

# *Predicting Terror Attacks*

## A Data Story

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Introduction

Exploring the Data

Terrorist Relationships as a Social Network

Predicting Terror Attacks

# Introduction

- ▶ Terrorism is a very complex problem
  - ▶ Different entities
  - ▶ Different goals
  - ▶ Different places
- ▶ What to focus on?
  - ▶ Relationships between people
  - ▶ Attacks

# Exploring The Data: Terrorist Relations I

- ▶ Each node is a relation between two terrorists
- ▶ Nodes are connected if they share one individual
- ▶ Relation type and binary vector of features for each node
- ▶ Line graph





Figure: Graph of the terrorist relations dataset

# Exploring The Data: What Is a Line Graph?


## Definition

Given a graph  $\mathcal{G}$ , its line graph  $L\{\mathcal{G}\}$  is defined as follows:

- ▶ Each node of  $L\{\mathcal{G}\}$  stands for an edge of  $\mathcal{G}$
- ▶ Two nodes of  $L\{\mathcal{G}\}$  are connected  $\Leftrightarrow$  they share a node of  $\mathcal{G}$




**Figure:** Construction of a line graph



# Exploring The Data: Terrorist Attacks I

- ▶ Each node is an attack
- ▶ Nodes are connected if the attacks were in close locations
- ▶ Location, date, organisation and binary vector of features for each node



**Figure:** Graph of the terrorist attacks dataset

## Exploring The Data: Terrorist Attacks II



Video

- ▶ A lot of isolated nodes
- ▶ The sub-components are complete


# Are terrorist relationships similar to social networks?

If we find that relationships networks are similar to social networks then we could eventually understand how they form and how people join terrorist organisations.

- ▶ The relationships line graph is built from a graph. We can only get partial information about this original graph.
- ▶ The *transitivity* and *homophily* are particularities of real social networks.
- ▶ We found that some social networks are scale-free.

# Making a scale free graph

We build the line graph from a scale free graph with parameters that makes sense given the previously stated assumptions.



**Figure:** Scale free network

# Making a comparable line graph

We make a line graph of the scale free network but can only compare it to one connected component, so we use the largest one of the dataset.





Figure: Line graph of the scale free network

# Relationships dataset: Results

Preliminary conclusion: The relationship network cannot be modeled by the line graph of a scale free network

- ▶ This could be because the relations of terrorist are not similar to social ties
- ▶ Is the size of the largest component is too small, making it hard for a scale free graph to represent a social network.



**Figure:** Difference in degree between the dataset and the line graph

# A First Unsuccessful Attempt: Setup

- ▶  $\mathcal{G}_t$  = graph of terror attacks at time  $t$
- ▶ Let  $\mathbf{attach}_t$  be a vector such that

$$\mathbf{attach}_t(i) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if node added at } t+1 \text{ links to node } i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

- ▶ Idea:  $\mathbf{attach}_t$  smooth  $\Rightarrow$  terror attack location can be explained by graph topology

# A First Unsuccessful Attempt: Result

- ▶ Graph nodes: terror attack locations (1293 nodes)
- ▶ Graph edges: weight based on proximity of features vector (835'278 edges)
- ▶ Complete graph




Figure: GFT of  $\text{attach}_{t=1282}$

# Predicting Terror Attack Locations: Setup

1. From the dataset, select the 10 biggest connected components
2. Sort the dataset by date of terror attack.
3. Hence component  $\Leftrightarrow$  location
4. For each node, select lead node  $l$  that maximises sum of weights to other nodes
5. Find the lead node  $l^*$  that is the most strongly linked to the new node (i.e. the next terror attack).
6. Prediction: next location is location of  $l^*$

# Predicting Terror Attack Locations: Results

Accuracy slightly over 50%



Video