diff --git a/axelrod/result_set.py b/axelrod/result_set.py
index bcb5f3de3..41ecade37 100644
--- a/axelrod/result_set.py
+++ b/axelrod/result_set.py
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ def __init__(self, players, turns, repetitions, outcome,
         self.ranking = None
         self.ranked_names = None
         self.payoff_matrix = None
+        self.wins = None
         self.cooperation = None
         self.normalised_cooperation = None
         self.vengeful_cooperation = None
@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ def __init__(self, players, turns, repetitions, outcome,
             self.ranked_names = self._ranked_names(self.ranking)
             self.payoff_matrix, self.payoff_stddevs = (
                 self._payoff_matrix(self.results['payoff']))
+            self.wins = self._wins(self.results['payoff'])
         if 'cooperation' in self.results and with_morality:
             self.cooperation = self._cooperation(self.results['cooperation'])
             self.normalised_cooperation = (
@@ -250,6 +252,62 @@ def _payoff_matrix(self, payoff):
                 stddevs[-1].append(dev)
         return averages, stddevs
 
+    def _wins(self, payoff):
+        """
+        Args:
+            payoff (list): a matrix of the form:
+
+                [
+                    [[a, j], [b, k], [c, l]],
+                    [[d, m], [e, n], [f, o]],
+                    [[g, p], [h, q], [i, r]],
+                ]
+
+            i.e. one row per player, containing one element per opponent (in
+            order of player index) which lists payoffs for each repetition.
+
+        Returns:
+            A wins matrix of the form:
+
+                [
+                    [player1 wins in repetition1, player1 wins in repetition2],
+                    [player2 wins in repetition1, player2 wins in repetition2],
+                    [player3 wins in repetition1, player3 wins in repetition2],
+                ]
+
+            i.e. one row per player which lists the total wins for that player
+            in each repetition.
+        """
+        wins = [
+            [0 for r in range(self.repetitions)] for p in range(self.nplayers)]
+        for player in range(self.nplayers):
+            for opponent in range(self.nplayers):
+                players = (player, opponent)
+                for repetition in range(self.repetitions):
+                    payoffs = (
+                        payoff[player][opponent][repetition],
+                        payoff[opponent][player][repetition])
+                    winner = self._winner(players, payoffs)
+                    if winner is not None:
+                        wins[winner][repetition] += 1
+        return wins
+
+    def _winner(self, players, payoffs):
+        """
+        Args:
+            players (tuple): A tuple of player indexes
+            payoffs (tuple): A tuple of payoffs for the two players
+        Returns:
+            The index of the winning player or None if a draw
+        """
+        if payoffs[0] == payoffs[1]:
+            return None
+        else:
+            winning_payoff = max(payoffs)
+            winning_payoff_index = payoffs.index(winning_payoff)
+            winner = players[winning_payoff_index]
+            return winner
+
     def _cooperation(self, results):
         """
         Args:
diff --git a/axelrod/tests/unit/test_resultset.py b/axelrod/tests/unit/test_resultset.py
index 41ec43d38..37923dfac 100644
--- a/axelrod/tests/unit/test_resultset.py
+++ b/axelrod/tests/unit/test_resultset.py
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ def setUpClass(cls):
         ]
         cls.expected_ranking = [0, 2, 1]
         cls.expected_ranked_names = ['Alternator', 'Random', 'TitForTat']
+        cls.expected_wins = [[2, 0], [0, 0], [0, 2]]
         cls.expected_cooperation = [
             [6, 6, 6],
             [6, 10, 6],
@@ -154,6 +155,24 @@ def test_payoff_matrix(self):
         self.assertEqual(self.round_matrix(
             rs.payoff_stddevs, 2), self.expected_stddevs)
 
+    def test_wins(self):
+        rs = axelrod.ResultSet(self.players, 5, 2, self.test_outcome)
+        wins = rs.wins
+        self.assertEqual(wins, self.expected_wins)
+
+    def test_winner(self):
+        rs = axelrod.ResultSet(self.players, 5, 2, self.test_outcome)
+        test_players = (8, 4)
+        test_payoffs = (34, 44)
+        winner = rs._winner(test_players, test_payoffs)
+        self.assertEqual(winner, 4)
+        test_payoffs = (54, 44)
+        winner = rs._winner(test_players, test_payoffs)
+        self.assertEqual(winner, 8)
+        test_payoffs = (34, 34)
+        winner = rs._winner(test_players, test_payoffs)
+        self.assertEqual(winner, None)
+
     def test_cooperation(self):
         rs = axelrod.ResultSet(self.players, 5, 2, self.test_outcome)
         self.assertEqual(
diff --git a/docs/usage.rst b/docs/usage.rst
index 4dd5cdb37..b2628fa5d 100644
--- a/docs/usage.rst
+++ b/docs/usage.rst
@@ -257,7 +257,6 @@ this is shown here:
    :width: 50%
    :align: center
 
-
 As an aside we can use this matrix with `gambit <http://gambit.sourceforge.net/>`_ or `sagemath <http://sagemath.org/>`_ to compute the Nash equilibria for the corresponding normal form game. Here is how to do this in Sage::
 
     # This is not part of the Axelrod module (run in Sage)
@@ -284,6 +283,26 @@ Recall the ordering of the players::
 
 Thus we see that there are multiple Nash equilibria for this game. Two pure equilibria that involve both players playing :code:`Defector` and both players playing :code:`TitForTat`.
 
+The ResultSet object also includes the 'wins' attribute, which is derived from the payoff matrix and lists the number of wins for each player::
+
+  import axelrod
+  strategies = [s() for s in axelrod.demo_strategies]
+  tournament = axelrod.Tournament(strategies)
+  results = tournament.play()
+  results.wins
+
+The resulting wins matrix is::
+
+  [
+  [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+  [8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8],
+  [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+  [2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2],
+  [4, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4]
+  ]
+
+which shows, for example, that Cooperator had 0 wins, Defector won 8 times in each repetition and Random won 4 times in the first repetition and twice in the second.
+
 Noisy Tournaments
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^