An Internet-Wide Analysis of Traffic Policing

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
amazon.com
bing
YouTube
NETFLIX
Content Providers
Internet Service Provider (ISP)
Users


Want to accommodate multitude of services/policies → Traffic Engineering
amazon.com
bing
YouTube
NETFLIX
Exponential growth of video traffic
Account for ~ 50% of traffic in North America
Want to maximize quality of experience (QoE) for their users
Often need high bitrate with low tolerance for latency and packet loss

Traffic Engineering: Policing vs. Shaping

Goal: Enforce a rate limit (maximum throughput)

Solutions:

a. **Drop** packets once the limit is reached
   → Traffic Policing

Focus of this talk

b. **Queue** packets (and send them out at the maximum rate)
   → Traffic Shaping

Contribution

Analyze the **prevalence** and **impact** of **traffic policing** on a **global scale**, as well as explore ways to **mitigate** the **impact** of policers.

Outline

1. How Policing Works
2. Detecting the Effects of Policing in Packet Captures
3. A Global-Scale Analysis of Policing in the Internet
4. Mitigating the Impact of Policers

How Policing Works



How Policing Works



Policing in Action



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

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

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

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

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

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

Policing can have negative side effects for all parties

- Content providers
  - Excess load on servers forced to retransmit dropped packets

    (global average: 20% retransmissions vs. 2% when not policed)

- ISPs
  - Transport traffic across the Internet only for it to be dropped by the policer
  - Incurs avoidable transit costs

- Users
  - Can interact badly with TCP-based applications
  - We measured degraded video quality of experience (QoE) → user dissatisfaction

Analyze the **prevalence** and **impact** of policing on a **global scale**

Develop a mechanism to detect policing in packet captures

Tie connection performance back to already collected application metrics

Collect packet traces for sampled client connections at most Google frontends

Analysis Pipeline



Detection Algorithm



Packets are always dropped when crossing the “policing rate” line

Detection Algorithm



1 Find the policing rate

- Use measured throughput between an early and late loss as estimate

2 Match performance to expected policing behavior

- Everything above the policing rate gets dropped
- (Almost) nothing below the policing rate gets dropped

Avoiding Falsely Labeling Loss as Policing



But: Traffic below policing rate should go through



But: Traffic above policing rate should be dropped

Congestion Looks Similar to Policing!



Packets are usually dropped when a router's buffer is already full

Buffer fills → queuing delay increases

Use inflated latency as signal that loss is not caused by a policer

Validation 1: Lab Setting

- Goal: Approximate the accuracy of our heuristic
- Generated test traces covering common reasons for dropped packets
  - Policing (used a router with support for policing)
  - Congestion
  - Random loss
  - Shaping
- High accuracy for almost all configurations (see paper for details)
  - Policing: 93%
  - All other reasons for loss: > 99%

Validation 2: Live Traffic



- Observed only few policing rates in ISP deep dives
  - ISPs enforce a limited set of data plans
- Confirmed that per ISP policing rates cluster around a few values across the whole dataset
- And: Observed no consistency across flows without policing

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Internet-Wide Analysis of Policing

- Sampled flows collected from most of Google's CDN servers
  - 7-day sampling period (in September 2015)
  - 277 billion TCP packets
  - 270 TB of data
  - 800 million HTTP queries
  - Clients in over 28,400 ASes

- To tie TCP performance to application performance, we analyzed flows at HTTP request/response ("segment") granularity

#1: Prevalence of Policing

Region	Policed segments (overall)
Africa	**1.3%**
Asia	**1.3%**
Australia	0.4%
Europe	0.7%
N. America	0.2%
S. America	0.7%

#1: Prevalence of Policing

Lossy:
15 losses or more
per segment

Up to 7% of lossy segments are policed

Region	Policed segments (overall)	Policed (among lossy)
Africa	**1.3%**	6.2%
Asia	**1.3%**	**6.6%**
Australia	0.4%	2.0%
Europe	0.7%	5.0%
N. America	0.2%	2.6%
S. America	0.7%	4.1%

#2: Policer-induced Losses

Lossy:
15 losses or more
per segment

Up to 7% of lossy segments are policed

Average loss rate increases from 2% to over 20% when policed

Region	Policed segments (overall)	Policed (among lossy)	Loss (policed)	Loss (non-policed)
Africa	**1.3%**	6.2%	**27.5%**	**4.1%**
Asia	**1.3%**	**6.6%**	24.9%	2.9%
Australia	0.4%	2.0%	21.0%	1.8%
Europe	0.7%	5.0%	20.4%	1.3%
N. America	0.2%	2.6%	22.5%	1.0%
S. America	0.7%	4.1%	22.8%	2.3%

Sudden Bandwidth Change Induces Heavy Loss



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

#3: Burst Throughput vs. Policing Rate

Up to 7% of lossy segments are policed

Average loss rate increases from 2% to over 20% when policed

Policing rate often over 50% lower than burst throughput

90th percentile:
Policing rate is 10x lower than burst throughput



Quality of Experience Metrics

Rebuffer Time:

Time that a video is paused *after playback started* due to insufficient stream data buffered

Watch Time:

Fraction of the video watched by the user

Rebuffer to Watch Time Ratio:

Goal is *zero* (no rebuffering delays after playback started).

#4: Impact on Quality of Experience

Up to 7% of lossy segments are policed

Average loss rate increases from 2% to over 20% when policed

Policing rate often over 50% lower than burst throughput

In the tail, policed segments can have up to 200% higher rebuffering times



Mitigating Policer Impact

For content providers

No access to policers and their configurations

But can control transmission patterns to minimize risk of hitting an empty token bucket

For policing ISPs

Access to policers and their configurations

Can deploy alternative traffic management techniques

Mitigating Policer Impact

For content providers

- Rate limiting
- Pacing
- Reducing losses during recovery in Linux

For policing ISPs

- Policer optimization
- Shaping

Mitigating Policer Impact

For content providers

For policing ISPs

Reducing losses
during recovery in Linux

Reducing Losses During Recovery in Linux



Send only one packet per ACK

Solution:
Packet conservation until ACKs indicate no further losses

- Reduces median loss rates by 10 to 20%
- Upstreamed to Linux kernel 4.2

Conclusion

- ISPs need ways to deal with increasing traffic demands and want to enforce plans → traffic policing is one option
- On a global scale up to 7% of lossy segments are affected by traffic policing
- Policed connections see …
  - Much higher loss rates
  - Long recovery times when policers allow initial bursts
  - Worse video rebuffering times (QoE)
- Negative effects can be mitigated
  - Content providers: Rate limiting, pacing, prevention of loss during recovery
  - ISPs: Better policing configurations, shaping

Questions? Email us: policing-paper@google.com

Data: http://usc-nsl.github.io/policing-detection/