

COURSE NAME: CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY

COURSE CODE: R1641051

COURSE INSTRUCTOR: MADHU BABU JANJANAM, ASSOC. PROF, CSE

UNIT: 4

By the end of this unit...

- Explain different Integrity, Authentication and Key Management techniques and algorithms.

By the end of this session...


- Describe how message integrity and message authentication is maintained

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By the end of this session...


- Differentiate between message integrity and message authentication.
- Describe the working of Nested MAC (HMAC)

HMAC




- NIST (FIPS - 198) standard for nested MAC.
- Often referred as HMAC (Hashed MAC).
- Algorithm:
 1. The message is divided into L blocks, each block of size b bits.
 2. The secret key is left padded with 0's to create a b -bit key. The size of secret key before padding is recommended as n bits.
 3. The result of step 2 is xor with a constant called ipad. The value of ipad is 00110110 (36 in hex).
 4. The result is added as the first block and the number of blocks is now $L+1$.

Contd...



5. The result of step 4 is hashed to create an n -bit digest. We call the digest the intermediate HMAC.
6. The intermediate n -bit HMAC is left padded with 0s to make a b -bit block.
7. The padded key is now xor with opad. The value of opad is 01011100 (5C in hex).
8. The step 4 is repeated to make the result in step 7 as first block to intermediate HMAC.
9. The result of step 8 is hashed with the same hashing algorithm to create the final n -bit HMAC.

CMAC



- NIST standard FIPS 113.
- Named as Data Authentication Algorithm or CMAC or CBCMAC.
- Operating Symmetric encryption algorithm in Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode to form MAC.
- The idea is to create one block of MAC from N blocks of plaintext using a symmetric key cipher N times.

Random Oracle Model

Message	Message Digest
4523AB1352CDEF45126	13AB
723BAE38F2AB3457AC	02CA
AB45CD103483726AAA	A38B

- Introduced in 1993 by Bellare and Rogaway.
- Function based on ROM behaves as follows:
 - When a new message is given, the oracle generates a fixed length message digest as a random string of 0s and 1s. The oracle records the message and message digest.
 - When a message is given for which digest exists, the oracle simply gives the message digest.
 - The digest for a new message needs to be chosen independently from previous digests.
 - The message digest of a message cannot be generated using a formula but generated as a random function.

Pigeonhole Principle

Message	Message Digest
000	00
001	01
010	10
011	11
100	00
101	01
110	10
111	11

- If n pigeonholes are occupied by $n+1$ pigeons, then atleast one pigeonhole is occupied by two pigeons.
- If n pigeonholes are occupied by $kn+1$ pigeons, then at least one pigeonhole is occupied by $k+1$ pigeons.
- There are some digests that correspond to morethan one message because the digest should be shorter than the message.
- Ex: if the message length is 6 bits long and digest size is 4 bits long then there are 16 digests possible, but there are 64 messages.

Birthday Problems

- There are four different birthday problems:
 - Problem 1: What is the minimum number of, k , of students in a classroom such that it is likely that at least one student has a predefined birthday?
 - Problem 2: What is the minimum number of k , of students in a classroom such that it is likely that at least one student has the same birthday as the student selected by the professor?
 - Problem 3: What is the minimum number of k , of students in a classroom such that it is likely that at least two students have the same birthday?
 - Problem 4: We have two classes, each with k students. What is the minimum value of k so that it is likely that at least one student from the first classroom has the same birthday as a student from the second classroom.


By the end of this session

- Discuss the general ideas behind cryptographic hash functions.

Iterated Hash Function

- All cryptographic hash function need to create a **fixed size message digest** from a **variable size message**.
- Rather building **Hash function with variable-size input** go for **fixed size input and use it multiple times**.
- The fixed size input functions is referred as **Compression function**, which takes n -bit string to create m -bit string. Where $n > m$.
- This process is named as **Iterated cryptographic hash function**.

Merkle-Damgard Scheme



- It is an primitive iterated hash function that is collision resistant, if the compression function is collision resistant.
- The scheme uses the following steps:
 - The original message length and padding are appended to create an augmented message that can be divided into blocks of n bits.
 - The message is then considered as t blocks, each of n bits. We call each block $M_1, M_2, M_3, \dots, M_t$. We call the intermediate message digests as H_1, H_2, \dots, H_t . H_t is the final Message digest.
 - Before starting the iteration, the digest H_0 is set to a fixed value and called Initial vector
 - The compression function at each iteration operates on H_{i-1} and M_i to create a new H_i .

Hash function is collision resistant if the compression function is collision resistant.

Two Groups of Compression Functions

- Hash functions made from Scratch
 - MD5
 - SHA
 - RIPEMD
- Hash functions based on Block Ciphers
 - Rabin Scheme
 - Davies-Meyer Scheme
 - Matyas-Meyer-Oseas Scheme
 - Miyaguchi-Preneel Scheme

Hash Functions made from scratch

- Cryptographic hash functions uses compression functions that are made from scratch.


Message Digest (MD):

- Designed by Ron Rivest.
- Referred as MD2, MD4, MD5.
- MD5 divides the message into 512 bits and creates a 128 bit digest.

Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA):


- Developed by NIST and published as a FIPS 180.
- Mostly based on MD5.
- Later revised as FIPS 180-1 named as SHA-1, then revised as FIPS 180-2 has four versions: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-512.

Hash Functions based on Block Ciphers – Rabin Scheme




- Based on Merkle-Damgard scheme.
- Compression function is replaced by any encrypting cipher.
- The message block is used as the key and previously created digest is used as plaintext.
- The message digest size is the ciphertext size created by the block cipher.
- Vulnerable to Meet-in-the-Middle attack.

Hash Functions based on Block Ciphers – Davies-Meyer Scheme




- Same as Rabin scheme except that this uses forward feed to protect against meet-in-the-middle attack.

Hash Functions based on Block Ciphers – Matyas-Meyer-Øseas Scheme



- Dual version of Davies-Meyer scheme.
- The Message block and IV can be used interchangeable as Plaintext and key.
- This scheme is possible only with the cipher where plaintext and ciphertext sizes are same.

Hash Functions based on Block Ciphers – Miyaguchi-Preneel Scheme




- Extended version of Matyas-Meyer-Øseas scheme.
- To make more stronger against attacks, the plaintext, the cipher key and cipher text are all xored to create new digest.

By the end of this session...

- Describe the working of Whirlpool cryptographic hash function.

Whirlpool




- Designed by Vincent Rijmen and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto.
- Endorsed by New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption (NESSIE).
- It is an iterated cryptographic hash function based on Miyaguchi-Preneel scheme and uses a symmetric key block cipher as compression function.
- The block cipher used is modified AES cipher

Preparation


- Requires the length of the original message less than 2^{256} bits.
- The message need to be padded before processed with 1-bit followed by necessary number of 0-bits.
- A block of 256 bits is added to define the length of original message.
- After padding and adding length, the augmented message size is a multiple of 512 bits.
- Produces a digest of 512 bits with initial vector of size 512 bits.

Whirlpool Cipher - Rounds




- Is a non-Feistel cipher like AES and a block cipher user in hash algorithm.
- Has 10 rounds.
- The block size and the key size are 512 bits.
- Uses 11 round keys, K_0 to K_{10} , each of 512 bits.

Whirlpool cipher – States and Blocks




- Like AES, Whirlpool cipher uses states and blocks.
- The size of block or state is 512 bits.
- A block is considered as a row matrix of 64 bytes.
- A state is considered as a square matrix of 8 X 8 bytes.
- Unlike AES, the block to state and state to block transformation is done row by row.

Whirlpool cipher – Structure of Each Round




- SubBytes
- Shift Columns
- MixRow
- AddRoundKey

Whirlpool cipher – SubBytes




	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
0	18	23	C6	E8	87	B8	01	4F	36	A6	D2	F5	79	6F	91	52
1	16	BC	9B	8E	A3	0C	7B	35	1D	E0	D7	C2	2E	4B	FE	57
2	15	77	37	E5	9F	F0	4A	CA	58	C9	29	0A	B1	A0	6B	85
3	BD	5D	10	F4	CB	3E	35	67	E4	27	41	8B	A7	7D	95	C8
4	FB	EF	7C	66	DD	17	47	9E	CA	2D	BF	07	AD	5A	83	33
5	63	02	AA	71	C8	19	49	C9	F2	E3	5B	88	9A	26	32	B0
6	E9	0F	D5	80	BE	CD	34	48	F1	7A	90	5F	20	68	1A	AE
7	B4	54	93	22	64	F1	73	12	40	08	C3	EC	DB	A1	8D	3D
8	97	00	CF	2B	76	82	D6	1B	B5	AF	6A	50	45	F3	30	EF
9	3F	55	A2	EA	65	BA	2F	C0	DE	1C	FD	4D	92	75	06	8A
A	B2	E6	0E	1F	62	D4	A8	96	F9	C5	25	59	84	72	39	4C
B	5E	78	38	8C	C1	A5	E2	61	B3	21	9C	1E	43	C7	FC	04
C	51	99	6D	0D	FA	DF	7E	24	3B	AB	CE	11	8F	4E	B7	EB
D	3C	81	94	F7	9B	13	2C	D3	E7	6E	C4	03	56	44	7E	A9
E	2A	BB	C1	53	DC	0B	9D	6C	31	74	F6	46	AC	89	14	E1
F	16	3A	69	09	70	B6	C0	ED	CC	42	98	A4	28	5C	F8	86


Whirlpool cipher – ShiftColumns



Whirlpool cipher – MixRows



Whirlpool cipher – AddRoundKey



Whirlpool cipher – Summary

Block size: 512 bits

Cipher key size: 512 bits

Number of rounds: 10

Key expansion: using the cipher itself with round constants as round keys

Substitution: SubBytes transformation

Permutation: ShiftColumns transformation

Mixing: MixRows transformation

Round Constant: cubic roots of the first eighty prime numbers

By the end of this session...

- Compare between conventional signatures and digital signatures
- Describe the process of digital signature

Digital Signatures




- A person signs a document to show that it is originated from her or was approved by her.
- Eg:
 - A notice from an authorized entity
 - A check from a bank customer
 - A painting from an artist
- Signature is the symbol of authentication
- What if we want authentication for electronic documents.

Conventional signature vs Digital Signature




- Inclusion
- Verification method
- Relationship
- Duplicity

Process




- Sender uses signing algorithm to generate signature of a message.
- Receiver uses the verifying algorithm to verify the signature.

Need of Keys



- Sender uses his private key to generate the signature.
- Receiver uses sender's public key to verify the signature.
- A digital signature needs a public key cryptosystem.

Signing the Digest



- Usually, Asymmetric cryptosystem is very inefficient while dealing with long messages.
- Digital signature schemes require asymmetric cryptosystem.
- Solution is to sign the digest of the message.

By the end of this session...


- Explain the security services provided by a digital signature
- Describe attacks on digital signatures
- Describe the working of RSA digital signature scheme.

Security services

Service	Encipherment	Mechanism							
		Digital Signature	Access Control	Data Integrity	Authentication Exchange	Traffic Padding	Routing Control	Notarization	
Peer entity authentication	Y	Y			Y				
Data origin authentication	Y	Y							
Access control			Y						
Confidentiality	Y						Y		
Traffic flow confidentiality	Y					Y	Y		
Data integrity	Y	Y		Y					
Nonrepudiation		Y		Y					Y
Availability				Y	Y				


- Message Authentication
- Message Integrity
- Nonrepudiation
- Confidentiality with Encipherment

Nonrepudiation



- Alice signs a message and then denies it, can Bob later prove that Alice actually signed it?
- Alice may change the private key and claim that signature is not authentic.
- One solution is to use trusted third party.

Confidentiality



- Digital signature alone can't provide confidentiality.
- The message and signature must be encrypted using either secret-key or public-key cryptosystem.

Attacks on Digital signatures


Attack types

- Key-Only Attack
- Known-Message Attack
- Chosen-Message Attack

Forgery types

- Existential Forgery
- Selective Forgery

RSA Digital signature scheme



- Alice creates a signature out of the message using her private exponent,
$$s = M^d \text{ mod } n$$
 and sends the message and the signature to Bob.
- Bob receives M and S . Bob applies Alice's public exponent to the signature to create a copy of the message
$$M^1 = S^e \text{ mod } n$$
- If $M^1 \equiv M \text{ mod } n$, Bob accepts the message.

RSA Digital signature scheme - Example

Alice: $p=823$, $q=953$, $n=784319$, $e=313$ and $d=160009$.

$$\begin{aligned} M: 19070, S &= 19070^{160009} \bmod 784319 \\ &= 210625 \bmod 784319 \end{aligned}$$

Bob: $e=313$, $M = 19070$, $S = 210625$

$$\begin{aligned} M^1 &= 210625^{313} \bmod 784319 \\ &= 19070 \bmod 784319 \end{aligned}$$


Attacks on RSA Signature

- Key-Only Attack – Existential Forgery
- Known-Message Attack – Existential Forgery
- Chosen-Message Attack – Selective Forgery

By the end of this session...

- Describe the working of ElGamal Digital Signature Scheme.

ElGamal Digital Signature Scheme




Key Generation

- Let p be the prime number and e_1 be a primitive element in Z_p^* .
- Alice selects her private key $d < p-1$ and calculates $e_2 = e_1^d \text{ mod } p$
- Alice's public key is the tuple (e_1, e_2, p) and private key is d .

Verifying and Signing

M: Message
S₁, S₂: Signatures
V₁, V₂: Verifications

r: Random secret
d: Alice's private key
(e₁, e₂, p): Alice's public key




Signing:

1. Alice chooses a secret random number r.
2. Alice calculates the first signature $S_1 = e_1^r \text{ mod } p$
3. Alice calculates the second signature $S_2 = (M - d \times S_1) \times r^{-1} \text{ mod } p - 1$
4. Alice sends M, S₁ and S₂ to Bob

Verifying and Signing – Contd...

M: Message
 S₁, S₂: Signatures
 V₁, V₂: Verifications
 r: Random secret
 d: Alice's private key
 (e₁, e₂, p): Alice's public key



Verifying: Receiver Bob receives M, S₁ and S₂

1. Bob checks to see if $0 < S_1 < p$ and $0 < S_2 < p-1$.
2. Bob calculates $V_1 = e_1^M \text{ mod } p$
3. Bob calculates $V_2 = e_1^{S_1} \times S_1^{S_2} \text{ mod } p$
4. If V_1 is congruent to V_2 the message is accepted,

Example

Alice:

$$p=3119, e_1=2, d=127$$

Calculates $e_2 = 2^{127} \bmod 3119 = 1702$.

Chooses $r = 307$.

Announces 2, 1702, 3119 as public key.

$$M = 320$$

$$S_1 = e_1^r = 2^{307} = 2083 \bmod 3119$$

$$\begin{aligned} S_2 &= (M - d \times S_1) \times r^{-1} \bmod p - 1 \\ &= (320 - 127 \times 2083) \times 307^{-1} = 2105 \bmod 3119. \end{aligned}$$

Bob:

$$\begin{aligned} V_1 &= e_1^M \bmod p = 2^{320} \\ &= 3006 \bmod 3119 \\ V_2 &= e_1^{S_1} \times S_1^{S_2} \bmod p \\ &= 1702^{2083} \times 2083^{2105} \\ &= 3006 \bmod 3119 \end{aligned}$$


Attacks on ElGamal Signature scheme

- Key only forgery
- Known-message forgery

By the end of this session...

- Describe the working of Schnorr Digital Signature Scheme.

Schnorr Digital Signature Scheme




- **p in ElGamal digital signature scheme needs to be large and atleast of 1024 bits to generate a signature as large as 2048 bits.**
- To reduce the size of the signature, Schnorr proposed a new scheme based on ElGamal, but with reduced signature size.
- Signing process uses two functions to create two signatures and verification process uses one function.

Key Generation

- Alice selects a prime p (1024 bits).
- Alice selects another prime q . The prime q needs to divide $(p-1)$.
- Alice chooses e_1 to be q th root of 1 modulo p .
 - Alice chooses a primitive element e_0 in Z_p .
 - Calculates $e_1 = e_0^{(p-1)/q} \text{ mod } p$.
- Alice chooses an integer d , as the private key
- Alice calculates $e_2 = e_1^d \text{ mod } p$
- Alice public key is (e_1, e_2, p, q) and private key is d .
- $p = 2267$
- $q = 103$
- $e_1 = 354$
- $e_0 = 2$
- $2^{22} \text{ mod } 2267$
- $d = 30$
- $e_2 = 354^{30} \text{ mod } 2267 = 1206$
- Public key $(354, 1206, 2267, 103)$
- Private key $d = 30$

Signing and Verifying



Signing:

1. Alice chooses a random number r.
2. Alice calculates the first signature
$$S_1 = h(M | e_1^r \text{ mod } p)$$
3. Alice calculates the second signature
$$S_2 = r + d \times S_1 \text{ mod } q$$
4. Alice sends M, S_1 , and S_2

Verifying:

1. Bob calculates $V = h(M | e_1^{S_2} \cdot e_2^{S_1} \text{ mod } p)$
2. If S_1 is congruent to $V \pmod{p}$, the message is accepted.

Example

- Public Key = (354, 1206, 2267, 103) and Private key d = 30.

Signing:

- Random number r = 11, Message M = 1000
- Calculates $S_1 = h(M|e_1^r \bmod p) = h(1000|354^{11} \bmod 2267) = h(1000630) = 200$
- Calculates $S_2 = r + d \times S_1 \bmod q = 11 + 30 \times 200 \bmod 103 = 35$


Verifying:

- Calculates $V = h(M|e_1^{S_2} \cdot e_2^{S_1} \bmod p) = h(1000|354^{35} \cdot 1206^{200} \bmod 2267) = h(1000|630) = 200$
- Here S_1 and V are equal and the signature is valid.

By the end of this session...

- Describe the working of Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

Digital Signature Standard



- Adopted by NIST in 1994 and published DSS as FIPS 186.
- DSS uses DSA based on ElGamal scheme with some ideas from the Schnorr scheme.
- The size of the prime is 512 bits, later the size made as variable.
- Signing process uses two functions to create two signatures
- Verifying process uses one function and the output of the function is compared with first signature.
- Uses two public moduli: p and q.

Key Generation

- Alice chooses a prime p , between 512 and 1024 bits, but must be multiple of 64.
- Alice chooses a 160-bit prime q , such that q divides $(p-1)$.
- Alice uses two multiplication groups $\langle Z_p^*, \times \rangle$ and $\langle Z_q^*, \times \rangle$; the second is a subgroup of the first.
- Alice creates e_1 to be the q th root 1 modulo p .
- Alice chooses d as the private key and calculates $e_2 = e_1^d$.
- Alice's public key is (e_1, e_2, p, q) and private key is (d)

Verifying and Signing

Verifying:

- Bob checks to see if $0 < S_1 < q$.
- Bob checks to see if $0 < S_2 < q$.
- Bob calculates a digest of M.
- Bob calculates $V = [((e_1^{h(M)S_2^{-1}} \cdot e_2^{S_1 \cdot S_2^{-1}}) \text{ mod } p] \text{ mod } q$.
- If S_1 is congruent to V, then the signature is valid

Signing:

- Alice chooses a random number r.
- Alice calculates first signature $S_1 = (e_1^r \text{ mod } p) \text{ mod } q$.
- Alice creates a digest of message $h(M)$.
- Alice calculates the second signature $S_2 = (h(M) + dS_1)r^{-1} \text{ mod } q$.
- Alice sends M, S_1, S_2 to Bob.


Example

- $p = 8081$, $q = 101$, $e_0 = 3$, $d = 61$, $h(M) = 5000$ and $r = 61$.
- Public key $(6968, 2038, 8081, 101)$ and Private key (61)
- $S_1 = 54$ and $S_2 = 40$.

By the end of this session...

- Describe the working of Elliptic curve Digital Signature Scheme.
- Outline the variations and applications for digital signatures.

Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Scheme



- DSA based on Elliptic curves and sometimes referred as ECDSA.
- Signing process, uses two functions and an extractor to create two signatures.
- Verifying process, the output of one function is compared with first signature.
- Functions f_1 and f_3 actually create points on the curve. f_1 creates a point on elliptic curve with sender's private key and f_3 creates the same point with the public key of sender

Key Generation

- Alice chooses an elliptic curve $E_p(a, b)$ with p a prime number.
- Alice chooses another prime number q to be used in the calculation.
- Alice chooses the private key d, an integer.
- Alice chooses $e_1(\dots, \dots)$, a point on the curve.
- Alice calculates $e_2(\dots, \dots) = d \times e_1(\dots, \dots)$, another point on the curve.
- Alice public key is (a, b, p, q, e_1, e_2) and her private key is d.

Signing Process.

- Alice chooses a secret random number r , between 1 and $q-1$.
- Alice selects a third point on the curve, $P(u, v) = r \times e_1(\dots, \dots)$
- Alice uses the first coordinates of $P(u, v)$ to calculate the first signature $S_1 = u \bmod q$.
- Alice uses the digest of the message, her private key, and the secret random number r , and the S_1 to calculate the second signature $S_2 = (h(M) + d \times S_1)r^{-1} \bmod q$.
- Alice sends M, S_1, S_2 .

Verifying

- Bob uses M, S_1, S_2 to create two intermediate results, A and B:

$$A = h(M)S_2^{-1} \bmod q \text{ and } B = S_2^{-1}S_1 \bmod q.$$

Bob then reconstructs the third point $T(x, y) = A \times e_1(\dots, \dots), B \times e_2(\dots, \dots)$

- Bob uses the first coordinate of $T(x,y)$ to verify the message. If $x = S_1 \bmod q$, the signature is valid.

Variations and Applications of Digital Signatures

- Two Variations
 - Timestamped Signatures
 - Blind Signatures
 - Undeniable Digital Signatures
 - Signing protocol
 - Verifying protocol
 - Disavowal protocol

By the end of this session...

- Explain Kerberos as a KDC and Authentication protocol.


KERBEROS

- Is an authentication protocol and a KDC.
- Used by most popular systems including Windows server 2000.
- Named after a three-headed dog in Greek mythology that guards the gates.
- Originally designed by MIT.

KERBEROS - Servers


- Three Servers
 - Authentication Server
 - Ticket Granting Server
 - Application Server

A simple authentication protocol



$$Ticket = E(K_v, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_V])$$


A more secure authentication protocol




$$Ticket_{tgs} = E(K_{tgs}, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_{tgs} || TS_1 || Lifetime_1])$$

$$Ticket_v = E(K_v, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_v || TS_2 || Lifetime_2])$$

Kerberos 4 Authentication protocol



Kerberos



By the end of this session...

- Describe the concept of symmetric key agreement and discuss the two common methods of session key creation.


Symmetric key agreement

- Alice and Bob can create a session key between themselves without using a KDC.
- Two common methods:
 - Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
 - Station-to-Station protocol

Diffie-Hellman Key agreement protocol

- Need to choose two public global parameters p and g .
 - p is a large prime
 - g is a generator of order $p-1$.
- Selects a private key to generate public key based on discrete logarithm problem.

Contd...



1. Alice chooses a large random number x and calculates $R_1 = g^x \text{ mod } p$
2. Bob chooses another large random number y and calculates $R_2 = g^y \text{ mod } p$
3. Alice sends R_1 to Bob and Bob sends R_2 to Alice.
4. Alice calculates $k = R_2^x \text{ mod } p$.
5. Bob calculates $k = R_1^y \text{ mod } p$.

Example


Assume that $g=7$, $p=23$, $x=3$ and $y=6$. The steps are as follows:

1. Alice chooses $x=3$ and calculates $R_1 = 7^3 \bmod 23 = 21$.
2. Bob chooses $y=6$ and calculates $R_2 = 7^6 \bmod 23 = 4$.
3. Alice sends the number 21 to Bob.
4. Bob sends the number 4 to Alice.
5. Alice calculates the symmetric key $K = 4^3 \bmod 23 = 18$.
6. Bob calculates the symmetric key $K = 21^6 \bmod 23 = 18$.
7. The value of K is the same for both Alice and Bob;
 $g^{xy} \bmod p = 7^{18} \bmod 23 = 18$.


Attacks on Diffie – Hellman: Discrete Logarithm Attack

- If eve can get x from R1 and y from R2, He can easily get secret key k .
- To make Diffie – Hellman strong:
 - The prime p must be very large (morethan 300 decimal digits).
 - The prime p must be choosen such that $p-1$ has atleast one large factor.
 - The generator must be choosen from the group $\langle Z_p^*, \times \rangle$
 - Bob and Alice must destroy x and y after they calculated k .

Attacks on Diffie – Hellman: Man in the middle attack



Station - to - Station Key Agreement




By the end of this session...

- Summarize the idea of public-key distribution and explain its duties.

Public key Distribution


- In asymmetric-key cryptography, everyone has access to everyone's public key
- Public keys are available to public
 - Public Announcement
 - Trusted Center
 - Controlled Trusted Center
 - Certification Authority
 - X.509
 - Public Key Infrastructure

Public Announcement




- Not secure
 - Subject to forgery
 - Eve can sign a document claiming as Bob
 - Also vulnerable if Alice directly requests Bob's public key.

Trusted center




- Trusted center retains a directory of public keys.
- The directory is dynamically updated.
- Users generate their public and private keys, and registers in the trusted center with their public keys.
- The directory can be publicly advertised by the trusted center.

Controlled Trusted Center




- A higher level security is needed while announcing the public key.
 - Interception
 - Modification of response
- Includes a timestamp and a signature of the authority.
- Creates a heavy load on the Trusted center.

Certification Authority




- **Bob wants two things:**
 - Wants people to know his public key.
 - Wants no one to accept a forged public key as his.
- **Certification Authority as a state organization or federal issues certificates that binds a public key with an entity.**

X.509



- Requires a universal format for certificate.
- The ITU has designed X.509, as a standard gives universal format for certificates.
- Maintenance of certificate:
 - Certificate Renewal
 - Certificate Revocation
 - Delta Revocation

Public Key Infrastructure



- Is a model for creating, distributing and revoking certificates based on X.509.
- Created by IETE.

Thank you!

