

# Second Stage

- \* Added user space interface
- \* Counting number of incoming & outgoing packets


fw@fw:~\$ ./a.out
Firewall Packets Summary:
Number of accepted packets: 182
Number of dropped packets: 96
Total number of packets: 278

## **Third Step**

- \* Implementing stateless packet filtering
- \* Use of rules to decide packets verdict
- \* Logging of packets in a dynamic list (Linux Kernel klist)


When a packet reaches the NF\_IP\_FORWARD STAGE, it's being examined against the predefined rules to decide it's verdict


- V Understand real-life rules of packets
- ∨ More hands-on experience in device drivers & Linux Kernel
- V Special use-case: XMAS packet (PSH & URG & FIN) blocked
















### DLP

#### Goal:

- \* Protection against leakage of important code
- \* Code leakage is innocent, assuming no bad intentions

#### Keeping in mind:

- V Must be fast (so users won't get upset)
- V Avoiding false-positives
- V Detecting code and blocking it when necessary

#### Solution:

Protection of leakage of:

VC

V C++

VC#

V Java

V Python

code!



Protection

What's Next?

#### Protection


- 1. Detecting is binary file: Scanning first [SIZE] bytes, counting printable VS. non-printable chars
- 2. Each language has a detector, to find out if may be matching:
- 2.1. Stripping comments out
- 2.2. If both functions and logical structures (i.e. loops, conditions) have been recognized, mark as suspicious
- 3. Each suspecting detector runs over the code:
- 3.1. Separating it to code blocks.
- 3.2. Every block being scanned and ranked for having:

Data structures, Functions, Code line markers, Libraries, Actions (i.e. pointer access), tokens and reserved words.

- 3.3. Anomaly test: is documentation if way more functions than commands. Or small code, by small amount of commands. If either being exonerated.
- 4. Maximal total rank among languages being compared to threshold if exceeds, blocking.

### **UML**

DLP module contains detectors for each language. Detector inherits from brackets or tabs detector. Detector uses static analysis on each block.



#### Data Leak Preventor

```
class CDataLeakPreventor:
     def isBinaryFile(self, data):
          chunk = data
if CDataLeakPreventor.SANITY CHUNK SIZE < len(chunk):</pre>
          chunk = data[:CDataLeakPreventor.SANITY_CHUNK_SIZE]
printableCount = 0.0 + len([c for c in chunk if c in string.printable])
return CDataLeakPreventor.PRINTABLE_THRESHOLD > (printableCount / len(chunk))
          for detector in CDataLeakPreventor.DETECTORS:
strippedComments = detector.stripComments(data)
          # Ranking language probabilities
languagesProbabilitiesUnsorted = {}
           if CDataLeakPreventor.DETECTION_THRESHOLD > maximalRankLanguage[1]:
```








#### Before we continue...

- 1. First stage; scanner detects vulnerable servers according to their version
- 2. Second stage; attacking by sending the malicious message

Estimation: 3,000-4,000 min. Lifetime: 2014 - 16.10.18




## Terminology

SSH: Protocol secure remote login into Unix/Linux, in an encrypted manner

Libssh: multiplatform C library implementing the SSHv2 protocol on client and server side

LibSSH!= LibSSH2 (Seems alike)
(Not common) LibSSH!= OpenSSH (Common)
Putty as well is not vulnerable
GitHub is not vulnerable


Can Windows be vulnerable?




### Versions in use

libssh versions 0.6 and above have an authentication bypass vulnerability in the server code.


libssh version 0.8.4 and libssh 0.7.6 have been released to address this issue.




# Snapshot



### Cisco







### The Vulnerable Code

#### Scanner


```
is likely VULNERABLE to authentication bypass (SSH-2.0-libssh-0.7.2)
is likely VULNERABLE to authentication bypass (SSH-2.0-libssh-0.6.0)
is not vulnerable to authentication bypass (SSH-2.0-libssh-0.2)

Scanner Completed Successfully
```






## Labor pains



### **CVE**

```
2 -- Subject: Authentication bypass in server code
- ** CVE ID#: CVE-2018-10933
6 -- Versions: All versions of libssh 0.6 and later
8 == Summary: There is a vulnerability within the server code which
2 ...
                can enable a client to bypass the authentication
                 process and set the internal state machine maintained
                by the library to authenticated, enabling the
11 ...
12 --
                (otherwise prohibited) creation of channels.
13 ***
16 ..........
17 Description
10 libssh versions 0.6 and above have an authentication bypass vulnerability in
21 the server code. By presenting the server an SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS message
in place of the SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message which the server would expect
23 to initiate authentication, the attacker could successfully authentciate
24 without any credentials.
16 The bug was discovered by Peter Winter-Smith of NCC Group.
29 Petch Availability
32 Patches addressing the issue have been posted to:
      https://www.libssh.org/
36 libssh version \theta.8.4 and libssh \theta.7.6 have been released to address this issue.
33 Workeround
42 There is no workaround for this issue.
44 ......
45 Credits
48 The bug was discovered by Peter Winter-Smith of MCC Group.
```

## Version renaming



### Solution!

Implemented a transparent SSH proxy, integrated within the FW

Client believes he is talking with the server Server thinks he talks with the client

But...

We exchange encryption keys with both of them, while listening carefully to all communication

#### **MITM**

V Authentication enforcement
V Full control over data passed
V Hindering attacker from scanning "real" server version
V Secured version in proxy

- COMPLETELY SECURED -

pHeaderTCP->fin=1; Gratitude to Reuven Plevinsky For the guidance & support

