



# GFM

## Smart Contract Audit Report



# ABOUT AUDITACE

Audit Ace is built, to combat financial fraud in the cryptocurrency industry, a growing security firm that provides audits, Smart contract creation, and end-to-end solutions to all crypto-related queries.

**Website - <https://auditace.tech/>**

**Telegram - [https://t.me/Audit\\_Ace](https://t.me/Audit_Ace)**

**Twitter - [https://twitter.com/auditace\\_](https://twitter.com/auditace_)**

**Github - <https://github.com/Audit-Ace>**

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# Overview

AUDITACE team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of smart contracts. Smart contracts were analyzed mainly for common contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks.

Audit Result: **Passed with Very High Risk**

Audit Date: December 10, 2022

KYC: Not done till date of Audit

Audit Team: TEAM AUDITACE

## Reason :

- Owner is able to mint new tokens

- Migrator contract is not provided, migrator contract has approval to spend staking contract's tokens, this could lead to owner withdraw staked tokens.



# Disclaimer

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment. Team provides no guarantees against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from being scammed. The Auditace team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools. Under no circumstances did Auditace receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from scams. This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token. The Auditace team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.

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# Used Tools

## Manual Review - Forked Pancakeswap V2 on Local Blockchain

Tests:

- Deployment
  - Adding Liquidity
  - Buying and selling for everyone, right after adding liquidity
  - Auto Liquidity
  - Marketing & Dev wallet receiving BNB
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# Token Summary

Parameter	Result
Address	-
Token Type	BEP 20
Contract Checksum	043a718774c572bd8a25adbeb1bfcd5c0256ae11cecf9f9c3f925d0e52beaf89
Decimals	-
Supply	Staking Contract
Platform	Binance Smart Chain
Compiler	v0.6.12
Token Name	GFM TOKEN
Symbol	GFM
License Type	-
Language	Solidity

# CONTRACT FUNCTION SUMMARY



Can edit Tax?

**NOT DETECTED**

Can take back Ownership?

**NOT DETECTED**

Is Blacklisted?

**NOT DETECTED**

Is Whitelisted?

**NOT DETECTED**

Is Mintable?

**DETECTED**

Disable Trade?

**NOT DETECTED**

Is Trading with CooldownTime?

**NOT DETECTED**

# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
  - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
  - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
  - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
  - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
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# Issues Checking Status

No	Issue Description	Checking Status
1	Compiler warnings.	Passed
2	Race conditions and Reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions.	Passed
3	Possible delays in data delivery.	Passed
4	Oracle calls.	Passed
5	Front running.	Passed
6	Timestamp dependence.	Passed
7	Integer Overflow and Underflow.	Passed
8	DoS with Revert.	Passed
9	DoS with block gas limit.	Passed
10	Methods execution permissions.	Passed
11	Design Logic.	Passed
12	Cross-function race conditions.	Passed
13	Safe Zeppelin module.	Passed
14	Malicious Event log.	Passed
15	Scoping and Declarations.	Passed
16	Fallback function security.	Passed
17	Arithmetic accuracy.	Passed




# SWC ATTACK TEST

SWC ID	Description	Test Result
SWC-100	Function Visibility	Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Passed
SWC-107	Re-entrancy	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed
SWC-112	Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed



SWC ID	Description	Test Result
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Grieving	Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed
SWC-134	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Passed

# Inheritance Tree



## Summary

- Owner is able to mint new tokens
  - Owner is not able to set buy or sell taxes
  - Owner is not able to set max buy/sell/transfer
  - Owner is not able to pause trades
  - Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary address
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# Classification of Risks

## Severity

## Description

◆ <b>High-Risk</b>	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.
◆ <b>Medium-Risk</b>	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.
◆ <b>Low-Risk</b>	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.
◆ <b>Gas Optimization /Suggestion</b>	A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

# Findings

## Severity

## Found

◆ <b>High-Risk</b>	<b>2</b>
◆ <b>Medium-Risk</b>	<b>0</b>
◆ <b>Low-Risk</b>	<b>1</b>
◆ <b>Gas Optimization / Suggestions</b>	<b>0</b>

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# MANUAL AUDIT

## High Risk Findings

**Centralization** - Owner is able to mint new tokens

```
function mint(address _to, uint256 _amount) public onlyOwner {  
    _mint(_to, _amount);  
}
```

**Allevation / Team Statement:** Stake needs to mint new tokens as rewards, once the stake has started we will transfer ownership

# MANUAL AUDIT

**Centralization** – Owner is able to withdraw any token from the contract using migrate function(in original sushi masterchef contract this function is used to withdraw UNI tokens from the contract), migrator contract is not provided and is not in this audit scope:

```
function migrate(uint256 _pid) public {
    require(address(migrator) != address(0), "migrate: no migrator");
    PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
    IERC20 lpToken = pool.lpToken;
    uint256 bal = lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));
    lpToken.safeApprove(address(migrator), bal);
    IERC20 newLpToken = migrator.migrate(lpToken);
    require(bal == newLpToken.balanceOf(address(this)),
"migrate: bad");
    pool.lpToken = newLpToken;
}
```

**Allevation/ Team Statement:** Football Manager is a gamefi with mystery box function , we need to migrate in the following deployment.

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# MANUAL AUDIT

## Low Risk Findings

**Compilers < 0.8.0 are outdated, use a compiler with version > 0.8.0**





# MANUAL AUDIT

## Gas Optimizations

- **Redundant function and code: manageBot function is never used in the contract and is also set to false, also, anti-bot implementation is not practical (refer to first logical issue) and can be deleted from the contract**
- **holdersFirstBuyTimestamp variable is redundant and never used in the contract**

## Suggestions

- **since compiler version is more than 0.8.0, then we can ignore using safeMath to increase gas efficiency**
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