
## TP4 MVFA

## February 17, 2017

The aim of today's practical session is to verify some LTL properties with Spin.

- 1. Last time, we have seen the Dining philosophers' problem (https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%C3% AEner\_des\_philosophes (French), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining\_philosophers\_problem (English)). You implemented this problem in Spin thanks to Petri nets. Implement the dining philosophers problem in Spin directly, without resorting to Petri nets. Verify whether the philosophers may starve to death.
- 2. We focus now on a cryptographic protocol. To share a secret, two agents use the following protocol. Each agent A has a pair of keys:
  - a key  $K_A$ , which is used as a lock. We denote by  $[m]_{K_A}$  the message m encoded by  $K_A$ ;
  - a key  $K_A^{-1}$ , used as a key, allowing one to decode messages encoded with  $K_A$ .

We assume that the encoding is commutative, that is:  $[[m]_{K_A}]_{K_B} = [[m]_{K_B}]_{K_A}$ . Denoting by  $K_A$  the key of Alice, and by  $K_B$  that of Bob, the protocol used by Alice and Bob to share a secret message m is given as follows:



Note that to compute the last message, Alice has used the fact that encoding is commutative.

Consider a potential attack, by Charlie. We assume that Charlie can grab any message of the network, send a message he owns, encode a message with his key KC, and compute m from  $[m]_{K_C}$ , thanks to  $K_C^{-1}$ . But he cannot encode or decode a message using Alice's or Bob's keys: he does not know  $K_A$ ,  $K_B$ ,  $K_A^{-1}$ ,  $K_B^{-1}$ .

We want to model the protocol and an attacker using Spin. Model the net by a rendez-vous channel. We assume that the messages have 3 fields: the message content, and the encryption keys (2 keys maximum). We use the following Spin structure (to understand structures, read Section 2.1.7 of http://spinroot.com/spin/Man/WhatsNew.html):

```
typedef msg {
    mtype data;
    mtype key1;
    mtype key2;
};
```

The fields key1 and key2 of a message can be KA, KB, KC or None, which means that the message is not encrypted: a non encrypted message has both fields set to None. Similarly if m.key1 is None and m.key2 is KB (or conversely), this means that m is encrypted by  $K_B$  only. Finally, if m.key1 is KA and m.key2 is KB, this means that m is encrypted by both  $K_A$  and  $K_B$ .

- 3. Model Alice and Bob using Spin. You will need to replace mtype to any type you want to specify data and keys.
- 4. Model Charlie using Spin.
- 5. Show whether Charlie can intercept a uncrypted message.