

Smart Contract Audit

FOR

Pepe Gangster

DATED: 14 May 23'



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name - Pepe Gangster

Date: 14 May, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: Passed

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	1	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0



USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:

a line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Test Network:

all tests were done on BSC Test network, each test has its transaction has attached to it.

3- Slither: Static Analysis

Testnet Link: all tests were done using this contract, tests are done on BSC Testnet

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x634f6cbeb1c5e3b 29869628385616cf622670cf1223aa69720a49ea41f 89aa70



Token Information

Token Name: Pepe Gangster

Token Symbol: PEPEG

Decimals: 9

Token Supply:1,000,000,000,000

Token Address:

0x8481c3Da0b3084664050acd956a2081dA3Aae5A0

Checksum:

b5bb614de2020c290c8d9c47740f00045d91de46

Owner:

0xBbCe79A675324713d6F2A933BC7af22e5D9925d2



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Fees:

Buy Fees: upto 5%

Sell Fees: upto 5 %

Transfer Fees: upto 5%

Fees Privilige: none

Ownership: owned

Minting: No mint function

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No

Blacklist: No

Other Priviliges: changing swap threshold - enabling

trades



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
- Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
- Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code isexercised when we run the test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.



VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST





CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

- Critical
- High-Risk
- Medium-Risk
- Low-Risk
- Gas Optimization
 /Suggestion

Description

These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.


A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity	Found
◆ Critical	0
♦ High-Risk	0
◆ Medium-Risk	1
♦ Low-Risk	0
Gas Optimization /Suggestions	0



INHERITANCE TREE





POINTS TO NOTE

- Owner is not able to change fees (5% for each type of tax)
- Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary address.
- Owner is not able to disable trades
- Owner is not able to set max buy/sell/transfer/hold amount to 0
- Owner is not able to mint new tokens
- Owner must enable trades manually



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
| Contract |
                Type
                             Bases
|<del>:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|</del>
       **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
111111
| **IBEP20** | Interface | ||| | |
| L | totalSupply | External | | NO | |
| L | balanceOf | External | | NO | |
| L | transfer | External | | | NO | |
| | allowance | External | | NO | |
| L | approve | External | | | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | External | | | NO | |
ШШ
**Context** | Implementation | |||
| L | msgSender | Internal 🦰 | | | | |
| L | msgData | Internal 🦰 | | |
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context | | |
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | ( NO | |
| L | owner | Public | | NO |
| L | transferOwnership | Public | | ( ) | onlyOwner |
| L | _setOwner | Private 🦳 | 🛑 | |
| **IFactory** | Interface | |||
| L | createPair | External | | | NO | |
111111
| **IRouter** | Interface | ||| | | |
| L | factory | External | | NO |
| L | WETH | External | | NO | |
| L | addLiquidityETH | External | | III | INO | |
| L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | | NO | |
111111
| **Address** | Library | | | |
| L | sendValue | Internal 🦰 | 🛑 | |
IIIIIII
| **PEPEG** | Implementation | Context, IBEP20, Ownable | | | | |
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | ( ) | NO | |
| L | name | Public | | | NO | |
| L | symbol | Public | | NO | |
| L | decimals | Public | | NO | |
| L | totalSupply | Public | | NO | |
| L | balanceOf | Public | | NO | |
```



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
| L | allowance | Public | | NO | | | |
| L | approve | Public | | 🛑 | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | Public | | ( NO | |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public | | 🛑 | NO | |
| L | decreaseAllowance | Public | | ( NO | |
| L | transfer | Public | | ( NO | |
| | | isExcludedFromReward | Public | | | NO | |
| | reflectionFromToken | Public | | NO | |
| L | EnableTrading | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | updatedeadline | External | | 🛑 | onlyOwner |
| L | tokenFromReflection | Public | | NO | |
📙 | excludeFromReward | Public 📗 | 🛑 | onlyOwner |
| L | includeInReward | External | | 🛑 | onlyOwner | |
| L | includeInFee | Public | | 🛑 | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromFee | Public | | NO | |
| L | reflectRfi | Private 🦳 | 🛑 | |
| L | _takeLiquidity | Private 🦳 | 🧓 | |
| L | _takeMarketing | Private 🤔 | 🧓 | |
| L | _getValues | Private 🦳 | | |
| L | _getTValues | Private 🦳 | | |
| L | getRValues1 | Private 🦰 | | |
| L | _getRValues2 | Private 🛅 |
| L | getRate | Private 🤔 | | |
| L | _getCurrentSupply | Private <a>P</a> | | | |
| L | _approve | Private 🦳 | 🛑 | |
| L | _transfer | Private 🦳 | 🛑 | |
| L | _tokenTransfer | Private 🦰 | 🛑 | |
| L | swapAndLiquify | Private 🕑 | 🛑 | lockTheSwap |
| L | addLiquidity | Private 🦰 | 🛑 | |
| L | swapTokensForBNB | Private 🛅 | 🛑 | |
| L | bulkExcludeFee | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | updateDevWallet | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | updateSwapTokensAtAmount | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| | updateSwapEnabled | External | | ( ) | onlyOwner |
| L | rescueBNB | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | rescueAnyBEP20Tokens | Public | | | | onlyOwner |
```



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
Legend

Symbol | Meaning |
|------|
| Function can modify state |
| Function is payable |
```



STATIC ANALYSIS

```
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
 PEPEG.includeInReward(address) (contracts/Token.sol#417-428) has costly operations inside a loop:
 - excluded.pop() (contracts/Token.sol#424)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#costly-operations-inside-a-loop
 Context._msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#59-62) is never used and should be removed Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
 - (MAX - (MAX % tTotal))
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#20) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
 solc-0.8.19 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
 - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sot#159/150/);
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
Function IRouter.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#115) is not in mixedCase
Struct PEPEG.valuesFromGetValues (contracts/Token.sol#215-229) is not in CapWords
Function PEPEG.EnableTrading() (contracts/Token.sol#383-388) is not in mixedCase
Parameter PEPEG.updateGeadline(uint256)._deadline (contracts/Token.sol#390) is not in mixedCase
Parameter PEPEG.updateSwapEnabled(bool)._enabled (contracts/Token.sol#810) is not in mixedCase
Parameter PEPEG.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._tokenAddr (contracts/Token.sol#822) is not in mixedCase
Parameter PEPEG.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._to (contracts/Token.sol#823) is not in mixedCase
Parameter PEPEG.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._amount (contracts/Token.sol#824) is not in mixedCase
Constant PEPEG._decimals (contracts/Token.sol#174) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Variable PEPEG.genesis_block (contracts/Token.sol#182) is not in mixedCase
Constant PEPEG._name (contracts/Token.sol#190) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant PEPEG._symbol (contracts/Token.sol#191) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
                                          "this (contracts/Token.sol#60)" inContext (contracts/Token.sol#54-63)
 Redundant expression
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
 PEPEG._lastSell (contracts/Token.sol#169) is never used in PEPEG (contracts/Token.sol#153-834) Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-state-variable
 PEPEG._tTotal (contracts/Token.sol#177) should be constant
 PEPEG.deadWallet (contracts/Token.sol#185) should be constant
 PEPEG.pair (contracts/Token.sol#172) should be immutable
 PEPEG.router (contracts/Token.sol#171) should be immutable
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,

No major issues were found in the output



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Router (PCS V2):

0xD99D1c33F9fC3444f8101754aBC46c52416550D1

All the functionalities have been tested, no issues were found

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xbff3d2ee08bc34c7c4ee87092c7 8971f101c9446cfe1b46791ee64638e238fdf

2- Buying when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa35404088c75c6fd0cc763a0c1f 58a9625543a8aab0f596c1dc6d4c8e0362b56

3- Selling when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x463f66297b155b371fcf24d89a5 341f2812e351be7e62c852f4c583d54b06f84

4- Transferring when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa8bb9ef5114b0d8e7edb423902 ead674f9038dbc16c23589983b4f9415b41e59

5- Buying when not excluded (5% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x8b6262b3190e0c2426313d5b53dca24a37e21c6c92e3c7201e8da7fe19eccb36

6- Selling when not excluded (5% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x634f6cbeb1c5e3b29869628385 616cf622670cf1223aa69720a49ea41f89aa70



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

7- Transferring when not excluded (5% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x61870d3f8806e5410d01c137212 a22db3f75235f9d587defc6880e42a337f66c

8- Internal swap (marketing + liquidity) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x634f6cbeb1c5e3b29869628385 616cf622670cf1223aa69720a49ea41f89aa70



MANUAL TESTING

Centralization - Trades must be enabled

Severity: Medium

function: EnableTrading
Status: Resolved (Safu dev)

Overview:

The smart contract owner must enable trades for holders. If trading remain disabled, no one would be able to buy/sell/transfer tokens.

```
function EnableTrading() external onlyOwner {
   require(!tradingEnabled, "Cannot re-enable trading");
   tradingEnabled = true;
   swapEnabled = true;
   genesis_block = block.number;
}
```

Suggestion

To mitigate this centralization issue, we propose the following options:

- Renounce Ownership: Consider relinquishing control of the smart contract by renouncing ownership. This would remove the ability for a single entity to manipulate the router, reducing centralization risks.
- Multi-signature Wallet: Transfer ownership to a multi-signature wallet. This would require
 multiple approvals for any changes to the mainRouter, adding an additional layer of security
 and reducing the centralization risk.
- 3. Transfer ownership to a trusted and valid 3rd party in order to guarantee enabling of the trades



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