

Date:

Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa

#publickeys

#Modular-exponentiation

↳ All RSA operation involves it.

$$2^{10} \bmod 17,$$

$$\cancel{+} 2^7 = 1024 \bmod 17 = 4.$$

pow(base, exponent, modulus)

↳ Trapdoor function

↳ Easy to compute in one direction, but hard to do in reverse unless right information.

#RSA

↳ Rivest, Shamir, Adleman

$$N = p \cdot q$$

↓
Modulus

↳ Together exponent & Modulus form RSA public key
(N, e)

↳ Most common e = 65537.

Euler's Totient: ϕ

↳ RSA relies on difficulty of factorization of M modulus.

$N = p \cdot q$ prime numbers can be factors can be deduced, then we can calculate Euler's totient of N & decrypt cipher-text.

$$N = p \cdot q$$

$$\phi(N) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1)$$

Private key (d) is used to decrypt CT. made with its Public key. & also used to sign.

↳ In RSA Private key is modular multiplicative inverse of e modulo $\phi(N)$, Euler's totient of N .

$$d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(N)}$$

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RSA Signature.

↳ How can u ensure person receiving ur message knows u wrote it?

Imagine message u wrote "m"
Encrypt with friend public key

$$c = m^{e_0} \text{ mod } N_0.$$

To sign message, calculate hash of message: $H(m)$ & encrypt with your private key.

$$s = H(m)^{d_1} \text{ mod } N_1.$$

- Friend can decrypt this msg using their ~~public~~ private key.

$$m = c^{d_0} \text{ mod } N_0$$

- Using ur public key they calculate

$$s = s^{e_1} \text{ mod } N_1.$$

Now by computing $H(m)$ & comparing to s^m . If its same we can ensure message is sent by them.

Factoring

- ↳ Using primes at least 1024 bits long is recommended.
- ↳ Multiplying two such 1024 primes gives you 2048 bit Large Modulus

Why?

n is prime numbers

just 1 prime not $p \cdot q$, anyone could comput private key.

↳ Euler Totient would be

$$\phi(n) = n - 1$$

so its easy to compute

→ Easy to factor

28 Many primes (chall)

↳ Our modulo is product
of over 30 primes.

↳ for decryption:

- ↳ we need to factor 'n' into
all its prime factors
- ↳ we use optimized algorithm
for this many primes
like Elliptic curve method
(ECM).
- ↳ use factordb.com to
get all primes if we
have 'n'.

Salty (chall)

- ↳ e=1 means no encryption

$$ct = pt^e \bmod n$$

$$= pt \bmod n$$

Modulus Inutils (chall)

↳ e = 3, 2 plaintext is short

↳ If $(P \cdot T)^{\frac{1}{e}}$ is less than n
means its not safe.

↳ In our case:

$$\begin{aligned} CT &= (P \cdot T)^3 \bmod n \\ &= (P \cdot T)^3 \end{aligned}$$

↳ So it's just cube root of P · T.

Multiplying or addition forms
any two elements in set
yields another element in
set of integers modulo N.

↳ When modulus is prime $N = p$,

Diffie-Hellman

- (i) A ring $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ is set $\{0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1\}$ where addition & multiplication are both in that set.
- (ii) When $N = p$ is prime, every non-zero element has multiplicative inverse - meaning for any $g \neq 0$, there exists d such that

$$g \cdot d \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$

- (iii) This makes it field \mathbb{F}_p where g = generator (or just element) you are given in infinite field \mathbb{F}_p .
- (iv) d is multiplicative inverse of g .

To find $d = g^{-1}$ where $g = 209$ & ~~prime~~ $p = 991$, we can use EEA.

$$g \cdot x + p \cdot y = \gcd(g, p) = 1$$

→ Diffie Hellman protocol works with element of some finite field F_p where prime modulus is typically very large.

Generator of Groups.

↳ In finite field F_p , if you take any element ' g ' & keep multiplying by itself.

$$g, g^2, g^3, g^4, \dots$$

↳ Eventually sequence cycles back to g, g^2 . The set of all distinct values in cycle forms subgroup $H = \langle g \rangle$.

↳ The no of distinct elements in $\langle g \rangle$ is called order of g .
 $\text{ord}(g)$. By Lagrange's theorem, order of any element must divide $p-1$.

↳ Positive primitive element is one whose generated subgroup equals entire multiplicative group. $F_p = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1\}$.

That means,

$$\text{ord}(g) = p - 1$$

- ④ Every non-0 group element of \mathbb{F}_p can be written as $g^n \bmod p$ for some n .
- ⑤ This is why they are called generators (they generate whole group).
- ⑥ $p = 28151$ & find smallest element g which is primitive element of \mathbb{F}_p .
SOL

- ① Find $p-1 = 28150$
- ② Break 28150 into prime factors ($2 \times 5^2 \times 563$)
 $= (2, 5, 563)$
- ③ g' is primitive element if & only if
 $(p-1)/q \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$
- ④ Then find all & get smallest.

L) D-H protocol is used coz the discrete logarithm is hard computation

Steps for DH

(cp)

① Establish prime & generator (g) of finite field \mathbb{F}_p

↳ must be chosen carefully.

↳ Eg: $p = 2 \cdot q + 1$ is usually picked such that only factors of $p - 1$ are $(2, q)$

where q is some other large prime. It protects D-H from Pohlig-Hellman algo.

② User picks secret $a \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1}$ & calculates,

$$g^a \bmod p$$

↳ The value a is known as secret value. while.

$A = g^a \bmod p$ is public value.

Computing shared secrets in DH

- You generate your secret integer b & calculate your public value

$B = g^b \text{ mod } p$ which you send to Alice

Now to get shared secrets.

Shared secret = $A^b \text{ mod } p$

Deriving symmetric keys (Hall)

= We have all DH parameters

g, p

(1) Alice public value (A)

(2) Our secret (b)

(3) Alice encrypted flag with IV & encrypted flag (C-T)

(4) AES is in CBC

source : How encryption
works
decrypt.py : Just helps.

Steps

① Compute shared secret

② Derive AES key via SHA1.

$$\text{key} = \text{SHA1}(C:16)$$

③ Decrypt with AES CBC

↳ Parameter Injection (Challenge).

↳ We can intercept Alice & Bob's key but also rewrite their messages. Recover shared secret.

↳ We get Alice Intercept(p, g, A)

↳ We can replace her A with p before forwarding to Bob & compute.

$$\text{Shared secret} = A^b \bmod p = p^b \bmod A$$

↳ If we inject $A:p$ bob computes $= 0$.

$$p^b \bmod p = 0$$

↳ Alice also now gets 0 when she computes.

↳ Now, we already know shared secret is 0. So we derive AES key & Decrypt the flag like before.

Export-grade (chall).

↳ Based on real Logjam attack (2016).

↳ Steps

(1) Parameters Downgrade:

↳ MITM between A & B.

A offers list of DH groups

(DH1536, DH1024).

You intercept A message & replace with weakest option & send to B. B now has DH64 so he sends DH64 parameters which is easy to crack.

(2) Crack.

↳ DH64 = Brute force.

↳ Bob public value is

$$B = g^b \bmod p$$

So simply brute force until
b value is found till:
 $\therefore g^b \bmod p = B$

- ↳ Now with b, compute shared secret:
 - ↳ $Ab \bmod p$.
- ↳ The same as prev chall.