

Smart Contract Audit

FOR

Meme King Inu

DATED: 17 June 23'



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name - Meme King Inu

Date: 17 June, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: Passed

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	1	0	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	1	0	0	0



USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:

a line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Test Network:

all tests were done on BSC Test network, each test has its transaction has attached to it.

3- Slither: Static Analysis

Testnet Link: all tests were done using this contract, tests are done on BSC Testnet

https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0xEcbC1a39E473 ACF3a9A4106B22Cd2a19D839449F#readContract



Token Information

Token Name: Meme King Inu

Token Symbol: MKI

Decimals: 9

Token Supply: 1,000,000,000

Token Address:

0x42De50c3a3195671e252BA1204EEf9D8F688232b

Checksum:

3cec57ec2ca99f405405ad19398e141ad397d9b7

Owner:

0x4EC29e7604aDfe7D4008fd8e2ac3Cdb749f64515



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Fees:

Buy Fees: 8%

Sell Fees: 8%

Transfer Fees: 8%

Fees Privilige: Static Fees

Ownership: Owned

Minting: No mint function

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: none

Blacklist: No

Other Priviliges:

- Initial distribution of the tokens
- Enabling trades



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
- Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
- Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code isexercised when we run the test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.



VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST





CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

- Critical
- High-Risk
- Medium-Risk
- Low-Risk
- Gas Optimization/Suggestion

Description

These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.


A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity	Found
♦ Critical	0
♦ High-Risk	1(Resolved)
♦ Medium-Risk	0
♦ Low-Risk	0
Gas Optimization /Suggestions	0



INHERITANCE TREE





POINTS TO NOTE

- Owner is not able to change buy/sell/transfer fees (8/8/8)
- Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary address.
- Owner is not able to disable trades
- Owner is not able to limit buy/sell/transfer/wallet amounts
- Owner is not able to mint new tokens
- Owner must enable trades manually



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
| Contract |
                Type
                              Bases
|<del>:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|</del>
       **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
111111
| **IBEP20** | Interface | ||| | |
| L | totalSupply | External | | NO | |
| L | balanceOf | External | | NO | |
| L | transfer | External | | | NO | |
| | allowance | External | | NO | |
| L | approve | External | | | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | External | | | NO | |
ШШ
**Context** | Implementation | |||
| L | msgSender | Internal 🦰 | | | |
| L | msgData | Internal 🦰 | | |
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context | | |
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | ( NO | |
| L | owner | Public | | NO |
| L | renounceOwnership | Public | | | onlyOwner |
| L | transferOwnership | Public | | ( ) | onlyOwner |
| L | _setOwner | Private 🦳 | 🛑 | |
111111
| **IFactory** | Interface | |||
| L | createPair | External | | | NO | |
111111
| **IRouter** | Interface | ||| | | |
| L | factory | External | | NO | |
| L | WETH | External | | NO | |
| L | addLiquidityETH | External | | III | INO | |
| L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | | NO | |
111111
| **Address** | Library | | | |
| L | sendValue | Internal 🦰 | 🛑 | |
IIIIIII
| **MKI** | Implementation | Context, IBEP20, Ownable | | | | |
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | ( ) | NO | |
| L | name | Public | | | NO | |
| L | symbol | Public | | NO | |
| L | decimals | Public | | NO | |
| L | totalSupply | Public | | NO | |
| L | balanceOf | Public | | NO | |
```



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
| L | allowance | Public | | NO | | |
| L | approve | Public | | 🛑 | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | Public | | ( NO | |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public | | 🛑 | NO | |
| L | decreaseAllowance | Public | | ( NO | |
| L | transfer | Public | | ( NO | |
| | | isExcludedFromReward | Public | | NO | |
| | reflectionFromToken | Public | | NO | |
| L | EnableTrading | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | updatedeadline | External | | 🛑 | onlyOwner |
| L | tokenFromReflection | Public | | NO | |
📙 | excludeFromReward | Public 📗 | 🛑 | onlyOwner |
| L | includeInReward | External | | 🛑 | onlyOwner | |
| L | includeInFee | Public | | 🛑 | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromFee | Public | | NO | |
| L | reflectRfi | Private 🦳 | 🛑 | |
| L | _takeLiquidity | Private 🦳 | 🧓 | |
| L | _takeMarketing | Private 🤔 | 🧓 | |
| L | _getValues | Private 🦳 | | |
| L | _getTValues | Private 🦳 | | |
| L | getRValues1 | Private 🦰 | | |
| L | _getRValues2 | Private 🛅 |
| L | getRate | Private 🤔 | | |
| L | _getCurrentSupply | Private <a>P</a> | | | |
| L | _approve | Private 🦳 | 🛑 | |
| L | _transfer | Private 🦳 | 🛑 | |
| L | _tokenTransfer | Private 🦰 | 🛑 | |
| L | swapAndLiquify | Private 🕑 | 🛑 | lockTheSwap |
| L | addLiquidity | Private 🦰 | 🛑 | |
| L | swapTokensForBNB | Private 🛅 | 🛑 | |
| L | bulkExcludeFee | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | updateDevWallet | External | | | onlyOwner |
| L | updateSwapTokensAtAmount | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| | updateSwapEnabled | External | | ( ) | onlyOwner |
| L | rescueBNB | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | rescueAnyBEP20Tokens | Public | | | | onlyOwner |
```



CONTRACT ASSESMENT



STATIC ANALYSIS

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

MKI.router (contracts/Token.sol#138) should be immutable

```
MKI.includeInReward(address) (contracts/Token.sol#334-345) has costly operations inside a loop:
             excluded.pop() (contracts/Token.sol#341)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#costly-operations-inside-a-loop
Context._msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#44-47) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
MKI. rTotal (contracts/Token.sol#145) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
          (MAX - (MAX % _tTotal))
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state
Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#19) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16 solc-0.8.20 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#112-117):
            (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#115)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
Function IRouter.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#91) is not in mixedCase
Struct MKI.valuesFromGetValues (contracts/Token.sol#182-196) is not in CapWords
Function MKI.EnableTrading() (contracts/Token.sol#305-310) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MKI.updatedeadline(uint256). deadline (contracts/Token.sol#312) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MKI.updateSwapEnabled(bool)._enabled (contracts/Token.sol#649) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MKI.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256). tokenAddr (contracts/Token.sol#660) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MKI.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256). to (contracts/Token.sol#660) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MKI.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256). amount (contracts/Token.sol#660) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MKI.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256).
                                                                          amount (contracts/Token.sol#660) is not in mixedCase
Constant MKI._decimals (contracts/Token.sol#141) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Variable MKI.genesis_block (contracts/Token.sol#149) is not in mixedCase
Constant MKI. name (contracts/Token.sol#157) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES Constant MKI. symbol (contracts/Token.sol#158) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
Redundant expression "this (contracts/Token.sol#45)" inContext (contracts/Token.sol#39-48)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
MKI. lastSell (contracts/Token.sol#136) is never used in MKI (contracts/Token.sol#120-666)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-state-variable
MKI._tTotal (contracts/Token.sol#144) should be constant
MKI.deadWallet (contracts/Token.sol#152) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
MKI.pair (contracts/Token.sol#139) should be immutable
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,

No major issues were found in the output

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Router (PCS V2):

0xD99D1c33F9fC3444f8101754aBC46c52416550D1

All the functionalities have been tested, no issues were found

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x86d48e0ebfedd9fd54d16e8e180 be01de8c622617bf9b381910eb938479b962d

2- Buying when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x94e97037b150fc3fdcaf0ba222f 13856902ad0c42574dd95d7575cd57bcdd98a

3- Selling when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x5f16db236a6f1741f74686e3c82 3a7b1b5b49a1e8c6dfd5b6a04a42aa390cb88

4- Transferring when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xeb69d2f9bd83f2f0b350f3dba57 51dae196689f0b2b5dff6b832685a8ba2f4cd

5- Buying when not excluded from fees (8% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x319d040123a0526d669822787aba6beb315a1a47bc1b80229f27d89804304329

6- Selling when not excluded from fees (8% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc64237d1632f27fa30edc332fc9ec7a9346628b3a5bf53d49a19c21faac86cca



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

7- Transferring when not excluded from fees (8% tax) (passed): https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x257c7813d216a4c65b9e057069b7c09eed4060b5fb2e2fb07a5ae33126a11cab

8-Internal swap & rewards distribution(passed):

- BNB sent to marketing wallet
- Auto liquidty
- Reflections

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x257c7813d216a4c65b9e057069b7c09eed4060b5fb2e2fb07a5ae33126a11cab



ISSUES FOUND

Centralization – Trades must be enabled

Severity: High

function: EnableTrading

Status: Resolved (owned by safu dev)

Overview:

The smart contract owner must enable trades for holders. If trading remain disabled, no one would be able to buy/sell/transfer tokens.

```
function EnableTrading() external onlyOwner {
  require(!tradingEnabled, "Cannot re-enable trading");
  tradingEnabled = true;
  swapEnabled = true;
  genesis_block = block.number;
}
```

Suggestion

To mitigate this centralization issue, we propose the following options:

- Renounce Ownership: Consider relinquishing control of the smart contract by renouncing ownership. This would remove the ability for a single entity to manipulate the router, reducing centralization risks.
- 2. Multi-signature Wallet: Transfer ownership to a multi-signature wallet. This would require multiple approvals for any changes to the mainRouter, adding an additional layer of security and reducing the centralization risk.
- 3. Transfer ownership to a trusted and valid 3rd party in order to guarantee enabling of the trades



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