



## I-Stable

Smart Contract Audit Report



## **ABOUT AUDITACE**

Audit Ace is built, to combat financial fraud in the cryptocurrency industry, a growing security firm that provides audits, Smart contract creation, and end-to-end solutions to all cryptorelated queries.

Website - https://auditace.tech/
Telegram - https://t.me/Audit\_Ace
Twitter - https://twitter.com/auditace\_
Github - https://github.com/Audit-Ace



# Overview

AUDITACE team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of smart contracts. Smart contracts were analyzed mainly for common contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks.

Audit Result: Passed - Medium Risk

Audit Date: November 26, 2022

KYC:Not done till date of Audit

Audit Team: TEAM AUDITACE

Result details: no centralization or logical issues found in the contract, token launched on a local blockchain and all functionalities were tested.



# Disclaimer

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# **I-Stable**

#### **Social Media Overview**



https://t.me/iStableOfficial



twitter.com/istableofficial



http://i-Stable.com



# Token Summary

| Parameter         | Result                                     |  |
|-------------------|--|--|
| Address           | 0x0573780eB18D5c847D89e745e94149B9E9d0cdE8 |  |
| Token Type        | BEP 20                                     |  |
| Decimals          | 18   |  |
| Supply            | 100,000,000                                |  |
| Platform          | Binance Smart Chain                        |  |
| Compiler          | v0.8.17+commit.8df45f5f                    |  |
| Contract checksum | debd8d927f8951e077a12890dc0306ec0b27621c2  |  |
|                   | b16b832247eeebce198561a                    |  |


#### **Used Tools**

Manual Review - Forked Pancakeswap V2 on local blockchain Tests:

- adding liquidty with WBNB and BUSD
- buying and selling right after launch
- · taxes get collected inside the contract
- · taxes are sent marketing wallet (BNB) and autoliquidity works



#### **CONTRACT FUNCTION SUMMARY**



Can edit Tax?

**DETECTED** 

Can take back Ownership?

**NOT DETECTED** 

Is Blacklisted?

**NOT DETECTED** 

Is Whitelisted?

**NOT DETECTED** 

Is Mintable?

**NOT DETECTED** 

Disable Trade?

**DETECTED** 

Is Trading with CooldownTime?

**NOT DETECTED** 



#### **AUDIT METHODOLOGY**

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
- Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
- Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code isexercised when we run the test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.



## **Issues Checking Status**

| No | Issue Description   | Checking Status |
|----|---|-----------------|
| 1  | Compiler warnings.  | Passed          |
| 2  | Race conditions and Reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions. | Passed          |
| 3  | Possible delays in data delivery.                               | Passed          |
| 4  | Oracle calls.   | Passed          |
| 5  | Front running.  | Passed          |
| 6  | Timestamp dependence.   | Passed          |
| 7  | Integer Overflow and Underflow.                                 | Passed          |
| 8  | DoS with Revert.  | Passed          |
| 9  | DoS with block gas limit.                                       | Passed          |
| 10 | Methods execution permissions.                                  | Passed          |
| 11 | Design Logic.   | Passed          |
| 12 | Cross-function race conditions.                                 | Passed          |
| 13 | Safe Zeppelin module.   | Passed          |
| 14 | Malicious Event log.  | Passed          |
| 15 | Scoping and Declarations.                                       | Passed          |
| 16 | Fallback function security.                                     | Passed          |
| 17 | Arithmetic accuracy.  | Passed          |



## **SWC ATTACK TEST**


| SWC ID  | Description                          | Test Result |
|---------|--------------------------------------|-------------|
| SWC-100 | Function Visibility                  | Passed      |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow       | Passed      |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version            | Passed      |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma                      | Passed      |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value          | Passed      |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal         | Passed      |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | Passed      |
| SWC-107 | Re-entrancy                          | Passed      |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility    | Passed      |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer        | Passed      |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation                     | Passed      |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | Passed      |
| SWC-112 | Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee    | Passed      |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call                 | Passed      |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence         | Passed      |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin      | Passed      |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time     | Passed      |



| SWC ID  | Description   | Test Result |
|---------|---|-------------|
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability                                  | Passed      |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name                              | Passed      |
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables                               | Passed      |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes        | Passed      |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks     | Passed      |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification                   | Passed      |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation                                   | Passed      |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location                     | Passed      |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order                             | Passed      |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Grieving                               | Passed      |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable              | Passed      |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit                                | Passed      |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error                                     | Passed      |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)       | Passed      |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables                            | Passed      |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance                                | Passed      |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments | Passed      |
| SWC-134 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain                       | Passed      |



#### Inheritance Tree



#### **Summary**

- Anti-Bot implementation: for up to 5 blocks, buyers and sellers get taxes by 99%
- Owner is able to change taxes, buy and sell up to 12% each.(24% total)
- Owner is not able to set max buy/sell/transferring amount
- Owner is not able to mint new tokens
- Owner is not able to pause trades
- Owner must enable trading in order for investors to be able to trade
- Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary address



#### Classification of Risks

#### Severity

#### **Description**

High-Risk

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

Medium-Risk

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

Low-Risk

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.

Gas Optimization/Suggestion

A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

### **Findings**

| Severity           | Found |  |
|--------------------|-------|--|
| ♦ High-Risk        | 0     |  |
| ◆ Medium-Risk      | 2     |  |
| ♦ Low-Risk         | 2     |  |
| Gas Optimization / | 3     |  |
| Suggestions        |       |  |



#### **Medium Risk Findings**

Centralization -owner is able to update dividend tracker, changing dividend tracker to a malicious contract may effect trades (eg disable them)

```
function updateDividendTracker(address newAddress) public
onlyOwner {
    iStableDividendTracker newDividendTracker =
iStableDividendTracker(
        payable(newAddress)
    );

newDividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(address(newDividendTracker), true);
newDividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(address(this), true);
newDividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(owner(), true);
    newDividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(address(router),
true);
    dividendTracker = newDividendTracker;
}
```



Logical -setting swapTokensAtAmount to 0 can disable sells if collected tokens from taxes (i.e contract's eldendoge token balance) is greater than swapTokensAtAmount.

```
function setSwapTokensAtAmount(uint256 amount) external
onlyOwner {
    require(amount < 1e6,"Swap Threshold should be less than 1% of
total supply");
    swapTokensAtAmount = amount * 10**9;
}</pre>
```

suggestion: make sure that you can not set swapTokensAtAmount to
0 at setSwapTokensAtAmount



#### Low Risk Findings

Centralization - owner is able to change buy/sell taxes each one up to 12%.

```
function setBuyTaxes(uint256 _rewards, uint256 _marketing,
uint256 _dev, uint256 _liquidity) external onlyOwner{
    buyTaxes = Taxes(_rewards, _marketing, _dev, _liquidity);
    require((_rewards + _marketing + _dev + _liquidity) <= 12, "Must
keep fees at 12% or less");
}
function setSellTaxes(uint256 _rewards, uint256 _marketing,
uint256 _dev, uint256 _liquidity) external onlyOwner{
    sellTaxes = Taxes(_rewards, _marketing, _dev, _liquidity);
    require((_rewards + _marketing + _dev + _liquidity) <= 12, "Must
keep fees at 12% or less");
}</pre>
```



Logical -setting rewardToken to a non-erc20 contract can revert the transaction if holder is eligible for claiming rewards (auto claim).

```
function setRewardToken(address newToken) external onlyOwner {
  require(newToken!=address(0),"New token can't be zero address");
  require(newToken!=deadWallet,"New token can't be dead address");
  require(newToken!=address(this),"New token can't be contract
  address itself");
  dividendTracker.setRewardToken(newToken);
  }
```

suggestion: make sure that you can not set swapTokensAtAmount to
0 at setSwapTokensAtAmount



#### **Gas Optimizations**

- do not use SafeMath library, overflow/underflows are handled internally by compiler if compiler's version is more than 0.8.0, using safemath only increases gas usage.
- create 2 variables for total buy taxes and total sell taxes, this
  will decrease gas usage in \_transfer function which leads to
  lower gas usage for all buys/sells/transfers, currently SLOAD
  opcode costs 2100 gas

#### **Suggestions**

 do not use SafeMath library, overflow/underflows are handled internally by compiler if compiler's version is more than 0.8.0