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
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Informatique  
Électronique

# Network Security

## *SYN City: A TCP/UDP Story*


Gwendal Patat  
Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA  
2025/2026

# Recall TCP/IP Model



**TCP/IP Model**

# Today's Topic: Transport Layer




**TCP/IP Model**

# Transport Layer 1/2

From last lecture, we know that the routing from **device to device** is made by the **Network layer**, layer 3.


Now what about the **Transport Layer**?



# Transport Layer 2/2

## Transport Layer:

- ☐ Layer 4.
- ☐ Provide a logical communication **between processes** on two different hosts.
- ☐ Two main protocols:
  - ☐ TCP
  - ☐ UDP
- ☐ Uses ports and sockets.



# Transport Layer: Ports & Sockets

- A socket **binds** an application with a port number.
  - It can be seen as a gate to the app.

# Port Numbers

- **"Reserved" ports:** 0 - 1023
  - For instance: ssh (22), telnet (23), smtp (25), dns (53), http (80), https (443)
- **Registered ports:** 1024 - 49151
  - battle.net (1119), openVPN (1194), Microsoft SQL server (1433), Microsoft Teams (3478–3481)
- **Private ports:** 49152 - 65535
  - Source ports

Note: Nothing is enforced, any application can use the port number they want (except the reserved ones where root rights are needed).

# Client-Server Paradigm

- **Server:**
  - Listening to incoming communications.
  - Provide the application layer service to the client.
  
- **Clients:**
  - Communicate with servers.
  - Do not communicate directly with each other.
  
- **Examples:** HTTP, IMAP



# Processes Communication

**Client process:** process initiating communication.

**Server Process:** process waiting for communication.

**Process:** program running on a host

- ☐ Within the same host:
  - ☐ Processes communicate using **inter-process communication** (OS defined)
    - e.g., signals, pipes, shared memory, etc...
  - ☐ Using messages send to **sockets**.
- ☐ With different hosts:
  - ☐ Using **sockets**.

*Note:* For Peer-to-Peer (P2P), both end users have a client process and server process.

# Transport Layer Protocols


	TCP	UDP
<b>Connection</b>	Connection	Connection-less
<b>Reliability</b>	✓	✗
<b>Ordering</b>	✓	✗
<b>Speed</b>	Slower	Faster
<b>Broadcast</b>	✗	✓

# UDP

## (User Datagram Protocol)

# UDP Header

- Application identified through the **destination port**.
- Responses will be sent to the **source port**.



# Sending and Receiving UDP Packets

- ❑ Need an IP address and the destination port
- ❑ The server will listen to its open port.

## Connectionless Demultiplexing:

Two senders communicating with a server on the same port will fill the same buffer.

- ❑ UDP packets with same destination port number will end up in the same socket **without taking care of the source IP.**

# Some UDP Applications

- DNS protocol
- Video/Audio Streaming: Skype, Zoom
  - Streaming services uses TCP (non-live performance)
- Real-Time Apps
- VPN (OpenVPN)

# UDP Attacks

# UDP Flood (Ping-Pong Attack) 1/2

**Objective:** DoS on two victims.

**How:** Launch an ***infinite loop*** of request/reply between two devices by ***spoofing the source IP and port*** of the first message.

- For it to work, we need a process listening and answering regardless of the request on both devices.
  - This was not uncommon in the 90s/early 2000s.




## UDP Flood (Ping-Pong Attack) 2/2

Here an Attacker leverages the Echo protocol on port 7.

- When a message is received, it is duplicated and **send back to the source address**.

By piping both Echo processes from A and B through port 7, the attacker create an infinite loop.

Nowadays, this protocol is disabled by default to avoid such attack.




# UDP Amplification Attack 1/2

Protocol	BAF			PAF <i>all</i>	Scenario
	<i>all</i>	50%	10%		
SNMP v2	6.3	8.6	11.3	1.00	<i>GetBulk</i> request
NTP	556.9	1083.2	4670.0	3.84	Request client statistics
DNS <sub>NS</sub>	54.6	76.7	98.3	2.08	ANY lookup at author. NS
DNS <sub>OR</sub>	28.7	41.2	64.1	1.32	ANY lookup at open resolv.
NetBios	3.8	4.5	4.9	1.00	Name resolution
SSDP	30.8	40.4	75.9	9.92	<i>SEARCH</i> request
CharGen	358.8	n/a	n/a	1.00	Character generation request
QOTD	140.3	n/a	n/a	1.00	Quote request
BitTorrent	3.8	5.3	10.3	1.58	File search
Kad	16.3	21.5	22.7	1.00	Peer list exchange
Quake 3	63.9	74.9	82.8	1.01	Server info exchange
Steam	5.5	6.9	14.7	1.12	Server info exchange
ZAv2	36.0	36.6	41.1	1.02	Peer list and cmd exchange
Salinity	37.3	37.9	38.4	1.00	URL list exchange
Gameover	45.4	45.9	46.2	5.39	Peer and proxy exchange

## UDP Amplification Attack 2/2

Here an Attacker can leverage an open port X with an amplifier process to degrade the bandwidth of the victim A.



# UDP Security Consideration

**Spoofing UDP:** Due to the protocol simplicity, it is really easy to spoof UDP messages.

UDP applications need to take this problem into consideration with additional protection build on top of the UDP protocol (e.g., random number in data, encryption, ...)

# TCP

## (Transmission Control Protocol)

# Order & Reliability

One of the main property of TCP: **Maintain order of packets**

- How? By using sequence number and acknowledgement.
- Reliability: Packets are resend if no acknowledgement comes back after a certain time.

# Flow & Congestion Control

TCP incorporates a mechanisms to **adjust the interval of packets between two hosts** with different speed.


- ☐ Using what we call a sliding window.
- ☐ Everything in the window can be sent to the destination without waiting for ACK.
- ☐ The window slides when the older packet has been acknowledged.

The receiver can ask for the window size to be updated with window advertisement messages.

On the sender end, a congestion window can be used when too many packets are lost on the road.


# TCP Header

- ❑ Communication with IPs, and **source/destination ports**.
- ❑ Reliability via sequence and acknowledgment (ACK) numbers.
- ❑ Flow control through the window size.
- ❑ Integrity with the checksum.
- ❑ Additional functions (SYN, FIN, RST, etc.) that handle connection establishment, termination, or reset.





# TCP Connection: 3-Way Handshake



# TCP Connection-oriented: 4 tuples

Connections are identified based on a 4 tuple:

- ☐ Source port
- ☐ Destination port
- ☐ Source IP
- ☐ Destination IP


Unlike UDP, a TCP connection is linked to a dedicated socket:

- ☐ Two different IPs cannot talk to the same socket.


Ver. 4 bits	Head. len 4 bits	Type of Service 8 bits	Total Length 16 bits	
Identification 16 bits			IP Flags 8 bits	Fragment offset 8 bits
Time to live 8 bits		Protocol 8 bits	Header Checksum 16 bits	
Source Address 32 bits				
Destination Address 32 bits				
IP Option (optional)				
Source Port Address 16 bits			Destination Port Address 16 bits	
Sequence Number 32 bits				
Acknowledgement Number 32 bits				
HLEN 4 bits	Reserved 6 bits	URG ACK PSH RST	SYN FIN	Window Size 16 bits
Checksum 16 bits				Urgent Pointer 16 bits
Option and Padding Up to 40 bytes				

# TCP Attacks

# SYN Flooding Attack 1/2



# SYN Flooding Attack 2/2



# SYN Flooding Countermeasure

## **SYN Cookie:**


- ☐ Encode information in the sequence number to avoid relying on the half-open connection queue.
- ☐ Enabled by default on current OSes.

# LAND Attack


An attacker can forge a SYN packet by spoofing the **IP src and dst** to be both the one of the victim: creating a connection with itself.

## Mitigations:

- ☐ Packet filtering (Firewall)
- ☐ OS mechanisms.




# Closing a TCP Connection 1/2





## Closing a TCP Connection 2/2




# TCP Reset Attack

If A and B are communicating, an attacker can **forge a reset package** by setting the **RST flag** and using the **next sequence number** to close one or both end of the connection.

The attacker needs to create the package using the good values:


- ☐ Source port
- ☐ Destination port
- ☐ Source IP
- ☐ Destination IP
- ☐ Seq #

Note: also used for defense.



# TCP Session Hijacking 1/2


An attacker can forge a TCP packet by **spoofing the 4-tuple and sequence #** to **inject data** in the TCP stream of the victim.



Ver. 4 bits	Head. len 4 bits	Type of Service 8 bits	Total Length 16 bits	
Identification 16 bits			IP Flags 8 bits	Fragment offset 8 bits
Time to live 8 bits	Protocol 8 bits		Header Checksum 16 bits	
Source Address 32 bits				
Destination Address 32 bits				
IP Option (optional)				
Source Port Address 16 bits			Destination Port Address 16 bits	
Sequence Number 32 bits				
Acknowledgement Number 32 bits				
HLEN 4 bits	Reserved 6 bits	URG 1 bit	ACK 1 bit	PUSH 1 bit
Checksum 16 bits		SYN 1 bit	FIN 1 bit	Window Size 16 bits
Urgent Pointer 16 bits			Option and Padding Up to 40 bytes	

# TCP Session Hijacking 2/2

**Example of impact:** This can allow an attacker to inject commands in a telnet session.



Ver. 4 bits	Head. len 4 bits	Type of Service 8 bits	Total Length 16 bits			
Identification 16 bits			IP Flags 8 bits		Fragment offset 8 bits	
Time to live 8 bits		Protocol 8 bits		Header Checksum 16 bits		
Source Address 32 bits						
Destination Address 32 bits						
IP Option (optional)						
Source Port Address 16 bits				Destination Port Address 16 bits		
Sequence Number 32 bits						
Acknowledgement Number 32 bits						
HLEN 4 bits	Reserved 6 bits	U R G	A C K	P S H	S T E M	Window Size 16 bits
Checksum 16 bits				Urgent Pointer 16 bits		
Option and Padding Up to 40 bytes						

# TCP Reverse Shell 1/2

Specific type of TCP session hijacking.


**Idea:** Run a shell command on the target.

**Problem:** We can't just replace our command with a simple */bin/bash* for instance.

- Need to figure out how to redirect IO to a TCP connection.

## TCP Reverse Shell 2/2

- The payload sent over need to create a shell redirecting IOs to the attacker device, with its IP and a port.




# Kevin Mitnick's Attack

# Kevin Mitnick (1963-2023) VS Tsutomu Shimomura (1964-)




WANTED BY U.S. MARSHALS	
NOTICE TO ARRESTING AGENCY: Before arrest, validate warrant through National Crime Information Center (NCIC). United States Marshall Service HOC entry number: (HOC) 022160021	
NAME: .....MITNICK, KEVIN DAVID	
AKA(S): .....MITNIX, KEVIN DAVID MORRILL, BRIAN ALLEX	
DESCRIPTION:	
Sex: .....	MALE
Race: .....	WHITE
Place of Birth: .....	YUF, CALIFORNIA
Date(s) of Birth: .....	08/06/63; 10/18/70
Height: .....	5'11"
Weight: .....	190
Eyes: .....	BROWN
Hair: .....	BROWN
Shampoo: .....	LIQUID
Shave, Mole, Tattoo: .....	NO SHAVE





# Mitnick Attack

# Mitnick Attack



# Countermeasures

Some countermeasures can be applied to avoid TCP attacks, for instance:

- ☐ SYN Cookies
- ☐ Random sequence number
- ☐ Random source port number
- ☐ Random half open connection entry deletion
- ☐ Encryption (IPSec, or Encrypted data)
- ☐ Packet inspection / Firewalls

## Bonus: Port Scanning

We have seen that some ports are commonly used for specific services:

- ☐ 22 ssh
- ☐ 23 telnet
- ☐ 80 http
- ☐ 443 https

By scanning the open ports on a device, and with specific requests, we can determine the **open services, versions, and even OS** of a target.

**Example of tool:** nmap

# Resources and Acknowledgements

- Computer Networking: A Top-down Approach by James F. Kurose, Keith W. Ross
- Internet Security: A Hands-on Approach, 3rd Edition, Du Wenliang
- External materials from Mathieu Goessens.