
Outline

- The new security stack for modern applications
- JSON Web Tokens
- OAuth2
- OpenID Connect
- OAuth2 security discussion
- Resources

Enterprise Security



The mobile Revolution

No SOAP No SAML No WS*




HTTP JSON

Scenario 1: Mobile Enterprise Apps




Scenario 2: Business to Customer

- Software vendors jump on the "apps bandwagon"
- Reach and cross-platform design becomes much more important



OAuth2


Authorization Server



Client

OpenID Connect

Authentication Server



Summary

- "Classic" security is intranet-only
 - plus maybe special customer facing (web) applications in the DMZ
- B2B federation using protocols like WS-Federation, SAML2p and WS-Trust
- Mobile devices are a game changer
 - no "enterprise security" integration
 - less powerful
 - ...but increasingly popular and business criticial
- New "common denominator" technologies
 - presentation (e.g. HTML5)
 - authentication & authorization

JSON Web Token (JWT)

Purpose of a security token

- Security tokens are (protected) data structures
 - contain information about issuer and subject (claims)
 - signed (tamper proof & authenticity)
 - typically contain an expiration time
- A client requests a token
- An issuer issues a token
- A resource consumes a token
 - has a trust relationship with the issuer

History

SAML 1.1/2.0

- XML based
- many encryption & signature options
- very expressive

Simple Web Token (SWT)

- Form/URL encoded
- symmetric signatures only

JSON Web Token (JWT)

- JSON encoded
- symmetric and asymmetric signatures (HMACSHA256-384, ECDSA, RSA)
- symmetric and asymmetric encryption (RSA, AES/CGM)
- (the new standard)

JSON Web Token

On its way to official standardization

http://self-issued.info/docs/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token.html

Header

- metadata
- algorithms & keys used

Claims

- Issuer (iss)
- Audience (aud)
- IssuedAt (iat)
- Expiration (exp)
- Subject (sub)
- ...and application defined claims

Structure

```
Header
             "typ": "JWT",
              "alg": "HS256"
Claims
             "iss": "http://myIssuer",
              "exp": "1340819380",
              "aud": "http://myResource",
              "sub": "alice",
              "client": "xyz",
              "scope": ["read", "search"]
```

```
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMD.4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt

Header Claims Signature
```

Producing a token

Microsoft library on Nuget

http://nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.JWT/

```
var token = new JWTSecurityToken(
     issuer: "http://myIssuer",
     audience: "http://myResource",
     claims: GetClaims(),
     signingCredentials: GetKey(),
     validFrom: DateTime.UtcNow,
     validTo: DateTime.UtcNow.AddHours(1));
// serialize
var tokenString =
 new JWTSecurityTokenHandler().WriteToken(token);
```

Consuming a token

Retrieve serialized token

from HTTP header, query string etc...

Validate token

and turn into claims

```
var token = new JWTSecurityToken(tokenString);
var validationParams = new TokenValidationParameters
{
    ValidIssuer = "http://myIssuer",
    AllowedAudience = "http://myResource",
    SigningToken = GetSigningKey()
};

var handler = new JWTSecurityTokenHandler();
var principal = handler.ValidateToken(token, validationParams);
```

Summary

- JWT is easy to
 - create
 - transmit
 - parse
 - validate
- Quickly becomes the standard for web based tokens
- Mandatory in OpenID Connect

What is OAuth2?



About Advisories Documentation Code Community

An **open protocol** to allow **secure authorization** in a **simple** and **standard** method from web, mobile and desktop applications.

Read the OAuth 2 specification »

The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework

Abstract

The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849.

History

- OAuth started circa 2007
- 2008 IETF normalization started in 2008
- 2010 RFC 5849 defines OAuth 1.0
- 2010 WRAP (Web Resource Authorization Profiles) proposed by Microsoft, Yahoo! And Google
- 2010 OAuth 2.0 work begins in IETF
- Working deployments of various drafts & versions at Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Github, Twitter, Flickr, Dropbox...
- Mid 2012 Lead author and editor resigned & withdraws his name from all specs
- October 2012 RFC 6749, RFC 6750

High level overview


















http://hueniverse.com/2007/09/explaining-oauth/http://amzn.com/1449311601





No problem. Trust me.



High level overview
















OAuth2: The Players



OAuth2 Flows - with User Interaction

Authorization Code Flow

- Web application clients
 - 1. Request authorization
 - 2. Request token
 - 3. Access resource

Implicit Flow

- Native / local clients
 - 1. Request authorization & token
 - 2. Access resource

OAuth2 Flows - no User Interaction

- Resource Owner Password Credential Flow
 - "Trusted clients"
 - 1. Request token with resource owner credentials
 - 2. Access resource
 - Client Credential Flow
 - Client to Service communication
 - 1. Request token with client credentials
 - 2. Access resource

Authorization Code Flow (Web Application Clients)

Web Application (Client)

Resource Owner


Resource Server

Step 1a: Authorization Request

Web Application (Client)



GET /authorize?
 client_id=webapp&
 scope=resource&
 redirect_uri=https://webapp/cb&
 response_type=code&
 state=123




Authorization Server






Resource Owner

Step 1b: Authentication



Step 1c: Consent



Twitter Consent

Authorize Twitter for Windows to use your account?

This application will be able to:

- · Read Tweets from your timeline.
- · See who you follow, and follow new people.
- · Update your profile.
- · Post Tweets for you.
- · Access your direct messages.

Username or email	
Password	

☐ Remember me · Forgot password?

This application will not be able to:

· See your Twitter password.




Twitter for Windows


www.twitter.com

Official Twitter for Windows application.

Evernote Consent





The Consent Screen is important!



Step 1d: Authorization Response


Web Application (Client)





Step 2a: Token Request

Web Application (Client)



POST /token

Authorization: Basic (client_id:secret)

grant_type=authorization_code&
authorization_code=xyz&
redirect_uri=https://webapp/cb



Step 2b: Token Response

Web Application (Client)





Authorization Server

```
{
    "access_token" : "abc",
    "expires_in" : "3600",
    "token_type" : "Bearer",
    "refresh_token" : "xyz"
}
```






Resource Owner

Step 3: Resource Access

Web Application (Client)



GET /resource

Authorization: Bearer access_token




Access Token

- The resource server will authorize the client & resource owner based on the contents of the access token
 - after validation of issuer, signature and expiration
- Typical claims for an access token are
 - resource owner identifier
 - client identifier
 - granted scopes
 - ...anything additional that makes sense for your application

(Step 4: Refreshing the Token)

Web Application (Client)



POST /token
Authorization: Basic (client_id:secret)

grant_type=refresh_token&
refresh_token=xyz



Client Management (Flickr)



leastprivilege

Apps By You Apps You're Using Your Favorite Apps

Below is a list of applications that you've given permission to interact with your Flickr account. It doesn't include apps that only use public photos and don't need to be authorized.

If you want to stop using one of these apps, click its "Remove permission" link.

Application	Permissions	
Adobe Photoshop Lightroom http://www.adobe.com/products/photoshoplightroom/	delete	Remove permission?
Flickr for Windows Phone 7 http://social.zune.net/redirect? type=phoneApp&id=2e49fb07-592b-e011-854c- 00237de2db9e	delete	Remove permission?
Photorank.me	read	Remove permission?
Microsoft http://aka.ms/flickr	write	Remove permission?

Client Management (Dropbox)




Client Management (Microsoft Live)

Microsoft account			
Overview Notifications Permissions Linked accounts	Apps and services you've given access These apps and services can access some of your info. Choose one to view or edit the details. WordPress.com You last used WordPress.com on 6/6/2012. Edit WLID Test You last used WLID Test on 5/11/2012. Edit		
Kids' accounts Add accounts Manage accounts Apps and Services Billing	Microsoft Minesweeper You last used Microsoft Minesweeper on 9/26/2012. Edit Microsoft Minesweeper on You last used idsrv on 2/20/2013. Edit		
	Dominick's App You last used Dominick's App on 2/27/2013. Edit		

Summary – Code Flow


- Designed for server-based applications
 - Client can store secret securely on the server
- Accountability is provided
 - access token never leaked to the browser
- Long-lived access can be implemented

Implicit Flow (Native / Local Clients)




Step 1a: Authorization Request

Resource Owner



Step 1b: Token Response





Step 2: Resource Access

Resource Server



GET /resource


Authorization:
Bearer access_token



Summary – Implicit Flow

- Simplified handshake
 - no authorization code
- Token is exposed to browser / local OS
- No client authentication
 - no refresh tokens
- Heavily debated and many "non-standard" variations

Resource Owner Password Credential Flow (Trusted Application)



Step 1a: Token Request







Authorization Server

POST /token

Authorization: Basic (client_id:secret)


grant_type=password&
scope=resource&
user_name=owner&
password=password&





Resource Owner

Step 1b: Token Response



Resource Owner

Step 2: Resource Access

Resource Server



GET /resource


Authorization:
Bearer access_token



Summary – Resource Owner Credential Flow

- Resource owner credentials are exposed to client
 - users should not become accustomed to that
- Still better to store access/refresh token on device than password
 - if the developer is using that feature

Client Credentials Flow – No human involved at all



POST /token
Authorization: Basic (client_id:secret)

grant_type=client_credentials&
scope=resource

Outline

- OAuth2 and authentication
- OpenID Connect
- Flows

OAuth2 & Authentication

- OAuth2 is for (delegated) authorization
 - authentication is a pre-requisite for that
 - access token is for some back-end service
- Sometimes you "just" need authentication
 - (at least to begin with)
 - identify user in an application
 - control access to application features
- OAuth2 is regularly "abused" for that



OAuth2 for Authentication: Request

UserInfo RS





Authorization Server

GET /authorize?
 client_id=nativeapp&
 redirect_uri=http://localhost/cb&
 scope=signin&
 response_type=token&
 state=123





Facebook Login

Log in to use your Facebook account with ACS Integration (IdSrv).

Email or Phone:

Password:


Keep me logged in

Log in or Sign up for Facebook

Forgotten your password?

Resource Owner

OAuth2 for Authentication: Response



Resource Owner


OAuth2 for Authentication: Accessing User Data

UserInfo RS



GET /userinfo

Authorization:
Bearer access_token








Resource Owner

The Problem



1. User logs into malicious app (app steals token)




2. Malicious developer uses stolen access token in legitimate app

The Solution?







OpenID Connect Flows

- OpenID Connect builds on top of OAuth2
 - Authorization Code Flow
 - Implicit Flow
- Adds some new concepts
 - □ ID Token
 - UserInfo endpoint
- ..and some additional protocols, e.g.
 - discovery & dynamic registration
 - session management

http://openid.net/connect/

OpenID Connect: The Players

Identity Provider

Authorization Endpoint

Token Endpoint

UserInfo Endpoint



Step 1a: Authorization Request

Identity Provider

Authorization Endpoint

Token Endpoint

UserInfo Endpoint

GET /authorize?
 client_id=webapp&
 redirect_uri=https://webapp/cb&
 scope=openid profile&
 response_type=code&
 state=123






User Agent

Scopes & Claims

OpenID defines a set of standard scopes and claims

Scope	Claims
profile	name, family_name, given_name, middle_name, nickname, preferred_username, profile, picture, website, gender, birthdate, zoneinfo, locale, and updated_at.
email	email, email_verified
address	address
phone	phone_number, phone_number_verified
offline_access	requests refresh token

Step 1b: Authentication



Step 1c: Consent

Identity Provider

Authorization Endpoint

Token Endpoint

UserInfo Endpoint




Application **WebApp** asks for permission to access your profile



User Agent

Step 1d: Authorization Response



Step 2a: Token Request

Identity Provider

Authorization Endpoint

Token Endpoint

UserInfo Endpoint

POST /token

Authorization: Basic (client_id:secret)

grant_type=authorization_code&

authorization_code=abc&

redirect_uri=https://webapp/cb





User Agent


Step 2b: Token Response

Identity Provider Authorization Endpoint Token Endpoint UserInfo Endpoint "access_token" : "abc", "id_token": "uvw", "expires_in" : "3600", "token_type" : "Bearer", "refresh_token" : "xyz" Client **User Agent**

ID Token

- JWT that contains claims about the authentication event
 - Issuer (iss)
 - Subject (sub)
 - Audience (aud)
 - Expiration (exp)
- Client must validate the ID token at this point


Step 3a: UserInfo Request



Step 3b: UserInfo Response

Token Endpoint Identity Provider Authorization Endpoint UserInfo Endpoint "sub": "248289761001", "name": "Jane Doe", "email": "janedoe@example.com" **User Agent** Client

Criticism & Concerns



Group

Name: Web Authorization Protocol

Acronym: oauth

Area: Security Area (sec)

State: Active

Charter: <u>charter-ietf-oauth-04</u> (Approved)



[Docs] [txt|pdf] [draft-ietf-oauth-v2] [Diff1] [Diff2]

PROPOSED STANDARD

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

Request for Comments: 6749

Obsoletes: 5849


Category: Standards Track

ISSN: 2070-1721

D. Hardt, Ed. Microsoft October 2012

The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework

"A Framework to build Protocols"



JSON Web Token (JWT)

JSON Web Encryption (JWE) JSON Web Signatures (JWS) JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) Assertion Framework for OAuth2
JWT Bearer Token Profiles
SAML 2.0 Bearer Token Profiles
Token Revocation
MAC Tokens

The OAuth2
Authorization Framework

(RFC 6749)

OAuth2
Bearer Token Usage

(RFC 6750)

Threat Model and Security Considerations

(RFC 6819)

Core (proposed standards)

Informational

OAuth2 Resource Set Registration
Dynamic Client Registration
User-Managed Access
Chaining and Redelegation
Metadata & Introspection

http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect basic-1_0-23.html implicit-1_0-06.html messages-1_0-15.html standard-1_0-16.html discovery-1_0-12.html registration-1_0-14.html session-1_0-11.html

http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/oauth/

Bearer Token

A security token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in possession of it can. Using a bearer token does not require a bearer to prove possession of cryptographic key material (proof-of-possession).

Developers & SSL



how to handle SSL validation error

Q

SSL Certificate Validation Error in .Net « Akbar's Blog

blog.syedgakbar.com/.../ssl-certificate-validation-error-in-net/
Jul 17, 2012 – This callback method is used to validate the certificate in an SSL conversation // Changed the handle to ignore the SSL Certificate errors in the ...

SSL Function Return Codes

publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/.../sssl2msg1000885.htm

The environment or **SSL handle** specified on a System **SSL** function call is not ... Certificate **validation error**. ... An error is detected while validating a certificate.

Ignoring SSL validation in Java - Stack Overflow

stackoverflow.com/questions/.../ignoring-ssl-validation-in-java

2 answers - 20 Nov 2012

Foreword: I DO know that skipping **SSL validation** is really ugly. In this ... ClientStateReceivedServerHello.**handle**(Unknown Source) at ... catch (KeyManagementException e) { log.**error** ("No **SSL** algorithm support: " + e.


How to handle invalid SSL certificates with Apache - Stack Overflow

stackovernow.com/.../now-to-nangle-invalig-ssi-certificates-wi...

9 answers - 1 Dec 2009

... at sun.security.validator.Validator.validate(Validator.java:235) at sun.security.ssl. ... When I go to mms.nw.ru, I get a **error** screen in Chrome.


Infrastructure & SSL



finland / nokia / security

Nokia: Yes, we decrypt your HTTPS data, but don't worry about it

Security Theater





Attack Surface

```
GET /authorize?
  client_id=nativeapp&
  redirect_uri=http://localhost/cb&
  scope=resource&
  response_type=token&
  state=123
```

http://leastprivilege.com/2013/03/15/common-oauth2-vulnerabilities-and-mitigation-techniques/http://leastprivilege.com/2013/03/15/oauth2-security/http://homakov.blogspot.de/2012/08/saferweb-oauth2a-or-lets-just-fix-it.html

Some Facebook Hacks

- http://www.darkreading.com/blog/240148995/
 the-road-to-hell-is-authenticated-by-facebook.html
- http://homakov.blogspot.no/2013/02/hacking-facebook-withoauth2-and-chrome.html
- www.nirgoldshlager.com/2013/03/ how-i-hacked-any-facebook-accountagain.html

Summary

- The OAuth2 "approach" is useful for many typical applications scenarios
- Spec needs some refinement
 - "basic profile"
- Current implementations are lacking
 - even by the big guys
 - let alone the myriad of DIY implementations
- Very good & balanced view
 - https://www.tbray.org/ongoing/When/201x/2013/01/23/OAuth

JWT

JWT debugger

http://openidtest.uninett.no/jwt

Microsoft JWT

http://nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.JWT/

Specs

- http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-08
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-11
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-11

Java JWT

https://bitbucket.org/nimbusds/nimbus-jose-jwt/wiki/Home

OAuth2

Specs

- http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750

Threat Model

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6819

Thinktecture.ldentityModel

https://github.com/thinktecture/Thinktecture.ldentityModel.45

Thinktecture.ldentityServer

https://github.com/thinktecture/Thinktecture.ldentityServer.v2

DotNetOpenAuth

http://dotnetopenauth.net/

OpenID Connect

Specs

http://openid.net/connect/

Google "OpenID Connect" signin

- https://developers.google.com/accounts/docs/OAuth2Login
- https://developers.google.com/accounts/cookbook/technologies/OpenID-Connect

Reference implementation

https://github.com/mitreid-connect/OpenID-Connect-Java-Spring-Server