted distributive arguments, political tensions, and a lack of political will that has slowed the movement toward deeper integration.

Overall, while all Latin American and Caribbean integration arrangements have established some mechanisms for political coordination and for the involvement of social partners, CAN has been surprisingly active in this regard, and CARICOM perhaps least so. There are certainly positive signs of broad cooperation in the region, reflected, for example, in the creation of Unasur, but statist approaches are likely to remain the norm for the medium term.

8 Subregional communities
Africa

The British and French preference for creating federations of their former African colonies as a prelude to independence did not produce successful political unions; yet, once independence had been achieved by each state, leaders realized that there were benefits to be gained in returning to some collective functional arrangement. As a result, a number of "first wave" African integration communities were formed after independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of these integration attempts remained at primitive functional levels, and many became the victims of political and ideological quarrels, the balkiness of self-interested leadership, and economic decline.

In 1980, as discussed in Chapter 5, the seminal Lagos Plan of Action was adopted calling for collective self-reliance, the deepening of regional integration, and the establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC). The plan proved, however, to be largely inoperable inasmuch as in the 1980s most African economies were stagnating because of the global economic recession, low commodity and high energy prices, and poor domestic management. Even the stronger economies—among them, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Ghana—were forced to adopt structural adjustment programs. As a result, only a few key cooperation and integration efforts were launched in the 1980s.

After the cold war, African countries, like other countries of the south, sought to revive old integration movements and develop new ones with more liberal goals. Unlike their counterparts in Latin America, however, African states moved slowly in their embrace of open economies. The strategic plan developed by the new African Union (AU) envisaged regional integration as a mechanism aimed at self-reliance, and not just global integration.[1] To achieve the goal of continental integration and development, the AU adopted a strategy that called for accelerated subregional integration within the AEC which was finally established in 1994. The many groupings formed earlier were consolidated into eight central institutions, known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs). These are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which was formed in 1989; the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) formed in 1993; the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), established in 1998; the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS or *Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale*, CEEAC), formed in 1985; the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), established in 1975; the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), created in 1996; the East African Community launched in 2000 as the successor to an earlier failed arrangement; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), established in 1992. These now form the main regional integration organizations, even though there are numerous other subgroupings in Africa, the proliferation of which, combined with the fact that the RECs themselves have overlapping memberships, has highlighted the need for continuing efforts to rationalize the AEC institutions and operations.[2]

In the following pages, the basic institutional features of the eight RECs are briefly discussed, dividing them by region, and this is followed by a general assessment of subregional African integration.

Integration in Central Africa

The French Africans were in the vanguard of post-independence integration that was based in some degree on two earlier French-promoted federations, the French West African Federation (*Federation de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*) comprising the West African colonies Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Soudan-Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey, and the Equatorial African Federation (*Federation de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française*), comprising Chad, Oubangi-Chari (Central African Republic), Congo, and Gabon.[3] Between 1959 and 1960, Senegal and Mali formed the Mali Federation, expecting that Upper Volta (today, Burkina Faso) and Dahomey (today, Benin) would join. However, these two changed their minds under pressure from rival Côte d'Ivoire, which offered them generous financial concessions in exchange for their defection. In any event, Senegal and Mali split up a mere two months after the federation was announced, the former complaining of Soudanese subversion. Instead of political union, French West African states turned their attention to loose functional efforts, creating the *Conseil de l'Entente* in 1959. This grouping, comprising Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo continues to exist today, devoting itself to promoting cooperation in economic development.

Map 8.1 Africa.

Communauté Économique des États de L'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC)

Nevertheless, there were also some attempts at formal economic integration. One of the earliest organizations, created in 1959, was the Equatorial Customs Union (*Union Douanière Equatoriale*, UDE) comprising the not-yet-independent Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, and Gabon, which in 1964 (effective 1966) was transformed into the Customs Union of Central Africa (*Union Douanière et Économique* *de L'Afrique Centrale,* UDEAC), with Cameroon also as a partner. The UDEAC treaty was notable for trying to ease the concerns of the less developed CAR and Chad by making provision for equitable apportionment of industrial projects, equitable distribution of the gains from integration, and providing appropriate funding through a Solidarity Fund. Some progress was made in UDEAC in terms of tariff reductions, the harmonization of fiscal policies, the development of common policies in industry, and cooperation in transportation, communications, and tourism. However, as in other integration movements, the economic deterioration and structural adjustment necessities of the 1980s led to decreased interest and investment by the members. Revitalization occurred in the 1990s, resulting in the creation of the CEMAC (*Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale*) as the successor to UDEAC.

In 1966, Zaire (today the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC), Burundi, and Rwanda had formed a mutual security grouping, and Zaire was eager to bring the other Central African states into its orbit as well. So it was that in 1968 CAR and Chad joined Zaire in forming a political grouping, the *Union des États de l'Afrique Centrale* (UEAC). According to Lynn Mytelka, CAR and Chad had both become dissatisfied with UDEAC:

> The failure to arrive at a formula for measuring the costs and benefits of integration, the inability to agree upon an equitable distribution of industrial projects, and the negative "spill-over" from conflicts with France and in other francophone African organisations, led the leaders of the C.A.R. and Chad to look favourably upon offers from Zaire for an association buttressed with substantial financial support.[4]

Although CAR's president soon returned the country to UDEAC, "encouraged by concessions from his U.D.E.A.C. partners and under pressure from France,"[5] Chad continued to work instead with Zaire.

Meanwhile, over time the security grouping of Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda developed into tripartite cooperation in functional areas as well, and led to the formation of another community, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) in 1976. In 1977, Zaire's president Mobutu Sese Seko proposed the merger of UDEAC and CEPGL, a proposal that was not, however, immediately accepted. But in 1983, in view of the mandate for integration promoted by the Lagos Plan of Action, Central African states revisited the idea and signed a treaty agreeing to form an umbrella organization. The Economic

Community of Central African States (or *Communaute Économique des États de L'Afrique Centrale*, CEEAC) was launched in 1985, comprising the French-speaking states including Chad, the former Spanish colony Equatorial Guinea (which became a member of UDEAC in 1983), and the former Portuguese colony Sao Tomé and Principe. Angola was originally an observer, but became a full member in 1999.

CEEAC focused on functional cooperation in a range of areas as well as on the establishment of a customs union. The latter was initially scheduled to come into being within 12 years but progress was slow in the 1980s. Integration stalled altogether in the 1990s because of members' financial difficulties as well as the eruption of ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi (which also stalled all cooperation in the CEPGL), and the widening of that conflict to the DRC as well. While Angola and Zimbabwe backed the government of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda were the main supporters of the antigovernment rebels. In addition to these major conflicts, civil tensions have been the norm in other CEEAC members as well, so much so that in fact, a CEEAC press communiqué noted in 2005 that seven out of the 11 member states had experienced some form of political conflict in recent times.[6] Cases include fighting between the government and opposition in Chad that dates back to the 1970s, and civil conflict in Angola stemming from the colonial era. In addition, there have been periodic coup attempts against the government of the CAR since the end of dictatorship in 1979, and there has been instability in the 1980s followed by electoral disturbances in the 1990s in neighboring Equatorial Guinea. In view of these serious problems, it was not until 1998 to 1999 that CEEAC was able to revive and refocus on accelerating the liberalization of trade and establishing a customs union, which is scheduled to be attained in 2008.

Main institutions of CEEAC and spillover assessment

CEEAC's integral institutions are: the Conference of Heads of State and Government meeting annually as the main decision-making organ; the Council of Ministers of economic and integration affairs, meeting twice yearly as the operational body; a Consultative Commission of experts appointed by member states; a General Secretariat located in Libreville, Gabon; and specialized technical committees established as needed. Decisions of the conference and council are approved by consensus. A Court of Justice was envisaged by the charter with a relatively limited mandate to interpret the treaty, rule on the validity of regulations and decisions, give advisory opinions, and decide disputes submitted to it in connection with the treaty's operations. However, as of 2007, the court had not been operationalized.

In view of the ubiquity of Central African conflicts in the 1990s, one of CEEAC's major accomplishments has been the establishment of a security mechanism for dealing with regional threats to the peace. Building on a mutual nonaggression and defense pact signed by CAR, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tomé in 1994, as well as on UN peacekeeping efforts, a Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (called COPAX) was adopted in 1999 and effected in 2004. COPAX comprises three organs: the Defense and Security Commission composed of heads of security agencies in the different countries; the Early Warning Mechanism for Central Africa (known as MARAC), that seeks to detect and prevent crises by way of data collection and analysis; and a nonpermanent Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) deployable in peace and humanitarian operations. A standby regional brigade was later created in line with AU plans for a standby African Force. CEEAC has subsequently sought to play an active role in mediating and monitoring conflicts in the subregion.

In seeking to revitalize the organization, CEEAC members agreed in 1999 to establish a parliament. In 2002 a protocol establishing a Network of Parliamentarians of CEEAC (*Réseau des Parlementaires de la CEEAC,* REPAC) was signed by member states. The parliament is located in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, and consists of 55 parliamentarians, five from each country. It can discuss and advise on a wide range of issues including social issues, human rights, environmental issues, communications, and energy and also the revision of the treaty. However, the possibility of its being influential is low, since it does not have formal links with CEEAC, even though the secretary-general or his deputies, especially those working in human development, peace, and security, are supposed to attend its meetings.

Integration in West Africa

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Like the Central Africans who formed the UDE, in 1959 French West Africans formed a West African customs union, the *Union Douanière des États d'Afrique Occidentale*, UDAO. The members were Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, Côte d'Ivoire, and Dahomey. Like UDE, UDAO was very much oriented toward and linked to France. Little progress was made in creating a customs zone because populous

Côte d'Ivoire refused to derail its own industrial ambitions by allowing Senegalese manufactures to flood its market.[7] These two were the dominant countries and therefore the main beneficiaries of the union. After UDAO stalled, it was reconstituted in 1966 as the *Union Douanière des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (UDEAO), a loose economic grouping offering tax credits as incentives to intraregional trade. In turn, UDEAO was expanded between 1972 and 1974 into an economic community, the West African Economic Community (or *Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest,* CEAO). Dahomey/Benin signed the CEAO treaty at the time, but later withdrew because of doubts about the effectiveness of the union, opting instead for observer status. (It rejoined in 1984 after experiencing tensions with Nigeria.) The member states of CEAO were all part of the African Financial Community franc zone that is interlinked with the French monetary system.

While the French Africans were engaged in this process, Nigeria was engaged in a civil war between 1967 and 1970 as the government attempted to subdue a secessionist Ibo movement in the southeast that had announced the formation of the Republic of Biafra. In this war, France opposed the Nigerian government, and even made it clear that it would veto Nigerian association with the European Economic Community (EEC), Nigeria having signed an agreement with the EEC in 1966. Two Francophone African states, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon, recognized Biafra, and the French, who used Benin and Cameroon as supply bases in support of the rebels, were thought to be contemplating recognition as well.[8] When Nigeria emerged from the war, even as French president Pompidou was visiting the African states to push them to harmonize their efforts so as to "counterbalance the heavyweight of Nigeria,"[9] the government began promoting a union of Anglophone and Francophone West Africa. By engaging in what is generally called "spraying diplomacy" (that is, petrodollar diplomacy), Nigeria tried to convince its neighbors to join the union by promising its financing for various development projects.[10] Nigeria was not only interested in countering French influence but also, despite considerable domestic debate centering on the costs of such a union, the government had concluded that integration with its neighbors was ultimately a beneficial domestic strategy. The entry of Britain into the EEC in 1973 was a factor to consider, for with the Yaoundé Convention governing French African relations with the EEC due to expire, a coordinated approach to European negotiations seemed to be in order.[11]

In 1963, the UN Economic Commission for Africa had recommended the construction of two iron and steel plants in West Africa. As a result Liberia, one of the targeted states, called regional leaders together for discussions in 1965.[12] This meeting led in 1967 to the signing in Accra of articles of association for the establishment of a West African Economic Community (WAEC), by Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The foot dragging that ensued, however, raised questions as to the commitment of the French African states that were preoccupied with their own community already described. In 1968, on the initiative of Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, which had established an organization of Senegalese River states, a West African Regional Group was created by West African heads of state meeting in Monrovia. It was envisaged that the group would engage in functional cooperation leading to a customs union. In fact, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Dahomey, Niger, and Sierra Leone chose not to sign the protocol establishing the group.

Despite vigorous Nigerian diplomacy, the wary French West African states went on to launch CEAO, deepening their French-only alliance. On the other hand, on the French side, Niger, Togo, and Benin were in one degree or another dependent economically on Nigeria and thus wanted to include Nigeria in CEAO. Benin had earlier been very concerned about Nigerian dominance, but after a change of government it developed closer relations with Nigeria. Benin withdrew from what it claimed was an ineffective CEAO, while Togo signed an agreement for economic union with Nigeria in 1972. These three states, along with Burkina Faso, began pressing for integration with Nigeria and also with Ghana.[13]

In 1975, after a variety of diplomatic maneuvers by Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, and others, and after it was agreed to allay French African concerns by making explicit the validity of other regional associations,[14] the treaty establishing the Economic Community of West Africa, ECOWAS (or *Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*, CEDEAO) was finally signed in Lagos in May 1975. The 15 states that eventually signed on comprised all the former French and British territories and Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania. Cape Verde joined after its independence in 1977, but Mauritania left in 2000, objecting to moves toward a higher level of integration.[15]

The ECOWAS treaty provided for the establishment of a customs union within ten years and the adoption of a common external tariff in five more years. Harmonization of economic and fiscal policy, and freedom of movement and capital were also anticipated. A fund, the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development (FCCD), was established to compensate members for losses suffered as a result of the application of the treaty. The fund draws on members' contributions, the revenues of community enterprises, and grants from non-ECOWAS countries.[16]

After it had garnered enough signatures, the ECOWAS agreement was quickly ratified. But the treaty's actual implementation was not begun until November 1976. A number of reasons for the delay are offered by analysts, among them a Nigerian diplomat, Ibrahim Gambari, who notes that the leaders "sat back for a long while as if waiting for someone else to take the initiative on the next steps. Many members also appeared to believe that the treaty would be self-executing."[17] Political changes in Nigeria also affected progress. Nigeria's leader Yakubu Gowon was overthrown, ending the Nigeria–Togo union and also refocusing Nigeria on internal matters. The general who took over was himself removed six months later. In addition to this, Senegal, which feared Nigerian dominance, delayed ratification while trying, unsuccessfully, to get Zaire and other francophone Central African states to join the arrangement. Gambari also mentions the closing of the border between Togo and Benin after accusations and counter-accusations of subversive actions. These disputes eased by the end of 1976 and ECOWAS states were finally able to agree on key issues left untouched such as the location of the secretariat (in Lagos; it is now in Abuja) and personnel appointments.[18]

Some problems experienced by ECOWAS in the ensuing years were predictable: French–English/CEAO–ECOWAS differences continued, and there were difficulties in coordination between the two groups of members, especially monetary coordination. In addition, distributive arguments resulted from the variations in levels of development among the members; in particular Nigeria's—and to some extent Côte d'Ivoire's—economic dominance made the arrangement highly imbalanced. The level of financial arrears also rose rapidly as countries diverted money to other pressing national purposes, a problem experienced in many African integration movements. Like other unions, the ECOWAS was able to ease financial difficulties somewhat by introducing a community tax on customs duties in 2003.

Although the original ECOWAS treaty avoided any focus on political aims, political rivalries, self-interest, and the lack of political will were inevitable obstacles to closer integration. Despite the continual reiteration of their commitment to the customs union, West African states had to postpone the date for implementation of a customs union and a common external tariff several times, so that the expected date moved to 2008. Still, intraregional trade rose from 2.9 percent of total exports in 1970 to 9.6 percent in 1980. After a reduction in the 1990s, trade rose again to 9.3 percent in 2005 (Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 African intraregional trade (in percentage and US$ million)

Grouping			*1960*	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*	*2000*	*2005*
COMESA	Percentage	Imports	2.3	6.8	2.3	4.1	3.2	4.0
		Exports	3.0	7.4	5.7	6.3	5.1	4.9
	$US mn	Imports	34.7	246.1	325.2	991.4	1,268.2	3,058.3
		Exports	39.2	317.8	555.1	888.8	1,328.5	2,716.0
ECCAS	Percentage	Imports	1.2	2.8	3.0	2.1	3.0	1.7
		Exports	2.2	9.8	1.4	1.4	1.1	0.6
	$US mn	Imports	3.6	40.7	120.7	147.3	217.2	301.1
		Exports	6.6	162.1	88.9	163.0	190.8	272.3
ECOWAS	Percentage	Imports	1.7	2.7	11.3	10.8	10.6	10.7
		Exports	1.4	2.9	9.6	8.0	7.6	9.4
	$US mn	Imports	23.3	72.7	918.4	1,874.2	2,473.6	5,835.0
		Exports	15.6	83.0	661.1	1,532.4	2,714.9	5,497.5
SADC	Percentage	Imports	3.4	4.4	2.2	5.3	9.9	9.5
		Exports	3.1	4.1	0.4	3.1	9.4	9.1
	$US mn	Imports	72.0	275.2	536.6	1,592.0	4,053.6	8,178.1
		Exports	46.7	252.7	106.3	1,069.6	4,382.8	7,585.1
UMA/AMU	Percentage	Imports	0.8	2.1	0.5	2.7	3.5	3.2
		Exports	4.6	1.4	0.3	2.9	2.3	2.0
	$US mn	Imports	17.0	59.6	128.4	795.1	1,190.2	2,132.6
		Exports	40.2	59.5	109.1	958.4	1,094.3	1,926.2

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of Statistics 2006*, (online at www.stats.unctad.org/handbook), Table 1.4, "Intra-trade of regional and trade groups."

Note: No data is available for the EAC, IGAD, or CEN-SAD.

In 1994 French West African states, bound together not only in CEAO but also monetarily (since 1959) in the West African Monetary Union (*Union Monétaire Ouest-Africaine*, UMOA), decided to revitalize their integration arrangement by replacing CEAO and the UMOA with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (*Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine*, UEMOA) aimed at establishing a common market. The UEMOA includes Togo but not Mauritania. Guinea-Bissau joined in 1997. In response to this French effort, in 2000, some ECOWAS states—specifically Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone—launched a West African Monetary Zone that could eventually merge with the French zone. These ECOWAS countries expect to introduce a common currency by 2009.

The outbreak of large-scale intrastate conflict in West Africa was a largely unpredictable handicap to ECOWAS's economic efforts, and in fact, has preoccupied ECOWAS since the 1990s. Despite its nonpolitical charter, ECOWAS had turned some attention to political issues by 1978 when a Protocol on Non-Aggression was adopted, matching one adopted by the French West African states. This protocol recognized that economic aims could not be achieved unless there was also political stability, and enjoined members to refrain from acts of aggression against the territorial integrity of other member states and to seek the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This was followed up with a Protocol Relating to Mutual Defense Assistance in 1981, essentially a collective defense arrangement in which armed threat or aggression against member states, or conflict between states or within states "actively maintained and sustained from outside" (article 18) will be handled by mediation and if necessary, interposition of the armed forces of the community. To fulfill the demands of the protocol, the Allied Armed Forces of the Community, a non-standing army comprising units designated by each member state, was established.[19]

In 1990 when conflict broke out in Liberia between invading rebels, led by Charles Taylor, and government forces, ECOWAS sent in a peacekeeping force for the first time to monitor a ceasefire mediated by the organization. However, rather than a force from each state as envisioned in the protocol of mutual defense, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring and Observer Group (ECOMOG) was formed by troops from five nations, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The force, which engaged in combat with the rebels, is credited with bringing about some stability and facilitating a peace accord signed in 1993, as well as with supervising the ensuing disarmament of the factions and the holding of elections in 1997, won by Taylor. ECOMOG's efforts were complemented by diplomatic efforts conducted by ECOWAS states, including the early imposition of sanctions on Taylor's rebel group when it failed to respect a prior agreement to disarm. ECOMOG's mission ended in 1999 but in the early 2000s anti-Taylor forces renewed serious fighting. This time, the brutality in Liberia drew greater international attention: UN, US, and ECOWAS pressure were all used to eventually force Taylor into exile in 2003. Meanwhile ECOWAS deployed troops in 2003 as the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) to secure yet another ceasefire, and this time the deployment was a precursor to the entry of a UN stabilization force, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This time around, the ECOWAS force had greater member support drawing on Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Togo, and Benin for its contingents.[20]

ECOMOG went on to engage in internal conflict in Sierra Leone where between 1991 and 2002 a civil war raged between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), backed by Liberia's Taylor, and successive governments. ECOMOG was sent in in 1997 after the military deposed President Kabbah who had negotiated a peace accord with the rebels. ECOMOG forces, comprising contingents primarily from Nigeria, but also from Guinea, Ghana, Gambia, and Mali fought the RUF and were instrumental in restoring the civilian government and eventually driving the rebels out of the capital that had been overrun in 1998. Intense diplomatic efforts led to the signing of another peace accord in 1999. A UN Observer Mission that had been established in 1998 was replaced by an expanded peacekeeping force which, with some separate British assistance, helped to restore order, oversee disarmament and the reintegration of the rebels, establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and move the country toward general elections.[21] Another key involvement of ECOMOG has been in Guinea-Bissau, where civil war broke out in 1998 between rebel army elements and the government; there ECOWAS helped broker a ceasefire and ECOMOG troops from Benin, Gambia, and Togo replaced Senegalese and Guinean troops that had entered in support of the government. Finally, in Côte d'Ivoire similar violence between 2002 and 2003 led to a ceasefire and the interposition of ECOMICI, the ECOWAS mission in Côte d'Ivoire. In a recurring pattern, UN peacekeepers (UNMICI) took over from ECOMICI in 2004.[22]

Main institutions of ECOWAS and spillover assessment

The original structure of ECOWAS included a Supreme Authority of the Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers, a secretariat headed by an executive secretary, and a Tribunal of the Community to settle disputes and interpret the treaty. The tribunal, however, was never formalized. The restructuring of the community began in earnest in 1991 with the appointment of a commission, and ended with the adoption of a revised treaty that entered into force in 1995. Among the main changes was the inclusion of political aspects which had been eschewed in the original treaty: in keeping with an earlier (1991) Declaration of Political Principles in which members committed themselves to preserving freedom, people's rights, and democratization, the revised treaty made note of the need to adhere to democratic principles as well as respect for human rights, the peaceful settlement of disputes, accountability, economic and social justice, and popular participation in development. A failing recognized by many in the original treaty, that is the lack of binding force of the decisions of the Supreme Authority and the council, was corrected in the new treaty which made decisions of the authority, that is the highest decision-making body composed of the Heads of State and Government, binding both on states and on the institutions of the community (article 9.4).[23]

Under the new treaty, the Supreme Authority remains the main decision-making body, and the Council of Ministers and the secretariat are retained. The authority meets annually, and the council meets twice a year. Decisions by both bodies are taken by consensus except for a few council decisions that require either unanimity or a two-thirds majority. A new advisory body, the Economic and Social Council, was established comprising representatives from the economic and social sectors. Mechanisms were to be set up for consultation with nongovernmental organizations as well as community and regional socioeconomic associations. A Parliament and Community Court of Justice were also anticipated and indeed these were inaugurated in 2000 and 2001 respectively. The parliament, located in Abuja, is composed of 115 seats distributed to member countries on the basis of five per member with additional seats distributed by population. Nigeria has the most seats, 35. As with other parliaments discussed previously, the aim is to eventually have direct elections for parliament; however, currently seats are held by members of the national legislatures who cannot be government ministers. Again, the parliament is only an advisory body. It meets twice a year and its competence ranges from human rights issues to issues affecting cooperation within the community, especially as they relate to the review of the ECOWAS treaty, citizenship, and social integration. On these issues, the parliament may make recommendations to the appropriate institutions and/or organs of the community.

The seven-member Community Court of Justice, located in Abuja, hears disputes and gives advisory opinions relating to acts of the community and interpretation of the community treaties. Importantly, the initial protocol establishing states as the only entities with standing was later amended to accept nonstate and individual petitions once efforts at amicable settlement have failed, thus widening the reach of the court. Its revised mandate also includes human rights cases.

In the financial area, in 1999 the FCCD became the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), with a mandate to finance investment in infrastructure as well as other development programs in the private and public sectors. EBID has two affiliates: the ECOWAS Regional Development Fund (ERDF) focusing on the public sector, particularly basic infrastructure and poverty alleviation, and the ECOWAS Regional Investment Bank (ERIB) focusing on private sector and commercial funding. The renewed focus on private enterprise brought the region into conformity with spreading global norms.

The spillover of ECOWAS activities from the economic to the political is particularly reflected in the security arena. The formation and interventions of ECOMOG have already been discussed, but other aspects of ECOWAS's institutional development should also be mentioned. Amid the problems in Guinea-Bissau noted earlier, ECOWAS took an important step to formalize and expand its conflict resolution procedures. In 1999, ECOWAS heads of state and government approved the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. By this protocol, member states endorsed the relationship between development and security, and, among other things, the need for democracy and human rights, protection of the environment, the safeguarding of the cultural heritage of member states, and the formulation and implementation of policies against corruption, money-laundering and the illegal circulation of small arms. The protocol goes on to institutionalize intervention and peacekeeping by ECOWAS, including activities undertaken in cooperation with other organizations, in cases of armed conflict between states and within states in the following circumstances: conflict that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or poses a serious threat to peace and security in the subregion; serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law; and in the case of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government (article 25). ECOMOG was converted into a permanent standby force, with a mandate to stem humanitarian crises, engage in peace building activities, and help (along with unarmed civilian and military observer missions) to restore political authority and the rule of law. A nine-state Mediation and Security Council was created to oversee the conflict management process, assisted by a Defense and Security Commission,

Box 8.1 Members of African Regional Economic Communities

Economic Community of Central African States/ Communauté Ėconomique des Ėtats de l'Afrique Centrale (ECCAS/CEEAC)

Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe

- Headquarters: Libreville, Gabon.
- *Italics:* original members.

Web site: http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

- Headquarters: Abuja, Nigeria.
- *Italics:* original members. Mauritania was also an original member.

Web site: http://www.ecowas.int/

East African Community (EAC)

Burundi,* *Kenya*, Rwanda,* *Tanzania*, *Uganda*

- Headquarters: Arusha, Tanzania.
- *Italics:* original members.

Web site: http://www.wac.int/

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Djibouti, Eritrea,* *Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda*

- Headquarters: Djibouti.
- *Italics:* original members.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,* South Africa,* *Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe*

- Headquarters: Gaborone, Botswana.
- *Italics:* original members.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, *Djibouti*, Egypt, *Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya*, Libya, *Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe*

- Headquarters: Lusaka, Zambia.
- *Italics:* original members of COMESA, and also members of the predecessor Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA), 1982–94. Somalia was a member of the PTA. Lesotho, Namibia, and Tanzania were also original COMESA members.

Web site: http://www.comesa.int/

Arab Mahgreb Union (AMU)

Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia

- Headquarters: Rabat, Morocco.

Web site: http://www. www.maghrebarabe.org/

Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)

Benin, *Burkina Faso,* Central African Republic, *Chad*, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d"Ivoire, Lberia, *Libya, Mali*, Morocco, Nigeria, *Niger*, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, *Sudan*, Togo, Tunisia

- Headquarters: Tripoli, Libya.
- *Italics:* original members.

Web site: http://www.cen-sad.org/

a Council of Elders, and ECOMOG itself. An early warning system was established in the form of an Observation and Monitoring Center located at the secretariat, in addition to Observation and Monitoring Zones comprising various geographical areas. Security issues such as cross-border crime, money laundering, corruption, and small arms trafficking were to be handled through cooperation among the various branches of the security apparatuses.[24]

A supplementary protocol to the conflict mechanism, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, was adopted in 2001. Here ECOWAS states committed themselves to constitutionalism, the rule of law, human rights, and good governance as well as poverty alleviation, educational, cultural, and religious cooperation, and the promotion of the welfare of children, women, and youth. Provisions were made for ECOWAS electoral assistance and monitoring, and importantly, by article 45, ECOWAS was given authority to impose sanctions "in the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is massive violation of human rights in a member state."[25]

ECOWAS's relatively strong security cooperation is not, however, so much a spillover from functional integration as a parallel development prioritized by events in the region. In fact, economic integration has been hampered by these political problems as well as by distributive and other complaints already cited. Thus while the French West Africans have deepened their customs and monetary cooperation, ECOWAS still has some way to go in implementing even the first integration stages.

Integration in East Africa

The East African Community (EAC)

East African integration dates back to colonial times when the British established a customs union among the three territories Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. This East African High Commission of 1948–61 was a pre-independence functional entity and customs union that was replaced after independence by the East African Common Services Organization, and later the East African Community (EAC I). The EAC countries had also tried to establish a federation in 1963 but the idea died prematurely amid bickering over the uneven distribution of benefits in the pre-existing common market. Indeed, despite efforts to balance the benefits, the functional integration that was continued in 1967 was beset by the same problems attributable to the differences in the levels of economic development among the member states, Kenya being the main beneficiary and Tanzania the least satisfied. Thus free trade was never achieved because of the exchange and import controls instituted by the less advanced members against Kenya.[26] By the 1970s the EAC had stagnated due to these as well as political differences between Tanzania which had adopted indigenous "ujamaa" socialism, Kenya which remained firmly capitalist, and Uganda which fell under the unpredictable dictator Idi Amin who governed from 1971 to 1979. In 1977 the EAC was officially deemed defunct.

Political as well as economic difficulties forestalled any revival of integration in the 1980s. Specifically, in 1979, Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda to remove Idi Amin and return Milton Obote, who had been deposed by Amin in 1971, to the presidency. However, Uganda then fell into civil war as Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army began a bitter fight against Obote's government. Meanwhile Kenya, which had achieved economic growth but had become increasingly undemocratic under Jomo Kenyatta (1963–78), entered a period of some democratic promise under Daniel Arap Moi, only to revert to yet more repression. In Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere handed over power peacefully to Ali Hassan Mwinyi, but despite the abandonment of socialism, Tanzania found it difficult to emerge from decades of poverty and economic decline.

In the 1990s, however, given the post–cold war changes as well as the changes in government in all three countries, East African leaders decided that the time was right to relaunch the EAC. In 1993 an agreement establishing a Permanent Tripartite Commission for Cooperation between the three states was signed, anticipating cooperation in economic, social, cultural, security, and political areas. This was followed in 1999 by the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, which entered into force in 2000. Unlike most other such treaties, the East African treaty calls for movement not just from a common market to monetary union but also to a *political* Federation of the East Africa States.[27] Among other things, the treaty emphasizes people-centered and market-driven cooperation, the need for export-oriented growth and equitable distribution of benefits and differential rates of integration, the need to strengthen and involve the private sector and civil society, good governance, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Apart from cooperation in numerous functional areas, the new EAC also promotes the development of common foreign and security policies, the latter including defense cooperation and intelligence sharing.

Main institutions of EAC and spillover assessment

The annual Summit of Heads of State and Government is the primary decision-making body of the new EAC while the Council of Ministers responsible for integration is the main policymaking body, meeting twice yearly. Decisions of the summit and council are taken by consensus. A Coordination Committee consisting of permanent secretaries (that is, the heads of the relevant integration ministries) assists the council and recommends the establishment of sectoral committees.

A six-member East African Court of Justice was established by the treaty, with a mandate to interpret the treaty and settle disputes, with standing for both states and individuals residing in member states. The court also hears internal employee disputes and gives advisory opinions to treaty agencies. (Human rights may also fall under its jurisdiction in the future.) The court was launched in 2001 and is temporarily located in Arusha where it gave its first judgment in 2006. The EAC treaty also established a legislative assembly in Arusha consisting of 27 elected members and five ex-officio members, namely, the EAC secretary-general, the EAC counsel, and the ministers responsible for regional cooperation. Interestingly, the members cannot be drawn from the national legislatures, even though they are chosen by those bodies. They must be the delegates of parties represented in the assemblies as well as an appropriate cross-section of societal groups representative of various shades of opinion, gender, and special interests. Still, the assembly is only advisory and its motions must be assented to by the heads of state for them to become law.

The EAC secretariat was established in Arusha and provision was made for development funding for members through the East African Development Bank. The bank was established in 1967, was closed with the breakup of the EAC I, and revived in 1980.

Overall, the EAC II, which has expanded to include Burundi and Rwanda, has progressed relatively quickly, reaching agreement in 2004 on a common external tariff with a minimum rate of 25 percent to be lowered to 20 percent over five years, which was duly implemented in January 2005. A single market and common currency are expected by 2009. In terms of labor mobility, a common passport to ease the cross-border movement of peoples was launched in 1999. Federation is possible but not probable by 2010. The community boasts of its extensive outreach to civil society and the private sector through the sector associations as well as through its legislative assembly. A tenth anniversary assessment also made note of the community's involvement in elections observations in all three member states since 2005.[28] The EAC has perhaps the most ambitious political and economic program of the RECs, but lingering political differences and differing levels of development are still obstacles to rapid progress in integration.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

East Africa is also host to another AU regional pillar or REC, the IGAD. IGAD originated as a narrow functional agency, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), established in 1986 to deal with the severe droughts, desertification, and related humanitarian disasters that had plagued the Horn of Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. The signatories of the earlier IGADD agreement were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, and Eritrea joined after its independence in 1993.

Even with its limited aims, IGADD held little promise of fostering more than superficial cooperation among its members. After all, the region had been a political hotbed in the 1970s and early 1980s. For instance, Somalia had championed secessionist irredentist movements in Ethiopia and Kenya, to the point of invading the Ogaden, an area annexed by Ethiopia but with a heavy Somali population. The invasion in 1977 was repelled by Ethiopian troops with the help of their Soviet and Cuban allies but the exodus of Somalis from the Ogaden after the invasion of 1977, combined with the outbreak of famine, left Somalia, already one of the world's poorest populations, with a refugee population of more than a million Ethiopians, and violent Ethiopia–Somalia border clashes continued well into the 1980s. In turn Ethiopia backed guerrillas fighting against the government of Siad Barre in Somalia, and it was also engaged throughout the 1970s and 1980s in fighting secessionists in Eritrea, as well as antigovernment forces fighting against the dictatorial Marxist Mengistu Mariam regime that had overthrown Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. Meanwhile, Somalis in Kenya's northern district also joined in the irredentist fighting, and Ethiopia and Somalia competed for influence in Djibouti, formerly French Somaliland, which gained its independence in 1977. Another IGADD member, Sudan, descended into civil war between northern and southern factions in the 1980s under President Jaafar al-Nimeiry and later, Omar al-Bashir. By the end of the 1980s, all the IGADD members were economically stressed and preoccupied with reconstruction.

With the end of the cold war came the fall of Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam (in 1991) as well as the deposing of Siad Barre in the same year. Jaafar al-Nimeiry had already been deposed in 1989. In 1993 Eritrea, where guerrillas had fought a long battle against Ethiopian annexation since 1952, gained its independence after the defeat of the now-weakened Ethiopian forces. With these changes, the movement to revive functional cooperation and economic integration started tentatively. Beginning in 1990, the IGADD began to assist members in adopting strategies for food security and environmental protection. This led to a decision in 1995 to reorganize IGADD into an organization with both economic and political aims, and the IGADD became the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996.

The basic principles of the organization are defined, similarly to other cooperation organizations of the 1990s, as sovereign equality, noninterference, peaceful settlement of disputes, equitable sharing of benefits, and protection of human rights. Apart from food security, sustainable development, infrastructural, and technological cooperation, the aims of IGAD are, among other things, to coordinate policies in trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and to promote the free movement of goods, services, and people (article 7b). IGAD also aims to create an enabling environment for foreign and domestic investment, and to promote peace and stability in the subregion. A customs union was anticipated by the treaty, to be implemented very gradually. According to the secretariat, the focus remains on cooperation in food security.[29]

Despite its economic intentions, IGAD has had to divert most of its attention to security issues. Somalia fell into factionalized conflict after the deposing of Siad Barre in 1991, necessitating a US and UN humanitarian intervention that failed to effect any lasting political results. Various attempts were made to establish transitional governments and in 2004 a government was finally formed, headquartered in Baidoa in south Somalia. However, this Federal Transitional Government did not control most of the country as the north and regions of the south had declared their autonomy and Islamists were in control of the capital Mogadishu. Between 2006 and 2007, the transitional government extended its control to the capital, with the help of Ethiopian troops, but fighting remained severe. Meanwhile, between 1998 and 2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a major war over the disputed frontier zone around the city of Badme, and though the border has been ostensibly settled by a boundary commission, tensions remained high and the border has not been demarcated. Meanwhile, in Sudan conflict between the government and southern rebels continued until a peace agreement was signed in 2005, and in the meantime, fresh conflict broke out with rebel groups in Darfur in the southwest, a major conflagration that remains unresolved as of 2008.

Main institutions of IGAD and spillover assessment

The annual Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme decision-making body of IGAD, while the Council of Ministers, composed of foreign ministers and ministers responsible for cooperation, meets twice a year, makes recommendations, oversees the implementation of decisions, monitors humanitarian activities, and follows up on political and security affairs that include conflict prevention, management, and resolution as well as post-conflict peace building. Decisions are made by consensus. A secretariat headed by an executive secretary is headquartered in Djibouti, and a Committee of Ambassadors accredited to Djibouti assists the executive secretary. A key provision in the IGAD agreement is the establishment of a mechanism for consultation and cooperation for the pacific settlement of disputes. IGAD has been in the forefront of developing an early warning mechanism, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARM), which has as a major focus the prevention of violent cross-border local conflicts among pastoralists and the enabling of local communities to deal with conflict. Among other things, monitors assess the potential for conflict and the effect of nongovernmental and other peace initiatives, in order to try to prevent the outbreak and escalation of cross-border violence.[30] IGAD is also participating in the plan for an AU standby force by establishing an East African Standby Brigade.

Given the unstable regional climate, IGAD has understandably given priority to conflict resolution and management. For example, Sudanese talks have largely been held under IGAD auspices, with Kenya the major mediator since 1994. In similar vein, the Somali agreement of 2004 came through a reconciliation process chaired by Ethiopia. Preoccupied with conflict resolution, therefore, IGAD has yet to put forward a timetable for economic integration, and has instead focused on looser functional cooperation.

Integration in Southern Africa

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

One of the problems encountered in African integration as a whole is the proliferation of arrangements that often overlap. Nowhere is this more evident than in southern Africa, where three arrangements converge: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Both SADC and COMESA have been designated as RECs in the AU's scheme.

SACU is the oldest arrangement, formed by the British in 1910 as a customs union between South Africa and three dependent territories, Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Basutoland (now Lesotho), and

Swaziland. It was reorganized in 1969 after these territories became independent, with some adjustments to accommodate their less developed status. Namibia joined in 1990.The agreement was renegotiated in 1994 to put an institutional structure in place, including a three-person ad hoc tribunal to handle disputes, and a common negotiating machinery for third party negotiations. A secretariat was established in Windhoek, Namibia.

Most members of SADC were/are either members of the SACU of 1910/1969 or of the somewhat mislabeled Central African Federation (CAF), an artificial administrative arrangement formed by Britain, linking Northern and Southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (now Malawi). Tanganyika was loosely associated with CAF because of its historical ties to the Rhodesias. The CAF lasted from 1953 to 1963.

Both SACU and CAF countries were in varying degrees dependent on their large more developed neighbor, South Africa, a problem that became a handicap when South Africa adopted its apartheid system. Under Pieter Botha who governed South Africa between 1978 and 1984, South Africa floated the idea of creating a constellation of southern African states or a south African community, but its neighbors were more interested in reducing their dependence on apartheid South Africa.[31] Instead Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia formed the "Front Line states" in 1975—Angola joined in 1976, and Zimbabwe after white rule ended in 1980—a grouping which sought to bring an end to the minority and colonial regimes in southern Africa. Lesotho also participated in Front Line discussions. It was in this context that these states also agreed to form the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) at a meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979. The organization, which came into being in 1980, was expected to serve as a counterbalance to South Africa by promoting economic and functional cooperation among the members. Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe joined immediately, and Namibia did so after its independence in 1990. Given the background to its formation, the organization received significant international funding and developed a major international presence. South Africa, Mauritius, and Seychelles joined the new SADC (below) in 1991, 1995, and 1997 respectively, and Madagascar in 2005. However, Seychelles left in 2004 citing financial difficulties and foreign exchange scarcities. It applied for readmission in 2006 but had not yet rejoined by 2007.[32]

In 1992, with the imminent settlement of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars, as well as changes in South Africa, and the movement toward greater pan-African integration, SADCC members decided that the organization needed to be transformed from a standing conference to a more highly institutionalized body. Thus SADCC became the South African Development Community (SADC), aimed at, among other things, promoting regional integration in the interest of achieving economic growth and development. In this respect, the charter aims were to enable the free movement of capital and labor, goods, and services; to strengthen collaboration in broad economic, social, technological, and cultural spheres, and to involve the people in such initiatives; to promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the interdependence of member states; protect the environment; and mobilize the inflow of public and private resources into the region.[33] In terms of formal economic integration, a trade protocol liberalizing trade, originally within a time frame of eight years, was formulated in 1996. However, by 2005 sufficient progress had not been made and the goal was postponed to 2008, with a proposed customs union anticipated by 2010, a single market by 2015, and a common currency by 2016. With an eye on SACU and other subregional arrangements, members allowed existing preferential trade agreements to continue, and countries could negotiate new preferential arrangements as well.

A focus on combating such social ills as the HIV/AIDS epidemic, poverty, and gender inequality was added later. But the organization also aimed to promote and defend peace and security by harmonizing political policies, and collaborating in diplomacy and international relations. Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and peaceful settlement of disputes were included as guiding principles. The SADC treaty was therefore amended in 2001 to add more institutions and in particular to include provisions for a conflict mechanism, the Organ of Politics, Defense, and Security, established by the summit in 1996 and institutionalized by protocol in 2001 (see section on “Institutions” below).

South Africa became a member of SADC in 1994, strengthening the economic prospects of the group but, as with SACU, raising some concerns about the probable unequal distribution of benefits. Indeed, South Africa became the first country to implement the free trade protocol in 2001.[34]

Main institutions of SADC and spillover assessment

As in other groupings, the Summit of Heads of State or Government is the supreme decision-making body of SADC. Originally the heads were scheduled to meet annually, but the provision was changed in the amended charter of 2001 to require a meeting twice a year. A Council of Ministers responsible for economic planning or finance has powers of oversight and implementation, policy approval, and program development. The council, also originally scheduled to meet annually, now meets four times a year. Decisions are taken by consensus. Assisting the council is a Committee of Senior Officials comprising permanent secretaries or others of like rank, with advisory powers. The secretariat, located in Gaborone, Botswana, is the principal administrative organ. In the amendment of 2001, a troika was added composed of the current, past, and future chairmen of the summit, the council, the security organ (described below), and the committees. This troika is responsible for SADC operations in between its regular meetings. Also added was an Integrated Committee of Ministers, comprising at least two ministers from each state, to oversee the activities of the core areas of integration ranging from trade to social and human development. A Regional Development Fund, with contributions from all stakeholders as well as external sources, replaced an earlier fund that had depended mainly on member states.

Progress in economic integration in SADC has been slow. SADC's original goal of implementing free trade by 2005 was postponed to 2008. A customs union is now proposed for 2010, a single market for 2015, and a common currency for 2016. These postponements are indicative of a number of problems the grouping faces, including the low levels of development of most member states, and the persistent social problems of a number of them, the imbalance in trade among the members in view of South Africa's dominance, and continuing political divisions among member states.

In terms of spillover into the political area, the incorporation of a tribunal and the Organ of Politics, Defense, and Security into SADC's formal institutional structure is important. The Tribunal was established by protocol in 2000 to hear disputes regarding the interpretation of the treaty, although it only began operating in 2007. Individuals have standing before the court and national courts may refer to it for preliminary rulings. In terms of the security organ, the Protocol Establishing the Organ of Politics, Defense, and Security was signed in 1996 but its institutional structure was only drawn up in 2001. The organ's aims are, among other things, to encourage regional political and foreign policy cooperation, promote the development of democratic institutions and practices; develop security cooperation and a peacekeeping and peace enforcement capacity, and enhance regional capacity in respect to humanitarian and emergency assistance.[35] The organ focuses on early warning procedures, and intervenes to resolve major civil and inter-state disputes by peaceful means, taking enforcement action as a last resort. Subsequently, SADC set aside standby brigades for peacekeeping and has also been engaged in elections observation in a number of countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe. In terms of structure, the Organ of Politics, Defense, and Security is composed of a chairperson, troika, and ministerial committee comprising ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and public and state security, as well as committees on diplomacy and defense. Finally, the protocol establishing the organ also anticipated the development of a mutual defense mechanism, and in 2003 a collective security pact was signed by member states, calling for collective action in cases of armed attack against a member state.[36]

SADC's efforts in conflict resolution have, however, sometimes been hampered by internal political conflicts. Thus the conflict in the DRC proved divisive to the organization when Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe actively supported the antigovernment rebels whereas SADC's official stance was more neutral. SADC's support for Angola in its dealings with antigovernment rebels has been steady but complicated by the divisions in the DRC. Again, the organization's lack of strong action as the domestic situation in Zimbabwe has deteriorated, and South Africa's open support for President Robert Mugabe, have also invited the disapproval of the international community. Intra-SADC arguments also broke out when South Africa and Botswana sent troops into Lesotho after election disturbances there in 1998.[37]

Unlike other such organizations, SADC has no parliament and the revised treaty does not include a reference to any. However, a SADC Parliamentary Forum was established between 1996 and 1997 under a charter provision allowing the formation of any other institutions deemed necessary (article 9.2). The forum did not, however, have a fully functioning secretariat until 1999. The parliament meets twice a year, is composed of the presiding officers and three representatives of member national parliaments, and can deliberate and advise on overall SADC policy. As of 2007, the Democratic Republic of Congo had not yet joined.

SADC has made efforts to devise mechanisms for the inclusion of civil society and societal issues in its decision making. The establishment of national committees was offered as a way to provide social input and coordinate the implementation of SADC's programs. These committees include governmental, private sector, civil society, nongovernmental, and workers' and employers' representatives. Furthermore, a Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC was adopted in 2003, emphasizing the civil and human rights of workers, the protection of children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities, the equality of men and women, and proper enforcement of workplace and health standards.[38] Overall, however, SADC integration both in the economic and political spheres remains relatively limited.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

The AU has also designated as a REC another free trade zone, of older vintage than SADC and even broader in membership. This is the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) formed in 1993 as the successor to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) that came into force in 1982.

The formation of such an area, with an eventual common market envisaged, had been promoted by the UN Economic Commission for Africa in the 1960s in keeping with the integrationist views at the time that focused on the need to expand market sizes and reduce dependency. However, the PTA only came into being after the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 had revived enthusiasm for the integration strategy in Africa. Between 1982 and 1993 when the COMESA treaty was signed, the PTA expanded to include all the independent countries of the two regions. (See Box 8.1 for membership.)

During the low-growth, high-debt 1980s, the PTA stagnated. According to the COMESA secretariat, the external debt of the COMESA region had, by the early 1990s, increased twenty-fold since 1970. Debt service ratios, which in 1970 were insignificant, averaged 45 per cent of export earnings in 1989–90, making the region one of the most heavily indebted in the world.[39]

In view of the new AU aspirations toward continental integration, COMESA was inaugurated in 1994 as the successor to the PTA. The Democratic Republic of Congo joined in 1998, and the north African members Egypt and Libya in 1999 and 2005. In addition, Seychelles left SADC for COMESA in 2001, although it reapplied for admission to SADC in 2006. On the other hand, Lesotho and Mozambique (1997), Tanzania (2000), and Namibia (2004), all withdrew from COMESA because of the incompatibilities between COMESA and SADC/SACU integration requirements and schedules. Tanzania also cited other factors when it left in 2000—the expense of maintaining these overlapping memberships, the need to protect its industries, a lack of readiness for full liberalization as a less developed country, and a preference for SADC's focus on infrastructural development. As of 2007 Tanzania was considering reapplying for membership, based on pressure on the government from both the private sector and from its partners in the

EAC wanting to rationalize their organizational memberships ahead of the planned establishment of a political federation in 2010.[40]

COMESA aims to foster trade liberalization by instituting a customs union and common market, and by fostering cooperation in areas ranging from transport and communications to industry, agriculture, energy, tourism, and social and environmental affairs. COMESA's attempt to distribute benefits evenly are notable: because Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland are least developed countries, they have been granted temporary exemptions from the full application of common market provisions. Among other things, member states agree to help the least developed states strengthen their infrastructure, attract new investments, improve their agricultural production; improve the service sector, and increase the income and standard of living of their populations.[41] In 2002 a special Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development was established to deal with the specific problems of the underdeveloped areas. A common market levy was instituted to finance common market activities.

Main institutions of COMESA and spillover assessment

As in the other organizations discussed, the Authority of Heads of State and Government is the main decision-making organ of COMESA, meeting annually and taking decisions by consensus. The Council of Ministers responsible for regional economic affairs meets annually as well, and ensures the proper functioning and development of the common market. A Committee of Governors of Central Banks handles financial and monetary matters while an Intergovernmental Committee composed of permanent or principal secretaries is responsible for the development of programs and action plans in all other sectors. There are also a large number of technical committees that monitor the implementation of agreements. The secretariat of the organization is based in Lusaka, Zambia. The original PTA Bank (formally called the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank), established in 1985, became the COMESA Trade and Development Bank headquartered in Bujumbura, Burundi. The bank acts as the financial arm of the integration movement.

In the political area, the need for peace and stability and peaceful settlement of disputes, accountability, respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights and popular participation were all noted as guiding principles in COMESA's founding treaty. Many of COMESA's members—including Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea—have been embroiled in conflict in the 1990s and 2000s, and COMESA has opted to support the AU in mediation and peacekeeping efforts. In 2000, however, members decided that it was time to establish a stronger local institutional structure to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts as well as to deal with post-conflict reconstruction. COMESA established a peace and security mechanism composed of a Peace and Security Committee reporting to the ministers of foreign affairs. The committee makes recommendations to the ministers who in turn report to the Authority of Heads of State and Government. COMESA has been cooperating with SADC and IGAD in the security arena, and, like SADC, is part of the AU's efforts to establish the regional standby peacekeeping forces.

COMESA also established a seven-member Court of Justice, based in Khartoum (Sudan), which advises on, and handles disputes over, the interpretation of integration agreements, and also hears disputes between the common market and its employees. Individuals resident in member states do have standing before this court, as long as local remedies have been exhausted.

COMESA has no parliament. However, the input of national parliamentarians is encouraged, especially in peace and security areas, and the secretariat hosts various activities in that regard. COMESA also promotes the inclusion of nonstate actors including the private sector, in its activities, through invitations to participate in deliberations as well as the grant of accreditation to its Peace and Security Program. Unlike many other organizations, COMESA also has a formal channel for stakeholder participation in technical activities, that is, the Consultative Committee of Business Community and other Interest Groups, whose representatives take part in the meetings of the technical committees and may make recommendations to the Intergovernmental Committee.

While there has been some political spillover in COMESA, progress in the core economic sphere has been slow. The customs union was expected to come into effect by 2000 and a common external tariff was to be imposed 10 years from the date of the entry into force of the treaty (which was 8 December 1994). As with other arrangements, existing preferential arrangements could be retained and new ones negotiated under most favored nation criteria. Indeed, the free trade area was inaugurated in 2000 by Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, with Burundi and Rwanda joining later in 2004. Swaziland's membership depends on its negotiation of a derogation agreement from SACU. Comoros and Libya joined in 2006. However, of COMESA's 20 members, six still had not moved ahead to this first stage of integration as of 2007.

Meanwhile a customs union and the introduction of a CET carded for 2004 were postponed until 2008, and a higher-level monetary union is not expected before 2025. Intraregional trade remains relatively weak, hovering at about 6 percent in the 2000s.

Integration in North Africa

Arab Mahgreb Union (AMU)

The history of the North African states is one of conflict interspersed with failed attempts at cooperation. Prior to the AMU's formation in 1989, the Maghreb (a word that means "west") leaders had talked about a federation in the 1950s before and after Morocco and Tunisia received their independence from France in 1956. A consultative economic committee was set up in 1964 to promote regional trade and cooperation but it never worked. At that time, the political climate was hardly conducive to collaboration in North Africa. Algeria and Morocco had fought a border war in 1963 that was not formally settled until 1972. Morocco also claimed parts of Mauritania as well as the Western Sahara. Algeria's militant nationalism, later joined by Libyan leader's Muammar Qaddafi's socialism, created tensions with Morocco's monarchical conservatism. In the Western Sahara which came under Moroccan and Mauritanian control after Spain left in 1975, Algeria and Libya became the main backers of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Seguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario), formed to fight for the territory's independence. (Mauritania gave up its claim in 1979.)

In 1974 Libya proposed a political union with Tunisia but the attempt was rebuffed. However, in August 1984, Libya and Morocco signed a treaty establishing a union that was supposed to provide for various forms of functional and political cooperation. The venture was widely seen, however, as a way for Morocco to stop further Libyan assistance to Polisario guerrillas in the Western Sahara, as well as a strategy by Qaddafi to prevent any Moroccan criticism of his intervention in Chad (discussed in Chapter 5). Meanwhile Chadli Benjedid of Algeria also sought a federation of some sort with his neighbors, beginning with the signing of a treaty with Tunisia in 1983 and later, a Treaty of Fraternity and Concord with Mauritania, which by then had dropped its own claim to the Western Sahara. However, Algerian–Moroccan antagonism remained high.

In 1988, with a UN plan in place for a referendum in Western Sahara, the North African states met and agreed to establish a commission to work out details of an agreement on a union. The union was duly launched in February 1989, with the stated aims of reinforcing fraternal ties among the members; bringing progress, prosperity and peace to these societies; working toward progressive economic and financial liberalization and free movement of persons; and developing common policies in diplomatic, defense, economic, and cultural-Islamic areas.[42] Economic collaboration was proposed in industrial, agricultural, commercial, and social areas. Members also wished to form a free trade area that would lead eventually to a customs union and common market. Indeed, in 1990, members met and agreed to establish this customs union by 1995. That turned out to be unrealistic, however, and it was not until 2001 that a draft plan was drawn up by the trade ministers. Since then, political problems have basically stalled any progress.

The continuation of the conflict in Western Sahara doomed the AMU from the start. Algeria—and the African Union—has continued to support the Polisario Front and Morocco has continued to resist any thought of abandoning the territory. Although since 1991 the United Nations has been attempting to hold a referendum in the Western Sahara, disputes over who to include in the voters' list have precluded a settlement. Apart from differences over the Western Sahara, the AMU was impacted by the political breakdown in Algeria, where the cancellation of elections in 1991 in which the Islamists appeared to be headed for victory, led to a long civil war that lasted throughout the 1990s. In 1990 members were also divided over how to respond to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait: Morocco sent troops to support Kuwait but Libya was completely opposed to the intervention; Algeria and Tunisia expressed reservations as well. After the war, the AMU called on the Arab League to heal the divisions caused by the conflict but could not resolve its own differences. Also impacting the AMU was the imposition of international sanctions against Libya after the downing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Libya's leader, already skeptical about the value of the five-member union, expressed great dissatisfaction with the organization after the AMU did little to oppose the sanctions. In vexation Qaddafi turned his attention to promoting continental African unity.

AMU summits have not been held since 1994, and not all five leaders attended most of the summits that *were* held. All the leaders attended the first two summits held in 1990, but King Hassan was absent for the third summit, Colonel Qaddafi for the fourth, and both Hassan and Qaddafi absented themselves for the fifth and sixth summits held in 1994. Libya was due to take the rotating chair next but refused it because of the Lockerbie impasse,[43] after which the next summit was postponed indefinitely. Although the Libyan sanctions were progressively lifted beginning in 1999, continuing problems in the Western Sahara have since prevented the holding of any summit as anticipated in the 2000s. Meanwhile, however, some technical work of the organization continues. The Consultative Council met in 2001, after a nine-year gap. The foreign ministers have met fairly regularly, with their 26th meeting held in Rabat in February 2007. Discussions have taken place and some progress has been made on environmental issues, migration, food security, health issues, and cultural issues.[44] Nevertheless, without the heads of state meeting, the AMU is considered to be essentially dormant.

In politics and security, the AMU treaty contains a collective security clause (article 14) by which aggression against a member state is considered to be aggression against all. States are also asked to respect one another's territorial integrity and to abstain from adhering to any pact that is aimed at undermining the integrity of another member state. Interestingly the treaty is open for signature to any Arab or African state, an apparent concession to the Libyan leader's broad interests.

Main institutions of AMU and spillover assessment

Although the AMU treaty was signed in 1989, it was not until 1991 that most of the structures were formalized and decisions made as to the location of the headquarters as well as the appointment of a secretary-general. The AMU treaty provided for a relatively lean institutional structure. The supreme decision-making organ is a Presidential Council that meets once a year—originally twice a year but that was deemed too onerous in 1992—and takes its decisions by consensus. A subsidiary Council of Prime Ministers meets when necessary. A Council of Foreign Ministers' role is to prepare the program for the meeting of the presidential council and examine questions submitted to it by a Follow-up Committee composed of ministers of integration affairs. Specialized ministerial commissions deal with the areas of food security, economy and finance, infrastructure, and human resources. An investment and trade bank (Banque Mahrébine du Commerce et de l'Investissement Extérieur, BMCIE) was established in Tunis, and a Mahgreb University and Science Academy was established in Libya. The university was intended to be a regional body, but has become a Libyan institution. The small secretariat was eventually located in Rabat, Morocco.

In the political arena, apart from the inclusion of a collective security clause (but no actual mechanism), the treaty established a Consultative Council based in Algiers composed of ten members, increased in 1994 to 30, chosen from the national legislatures or selected according to the domestic rules of each state. While this advisory body is supposed to meet yearly, it has actually met only once, in 1992. A court was also constituted in 1999 and became operational in 2001. Based in Nouakchoutt (Mauritania), it consists of two judges per state and deals with issues and disputes concerning the interpretation of the treaty.

It is widely recognized that AMU integration will not proceed until the conflict in the Western Sahara is resolved. Overall, as one author notes, economic cooperation in the AMU depends on political will (more than in other regional economic schemes), and that has not been present.[45] It is indeed the case that "the concept of a Grand Maghreb was, and remains, much more a diplomatic one than an economic artifact. The political will of the heads of state is the motor that drives or stalls the regional construct … The logic of national interest has consistently overridden the logic of functional cooperation or economic integration."[46]

Central, North, and West Africa

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)

One African REC that crosses a number of regional boundaries is the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), established in 1998. Members include the North African states except Algeria, 14 French and English-speaking African states, and in Central and East Africa CAR, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan.

Promoted by Libya—like the AU which came into being shortly after—the CEN-SAD envisages the creation of a free trade zone and a common market, and aims, like other arrangements, to foster cooperation in transportation, industry, agriculture, energy, science and technology, and social and cultural areas. However, the creation of a free trade zone has been hindered by the obligations of the member states to other economic communities and has been postponed to 2010. CEN-SAD also aims to foster peace and security by prohibiting member states from using their territories in a way that might threaten the sovereignty or unity of the other member states. To ensure peace and stability, the member states have formulated a security charter, and adopted a mechanism for conflict resolution and management (see "Institutions," below).

Main institutions of CEN-SAD and spillover assessment

The Conference of Heads of State and Government is the supreme decision-making body, meeting annually. An Executive Council is the main implementing and technical body, meeting every six months and comprising ministers of foreign affairs, economy, and Interior and Public Security. The General Secretariat is the administrative and monitoring body and is located in Tripoli. In 2006, a Committee of Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives was added to function as another advisory organ for the Conference of Leaders and Heads of State, the Executive Council, the General Secretariat, or any other CEN-SAD organ.

A Sahel-Saharan investment and trade bank (established in 1999 as the African Bank for Development and Trade) based in Tripoli, Libya provides development and trade financing. A Special Solidarity Fund for humanitarian purposes was set up in 2001 and is supervised by Libya. Finally, an Economic, Social, and Cultural Council, located in Bamako (Mali), serves as an advisory board mandated to assist the organs of CEN-SAD in the design and preparation of programs of an economic, social, and cultural nature. The council is composed of five members designated by each member country, and meets annually. CEN-SAD has no court or parliament.

In 2000 a security charter was adopted reiterating members' commitment to help each other and to cooperate in defense matters. In 2003, by the Niamey Declaration, states committed themselves to the peaceful settlement of disputes; and in 2004, a Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, and Resolution of Conflicts was established. The mechanism is the Sahel-Saharan Council for Peace and Security, which answers to the summit and can meet at the level of heads of state, foreign ministers, or ambassadors. At the level of the secretariat too, there is a Defense and Security Committee of senior security officials, a Panel of the Wise composed of two persons from each country, a Sahel-Saharan Intervention Force (FSSI/CEN-SAD) made up of security personnel who can be deployed if necessary in conflict and humanitarian situations along with standby national units, and an early warning system, the Conflict Prevention and Surveillance Response System, in which input from civil society is solicited.[47]

CEN-SAD has joined with the AU, the UN, and other subregional groupings in trying to resolve major regional conflicts. It has sent fact-finding missions into Chad and Sudan and has engaged in mediation there, primarily through Libya and Nigeria. CEN-SAD called for African handling of the Darfur crisis, including the use of African standby forces. It has also supported other organizations in seeking to resolve the situation in Somalia. In less fractious arenas, the organization has been involved in elections observation in member states, including Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Benin, and Chad. CEN-SAD security officials have been meeting regularly in recent years and have agreed to joint action in terms of such "newer" security issues as illegal arms and drug trafficking, illegal immigration, terrorism, organized cross-border crime, money laundering, and cyber-crime.[48]

If judged by attendance at meetings, regularity of meetings, and expansion of membership, all sometimes rare in African movements, CEN-SAD is successful. It is also quite active in political areas. However, the creation of a free trade area has been stalled. In recognition of the problem of overlapping memberships, CEN-SAD has agreed to work toward the effective merging of CEN-SAD, ECOWAS, and AMU into one Community, but since CEN-SAD insists that this has to be a community under its own umbrella, such a merger will be difficult.[49] Finally, even more than the ECOWAS, CENSAD is seen as weakened by its heavy reliance on one country, in this case Libya, both financially and politically. In fact, the organization is widely viewed as a vehicle for the Libyan leader's pan-African ambitions.

General assessment/conclusion

Even a cursory look at the subregional arrangements in Africa will highlight the sheer number and overlapping nature of the communities. In West Africa, French arrangements compete with ECOWAS, despite the fact that ECOWAS has members from both cultural areas. In Central Africa, CEEAC overlaps with the smaller more tightly integrated grouping, CEMAC, not detailed in the chapter. In South Africa, there is SACU, SADC, and COMESA. COMESA, IGAD, and the EAC overlap, and CEN-SAD is an umbrella for three regions. The rationalization and streamlining of these arrangements is recognized as an urgent need inasmuch as overlapping memberships create a financial burden and, as integration proceeds, will generate trade and policy incompatibilities. Several countries have already withdrawn from groupings, and others will need to make difficult decisions about preferred memberships. In this respect, a number of groupings are considering mergers, notably CEMAC (not an AU REC) and CEEAC, UEMOA (also not a REC) and ECOWAS, and CEN-SAD with ECOWAS and AMU, but there are inevitable doubts among members about submerging their subregional identities.

Another feature of the African integration scene is its ambitious reach. Continental unity is the stated political as well as economic goal, and economic integration is being developed within the context of the creation of an African economic community. Whereas in Latin America, the continental process, envisaged unsuccessfully in the 1960s, is now bubbling up from below, the African process is being directed at the wider level. On the positive side, this means that the RECs can be actively assisted by the AU/AEC; on the negative side, subregional groupings may not be able to dictate their own pace.

The economic integration movement is also proceeding rather slowly overall. Except for a few arrangements—the smaller CEMAC and EAC, the cohesive UEMOA, and the older SACU—countries have not reached the goal of free trade and are far from moving to monetary union which only CEMAC (which is not a REC) and UEMOA have reached. Table 8.1 shows the growth in intraregional trade for most of the African communities. The most successful groupings in this respect are UEMOA (not shown in table), where regional exports have risen from almost nothing in 1960 to more than 13 percent of total exports in 2005, ECOWAS (where exports have risen from 1.4 percent in 1960 to 9.4 percent in 2005), and SADC (exports rose from 3.1 percent in 1960 to 9.1 percent in 2005).

In almost all the integration movements, there is a mix of members at medium levels of development and those at much lower levels, a situation which results in distributive arguments, despite arrangements put in place in all the communities to help less developed members. In addition, in many arrangements, the domestic financial problems of member states have been reflected in delays in dues-paying with adverse effect on the administration of the process. Both the distributive and financial issues also bring up another problem, that is the dependence in some arrangements on one or two wealthier members. In West Africa, Nigeria plays the dominant role in terms of economic, financial, as well as military and technological assistance. In UEMOA, the political crisis between north and south in Côte d'Ivoire between 2002 and 2007 (when a peace deal was signed) slowed growth considerably in neighboring member states. Moreover, the union is still heavily tied to France, which, while providing a measure of economic stability to members, and security assistance as well, places members in a politically compliant position. Likewise, CEN-SAD is heavily dependent on Libyan support.

Political instability is a major problem for African integration arrangements. The conflicts in West and Central Africa have absorbed the energies of the subregions, so much so that security issues have predominated over economic ones. Funding and resources for ECOMOG and other African forces have strained organizational capacity, and deep divisions within groupings have been caused by the tendency of members to support opposition or subversive groups in neighboring states.

Finally, on the positive side, the new integration in Africa is more than just technical or functional cooperation. In every arrangement except CEN-SAD there is a higher court and except for CEN-SAD and COMESA, a parliament. All courts except the AMU's and CEEAC's proposed court allow standing for individuals, that is "natural and legal persons," usually once local remedies are exhausted, and allow national courts to seek preliminary rulings. All courts except CEEAC's explicitly expect courts to apply domestic and international law as well as the integration treaty in their rulings. On the other hand, however, this progress toward supranationalism is limited: thus no court except that of ECOWAS has moved to incorporate human rights under its purview;[50] and nowhere is there yet a parliament elected by direct elections. As elsewhere, therefore, states remain quite firmly in control.

9 Subregional communities

Southeast, South, and West Asia, and the Pacific

Although Asian nations led the struggle for decolonization, the purely Asian solidarity movement was quickly sidetracked into the broader Afro-Asianism and nonalignment, which permitted the leaders of China, Egypt, India, and other proactive states to gain prestige and influence on the world stage. It was perhaps also inevitable that Asian cooperation efforts would be limited, given the diversity of the region in terms of pre-colonial histories and cultures, the great geographical spaces (including the Asian spaces that had fallen to Russian/Soviet expansionism), and above all the political competition among the various countries. As a result, the Asian regions have been, until recently, less enthusiastic about integration than their counterparts in Latin America and Africa. In this chapter, the most prominent integration movements of the Asian and Pacific countries of the global south are described.

Integration in South and Southeast Asia

India, the pearl of the British Empire, was the seat of non-Arab Asian anticolonialism, providing a nationalist success that helped drive the independence movement in Asia and Africa. India's prominence led it to host two important conferences intended to foster Asian cooperation. In 1947, an Asian Relations Conference was held in New Delhi to discuss Asian issues in view of the anticipated end of the European presence in the region. At this conference, which was technically a nongovernmental conference but which drew official attention and attendance, 28 countries were represented, ranging from Afghanistan to Egypt, Iran to the Soviet republics, Palestine to Tibet. A wide variety of Asian political and economic problems were discussed, and a weak coordinating council was established that lasted for eight years.[1] In 1949 another conference was held to discuss the situation in Indonesia, where the Dutch were seeking to reintroduce colonial rule. But thereafter Asian enthusiasm waned, at least partly because, as one author notes, "a number of Asian states were becoming jealous of India's predominance and did not wish to see it institutionalized."[2] In fact at the 1947 conference, divisions were already visible. According to Nicholas Mansergh,

> [I]t was clearly revealed throughout the discussions at the Conference that Asia is not a unit. The continent is split by divisions less deep that those which distract Europe but none the less profound. Imperial control in large parts of Asia had in fact papered over some of the cracks … The differences that now emerge are not differences between nations which for long have been independent and those which were dependent, but rather nascent rivalries between great Powers on the one hand [India, China, the Soviet Asian republics, and Japan, which was not represented at the conference] and fears of those great Powers by small Powers on the other.[3]

By the Bandung conference in 1955, rivalries for influence had deepened between India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Indonesia's Achmed Sukarno in particular, but also between these and Ceylon's Solomon Bandanaraike. Smaller countries were not anxious to see any hegemonic power emerge. Moreover, the hardening of the cold war brought competitive alliances—India with the Soviet Union, Pakistan and Indonesia with China. In fact, most Asian countries soon were drawn into the cold war competition in one degree or another.

The nations of East and Southeast Asia were particularly affected by this new development. Even at the 1947 conference, these countries had shown a suspicion of Chinese and Indian ambitions, and had mooted the idea of forming a bloc. In the 1930s Japan's colonization drive had resulted in the creation of an East Asian Federation involving Korea, Japan, and parts of China, as well as the establishment of the broader East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere uniting the federation members with Southeast Asia between 1942 and 1945. Japan's harsh occupation, despite its talk of anti-Western camaraderie, had ignited Asian nationalism. Once the Japanese were overthrown, however, divisions once again came to the fore, many resulting from the onset of the cold war. Korea was divided between the communist north and the pro-west south, leading to a war between them from 1950 to 1953; Vietnam was similarly divided, with northern socialists fighting against the pro-West south; pro-Chinese communists in Indonesia, which became independent in 1949, and the country's anticommunist military establishment observed an uneasy balance until an aborted communist coup in 1965 brought bloodshed, violence, and an army takeover. In

British Malaya, a Chinese communist rebellion delayed independence until 1957.

Meanwhile, the British supported the formation of a federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah), and Sarawak in 1963. This "Greater Malaysian Union," however, quickly disintegrated as Singapore pulled out in 1965, citing racial as well as ideological differences with Malaya. Indeed, Singapore was predominantly Chinese, whereas Malaya was predominantly Malay, and furthermore, Singapore was ruled by the nominally socialist People's Action Party headed by Lee Kuan Yew, whereas Malaya was governed by the conservative Tunku Abdul Rahman.

For its part, Indonesia, the largest state in the region, pursued a policy of "confrontation" (*confrontasi*) with the Malaysian federation, supporting various incursions into Malaysian territory, and announcing its desire to withdraw from the United Nations when Malaysia was elected to a term on the Security Council. As for the Philippines, which had gained its freedom from US control in 1946, it too claimed Sabah and opposed the Malaysian federation. Finally, Thailand, never colonized and located further away, while not involved in these Southeastern disputes, was focused on the problems in Indochina and the possibility of communist contagion. It therefore joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, an alliance of the Philippines, Pakistan, the United States, Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand, which placed it squarely in the pro-West camp, and in the early 1960s it began to play host to American bases where troops fighting in the Vietnam War were stationed.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Despite what would seem to be major political differences, by the 1960s the Southeast Asians, like others in the global south, were interested in functional cooperation. However, the Association of South East Asia formed in 1961 by Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand could not be effective so long as the first two members were arguing over Sabah. Another association, the Maphilindo association, brought together Malaya, Philippines, and Indonesia in 1963 but again political problems could not be sorted out. Maphilindo was an attempt to unite Malay peoples, but was also developed as an alternative to the federation of Malaysia that both Indonesia and the Philippines opposed as an imperial concoction. Finally, in 1967, with inter- and intrastate tensions fading and Sukarno's replacement by the anticommunist General Suharto, five countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—met in Bangkok in 1966, and agreed on the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN came into being in 1967.

Box 9.1 Members of Asian economic integration groupings

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Brunei, Cambodia, *Indonesia*, Laos, *Malaysia*, Myanmar, *Philippines*, *Singapore*, *Thailand*, Vietnam.

- Headquarters: Jakarta, Indonesia.
- *Italics:* original members.

Web site: http://www.aseansec.org/

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Afghanistan, *Bhutan*, *Bangladesh*, *India*, *Maldives*, *Nepal*, *Pakistan*, *Sri Lanka*

- Headquarters: Kathmandu, Nepal.
- *Italics:* original members.

Web site: http://www.saarc-sec.org/

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.

- Headquarters: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
- Note: Yemen is negotiating membership.

Web site: http://www.gcc-sg.org/

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)

Australia, Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

- Associate members: New Caledonia, French Polynesia.
- Special observer: Timor-Leste.
- Headquarters: Suva, Fiji.

Web site: http://www.forumsec.org.fj/

When ASEAN was created, war was still raging in Vietnam and there were fears, at least in Indonesia and Malaysia, of destabilization by insurgents backed by China. Thus, although ASEAN was intended simply to promote regional economic and social self-reliance, it evolved as well into an organization aimed at political coordination in the face of security threats.[4] ASEAN's aims, among other things, were to accelerate the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development of the region; to promote regional peace and stability; to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative fields; to collaborate in training and research in various spheres; and to foster cooperation in agriculture, industry, trade, transportation, communications, and social areas.[5]

Over the years, ASEAN economic integration took a back seat to the members' strong national economic policies. By focusing on national development, the group achieved the creation of a climate of stability and cooperation that allowed members to enjoy high economic growth rates.[6] Initially, intraregional trade grew at a rapid rate, despite the lack of any formal integration agreement. Intraregional trade was almost 13 percent of total trade in 1960 but rose to 22 percent in 1970 (Table 9.1). Functional cooperation in a wide range of areas was strengthened: the ad hoc committees and permanent committees of specialists and officials established by the Bangkok Declaration (article 3c) mushroomed by the 2000s into a host of ministerial committees meeting regularly to coordinate policy in (among other areas) agriculture and forestry, trade, energy, the environment, regional haze, rural development and poverty alleviation, science and technology, social welfare, tourism, and youth. There was, however, a lack of interest in formal and deeper integration until the 1990s, largely because the members were economically nationalist as well as sensitive to the problems posed by their differing levels of development. The Philippines and Indonesia were much less developed than the newly industrializing Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Competition for export markets and the prevalence of statist-oriented strategies hindered greater integration.

ASEAN states also became more engaged in conflict management. The situation in Cambodia was a preoccupation well into the 1980s. Vietnam had invaded that country in 1978, precipitating China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979, and it was not until 1989 that Vietnam ended its occupation. ASEAN was instrumental in mediating this dispute, and Indonesia co-chaired with France the 1991 Paris Conference where the five permanent members of the UN Security Council succeeded in negotiating a peace settlement. Under the settlement, a UN peacekeeping

Table 9.1 Asian intraregional trade (in percentage and US$ million)

Grouping			*1960*	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*	*2000*	*2005*
APTA	Percentage	Imports	3.4	2.2	1.3	1.2	9.8	13.8
		Exports	4.8	2.8	1.7	1.6	8.0	11.0
	$US mn	Imports	100.0	99.9	802.0	1,911.1	44,291.1	149,331.1
		Exports	83.7	89.3	783.1	2,428.7	37,894.6	127,276.9
ASEAN	Percentage	Imports	9.4	13.8	14.4	15.2	22.5	24.8
		Exports	12.7	22.4	17.4	19.0	23.0	26.2
	$US mn	Imports	260.4	1,084.1	9,264.5	24,845.6	82,929.9	141,614.8
		Exports	258.7	1,398.8	12,413.5	27,364.8	98,059.8	165,064.3
GCC	Percentage	Imports	–	2.9	6.6	8.4	8.7	7.7
		Exports	–	4.6	3.0	8.0	4.8	4.8
	$US mn	Imports	–	48.3	3,405.3	3,999.8	6,496.7	15,469.0
		Exports	–	117.0	4,631.9	6,905.8	7,958.3	16,507.2
MSG	Percentage	Imports	–	0.1	0.8	0.2	1.0	1.3
		Exports	1.0	0.4	0.7	0.3	0.6	0.8
	$US mn	Imports	–	0.5	13.5	4.5	23.4	53.2
		Exports	0.4	0.8	11.0	5.4	22.4	50.9
Oceania[1]	Percentage	Imports	–	0.2	1.0	0.8	2.3	2.3
		Exports	4.6	1.6	3.5	0.6	2.3	3.0
	$US mn	Imports		1.6	23.3	25.7	81.2	152.3
		Exports	1.8	6.1	71.8	12.6	101.5	234.7
SAARC	Percentage	Imports	3.9	2.1	2.0	2.0	3.5	3.8
		Exports	5.0	3.2	4.8	3.2	4.1	5.4
	$US mn	Imports	128.8	75.8	493.8	755.7	2,717.5	7,104.4
		Exports	104.0	98.7	612.7	863.0	2,593.4	7,062.0

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of Statistics 2006,* (online at www.stats.unctad.org/handbook), Table 1.4, “Intra-trade of regional and trade groups.”

Note: (–) not available or not separately reported. (1) Figures are not available for the Pacific Islands Forum. The data provided here are proxy figures, representing the intra-trade for “developing Oceania.” More than 80 percent of developing Oceania’s trade continues to go to the rest of Oceania.

force, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, was deployed. Another case in which ASEAN states were involved was in Timor Leste, when anti-Indonesian violence broke out in 1999. Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore sent troops to join the UN international force in East Timor.

However, ASEAN has more frequently not intervened with force in conflict situations, preferring dialogue and accommodation. This has particularly been the case with issues involving their large neighbor China. An especially contentious issue involving ASEAN members and China is the status of the Spratly Islands that are claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Philippines, as well as China. In this dispute there have been a number of military skirmishes and maneuvers that have threatened regional stability, and by a declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea approved in 2002, ASEAN states and China agreed to settle these disputes through dialogue and peaceful means. In the interim, they also agreed to allow the use of the islands for activities such as marine environmental and scientific research, search and rescue operations, and anti-crime activities.[7] On another major flashpoint, North Korea's nuclear ambitions, ASEAN has simply supported all attempts at dialogue.

ASEAN has taken some steps in the 1990s and 2000s to deepen economic integration. While member states had always promoted trade links, they had never been enthusiastic about establishing a formal common market, abandoning the idea in 1987.[8] However, in 1992 ASEAN members, responding to global developments including the consolidation of the European Union (EU) and the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation,[9] decided to create an Asian Free Trade Area as of 1 January 1993, with the eventual goal of achieving a common market. The agreement was to be phased in over 15 years (eight years at most to reduce tariffs to 20 percent, followed by seven more years to reduce tariffs to 0–5 percent). The original time frame was shortened in 1995 to five years each. In 1999, it was agreed to eliminate all import duties by 2010 for the six original members of ASEAN and by 2015 for newer members Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam, these having joined between 1995 and 1999. Some sensitive products were allowed an extension to 2018. A mechanism for settling disputes related to the free trade area was put in place in 1996 and revised in 2004. It consists of panels put together by a technical committee called the Senior Economic Officials Meeting, with appeal possible to the ASEAN Economic Ministers, one of ASEAN's main ministerial committees.

Then in 1997 to 1998, the currency crisis that hit the region brought home to member states the need to work to counter the adverse effects of heightened global interdependence as also the costs of liberalization. Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammad was particularly critical of the Western nations for pushing global south countries to liberalize rapidly, and of Western investors whom he saw as engaging in the speculation that had sparked the crisis. The fall of Indonesia's government and continuing political problems in the Philippines added a political overlay to the economic malaise. Spurred to act by the crisis, ASEAN members (in cooperation with dialogue partners China, Republic of Korea, and Japan, the so-called ASEAN plus three) agreed to put in place mechanisms for stronger monetary cooperation.

Main institutions of ASEAN and spillover assessment

The "ASEAN way" has been touted as a flexible approach based on shared values rather than formal institutionalization. Indeed, the Bangkok Declaration that established ASEAN was not a charter. By the declaration a simple structure was created: an annual meeting of foreign minister as the main policymaking body; a Standing Committee as the operational body, chaired by the foreign minister of the host country or his representative, and also including the accredited ambassadors of the other member countries; ad hoc committees and permanent committees of specialists and officials; and national secretariats in member countries. As in other integration arrangements, summits are the highest decision-making body, but the ASEAN structure leaves most policymaking in the hands of the foreign ministers. In fact, initially few summits were held: summits were held in 1976 and 1977, but then not for 10 years, until the political problems of the member states eased in 1987. Since 1995 there have been annual summits, two of which—1996 and 2000—were informal meetings.

Noteworthy in the original scheme was the absence of a permanent secretariat. The agreement on the establishment of a secretariat was not drawn up until 1976, when members endorsed the need for one based on the rapidly growing activities of ASEAN. Apart from this secretariat, located in Jakarta, Indonesia, the national secretariats, which work with the Standing Committee, continue to be involved in the form of sections within the foreign ministry of each member state.

ASEAN ministers of finance and economic affairs also meet regularly as the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting and the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting respectively. In addition to the wide-ranging technical committees already mentioned, ASEAN has a number of specialized centers on energy, biodiversity, meteorology, and tourism, among other foci, as well as a university network. All ASEAN members are members of the Asian Development Bank created in 1966 and consisting of 67 members in 2007. The bank assists developing member countries in financing regional cooperation through technical assistance grants and project loans. Japan has long dominated the bank in funding.

From relatively early on, ASEAN articulated a number of norms in the security arena. In the 1970s, there was a recognition by states that true security depended not just on military capability but also on developing "resilience"—that is, political, economic, social, and cultural strengths—at both the national and regional levels. In 1971, with Britain's withdrawal from the region and the US loss in the Tet offensive in Vietnam, ASEAN states adopted a declaration requesting states to make every effort to establish the region as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN), "free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers."[10] However, given the continuing conflicts in Indochina and their aftermath that would last well into the 1980s, the declaration remained a wish list for another two decades. More positively, in 1976 ASEAN states meeting for their first summit adopted a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that promoted cooperation, respect for sovereignty, the right of every state to be free from external interference, the nonuse of force, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In terms of the last, a mechanism was established in the form of a High Council comprising a ministerial representative from each state, to recommend appropriate means of settling disputes and to engage in good offices if needed.[11] (Amendments made in 1987 and 1998 opened the treaty to other states in Southeast Asia and to non-Southeast Asian states respectively.)

At the 1976 summit in Bali, an ASEAN Concord was also signed establishing political, economic, social, and cultural goals. Among the political was the signing of the Treaty of Amity and the promotion of the ZOPFAN.[12] Then in 1995, with major regional conflicts settled, ZOPFAN was supplemented by the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone that came into effect in 1997. By the treaty, each state party undertakes not to develop or manufacture, station, transport, or test nuclear weapons; not to allow, in its territory, any other state to do the same, and not to dump or dispose of nuclear waste on its territory or at sea or allow other states to do so.[13] Another development of ASEAN in the security arena was the creation of an Asian Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 where ASEAN members and other developed and developing country partners meet to discuss and manage regional security issues.[14] Complementing ARF was the establishment in 2000 of an informal ministerial troika composed of the current, past, and future chairs of ASEAN's Ministerial Committee.

They would be available if needed to "address in a timely manner urgent and important regional political and security issues and situations of common concern likely to disturb regional peace and harmony."[15] In 2003, the Bali Concord created an ASEAN Security Community reiterating the essential goals of the three "pillars"—that is, political/security, economic, and sociocultural spheres—enunciated in the first Bali Concord, and recommitting the region to policies of noninterference, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, nonuse of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes.[16] In the 2000s, there has been intensified cooperation on such newer issues as transnational crime, especially drug trafficking, HIV/AIDS and the spread of diseases, and terrorism, this last brought close to home in 2002 by bombings in Bali, Indonesia, as well as in the Philippines.[17] Various initiatives against terrorism, including close cooperation with the EU and with China, were initiated at that time.

In the 2000s, ASEAN states have determined that it is time to incorporate the relevant declarations and agreements reached to date, including those dealing with development goals and the promotion of democracy, human rights, transparency, and good governance, into a formal charter. In 2005 the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter was adopted, establishing a Group of Eminent Persons to examine and provide practical recommendations on a charter. A high-level task force was assigned to draft the charter.[18] The charter was tabled and signed at the fortieth anniversary commemorative summit in 2007. Among the institutional changes proposed are: twice-yearly instead of annual summits; the institutionalization of the foreign ministers' body as the Coordinating Council which, among other things, will oversee the work of relevant ministers serving within three community councils (the Political-Security Council, the Economic Council, and the Socio-Cultural Council), all meeting twice a year; a Committee of Permanent Representatives; creation of a human rights body (with an as-yet unclear mandate); and the creation of an ASEAN Foundation for community outreach. Decision making will continue to be primarily by consultation and consensus, and disputes are to be resolved by peaceful procedures or, for matters related to the treaty, usually by resort to the ASEAN enhanced dispute settlement mechanism.

ASEAN has no court or parliament. However, quite early on, in 1986, the organization adopted guidelines for the accreditation of civil society groups to the institution. Since then, the groups accredited have come to include chambers of commerce, academic associations, labor groups, student groups, and employee federations. However, as elsewhere, civil society has limited independent impact or influence.

ASEAN has particularly sought to include the traditional major stakeholders in its deliberations.

While ASEAN states have been praised for their early recognition of the relationship between security and development, they have also been criticized for their non-confrontational approach to resolving problems, their adherence to noninterference, and their reliance on informal mechanisms and constructive engagement. In this spirit, in 1997 Myanmar was accepted as a member, despite the country's abysmal human rights record, an ASEAN decision that was much criticized by Western countries. ASEAN has a policy of constructive engagement with Myanmar but divisions within ASEAN on the issue have grown, with the low-income members empathizing with Myanmar, whereas Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines are concerned about ASEAN's diplomatic image, and Thailand has become more worried over time.[19] ASEAN's noninterventionist approach has meant that major disputes have tended to be resolved not by ASEAN but by external partners such as the United States and the United Nations. Also, as one analyst notes, ASEAN's propensity to restrict institutionalism has limited its ability to test formal intramural dispute settlement and to engage in multilateral diplomacy.[20]

Among integration arrangements, the ASEAN case is interesting in that almost from the beginning ASEAN has been developing security and political norms and principles. In this sense, spillover has not been a matter of moving from technical economic cooperation to higher levels of economic and political integration, but rather a movement from political cooperation to the economic. But then, the ASEAN view on economic arrangements has long been that economic cooperation is secondary to national development or, as ASEAN members view it, that national resilience is the key to regional resilience. In this respect, one of the difficulties posed has been how best to deal with Indonesia and the Philippines, and more recently, the newer members Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Although the organization has become more diverse, integration has become a more difficult proposition. The new charter signed in 2007 therefore gives a nod to the hesitant economic approach in including an "Asean Minus X" provision that allows members to opt out of economic commitments if they can win consensual agreement from other members.[21]

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

In South Asia, the struggle against British colonialism did not lead to efforts to find common economic and/or political cause after independence, but rather to disunity and disintegration. Pakistan seceded from India when a suitable agreement could not be reached about the status of Muslims in independent India. The ensuing years have been characterized by ethnic and religious conflict between Muslims and Hindus that has often been stirred up or supported by their state sponsors; by four wars over disputed Jammu and Kashmir; and by a competition for power in the region that reached a peak when the countries exploded competing nuclear devices in 1998.

India's size and dominance are by nature a destabilizing element in the South Asian region, especially since India seeks to influence developments in neighboring countries. Thus in 1971 India lent assistance to Bangladesh in its (successful) effort to secede from Pakistan. In Sri Lanka, India, pressured by its own Tamil groups, was accused of covertly supporting the antigovernment Tamil rebels, and in 1986 to 1987 it sent a "humanitarian" force into Sri Lanka that was later legitimized as an Indian peacekeeping force. India has also had a dominant relationship with the smaller Himalayan kingdoms, and even the Maldives fell under its long reach when India intervened militarily in 1988 to restore the government after an attempted coup.

Economic cooperation is obviously a difficult enterprise amid a climate of inter- and intrastate instability. In addition to the core India–Pakistan conflicts, and the Tamil–Sinhalese conflict that has since the 1970s wracked Sri Lanka, once viewed as an exemplary, socialistic global south country, Nepal in recent years became a collapsed state where the conservative royalty faced a Maoist guerrilla insurrection and, more recently, a successful movement for democratization against royal rule. Democracy has in fact been lacking in the states of South Asia other than India: Pakistan's political history is one of military rule interspersed with a few attempts at democracy that have invariably produced violent social upheavals; Nepal (prior to 1990) and Bhutan have been traditional monarchies (although Bhutan is democratizing: a referendum on a new constitution was held in July 2008); in the Maldives the government has not changed since 1978; and Bangladesh was under military rule until 1991. In the democratic states or during democratic eras, family dynasties have emerged, reflected in the political powerhouses of the Gandhis in India, the Zias and Sheiks in Bangladesh, and the Bhuttos in Pakistan.

With so much conflict among South Asian states, and such intense power rivalries among the leaders, a successful regional arrangement that would involve the majors of Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka seemed unlikely. Yet in 1981, Bangladesh proposed the establishment of a functionally oriented Association of South Asian Nations. In response, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives attended a preliminary conference on the issue in Colombo, Sri Lanka. At the time, however, India and Pakistan, not surprisingly, were cautious about the establishment of any formal grouping. The 1981 meeting was followed up by a foreign ministers' meeting in 1983 in New Delhi, India. After further discussion, in 1985 a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) charter was formally adopted by all seven nations. In 2007 Afghanistan, though still emerging from civil conflict between the Taliban and the Western-backed government of Hamid Karzai, was welcomed as the eighth member of SAARC.

The aims of the association were necessarily nonpolitical, except insofar as the stated guiding principles included respect for territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and noninterference in countries' internal affairs. The organization was created to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region; to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the member states; and to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in economic, social, cultural, technical, and scientific fields.[22] Article 10 reinforced the nationalist approach in affirming that decisions at all levels were to be taken on the basis of unanimity, and that further, bilateral and contentious issues should be excluded from deliberations.

SAARC has focused its attention on functional cooperation through committees and working groups in a wide range of areas including agriculture, health and population activities, women, youth and children, the environment, science and technology, transport, communications, tourism, and energy. Poverty alleviation has been a strong focus in view of SAARC members' own priorities as well as, since 2000, the members' desire to attain the Millennium Development Goals. In terms of formal economic integration, in 1993 countries agreed to establish a South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) within which tariffs would be reduced while taking into account the position of the least developed countries. The agreement entered into force in 1995, but by then the leaders had agreed to further integration by establishing a free trade area (SAFTA). Between 1995 and 2004, work was done on the drafting of a SAFTA treaty. In 2004 this treaty was signed and it entered into force January 2006.

The treaty called for the creation of a free trade area, leading to a customs union by 2016. The more developed members would reduce tariffs to 20 percent in two years, and 0–5 percent in five more years, whereas the least developed members—Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal—would be given an additional three more years to complete the schedule.[23] Under an "early harvest program," India, Pakistan, and

Sri Lanka could bring down their customs duties to 0–5 percent by 1 January 2009 for the products from the least developed member states. These last are accorded special and differential treatment with respect to their integration obligations: they have greater flexibility in terms of continuing quantitative restrictions, measures have been put in place to enhance their exports, and technical assistance and compensation are granted to them to make up for the loss of customs revenue. Further down the road, SAARC members are hoping to create a South Asian Economic Union.

Main institutions of SAARC and spillover assessment

As is the case with other organizations, the highest decision-making body of the SAARC is the summit of leaders, which is expected to be held annually. However, some summits have not been held, and some have been postponed for months because of members' domestic political problems. The 1989 summit in Colombo was postponed because of ethnic violence as well as another round of India–Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. The ethnic strife in Bhutan caused the postponement of the 1991 summit. Problems in India led to the postponement of the 1993 summit and the cancellation of the 1994 summit. A coup in Pakistan led to the postponement of the 1999 summit and no meeting was held until 2002. The 2003 summit was postponed because of renewed tension between India and Pakistan. The 2005 summit was postponed when India pulled out, citing political problems in Nepal as well as the deteriorating security situation in Bangladesh. On the other hand, the 14th summit held in New Delhi in 2007 was generally viewed as one of the most successful and least contentious.

As noted earlier, SAARC decisions are adopted on the basis of unanimity, making the organization strongly statist. A Council of Ministers comprising foreign ministers meets at least twice a year and is the body responsible for formulating policy and reviewing progress in regional cooperation. The Standing Committee comprising foreign secretaries (bureaucratic heads) monitors and coordinates SAARC's programs of cooperation. It meets as often as necessary and reports to the Council of Ministers. The Committee on Economic Cooperation consisting of secretaries of commerce oversees regional cooperation in the economic field. Lastly, technical committees comprising representatives of member states are responsible for the implementation, coordination, and monitoring of the programs in their respective areas of cooperation. The SAARC secretariat is based in Kathmandu, Nepal.

The SAFTA established a weak mechanism whereby disputes on integration matters can be settled. Disputes are to be handled bilaterally or, if no agreement can be reached, by a Committee of Experts, which is a standing advisory body of senior economic officials who advise the SAFTA Ministerial Council. The establishment of an arbitration council is under consideration.

In 2002 a permanent committee consisting of central bank governors and finance ministers (SAARFINANCE) was established, mandated, inter alia, to harmonize the macroeconomic and banking policies of the member states, and monitor important global financial developments. In 2005 it was decided that the South Asian Development Fund, which was established in 1996 to promote industrial and infrastructural, institutional, and human resource development in the SAARC region, would become a development fund (the SAARC Development Fund, SDF) and would be an umbrella institution for all SAARC projects. Within the SDF, a poverty alleviation fund was established.

SAARC members have been attuned to newer integration initiatives, including the need to make integration relevant to their social sectors. In the first place, like many other integration groupings, SAARC passed a Social Charter in 2004 expressing a commitment to people-centered development, and encouraging cooperation as well as a recognition, appreciation, and respect for cultural diversity and traditions.[24] Second, SAARC has also developed some consultative mechanisms that allow for limited input from civil society. SAARC gives special status to the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a SAARC regional lawyers group called SAARCLAW, and regional accountants (SAFA). These are designated in its institutional scheme as "apex bodies." In addition, medical, media, women's and architect groups, are among those associated with SAARC as "recognized bodies."

SAARC has no parliament but a special status has been granted to the Association of Speakers and Parliamentarians, an organization of the heads of legislative assemblies of SAARC member states. The association was launched in 1992 but has met irregularly (in 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2006). It is not a parliament, has no formal structure and no mechanism by which to advise the SAARC, and primarily has a role in promoting people-to-people contacts and interchange.

Even though SAARC has avoided political discussions on contentious bilateral issues (except on the margins of meetings), the members have embarked on various security initiatives, conscious of the fact that economic progress depends on political stability and cooperation. In 1987 in the aftermath of various terrorist incidents, SAARC members adopted the SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of

Terrorism that contains measures for cooperation and extradition of terrorists (the convention came into effect in 1988). An additional protocol of 2004 focusing on measures to combat the financing of terrorism was ratified in 2005. Apart from this protocol, at the Islamabad summit of 2004, a declaration was adopted condemning terrorism, committing member states to peace, territorial integrity, and noninterference, and, in view of the membership composition, alerting them to the particular vulnerabilities of small states that "should be firmly addressed by scrupulous adherence to the UN Charter, rules of international law and strict adherence to the universally accepted principles and norms related to sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all states."[25] Apart from terrorism, SAARC, like other organizations has intensified cooperation, including law enforcement and humanitarian coordination, in multidimensional areas of security including drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children, cross-border issues, corruption, the effect of natural disasters, and HIV/AIDS and other health issues peculiar to the region.

Overall, SAARC is still a relatively weak integration arrangement. As shown in Table 9.1, trade among SAARC members has never been much more than about 5 percent of total exports, low in comparison to Latin American interregional exports but comparable to the Central African and North African experience. Since the institutions of the grouping are still being strengthened, the development of supranational organs such as a higher court or a regional directly-elected parliament, are not on the agenda for the foreseeable future.

Integration in the Pacific

The Polynesian, Melanesian, and Micronesian island chains were variously colonized by, or entrusted under the League of Nations' mandate system and/or the UN's successor trusteeship system to, seven powers: the United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The largest independent state, Papua New Guinea, was an Australian and German colony that became a mandate and then trust territory of Australia. Nauru, the smallest, was also administered by Australia in coordination with Britain and New Zealand. New Zealand once administered the former German Samoa and nearby Niue, and governed the Cook Islands as well. Most of the other islands were British protectorates or territories given over to US trusteeship after Japan's defeat in World War II. Vanuatu was administered through a condominium arrangement between France and the United Kingdom, but most of France's territories have remained dependencies.

In 1947 the administering countries formed the South Pacific Commission (SPC) as a nonpolitical body aimed at fostering consultation and providing advice and technical assistance to the South Pacific countries. As the small islands became independent, beginning in 1962 with (Western) Samoa, they were admitted to the SPC as members. However, in 1962 the Netherlands withdrew from the organization when the status of Irian Jaya (West New Guinea) was resolved in favor of Indonesia. In 1996, Britain left the organization alleging that it was mismanaged; Britain returned in 1998 after the organization was reformed administratively and financially, but withdrew again in 2005, preferring to focus its attention elsewhere. Even though the SPC, which is headquartered in Nouméa, New Caledonia, has become less paternalistic and metropolitan-oriented as a result of the membership of the former dependent territories, the metropolitan powers still control the organization's budget, with Australia providing the lion's share. The SPC changed its name in 1998 to the more geographically accurate Pacific Islands Community. It continues to focus on technical programs in a tripartite set of areas: land resources, marine resources, and social and human resources.[26]

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)

The Pacific Islands Forum differs from the organizations discussed earlier in this chapter in that it is not a grouping of only developing states but also includes Australia and New Zealand as developed country members. Nevertheless, because it is an organization that was established as a counterpoint to the earlier colonial SPC, that is to primarily reflect the views of the small Pacific states, it has to be included as a global south institution.

The forum began as the South Pacific Forum (SPF) Forum in 1971, formed by newly independent Pacific states that viewed the SPC as not capable of dealing with decolonization and development issues. The SPF's goal was to encourage both political and economic cooperation among the members, and also cooperation between the less developed and more developed members. Like the SPC, the SPF changed its name in 2000 to more accurately reflect the regional scope of the membership.

Main institutions of PIF and spillover assessment

Until 2005, the SPF/PIF operated without a charter: policy guidance was provided by the summit of heads of government and by ministerial committees. The 2005 agreement established the following structure: the Forum Leaders' Meeting is the highest decision-making body (this is an annual summit), with decisions taken by consensus; the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat is based in Suva, Fiji, and has an executive committee, the Pacific Islands Forum Officials' Committee, comprising one representative of each member state, that gives general policy directions to the secretariat and makes recommendations to the leaders.[27] The forum has no formal rules governing its operations. The secretariat is the permanent chair of a 10-member Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific that includes the SPC along with various regional educational associations, the regional environmental program, and development, fisheries, travel, and geoscience agencies.

In 1980, the SPF negotiated a South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Agreement (SPARTECA) which permitted nonreciprocal access to the markets of Australia and New Zealand. However, in the 1980s and 1990s members were primarily focused on cooperation in functional areas such as transport, fisheries, and environmental issues, especially anti-nuclear issues. In the 2000s, however, economic integration efforts were initiated. In 2001 the governments of Papua New Guinea and the smaller islands agreed to form a free trade zone, the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) with progressive elimination of tariffs by 2010 (2012 for the small island and least developed members) and 2016 for certain imports. The "least developed" category refers to states designed as such by the United Nations, that is Kiribati, Tuvalu, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Small island states are: Cook, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and any others so designated. The agreement came into force in 2003 and only the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands (which did not sign), and Tuvalu had not ratified it as of 2007. In addition to PICTA, the Pacific Agreement on Closer Relations (PACER) was drawn up in the same year granting favorable treatment for Australia and New Zealand in free trade talks between forum members and other non-forum countries. PACER entered into force in 2002 but was not ratified by Marshall Islands, Palau, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, and not signed or ratified by Micronesia as of 2007.

The PIF has also continued to focus on environmental security and in the late 1990s and 2000s money laundering, drug trafficking, terrorism, and threats to governance. A number of declarations on regional security cooperation have been adopted since 1992. Most significant has been the 2000 Biketawa Declaration which moved the community away from its traditional stance of noninterference. The Biketawa Declaration proposed the following mechanism for dealing with crises: the secretary-general of the SPF (PIF), after consulting the forum chairman would initiate a process including consultations with the national authorities and with the forum foreign ministers, the formation of a fact finding group, mediation, or the convening of a meeting of the forum security committee or if all else fails, a meeting of the leaders themselves to consider "targeted" measures. With a new mandate to intervene, PIF sent election observer missions into the Solomon Islands in 2002, and then, in 2005, into Bougainville (Papua New Guinea, PNG) where a secessionist war had been fought throughout the 1990s and a new autonomous government was elected in 2005), and in 2006 into Fiji. The persistent problems in Solomon Islands led to intervention under the Biketawa Declaration when the government asked for help to restore stability amid ethno-political unrest and general lawlessness in 2003. An Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI) has been in the islands since then. In addition, in 2004, PIF leaders agreed to support Nauru's request for forum assistance under the Biketawa Declaration. Nauru has been in a financial crisis as a result of the decline in its phosphate-based economy.

In October 2005, the PIF leaders adopted a comprehensive Pacific Plan to strengthen cooperation in the next 10 years. The plan is built on four pillars: economic growth, sustainable development, good governance, and security for the Pacific through regionalism. In the context of the plan, the "Kalibobo (PNG) Roadmap" offered specific initiatives for the first three years, including deepening economic integration and functional cooperation, developing conservation, energy, health, education and sport initiatives, institutionalizing human rights and leadership and accountability norms, and strengthening border security, law enforcement cooperation, and disaster mitigation programs.[28]

The PIF has no parliament. However, like other organizations, it has been strengthening its links with civil society. The private sector has been the primary stakeholder, engaged through a Regional Public-Private Sector Consultative Mechanism (RCM) adopted in 2002. Civil society groups have held parallel meetings to the annual summits since 1995, but they became more formally integrated with the drawing up of a Framework for engagement with Pacific Regional Non-State actors by the secretariat in 2002. Civil society groups have been widely consulted in drawing up the Pacific Plan, and for that purpose the secretariat has formalized links through the stationing of a liaison officer at the secretariat.

Like ASEAN, the PIF has focused on consensus, noninterference, national prioritization, and institutional flexibility, but it is currently restructuring in all those areas. The members have been slow to integrate economically. At least part of the problem comes from the varying levels of development: the situation of the small island states contrasts with the dominance of PNG, and the relative strength of Fiji. In fact, PNG, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu formed their own free trade association, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), in 1993, which Fiji also joined in 1998. In addition, overall, the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the organization has produced a dependence on those countries in terms of financial support and reduces the effectiveness of the PIF as a "third world" organization.[29] The influence of Australia is particularly strong in the security realm, where the country has spearheaded intervention in Solomon Islands and PNG as well as East Timor. The Australian approach has been increasingly aggressive and impatient as the country has demanded results for its money and has also become bogged down in security operations.[30] Not surprisingly, the MSG, the only Pacific organization in which Australia and New Zealand are not members, has been particularly critical of this approach.

Integration in the Persian Gulf region of West Asia

The Persian Gulf states include the relatively small states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, seven Trucial states, and (Muscat and) Oman. As in other global south regions, Britain, which established quasi-colonial arrangements in the Gulf by way of truces and treaties from 1820 to the 1960s, sought to federate the smaller states before leaving the region.[31] For their part, the smaller states had needed Britain to counterbalance the Ottomans and later, to counterbalance Saudi Arabia which claimed territory in Muscat and in Abu Dhabi. On the other side, they needed to counterbalance Iran which claimed Bahrain as well as the gulf islets of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. Kuwait, a bit more removed, was also claimed by Iraq, since it had been Iraq's province before Britain took control of the territory.

Britain's proposed trucial federation did not immediately come into being. Instead Bahrain opted for independence in 1970 after Iran dropped its claim to the territory, and Qatar and Ras-al-Khaimar followed in 1971. In that year, the remaining states Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, Dubai, and Umm al-Qaiwain, formed the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 1972 Ras al-Khaimar changed its mind about single independence and joined the UAE. Muscat and Oman merged to become Oman, which was granted its independence in 1971.

Territorial disputes continued after independence, however, marring prospects for strong cooperation in the Gulf as a whole, Although Iran dropped its claim to Bahrain, it seized the islets of Abu Musa and the Tunbs after signing a bilateral accord with Sharjah giving the latter some rights on Abu Musa.[32] Sharjah had previously exercised sovereignty over that island. This precipitated a long lasting dispute with the UAE, supported by the other Gulf states. In response Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and expelled Iranians from Iraq.[33] The dispute remains unresolved, with Iran insisting on its claim to pre-colonial sovereignty while the Gulf states continue to affirm the full sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the islands, the territorial waters, airspace, and the related continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.[34]

In addition to this dispute, whereas the Shah of Iran had renounced Iran's claim to Bahrain in 1970, the claim was revived by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. The fact that Bahrain has a majority Shia population is certainly an influence on Iran's relationship with the country.[35] One analyst also points to the Gulf's strategic significance: "The Gulf is very important to Iran … : it is Iran's main window to the outside world. The Straits of Hormuz, controlled by the Sultanate of Oman and Iran, through which Iran exports all of its oil production, is of vital strategic important to Iran."[36]



Map 9.1 Western Asia.

There are other territorial disputes among the Gulf nations. Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi settled their border in 1974 but in 2005 the UAE rescinded the 1974 boundary—which it may have been unduly anxious to sign in order to get Saudi recognition at the time of its independence—claiming that the agreement had not been formally ratified. Tensions increased between the two countries, but both continued to adhere to the 1974 agreement.[37] Qatar also had border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, both settled only in 2001, the former by a ruling of the International Court of Justice. These territorial disputes, which occasionally led to skirmishes and gunboat diplomacy in the 1980s and 1990s, prevented the deepening of Gulf cooperation. Qatar distrusted Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, while Bahrain occasionally claimed that Qatar was meddling in its affairs.[38]

Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have long played rather large roles in influencing Gulf foreign relations. As historian Peter Calvocoressi notes regarding the post-independence scene,

> the new order rested essentially on agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, on the latter's inability to secure at this stage full control over the western shores of the Gulf to match Iran's control on the other side, and on the fortuitous absence of Egyptian and Iraqi voices owing to the former's defeat in 1967 [Arab–Israeli war] and the latter's continuing war with the Kurds, and other internal weaknesses … [39]

Maintaining this balance of power has continued to be highly important to the countries involved. While pursuing pragmatic relations with Iran, the Gulf states have also had to keep a wary eye on that country's ambitions. Furthermore, apart from the border disputes and the general Iran–Arab differences, Iran and Saudi Arabia have vied for regional influence as well as religious influence based on the one hand, on Shiism, and on the other, on Sunnism and on Wahabbism, Saudi Arabia's dominant doctrine.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in 1981 at a time when Iran was flexing its muscles under a new revolutionary Islamic regime and the Iran–Iraq war was intensifying. The GCC, initiated by Kuwait and carried forward by Saudi Arabia, was ostensibly *not* intended to deal with any particular security issue but certainly the Gulf states could not but be aware of the need for cooperation in the face of the threat from Iran. By cooperating in economic and functional areas, this group of countries, which shared a common culture and common values, could also strengthen their political position in the region.

The GCC charter itself is somewhat vague about the organization's role—the stated aim is simply to strengthen relations, especially in economics, commerce, culture and education, and science and technology. However, in a November 1981 United Economic Agreement, the states clarified their position regarding economic cooperation: they agreed to harmonize their development, their industrial, financial and investment policies, and their transportation, communications, and technical assistance policies. They also agreed to grant reciprocal treatment to one another in terms of facilitating the freedom of labor and capital, and to free barriers to trade to the point of establishing a minimum external tariff.[40] Indeed, a free trade area came into being in 1983.

Economic and political problems delayed further progress in integration until the 1990s when revitalization was begun. In 1999 members finally agreed to move to a customs union by 2003 (originally 2005). The Economic Agreement of 1981 was then revised and adopted in 2001. The customs union was initiated on time, when the external tariff was lowered to 5 percent. A currency peg of the currencies of these primarily oil-based economies to the dollar was also approved at that time. As of 2007, monetary union is expected by 1 January 2010.

The Economic Agreement of 2001 is notable for its provision of a strong dispute settlement mechanism. Claims can be brought by any GCC citizen or official entity, first to the secretariat and if not resolved, to the GCC Commercial Arbitration Center, a center established in 1993 in Bahrain. If the two parties do not agree to refer the dispute to arbitration, or should the dispute be beyond the competence of the center, it is referred to relevant GCC committees (to be replaced eventually by a special judicial commission).[41]

The GCC states have engaged in a variety of cooperative endeavors, coordinating policy in, among other areas, the oil and gas sectors, in industrial development, commerce, utilities, finance, information, science and technology, and social and environmental spheres. Cultural promotion has been an important area because the GCC states seek to promote knowledge about, and appreciation of, their common heritage, and of Arabic and Islamic values. Their legal systems share a common basis in the Islamic Sharia.

Despite the functional content of the original charter, issues of peace and security were of immediate concern to the GCC states. Saudi Arabia, a leading promoter of the GCC, supported Iraq in the Iran–Iraq war and the war generated concerns about GCC security. In 1983 therefore, a defense force called Peninsula Shield was created, primarily with Saudi Arabian troop participation. The force was intended to provide collective defense in case of aggression against any member; however, it was a supplement rather than a replacement for the national forces and national defense plans. Then during the Gulf War of 1991, Egypt and Syria met with GCC foreign ministers in Damascus who agreed on the formation of a collective security system that would be heavily funded by the GCC. But GCC states, including the beleaguered Kuwait, soon reconsidered the possibly destabilizing, and definitely costly, ramifications of maintaining an Arab force. Instead, they relied on signing military agreements with the United Stares allowing for the stationing of troops and the use of GCC territory by the US-led forces. During and after the war, they confined themselves to calling for Iraq to respect the territorial sovereignty of Kuwait, to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, and to work with the United Nations so that the sanctions that were hurting the populace could be lifted. During the second Gulf War, these states also chose to assist the US-led coalition forces by providing logistical assistance. In Afghanistan, another front in the counterterrorist movement, GCC states also provided some logistical support and humanitarian aid for the forces in Afghanistan.

The conservative GCC states may not always agree with other Arab states but they have been consistent in their support for a Palestinian state, and indeed Saudi Arabia has often taken the lead in this regard. A Saudi plan for Middle East peace has been promoted since 2002 and was adopted by the League of Arab States in 2003. The plan centers on Arab recognition of Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from territories seized in 1967, and a resolution of the Palestinian refugees' right to return. GCC states have also lent diplomatic support to Muslim allies in Lebanon, Somalia, and Bosnia, among other hotspots.

Main institutions of the GCC and spillover assessment

The GCC is institutionally quite lean. An annual meeting of the Supreme Council of heads of state is the highest decision-making body. This Supreme Council can choose members of a Commission for the Settlement of Disputes on an ad hoc basis when disputes arise concerning the interpretation or implementation of the charter. There is no regional court. A Ministerial Council of foreign ministers meets every three months and is in charge of (among other things) proposing and reviewing policies, making recommendations, and making arrangements for meetings of the Supreme Council. It is also charged with encouraging coordination of private sector activities and cooperation among the region's chambers of commerce and industry, and encouraging labor mobility within the GCC. Votes in the councils are unanimous on substantive matters, and by a simple majority on procedural issues.

The GCC has no parliament. However, in 1997, the Supreme Council approved the creation of a Consultative Assembly that would give individuals a channel to voice their concerns and views. In 1998, the Supreme Council decided that this assembly would meet annually in between summits. The assembly consists of 30 individuals, five from each member state, and its main responsibility is to study the issues that are presented to it by the Supreme Council. Completing the structure of the GCC is the secretariat, which is located in Riyadh.

In the security area, as already noted, GCC attempts to develop stronger collective defense mechanisms have floundered and nationalist approaches predominate. The GCC has been criticized for its perceived toothlessness in dealing with regional conflict. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq caught the GCC by surprise, and the organization is generally viewed as having reacted slowly during this crisis. Its forces were not deployed independently of the UN-backed multinational force.[42] The invasion brought new fears about Iraq's ambitions, resulting in the GCC moving closer to the Western countries, a position affirmed during the second Gulf War, and one which has distanced them from many of their more neutral Arab neighbors. On the other hand, since the 1990s, the GCC, like other regional groupings, has deepened regional cooperation among national security agencies in areas such as narcotics and arms trafficking, immigration issues, and counterterrorism initiatives.

Overall, the GCC remains firmly intergovernmental and functionally oriented. States remain in control of GCC affairs, for example dispute settlement and civil society consultations fall under the purview of the heads of state, and unanimity is required for all major decisions. On the economic side, however, the member states have succeeded in forming a customs union, are moving toward travel liberalization, and are continuing to unify their relevant regulations. Still, the success of the union is yet to be reflected in trade figures. Intraregional exports declined in the 1990s from 8 percent of total exports in 1990 to 4.8 percent in 2000, and have yet to show major increases in the 2000s. GCC cooperation is hampered by the preference for bilateral approaches, as reflected in the successful negotiation of a US-Bahraini free trade accord in 2004, and in continuing negotiations between the United States and the UAE and Oman. GCC cooperation is also hindered by social underdevelopment, despite the fact that the oil-based economies of most member states are quite robust.

General assessment/conclusion

Although accelerating in recent years, the movement toward deeper economic integration is weaker in Asia than it is in Latin American and the Caribbean, and far less ambitious than current African efforts. In South Asia, the slow effort is focused on functional cooperation with only very limited institutionalization and policy integration. Instead of developing conflict resolution mechanisms as has happened in Africa, the SAARC has avoided contentious political issues which have, nevertheless, severely impacted the integration effort. In West Asia, in the GCC, one of the few integration movements, conservative Gulf states have favored national political initiatives over the regional, and even though in the economic area they have officially embraced trade integration, intraregional trade remains limited. In Southeast Asia, intra-trade is strong, but this has hardly been the result of the formal integration process. Instead it is the result of the compatibilities between policies of national and regional resilience. Security cooperation follows similar dynamics. In addition, in all the arrangements discussed, differences in regulating countries that are at varying levels of social and economic development have made integration a challenge.

In Southeast Asia, the "Asian way" is often touted as a caring approach, one that favors non-confrontation and informal procedures, and a flexible approach based on limited institutionalization. The "Asian way" has a counterpart in the Pacific where the Pacific Islands Forum has preferred very informal procedures, at least until the 2000s. This makes it difficult to assess many Asia-Pacific integration arrangements by the usual standard of higher institutionalization and progressively deeper policy coordination among members. On the other hand, in terms of the construction and consolidation of a common culture and common values, these arrangements are more advanced than many others in the global south.

Finally, although there seem to be no hyper-regional integration aspirations in the Asian region similar to the continental African aspirations or the Latin American continental integration goals (which are now also tentatively hemispheric), steady steps toward wider cooperation are present, reflected in the ARF and ASEAN plus three initiatives as well as in the creation in 1997 of the BISTEC (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation). Now called the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), with membership including also Bhutan, Myanmar, and Nepal, this grouping runs across South and Southeast Asia, and aims at both extensive functional cooperation as well as the creation of a free trade area between 2012 for the more developed members and 2017 for the less developed (2009 and 2011 for fast track products).[43] In addition, an older preferential trade agreement (Asia Pacific Trade Agreement, APTA, formerly the Bangkok Agreement) signed in 1975, under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), has been revitalized institutionally in the 2000s. In 2001 China joined this institution, whose original members are Bangladesh, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Republic of Korea, and Sri Lanka. Laos has not extended concessions but receives these from some members. Other members of UNESCAP, including the Philippines, Thailand (which both signed but did not ratify the original agreement), Papua New Guinea, and Pakistan have been observers during some or all of the three rounds of talks held on trade liberalization, and are expected to join soon. In short, APTA could therefore conceivably play the role of regional umbrella for subregional efforts.[44]



Map 9.2 Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

10 Summarizing global south institutionalism

In the last eight chapters, the main global south multilateral, intergovernmental institutions have been analyzed at three levels of analysis: the tricontinental, regional, and the subregional. From a chronological viewpoint, there has been an evolution of southern institutionalism from the all-regional and multifunctional (dating back to the 1940s), through the tricontinental (established to gain global political influence) as well as the subregional (formed for narrow technical reasons) in the 1960s, and then to today's enhanced subregional initiatives that aim not only at deepening economic integration but at policy and political spillover. What is noticeable is the persistence of old institutions and the growth of many new ones. For example, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) seemed in danger of obsolescence in the post–cold war age, but has instead persisted, retooling to address original goals—in particular, the improvement in the socioeconomic status of the developing nations—by the adoption of new accommodationist strategies. Again, the 1990s and 2000s have witnessed the revitalization of old subregional movements and the flourishing of new ones, even in regions such as Asia where cooperation has until now been limited by inter-state political rivalries. Indeed, global south nations see institutional growth as necessary if the challenges of liberalization and globalization are to be satisfactorily addressed.

In the Introduction to this book, some perspectives were offered as to why global south nations have joined and created so many institutions. Clearly they are guided by practical considerations: institutionalism is an efficient way of containing costs while learning about and engaging with the world. But the importance of institutional means of challenging the status quo has also been emphasized. In this conclusion, it is first worthwhile to consider what these analyses of the institutions of the global south can tell us about the utility of various theoretical approaches. We can then end by briefly asking what the prospects are for further intensification of global south institutionalism.

Theoretical approaches

Looking back on our eight chapters, four of the (state-centric) theoretical approaches seem relevant: neofunctionalism, neoliberalism, critical institutionalism (the name I give to counterhegemonic/counterdependent perspectives), and identity constructivism (recognizing that constructivist approaches are quite diverse). Of course other approaches can also be employed to understand integration, especially today, approaches that focus on the informal and nonstate sectors (for example, a New Regionalisms Approach has been developed by a group of international political economists).[1] But informal processes are beyond the scope of this book. Rather, each of the statist approaches noted has something to offer to the analysis of the global south, but each must at the same time be brought in line with some unique characteristics of the global south nations.

In today's world where regionalism is again a popular strategy, neofunctionalism, one of the early efforts to address and explain the phenomenon of regionalism, still has some explanatory power. The theory suggests that depending on certain preconditions such as common history, values, and, in particular, interests, states will proceed to integrate gradually at the regional level, with technical integration deepening over time and spilling over into political areas. In a related vein, economists have long clearly delineated the stages of integration: from free trade area to customs union to common market to true community. However, neofunctionalists recognize that spillover may not occur in an orderly rationalist fashion. Instead a disjoined incrementalism is normal during which spill-back and side-tracking will occur.[2] However, goals remain quite constant.

Over time, the theory of neofunctionalism was all but abandoned, as the most advanced regional arrangement, the European Community, experienced setbacks that did not conform to neofunctionalist expectations. However, the new regionalism of the 1990s revived interest in the perspective. As can be seen in all the subregional chapters of this book, a neofunctionalist ethos permeates global south integrationist initiatives: formal processes of economic integration have clearly been laid out in most subregions of the global south, and in many there is an expressed hope for continental integration, even political union.

On the other hand, the discussions in the various chapters have highlighted the continuing reluctance of southern nations to give up too much of their sovereignty, even as they try mightily to expand their functional and security cooperation. Agencies with supranational intent are rare in the south, and mechanisms for retaining state control over the integration process proliferate. Even as decision making in northern countries becomes more and more open to nongovernmental influences, domestic and civil society influences on the formal integration process in the south continues to be weak, deliberately kept so by the state leaders who dominate the process. Global south countries, in other words, continue to be sovereignty-guarding and to view regionalism as an adjunct to nationalist processes.

Another key aspect of the integration process as it works in the global south (in the 1960s as well as today) is the strong impact of external forces on both the decision to integrate and subsequent decisions to deepen cooperation. The very impetus to cooperate in the south has in large measure come from outside. It is not just that the constantly changing global environment demands reaction and response, for indeed all states and institutions experience this effect as the natural course of things, but it is rather that, as the discussions in the chapters show, much of the institutional change in the south is *driven* by the need to survive in a system in which it is northern countries that are most capable of molding matters to suit their interests. The issue is essential to the critical institutionalist perspective outlined briefly below. It is also important to note that many institutional mechanisms adopted in the south are normative and structural borrowings from the north. Standards of economic development, declarations and protocols on democracy and human rights, these are not generally produced by endogeneous urges but rather as a way of responding to the demands of external forces (or of domestic forces influenced by and allied with external partners). This does raise the issue of whether some of the changes we have seen in the structure and content of global south institutions reflects true commitment on the part of member states or are merely superficial constructions that may or may not take root, depending once again on the extent to which external forces keep up the pressure.

Another aspect of externalization is important, even though not unique to the south. In the 1970s Ernst Haas spoke of the role of growing global interdependence in hindering the orderly progress of European integration: the integration process had been "sidetracked by the competing process of growing extra-regional enmeshment which may not be integrative in the same sense, or which may lead to a different focus for integration."[3] In other words, extra-regional considerations (such as, at the time, the need to work more closely with the global south, all too apparent after the oil crises of the 1970s) had hijacked the priorities of regional harmonization and institutionalization. Similarly, in the global south, externalization has played a major role in inducing the highs and lows of integration: more so than in somewhat more self-contained Europe, southern countries have had to keep in mind that their primary trading partners are in the north, such that progress in integration in the south has been dependent on calculations of the impact on and of external arrangements.

The second theory that can be considered relevant is the grand theory of neoliberalism, an approach that assumes that states are self-interested actors that bargain and offer incentives and disincentives to achieve their individual goals. What is called "intergovernmental regime theory"[4] remains quite applicable to global south cooperation and integration because the influence of domestic sectors on foreign policy as a whole is still so weak in most developing countries. Global south governments seem to engage in institutionalism primarily to achieve instrumental goals. State interests are primary and can be conceived as rational.

The ups and downs of global south multilateral cooperation to a great degree reflect the prevalence of cost-benefit analyses by states that constantly ask: what can institutionalism offer that cannot be handled singly? The institutions of the global south are geared primarily toward achieving some tangible (primarily economic) benefit for the members, and these benefits are expected to be distributed evenly or harmoniously, a problem when so many institutions are dominated by one or more wealthier or stronger states. Still, the institutions generally show a capacity to deal cooperatively with such power differentials and to try to compensate by ensuring side payments of various kinds to smaller and disaffected members that are only too willing to threaten withdrawal or to free ride. It is a positive sign that institutional mechanisms to resolve related technical disputes are becoming increasingly stronger. On the other hand, with regard to the extra-institutional inter- and intra-state conflict that has disrupted the progress of many a global south organization, distrust and competition among states continue to hinder institutional attempts to deal more effectively with such disputes. Some organizations have opted simply for conflict avoidance, others for the careful use of non-confrontational methods, and others have tentatively and rather reluctantly moved toward more interventionist stances, which still are heavily dependent on national will and perceptions of interest. Despite the slow development in this area, however, the descriptions in this book highlight the fact that in all the major institutions of the global south, security cooperation and trust are deepening, not so much in traditional security areas, but in response to the rise of numerous new transnational threats that obviously cannot be tacked singly.

A third applicable perspective, one that is arguably the best explanatory approach to understanding the global south's actions, is what can be termed critical institutionalism. For, as noted in the Introduction, while realists and neoliberals stress the impact of anarchy (that is, the lack of a central government) on state behavior in the international system, critical theorists point to the hierarchical structure of the system and the patterns of southern behavior that result from this. On their independence, the nations of the global south inherited patterns of economic, political, and cultural dependence arising from colonialism, and postcolonial strategies of counterdependence or counterhegemony have been adopted to try to bring about change. But the political and economic dominance of the super- and great powers has constrained the sphere of action of the weaker states, such that their options have basically been either to bandwagon or to adopt resistant postures that risk sanctions from their stronger counterparts. Given this reality, it is not surprising that the south has used institutionalism as a way to counter this dependence and marginalization through collective action. As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the creation of the NAM and the work of the Group of 77 (G77) must be seen in this light, as indeed also the establishment of the more narrow subregional initiatives in the 1960s. The heyday of southern collective action was the 1970s, followed by continued declines in influence as the diffusion of liberal norms from north to south and the advent of a new era of globalization engendered more complex patterns in north–south relations. Even so, while global south institutionalization might appear today to be less radical or, even, less reformist in orientation, southern multilateral institutions, even the most technical among them, are still seen as forums and mechanisms used by global south states to try to avoid marginalization, to achieve a more equitable distribution of global economic benefits, improve the social condition, and increase the south's political influence in global affairs.

The neoliberal view of regimes (that is, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures) as the benign product of collective agreement among the members of the international community, also merits critical reconsideration. For in fact, norms have tended to be promoted by the northern nations and imposed on, or put more generously, diffused to, southern nations normally through elite groups and then governmental sectors. The inclusiveness of the dialogue relevant to the establishment of most such regimes is therefore open to question. As Randolph Persaud notes, "the neoliberal institutionalist stresses cooperation, but the very principles and norms that underpin this cooperation are themselves elements of power that keep third world countries in structurally disadvantageous positions."[5] To be sure, norms such as decolonization can be viewed as having originated in the activities and lobbying of developing nations; however, the path toward northern acceptance of such bubble-up norms has been strewn with more obstacles than the path by which north-initiated norms are diffused. And, as anti-globalization forces articulate so well today, regimes that have originated in the north—in particular, the liberal regime widely adopted in the 1990s and 2000s—have not had such benign effects on the fortunes of global south nations.

Finally, a fourth and important perspective on global south institutionalism, is constructivist, in particular the focus of many on the role of culture and identity factors in the formation and maintenance of cooperation among developing nations. (Given what was said above about norm promotion, the constructivist focus on how norms become established is also obviously important.) The discussions in this book highlight the importance of common cultural ties in engendering all levels of cooperation: that is to say, it is almost a cliché to note that a third world identity born of a sense of relative deprivation helped bring African, Asian, and Latin American states together in the NAM and in the G77. Even the more narrowly focused cartel arrangements such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries have exploited this third world identity. At the continental level, the impetus for multifunctional cooperation came from ideas and sentiments of pan-culturalism; and at the subregional level, common culture has been as important as narrow technical interests in fostering economic integration. This is not to say that cultural commonalities—the somewhat fuzzy sense of brotherhood and sisterhood and "x-ness"—have trumped nationalism in terms of the actual performance of integration. In fact, while culture may have played a significant role in promoting cooperative linkages, it has not in the past been sufficient to ensure the maintenance of cooperative relations at the state level (often people–people integration has been much more progressive). On the other hand, the revitalized and new regionalisms appear to be more focused today on the need to build and expand this foundation of common identities, whether African or Latin American continentalism or multicultural Caribbeanness or pride in Asian values and ways of doing. It is a positive development that the assumption seems to be made that the wider the identity institutions are able to foster, the greater the chance of socioeconomic success for the members in a globalized world that demands broad cooperation. Moreover, the fact that global south nations are making much of fostering a *dialogue* of civilizations as the scaffolding which can sustain efforts at cross-cultural cooperation, is also an extremely promising approach.

The promise of global south institutionalism

Global south analysts have much to lament: the social fallout from rapid economic liberalization; the marginalization of uncompetitive economies; the vulnerabilities of open economies especially in the financial sector; the new burdens placed on poor states with respect to implementing tax and investment regulations and legislating intellectual property rights; the pressure on states to cooperate in security, labor, environmental, and other areas; the unwillingness of the northern countries to make major agricultural concessions; the loss of influence of the global south in international economic decision making; and many, many, other concerns. As leaders seek to address these concerns, they see that the global environment of the 2000s is one that in many ways favors bilateral and bi-regional approaches that compete with the construction of broader global south initiatives. But the Bandung spirit of third world cooperation has not been abandoned. It has simply evolved into new forms, particularly regional forms.

One might say that the institutions of the "third world" (a term that carried an inherent sense of inferiority and struggle) have become the institutions of the global south (suggesting a more mature and multifaceted approach to cooperation). After a period of pure cooptation and some disarray, global south nations appear to be opting for a variety of approaches, involving a judicious blend of both cooptation (perhaps superficial) and confrontation. These changes are reflected in the institutions that they dominate. The analyses in this book suggest that the global south nations continue to put their faith in institutions, both because it is the practical and least costly approach, and because institutions remain channels for achieving both tangible gains and global influence. The institutional also remains the best sphere for achieving long-term change by furthering the collective southern interests *vis-à-vis* the north. This explains why the pace of institutionalism has in fact quickened in the 2000s.

In the final analysis, global south nations have constructed an identity or a set of regional identities out of their common experiences, and that identity fosters cooperation and persists because of the persistence of hierarchy in the international system. Until that hierarchy changes, and until the international system and the states and other units that comprise that system become more inclusive, global south connectivity will be reflected in a growing number of south–south activities and institutions. This augurs well for the continuing study of multilateralism in the south.

Notes

Foreword

1 Maggie Black, *The No-Nonsense Guide to International Development*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: New Internationalist, 2007), 16.
2 See Rorden Wilkinson and James Scott, "Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Reassessment," *World Trade Review* 7, no. 2 (July 2008): 473–510; and Rorden Wilkinson, *The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade* (London: Routledge, 2006).
3 Ian Taylor and Karen Smith, *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)* (London: Routledge, 2007).
4 See James Vreeland, *The International Monetary Fund: The Politics of Conditional Lending* (London: Routledge, 2007); Graham Harrison, *The World Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States* (London: Routledge, 2004); and, Jim Yong Kim, Joyce V. Millen, Alec Irwin, and John Gershman, eds., *Dying for Growth: Global Inequality and the Health of the Poor* (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2000).
5 See Mark T. Berger, guest editor, "After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism,"special issue of *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004): 9–39. See also R. Malley, *The Call From Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); and G. Lundeestad, *East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics Since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
6 Georges Balandier and Alfred Sauvy, *Le "Tiers-Monde," sous développement et développement* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1961).
7 See the Group of 77 at the United Nations web site, www.g77.org
8 See also Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, *The World Trade Organization: Law, Economics, and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2007); and Katherine Marshall, *The World Bank: From Reconstruction to Development to Equity* (London: Routledge, 2008).
9 Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner and Dennis Gayle, eds., *Caribbean Public Policy: Regional, Cultural and Socioeconomic Issues for the 21st Century* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997); Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, W. Marvin Will, Dennis G. Gayle, and I. Griffith, *The Caribbean in the Pacific Century* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, *The Caribbean in World Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the English-Speaking Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Jacqueline

Braveboy-Wagner, *Interpreting the Third World: Politics, Economics and Social Issues* (New York: CBS/Praeger, 1986); and Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, *The Venezuela-Guyana Border Dispute: A Study in Conflict Resolution* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).

10 Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, *The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

Introduction: multilateralism and the global south

1 Published annually by the Union of International Associations, Brussels, Belgium, and K. G. Saur Verlad, München, Germany. The 43rd edition was published in 2006–7.

2 For example, see Maurice East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," *World Politics* 25 (July 1973): 556–76.

3 See Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, *Interpreting the Third World: Politics, Economics, and Social Issues* (New York: Praeger, 1986), chapter 1: "Defining the Third World."

4 Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 246, 89–91.

5 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations," in *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World,* ed. Paul F. Diehl (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 11.

6 Ibid.

7 Ernst Haas, *When Knowledge is Power: Three Modes of Change in International Organization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

8 See for example Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

9 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1989), 36.

10 See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 2 (1971): 81–117.

11 On the dependency approach, see, among others, André Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson, eds., *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972); the world-systems approach is most associated with Immanuel Wallerstein. See, for example, his *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

12 See, for example, Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Shaping of World History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); and Robert W. Cox, "The Way Ahead: Toward a New Ontology of World Order," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 45–59.

13 Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,* 255–57; see also the cosmopolitan vision of David Held in "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism," in *Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance*, ed. David Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 160–86.

14 John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Practice of an Evolutionary Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 13.

15 Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (December 1988): 386.
16 The more stringent criterion is Ruggie's. See *Multilateralism Matters*, 1, 13.
17 For an overview, see Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism," in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacquie True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 188–212.
18 For example, see Michael Brecher, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics* 15 (January 1963): 213–35, and William Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem," *International Studies Quarterly* 17 (March 1973): 89–117.
19 Bruce Russett, *International Regions and the International System* (Skokie, Ill: Rand McNally, 1967).
20 This is noted by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner in "The New Wave of Regionalism," in *The Politics of Global Governance*, ed. Paul F. Diehl (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 315. They also refer to a very useful source, Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective," in *Network Power: Japan and Asia*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), 1–44.
21 G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), 26.
22 Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International World Order*, ed. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 37–71. Cohesion involves both a common front *vis-à-vis* external forces, and the role of the region as an organizational base for implementation of policies on different issues at a regional level.
23 Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), 16.

1 Tricontinental diplomacy: the Non-Aligned Movement

1 The Colombo Group had joined with Western developed nations in a plan for economic and social assistance initiated in 1951. The Colombo Plan is now called the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific.
2 The 29 participants were the five organizers Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Pakistan, and India; plus Afghanistan, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast (Ghana), Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the state of Vietnam, and Yemen.
3 See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 2 (1971): 81–117.
4 Bandung documentation is available from the European Navigator *Centre Virtuel de la Connsissance sur L'Europe* (www.ena.lu). Documents from the Indonesian government's special site, www.asianafricansummit2005.org were also used here but have since been archived. Some of them may still be found (as of 1 September 2007) on other Indonesian government sites, for example, Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kerekonomian (www.ekon.go.id) and the site of the Indonesian embassy in Singapore, www.kbrisingapura.com/kaa.

5 See Peter Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance* (New York: Nichols, 1978), 18–19.
6 Ibid., 23
7 Most of this is noted ibid., 38–43.
8 Sources used for these documents were Henry M. Christman, ed., *Neither East nor West: The Basic Documents of Non-Alignment* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1973); *Final Document of the XIII Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement*, Kuala Lumpur, 25 February 2003 (available from the Malaysian government at www.bernama.com as of 1 August 2007); and *Final Document, 14th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement*, Havana, Cuba, 11–16 September 2006 (NAM 2006/Doc.1/Rev.3, available at www.cubanoal.cu/ingles/index.html).
9 *Declaration on the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership*, and *Joint Ministerial Statement on the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership, Plan of Action*, Asian–African Summit, Jakarta 2005. Available at www.kbrisingapura.com/kaa
10 See *Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Movement at the 58th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Report on the Activities of the Non-Aligned Meeting*, NAM/FMM/GA58/Chair/Report (New York, 26 September 2003).
11 *Statement on the Revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement in UNESCO*, 12 March 2007. http://embacu.cubaminrex.cu/Default.aspx?tabid=3156
12 *Basic Documents, The Call from Colombia*, 11th summit of the Non-aligned Movement, Cartagena, Colombia, 18–20 October 1995. Available at www.nam.gov.za/xisummit/call.htm
13 "India Trying to Bring NAM into the New World Order: A World Without Cold War between Superpowers," *India Daily*, 15 September 2006 (online edition at www.indiadaily.com).
14 See, for example, "India to US: NAM Still Relevant," Press Trust of India report, *The Indian Express*, 29 June 2007 (available online at www.indianexpress.com).
15 Data on NAM voting coincidence with the United States are available in United States Department of State, *Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations 1987, 1997, 2006*. For 1987 see Government Document S1.1/8:987. Reports from 1997 on are also available online from the State Department web site (www.state.gov).
16 The conference final declaration is available at www.un.org/WCAR/
17 For more information, see its web site at www.southcentre.org
18 Kalinga Seneviratne, "Born Again Non-Aligned News Network Has Chances," *Inter-Press Service*, 18 March 2006 (http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31156).
19 *Final Document*, XI Summit, Cartagena, 18–20 October 1995, article 30.
20 *Journal of the Group of 77*, July/August 1977.

2 Tricontinental functionalism: the Group of 77

1 R. D. Hansen and contributors, *US Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1982* (New York: Praeger Publishers for the Overseas Development Council, 1982), annex chart B-6, 175.

2 "Network of Exports by Region and Commodity Group, Historical Series 1955–2002," United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *Handbook of Statistics 2005*. Available at www.stats.unctad.org
3 See World Bank, *World Bank Tables 1980* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1980), 414–18.
4 *Handbook of Statistics 2005*.
5 "Joint Declaration at the 8th Session of the UN General Assembly, 11 November 1963," *ECDC Handbook, Documents of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of 77* (UNCTAD/NAM, 1983), 103.
6 Ibid., 103–4.
7 UNCTAD, "Long-term Changes in the Terms of Trade, 1954–71," Documents TD 138 and 138/Suppl. 1, 24 March 1972, tables I-1, I-2, and A-4.
8 Information Service, UNCTAD, Office of the United Nations, Geneva, press release, TAD/350/November 1968.
9 For more see Joan Edelman Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, *The Politics of International Economic Relations* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 228.
10 Ibid.
11 Bernard Hoekman and Patrick Messerlin, "Removing the Exception of Agricultural Export Subsidies," in *Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda,* ed. Will Martin and Kym Anderson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
12 See the OECD database: http://www.oecd.org.
13 See, for example, "Action Programme for Economic Cooperation, Fifth Non-Aligned Summit, Colombo, 16–19 August 1979," in *ECDC Handbook, Documents of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of 77*, 1983, 34–45.
14 Figures are from UNCTAD, *Handbook of Statistics 2006*. Table 1.4, "Intra-trade of regional or trade groups."
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., table 2.1, "Country trade structure by main region of destination and origin."
17 Member countries are: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro), and Zimbabwe.
18 The seven are Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and the United States. The IMF's G7 has a slightly different history. It began as the Group of Five (Britain, France, Japan, West Germany, and the United States) until 1986–87 when the seven took over.
19 But the committee was overtaken by events including the currency float, oil crisis, and global inflation, and concluded that it would be impossible to draw up a plan for reform. See Spero and Hart, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, 23.
20 The committee's formal name is the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and Fund on the Transfer of Real

Resources to Developing Countries. In 2007, the members were the governors of the World Bank for: Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Finland, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Morocco, Netherlands, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.

21 See details at www.g15.org. See Box 2.1 for the members as of 2007.

22 Denis Benn, *Multilateral Diplomacy and the Economics of Change* (Miami, Fla.: Ian Randle, 2003), 29.

23 GA Res. 3281, GAOR, 1974, 29th session, supplement no. 31, 50. Six countries voted against (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and 10 abstained (Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, and Spain). Opponents were primarily concerned about preservation of foreign property rights. For a discussion, see Burns H. Weston, "The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth," *American Journal of International Law* 75 (July 1981): 437–75.

24 Participants in Cancún were: United States, Sweden, Japan, France, Britain, Canada, Austria, West Germany, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Guyana, India, Venezuela, Ivory Coast, Mexico, the Philippines, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Brazil, China, and Yugoslavia. The USSR was invited but did not attend. Cuba, though chair of the nonaligned at that time, was not invited.

25 For a discussion, see "Developing the Capacity to Compete in a Liberalizing and Globalizing World Economy?" South Center (Switzerland), *South Letter* 27, no. 4 (1996).

26 IMF data on commodity prices are available online at www.imf.org

27 The eight goals are to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a Global Partnership for Development.

28 *Statement by Rolf W. Boehnke, Managing Director, the Common Fund for Commodities*, 16 June 2004, UNCTAD 11th Session, General Debate, São Paulo, Brazil, 13–18 June 2004.

29 *Doha Plan of Action,* Second South Summit 12–16 June 2005, Document G-77/SS/2005/2.

30 See for example, United Nations High-Level Committee on the Review of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, *New Directions for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries,* (TCDC 13/3) 17 March 2003, and *Review of Progress in the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action and the New Directions Strategy for Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries,* (TCDC 13/1), 2 April 2003.

31 See OECD, Development Cooperation Directorate, *Final Official Development Assistance (ODA) Data for 2005,* and preliminary statistics for 2006, available at www.oecd.org. Information on MDG timetables is from the UN Millennium Project, www.unmillenniumproject.org/

32 See *The Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development*, The Final Text of Agreements and Commitments adopted at the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18–22 March 2002, (A/CONF.198/11), 22 March 2002.

33 More information is available at www.unctad.org
34 See *Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights*, (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2), 13 August 2003; (E/CN.4/2005/L.87), 15 April 2005. These are documents of the sub-Commission and Commission on Human rights respectively.
35 See the IMF's web site at www.imf.org
36 See the web site www.spa-psa.org
37 The G22 (or G20 plus) countries protested northern refusal to negotiate on farm issues at the WTO negotiations in Cancún in September 2003. Members included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. El Salvador was a member but withdrew.
38 *Statement by His Excellency Mr. Clement Rohee, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Guyana, on the Occasion of the Turn-over of the Chairmanship of the Group of 77 and China for 1999*, 12 January 1999), www.g77.org/Speeches/011299b.htm

3 Tricontinental single-issue functionalism: the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

1 Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, and William R. Overstreet, eds., *Political Handbook of the World 2005–2006* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006), 1444–45. The reference also contains a summary of the origins and development and activities of OAPEC.
2 Joan Edelman Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, *The Politics of International Economic Relations* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 280. The following account of the earlier period of OPEC's activities draws heavily from J. Braveboy-Wagner, *Interpreting the Third World* (New York: Praeger/CBS, 1986), 294–99.
3 These were the "seven sisters": Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), Standard Oil of California, Mobil, Gulf, Texaco, British Petroleum, and Royal Dutch Shell.
4 The description of events after 1985 up to 2003 draws heavily from Banks *et al*., *Political Handbook of the World 2005–2006*, 1450–52.
5 Jad Mouawad, "At OPEC, Some Worry as Oil Prices Start Falling," *New York Times*, 11 September 2006, C1.
6 United States Energy Information Administration, *International Energy Outlook 2007* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, May 2007), chapter 4: "Natural Gas".
7 Jad Mouawad, "At OPEC, Some Worry as Oil Prices Start Falling," C1, C2; at the time, Iran's oil minister said that prices should not be allowed to fall below $60 a barrel.
8 Ibid., C2.
9 Lester Brown, *World Without Borders* (New York: Vintage, 1973), 198.
10 See US Energy Information Administration, *Monthly Energy Review, March 2005* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2005), tables 11.1a and 11.1b.
11 *OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2004.* Available at www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/asb2004.htm

12 Ibid. Comparative crude oil reserves (in million barrels): Saudi Arabia, 264,310; Iran 132,460; Iraq 115,000; Kuwait 101,500; UAE 97,800.
13 The Riyadh Declaration, The Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of OPEC Member Countries, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 17–18 November 2007. www.opec.org/aboutus/III%20OPEC%20Summit%20Declaration.pdf
14 Banks *et al.*, *Political Handbook of the World 2005–2006,* 1451, 1452.
15 Ibid.
16 Bauxite producers, including Yugoslavia and Australia, formed the International Bauxite Association in 1974 and experienced some initial success in raising taxes on production. However, price discipline was never maintained. The main copper-producing countries—including the four main producers Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia—had established the CIPEC (*Conseil Intergouvernmentale des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre*) since 1967 but sought greater price control in the 1970s. Slumping demand and limited appetite for reductions in the employment-generating industry hurt the cartel's chances. The attempt to cartelize bananas was unsuccessful because of easy substitutability as well as lack of the ability to stockpile. For a discussion see Spero and Hart, *The Politics of International Economic Relations,* 306–12.
17 For a description of, and links to all aid funds, see www.oprcfund.org/
18 World Bank, *World Development Report 1994, 1995* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank 1995, 1996), appendix, table 18.
19 See United Nations Economic Commission for West Asia, *Economic Trends and Impacts, Foreign Aid and Development in the Arab Region*, issue 4, (E/ESCWA/EAD/2007/1) (New York, 2007), 7, 11.
20 Ibid., 15.
21 The Riyadh Declaration, The Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of OPEC Member Countries, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 17–18 November 2007.

4 Regional visions: Pan-Americanism

1 The rest were held in Lima in 1847, Santiago 1856, Washington 1856, and Lima 1864, followed by two juridical conferences in 1877 (Lima) and Montevideo (1888 and 1889). These conferences were not attended by all Latin American nations.
2 Written 5 August 1829; quoted from Simón Bolívar's *Obras Completas* in Leopoldo Zea, *Latin America and the World* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 56.
3 See *Enhancing Canada's Role in the OAS: Canadian Adherence to the American Convention on Human Rights, Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights*, May 2003, www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/huma-e/rep-e/rep04may03-e.pdf
4 The pact has been ratified by Brazil, Chile (with reservations), Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua (with reservations), Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay (Peru removed its earlier reservations in 2006). Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, the United States, and Venezuela signed the pact but have not ratified it. As indicated, El Salvador left in 1973.

5 Some of this description is drawn from G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), 213–19.
6 "Representative Democracy," Resolution adopted at the fifth plenary session, 5 June 1991 (AG/RES. 1080 [XXI-O/91]).
7 Preamble, Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted by the General Assembly at its special session held in Lima, Peru, 11 September 2001, available at www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm
8 Ibid.
9 Text available at www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/6-32.htm. As of 2007, 25 American nations have ratified or have adopted the convention: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago denounced the American Convention on Human Rights, by a communication addressed to the secretary-general of the OAS on 26 May 1998.
10 Charter, chapter VII.
11 Members are: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Web site: www.sela.org
12 The members are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, a representative from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and, following the Cartagena summit of June 2000, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
13 This followed the non-election of the United States to a seat on the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights for the first time in 2003. The United States suffered a similar fate in the UN Human Rights Commission.

5 Regional visions: Pan-Africanism

1 Some of the description below appeared in Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, *Interpreting the Third World* (New York: Praeger/CBS, 1986), 58–63.
2 The UAM/Monrovia Group included the Brazzaville 12—Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal, and Chad, in addition to Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, and Congo (Kinshasa).
3 The Common African and Malagasy Union was renamed the Common African Malagasy and Mauritian Organization in 1970, and the Common African and Mauritian Organization in 1974.
4 Paul Adoghame, "African Foreign Policy," in *The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks*, ed. Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 93.
5 See the text of the AU Charter, available at www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/OAU_Charter_1963.pdfhttp://www.african_union.org/treaties

6 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 27 June 1981 (CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L. M. 58 [1982]).
7 See, for example, Amadu Sesay, Olusola Ojo, and Orobola Fasehun, *The OAU After Twenty Years* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 11.
8 For more about the mechanism, see OAU, Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Cairo, Egypt, 30 June 1993, (AHG/DECL.3 [XXIX]).
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6 Regional visions: Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islam

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7 Subregional communities: Latin America and the Caribbean

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Colombia but only 0.3 percent for Ecuador, just above zero for Bolivia and - 0.9 percent for Venezuela. See United Nations Development Bank (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2006* (New York: UNDP, 2006), table 14.

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13 Ibid., 309–10. On Benin's motivations, see Bach, "The Politics of West African Economic Co-operation," 608–9.

14 Bach, 621, referring to article 59 of the ECOWAS treaty of 1975.

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21 For information on the UN missions go to www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/index.html. This UN Mission in Sierra Leone ended in 2005 and was replaced by a smaller UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL).
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9 Subregional communities: Southeast, South, and West Asia, and the Pacific

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37 "Border disputes erupt between Saudi Arabia, UAE; Riyadh denies," *Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates, Politics,* 23 February 2005, www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/050223/2005022318.html
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39 Calvocoressi, *World Politics since 1945*, 384.
40 The original agreement, not available on the GCC web site, may be found on the web site for Dartmouth Business School, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cib/ trade_agreements_db/archive/GCC.pdf
41 Article 27, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Secretariat General*, The Economic Agreement between the GCC States, adopted by the GCC Supreme Council*, 22nd session, 31 December 2001, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman, www.gcc-sg.org/Economic.html
42 See Muhammad Faour, *The Arab World after Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1993).
43 See *Framework Agreement on BIMST-EC Free Trade Area*, Bangkok, 25 June 2004, www.bimstec.org/PDF/Protocol_to_agreement.pdf; and *Protocol to the Framework Agreement on BIMST-EC Free Trade Area,* Bangkok, 8 February 2004, www.bimstec.org/PDF/framework_agreement.pdf
44 The revised APTA agreement, *Amendment to the First Agreement on Trade Negotiations among Developing Member Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok Agreement)*, Beijing, 2 November 2005, is available at www.unescap.org/tid/apta/ta_amend.pdf

10 Summarizing global south institutionalism

1 For more, see, for example, J. Andrew Grant and Fredrick Söderbaum, eds., *The New Regionalism in Africa* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003).
2 Ernst Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration,' *International Organization* 30 (spring 1976): 176, 183.
3 Ibid., 208.
4 See Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
5 Randolph B. Persaud, "Reconceptualizing the Global South's Perspective: the End of the Bandung Spirit," in *The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks*, ed. Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 59.

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