



# Smart Contract Audit

FOR  
**FCUK BULL**

DATED : 18 MAY 23'



# AUDIT SUMMARY

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**Project name – BULL**

**Date:** 18 May, 2023

**Scope of Audit-** Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

**Audit Status:** **Passed with Critical risk**

## Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	2	0	1	1	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0

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# USED TOOLS

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## Tools:

**1. Manual Review:** The code has undergone a line-by-line review by the **Ace** team.

**2. ETH Test Network:** All tests were conducted on the ETH Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

**3. Slither:** The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

## Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the ETHTestnet, which can be found at the following address:

[https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0xBCE6f2Ff37f7b69D8628cf604CfA325Bd7053c0F?  
a=0xff0ad89f982bd10e07a9fb108a655eaad4d9b2fa](https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0xBCE6f2Ff37f7b69D8628cf604CfA325Bd7053c0F?a=0xff0ad89f982bd10e07a9fb108a655eaad4d9b2fa)

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# Token Information

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**Name :** FCUK BULL

**Symbol :** BULL

**Decimals:** 18

**Network:** ETH

**Token Type:**ERC20

**Token Address:**

0x600D4C42676bbEaB2B201f93300C6af9B1F6D163

**Owner:**

0x4e1BEEfc268bBeEcD74C4bB8ee834fA398bb3ef9  
(at time of writing the audit)

**Deployer:**0x8587A1e4EA67506D44f003628770d88  
D95cE1da6

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# Token Information

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## **Fees:**

Buy Fees: 0%

Sell Fees: 0%

Transfer Fees: 0%

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**Fees Privilege:** None

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## **Ownership :**

0x4e1BEEfc268bBeEcD74C4bB8ee834fA398bb3ef9

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**Minting:** None

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**Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount:** No

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**Blacklist:** Yes

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**Other Privileges:-** blacklisting wallets

- enabling/disabling trades

- setting max and minimum wallet amounts

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# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

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The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
  - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
  - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
  - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
  - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
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# VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

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- |                                    |                               |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ✓ Return values of low-level calls | ✓ Gasless Send                |
| ✓ Private modifier                 | ✓ Using block.timestamp       |
| ✓ Multiple Sends                   | ✓ Re-entrancy                 |
| ✓ Using Suicide                    | ✓ Tautology or contradiction  |
| ✓ Gas Limitand Loops               | ✓ Timestamp Dependence        |
| ✓ Address hardcoded                | ✓ Revert/require functions    |
| ✓ Exception Disorder               | ✓ Use of tx.origin            |
| ✓ Using inline assembly            | ✓ Integer overflow/underflow  |
| ✓ Divide before multiply           | ✓ Dangerous strict equalities |
| ✓ Missing Zero Address Validation  | ✓ Using SHA3                  |
| ✓ Compiler version not fixed       | ✓ Using throw                 |
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# CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

## Severity

## Description

◆ Critical	These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
◆ High-Risk	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.
◆ Medium-Risk	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.
◆ Low-Risk	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestion	A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

## Findings

### Severity


### Found

◆ Critical	2
◆ High-Risk	0
◆ Medium-Risk	1
◆ Low-Risk	1
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions	0



# INHERITANCE TREE

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## POINTS TO NOTE

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- The contract has an owner, and only the owner can perform certain actions such as **blacklisting** addresses, setting limitations, and transferring ownership.
  - The contract owner can blacklist or unblacklist an address, preventing them from sending or receiving tokens.(buy, sell, transfers would be disabled)
  - The contract owner can set trading rules, including enabling/disabling trading limits, setting the UniswapV2Pair address (if set to address zero, can disable trades), and setting maximum and minimum holding amounts.
  - The contract owner cannot set buy/sell/transfer fees.
  - The contract owner cannot mint new tokens after the initial supply is created.
  - The contract owner can disable trades
  - The contract has a burn function that allows any address to burn their tokens, reducing the total supply.
  - The contract checks for blacklisted addresses before allowing token transfers.
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# POINTS TO NOTE

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- The contract checks for trading limits before allowing token transfers from the UniswapV2Pair address.
  - It's a fork from Pepe
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# CONTRACT ASSESMENT

Contract	Type	Bases			
:-----: :-----: :-----: :-----: :-----:					
└	**Function Name**	**Visibility**	**Mutability**	**Modifiers**	
**Context**   Implementation					
└	_msgSender	Internal	🔒		
└	_msgData	Internal	🔒		
**Ownable**   Implementation   Context					
└	<Constructor>	Public	!	●	NO !
└	owner	Public	!		NO !
└	renounceOwnership	Public	!	●	onlyOwner
└	transferOwnership	Public	!	●	onlyOwner
└	_transferOwnership	Internal	🔒	●	
**IERC20**   Interface					
└	totalSupply	External	!		NO !
└	balanceOf	External	!		NO !
└	transfer	External	!	●	NO !
└	allowance	External	!		NO !
└	approve	External	!	●	NO !
└	transferFrom	External	!	●	NO !
**IERC20Metadata**   Interface   IERC20					
└	name	External	!		NO !
└	symbol	External	!		NO !
└	decimals	External	!		NO !
**ERC20**   Implementation   Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata					
└	<Constructor>	Public	!	●	NO !
└	name	Public	!		NO !
└	symbol	Public	!		NO !
└	decimals	Public	!		NO !
└	totalSupply	Public	!		NO !
└	balanceOf	Public	!		NO !
└	transfer	Public	!	●	NO !
└	allowance	Public	!		NO !
└	approve	Public	!	●	NO !
└	transferFrom	Public	!	●	NO !
└	increaseAllowance	Public	!	●	NO !
└	decreaseAllowance	Public	!	●	NO !
└	_transfer	Internal	🔒	●	
└	_mint	Internal	🔒	●	



# CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
| L | _burn | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |  
| L | _approve | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |  
| L | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |  
| L | _afterTokenTransfer | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |  
|||||  
| **BullToken** | Implementation | Ownable, ERC20 |||  
| L | <Constructor> | Public | ! | ● | ERC20 |  
| L | blacklist | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |  
| L | setRule | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |  
| L | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |  
| L | burn | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
```

## Legend

Symbol	Meaning
!	Function can modify state
💰	Function is payable



# STATIC ANALYSIS

```
BullToken.constructor(uint256)._totalSupply (contracts/Token.sol#637) shadows:
- ERC20._totalSupply (contracts/Token.sol#278) (state variable)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing

BullToken.setRule(bool,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#648-658) should emit an event for:
- maxHoldingAmount = _maxHoldingAmount (contracts/Token.sol#656)
- minHoldingAmount = _minHoldingAmount (contracts/Token.sol#657)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-arithmetic

BullToken.setRule(bool,address,uint256,uint256)._uniswapV2Pair (contracts/Token.sol#650) lacks a zero-check on :
- uniswapV2Pair = _uniswapV2Pair (contracts/Token.sol#655)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation

Different versions of Solidity are used:
- Version used: ['^0.8.0', '^0.8.17']
- ^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#42)
- ^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#124)
- ^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#218)
- ^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#246)
- ^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#628)
- ^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#16)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used

Context._msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#33-35) is never used and should be removed
ERC20._beforeTokenTransfer(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#599-603) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#16) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#42) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#124) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#218) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#246) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/Token.sol#628) allows old versions
solc-0.8.19 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Parameter BullToken.blacklist(address,bool)._address (contracts/Token.sol#642) is not in mixedCase
Parameter BullToken.blacklist(address,bool)._isBlacklisting (contracts/Token.sol#643) is not in mixedCase
Parameter BullToken.setRule(bool,address,uint256,uint256)._limited (contracts/Token.sol#649) is not in mixedCase
Parameter BullToken.setRule(bool,address,uint256,uint256)._uniswapV2Pair (contracts/Token.sol#650) is not in mixedCase
Parameter BullToken.setRule(bool,address,uint256,uint256)._maxHoldingAmount (contracts/Token.sol#651) is not in mixedCase
Parameter BullToken.setRule(bool,address,uint256,uint256)._minHoldingAmount (contracts/Token.sol#652) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
```

## Static Analysis

an static analysis of the code were performed using  
slither. No issues were found



# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

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**Router (PCS V2):**

**0xD99D1c33F9fC3444f8101754aBC46c52416550D1**

**1- Adding liquidity (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xcd182dc6f75222bd03744215587eba59c9d0a0a3d123270d26636f9f3c15b539>

**2- Buying when excluded (0% tax) (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x6c99497930c0e37cc241eb127204fc682b80c6fe1e8b72b5e0e82859282ef6>

**3- Selling when excluded (0% tax) (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xb072be27bf6ebcf1f5656569de29e66202d67ef25654ec5878a41d1a1aeeb71>

**4- Transferring when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xd292bb172c8011fb435739382082992665862bc7045dfe503124ecbefc90bbc5>

**5- Buying from a regular wallet (0% tax) (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xf59522e98e1d10e130ff006360daa5e1f14737c2c0de6fd3d40ad89d1bd75a0d>

**6- Selling from a regular wallet (0% tax) (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xf7db27e4828477fc6eb5f443266dc0a2379b2a75749f98f73900fd3b6384bb6d>

**7- Transferring from a regular wallet (0% tax) (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc431dcfbd0c3c0d4cfcc57162cbd3c0bb5feedc3319c05ccd5c1cca719b6e417>

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# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

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**8- Internal swap (marketing bnb) (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xaf0baf835c9add08bd86fa8c8950e0bcd67c7418727462da7a2d508b3af3f10>

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# FINDINGS TABLE

Category	Subject	Severity	Suggestion/Summary
Logical	Incorrect handling of limited transfers	Medium	Enforce the limits for all types of transfers except sells
Logical	Incomplete trading start condition	Critical	Add a boolean variable tradingStarted and create a mapping to exclude specific addresses when trading is not enabled
Centralization	Limiting trading	Critical	Ensure max holding is not more than a % of total supply, and min holding amount doesn't disable buys. Make uniswapV2Pair immutable
Centralization	Burning tokens	Low	Implement a decentralized governance mechanism to decide on burning tokens

# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

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**Category:** Logical

**Subject:** Incorrect handling of limited transfers

**Severity:** Medium

**Overview:**

The contract has a limited transfer feature that restricts the amount of tokens a user can hold. However, the implementation only checks the limits when the sender is the UniswapV2Pair, which means that the limits are not enforced for other types of transfers. This means holders are still able to accumulate more tokens than what is allowed which could result in price manipulations

**Logical issue code:**

```
if (limited && from == uniswapV2Pair) {  
    require( super.balanceOf(to) + amount <= maxHoldingAmount && super.balanceOf(to) + amount >=  
minHoldingAmount, "Forbid" );  
}
```

**Suggestion:**

To enforce the limits for all types of transfers except sells, the condition should be updated to check for the limited flag and if to is not equal to uniswapV2Pair, and not specifically for the UniswapV2Pair as the sender. The updated code should look like this:

```
if (limited && to != uniswapV2Pair) {  
    require( super.balanceOf(to) + amount <= maxHoldingAmount && super.balanceOf(to) + amount >=  
minHoldingAmount, "Forbid" );  
}
```

# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

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**Category:** Logical

**Subject:** Incomplete trading start condition can disable claims at end of presale

**Severity:** Critical

**Overview:**

The contract has a condition to check if trading has started by comparing the UniswapV2Pair address with the **zero address**. However, this condition is not sufficient to ensure that trading has actually started and also doesn't allow transfers from or to wallets except than owner's wallet (which can disable claims at end of presale).

**Logical issue code:**

```
if (uniswapV2Pair == address(0)) {  
    require(from == owner() || to == owner(), "trading is not started");  
    return;  
}
```

**Suggestion:**

To ensure that trading has actually started and also to allow finalize of the presale, you can add a boolean variable `tradingStarted` in the contract and set it to true when the trading is initialized. Also you can create a mapping to exclude specific addresses from this limitations when trading is not still enabled. The updated condition should look like this:

```
if (!tradingStarted) {  
    require(isWhitelisted[from] || isWhitelisted[to], "trading is not started");  
    return;  
}
```

And when initializing the trading, set the `tradingStarted` variable to true:

```
function startTrading() external onlyOwner {  
    tradingStarted = true;  
}
```

# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

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**Category:** Centralization

**Subject:** Limiting trading

**Severity:** **Critical**

**Overview:**

The contract allows the owner to set rules that limit trading, including setting a maximum and minimum holding amount.

**Code:**

```
bool public limited;
```

```
uint256 public maxHoldingAmount;
```

```
uint256 public minHoldingAmount;
```

```
function setRule( bool _limited, address _uniswapV2Pair, uint256 _maxHoldingAmount, uint256  
_minHoldingAmount ) external onlyOwner {
```

```
    limited = _limited;
```

```
    uniswapV2Pair = _uniswapV2Pair;
```

```
    maxHoldingAmount = _maxHoldingAmount;
```

```
    minHoldingAmount = _minHoldingAmount;
```

```
}
```

**Suggestion:**

- max holding amount should be more than a reasonable % of total supply (0.1% suggested by pinksale)
- min holding amount should not be more than a reasonable amount which can disable buys
- uniswapV2Pair should be immutable



# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

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**Category:** Centralization

**Subject:** Burning tokens

**Severity:** Low

**Overview:**

The contract allows users to burn their tokens, which can lead to centralization if a few users hold a large portion of the total supply.

**Code:**

```
function burn(uint256 value) external {  
    _burn(msg.sender, value);  
}
```

**Suggestion:**

Implement a decentralized governance mechanism to decide on burning tokens



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