

Public-Private Interactions and Practices of Security

Deborah Avant and Virginia Haufler

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Abstract and Keywords

Though most assume a settled relationship between security and the state, the degree to which different forms of violence are collective endeavors handled by states has varied over time, affecting who or what it secured, how, and what is understood to be public. In the modern era the control and management of violence were core elements of state practice. We examine recent history to show how globalization initiated debates over security and opened avenues for different claims, both about security and about what is public and private. We trace how interactions among intellectuals, governments, transnational activists, and companies shifted who authorizes security, who provides security, and how legitimate and illegitimate force are distinguished—all public concerns. We conclude by discussing current developments that could reinforce or disrupt these trends and claim again that public-private interactions will shape their impact on future global security practices.

Keywords: security, private security, security practices, transnational actors, global governance, securitization, transnational corporations, transnational activists, international humanitarian law

MOST people connect security issues with what we think of as “public” and attach them to a particular collective endeavor such as a community or a nation.¹ Imagining public authorities as those charged with ensuring the security of their followers is a key part of contractarian narratives of governance. What we see as “public” is often tied to governance and settles whose safety is deemed important and who is threatening or expendable. In the modern era the state has embodied this collective endeavor, and the control and management of violence have been seen as core elements of state practice. We argue here that in recent years, interactions among intellectuals, governments, transnational activists, and companies have broadened the idea of security, changing who or what should be secured, and shifting our understanding of what is public. A focus on these interactions should inform our thinking about the future of global security.

History shows that the degree to which different forms of violence are collective endeavors handled by states has varied. Organizations outside of government have been integral participants in defining public, private, and the line separating the two. Nongovernmental organizations have nearly always participated in the practice of security, though in different ways across time and space. Historical examples include the British East India Company or the London Missionary Society in the nineteenth century, both of which undertook “private” pursuits that were pivotal in shifting governmental roles in controlling violence and providing security (Avant and Haufler 2014).

In the current era, these practices have been affected by globalization, understood here as social, economic, and technological processes that increase connections among people and organizations (Held et al. 1999). With these increased connections have come claims to broader views of both security and the public, opening the way for the participation of various “private” actors including multinational corporations, advocacy NGOs, implementing NGOs, and private military and security companies (PMSCs) (p. 351) in the practice of security. These new actors have not only broadened participation in security, but have also changed its practice.

We illustrate our argument in three parts. In Section 24.1, we examine how global changes inspired debate among public intellectuals and academics over how to define security in the post-Cold War moment. This debate and its new language opened avenues for different arguments about public and private, as well as about security itself. In the second section, we explore how the use of this language fostered interactions that changed perspectives about who authorizes security, with particular implications for company behavior, practices, and interactions in the security realm. In Section 24.3, we turn to changes in who provides security and how this has influenced ideas about what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate force. We conclude with a brief discussion of current developments that might reinforce—or disrupt—contemporary practices.

24.1 Public-Private Interactions and the Redefinition of Security

In 1989 Jessica Tuchman Mathews wrote a *Foreign Affairs* article calling for a redefinition of security. Mathews particularly sought to include environmental and demographic concerns: “Environmental strains that transcend national borders are already beginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national sovereignty, previously rendered porous by the information and communication revolutions and the instantaneous global movement of financial capital.” (Mathews 1989). In the debate that ensued, Daniel Deudney (1991) called her logic “muddled thinking,” and Stephen Walt (1991) held that including topics such as environmental hazards in security would destroy the intellectual coherence of the field. Soon after, the United Nations introduced the concept of “human security” (UNDP 1994), which uses the individual as the referent for security and linked the security of individuals to economic and social conditions in ways that traditional security advocates saw as misguided (Paris 2001). European scholars then began analyzing

the process by which something became a security issue, or was “securitized” (van Munster 2012). The securitization literature implied that what security means shifts over time, depending on claims about an issue’s relevance to security and the acceptance of those claims. At the same time, this literature still accepted the traditional assertion that evoking security implied a special role for the state (Williams 2003).

This debate over what we should “secure” was opened by a prominent public intellectual, carried on by academics in academic journals, and further broadened by representatives at the UN. As Matthews made explicit, the debate was partly a response to processes of globalization, but it was also made opportune by the Cold War’s end, which opened possibilities for re-shaping the security priorities of prominent states like the United States. And while Matthews sought to direct attention to environmental (p. 352) challenges, others fought to bring security’s urgency to additional issues in order to frame them in a way that would garner attention and action.

This debate has not been resolved. Its various protagonists continue to call for and analyze “security”—but with different meanings and in different ways. The word “security” appears in studies of many different issues: environmental security, economic security, food security, human security, national security, international security, collective security. These point to sources of risk well beyond traditional military threats, including everything from pandemics and women’s oppression, to financial contagion, and more. These have been taken up by governments as guides to policy, as when Japan, Canada, and South Africa each committed themselves to principles of human security and shifted their agendas accordingly (Brysk 2009). Even when not taken up explicitly in government policy, different parts of government including military organizations adopted the language of security for a wider array of risks. So have companies, NGOs, international organizations (IOs), and policy analysts. The privileged role for the state and the enmity over issues attached to security that securitization theorists expected to see was visible in some of these new issue areas. In others, the process demonstrated malleability in the degree to which security invokes enmity or is tied to the state (Avant 2007). These dynamics affected both who authorizes security and how we have come to understand the laws of war.

24.2 Broadened Security and Shifts in who Authorizes Security

Governments often seek to monopolize violence by claiming not just the sole right to exercise it, but the right to define which violence is threatening and how its populations should understand violent experiences. But this ability to shape security practices by defining violence and threat is not confined to governments. Other organizations also make claims about which threats we should be concerned about; which ones justify a response and by whom; and what or who we should protect. Sometimes they are successful in gaining acceptance and legitimacy for their claims from other groups and even from

governments. In other cases, organizations make no claims themselves, but become the target of claims made by others—either as a source of threat or as a source of protection.

In the current era, transnational activists and social movements often adopt the language of security when making appeals about the issues they organize to address. They link problems such as threats to human rights, democracy, or the environment to security in order to gain attention and pressure others to action. Although some activists operate across borders, most of their efforts focus on local conflicts (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Local activists appeal to transnational groups by framing conflicts in the global language of human rights and environmental protection in order to gain support for (p. 353) their cause (Keck and Sikkink 1998). As a result, the international community becomes more likely to view environmental degradation in localities such as the Niger River delta as a source of insecurity, and local activists more concerned about unemployment and inequality nevertheless frame their cause in the language of environment and human rights for an international audience (Bob 2002; Oduah 2016). In either case, organizations identify themselves as principled actors working for the common good and speaking for communities who have too little voice, which gives them authority to determine the content of security concerns locally and internationally. As such, they take on a public role—identifying threats to the common good or to particular communities.

Through their claims in recent years, these organizations have pushed commercial actors to take on more public roles (Brysk 2009; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Risse et al. 2013). Consider the direct naming and shaming of companies by activist campaigns seeking to mobilize citizens, consumers, and policy-makers on issues of common concern (Soule 2009; Friman 2015). They target prominent companies, such as Nike or Shell Oil, or criticize the global supply chains that obscure the role of specific firms (MacDonald 2014). These campaigns occur within the context of larger movements that seek to re-shape global norms, such as the corporate social responsibility movement (Tsutsui and Lim 2015) or the broader global justice movement (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005).

In enlisting transnational corporations to address local violence in the areas where companies operate, these activists also authorize a broader public role for commercial actors (Haufler 2001, 2010b; Fort 2008; Dietelhoff and Wolf 2013). Transnational companies are identified as a source of grievance, complicit in government violence against communities, and engaging in what has been labeled “militarized commerce” (Forcese 2001). But they are also viewed as having more resources and capacity to resolve these conflicts and end the violence—and are thus given authority to act (Haufler 2010b). These campaigns typically enroll other NGOs concerned about related issues within the broader definition of security—human rights, environment, corruption—thus further securitizing these issues. For instance, the transnational campaign against the trade in “conflict” diamonds that financed war in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) garnered support from literally hundreds of NGOs which tied their own issues to this one (Tamm 2004; Haufler 2010a). These campaigns build on and reinforce broad definitions of security and work to pull private actors into public roles.

The effort to enlist companies into conflict prevention has found significant support among international institutions and governments. The UN Global Compact facilitated the growing acceptance of business as a security actor through regular dialogues beginning in 2001, and eventually launched the Business4Peace platform to support corporate conflict prevention activities in 2015. The UN Security Council in 2014 discussed the role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding for the first time. Individual governments have adopted policies that identify commercial actors as part of security processes, reflected in recent legislation in the United States and the EU that requires companies to report their trade in conflict minerals. (p. 354) Conflict-affected governments and communities often expect corporations to take on security responsibilities, even when those companies are reluctant to do so.

In response, some corporations have adopted new practices. Urged by activists to adopt “conflict sensitive business practices” (International Alert 2005), they have begun analyzing the impact of their own investments and operations on local stability and human rights practices. Many are adopting transparency policies, reporting on their operations, plans for the future, and payments to government. They engage more directly with the local communities in which they operate, and participate in multi-stakeholder processes and institutions at both the local and international levels (Ruggie 2013). Examples include the participation of the diamond industry in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the oil and gas industry in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and due diligence initiatives regarding global supply chains in general.² In some cases, business has been a key supporter in peace negotiations, as in Mozambique at the end of its civil war and currently in South Sudan. These interactions link local conflicts to broader global norms at the same time as they connect a broader set of issues to security. They expand the range of actors involved in both defining and providing security and give companies authority in security affairs.

Some observers argue that transnational corporations need to develop their own corporate foreign policy and engage in corporate diplomacy (Chipman 2016). As Ciepley argues, corporations have never been truly “private” actors but are government-like, and as such, need to abide by principles of geopolitical due diligence regarding transnational risk in both home and host countries (Ciepley 2013). Their contemporary role requires them to engage more fully with local and international stakeholders, building a positive reputation as a legitimate participant with a “social license to operate” (Zandvliet and Anderson 2009; Ruggie 2013; Henisz 2014). Fort goes so far as to argue that companies should explicitly pursue peace as a corporate policy (Fort 2015). These arguments blur lines between public and private actors and recognize that company practices endow firms with the authority to determine the contours of security.

A striking example of the implications of this change is the evolving behavior of Chinese companies in Africa. The rise of Chinese economic and political power is typically framed as an evolving geostrategic competition with the United States. But this misses the ways in which Chinese engagement abroad is having an impact on China itself. Chinese companies have become the most significant investors in Africa in recent years, especially in re-

source-rich areas. These companies are generally thought to be more willing to invest in weakly governed regions than their Western counterparts³ (Chen et al. 2015; Matfess 2015), and Chinese investors are assumed to be preferable to governments concerned about conditionality. The Chinese government has a long-standing policy of not intervening in local affairs which reinforces assumptions that neither the government nor firms pay attention to environmental or social issues (Saferworld 2011).

However, Chinese investments are prone to the same risks from local conflict dynamics that have been problematic for Western investors, and face some of the same pressures (Patey 2014; Patey and Chun 2015). A number of critical observers argue that Chinese companies should take into account the impact their operations have on the (p. 355) potential for violence. As one remarks, “Whether China likes it or not, it plays a significant role in peace and security in Africa; negatively, through its absence, and positively, through an increased partnership with African states and institutions working for peace and security” (Iyasu 2013). A number of recent analyses go further to argue that China is incrementally and unofficially moving away from its policy of non-interference, in response to its experience in specific and varying African contexts (Verhoeven 2014; Aidoo and Hess 2015).

Indeed, Chinese company practices on the ground are becoming more similar to those of Western firms. Even state-owned oil companies participate in multi-stakeholder engagement processes such as the EITI, and Chinese companies are about as transparent concerning their payments to governments as Western ones (Matfess 2015; Schjolberg Marques 2015). An increasing number now issue corporate social responsibility reports detailing their efforts to promote sustainability and engage with local communities (Liu 2015). The main Chinese association for mining recently published social responsibility guidelines for mining investments abroad, including due diligence standards on conflict similar to those developed by the OECD.⁴ In South Sudan, Chinese investors are undertaking social engagement on the ground and participating in international peace talks⁵ (Johnson 2014; Alessi and Xu 2015). These corporate actions suggest a shift away from policies of non-interference in response to both particular crises in different African countries and more general expectations about the role that companies play in global affairs (Alessi and Xu 2015). Observers see Chinese firms as having responsibility and authority in security affairs and expect that they will take on a more public role.

The debate over whether we need to redefine security gave a wider range of actors opportunities to determine what security is about—who or what needs to be protected, and what risks should be evaluated. They provided space for activists to promote new expectations for corporations in contributing to peace and stability in the areas where they invest. Those expectations entailed a larger role for companies in assessing their own impact on conflicts. They led firms to change their practices to reduce risk and instability, and to influence who or what gets secured in specific contexts. These expectations were reinforced by international organizations and some governments, which have essentially

authorized public practices for firms in security affairs—even when contrary to some government policy.

24.3 Claims about who Can Deliver Security and Shifting Meanings in the Laws of War

In Section 24.2, we looked at how interactions between activists and companies—reinforced by other authorities—gave companies more authority to influence the definition of security and adopt policies to mitigate risk. In this section, we look at how (p. 356) public-private interactions—and claims about them—have also shaped who delivers security and, in turn, the global norms that govern legitimate violence. Domestic political movements in the United States and the UK combined with larger structural changes such as the end of the Cold War increased transnational connections to generate a significant role for “private” commercial security providers. Often organized transnationally, private military and security companies (PMSCs) deliver security services all over the globe (Singer 2003a; Avant 2005; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010). PMSCs provide a wide variety of services, overlapping with both military and policing functions, to both governmental and nongovernmental clients. Claims about the inability or unwillingness of government forces to serve “public” or collective concerns have also animated the rise in sub-state or transnational armed groups—called “militia,” “rebel,” or “terrorist.” These groups also claim to deliver security to some communities, and to use legitimate violence against others. Traditionally, both commercial and sub-state or transnational armed groups have been viewed as “private,” illegitimate managers of violence precisely because they are not state actors.

As commercial and non-commercial non-state armed groups have increasingly managed violence, they have run up against arguments that challenge their legitimacy. In this section we examine how their claims to legitimacy, alongside problem-solving efforts to affect their behavior, have led to changes in the norms governing war—particularly the way we think about just war and international humanitarian law (IHL). Both rebel groups and PMSCs challenge the categories on which just war and IHL rest. Because militias, rebels, and terrorists are not states (which are assumed to be public authorities), they do not have the proper standing to enter a war justly. Furthermore, their strategies often blur the lines between combatant and civilian, something that violates a fundamental tenet of IHL. Similarly, PMSCs can operate on the battlefield but are often not covered by military justice systems and occupy a middle area between combatant and civilian. This led some to claim there was a “vacuum of [international] law” surrounding their actions (Singer 2003). Both rebel movements and PMSCs, however, have made some strides toward greater legitimacy by claiming their behavior is in pursuit of, or consistent with, common concerns.

Historically, rebel forces often claim to better represent public ends than the governments they oppose. Some rebel groups also take it upon themselves to exercise restraint with regard to non-combatants—observing some principles of *jus in bello*.⁶ One of the fun-

damental tenets of Mao's doctrine was a focus on winning the hearts and minds of the population among which the guerrilla forces swam. While these forces committed what could be regarded as "murder" by their surreptitious assassinations of military forces or political leaders, they often took pains to distinguish between members of the regime against which they fought and members of the civilian population to whom they turned for support. In practice rebel armies vary in the degree to which they protect or brutalize the population. Jeremy Weinstein's study of rebel forces begins with a contrast between the 1981 rebel force behavior in Lukumbi Village, Uganda (largely respectful and protecting of civilians) and rebel behavior in Maringue Village, Mozambique in 1979 (largely unrespectful of civilians) (Weinstein 2006).

(p. 357) Beyond particular behavior toward civilians, some rebel groups have actually pledged support for IHL as the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) did in El Salvador. In other cases, as with the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, the rebels have espoused doctrine that is fundamentally at odds with IHL. Hyeran Jo examined the data to explain why some rebels (51 percent of the groups she examines) comply with IHL and others (22 percent) do not. She looked at rebel commitment to international law and rebel compliance in three areas: civilian killing, the use of child soldiers, and the treatment of detainees (Jo 2015).⁷ Her analytical categories demonstrate the concerns many international experts pay attention to in assessing legitimate management of force: the treatment of vulnerable groups and a commitment to established international norms and practices. By associating themselves with accepted public authorities—governments and international law—otherwise suspect rebel groups believe they can generate greater acceptance, and even legitimacy. Groups with a persistent political wing, governance aims, and openness to transnational actors were those most likely to pledge respect for IHL.

The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) has consistently encouraged respect for IHL regardless of the status of militant groups (whether labeled rebels or terrorists). While careful not to endorse these groups as legitimate, the ICRC has focused its efforts on engendering respect for *jus in bello* principles. In pursuit of this respect, the ICRC is prepared to engage with any actor willing to work toward those principles. Another Swiss-based NGO, Geneva Call, specifically aims to work with armed non-state actors (ANSA) to encourage their respect for international humanitarian norms.⁸ Concerned that the IHL focus on states leaves non-state armed actors without a clear logic for abiding by IHL, Geneva Call educates and trains these ANSA about *jus in bello* principles and offers them a chance to issue a "Deed of Commitment" to refrain from sexual violence, to ban landmines, and/or to protect children. Though both the ICRC and Geneva Call avoid discussing the legitimacy of these actors per se, the implicit presumption is that groups who make this commitment are more legitimate than those who do not.

Academics have not been so shy. Michael Gross proposes an ethics even for those seeking violent political change, considering both the relative justice of their resistance as well as the justice of their tactics (Gross 2015). In keeping with the logic here, just resistance requires it to generate self-determination, a dignified life, and an acceptable level of public consent. Just tactics must reduce potential harm to non-combatants, and "permissible tar-

getting turns on liability” (Gross 2015: 9).⁹ Thus different “private” actors such as the ICRC, Geneva Call, and academic analysts have made claims about what “private” (rebel) forces should do in order to act “public.”

The logic surrounding PMSCs is a little different from the logic regarding non-state armed groups. As more military and security services began to be delivered and financed by the private sector in the 1990s a debate broke out over the conditions, if any, under which they were legitimate. Representatives of some governments and international lawyers claimed that PMSCs could gain legitimacy through right *authorization*. If these companies were authorized by states, they could be considered legitimate (p. 358) as an extension of right authority. Though states would delegate authority to PMSCs they would remain responsible for their actions. But because authorizing private forces changes the way states operate, this can lead a government to avoid constitutional or public checks—thus leading the state itself to behave less in keeping with public or common concerns (Avant and Sigelman 2010). This logical move, then, was not satisfying to many observers of the rise in PMSCs.

What has gained more traction is an approach that looks at the range of relationships between states and private forces, and to think concretely about how states should relate to PMSCs in order to be congruent with their general international legal obligations. This approach was initiated by the ICRC (along with the Swiss government) in 2007 and involved governments as well as representatives from PMSCs and civil society in a multi-stakeholder process to develop the relevant guidelines. The resulting Montreux Document outlines legal obligations and best practices for contracting states (those who contract with PMSCs), home states (those states where PMSCs are incorporated), and territorial states (those states on whose territory PMSCs operate).¹⁰ The logical follow-on step was to extend the principles of IHL to PMSCs. In the wake of the Montreux Document process, the ICRC and Swiss again initiated a multi-stakeholder process to come up with an international code of conduct (ICoC) for security services.¹¹ The ICoC was signed in 2010 and an organization to implement it, the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA), was launched in 2013. As of June 2016 the ICoCA has 6 government members, 16 civil society members, and 101 company members. Private national and international standards have been built on the Montreux/ICoC principles and at the five-year anniversary of the Montreux Document the government signatories formed a Montreux Document Forum (Avant 2016).

Together the Montreux Document and ICoC provide an integrated framework for best practices among governments and PMSCs. The standards based on this framework can be written into contracts and then enforced through contract law. The multi-stakeholder ICoCA promises oversight and monitoring of the ICoC, along with coordination with both standards bodies and the Montreux Document Forum. Though many of these instruments are non-binding, they have driven changes in government regulation, with governments including the United States making them a part of legal requirements in ways that promise enforcement.

More importantly, the interactions among various academic and civil society claims, companies, and governments have also contributed to a shift in the focus of international humanitarian law. As with the rebel example, these claims have concentrated on the *behavior* of actors rather than being concerned about the category into which they fall. The Montreux Document claimed to introduce nothing new, but simply to interpret what government obligations under existing IHL meant for private security providers. However, stretching these principles to an additional set of actors has furthered the idea that public behavior is more about what an actor *does* than who it *is*.

These two instances show how “private” actors can gain acceptance and legitimacy for their actions by claiming to behave in keeping with public concerns. Though the particular claims of non-state armed groups and commercial security providers are quite (p. 359) different, they have both pledged to constrain their behavior in accord with IHL principles. These pledges and their acceptance by others have been stabilizing in that they prescribe and reinforce behavior for nongovernmental security providers consistent with IHL. It has also, though, altered the meaning of “public” in IHL, giving more emphasis to behavior that respects public norms than it does to incorporation by a state (Avant and Haufler 2014: 51). Claims in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine support a similar change from a different angle by arguing that states only access their “public” status if they uphold their responsibilities by acting in keeping with common concerns. This refocus, in turn, may allow even more space for other types of nongovernmental security providers in IHL.

24.4 Public-Private Interactions and the Future of Security

Debate around the definition of security provided space for public-private interactions that fostered security roles for different actors and envisioned the public in new ways. Pulling these various actors into global norms has led to adjustments that reinforce a broader view of both security and the public. But in what we have sketched in this chapter, these dynamics have drawn various new threads spun by globalization into familiar patterns. Similar trends in the past, however, tell us that these patterns can be erased or redrawn as well as extended (Ciepley 2013; Avant and Haufler 2014). As we look to the future, two particular developments could disrupt the trends we have discussed in Section 24.3: security in the cyber world and nationalist reactions to globalization itself.

In the cyber world, technology has generated new political spaces that bear little connection to territory (Adamson 2016: 25). Cyberspace is arguably a public arena involving issues of common concern to be secured. However, what is to be secured, who defines it, and who provides security are all contested. Rather than seeing governments as protectors of this public space, they are often viewed as part of the threat. The Global Network Initiative (GNI), for instance, seeks to insulate cyberspace from government pressures that may, as their homepage puts it, “conflict with the internationally recognized human rights of freedom of expression and privacy.”¹² Much of the infrastructure of the Internet

is owned and organized by private companies, such as Google or Facebook. But the services they provide lead many people to see them as public actors. Our discussions in this chapter might suggest that they, too, will be drawn into public norms. The norms defining common concerns in cyberspace, though, are murky and contested (Finnemore and Hollis 2016). The Internet provides tools that can put power in the hands of individuals but also reinforce the capacities of governments. The threats posed in cyberspace appear quite distant from the violence concerns in traditional security but cyber tools can both affect violent capacities and have dire consequences for stability and legitimacy. (p. 360) Cyberspace is thus not easily situated in the normative space that has grown around the incorporation of commercial and activist organizations thus far.

The new online media have been credited with reducing the cost of mobilization for social change. Ironically, some of this mobilization has allowed attacks on the very globalization responsible for the growth of the cyber world (Cronin 2002–03). These movements, cutting across left-right divisions, seek to reassert nationalism or localism. The Brexit vote is a dramatic example of this, but populist sparks can be seen all over Europe, in the United States, and in Russia and China (Weiss 2014). More extreme versions like ISIS have taken the use of globalization's tools to new levels, using new media to mobilize support (Cronin, Chapter 34 this volume). The "common" concerns espoused by these groups or movements are narrow and inward-looking, contrasting markedly with the expansive view of the public we discuss in this chapter. They harken back to a simpler time and promote practices that would erase broader concerns and reinforce more traditional, national, views of security—protecting "us" against "them" with violence.

Though pointing to different logics of disruption, the cyber world and nationalist mobilization work in tandem. Because the cyber world touches nearly every dimension of the physical world, how cybersecurity is imagined, what norms it builds on, and how its practices unfold will have dramatic consequences for how we think of security, who provides it, and what governs their behavior. Whether these trends portend further broadening, a dramatic break with existing practices, or a return to traditional security depends on unfolding interactions between technology companies, advocacy organizations, governments, movements, and others. These interactions will decide how we see the public and its security in the future.

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Notes:

(1.) Public defined here as issues of common concern (Best and Gheciu 2014).

- (2.) Corporate participation in the security arena is uneven and it is not clear whether it has significantly reduced violence. Nevertheless, these practices influence who and what gets secured, and who provides security.
- (3.) Data on Chinese investment abroad is difficult to obtain and interpret, and there are ongoing debates over the amount and significance of it (Brautigam 2011; Shinn 2012).
- (4.) The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.
- (5.) At the same time, the Chinese government has sold arms and ammunition to the government of South Sudan, which may have undermined the peace, so Chinese engagement is not always peace promoting (Matfess 2015).
- (6.) The just war tradition consists of both claims about the justness of the decision to enter a war (*jus ad bellum*) and claims about the justness of behavior undertaken in prosecuting a war (*jus in bello*). *Jus in bello*'s cardinal principles are discrimination between civilians and combatants (targeting only combatants) and proportionality of means (violence should be used proportionately to the injustice suffered).
- (7.) Her dataset covers 1990–2010 and includes rebel groups in violent engagement with government forces that have produced at least 25 battle deaths.
- (8.) <http://www.genevacall.org/>.
- (9.) Neither mercenaries nor PMSCs are included in Gross's analysis.
- (10.) See <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html>.
- (11.) Defined as: guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or unarmed), or any other activity for which the Personnel of Companies are required to carry or operate a weapon in the performance of their duties. See the ICoC, available at: http://icoca.ch/en/the_icoc.
- (12.) <https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/>.

Deborah Avant

Deborah Avant is Sié Chéou-Kang Chair for International Security and Diplomacy at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver.

Virginia Haufler

Virginia Haufler is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park.