



Smart Contract Audit

FOR

POTTERPEPE

DATED : 27 MAY 23'



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name – POTTERPEPE

Date: 27 May, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: **Passed**

Issues Found

| Status | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Suggestion |
|--------------|----------|------|--------|-----|------------|
| Open | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Acknowledged | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Resolved | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

USED TOOLS

Tools:

1. Manual Review: The code has undergone a line-by-line review by the **Ace** team.

2. ETH Test Network: All tests were conducted on the ETH Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

3. Slither: The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the BSC Testnet, which can be found at the following address:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x9c98932c84A5F73855267720d0d4FD96c126A58B>



Token Information

Name : Potter Pepe

Symbol : POTTERPEPE

Decimals: 18

Network: BSC

Token Type: BEP20

Token Address:

0x2AE1b523b6E9Bf8D807B370BBc2A8368BbbA353
a

Owner:

0x43fA3d8C26bd82BE2DD3743176263B9D7c2e4f1D
(at time of writing the audit)

Deployer: 0x854a73a5434aC0A9899751E4Fd102ba8
7940005f



Token Information

Fees:

Buy Fees: 0-10%

Sell Fees: 0-10%

Transfer Fees: 0-5%

Fees Privilege: owner

Ownership :

0x43fA3d8C26bd82BE2DD3743176263B9D7c2e4f1D

Minting: None

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No

Blacklist: No

Other Privileges:- including in fees

- excluding from fees
 - initial distribution of the tokens
 - modifying fees
-
-



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
 - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
 - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
 - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
 - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
-



VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ✓ Return values of low-level calls | ✓ Gasless Send |
| ✓ Private modifier | ✓ Using block.timestamp |
| ✓ Multiple Sends | ✓ Re-entrancy |
| ✓ Using Suicide | ✓ Tautology or contradiction |
| ✓ Gas Limitand Loops | ✓ Timestamp Dependence |
| ✓ Address hardcoded | ✓ Revert/require functions |
| ✓ Exception Disorder | ✓ Use of tx.origin |
| ✓ Using inline assembly | ✓ Integer overflow/underflow |
| ✓ Divide before multiply | ✓ Dangerous strict equalities |
| ✓ Missing Zero Address Validation | ✓ Using SHA3 |
| ✓ Compiler version not fixed | ✓ Using throw |
-

CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

Description

◆ Critical

These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

◆ High-Risk

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

◆ Medium-Risk

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

◆ Low-Risk

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.

◆ Gas Optimization /Suggestion

A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity

Found

◆ Critical

0

◆ High-Risk

0

◆ Medium-Risk

0


◆ Low-Risk

0

◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions

1

INHERITANCE TREE



POINTS TO NOTE

- **Owner is not able to change buy/sell fees over 12.5% and transfer fee over 5%**
 - Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary address.
 - Owner is not able to disable trades
 - Owner is not able to set max buy/sell/transfer/hold amount to 0
 - Owner is not able to mint new tokens
 - **Owner must enable trades manually**
-



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

| Contract | Type | Bases | | | |
|---|--|----------------|----------------|---------------|-----------|
| └── | **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** | |
| | | | | | |
| **Factory** Interface | | | | | |
| └── | createPair | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| | | | | | |
| **Router** Interface | | | | | |
| └── | WETH | External | ! | | NO ! |
| └── | factory | External | ! | | NO ! |
| └── | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| | | | | | |
| **IBEP20** Interface | | | | | |
| └── | totalSupply | External | ! | | NO ! |
| └── | balanceOf | External | ! | | NO ! |
| └── | transfer | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| └── | allowance | External | ! | | NO ! |
| └── | approve | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| └── | transferFrom | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| | | | | | |
| **Context** Implementation | | | | | |
| └── | _msgSender | Internal | 🔒 | | |
| └── | _msgData | Internal | 🔒 | | |
| | | | | | |
| **Ownable** Implementation Context | | | | | |
| └── | <Constructor> | Public | ! | ● | NO ! |
| └── | owner | Public | ! | | NO ! |
| └── | renounceOwnership | Public | ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| └── | transferOwnership | Public | ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| └── | _setOwner | Private | 🔒 | ● | |
| | | | | | |
| **IFactory** Interface | | | | | |
| └── | createPair | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| | | | | | |
| **IRouter** Interface | | | | | |
| └── | factory | External | ! | | NO ! |
| └── | WETH | External | ! | | NO ! |
| └── | addLiquidityETH | External | ! | 💰 | NO ! |
| └── | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| | | | | | |
| **Address** Library | | | | | |
| └── | sendValue | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | | | | | |
| **POTTER_PEPE** Implementation Context, IBEP20, Ownable | | | | | |



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----------------------|--|----------|---|--|---|--|-----------|---|--|
| | | <Constructor> | | Public | ! | | ● | | NO | ! | |
| | | name | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | symbol | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | decimals | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | totalSupply | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | balanceOf | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | allowance | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | approve | | Public | ! | | ● | | NO | ! | |
| | | transferFrom | | Public | ! | | ● | | NO | ! | |
| | | increaseAllowance | | Public | ! | | ● | | NO | ! | |
| | | decreaseAllowance | | Public | ! | | ● | | NO | ! | |
| | | transfer | | Public | ! | | ● | | NO | ! | |
| | | isExcludedFromReward | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | reflectionFromToken | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | EnableTrading | | External | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | updateBuyTaxes | | Public | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | updateSellTaxes | | Public | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | updateTransferTaxes | | Public | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | tokenFromReflection | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | excludeFromReward | | Public | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | includeInReward | | External | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | excludeFromFee | | Public | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | includeInFee | | Public | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | isExcludedFromFee | | Public | ! | | | | NO | ! | |
| | | _reflectRfi | | Private | 🔒 | | ● | | | | |
| | | _takeMarketing | | Private | 🔒 | | ● | | | | |
| | | _getValues | | Private | 🔒 | | | | | | |
| | | _getTValues | | Private | 🔒 | | | | | | |
| | | _getRValues1 | | Private | 🔒 | | | | | | |
| | | _getRate | | Private | 🔒 | | | | | | |
| | | _getCurrentSupply | | Private | 🔒 | | | | | | |
| | | _approve | | Private | 🔒 | | ● | | | | |
| | | _transfer | | Private | 🔒 | | ● | | | | |
| | | _tokenTransfer | | Private | 🔒 | | ● | | | | |
| | | InternalSwap | | Internal | 🔒 | | ● | | LockSwap | | |
| | | bulkExcludeFee | | External | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | rescueBNB | | External | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | rescueAnyBEP20Tokens | | Public | ! | | ● | | onlyOwner | | |
| | | <Receive Ether> | | External | ! | | 💰 | | NO | ! | |



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

| Symbol | Meaning |
|--------|---------------------------|
| : | : |
| ● | Function can modify state |
| 💰 | Function is payable |



STATIC ANALYSIS

```
POTTER_PEPE.includeInReward(address) (contracts/Token.sol#409-420) has costly operations inside a loop:
- _excluded.pop() (contracts/Token.sol#416)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#costly-operations-inside-a-loop

Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#143-153) is never used and should be removed
Context._msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#63-66) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

POTTER_PEPE._rTotal (contracts/Token.sol#173) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
- (MAX - (MAX % _tTotal))
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state

Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
solc-0.8.20 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#143-153):
- (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#148)
Low level call in POTTER_PEPE.InternalSwap() (contracts/Token.sol#595-615):
- (success) = address(marketingWallet).call{value: address(this).balance}() (contracts/Token.sol#612-614)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Function Router.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#13) is not in mixedCase
Function IRouter.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#119) is not in mixedCase
Contract POTTER_PEPE (contracts/Token.sol#156-640) is not in CapWords
Struct POTTER_PEPE.valuesFromGetValues (contracts/Token.sol#196-204) is not in CapWords
Function POTTER_PEPE.EnableTrading() (contracts/Token.sol#354-357) is not in mixedCase
Function POTTER_PEPE.InternalSwap() (contracts/Token.sol#595-615) is not in mixedCase
Parameter POTTER_PEPE.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._tokenAddr (contracts/Token.sol#631) is not in mixedCase
Parameter POTTER_PEPE.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._to (contracts/Token.sol#632) is not in mixedCase
Parameter POTTER_PEPE.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._amount (contracts/Token.sol#633) is not in mixedCase
Constant POTTER_PEPE._decimals (contracts/Token.sol#169) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant POTTER_PEPE._name (contracts/Token.sol#177) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant POTTER_PEPE._symbol (contracts/Token.sol#178) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Modifier POTTER_PEPE.LockSwap() (contracts/Token.sol#211-215) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Redundant expression "this (contracts/Token.sol#64)" inContext (contracts/Token.sol#58-67)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements

POTTER_PEPE._getValues(uint256,bool,address,address) (contracts/Token.sol#470-492) uses literals with too many digits:
- s.tRfi = (tAmount * temp.rfi) / 100000 (contracts/Token.sol#488)
POTTER_PEPE._getValues(uint256,bool,address,address) (contracts/Token.sol#470-492) uses literals with too many digits:
- s.tMarketing = (tAmount * temp.marketing) / 100000 (contracts/Token.sol#489)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits

POTTER_PEPE._tTotal (contracts/Token.sol#172) should be constant
POTTER_PEPE.marketingWallet (contracts/Token.sol#175) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant

POTTER_PEPE.pair (contracts/Token.sol#217) should be immutable
POTTER_PEPE.swapRouter (contracts/Token.sol#218) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
```

Static Analysis

an static analysis of the code were performed using
slither. No issues were found



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Router (PCS V2):

0xD99D1c33F9fC3444f8101754aBC46c52416550D1

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc8f5c7c53dccd124a17680f93a48918adf6e1ffad741b9d163c9ccf47acb49c4>

2- Buying when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xb38185e488e4a9a7df56acd68680558b70674ea1d42b13f2da04f973f17c84f4>

3- Selling when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xe2eac8912f430b7a06e3f51caec06e98226bb70e3b4095b5efc4aaf4927f5437>

4- Transferring when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xcdcd019c82d7d67aca40a99689beedf62d82aa195c3bd2de0779b4a40577282e>

5- Buying when not excluded from fees (0-12.5% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x82f88655ee0d2e7c6cdd300b56de3cc796a653eb0977f025a979cf5d211a884d>

6- Selling when not excluded from fees (0-12.5% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x23d632bee1643db077a2183f00165ab6d167821e818828591099cef83f3dd99a>

7- Transferring when not excluded from fees (0-5% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x5d53ad743d70db5c01745c81b574d25222dda0e369ea7580b97fe64e5fb94a58>



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

8- Internal swap (marketing bnb) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xdf552c6f432be69d4e6cce2792d6de0ffc0e76eb#internaltx>

FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Centralization – Trades must be enabled

Severity: **Suggestion**

function: Enable Trading

Status: Not Resolved

Overview:

The smart contract owner must enable trades for holders. If trading remains disabled, no one would be able to buy/sell/transfer tokens.

```
function Enable Trading () external only Owner {  
    require (! trading Enabled, "Cannot re-enable trading");  
    trading Enabled = true;  
}
```

Suggestion

To mitigate this centralization issue, we propose the following options:

1. Renounce Ownership: Consider relinquishing control of the smart contract by renouncing ownership. This would remove the ability for a single entity to manipulate the router, reducing centralization risks.
2. Multi-signature Wallet: Transfer ownership to a multi-signature wallet. This would require multiple approvals for any changes to the main Router, adding an additional layer of security and reducing the centralization risk.
3. Transfer ownership to a trusted and valid 3rd party in order to guarantee enabling of the trades



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