



https://atulsingharora.github.io/QIP_19

Coin Flipping where weakness is a virtue

Overview

Acknowledgments

Motivation

Stolen shamelessly from Prof Schaffner's QIP 2018 tutorial talk.

Problem Statement

Strong CF, Weak CF, correctness and bias

Prior Art

Bounds and protocols, Kitaev's Frameworks, Mochon's Breakthrough

Contribution

TEF, Blinkered Unitaries, 1/10 explicit, Elliptic-Monotone-Align Algorithm

Conclusion

Acknowledgments



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


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Motivation

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Beyond QKD

Multi-party Computation
(dishonest majority)



Two-party
Secure Function Evaluation



Oblivious Transfer

$\Downarrow, \not\Downarrow, \Uparrow$

Bit Commitment

Quantumly
Impossible
[Mayers⁹⁷,
LoChau⁹⁷]

$\Downarrow, \not\Downarrow$

Coin Flipping

Classically all
are impossible.

Problem Statement

Strong CF, Weak CF, correctness and bias

Problem Statement

Coin Flipping (CF): Alice and Bob wish to agree on a random bit remotely without trusting each other.

- **Strong Coin Flipping:** No player knows the preference of the other.
- **Weak Coin Flipping (WCF):** Each player knows the preference of the other.

Situations

Honest player: A player that follows the protocol exactly as described.

Alice	Bob	Remark
Honest	Honest	Correctness
Cheats	Honest	Alice can bias
Honest	Cheats	Bob can bias
Cheats	Cheats	Independent of the protocol

Bias of a protocol: A protocol that solves the CF problem has bias ϵ if neither player can force their desired outcome with probability more than $\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon$.

Situations | Weak CF

| NB. For WCF the players have opposite preferred outcomes.

Alice	Bob	Pr(A wins)	Pr(B wins)
Honest	Honest	P_A	$P_B = 1 - P_A$
Cheats	Honest	P_A^*	$1 - P_A^*$
Honest	Cheats	$1 - P_B^*$	P_B^*

| **Bias:**

smallest ϵ s.t. $P_A^*, P_B^* \leq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$

| NB.

$$0 \leq \epsilon \leq \frac{1}{2}$$

Situations | Weak CF | Flip and declare

| Protocol: Alice flips a coin and declares the outcome to Bob.

Alice	Bob	Pr(A wins)	Pr(B wins)
Honest	Honest	$P_A = 1/2$	$P_B = 1/2$
Cheats	Honest	$P_A^* = 1$	$1 - P_A^* = 0$
Honest	Cheats	$1 - P_B^* = 1/2$	$P_B^* = 1/2$

| **Bias:** smallest ϵ s.t. $P_A^*, P_B^* \leq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ $\implies \epsilon = \frac{1}{2}$

Prior Art

Bounds and protocols, Kitaev's Frameworks, Mochon's Breakthrough

Bounds and Protocols


Classically: $\epsilon = \frac{1}{2}$ viz. at least one player can always cheat and win.

Quantumly:


	Bound	Best protocol known
Strong CF	$\epsilon \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} - \frac{1}{2}$ [Kitaev 03]	$\epsilon = \frac{1}{4}$ [Ambainis 01]
Weak CF	$\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ [Mochon 07] [Aharonov et al 16]	$\epsilon \rightarrow \frac{1}{6}$ [Mochon 05]

Kitaev | Three Equivalent Frameworks

Protocol




Time Dependent Point Game (TDPG)



Time Independent Point Game (TIPG)

Kitaev | Protocol



- Variables involved: ρ, U
- Two SDPs
 - P_A^* is an SDP in ρ_B : $P_A^* = \max(\text{tr}(\Pi_A \rho_B))$
s.t. the honest player (Bob) follows the protocol.
 - Similarly for P_B^* .
- Dual: $\rho \leftrightarrow Z$, $\max \leftrightarrow \min$, $P^* = \max \leftrightarrow P^* \leq \text{certificate}$


Kitaev | TDPG

Time Dependent Point Game (TDPG):

A sequence of frames (frames = points on a plane) such that

- Starts with points at $(0, 1)$ and $(1, 0)$ with weight $1/2$.
- Consecutive frames: along a line, for all $\lambda \geq 0$

$$\sum_z \frac{\lambda z}{\lambda + z} p_z \leq \sum_{z'} \frac{\lambda z'}{\lambda + z'} p'_{z'}.$$



- Ends with a single point (β, α) .

Mathemagic: For a valid TDPG there is a protocol with $P_A^* \leq \alpha$, $P_B^* \leq \beta$.

Charm: Operator monotone functions.

Kitaev's Framework #2 | TDPG | Rule


Merge ($n_g \rightarrow 1$):

$$\langle x_g \rangle \leq x_h$$



Split ($1 \rightarrow n_h$):

$$\frac{1}{x_g} \geq \left\langle \frac{1}{x_h} \right\rangle$$




Raise ($n_g = n_h \rightarrow n_h$):

$$x_{g_i} \leq x_{h_i}$$



Kitaev's Frameworks | TDPG | Rule



Consecutive frames: along a line, for all $\lambda \geq 0$

$$\sum_i \frac{\lambda x_{g_i}}{\lambda + x_{g_i}} p_{g_i} \leq \sum_i \frac{\lambda x_{h_i}}{\lambda + x_{h_i}} p_{h_i}.$$


Kitaev's Frameworks | TDPG | Example

Merge ($n_g \rightarrow 1$):

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Raise ($n_g = n_h \rightarrow n_h$):

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The flip and declare protocol!

Kitaev's Frameworks | TDPG | Example

Merge ($n_g \rightarrow 1$):


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Raise ($n_g = n_h \rightarrow n_h$):

$$x_{g_i} \leq x_{h_i}$$



Spekkens Rudolph protocol (PRL, 2002)

Kitaev's Frameworks | TDPG | Example

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
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Raise ($n_g = n_h \rightarrow n_h$):

$$x_{g_i} \leq x_{h_i}$$



Best known explicit protocol:
Dip Dip Boom (Mochon, PRA 2005)

Kitaev's Frameworks | TIPG

Time Independent Point Game (TIPG):

- Key idea: Allow negative weights
- $h(x, y), v(x, y)$ s.t.
 $h + v = \text{final frame} - \text{initial frame}$
 h, v satisfy a similar equation.

Mathemagic: For a valid TIPG there is TDPG with the same last frame.

Charm: Catalyst state.


Mochon | Near-perfect WCF is possible

- Mathemagic: Family of TIPGs that yield

$$\epsilon = \frac{1}{4k + 2}$$

where $2k =$ number of points involved in the non-trivial step.


- $k = 1$ yields the Dip Dip Boom protocol ($\epsilon = 1/6$) protocol.
- Charm: Polynomials.



Contribution

TEF, Blinkered Unitaries, 1/10 explicit, Elliptic-Monotone-Align Algorithm

TEF



TDPG to Explicit protocol Framework (TEF):

A TDPG \rightarrow Protocol if
for each consecutive frame of a TDPG one can construct a U s.t.

$$\sum \underline{x_{h_i}} |h_i\rangle \langle h_i| - \sum \underline{x_{g_i}} E_h U |g_i\rangle \langle g_i| U^\dagger E_h \geq 0$$

and

$$U(\underbrace{\sum \sqrt{p_{g_i}} |g_i\rangle}_{|v\rangle}) = \underbrace{\sum \sqrt{p_{h_i}} |h_i\rangle}_{|w\rangle}.$$

TEF | Blinkered Unitaries

For the Dip Dip Boom ($\epsilon = 1/6$) protocol, we need a U that implements

- Split: $1 \rightarrow n_h$
- Merge: $n_g \rightarrow 1$

Claim: $U_{\text{blink}} = |w\rangle\langle v| + |v\rangle\langle w| + \mathbb{I}_{\text{else}}$ can perform both.

Significance: Current best protocol from its point game directly.

TEF | 1/10 Explicit

For initialising and the catalyst state we need


- Merge
- Split

and to climb down the ladder we need a special class


- $3 \rightarrow 2$
- $2 \rightarrow 2$.

$$U_{3 \rightarrow 2} = |w_1\rangle\langle v_1| + (|v'_2\rangle + |w_2\rangle)\langle v'_2| + |v'_0\rangle\langle v'_0| + (|v'_2\rangle - |w_2\rangle)\langle w_2| + |v_1\rangle\langle w_1|$$

$$U_{2 \rightarrow 2} = |w_1\rangle\langle v_1| + (\alpha|v_1\rangle + \beta|w_2\rangle)\langle v_2| + |v_1\rangle\langle w_1| + (\beta|v_1\rangle - \alpha|w_2\rangle)\langle w_2|$$



Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) Algorithm



Find a U s.t.


$$X_h \geq UX_g U^\dagger$$

and

$$U |v\rangle = |w\rangle$$

where $X_h = \text{diag}(x_{h_1}, x_{h_2}, \dots)$, $|w\rangle \doteq (\sqrt{p_{h_1}}, \sqrt{p_{h_2}}, \dots)^T$.
 X_g and $|v\rangle$ are similarly defined.

EMA | Elliptic Representation




- Restrict to reals: $U \rightarrow O$.
- For X diagonal

$$\mathcal{E}_X = \{|u\rangle \mid \langle u| X |u\rangle = 1\}$$

is \vec{u} which satisfy $\sum x_i u_i^2 = 1$, viz. an ellipsoid.

- Generalises to all $X > 0$.
- $\underbrace{X_h}_{H} \geq \underbrace{OX_gO^T}_{G}$ means \mathcal{E}_H is contained in \mathcal{E}_G (containment is reversed).


EMA | Elliptic Representation




- Imagine: Solution O is known, viz.
 - $O|v\rangle = |w\rangle$.
 - $X_h \geq OX_g O^T$.
- Suppose: Point of contact is $|w\rangle$.
- Observation:
 - $O|n_g\rangle = |n_h\rangle$.
 - Inner ellipsoid more curved.

EMA | Elliptic Representation

- Imagine: Solution O is known, viz.
 - $O|v\rangle = |w\rangle$.
 - $X_h \geq OX_gO^T$.
- Suppose: Point of contact is $|w\rangle$.
- Observation:
 - $O|n_g\rangle = |n_h\rangle$.
 - Inner ellipsoid more curved.



EMA | Elliptic Monotone-Align Algorithm



- Given a k dimension problem:
 - Tighten;
 - Normals must coincide at the point of contact;
 - The inner ellipsoid must be more curved than the outer ellipsoid,
- which yields a $k - 1$ dimension problem.
- Apply iteratively and combine to get U .
- Significance: Explicit protocol for Weak CF with $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$.

Conclusion

Summary

- Framework for finding protocols from point games.
 - Split and Merge, basic moves in these games, exactly converted to unitaries
 - Bias 1/6 protocol
 - Catalyst State
 - Bias 1/10 protocol moves exactly determined
- Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) Algorithm.
 - A systematic way of finding unitaries for any valid move
 - Protocol for WCF with $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$.

Summary

Classically: $\epsilon = \frac{1}{2}$ viz. at least one player can always cheat and win.

Quantumly:

	Bound	Best protocol known
Strong CF	$\epsilon \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} - \frac{1}{2}$ [Kitaev 03]	$\epsilon \rightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} - \frac{1}{2}$ [Chailloux Kerenidis 09]
Weak CF	$\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ [Mochon 07] [Aharonov et al 16]	$\epsilon \rightarrow \frac{1}{10}$ (analytic) $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ (algorithmic)

Outlook

- • *Resources.* Compile the 1/10 game into a neater protocol
- • *Structure.* Relation between Mochon's polynomial assignment and the EMA solution
- • *Simpler.* Study the Pelchat-Høyer point games and its moves
- • *Robust.* Account for noise in the unitaries
 - • EMA will run with finite precision; quantify its effect on the bias
- • *Bounds.* Prove lower bounds on number of points needed for achieving a certain bias



?



[arXiv:1811.02984](https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.02984)

Thank you

The work was funded by FRIA, FNRS; FNRS grant QUICTIME; FNRS grant QuantAlgo.

Resource Requirements

COROLLARY 4.6. *Assume there exists a TIPG with a valid horizontal function $h = h^+ - h^-$ and a valid vertical function $v = v^+ - v^-$ such that $h + v = 1[\beta, \alpha] - \frac{1}{2}[0, 1] - \frac{1}{2}[1, 0]$. Let Γ be the largest coordinate of all the points that appear in the TIPG game. Then, for all $\varepsilon > 0$, we can construct a point game with $O(\frac{\|h\|\Gamma^2}{\varepsilon^2})$ valid transitions and final point $[\beta + \varepsilon, \alpha + \varepsilon]$.*

5. Construction of a TIPG achieving bias ε . In this section we construct for every $\varepsilon > 0$ a game with final point $[1/2 + \varepsilon, 1/2 + \varepsilon]$. Moreover, the number of qubits used in the protocol will be $O(\log \frac{1}{\varepsilon})$ and the number of rounds $(\frac{1}{\varepsilon})^{O(\frac{1}{\varepsilon})}$.

DORIT AHARONOV[†], ANDRÉ CHAILLOUX[‡], MAOR GANZ[†], IORDANIS KERENIDIS[§],
AND LOÏCK MAGNIN[†]

EMA | Big Picture

■ Best Strategy
(SDP)

$\xrightarrow{\text{Dual}}$

Constraint: Honest player follows the protocol

$$\rho_f = \text{tr}(U\rho_i U^\dagger)$$

■ (SDP)

$\xrightarrow{\text{Kitaev}^\dagger}$

Constraint: Matrix inequality

$$\underbrace{Z_f}_H \geq \underbrace{(U Z_i U^\dagger)}_G$$

■ TDPG

frame

=Measurement outcome of $Z_A \otimes Z_B$ with prob. given by $|\psi\rangle$
= Prob[$Z_A \otimes Z_B, |\psi\rangle$]

■ Constraint: (*)

† Combine the dual SDP with the “honest state” or primal variable to get rid of the extra basis information.
Same idea behind his bound on Strong CF.

EMA | Big Picture (cont.)

■ (*) Expressible By Matrices
(EBM)

$$H \geq G, |\psi\rangle \text{ s.t.}$$

$$\text{Prob}[G, |\psi\rangle] \rightarrow \text{Prob}[H, |\psi\rangle]$$

■ Operator monotone function

$$f \text{ s.t.}$$

$$\forall H \geq G, f(H) \geq f(G)$$

■ Valid functions

$$\sum_{\text{final}} \frac{\lambda z}{\lambda + z} p_z \geq \sum_{\text{init}} \frac{\lambda z}{\lambda + z} p_z$$

$K : \text{cone of EBM}$

$\xrightarrow{\text{Dual}}$

$K^* : \text{cone of}$
Operator Monotones

$\xrightarrow{\text{Dual}}$

$K^{**} : \text{cone of}$
valid functions



EMA | EBRM=EBM

Expressible By
Real Matrices (EBRM)

$H \geq G, |\psi\rangle$ s.t.

$\text{Prob}[G, |\psi\rangle] \rightarrow \text{Prob}[H, |\psi\rangle]$

$K' : \text{cone of EBRM}$

$\xrightarrow{\text{Dual}}$

Operator monotone function

f s.t.

$\forall H \geq G, f(H) \geq f(G)$

$K^* : \text{cone of}$
Operator Monotones

$\xrightarrow{\text{Dual}}$

Valid functions

$$\sum_{\text{final}} \frac{\lambda z}{\lambda+z} p_z \geq \sum_{\text{init}} \frac{\lambda z}{\lambda+z} p_z$$

$K^{**} : \text{cone of}$
valid functions

$$\implies K' = K$$

Lemma: $K' = K^{**}$

i.e. we don't need complex numbers for quantum weak coin flipping.




Figure 1: Attempting calculation of bias (performance parameter of the WCF protocols) using the CT framework




Figure 2: Comparing the difference in approach

Kitaev-Mochon Framework extension:
TDPG → Explicit Protocol




Figure 3: Extending the Kitaev-Mochon Framework to allow TDPG→Explicit Protocol construction

Kitaev-Mochon Framework extension:
 TDPG → Explicit Protocol




Figure 4: Adding moves to the framework for TDPG→Explicit Protocol construction