

Smart Contract Audit

FOR

Crazy Hippo

DATED: 7 Sep 23'



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name - Crazy Hippo

Date: 7 Sep, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: Passed

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	1	0	0	0



USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:

A line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Test Network: All tests were conducted on the BSC Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

3-Slither:

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the BSC Testnet, which can be found at the following address:

https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x62035c573954db D4581f8f0fF89F77ed14CB9ee6



Token Information

Token Name: Crazy Hippo

Token Symbol: HIPPO

Decimals: 18

Token Supply: 200,000,000,000

Token Address:

0x890767185bC36cFDF52e24C9f05cdFC3Bd7948a9

Checksum:

3aa85371cb9853106409d78434d3d28f551c2fad

Owner:

0xC58FFC041806c4FFE34943C27703A3a7FdA5baEf (at time of writing the audit)

Deployer:

0xC58FFC041806c4FFE34943C27703A3a7FdA5baEf



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Fees:

Buy Fees: 0-3%

Sell Fees: 0-3%

Transfer Fees: 0-3%

Fees Privilege: owner

Ownership: owned

Minting: No mint function

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No

Blacklist: No

Other Privileges: Initial distribution of the tokens

modifying fees

Enabling trades



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
- Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
- Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code isexercised when we run the test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.



VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST





CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

- Critical
- High-Risk
- Medium-Risk
- Low-Risk
- Gas Optimization/Suggestion

Description

These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.

A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity	Found
◆ Critical	0
♦ High-Risk	1
♦ Medium-Risk	0
♦ Low-Risk	0
Gas Optimization / Suggestions	0



INHERITANCE TREE





POINTS TO NOTE

- Owner is able to adjust buy/sell/transfer fees within 0-3%
- Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary wallet
- Owner is not able to disable trades
- Owner is not able to mint new tokens
- Owner is not able to set maximum wallet and maximum buy/sell/transfer limits
- Owner must enable trades manually



```
| Contract|
        Type Bases
                        **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
| **IBEP20** | Interface | |||
| LotalSupply | External | | NO! |
| L | balanceOf | External ! | NO! |
| └ | transfer | External ! | ● |NO! |
| Lallowance | External ! | NO! |
| └ | approve | External ! | ● |NO! |
| └ | transferFrom | External ! | ● | NO! |
\mathbf{H}
**SafeMath** | Library | |||
| └| tryAdd | Internal 🔒 | ||
111111
| **Context** | Implementation | |||
| └ | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● |NO! |
| L |_{msgSender} | Internal = | | |
111111
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context | | |
| └ | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | NO! |
| └ | renounceOwnership | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
111111
| **BEP20Detailed** | Implementation | | | |
| └ | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | NO! |
```



```
| **Address** | Library | | | |
| | isContract | Internal | | | |
111111
**SafeBEP20** | Library | |||
| L | safeTransfer | Internal 🔒 | 🔵 | | |
| └ | safeTransferFrom | Internal | ● | ● | |
| └ | safeApprove | Internal 🔒 | ● | |
| L | callOptionalReturn | Private 🔐 | 🌑 | |
| **IUniswapV2Factory** | Interface | | | |
| - | feeToSetter | External ! | | NO! |
| └ | getPair | External ! | |NO! |
| L | allPairs | External ! | NO! |
| L | allPairsLength | External ! | NO! |
| └ | createPair | External ! | ● | NO! |
| └ | setFeeTo | External ! | ● |NO! |
| └ | setFeeToSetter | External ! | ● | NO! |
111111
| **IUniswapV2Pair** | Interface | ||| | |
| L | decimals | External ! | NO! |
| └ | totalSupply | External ! | NO! |
| L | balanceOf | External ! | NO! |
| Lallowance | External | NO! |
| └ | transferFrom | External ! | ● | NO! |
| L | DOMAIN_SEPARATOR | External | | | NO | |
| └ | PERMIT_TYPEHASH | External ! | |NO! |
| └ | MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY | External ! | NO! |
| L | factory | External | | NO! |
| └ | getReserves | External ! | |NO! |
| L | priceOCumulativeLast | External ! | NO! |
| L | price1CumulativeLast | External ! | NO! |
| L | kLast | External | | NO | |
```



```
| L | burn | External | | O | NO | |
| L | initialize | External ! | ONO! |
| **IUniswapV2Router01** | Interface | |||
| | factory | External | | NO | |
| L | WETH | External ! | NO! |
| LaddLiquidity | External ! | ONO! |
| - | addLiquidityETH | External ! | 💵 | NO ! |
| └ | removeLiquidityETH | External ! | ● | NO! |
| └ | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External ! | ● |NO! |
└ | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External ! | ● |NO! |
| └ | swapTokensForExactTokens | External ! | ● |NO! |
| L | swapExactETHForTokens | External ! | 1 NO! |
| L | getAmountOut | External ! | NO! |
| └ | getAmountIn | External ! | |NO! |
| L | getAmountsOut | External ! | NO! |
| └ | getAmountsIn | External ! | NO! |
111111
| **IUniswapV2Router02** | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 |||
| - | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | • | NO! |
| └ | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | ● | NO! |
└ | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | ● | NO! |
| - | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | 11 | NO! |
| └ | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | ● |NO! |
111111
| **HIPPO** | Implementation | Context, Ownable, IBEP20, BEP20Detailed ||| | |
| └ | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | BEP20Detailed |
| └ | totalSupply | Public ! | |NO! |
| L | balanceOf | Public ! | NO! |
| └ | transfer | Public ! | ● |NO! |
| L | allowance | Public ! | NO! |
| └ | approve | Public | | ● |NO | |
```



```
| └ | transferFrom | Public ! | ● | NO! | | |
| └ | decreaseAllowance | Public ! | ● | NO! |
| L | approve | Internal 🔒 | 🌒 | |
| | enableTrading | External | | | onlyOwner |
| L | isContract | Internal A | | |
| | setSellDevelopmentFeePercent | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| | setDevelopmentAddress | External ! | • onlyOwner |
| └ | changeNumTokensSellToFee | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| - | clearETH | External ! | • | onlyOwner |
│ └ | clearERC20 | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | excludeFromFee | Public ! | OnlyOwner | |
| └ | includeInFee | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| └ | isExcludedFromFee | Public ! | |NO! |
| └ | <Receive Ether> | External ! | ₽₽ | NO! |
| └ | _transfer | Internal 🔒 | ● | |
| └ | swapAndLiquify | Private 🔐 | ● | lockTheSwap |
│ └ | swapTokensForEth | Private 🔐 | ● | |
### Legend
```



STATIC ANALYSIS

```
Parameter HIPPO.clearERC20(address,address,uint256)._amount (contracts/Token.sol#822) is not in mixedCase Variable HIPPO._balances (contracts/Token.sol#616) is not in mixedCase Variable HIPPO._allowances (contracts/Token.sol#617) is not in mixedCase Variable HIPPO._totalSupply (contracts/Token.sol#601) is not in mixedCase Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
 INFO:Detectors:
 Reentrancy in HIPPO._transfer(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#843-908):
External calls:
                    - swapAndLiquify(contractTokenBalance) (contracts/Token.sol#866)
- address(developmentAddress).transfer(address(this).balance) (contracts/Token.sol#914)
                   State variables written after the call(s):
                   - _balances[sender] = _balances[sender].sub(amount,BEP20: transfer amount exceeds balar
- _balances[recipient] = _balances[recipient].add(TotalSent) (contracts/Token.sol#896)
                   -__balances[rectpient] = __balances[rectpient].adu[fotalsent] (contracts/foxen.sol#090)
-_balances[address(this]] = _balances[address(this]].add[taxMount) (contracts/foxen.sol#097)
-_balances[sender] = _balances[sender].sub(amount,8EP20: transfer amount exceeds balance) (contracts/foxen.sol#001-904)
-_balances[rectpient] = _balances[rectpient].add(amount) (contracts/foxen.sol#005)
-_developmentFee = _buyDevelopmentFee (contracts/foxen.sol#005)
-_developmentFee = _sellDevelopmentFee (contracts/foxen.sol#008)
                   Event emitted after the call(s):
- Transfer(sender,recipient,TotalSent) (contracts/Token.sol#898)
                    - Transfer(sender,address(this),taxAmount) (contracts/Token.sol#899)
- Transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (contracts/Token.sol#906)
         ntrancy in HIPPO.swapAndLiquify(uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#910-917):
                       address(developmentAddress).transfer(address(this).balance) (contracts/Token.sol#914)
                    Event emitted after the call(s):
                      SwapAndLiquify(contractTokenBalance,address(this).balance) (contracts/Token.sol#916)
  Reentrancy in HIPPO.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#703-718):
                   External calls:
                    - _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (contracts/Token.sol#708)
                                          address(developmentAddress).transfer(address(this).balance) (contracts/Token.sol#914)
                   State variables written after the call(s):
                    -_approve(sender,_msgSender(),_allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount,BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance)) (contracts/Token.sol#709-716)
-_allowances[towner][spender] = amount (contracts/Token.sol#750)
 Event emitted after the call(s):
- Approval(towner,spender,amount) (contracts/Token.sol#751)
- _approve(sender,_msgSender(),_allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount,BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance)) (contracts/Token.sol#709-716)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-4
 INFO:Detectors:
 Variable IUniswapv2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint2
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation@variable-names-too-similar
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
 HIPPO._owner (contracts/Token.sol#645) should be immutable
HIPPO._totalSupply (contracts/Token.sol#620) should be immutable Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,

No major issues were found in the output

INFO:Slither:./contracts/Token.sol analyzed (12 contracts with 88 detectors), 46 result(s) found



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xd3955fa8af71d3cc0736fd0bce7db6e 48474ac99ee3ac1067239b711a0cf38b9

2- Buying when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x28bb41330f0bfec5fd9bc67847a9c4c 95f96a9ebf2cd6e98294a90849dd68ed9

3- Selling when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x3bea7a77960dc7d055871c5d5f29b2 084799c3498bd7ade6c5095ab91d649742

4- Transferring when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xdcd4f69606430207ef977e5f70f774 33be541bfa34babad80235cccff0555da9

5- Buying when not excluded from fees (tax 0-3%) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x0c1fd75c5c8b2d6d76e252a8d450b4 ce896a3129fc859d5bca7ec071e5c879fb

6- Selling when not excluded from fees (tax 0-3%) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x60e2475ac4c210aa468baa6863f4e9d314fe31aa40fcae8d3dd5d92457568e21



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

7- Transferring when not excluded from fees (0-3% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x0dd9267fde1d84d5e12272c735f9e8e de000d2670bc2b7cdad33616895a51bda

8- Internal swap (BNB set to Marketing wallet) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x60e2475ac4c210aa468baa6863f4e9d314fe31aa40fcae8d3dd5d92457568e21



High Risk

Centralization – **Enabling Trades**

Severity: High

function: enableTrading

Status: Resolved (contract owned by safu developer)

Overview:

The **launch** function permits only the contract owner to activate trading capabilities. Until this function is executed, no investors can buy, sell, or transfer their tokens. This places a high degree of control and centralization in the hands of the contract owner.

```
function enableTrading() external onlyOwner {
    require(!tradingEnabled, "Trading is already enabled");
    tradingEnabled = true;
    startTradingBlock = block.number;
}
```

Suggestion

To reduce centralization and potential manipulation, consider one of the following approaches:

- 1. Automatically enable trading after a specified condition, such as the completion of a presale, is met.
- 2. If manual activation is still desired, consider transferring the ownership of the contract to a trustworthy, third-party entity like a certified "PinkSale Safu" developer. This can provide investors with more confidence in the eventual activation of trading capabilities, mitigating concerns of potential bad faith actions by the original owner



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