



Training Guide



Acknowledgments

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Training Guide

About this guide

The purpose of this training guide is to raise counter-terrorism awareness knowledge among community members, schools and youths at risk. The manual uses easily understood language and practical real-life and context-specific examples to help learners absorb knowledge and skills necessary in the fight against terrorism and radicalization in the identified countries. This training will take place in Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. The training will use lecturers, workshops, dialogues, demonstrations, storytelling and discussions, and films and video show. The trainers will use community influencers, youth and women leaders in communities where training will take place.

This training is composed of five modules:

Module One- Introduction - Definition of Terms provides a conceptual foundation of key terms, terminologies, and phrases within the P/CVE realm.

Module Two - Gender and Extremism explains the gender-based narratives used for recruitment and radicalization into terrorism and violent extremism. Key roles and responsibilities have also been explicated with the overriding aim of understanding the gender-specific recruitment pathways.

Module Three - Counter and Alternative Narratives discusses country-specific responses to terrorism, and the counter-narratives developed by each member country to discourage and reduce vulnerabilities of terrorism.

Module Four - Return and Reintegration explains the concept of returnees/defectors and the assistance they are getting from governments to help re-adjust back into society. This module further provides a framework with which trainees can use to reduce the stigma associated with returnees face after defecting and disassociating from terrorist groups.

Module Five – Using Art to Counter Violent Extremism is the last in this guide and it contextualizes the role of the youth in the P/CVE. It explains this approach by giving real-life stories of youths who have used art, skills, and talent to avoid terrorism, and or dissuade others, especially fellow youth, from joining the terror groups. At the end of this module, the trained youth are expected to explore alternative avenues of getting income and in the process make joining terror groups less attractive.

Glossary

ABBREVIATIONS

- CVE –Counterering Violent Extremism
PVE – Preventing Violent Extremism
IDP(s) -Internally Displaced People
IS -Islamic State
AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
TPLF - Tigray People's Liberation Front
ENDF - Ethiopian National Defense Forces
ADF - Allied Democratic Forces
LRA - Lord's Resistance Army
UNODC - Office on Drugs and Crime
IGAD - InterGovernmental Authority for Development
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
ICSR - International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence
ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KTU - Kenya Tuna Uwezo
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
IOM- International Organization for Migration
ICRS - Information Counselling and Referral Service
NSCVE - National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism
GHR - Greater Horn of Africa Region
ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
POTA - Prevention of Terrorism Act
SLAA - Security Laws Amendment Act
CSOs - Civil Society Organizations
CAPS - County Action Plans
NCTC - National Counter Terrorism Centre
LUNT - Lenga Ugaidi Na Talanta
UNDP United Nations Development Program
NGOs - Non- Governmental Organizations

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Training guide assumptions

This training guide is based on the following assumptions:

1. The youth are the greatest beneficiaries of a peaceable environment. However, on the other end of the spectrum, they can be perpetrators and victims of violence. With this understanding, the youth can learn to be safe by avoiding violence by actively taking part in avoiding it.
2. The youth can learn to make sober decisions related to avoiding violence, getting radicalized, joining violent extremist groups or illegal groups if they are guided fully on key decision-making skills; factual information; how to use their talents; confidence to face issues and life; as well as communication and assertive skills.

In using this training guide, it is assumed that the lead facilitators will have acquired skills and knowledge that will assist them to effectively facilitate sessions with a clear understanding of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). To adequately address these assumptions, the preparedness of the facilitators is seen as fundamental to the process. The conceptualization of this training guide, therefore, assumes that the trained facilitators leading the training activities play an important role in the entire programme and competition thereof.



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Introduction

The Horn of Africa region is still in the throes of instability. For the past two decades, the region has been subsumed in never-ending internal and or external conflict. Somalia in particular is grappling with a number of issues including an ongoing armed conflict waged by a resilient Al-Shabab; massive insecurity; lack of sufficient state protection; and recurring political and humanitarian crises. More than 2.5 million Somalis are internally displaced people (IDPs). The terror group has suffered setbacks which includes territorial losses in Kismayo and Barawe but has managed to maintain control over parts of central and southern Somalia. In the last two years, it has stepped up its presence in the northern part of Somalia, where it is battling fighters allied with the Islamic State (IS) for pre-eminence. Suffice it to say, Al-Shabab remains capable of carrying out massive attacks in Somalia and surrounding countries despite the presence of AMISOM troops. The group has managed to keep itself relevant through manipulation of religious narratives and robust communication in online and offline platforms.

A photograph showing the silhouettes of three individuals standing in a field of tall grass. They are holding various types of firearms, including rifles and machine guns. The background is a dramatic sunset or sunrise, with the sun low on the horizon, casting a warm orange glow across the sky and clouds.

The group has managed to keep itself relevant through manipulation of religious narratives

Kenya has also borne the brunt of Al-Shabab terrorism in the greater Horn of Africa. The group has managed to continue recruiting, radicalising and operating within the Kenyan territory especially in the northern part of Kenya and the coastal region, which also happen to have a higher population of Muslim believers. Perceived or real radicalization, persecution, historical injustices, and lack of economic development have been some of the push factors into terrorism and violent extremism for most young men and youth. Today, in Kenya, there is a high likelihood of the terrorist carrying out attacks in various parts of the country. There is also a serious threat of extremism, including terrorist abductions especially in the hot spot areas – those are closer to the Kenya-Somalia border. In 2019, it suffered its worst terror attack in four years when Al-Shabaab attacked the DusitD2 hotel in Nairobi.

DusitD2 hotel attack



Ethiopia on the other hand is currently enmeshed in a vicious internal conflict following the army's incursion into the Tigray region. The Tigray conflict began in early November 2020 after the federal government accused Tigray's TPLF of attacking its barracks in Mekele, the capital of Tigray which also has one of the largest army barracks in Ethiopia. Subsequently, the Ethiopian government sent in the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) to fight the Special Forces of the Tigray Regional gov-

ernment, a war which also sucked in Amhara Special Forces as well as Eritrean soldiers who crossed the border at the invitation of the Ethiopian government. On the security front, Ethiopia is regarded as a strong security state, and even though it has experienced acts of political violence at the domestic level, it is yet to report an attack by a terror group outside the country. However, intelligence reports have shown that terror groups, especially Al Shabab have been trying to make inroads into Ethiopia without much success. However, a worrying trend is the ethnic violent extremism that is rife in the country.

Even though Uganda has not recorded any high-profile terror attack since 2010 when more than 70 people were killed following a terror attack by Al-Shabab in Kampala, there is a danger of continued recruitment into terrorism and violent extremism. The terror attacks in the country have targeted places where soccer fans are watching matches. The Uganda Police Force regularly issue alerts, particularly around public holidays or religious events. Like Uganda, Tanzania has not recorded a major terror event since the bombing of the United States embassy in 1998, even though there have been smaller-scale episodes perpetrated by locals. However, there is a heightened threat of terrorism in the country in the wake of the rise of a group calling itself Al-Shabab (no affiliation with Somalia-based terror group). For instance, in October 2020, the Kitaya area in the Mtwara region near the Mozambique border was attacked by allegedly Islamic radicals operating from northern Mozambique. Djibouti and Eritrea, just like Uganda and Tanzania have not been significantly impacted by terrorism and violent extremism even though there is fertile ground for radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism.

Therefore, it is imperative to note that terrorism remains the number one source of insecurity especially in the region, and Kenya and Somalia, in particular. Al Shabab continues to recruit, radicalize, and mete out violence on soft and hard targets. While the group has not been successful in establishing a new Somalian state ruled according to a strict interpretation of Shariah law, its violence has increased and the group has been emboldened by the singular use of hard power.

Module 1

Understanding Violent Extremism and Terrorism Terminology Overview

According to the Eastern Kentucky University, the history of modern terrorism began with the French revolution in 1789 and has evolved ever since. The most common causes or roots of terrorism include civilizations or culture clashes, globalization, or religion conflict. More individual-based reasons for terrorism are frustration, deprivation, negative identity, narcissistic rage, and/or moral disengagement. There five major types of terrorism consist of:

- State-Sponsored terrorism, which consists of terrorist acts on a state or government by a state or government;
- Dissent terrorism, which are terrorist groups which have rebelled against their government;
- Terrorists and the Left and Right, which are groups rooted in political ideology;
- Religious terrorism, which are terrorist groups which are extremely religiously motivated and;
- Criminal Terrorism, which are terrorists acts used to aid in crime and criminal profit.

In the Horn of Africa region, religiously motivated terrorism has been used to push certain ideologies and address grievances. It is defines as “terrorism motivated by an absolute belief that other-worldly power has sanctioned and commanded the application of terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith. Religious terrorism is usually conducted in defense of what believers consider to be the one true faith” (Martin & Eid, 2014). This type of terrorism is extremely dangerous as those practicing it are willing to do anything and to sacrifice themselves for the cause.

In the Horn of Africa region, the three most well-known organizations, base their existence on Christian and Islam religious ideology. They include the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)

Regional context

The Horn of Africa region has three major terrorist organizations which operate within its territory. These groups have developed their own ideologies and beliefs which formed their establishment.

Al Shabab



Somalia
Kenya
Djibouti
Ethiopia

- Some embrace the idea of a Greater Somalia in the Horn of Africa.
- Establish an Islamic Government in the country.

Lords Resistance Army



Uganda

- Establish a theocracy based on the Ten Commandments.

Allied Democratic Forces



Uganda

- Establishing a caliphate in the region.

Definition of terms

The following key terms have been sourced from various credible sources within the P/CVE realm.

Terrorism

Terrorism is defined as the threat or use of force or violence in the pursuit of politically motivated goals and ideologies. Terrorism is a criminal act intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons, for political purposes (UNODC, 2018).

Radicalization

Radicalization is the process of developing extremist beliefs of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. These extremist beliefs are profound convictions which oppose a society's fundamental values and practices, universal human rights and the laws of democracy (UNODC, 2018).

Radicalization is a change in beliefs, feelings and behavior to justify group violence and demand for a sacrifice in defending a group (Botha, 2015)

Violent Extremism

Violent extremism is defined as the activities that condone, justify and support the commission of violent acts by advocating, engaging in or preparing so as to further social, economic or political objective (UNODC, 2018).

Target Groups and Drivers of Violent Extremism

Generally, the language of 'driver' is used in relation to violent extremism; whereas the term 'pathway' is used with respect to individual radicalization (UNODC, 2018).

Push Factors and Pull factors

Push Factors: These are known as the conditions conducive to violent extremism and the structural context from which it emerges (UNODC, 2018). On one part, the extremists radicalize and recruit to violence by exploiting a slew of 'push factors', including structural factors such as underdevelopment, endemic poverty, lack of voice or opportunity, lack of access to education, high levels of youth employment, food insecurity, real or perceived social or political exclusion, human rights violations, persecution, corruption, ethnic, national and reli-

gious discrimination and marginalization (IGAD, 2018).

Pull Factors: These are individual motivations and processes, which play a key role in transforming ideas and grievances into violent extremist action (UNODC, 2018). Extremists make promises and provide immediate incentives to lure people or communities to accept their extremist beliefs. Extremists have also managed to expand the space of radicalizing and recruiting to violence by using charismatic preachers, teachers and mobilizers; powerful strategic communications and compelling messages; such as promises of socio-economic development, immediate material and financial benefits, or perceived social status that people expect to gain by being members of a militant organization (IGAD, 2018).

Responses to Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Counter-terrorism

This response stressed the use of 'hard' security measures: military, law-enforcement or policing resources, covert responses that involve force, the criminal justice system or (most controversially) extrajudicial processes (IGAD, 2018).

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

Although it lacks a consistent definition, CVE is generally held to mean increasing reliance on 'softer' responses to terrorism and radicalization involving preventative and mostly non-coercive policies, actions and programs that seek to address the underlying causes of violent extremism (IGAD, 2018).

Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE)

Closely connected with CVE, PVE stresses non-coercive interventions to mitigate the threat from sections of populations already engaged in violent extremism to ensure that militants do not cause harm. Risk reduction measures are increasingly focusing on research, diagnosis, and recommending innovative ways to identify and secure individuals, groups or communities at risk of radicalization (IGAD, 2018).

Counter Narrative

Counter-narrative refers to the narratives that arise from the vantage point of those who have been historically marginalized. The idea of “counter-” implies a space of resistance against traditional domination. A counter-narrative goes beyond the notion that those in relative positions of power can just tell the stories of those in the margins (Mora, 2014).

De-radicalization

This refers to the social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity (Pettinger, 2017).

The Radicalization Process

Radicalization is not an instant occurrence which occurs randomly but a well calculated learning process. Radicalization is the degree which distinguishes active terrorist from the base of sympathizers. It takes place in four stages namely; Pre-radicalization, Self-identification, Indoctrination and Jihadization.

Pre-radicalization – this is the initial stage which describes a person's life situation before radicalization and before exposure and adoption of radical ideologies. It is targeted to “at-risk” groups which display vulnerabilities, examples include unemployed youth, gangs etc.

Self-identification - this stage comprises of the person's early exploration to radical ideology and the gradual gravitation from their old identity. They begin associating with like-minded individuals and adopting the new ideology as their own. In this stages, catalyst like money is offered to the individual.

Indoctrination - this phase sees an individual intensifying their beliefs and wholly adopting radical ideologies. This leads to a conviction that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause of militant Jihad. At this stage they are moving towards extremes ideologies.

Jihadization - This is the final stage in the radicalization process where members of the radical group accept an individual duty to participate in Jihad. At this stage individual are willing to carry out attacks on behalf of the ideology they support (Christmann, 2012).

Radicalization Process

Pre Radicalization

this is the initial stage which describes a person's life situation before radicalization

It is targeted to "at-risk" groups such as youth,gangs

Indoctrination

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self-identification

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jihadization

final stage where members of the radical group accept an individual duty to participate in Jihad

At this stage individual are willing to carry out attacks on behalf of the ideology

Other related definitions/terms

Cyber-terrorism

Cyber-terrorism is defined by its location or the medium through which it is executed. It is a criminal act perpetrated by the use of computers and telecommunication capabilities resulting in violence, destruction and/or disruption of services to create fear within a given population with a goal of influencing a government or population to conform to a particular political, social or ideological agenda (Pujari, 2016).

Online Radicalization

Online Radicalization (also called Cyber-Terrorism or Extremism or Cyber-Racism or Cyber- Hate) is widespread and has become a major growing concern to the society, governments and law enforcement agencies around the world. Research shows that various platforms on the Internet such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp among others are becoming breeding grounds for this as it has low barrier to publish content, allows anonymity, provides exposure to millions of users and a potential of a very quick and widespread diffusion of message (UN, 2017).

Ethnic Terrorism

Ethnic terrorists frequently seeks to foster communal identity, in contrast to an identity proposed by the state. Ethnic terrorists often target potential intermediaries, who might otherwise compromise on identity issues (Byman, 1998).

Foreign Fighters

These are individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict (UN, 2017).

Jihadist bride or female Jihadist (ISIS)

It refers to the alleged practice in which Sunni Muslim women sympathetic to Salafi Jihadi travel to warzones such as Syria and voluntarily offer themselves to be “married” to jihadist militants, often repeatedly and in temporary marriages, serving sexual comfort roles to help boost the fighters’ morale (Speckhard A; Yayla A. 2015).

Al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah

This refers to a state that is governed by sharia law. Islamists believe that no man-made law should be prevalent and that it is prohibited to rule any country by any other system other than sharia.

Bid'a / Tabdi

Bid'a, or "innovation" refers to unnecessary innovation in Islam. Salafis believe that any practice that developed in Islam that is not directly based on the ways that the first believers practiced Islam is bid'a and therefore not authentic. Tabdi, a term rooted in the word bid'a, refers to the declaration of a Muslim as an innovator (mubtadi') (Melagrou-Hitchens, 2018).

Caliphate

Khilafa is the Arabic word for the Caliphate meaning an Islamic state. The reemergence of a Caliphate led by a rightful Caliph and guided by Islamic law is a general, theoretical goal for most iterations of the Islamist movements. However, a specific focus on its re-establishment is more closely associated with Islamist, rather than Salafi, thought (Melagrou-Hitchens, 2018).

Salafism

Salafism is a religious-political ideology based on Sunni Islamism seeking a global caliphate, advocacy for "physical" jihadism and concepts of returning to (what adherents believe to be) true Islam.

Daesh (Daish)

Arabic, acronym for al-dawla al-'islāmiyya fi 'l-īrāq wa 'l-šām 'the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant' (Oxford Dictionary)

Dabiq; Rumiyah

These are magazines published by terrorist organizations in languages spoken in Western countries. The accessibility of those magazines allows Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab to propagate their messages effortlessly (Matusitz, Madrazo & Udani, 2019).

Taghut

It can refer to idols, a tyrant, an oracle or an enemy of Muhammad. Tāghūt means "one who has crossed the limits", in plain language: a rebel.

Takfir

Takfir (or apostate) is an Arabic word used to describe a Muslim as infidel or non-believer. The practice of accusing another Muslim of apostasy or declaring another Muslim as infidel is called Takfir.

Hajj

Hajj, also spelled ḥadjdj or hadj, in Islam, the pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, which every adult Muslim must make at least once in his or her lifetime. The hajj is the fifth of the fundamental Muslim practices and institutions known as the Five Pillars of Islam.

Hadith

It might be defined as the biography of Muhammad perpetuated by the long memory of his community (Ummah) for their exemplification and obedience. The development of Hadith is a vital element during the first three centuries of Islamic history, and its study provides a broad index to the mind and ethos of Islam.

Ummah

Ummah refers to the worldwide community of Islam.

Zakat

Zakat is a charitable donation which is made annually under Islamic law. It is applicable on all assets, qualifying property and disposable income. Zakat is the fourth of the Five Pillars of Islam.

Shariah

The law represents a divinely ordained path of conduct that guides Muslims toward a practical expression of religious conviction in this world and the goal of divine favor in the world to come.

Madrasa

This is an Islamic learning institution where people go to learn about the religion of Islam.

Muhajir

A person who emigrates from a country which is, or has be-

come, ruled by non-Muslims.

Murtadd

A Murtadd is subject to the death penalty or banishment. Legal opinions vary regarding the status of an apostate's property but agree that an apostate's marriage is void and that he or she loses the right to a Muslim burial

Munafik

Munafiq or Munafik is a terminology in Islam which refers to those who pretend to follow religious teachings but actually do not admit it in his heart.

Mujahideen

Mujahideen, Arabic mujāhidūn ("those engaged in jihad"), singular mujāhid, in its broadest sense, Muslims who fight on behalf of the faith or the Muslim community (ummah). Its Arabic singular, mujāhid, was not an uncommon personal name from the early Islamic period onward.

Mujaheed

A person (especially a guerrilla) who strives or fights in support of Islam; specifically an Islamic fundamentalist guerrilla.



case study Nine Years in an Al-Shabaab Camp: One Woman's Story

This story was reported by Institute for Security Studies in 2017.

At 30, Amina (not her real name) appears older than her age. She was born in Majengo, in Mombasa, to a poor Muslim family who could not afford to pay for her high school education. Instead, she started washing clothes to earn a living and married young.

After separating from her husband, Amina was nevertheless convinced to follow him when he disappeared without warning and ostensibly to Somalia. She was drawn not only by the hope of a reunion with him but especially by the promise of employment. She found neither. Instead, she was taken to Boni Forest, a known al-Shabaab hideout on the border of Kenya and Somalia, and confined to an al-Shabaab camp for the next nine years. She was 21 years old at the time.

Al-Shabaab has long exploited and contributed to economic hardship in the Kenyan communities. In areas such as Majengo and Mombasa, it has taken advantage of widespread poverty and unemployment to lure men and women into its cohorts with promises of jobs and money. While Amina did not deliberately join al-Shabaab, the loss of her husband's income when he left for Somalia, compounded by her lack of formal education, made her vulnerable to promises of employment.

Since fleeing Somalia, Amina has been ostracized and stigmatized by her community in several ways. Her years in Somalia are part of the reason for this. According to a government official in Nairobi, communities often shun the wives, widows or children of men suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. The same goes for women who are recruited by al-Shabaab. The stigma Amina faces is made worse by the sexual abuse she endured. Muslim women who have had sex with men other than their husbands even if these relations are forced are often shamed by their communities. In this way, al-Shabaab consistently shatters social cohesion.

conclusion

Violent extremism and Terrorism are phenomenon's that are dynamic and always have emerging trends, which we always need to keep at the back of our minds. Much remains speculative, unknown or uncertain. Disparate phenomena tend to be aggregated; key terms are poorly defined. Most work in the field has focused on why and how people become drawn into terrorism, the problem now usually referred to as 'radicalization' and how violent extremist groups and networks are organized. This calls for joint efforts and investments to address it so as to see this vice come to an end. Various country based programs have been established to mitigate the rising cases of radicalization to terrorism which have helped curb the numbers. But with foreign fighters migrating to join terrorist group, a more comprehensive and joint program with member countries needs to be put in place. The youth need to be engaged in programs that empower them so that they do not fall victim of terrorist and violent extremist groups.





Training Guide

Module 2: Gender and Extremism – The Process

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Introduction

As trends of violent extremism are on the rise in the Horn of Africa region, a particular attention is placed on gender and its impact on the current security challenges unfolding in the region. In a report published by International Security Studies, it has been argued that violent extremism and terrorist activities are gendered activities (Ndung'u & Shadung, 2017). Both men and women, girls and boys have different experiences in violent extremist groups. They may be the victims, perpetrators or even participate in prevention and countering violent extremism efforts (peace building capacity). It is important to note that as much as men make up majority of perpetrators, women also play a major role in violent extremist groups (OSCE, 2019). This therefore, prompts a need to understand gender dynamics and its impact on violent extremism in the Horn of Africa region in order to contribute to better informing policies and strategies in the prevention and countering violent extremism measures.

This chapter will focus on understanding how gender intersects with violent extremism; why and how they are instigated to join extremists groups; and a gender review involvement in violent extremism and terrorism.

In efforts to understand gender and its role in violent extremism, it is important to define a few terminologies in this chapter:

Gender is defined as the “social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female as well as the relationships and power dynamics between women and men, and girls and boys” (OSCE, 2019).

Gender analysis refers to exploring the relationships between men and women and how norms play a role in their personal experiences, what is to be a man or a woman in a society, a comparison of the challenges and opportunities in distribution of power and resources and in what ways ‘in which they are involved in political, economic, legal and social structures’ (Ndung'u & Shadung, 2017). For example, one can analyze the inequalities caused by different gender roles and norms or the impacts of cultural and religious beliefs.

According to Ndung'u and Shadung (2017), a gendered approach 'involves an assessment of the ways in which issues related to violent extremism affect women and men differently and how they are differently involved in those issues'.

Regional context

An understanding of gender dynamics in violent extremism activities requires one to look in-depth in the roles played by both men and women and understand their different roles within the organization. In most violent extremist groups, men are key players in leadership and operational roles. They are more outspoken than women, hold extreme views and tend to be more visible when engaging in acts of violence. Whilst women participation in extremist acts is limited or not as visible (OSCE, 2019). Men dominate extremist groups such as Al-Shabab and are quiet visible in their propaganda images.



Women pose with weapons at an Al-Shabaab demonstration against the Somali government in Mogadishu.

For so long, the literature had focused on the role of men in violent extremist groups and portrayed the men as being the main violent actors and overlooked or misperceived the role women. This is a huge gap because as there are instances in Horn of Africa region where women suicide bombers or fighters have been noted (Noor, 2015); a good example is the controversial three women who attacked a police station in Mombasa in September 2016 (BBC, 11.9.2016). Women were seen as victims, helpless, and passive family members of extremist individuals, as much as this is the case in certain contexts, it does not explain the reasons for those who joined these groups voluntarily and play a range of different roles within the organization for example, as recruiters and supporters (Idris & Abdelaziz, 2017).

In the Horn Africa, there is a growing trend of women being radicalized and recruited through social media platforms and the number of women joining such groups is on the rise in Kenya (The HORN Institute, 2018). In context of Kenya, Al-Shabab ‘appears to actively (and forcibly) recruit women in online and offline platforms. This includes but not limited to social media, religious indoctrination in schools, marriage, employment incentives, and abduction’ (Factsheet, 2020). Additionally, women join extremist groups for the same reasons as men and those factors include; religious and ideological beliefs, socioeconomic circumstances, ongoing conflicts and singles out that economic restraints is the biggest motivation for women to join. These indicates the push and pull factors are common to both genders. Ndung'u et al. (2017) highlight several roles played by women within violent extremist groups that is they:

“convey messages and packages, undertake analytical intelligence work, spy, keep the books and ensure financial organization, manage logistics for large and small terrorist units, provide healthcare, food and safe houses for violent extremists and terrorists, traffic arms and ammunition to men at the front line, and infiltrate communities during recruitment drives through their greater access to families.”

The study also points out that as compared to their counterparts, women are able to evade the scrutiny of security forces due to their calm nature or perceived peacefulness whilst in the certain regions the cultural norms hinder security searches due to it perceived as abhorrent. Therefore they are able to move around undetected and carry out their supportive activities such as financing terrorism through organized transactions, offering medical assistance, or simply just providing refuge for the (shelter) hiding terrorists.

Women are mobilisers of extremist groups both at the family and social level; as family relations are big motivator to join and stay in extremist groups, family members perpetuate the idea of martyrdom and romanticize idea of joining a brotherhood. Families are able to create strong ties that are crucial in solidifying loyal terrorists networks, this way, wives, mothers, sisters, daughters end up encouraging a male relative to join extremist group (Ndung'u et al., 2017).

Saltman and Smith (2015) points that women being able to find it easy to socialize with others makes them better recruiting agents. Hence inculcating the extremists' agenda will be easy as the audience finds it easy to trust women as compared to men. This influence was used by the perpetrators to project their beliefs to the larger vulnerable masses.

The impact of violent extremism on women include: repression of their basic human rights, as such organizations work in strict adherence to gender norms due to their ideological beliefs which restrict the rights of women and girls. (Saghaf & Zeuthen, 2018). For example, in Somalia, Al-Shabab executes the strictest interpretation of the Sharia law, forbidding basic forms of human rights such as freedom of expression, speech and movement and many of the rules affect women significantly (Ndung'u et al., 2017).

Women in extremist groups are most times subjected to sexual and gender-based violence. Ndung'u et al., (2017) note:

“In al-Shabaab controlled areas, militants have been responsible for numerous acts of violence against girls and women, including rape, forced marriage, corporal punishment, and killing. Al-Shabaab has further inflicted violence against Somali women and girls by way of hudood, or physical punishment of those they deem to have violated Sharia, or Islamic law.”

Extremist groups operate in ungoverned spaces encompassed by conflict therefore worsening the situation for women as they are unable to access healthcare or psychosocial services or access to justice they need (Ndung'u et al., 2017). Lastly, Saghal and Zeuthen (2018) state women also face domestic violence, extreme economic vulnerability, and secondary victimization through state institutions such as the criminal justice system’.

A photograph of Samantha Lewthwaite, a woman with short dark hair, wearing a blue patterned headscarf and a dark top. She is smiling at the camera. In the background, there is a building with a green roof and some trees.

**Samantha Lewthwaite
Is a british al shabaab jihad-
ist who is one of the western
world's most wanted terrorism
suspects.**

case study

Badurdeen, (2018) carried out a study focusing on recruitment of women and recruitment in Al-Shabab network in the coastal region of Kenya. The key focus of the study was women's recruitment into the extremist group by women recruiters. She interviewed six women and through her findings, she deduced that majority of the women recruits were involuntarily recruited. Economic vulnerabilities was noted as a factor that made such women especially vulnerable to forced recruitment. Regardless of the similarity in these women's experiences (that is, the recruiters and potential recruits) recruiters created personalized strategies in efforts to lure possible recruits. The women were offered employment opportunities, while others were informed that they would have the option to go into starting their own business. At this point the recruiters have the power, as they have the time and money to invest in the potential recruits. Badurdeen also examined why women recruiters joined extremist groups, she noted that most women appeared to be motivated by financial incentives and others were inspired by their ideological beliefs.

Some of recommendations noted in the study comprise of using the community to expose recruiters and their networks suggesting a lateral surveillance by community members, sensitization on how recruiters exploit family and friend networks, increase of public awareness on recruitment of girls and women and lastly to investigate and understand social media as a recruitment tool for Al-Shabab. Badurdeen emphasizes on the need for more research on women recruited into extremist groups like Al-Shabab, especially to understand the women and girls and 'recruitee turned women recruiter relationship'.

Short discussion and questions

1. What is the role of gender in contributing to violent extremism?
2. What is a gendered approach to violent extremism and preventing and countering violent extremism?
3. What are the possible challenges and solutions for the above questions?

Conclusion

There is an emphasis on understanding of the gendered pathways into violent extremism. As women have been adversely affected by violent extremism, recent literature has focused on their role as perpetrators and supporters of extremist groups. Traditionally, men had violent role whilst women were perceived to have a non-violent role, however, this perception hinders the understanding of women's involvement in extremist groups. The focus now should be entirely on gendered approach to violent extremism in order to find solutions to mitigate the current crisis and that would require focusing on stressing on gender and not only women as part of the agenda and find specific context when developing and implementing gender policy in such issues. Ultimately, in understanding the ways violent extremist groups and how each part plays a role, then relevant actors in P/CVE will be capable of developing collaborative, gender-aware policies and strategies to current threat.



women have been adversely affected by violent extremism

Recommendations

1. Patriarchal constructs manifest where there are tendencies where when we speak about gender, we tend to ignore the male persons and put more emphasis on the roles of men in violent extremism which is a misconception that more research needs to be emphasized on gendered push and pull factors involving men as well.
2. Since vulnerability of the youth exposes them to the recruiters, in depth analysis should be phased out in terms of its contextual localization rather than generic; the people involved and their drivers; and of course, the interventions put in place to adversely not only offer counter narratives for them and involve them in every step from stake holder partnerships, advocacy, awareness and empowerment.
3. Gender based mainstreaming is key as far as CVE is concerned and streamlining it together with frameworks gender related with peace and security.
4. After all is said and done, more focus is geared towards the violent extremists, recruiters, supporters or sycophants; but what about the returnees? There is need to develop or strengthen existing policies or approaches that accommodate re-integration and rehabilitation of the returnees and combatants.





Training Guide

Module 3: Counter And Alternative Narratives

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Introduction

Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict-affected parts of the world. All countries in the Horn of Africa have experienced terror attacks in one form or the other - whether perpetrated by and against a country's nationals for a domestic cause or focused on national or regional targets, for example, US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were attacked in August 1998 (Kessels et al, 2016, p.ix). The military approach to defeating groups like Al-Shabaab has been successful pushing the Al Qaida affiliate from major towns but it has not been defeated. This is despite international efforts from the Somalia, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the United States of America, which increased its drone attacks significantly under former president Donald Trump (Life and Peace Institute, 2020).



US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were attacked in August 1998

There have been territorial gains in some areas, but Al-Shabaab appears to be remarkably resilient overall and able to maintain itself (Life & Peace Institute, 2020). The P/CVE agenda is supposed to blend hard and soft approaches. Evidence shows overreliance (and exclusively) on military methods may only have limited impact. Instead, it aims to achieve the same goal but by addressing the underlying factors that motivate their recruits (Saferworld).

Counter/alternative narratives are offline or online communication activities which directly or indirectly challenge the violent extremists' propaganda used to radicalize. They deconstruct extremist messages for individuals who are at risk of joining extremist groups (Avis, 2016). The table below explains the Counter Messaging Spectrum (Briggs & Feve, 2013, p 6).

Regional context

In an environment of volatile politics and localized security vacuums, violent extremists, terrorists, and non-state armed groups have space to thrive and can fill the void left behind by the absence of a functioning state and institutions (in the case of Somalia). Pull factors of violent extremism are complex and multifaceted, which is reflected in how these groups continue to influence communities and young people, through propaganda, and indoctrination via radical curricula for young children. (UN Somalia Mission, 2017)

Extremists have a habit of focusing on a mix of ideological, political, moral, religious, and social narratives, based on a range of real or imagined grievances, with their narrative comprised of fascinating stories delivered by charismatic individuals calculated to sway a generation of young people whose main source of information is derived online. The narratives provide a simplistic, unifying ideological structure, which combines facts with half-truths and misinformation (The Commonwealth).

P/CVE efforts benefit from using a network approach where a range of individuals highly connected in their respective social networks are used to disseminate counter narratives. Interactive, interpersonal messaging techniques also help to remove obstacles to participation in CVE efforts. Counter-extremism narratives that relate to wider community concerns and priorities, are often better acknowledged than when they are solely focusing on terrorism or violent extremism (Bilazarian, 2020).

Halverson, Goodall, & Corman (2011) proposed five principles that should be used in coming up with narratives to counter terrorism narratives across any region that is affected, namely:

1. Avoiding reinforcement;
2. Contesting analogies;
3. Decompressing time;
4. Deconstructing binaries;
5. Recasting archetypes.

Some of the narratives often used by extremist groups in the Horn of Africa (Zeiger, 2018, p 10-14) include:

Political and military narratives which suggest that the terrorist group is more credible as a governing body than the governments in East Africa. For example, prior to the elections in Kenya in June 2017, Al-Shabaab's media arm, released a video that emphasized Al-Shabaab's abilities to obtain resources, territory and protect their own, implicitly suggesting the Kenyan government cannot govern appropriately.

Social and personal narratives e.g. in 2017, Al-Shabaab was reportedly meeting with clan members from Bay and Bakool in southwestern Somalia to identify children and meet with specific young people ages 9-18 to be educated and trained under Al-Shabaab leadership.

Ethnic and clan-based narratives which use ethnic differences in appealing to different audiences. For example, Al-Shabaab points to the historical separation by Western powers of Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, and couples this with modern-day discrimination of Muslims in both of those countries, to identify grievances targeted at local communities.

Religious and ideological narratives exploit the jihad concept, and push for the establishment of an Islamic state – a caliphate. According to a former Kenyan Al-Shabaab member, Al-Shabaab recruiters them feel that they were not proper Muslims because they were not acting against the enemy that was attacking Muslims worldwide

Economic narratives include cash rewards, employment, for example, a report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) suggested that Al-Shabaab promised 50,000 Kenyan Shillings (approximately 500 USD) per month as a salary for group members, which was four times the national average at the time.


case study

The narratives should be formulated in such a way that they reach to the various categories of persons affected by radicalization. Similarly, they should be tailored to the specific region.

In Somalia, for example, the Federal Government of Somalia has engaged in numerous socioeconomic transformation calling on the private sector to join them. This public and private sector interaction appears to have increased trust between the business community and policymakers and various community-led empowerment initiatives being implemented with the aim of addressing the deep economic grievances Al-Shabaab and ISIS have capitalized on as part of their recruitment tactics.

Families and local communities also reportedly play a role in creating self-employment opportunities for their children to keep them from joining the terror groups by purchasing motorcycles, 'tuktuks', and taxis and sometimes providing funding for sustainable small businesses. Remittances from the Somali diaspora and businesses established by returnees also attempt to contribute to reducing the likelihood of Somali youth joining Al-Shabaab by creating employment opportunities.

Fig 1: Categories of Violent Extremist Participants (Joosse et al, 2015, p 813)



Back in 2012, the USAID partnered with Global Communities on Kenya Tuna Uwezo (“We have the power” in Kiswahili), or KTU, to prevent future violence. When it started, the program focused mainly on inter-ethnic violence between Kenyans, but after seeing its success, it was expanded to help in countering violent extremism in informal settlements. It integrates conflict mitigation and civic education approaches. KTU takes a community-based conflict management approach that affirms that if there is a security problem but that those who are part of the problem are also part of the solution and can come up with their own approaches to achieve the same goal.

The KTU approach is based on the realization that grievances, real or perceived, cause conflicts. The grievances can be economic, social, tribal, ideological, personal, political, historical etc. The intervention must be customized to the source of the grievance—it is not a “one size fits all” approach – and it must be developed and implemented with the input of the aggrieved community. KTU helps provide people with economic opportunities, but first it seeks to change mind-sets so that the change provided by such an opportunity is sustainable. (Horn of Africa Bulletin, 2016, p 22-26)

Discussion Questions

1. Can you share with us a story of a relative, a friend, a friend of a friend who has joined such groups? What happened and how did it end?
2. Are young people joining violent extremist groups mainly for economic reasons (i.e. money/salaries)? Do they also join because of other reasons?
3. Which common locations are being used for recruitment/propaganda? Schools? Mosques? Street? Are there community leaders involved in recruitment? Are groups using the radio? Printing leaflets? Social media? Organizing meetings? Other communication tools?
4. Do you know examples of youth-led initiatives in your area or nearby that contribute to building peace, resolving conflicts, and preventing/combatting violent extremism? (Youth For Peace)

conclusion

The primary objective of counter narratives should be to sow seeds of doubt among at risk communities who are exposed to violent extremism influences, and to highlight viable alternative approaches and behaviors. Being clear about campaign objectives is essential. Each campaign should be tailored – there is no “one-size-fits-all”. Counter narratives are a long-term strategy success is seldom achieved overnight sustained efforts are most effective. Campaigns should be as compelling and professionally produced as possible. Quality should be prioritized.

It is important to think of Counter Narratives in terms of both online and offline. Most successful campaigns are a judicious blend of the two. When identifying key messengers for a campaign, ensure they have necessary technical support to be able to fully exploit online and offline communications channels. Governments and communities engaged in counter narrative campaigns should seek to work with private sector companies – both digital and traditional media. There are many resources, ideas and strategies that have been produced and deployed elsewhere – do not hesitate to draw on the experience and content developed elsewhere. Also be prepared to share what has been successful in your efforts (Counter Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism, P 16-17)





Training Guide

Module 4: Return and Re-Integration of Returnees

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Introduction

Horn of Africa is one of the regions in the world that has been most affected by violent extremism and has become a fast-evolving security threat area. Violent extremism in the Horn of Africa constitutes a complex hybrid of civil wars, insurgencies, separatisms, terrorism, political violence and criminality deeply rooted in internal and regional conflicts that the region has experienced in recent decades, natural disasters (drought, famine and food insecurity largely as effects of climate change), widespread poverty, underdevelopment and unemployment, especially affecting a rapidly growing youth stratum (IGAD, 2018).

Earlier research showing why individuals joined terror groups drew on different motivators including structural motivators such as state repression, corruption, inequality, relative deprivation, discrimination and longstanding hostilities between identity groups, individual incentives comprising of economic, security-related and psycho-social enticements that are contingent on personal contributions to the production of violence. A different sample agreed that they were driven by the promise of a salary, while there was a group that joined due to implied terror group threats. The third motivator was enabling factors which includes drivers that facilitate violence rather than motivate it - corresponding largely to questions about how individuals enlist in terror groups, rather than why (Khalil, Brown, Chant, Olowo & Wood, 2019).

Several governments in the Horn of Africa region with the help of international communities have principally worked on defeating the terror groups and reducing the terror attacks in the region through capturing militants. Countries like Somalia have repeatedly in an ad-hoc manner and without any policy specification or clear legal consequence declared temporary amnesties for Al Shabaab defectors. They have also struck political deals with smaller groups and maintains a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs for low level al Shabaab defectors (Brown, 2018).

Regional context

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case study

How Al-Shabaab Returnees in Kenya's Mombasa and Kwale are reintegrated Kenya's reintegration experience began specifically in 2015 with the announcement of an amnesty programme. In 2016, President Uhuru Kenyatta launched the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) which included prevention and counter-radicalization to the more traditional counter-terrorism approaches already in place. This strategy assigned roles to various government agencies, county governments, civil society organizations and communities. These laws address violent extremism by policing, intelligence gathering, and prosecution. The Strategy was designed to complement them and look at the softer approaches and means of reducing communities' vulnerability to violent extremism. The Kenyan government, like many other governments across the world, acknowledges that hard power alone cannot address this threat.

New interventions are continuously focusing on community engagement to build improved relations with citizens, which aids in the gathering of terror-related information by the police, identification of violent extremists and curtailing radicalization (Cherney & Hartley, 2017). Kenya's comprehensive strategy derives from the country's strong perception of terrorism threats. Securitising terrorism is an existential threat that requires extraordinary inter-



ventions to address it. Interestingly, this is a war of allies and foes, with those fighting against it perceived as allies and those against as foes. This came out strongly in President Uhuru Kenyatta's speech, as he launched the 2016 NSCVE, where he encouraged a united approach to counter terrorism using the 'us' versus 'them' framing. "The world's security agencies, multilateral institutions, and the overwhelming bulk of civil society stand against them. In every continent, armies and police forces are fighting them (p.1)". Kenya's national government mandated county governments to develop County Action Plans (CAPs) to support the national CVE efforts at the local level. Kwale County was the first to develop a CVE plan and launched the Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism in February 2017, a document that discusses countering violent extremism through prevention and restorative efforts (Shauri, 2017). Mombasa County Governor Hassan Joho launched Mombasa's Action Plan shortly after the Kwale one. The Action Plan is based on the nine pillars of the NSCVE, which are training and capacity building, education, psychosocial, security, media and online, arts and culture, faith-based and ideological, legal and policy and political, with an additional two pillars on women and the economy (Mombasa County, 2017). Both plans recognize the crucial role that a successful reintegration programme can play in the countering violent extremism arena (Juma & Githigaro, 2021).



Short discussion and questions

1. Are returnees aware of the programs or projects that have been put in place in their respective countries to help them reintegrate back into the community?
2. are the programs effective if any?
3. How should the community be involved when coming up with the return and reintegration policies?

Conclusion

Rehabilitating and reintegrating defectors is not an easy task, especially in the midst of the still ongoing conflicts across the Horn of Africa region. There is high level of insecurity and the operation tactics for this terror groups makes it difficult to protect the disengaging members from the risks and threats. Other than attacks from the terror groups as a challenge, there is also infiltration and retaliation from the community which poses a great danger to the returnees.

The government should involve the community to share ideas, contribute to decision making or even debate concerns of the reintegration measures. There is also the need for protection for all the programs or the set project members; staff and partners as their security is also a high risk, thus there should be a constant assessment of security so as to help the programmes setup achieve its goals and objectives.

If the defectors distrust the programmes or they do not feel safe enough then they may opt to remain in the terror groups and camps or even try exit on their own thus not sharing the relevant information that can help in capturing the militants and reducing the rate of terror attacks. Robust measures need to be established to mitigate risks and further development of defectors rehabilitation programmes should be encouraged across the region so as to weaken the terror groups. Research should consider the comprehensive approach that recognizes the needs for both the defectors and affected communities at large.

Reccomendations

1. Building relationships between civil society and security actors is important in developing information and knowledge that would be shared to the entire community, thus it is important to engage civil societies when coming up with the policies. This goes a long way in ensuring that the community at large has been involved in the re-integration process and are aware of what to do, how to do it and also know how to handle any issues that may arise in the reintegration process.
2. The stake holders in countering violent extremism should continuously carry out independent evaluations to the old, current and new reintegration program, so as to ensure that the objectives of this program are being met and there are no underlying assumptions that would hinder the success of the set programs. With the continuous evaluation, the initiatives set become more effective.
3. There are challenges due to lack of a legal structure; including the absence of safety assurances for returnees, mistrust between stakeholders and poor community engagement. The governments, in consultation with all relevant stakeholders, should draw up a policy framework, upon which to anchor reintegration of returnees. This framework will guide on the due processes to be followed by all persons and institutions handling returnees, establish a clear chain of command and detail the step-by-step procedures of returnees' reintegration and follow-up.



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GAME
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Training Guide

Module 5: Using Arts to Counter Violent Extremism

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Introduction

Violent extremism is a global challenge with local implications for individuals and their communities. In order to effectively respond to the challenge, there is need for systematic and proactive initiatives that counter efforts to recruit and mobilize followers. By disrupting recruitment and mobilization, these efforts reduce violence, protect communities and democratic institutions and support shared community identities.

Violent Extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa

The Greater Horn of Africa Region (GHR) can be said to comprise eleven countries – Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The threat of violent extremism is not new to the Greater Horn of Africa. For decades, terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida and al-Shabaab, have peddled hate-filled ideology to recruit new followers and to justify devastating attacks that have taken the lives of innocent people, often as they have gathered in public places such as local markets, shopping malls, hotels, and buses. However, organizations like al-Shabaab have differed from many earlier terrorist groups in their desire and ability to hold territory and not to simply replace power structures and systems but transform them in a manner that challenges the international state system. Moreover, there are concerns that regional dynamics are being negatively impacted by the emergence and influence of trans-national terrorist and criminal groups beyond the region, including Boko Haram and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Aroussi, 2020: 16).

Saturday, 21 September 2013
westgate attack



Application of Business & Creative Arts in preventing & countering violent extremism; Case of Kenya

The 2016 United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism called on member-states to develop “a national plan of action to prevent violent extremism which sets national priorities for addressing the local drivers of violent extremism and complements national counter-terrorism strategies.”

Kenya was among the first countries to develop such a national plan, launching the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) in September 2016 (UNDP, 2019: 72). Although Kenya’s shift towards a “whole of society” approach echoes a global trend towards P/CVE strategies, the government’s policy evolution was motivated by its own unique experience in response to domestic violent extremism (Idris, 2019). The wave of attacks by Al-Shabaab following Kenya’s 2011 military engagement in Somalia made violent extremism an urgent matter of national security (CEP, 2020).

In response to these attacks, especially the Westgate shopping mall attack in 2013, the Kenyan government introduced a series of laws expanding and consolidating the legal purview of the country’s security and intelligence apparatus (Alexandra, 2017: 3). The 2012 Prevention of

In 2011, Kenya joined the African Union Mission to Somalia



Terrorism Act (POTA), followed by the 2014 Security Laws Amendment Act (SLAA), institutionalized a centralized security-focused approach with the goal of identifying and eliminating violent extremist threats (Bukarte and Munasinghe, 2020: 5).

Thus, the national government in Kenya introduced the NSCVE in 2016. This new policy framework emphasized a devolved, development-oriented approach to P/CVE policy by encouraging county governments and local civil society organizations (CSOs) to develop county action plans (CAPs/RCAPs) to address the drivers of violent extremism. While the NSCVE calls for policy formulation at the national level, implementation rests primarily at the county level (Barbera, 2020). The Kenyan National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), foreign donors, county governments, and CSOs are the crucial actors driving implementation (Bigio & Vogelstein, 2019: 10). Overall, the Kenyan experience with P/CVE demonstrates the institutional challenges in implementing a nationally directed strategy that requires localized approaches and leadership.

With the introduction of the county action plans (CAPs/RCAPs) to address the drivers of violent extremism, Arts and business have been used in preventing & countering violent extremism in different counties across the country (CEP, 2020).

In Nairobi County, for example, we have initiatives such as LUNT that involve the youth through guided-trainings, sequels, and a competition. Such sport based initiatives have helped the youth to not only participate in the actual production of counter-radicalization and recruitment narratives but also exit with valuable skills and enhanced talent through context-specific trainings.



we have initiatives such as LUNT that involve the youth through guided-trainings, sequels, and a competition

Institutions: The implementers

In Kenya, National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), coordinates all initiatives geared towards preventing & countering violent extremism. In line with the NSCVE policy of 2016, County governments play an active role in preventing & countering violent extremism through coming up with action plans (CAPs/RCAPs) to address the drivers of violent extremism (UNDP, 2019: 72).

There are other actors in this area such as the business community and civil society groups that work closely with the NCTC and the County governments in the areas where they implement their programmes.

Discussion Questions

1. What are the current initiatives on P/CVE in your Country?
2. What are the priority areas in addressing the drivers of violent extremism in your County?
3. Do you think the current initiatives on P/CVE in your Country are effective (if any)?

Conclusion

Since the implementation of Kenya's NSCVE, there has been marked policy progress. All counties have developed their own CAPs/RCAPs and the government coordinates regularly with foreign donors, county governments, CSOs, and FBOs. Security responses to major attacks have been more professional, with greater coordination among security forces and increased respect for human rights. Additionally, traditional outcomes of interest (like travel to Somalia) have also improved, according to local stakeholders.

Most countries have adopted initiatives that involves Arts and sports in their action plans on P/CVE. Also, NGOs and civil society groups have also adapted Arts in their P/CVE initiatives. This is a strong indicator of the potential of Arts in preventing & countering violent extremism

Most countries have adopted initiatives that involves Arts and sports in their action plans on P/CVE



Reccomendations

Looking at the important role that Art is playing in preventing & countering violent extremism, there is need to support Arts based initiative on P/CVE across the region in order to replicate the success that has been achieved in Kenya

CONCLUSION The role of youth in preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism hitherto around 2015 had been overlooked and received less attention. The United Nations was amongst the first organisations to reimagine the role of the youth and women in the P/CVE space. Two vital resolutions were passed to rope in the youth (and women). These are 'Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security' and 'Resolution 2242 on Women, Peace and Security'. These resolutions highlighted the centrality of addressing the factors as well as conditions pushing youth and women towards violent extremism. In its implementation, the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism in 2015 called upon UN member states to considerably involve young people and women in approaches intended at countering and preventing violent extremism.

In 2017, Epuka Ugaidi Organization was formed by a group of youth in Kenya, with the intent of providing a platform for the youth to utilize art, talents, and skill to prevent radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism. Now in its fifth season, the Lenga Ugaidi na Talaanta Competition, an initiative of Epuka Ugaidi, has had a great impact, especially in discouraging fellow youth from joining terror groups in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. With this impact and the promise to reach a wider audience, Epuka Ugaidi Organization is keen on expanding this competition to at least five Horn of Africa countries. It is against this background that this manual was created to aid in rolling out similar programmes in five Horn of Africa countries.

This training guide consisting of five modules expounded on various ways the youth in select Horn of Africa countries can use their talent and skills to make income, but more importantly, dissuade fellow youth from joining terrorist organizations in the region or abroad. These modules include Module One- Introduction - Definition of Terms; Module Two - Gender and Extremism; Module Three - Counter and Alternative Narratives; Module Four - Return and Reintegration; and Module Five – Using Art to Counter Violent Extremism. All these modules are structured in a way to make it easier for the trainee to replicate but also fit local realities. Examples and illustrations must also be drawn from the target group.

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Epuka Ugaidi Organization and Lenga Ugaidi Na Talanta Competition in Kenya

In Kenya, at the time when Al-Shabab was gaining ground, radicalizing, and recruiting Kenyan youth into their ranks, Epuka Ugaidi Organization, a youth-led and youth-focused organization came up with the concept of Lenga Ugaidi Na Talanta competition - a program to help the youth use art and sports to fight against terrorism and radicalization. The competition began in 2017, and over the past four years (approximately four seasons), more than 1,500 participants have taken part in the competition and in the process reaching millions of Kenyan youth (including at-risk youth); P/CVE practitioners; and civil society organizations in the CVE space. The goal of this competition is to give the youth a platform to use creative arts and sports to fight terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya. The winners of the competition have won prizes worth thousands of dollars and created an impact by demonstrating that the youth can play a critical role in preventing terrorism and violent extremism. Stakeholders and counter-terrorism experts have seen the success of this competition in Kenya and made the choice to involve the Horn of Africa nations so as to curb the rising cases of radicalization and terrorism. Youth from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti will have a platform to participate are in this year's competition so as to raise regional awareness against terrorism and violent extremism.



