

Smart Contract Audit

FOR

VPW

DATED: 9 June 23'



HIGH RISK FINDING

Centralization – Trades must be enabled

Severity: High

function: EnableTrading

Status: Resovled (owned by safu developer)

Overview:

The smart contract owner must enable trades for holders. If trading remain disabled, no one would be able to buy/sell/transfer tokens.

```
function enableTrading() external onlyOwner {
  require(!tradingEnabled, "Trading is already enabled");
  tradingEnabled = true;
  providingLiquidity = true;
  genesis_block = block.number;
}
```

Suggestion

To mitigate this centralization issue, we propose the following options:

- Renounce Ownership: Consider relinquishing control of the smart contract by renouncing ownership. This would remove the ability for a single entity to manipulate the router, reducing centralization risks.
- Multi-signature Wallet: Transfer ownership to a multi-signature wallet. This would require multiple approvals for any changes to the mainRouter, adding an additional layer of security and reducing the centralization risk.
- Transfer ownership to a trusted and valid 3rd party in order to guarantee enabling of the trades



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name - VPW

Date: 9 June, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: Passed

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	1	0	0	0



USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:

A line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Test Network: All tests were conducted on the BSC Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

3-Slither:

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

Testnet version:

Contract has been tested on binance smart chain testnet which can be found in below link: https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x812d58fa4be6bcb3a3e08cb0c4f0bfb9c4b3b51f#code



Token Information

Token Name: Virtual Peradox World

Token Symbol: VPW

Decimals: 18

Token Supply: 599,000,000

Token Address:

0x7BB224B336ECa8f5FfBf45bD460eFc61f018F962

Checksum:

5970ffc8793efd442c45649650ac16c09e7ca8c4

Owner:

0x054f5759416785897Dbff570a2Dc3e18d4F38Fa6

Deployer:

0x054f5759416785897Dbff570a2Dc3e18d4F38Fa6



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Fees:

Buy Fees: 1%

Sell Fees: 1%

Transfer Fees: 1%

Fees Privilege: None

Ownership: Owned

Minting: None

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: Yes

Blacklist: No

Other Privileges: - initial distribution of tokens

- including or excluding from fees
- changing swap threshold



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
- Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
- Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code isexercised when we run the test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.



VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST





CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

- Critical
- High-Risk
- Medium-Risk
- Low-Risk
- Gas Optimization/Suggestion

Description

These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.


A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity	Found
◆ Critical	0
♦ High-Risk	1
◆ Medium-Risk	0
♦ Low-Risk	0
Gas Optimization /Suggestions	0



INHERITANCE TREE





POINTS TO NOTE

- owner is not able to set change buy/sell/transfer fees (1% static)
- owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary wallet
- owner is not able to set limit for buy/sell/transfer/holding amounts
- owner is not able to mint new tokens
- owner is not able to disable trades
- owner can exclude/include an address from fees
- owner can change internal swap thershold
- owner can enable/disable internal swap (I.e marketing and development BNB not trades)
- owner can claim stuck tokens
- owner can transfer ownership
- owner can renounce ownership



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
| Contract |
              Type
                          Bases
**Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
**Context** | Implementation | |||
<mark>| <sup>L</sup> | _msgSende</mark>r | Internal 🕤 | ||
<mark>| └ | msgDat</mark>a | Internal 🗗 | | |
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
**IERC20** | Interface | |||
| L | totalSupply | External | | NO | | |
| L | balanceOf | External | | | NO | |
| transfer | External | | | NO | |
L | allowance | External | | NO | |
| L | approve | External | | | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | External | | | NO | |
|||||||
| **IERC20Metadata** | Interface | IERC20 | | |
| L | name | External | | NO | |
| L | symbol | External | | NO | |
| L | decimals | External | | NO | |
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
| **ERC20** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata | | | | |
| L | name | Public | | NO | |
| L | symbol | Public | | NO | |
| L | decimals | Public ! | NO! |
| L | balanceOf | Public | | NO | |
| L | transfer | Public | | | NO | |
| L | allowance | Public | | NO | |
| L | approve | Public | | ( NO ! |
| L | transferFrom | Public | | | NO | |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public | | | NO | |
| L | transfer | Internal 🛈 | 🔘 | |
| L | tokengeneration | Internal 🙃 | 🌑 | |
| L | burn | Internal 🛅 | 🔘 | |
| L | approve | Internal 🗗 | 🔘 | |
| L | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal 🛅 | 🔘 | |
| **Address** | Library | |||
| L | sendValue | Internal 🔒 | 🔘 | |
```



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
111111
**Ownable** | Implementation | Context | | |
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | | NO | |
| L | renounceOwnership | Public | | | OnlyOwner |
| L | transferOwnership | Public | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | _setOwner | Private 📆 | 🔘 | |
111111
| **IFactory** | Interface | |||
| | createPair | External | | | NO | |
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
| **IRouter** | Interface | |||
L | factory | External | | NO | |
| L | WETH | External | | NO | | | |
| L | addLiquidityETH | External | | I I NO | |
| L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | | NO | |
| **VPW** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable | | |
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | ( ) | ERC20 |
| L | approve | Public | | | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | Public ! | \infty | NO !
| L | increaseAllowance | Public | | | NO | | |
| L | decreaseAllowance | Public ! | | NO! |
| L | transfer | Internal 🙃 | 🔘 | |
| L | handle_fees | Private 📆 | 🔘 | mutexLock |
| L | swapTokensForETH | Private 📆 | 🔘 | |
| └ | addLiquidity | Private 📆 | 🌑 | |
| L | updateLiquidityProvide | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | updateLiquidityTreshhold | External | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | enableTrading | External | | | OnlyOwner |
| L | updatedeadline | External | | | OnlyOwner |
| L | updateMarketingWallet | External | | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | updateDevWallet | External | | | OnlyOwner |
| L | rescueBNB | External | | | NO | |
| L | rescueBEP20 | External | | | NO | |
| L | <Receive Ether> | External | | I NO | |
```



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

Legend



STATIC ANALYSIS

```
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
Context._msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#14-17) is never used and should be removed ERC20._burn(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#278-289) is never used and should be removed Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
 VPW.TotalBuyFee (contracts/Token.sol#430-431) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
- (buytaxes.marketing + buytaxes.nativeTax + buytaxes.dev + buytaxes.liquidity) / buytaxes.denominator

VPW.TotalSellFee (contracts/Token.sol#432-433) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
- (sellTaxes.marketing + sellTaxes.nativeTax + sellTaxes.dev + sellTaxes.liquidity) / sellTaxes.denominator

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state
Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#7) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
sole-0.8.20 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#330-335):
- (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#333)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
Variable ERC20. allowances (contracts/Token.sol#58) is not in mixedCase Function IRouter.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#379) is not in mixedCase
 Function VPW.handle_fees(uint256,VPW.Taxes) (contracts/Token.sol#551-588) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updateLiquidityTreshhold(uint256).new_amount (contracts/Token.sol#617) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updatedeadline(uint256). deadline (contracts/Token.sol#628) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updateMarketingWallet(address). newWallet (contracts/Token.sol#633) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updateDevWallet(address). newWallet (contracts/Token.sol#637) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updateExemptFee(address).newWallet (contracts/Token.sol#637) is not in mixedCase
Variable VPW.genesis block (contracts/Token.sol#411) is not in mixedCase
Variable VPW.deadWallet (contracts/Token.sol#411) is not in mixedCase
Constant VPW.deadWallet (contracts/Token.sol#417) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES Variable VPW.TotalBuyFee (contracts/Token.sol#430-431) is not in mixedCase Variable VPW.TotalSellFee (contracts/Token.sol#432-433) is not in mixedCase
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
VPW.launchtax (contracts/Token.sol#413) should be constant Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
VPW.TotalBuyFee (contracts/Token.sol#430-431) should be immutable VPW.TotalSellFee (contracts/Token.sol#432-433) should be immutable VPW.pair (contracts/Token.sol#403) should be immutable VPW.router (contracts/Token.sol#402) should be immutable
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,

No major issues were found in the output



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x394541469f999a97fb96c473ba491f 816505d9318bc7746d127b7f09fe719d58

2- Buying when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x20f30746694fa8400dd63631075952 99380905b28283ac6935aaf24717414270

3- Selling when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xd1dd73342317657ef18704ea748ec6 73e316b0c13c38f90473cb83bfcbeaf5aa

4- Transferring when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x85bd3ece6124eaf14a3744c53f8830 dee8bf17c2c8f92f50fa1d41b9e64fe9ee

5- Buying when not excluded from fees (1% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x28d750cde7ed8c2f4925512c3173a15 e73594a3c143ff6fd5ed763bbab2de499

6- Selling when not excluded from fees (1% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa47e15f16212f5dedca2535f26ce533cd356fa80e745b17a60887e5f7a73f686



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

7- Transferring when not excluded from fees (1% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x805ab4627f41a31d024d1e275d218b3abe40cdabd0b80e2a97dcc85a912fc334

8- Development and marketing BNB (Internal swap) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x7374161405ddee4de1a357efd392f98 2418e03161cee3f3a9edf9690ab236ea9



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Centralization – Trades must be enabled

Severity: High

function: EnableTrading

Status: Resovled (owned by safu developer)

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Suggestion

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