

# Protecting Victims of Authorised Push Payment Fraud

## 1 Preliminaries

### 1.1 Notations and Assumptions

We use  $\text{Enc}(\cdot)$  and  $\text{Dec}(\cdot)$  to denote the encrypting and decrypting algorithms of a semantically secure symmetric key encryption scheme. In this work, we use a committee of honest arbiters  $\mathcal{D} : \{\mathcal{D}_1, \dots, \mathcal{D}_n\}$ . Each arbiter, given a set of inputs, provides a binary verdict. We assume  $\mathcal{D}_i$ 's share a pair of keys  $(pk_{\mathcal{D}}, sk_{\mathcal{D}})$  of an asymmetric key encryption. The encryption scheme has key generating  $\text{keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk_{\mathcal{D}}, pk_{\mathcal{D}})$ , encrypting  $\text{Enc}(pk_{\mathcal{D}}, \cdot)$  and decrypting  $\text{Dec}(sk_{\mathcal{D}}, \cdot)$  algorithms, where its public key is known to everyone. Also, we assume all arbiters have interacted with each other to agree on a secret key,  $\bar{k}_0$ . We use  $\phi$  to denote a null value. Our proposed solution is built upon the existing online banking system. We assume the banking system has three algorithms in place, (1)  $\text{setupNewPayee}(\cdot)$ : allows a customer to add a new payee to its payee list, (2)  $\text{amendExistingPayee}(\cdot)$ : lets a customer amend its existing payee list, and (3)  $\text{pay}(\cdot)$ : transfers money from the customer's account to a payee's account that is specific by the customer. We denote the inputs of algorithms  $\text{setupNewPayee}(\cdot)$ ,  $\text{amendExistingPayee}(\cdot)$ , and  $\text{pay}(\cdot)$  by  $in_s, in_a$ , and  $in_p$  respectively. We assume the source code of the online banking system is static, is not updated, and any change to the source code can be detected, e.g., the bank can use a cryptographic commitment to commit to the source code. Moreover, we assume the online banking system is secure.

### 1.2 Digital Signature

A digital signature is a scheme for verifying the authenticity of digital messages or documents. Below, we restate its formal definition, taken from [9].

**Definition 1.** *A signature scheme involves three sub-processes,  $\text{Signature} := (\text{Sig.keyGen}, \text{Sig.sign}, \text{Sig.ver})$ , that are defined as follows.*

- $\text{Sig.keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk, pk)$ . A probabilistic algorithm run by a signer. It takes as input a security parameter. It outputs a parameter pair:  $(sk, pk)$ , consisting of secret:  $sk$ , and public:  $pk$  parameters.
- $\text{Sig.sign}(sk, pk, u) \rightarrow sig$ . An algorithm run the signer. It takes as input parameter pair:  $(sk, pk)$  and a file:  $u$ . It outputs a signature:  $sig$ .
- $\text{Sig.ver}(pk, u, sig) \rightarrow h \in \{0, 1\}$ . A deterministic algorithm run by a verifier. It takes as input public parameter:  $pk$ , file:  $u$ , and signature:  $sig$ . It checks the signature's validity. If the verification passes, then it outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0.

A digital signature scheme should meet the following properties:

- *Correctness.* For every input  $u$  it holds that:

$$\Pr \left[ \text{Sig.ver}(pk, u, \text{Sig.sign}(sk, pk, u)) = 1 : \text{Sig.keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk, pk) \right] = 1$$

- *Existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks.* A (PPT) adversary that obtains  $pk$  and has access to a signing oracle for messages of its choice, cannot create a valid pair  $(u^*, sig^*)$  for a new file  $u^*$  (that was never a query to the signing oracle), except with a small probability,  $\sigma$ . More formally:

$$\Pr \left[ u^* \notin Q \wedge \text{Sig.ver}(pk, u^*, sig^*) = 1 : \begin{array}{l} \text{Cer.keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk, pk) \\ \mathcal{A}^{\text{Sig.sign}(k, \cdot)}(pk) \rightarrow (u^*, sig^*) \end{array} \right] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

where  $Q$  is the set of queries that  $\mathcal{A}$  sent to the certificate generator oracle.

An application of a digital signature is in digital certificate, which is a document digitally signed by a certificate generator. Given a certificate and its parameters, anyone can check whether it has been correctly generated by a valid generator. There is a case where a *hard copy* certificate is used. In this case, the process  $\text{Sig.keyGen}(\cdot)$  outputs a blank legitimate stamped certificate as a private parameter:  $sk$ , and the description of a standard legitimate certificate as a public parameter:  $pk$ . Moreover, the process  $\text{Sig.sign}(k, u)$  takes  $k$  and the file  $u$  on which a certificate should be generated and outputs a stamped certificate with the information printed on it. The process  $\text{Sig.ver}(pk, u, sig)$  takes the public parameter, the file, and the hard copy of the certificate and outputs 1 if it is valid and 0 if it is not. Note, when a hard copy certificate is considered, it is not possible to precisely define the success probability of the adversary, as it depends on the technology available to the adversary to generate a blank stamped certificate that looks like a legitimate one. In the real world however, this probability is usually small (but it may not be negligible). In this paper, we mainly consider a digital certificate; however, our solution can adopt hard copy certificates as well with the above caveat regarding the adversary's success probability.

### 1.3 Smart Contract

Cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin [12] and Ethereum [16], beyond offering a decentralised currency, support computations on transactions. In this setting, often a certain computation logic is encoded in a computer program, called a “*smart contract*”. Although Bitcoin, the first decentralised cryptocurrency, supports smart contracts, the functionality of Bitcoin's smart contracts is very limited, due to the use of the underlying programming language that does not support arbitrary tasks. To address this limitation, Ethereum, as a generic smart contract platform, was designed. Thus far, Ethereum has been the most predominant cryptocurrency framework that lets users define arbitrary smart. This framework allows users to create an account with a unique account number or address. Such users are often called external account holders, which can send (or deploy) their contracts to the framework's blockchain. In this framework, a contract's code and its related data is held by every node in the blockchain's network. Ethereum smart contracts are often written in a high-level Turing-complete programming language called “Solidity”. The program execution's correctness is guaranteed by the security of the underlying blockchain components. To prevent a denial of service attack, the framework requires a transaction creator to pay a fee, called “*gas*”, depending on the complexity of the contract running on it.

### 1.4 Commitment Scheme

A commitment scheme involves two parties, *sender* and *receiver*, and includes two phases: *commit* and *open*. In the commit phase, the sender commits to a message:  $x$  as  $\text{Com}(x, r) = \text{Com}_x$ , that involves a secret value:  $r \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ . In the end of the commit phase, the commitment  $\text{Com}_x$  is sent to the receiver. In the open phase, the sender sends the opening  $\tilde{x} := (x, r)$  to the receiver who verifies its correctness:  $\text{Ver}(\text{Com}_x, \tilde{x}) \stackrel{?}{=} 1$  and accepts if the output is 1. A commitment scheme must satisfy two properties: (a) *hiding*: it is infeasible for an adversary (i.e., the receiver) to learn any information about the committed message  $x$ , until the commitment  $\text{Com}_x$  is opened, and (b) *binding*: it is infeasible for an adversary (i.e., the sender) to open a commitment  $\text{Com}_x$  to different values  $\tilde{x}' := (x', r')$  than that was used in the commit phase, i.e., infeasible to find  $\tilde{x}'$ , s.t.  $\text{Ver}(\text{Com}_x, \tilde{x}) = \text{Ver}(\text{Com}_x, \tilde{x}') = 1$ , where  $\tilde{x} \neq \tilde{x}'$ . There exist efficient non-interactive commitment schemes both in (a) the standard model, e.g., Pedersen scheme [13], and (b) the random oracle model using the well-known hash-based scheme such that committing is:  $H(x||r) = \text{Com}_x$  and  $\text{Ver}(\text{Com}_x, \tilde{x})$  requires checking:  $H(x||r) \stackrel{?}{=} \text{Com}_x$ , where  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$  is a collision resistant hash function; i.e., the probability to find  $x$  and  $x'$  such that  $H(x) = H(x')$  is negligible in the security parameter,  $\lambda$ .

### 1.5 Statement Agreement Protocol

Recently, a scheme called “Statement Agreement Protocol” (SAP) has been proposed in [1]. It lets two mutually distrusted parties, e.g.,  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ , efficiently agree on a private statement,  $\pi$ . Informally, the SAP

satisfies the following four properties: (1) neither party can convince a third-party verifier that it has agreed with its counter-party on a different statement than the one both parties previously agreed on, (2) after they agree on a statement, an honest party can (almost) always prove to the verifier that it has the agreement, (3) the privacy of the statement is preserved (from the public), and (4) after both parties reach an agreement, neither can deny it. The SAP relies on a smart contract and commitment scheme and assumes that each party already has a blockchain public address,  $adr_{\mathcal{R}}$  (where  $\mathcal{R} \in \{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}\}$ ). Below, we restate the SAP, taken from [1].

1. **Initiate.**  $SAP.init(1^\lambda, adr_{\mathcal{B}}, adr_{\mathcal{C}}, \pi)$   
The following steps are taken by  $\mathcal{B}$ .
  - (a) Deploys a smart contract that explicitly states both parties' addresses,  $adr_{\mathcal{B}}$  and  $adr_{\mathcal{C}}$ . Let  $adr_{SAP}$  be the deployed contract's address.
  - (b) Picks a random value  $r$ , and commits to the statement,  $Com(\pi, r) = g_{\mathcal{B}}$ .
  - (c) Sends  $adr_{SAP}$  and  $\tilde{\pi} := (\pi, r)$  to  $\mathcal{C}$ , and  $g_{\mathcal{B}}$  to the contract.
2. **Agreement.**  $SAP.agree(\pi, r, g_{\mathcal{B}}, adr_{\mathcal{B}}, adr_{SAP})$   
The following steps are taken by  $\mathcal{C}$ .
  - (a) Checks if  $g_{\mathcal{B}}$  was sent from  $adr_{\mathcal{B}}$ , and checks locally  $Ver(g_{\mathcal{B}}, \tilde{\pi}) = 1$ .
  - (b) If the checks pass, it sets  $b = 1$ , computes locally  $Com(\pi, r) = g_{\mathcal{C}}$ , and sends  $g_{\mathcal{C}}$  to the contract. Otherwise, it sets  $b = 0$  and  $g_{\mathcal{C}} = \perp$ .
3. **Prove.** For either  $\mathcal{B}$  or  $\mathcal{C}$  to prove, it sends  $\tilde{\pi} := (\pi, r)$  to the smart contract.
4. **Verify.**  $SAP.verify(\tilde{\pi}, g_{\mathcal{B}}, g_{\mathcal{C}}, adr_{\mathcal{B}}, adr_{\mathcal{C}})$   
The following steps are taken by the smart contract.
  - (a) Ensures  $g_{\mathcal{B}}$  and  $g_{\mathcal{C}}$  were sent from  $adr_{\mathcal{B}}$  and  $adr_{\mathcal{C}}$  respectively.
  - (b) Ensures  $Ver(g_{\mathcal{B}}, \tilde{\pi}) = Ver(g_{\mathcal{C}}, \tilde{\pi}) = 1$ .
  - (c) Outputs  $s = 1$ , if the checks, in steps 4a and 4b, pass. It outputs  $s = 0$ , otherwise.

## 1.6 Pseudorandom Functions

Informally, a pseudorandom function is a deterministic function that takes a key of length  $\lambda$  and an input; and outputs a value indistinguishable from that of a truly random function. In this paper, we use pseudorandom function:  $PRF : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_p$ , where  $p$  is a large prime number,  $|p| = \lambda$ , and  $(\lambda, \lambda)$  are the security parameters. In practice, a pseudorandom function can be obtained from an efficient block cipher [9].

## 1.7 Bloom Filter

A Bloom filter [2] is a compact data structure that allows us to efficiently check an element membership. It is an array of  $m$  bits (initially all set to zero), that represents  $n$  elements. It is accompanied with  $k$  independent hash functions. To insert an element, all the hash values of the element are computed and their corresponding bits in the filter are set to 1. To check an element membership, all its hash values are re-computed and checked whether all are set to 1 in the filter. If all the corresponding bits are 1, then the element is probably in the filter; otherwise, it is not. In Bloom filters it is possible that an element is not in the set, but the membership query indicates it is, i.e., false positives. In this work, we ensure the false positive probability is negligible, e.g.,  $2^{-40}$ . In Appendix A, we explain how the Bloom filter's parameters can be set.

## 2 An Overview of Payment with Dispute Resolution Scheme

In this section, we provide an overview of a Payment with Dispute Resolution (PwDR) scheme. Simply put, a PwDR scheme allows a customer to interact with its bank (via the online banking scheme) to transfer a certain amount of money from its account to another account in a transparent manner; meanwhile, it offers a distinct feature. Namely, when an APP fraud takes place, it lets an honest customer raise a dispute and

*prove* to a third-party dispute resolver that it has acted honestly, so it can be reimbursed. It offers other features too. Specifically, an honest bank can also prove it has acted honestly. PwDR lets the parties prove their innocence without their counter-party’s collaboration. It also ensures the message exchanged between a bank and customer remains confidential and even the party which resolves the dispute between the two learns as little information as possible. The PwDR scheme can be considered as an extension to the existing online banking system. To design such a scheme, we need to address several challenges. The rest of this section highlights these challenges.

## **2.1 Challenge 1: Lack of Transparent Logs**

In the current online banking system, during a payment journey, the messages exchanged between customer and bank is usually logged by the bank and is not accessible to the customer without the bank’s collaboration. Even if the bank provides access to the transaction logs, there is no guarantee that the logs have remained intact. Due to the lack of a transparent logging mechanism, a customer or bank can wrongly claim that (a) it has sent a certain message or warning to its counter-party or (b) it has never received a certain message, e.g., due to hardware or software failure. Thus, it would be hard for an honest party (especially a customer) to prove its innocence. To address this challenge, the PwDR protocol uses a standard smart contract (as a public bulletin board) to which each party needs to send (a copy of) all outgoing messages, e.g., payment requests, warnings, and confirmation of payments.

## **2.2 Challenge 2: Lack of Effective Warning’s Accurate Definition in Banking**

One of the determining factors in the process of allocating liability to the customers (after an APP fraud occurs) is paying attention to and following “warning(s)”, according to the “Contingent Reimbursement Model” (CRM) code [11]. However, there exists no publicly available study on the effectiveness of every warning used and provided by the bank. Therefore, we cannot hold a customer accountable for becoming the fraud’s victim, even if the related warnings are ignored. To address this challenge, we let a warning’s effectiveness is determined on a case-by-case basis after the fraud takes place. In particular, the protocol provides an opportunity to a victim to challenge a certain warning whose effectiveness will be assessed by a committee, i.e., a small set of arbiters. In this setting, each member of the committee provides (an encoding of) its verdict to the smart contract, from which a dispute resolver retrieves all verdicts to find out the final verdict. The scheme ensures that the final verdict is in the customer’s favour if at least threshold of committee members voted so.

## **2.3 Challenge 3: Linking Off-chain Payments with a Smart Contract**

Recall that an APP fraud occurs when a payment is made. In the case where a bank sends a message (to the smart contract) to claim that it has transferred the money following the customer’s request, it is not possible to automatically validate such a claim (e.g., for the smart contract does the check) as the money transfer takes place outside of the blockchain network. To address this challenge, the protocol lets a customer raise a dispute and report it to the smart contract when it detects an inconsistency (e.g., the bank did not transfer the money but it wrongly declared it did so, or when it transferred the money but did not declare it). In this case, the above committee members investigate and provide their verdicts to the smart contract that allows the dispute resolver to extract the final verdict.

## **2.4 Challenge 4: Preserving Privacy**

Although the use of a public transparent logging mechanism plays a vital role in resolving disputes, if no privacy-preserving mechanism is used, then it can violate parties’ privacy, e.g., the customers’ payment detail, bank’s messages to the customer, or even each arbiter’s verdict. To protect the privacy of the bank’s and customers’ messages against the public (and other customers), the PwDR scheme lets the customer and

bank provably agree on encoding-decoding tokens that let them to encode their outgoing messages (sent to the smart contract). Later, either party can provide the token to a third party which can independently check the tokens' correctness, and decode the messages. To protect the privacy of the committee members' verdicts from the dispute resolver, the PwDR scheme must ensure that the dispute resolver can learn only the final verdict without being able to link a verdict to a specific member of the committee.

### 3 Definition of Payment with Dispute Resolution Scheme

In this section, we present a formal definition of a PwDR scheme. We first provide the scheme's syntax. Then, we formally define its correctness and security properties.

**Definition 2.** *A payment with dispute resolution scheme includes the following processes  $PwDR := (\text{keyGen}, \text{bankInit}, \text{customerInit}, \text{genUpdateRequest}, \text{insertNewPayee}, \text{genWarning}, \text{genPaymentRequest}, \text{makePayment}, \text{genComplaint}, \text{verComplaint}, \text{resDispute})$ . It involves six types of entities; namely, bank  $\mathcal{B}$ , customer  $\mathcal{C}$ , smart contract  $\mathcal{S}$ , certificate generator  $\mathcal{G}$ , set of arbiters  $\mathcal{D} : \{\mathcal{D}_1, \dots, \mathcal{D}_n\}$ , and a dispute resolver  $\mathcal{DR}$ . The processes of PwDR are defined below.*

- **keyGen**( $1^\lambda$ )  $\rightarrow (sk, pk)$ . It is a probabilistic algorithm run independently by  $\mathcal{G}$  and one of the arbiters,  $\mathcal{D}_j$ . It takes as input a security parameter  $1^\lambda$ . It outputs a pair of secret keys  $sk := (sk_{\mathcal{G}}, sk_{\mathcal{D}})$  and public keys  $pk := (pk_{\mathcal{G}}, pk_{\mathcal{D}})$ . The public key pair,  $pk$ , is sent to all participants.
- **bankInit**( $1^\lambda$ )  $\rightarrow (T, pp, \mathbf{l})$ . It is run by  $\mathcal{B}$ . It takes as input security parameter  $1^\lambda$ . It allocates private parameters to  $\tilde{\pi}_1$  and  $\tilde{\pi}_2$ . It generates an encoding-decoding token  $T$ , where  $T := (T_1, T_2)$ , each  $T_i$  contains a secret value  $\tilde{\pi}_i$  and its public witness  $g_i$ . Given a value and its witness anyone can check if they match. It also generates a set of (additional) public parameters,  $pp$ , one of which is  $e$  that is a threshold parameter. It also generates an empty list,  $\mathbf{l}$ . It outputs  $T, pp$  and  $\mathbf{l}$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  sends  $(\tilde{\pi}_1, \tilde{\pi}_2)$  to  $\mathcal{C}$  and sends  $(g_1, g_2, pp, \mathbf{l})$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- **customerInit**( $1^\lambda, T, pp$ )  $\rightarrow a$ . It is a deterministic algorithm run by  $\mathcal{C}$ . It takes as input security parameter  $1^\lambda$ , token  $T$ , and public parameters  $pp$ . It checks the correctness of the elements in  $T$  and  $pp$ . If the checks pass, it outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
- **genUpdateRequest**( $T, f, \mathbf{l}$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(C)}$ . It is a deterministic process run by  $\mathcal{C}$ . It takes as input token  $T$ , new payee's detail  $f$  and empty payees' list  $\mathbf{l}$ . It generates  $m_1^{(C)}$  which is an update request to the payees' list. It uses  $T_1 \in T$  to encode  $m_1^{(C)}$  which results in  $\hat{m}_1^{(C)}$ . It outputs  $\hat{m}_1^{(C)}$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  sends the output to  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- **insertNewPayee**( $\hat{m}_1^{(C)}, \mathbf{l}$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{\mathbf{l}}$ . It is a deterministic algorithm run by  $\mathcal{S}$ . It takes as input  $\mathcal{C}$ 's encoded update request  $\hat{m}_1^{(C)}$ , and  $\mathcal{C}$ 's payees' list  $\mathbf{l}$ . It inserts the new payee's detail into  $\mathbf{l}$  and returns an updated list,  $\hat{\mathbf{l}}$ .
- **genWarning**( $T, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, aux$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ . It is run by  $\mathcal{B}$ . It takes as input token  $T$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$ 's encoded payees' list  $\hat{\mathbf{l}}$  and auxiliary information:  $aux$ , e.g., a set of policies. Using  $T_1 \in T$ , it decodes and checks all elements of the list, e.g., whether they comply with the policies. If the check passes, then it sets  $m_1^{(B)} = \text{"pass"}$ ; otherwise, it sets  $m_1^{(B)} = \text{warning}$ , where the warning is a string containing a warning detail along with the string "warning". It uses  $T_1$  to encode  $m_1^{(B)}$  which yields  $\hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ . It outputs  $\hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  sends  $\hat{m}_1^{(B)}$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- **genPaymentRequest**( $T, in_f, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(C)}$ . It is run by  $\mathcal{C}$ . It takes as input token  $T$ , a payment detail  $in_f$ , encoded payees' list  $\hat{\mathbf{l}}$ , and encoded warning message,  $\hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ . Using  $T_1 \in T$ , it decodes  $\hat{\mathbf{l}}$  and  $\hat{m}_1^{(B)}$  yielding  $\mathbf{l}$  and  $m_1^{(B)}$  respectively. It checks the warning. It sets  $m_2^{(C)} = \phi$ , if it does not want to proceed. Otherwise, it sets  $m_2^{(C)}$  according to the content of  $in_f$  and  $\mathbf{l}$  (e.g., the amount of payment and payee's detail). It uses  $T_1$  to encode  $m_2^{(C)}$  resulting in  $\hat{m}_2^{(C)}$ . It outputs  $\hat{m}_2^{(C)}$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  sends  $\hat{m}_2^{(C)}$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- **makePayment**( $T, \hat{m}_2^{(C)}$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(B)}$ . It is a deterministic process run by  $\mathcal{B}$ . It takes as input token  $T$ , and encoded payment detail  $\hat{m}_2^{(C)}$ . Using  $T_1 \in T$ , it decodes  $\hat{m}_2^{(C)}$  and checks the result's validity, e.g., ensures it is well-formed or  $\mathcal{C}$  has enough credit. If the check passes, then it makes the payment and sets  $m_2^{(B)} = \text{"paid"}$ . Otherwise, it sets  $m_2^{(B)} = \phi$ . It uses  $T_1$  to encode  $m_2^{(B)}$  yielding  $\hat{m}_2^{(B)}$ . It outputs  $\hat{m}_2^{(B)}$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  sends  $\hat{m}_2^{(B)}$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ .

- **genComplaint** $(\hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}, T, pk, aux_f) \rightarrow (\hat{z}, \hat{\pi})$ . It is run by  $\mathcal{C}$ . It takes as input the encoded warning message  $\hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ , encoded payment message  $\hat{m}_2^{(B)}$ , token  $T$ , public key  $pk$ , and auxiliary information  $aux_f$ . It initially sets fresh strings  $(z_1, z_2, z_3)$  to null. Using  $T_1 \in T$ , it decodes  $\hat{m}_1^{(B)}$  and  $\hat{m}_2^{(B)}$  and checks the results' content. If it wants to complain that (i) "pass" message should have been a warning or (ii) no message was provided, it sets  $z_1$  to "challenge message". If its complaint is about the warning's effectiveness, it sets  $z_2$  to a combination of an evidence  $u \in aux_f$ , the evidence's certificate  $sig \in aux_f$ , the certificate's public parameter, and "challenge warning", where the certificate is obtained from  $\mathcal{G}$  via a query,  $Q$ . In certain cases, the certificate might be empty. If its complaint is about the payment, it sets  $z_3$  to "challenge payment". It uses  $T_1$  to encode  $z := (z_1, z_2, z_3)$  and uses  $pk_D$  to encode  $\hat{\pi} := (\hat{\pi}_1, \hat{\pi}_2) \in T$ . This results in  $\hat{z}$  and  $\hat{\pi}$  respectively. It outputs  $(\hat{z}, \hat{\pi})$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  sends the pair to  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- **verComplaint** $(\hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, g, \hat{m}, \hat{l}, j, sk_D, aux, pp) \rightarrow \hat{w}_j$ . It is run by every arbiter  $\mathcal{D}_j$ . It takes as input  $\mathcal{C}$ 's encoded complaint  $\hat{z}$ , encoded private parameters  $\hat{\pi}$ , the tokens' public parameters  $g := (g_1, g_2)$ , encoded messages  $\hat{m} = [\hat{m}_1^{(C)}, \hat{m}_2^{(C)}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}]$ , encoded payees' list  $\hat{l}$ , the arbiter's index  $j$ , secret key  $sk_D$ , auxiliary information  $aux$ , and public parameters  $pp$ . It uses  $sk_D$  to decode  $\hat{\pi}$  that yields  $\pi := (\pi_1, \pi_2)$ . It uses  $\pi_1$  to decode  $\hat{z}$ ,  $\hat{m}$ , and  $\hat{l}$  that results in  $z := (z_1, z_2, z_3)$ ,  $m$ , and  $l$  respectively. It checks if  $\pi_i$  matches  $g_i$ . If the check fails, it aborts; otherwise, it continues. It checks if  $m_1^{(C)}$  and  $m_2^{(C)}$  are non-empty; it aborts if the checks fail. It sets fresh parameters  $(w_{1,j}, w_{2,j}, w_{3,j}, w_{4,j})$  to  $\phi$ . If "challenge message"  $\in z_1$ , given  $l$ , it checks whether "pass" message (in  $m_1^{(B)}$ ) was given correctly or the missing message did not play any role in preventing the scam. If either checks passes, it sets  $w_{1,j} = 0$ ; otherwise, it sets  $w_{1,j} = 1$ . If "challenge warning"  $\in z_2$ , it verifies the certificate in  $z_2$ . If it is invalid, it sets  $w_{3,j} = 0$ . If it is valid, it sets  $w_{3,j} = 1$ . It determines the effectiveness of the warning (in  $m_1^{(B)}$ ), by running a process which determines that, i.e., **checkWarning** $(\cdot) \in aux$ . If it is effective, i.e., **checkWarning** $(m_1^{(B)}) = 1$ , it sets its verdict to 0, i.e.,  $w_{2,j} = 0$ ; otherwise, it sets  $w_{2,j} = 1$ . If "challenge payment"  $\in z_3$ , it checks if the payment was made (with the help of  $m_2^{(B)}$ ). If the check passes, it sets  $w_{4,j} = 1$ ; otherwise, it sets  $w_{4,j} = 0$ . It uses  $\pi_2$  to encode  $w_j = [w_{1,j}, w_{2,j}, w_{3,j}, w_{4,j}]$  yielding  $\hat{w}_j = [\hat{w}_{1,j}, \hat{w}_{2,j}, \hat{w}_{3,j}, \hat{w}_{4,j}]$ . It outputs  $\hat{w}_j$ .  $\mathcal{D}_j$  sends  $\hat{w}_j$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- **resDispute** $(T_2, \hat{w}, pp) \rightarrow v$ . It is a deterministic algorithm run by  $\mathcal{DR}$ . It takes as input token  $T_2$ , arbiters' encoded verdicts  $\hat{w} = [\hat{w}_1, \dots, \hat{w}_n]$ , and public parameters  $pp$ . It checks if the token's parameters match. If the check fails, it aborts; otherwise, it proceeds. It uses  $\pi_2 \in T_2$  to decode  $\hat{w}$  and from the result it extracts final verdicts  $v = [v_1, \dots, v_4]$ . The extraction procedure ensures each  $v_i$  is set to 1 only if at least  $e$  arbiters' original verdicts (i.e.,  $w_{i,j}$ ) is 1, where  $e \in pp$ . It outputs  $v$ . Note, if  $v_4 = 1$  and (i) either  $v_1 = 1$  (ii) or  $v_2 = 1$  and  $v_3 = 1$ , then customer  $\mathcal{C}$  must be reimbursed.

Informally, a PwDR scheme has two properties; namely, *correctness* and *security*. Correctness requires that (in the absence of a fraudster) the payment journey is completed without the need for (i) the honest customer to complain and (ii) the honest bank to reimburse the customer. Below, we formally state it.

**Definition 3 (Correctness).** A PwDR scheme is correct if the key generation algorithm produces keys  $\text{keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk, pk)$  such that for any payee's detail  $f$ , payment's detail  $in_f$ , and auxiliary information  $(aux, aux_f)$ , if  $\text{bankInit}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (T, pp, l)$ ,  $\text{customerInit}(1^\lambda, T, pp) \rightarrow a$ ,  $\text{genUpdateRequest}(T, f, l) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(C)}$ ,  $\text{insertNewPayee}(\hat{m}_1^{(C)}, l) \rightarrow \hat{l}$ ,  $\text{genWarning}(T, \hat{l}, aux) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ ,  $\text{genPaymentRequest}(T, in_f, \hat{l}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(C)}$ ,  $\text{makePayment}(T, \hat{m}_2^{(C)}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(B)}$ ,  $\text{genComplaint}(\hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}, T, pk, aux_f) \rightarrow (\hat{z}, \hat{\pi})$ ,  $\forall j \in [n]$  :  
 $(\text{verComplaint}(\hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, g, \hat{m}, \hat{l}, j, sk_D, aux, pp) \rightarrow \hat{w}_j), \text{resDispute}(T_2, \hat{w}, pp) \rightarrow v$ , then  $(z_1 = z_2 = z_3 = \phi) \wedge (v = 0)$ , where  $g := (g_1, g_2) \in T$ ,  $\hat{m} = [\hat{m}_1^{(C)}, \hat{m}_2^{(C)}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}]$ ,  $\hat{w} = [\hat{w}_1, \dots, \hat{w}_n]$ , and  $z := (z_1, z_2, z_3)$  is the decoded  $\hat{z}$ .

A PwDR scheme is secure if it satisfies three main properties; namely, (a) security against a malicious victim, (b) security against a malicious bank, and (c) privacy. Below, we formally define them. Intuitively, security against a malicious victim requires that the victim of the APP fraud which is not qualified for the reimbursement should not be reimbursed (despite it tries to be). More specifically, a corrupt victim cannot (a) make at least threshold committee members,  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s, conclude that  $\mathcal{B}$  should have provided a warning, although  $\mathcal{B}$  has done so, or (b) make  $\mathcal{DR}$  conclude that the pass message was incorrectly given or a vital

warning message was missing despite less than threshold  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s believe so, or (c) persuade at least threshold  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s to conclude that the warning was ineffective although it was effective, or (d) make  $\mathcal{DR}$  believe that the warning message was ineffective although only less than threshold  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s do believe that, or (e) convince  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s to accept an invalid certificate, or (f) make  $\mathcal{DR}$  believe that at least threshold  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s accepted the certificate although they did not, except for a negligible probability.

**Definition 4 (Security against a malicious victim).** A PwDR scheme is secure against a malicious victim, if for any security parameter  $\lambda$ , auxiliary information  $aux$ , and probabilistic polynomial-time adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu(\cdot)$ , such that for an experiment  $\text{Exp}_1^{\mathcal{A}}$ :

$\text{Exp}_1^{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, aux)$

```

keyGen( $1^\lambda$ )  $\rightarrow$  ( $sk, pk$ )
bankInit( $1^\lambda$ )  $\rightarrow$  ( $T, pp, \mathbf{l}$ )
 $\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, T, pp, \mathbf{l}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(c)}$ 
insertNewPayee( $\hat{m}_1^{(c)}, \mathbf{l}$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{\mathbf{l}}$ 
genWarning( $T, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, aux$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ 
 $\mathcal{A}(T, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(c)}$ 
makePayment( $T, \hat{m}_2^{(c)}$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(B)}$ 
 $\mathcal{A}(\hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}, T, pk) \rightarrow (\hat{z}, \hat{\pi})$ 
 $\forall j, j \in [n]$  :
  ( $\text{verComplaint}(\hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, g, \hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, j, sk_{\mathcal{D}}, aux, pp) \rightarrow \hat{\mathbf{w}}_j = [\hat{w}_{1,j}, \hat{w}_{2,j}, \hat{w}_{3,j}, \hat{w}_{4,j}]$ )
resDispute( $T_2, \hat{\mathbf{w}}, pp$ )  $\rightarrow \mathbf{v} = [v_1, \dots, v_4]$ 

```

it holds that:

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} \left( (m_1^{(B)} = \text{warning}) \wedge \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{1,j} \geq e \right) \right) \\ \vee \left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{1,j} < e \right) \wedge (v_1 = 1) \right) \\ \vee \left( (\text{checkWarning}(m_1^{(B)}) = 1) \wedge \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{2,j} \geq e \right) \right) \\ \vee \left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{2,j} < e \right) \wedge (v_2 = 1) \right) \\ \vee \left( u \notin Q \wedge \text{Sig.ver}(pk, u, sig) = 1 \right) \\ \vee \left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{3,j} < e \right) \wedge (v_3 = 1) \right) \end{array} : \text{Exp}_1^{\mathcal{A}}(\text{input}) \right] \leq \mu(\lambda),$$

where  $g := (g_1, g_2) \in T$ ,  $\hat{\mathbf{m}} = [\hat{m}_1^{(c)}, \hat{m}_2^{(c)}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}]$ ,  $(w_{1,j}, \dots, w_{3,j})$  are the result of decoding  $(\hat{w}_{1,j}, \dots, \hat{w}_{3,j}) \in \hat{\mathbf{w}}$ ,  $\text{checkWarning}(\cdot)$  determines a warning's effectiveness,  $\text{input} := (1^\lambda, aux)$ ,  $(u, sig) \in x$ ,  $sk_{\mathcal{D}} \in sk$ , and  $n$  is the total number of arbiters. The probability is taken over the uniform choice of  $sk$ , randomness used in the blockchain's primitives (e.g., in signatures), randomness used during the encoding, and the randomness of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Intuitively, security against a malicious bank requires that a malicious bank should not be able to disqualify an honest victim of the APP scam from being reimbursed. In particular, a corrupt bank cannot (a) make  $\mathcal{DR}$  conclude that the “pass” message was correctly given or an important warning message was not missing despite at least threshold  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s do not believe so, or (b) convince  $\mathcal{DR}$  that the warning message was effective although at least threshold  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s do not believe so, or (c) make  $\mathcal{DR}$  believe that less than threshold  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s did not accept the certificate although at least threshold of them did that, or (d) make  $\mathcal{DR}$  believe

that no payment was made, although at least threshold  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s believe the opposite, except for a negligible probability.

**Definition 5 (Security against a malicious bank).** A PwDR scheme is secure against a malicious bank, if for any security parameter  $\lambda$ , auxiliary information  $aux$ , and probabilistic polynomial-time adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu(\cdot)$ , such that for an experiment  $\text{Exp}_2^{\mathcal{A}}$ :

$\text{Exp}_2^{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, aux)$

```

keyGen( $1^\lambda$ )  $\rightarrow$  ( $sk, pk$ )
 $\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (T, pp, \mathbf{l}, f, in_f, aux_f)$ 
customerInit( $1^\lambda, T, pp$ )  $\rightarrow a$ 
genUpdateRequest( $T, f, \mathbf{l}$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(c)}$ 
insertNewPayee( $\hat{m}_1^{(c)}, \mathbf{l}$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{\mathbf{l}}$ 
 $\mathcal{A}(T, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, aux) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ 
genPaymentRequest( $T, in_f, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}$ )  $\rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(c)}$ 
 $\mathcal{A}(T, \hat{m}_2^{(c)}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(B)}$ 
genComplaint( $\hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}, T, pk, aux_f$ )  $\rightarrow (\hat{z}, \hat{\pi})$ 
 $\forall j, j \in [n]$  :
  ( $\text{verComplaint}(\hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, g, \hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, j, sk_{\mathcal{D}}, aux, pp) \rightarrow \hat{\mathbf{w}}_j = [\hat{w}_{1,j}, \hat{w}_{2,j}, \hat{w}_{3,j}, \hat{w}_{4,j}]$ )
resDispute( $T_2, \hat{\mathbf{w}}, pp$ )  $\rightarrow \mathbf{v} = [v_1, \dots, v_4]$ 

```

it holds that:

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} \left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{1,j} \geq e \right) \wedge (v_1 = 0) \right) \\ \vee \left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{2,j} \geq e \right) \wedge (v_2 = 0) \right) \\ \vee \left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{3,j} \geq e \right) \wedge (v_3 = 0) \right) \\ \vee \left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{4,j} \geq e \right) \wedge (v_4 = 0) \right) \end{array} : \text{Exp}_2^{\mathcal{A}}(\text{input}) \right] \leq \mu(\lambda),$$

where  $g := (g_1, g_2) \in T$ ,  $\hat{\mathbf{m}} = [\hat{m}_1^{(c)}, \hat{m}_2^{(c)}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}]$ ,  $(w_{1,j}, \dots, w_{3,j})$  are the result of decoding  $(\hat{w}_{1,j}, \dots, \hat{w}_{3,j}) \in \hat{\mathbf{w}}$ ,  $\text{input} := (1^\lambda, aux)$ ,  $sk_{\mathcal{D}} \in sk$ ,  $n$  is the total number of arbiters. The probability is taken over the uniform choice of  $sk$ , randomness used in the blockchain's primitives, randomness used during the encoding, and the randomness of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

A careful reader may ask why the following two conditions (some forms of which were in the events for Definition 4) are not added to the above events list: (a)  $\mathcal{B}$  makes at least threshold committee members conclude that it has provided a warning, although  $\mathcal{B}$  has not (i.e.,  $m_1^{(B)} \neq \text{warning} \wedge \sum_{j=1}^n w_{1,j} < e$ ), and (b)  $\mathcal{B}$  persuades at least threshold  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s to conclude that the warning was effective although it was not (i.e.,  $\text{checkWarning}(m_1^{(B)}) = 0 \wedge \sum_{j=1}^n w_{2,j} < e$ ). The reason is that  $\mathcal{B}$  does not generate a complaint and interact directly with  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s; therefore, we do not need to add these two events to the above events' list. Now we move on to privacy. Informally, a PwDR is privacy-preserving if it protects the privacy of (1) the customers', bank's, and arbiters' messages (except public parameters) from non-participants of the protocol, including other customers, and (2) each arbiter's verdict from  $\mathcal{DR}$  which sees the final verdict.

**Definition 6 (Privacy).** A PwDR preserves privacy if the following two properties are satisfied.



1. For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1$ , security parameter  $\lambda$ , and auxiliary information  $aux$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu(\cdot)$ , such that for any experiment  $\text{Exp}_3^{\mathcal{A}_1}$ :

$\text{Exp}_3^{\mathcal{A}_1}(1^\lambda, aux)$

$\text{keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk, pk)$   
 $\text{bankInit}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (T, pp, \mathbf{l})$   
 $\text{customerInit}(1^\lambda, T, pp) \rightarrow a$   
 $\mathcal{A}_1(1^\lambda, pk, a, pp, g, \mathbf{l}) \rightarrow ((f_0, f_1), (in_{f_0}, in_{f_1}), (aux_{f_0}, aux_{f_1}))$   
 $\gamma \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$   
 $\text{genUpdateRequest}(T, f_\gamma, \mathbf{l}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(c)}$   
 $\text{insertNewPayee}(\hat{m}_1^{(c)}, \mathbf{l}) \rightarrow \hat{\mathbf{l}}$   
 $\text{genWarning}(T, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, aux) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(B)}$   
 $\text{genPaymentRequest}(T, in_{f_\gamma}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(c)}$   
 $\text{makePayment}(T, \hat{m}_2^{(c)}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(B)}$   
 $\text{genComplaint}(\hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}, T, pk, aux_{f_\gamma}) \rightarrow (\hat{z}, \hat{\pi})$   
 $\forall j, j \in [n]:$   
 $(\text{verComplaint}(\hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, g, \hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, j, sk_D, aux, pp) \rightarrow \hat{w}_j)$   
 $\text{resDispute}(T_2, \hat{w}, pp) \rightarrow v$

it holds that:

$$\Pr [\mathcal{A}_1(g, \hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, \hat{w}) \rightarrow \gamma : \text{Exp}_3^{\mathcal{A}_1}(\text{input})] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mu(\lambda).$$

2. For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries  $\mathcal{A}_2$  and  $\mathcal{A}_3$ , security parameter  $\lambda$ , and auxiliary information  $aux$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu(\cdot)$ , such that for any experiment  $\text{Exp}_4^{\mathcal{A}_2}$ :

$\text{Exp}_4^{\mathcal{A}_2}(1^\lambda, aux)$

$\text{keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk, pk)$   
 $\text{bankInit}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (T, pp, \mathbf{l})$   
 $\text{customerInit}(1^\lambda, T, pp) \rightarrow a$   
 $\mathcal{A}_2(1^\lambda, pk, a, pp, \mathbf{l}) \rightarrow (f, in_f, aux_f)$   
 $\text{genUpdateRequest}(T, f, \mathbf{l}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(c)}$   
 $\text{insertNewPayee}(\hat{m}_1^{(c)}, \mathbf{l}) \rightarrow \hat{\mathbf{l}}$   
 $\mathcal{A}_2(T, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, aux) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(B)}$   
 $\text{genPaymentRequest}(T, in_f, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(c)}$   
 $\mathcal{A}_2(T, pk, aux_f, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(c)}) \rightarrow (\hat{m}_2^{(B)}, \hat{z}, \hat{\pi})$   
 $\forall j, j \in [n]:$   
 $(\text{verComplaint}(\hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, g, \hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, j, sk_D, aux, pp) \rightarrow \hat{w}_j)$   
 $\text{resDispute}(T_2, \hat{w}, pp) \rightarrow v$

it holds that:

$$\Pr [\mathcal{A}_3(T_2, pk, pp, g, \hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, \hat{w}, v) \rightarrow w_j : \text{Exp}_4^{\mathcal{A}_2}(\text{input})] \leq Pr' + \mu(\lambda),$$

where  $g := (g_1, g_2) \in T$ ,  $\hat{\mathbf{m}} = [\hat{m}_1^{(C)}, \hat{m}_2^{(C)}, \hat{m}_1^{(B)}, \hat{m}_2^{(B)}]$ ,  $\hat{\mathbf{w}} = [\hat{w}_1, \dots, \hat{w}_n]$ ,  $\text{input} := (1^\lambda, \text{aux})$ ,  $sk_{\mathcal{D}} \in sk$ ,  $n$  is the total number of arbiters. Moreover,  $Pr'$  is defined as follows. Let arbiter  $\mathcal{D}_i$  output 0 and 1 with probabilities  $Pr_{i,0}$  and  $Pr_{i,1}$  respectively. Then,  $Pr'$  is defined as  $\text{Max}\{Pr_{1,0}, Pr_{1,1}, \dots, Pr_{n,0}, Pr_{n,1}\}$ . In the above privacy definition, the probability is taken over the uniform choice of  $sk$ , the probability that each  $\mathcal{D}_j$  outputs 0 or 1, the randomness used in the blockchain's primitives, the randomness used during the encoding, and the randomness of  $\mathcal{A}_1$  and  $\mathcal{A}_2$ .

**Definition 7 (Security).** A PwDR is secure if it meets security against a malicious victim, security against a malicious bank, and preserves privacy with respect to definitions 4, 5, and 6 respectively.

## 4 Payment with Dispute Resolution Protocol

In this section, first we provide an outline of the PwDR protocol. Then, we present a few subroutines that will be used in this protocol. After that, we describe the PwDR protocol in detail.

### 4.1 An Overview of the PwDR Protocol

In this section, we provide an overview of the PwDR protocol. For the sake of simplicity, we assume  $\mathcal{C}$  wants to transfer a certain amount of money to a new payee. Initially, only for once, customer  $\mathcal{C}$  and bank  $\mathcal{B}$  agree on a smart contract  $\mathcal{S}$ . They also use the SAP to provably agree on two private statements that include two secret keys. The keys will be used to encrypt messages sent to  $\mathcal{S}$  and will be used by  $\mathcal{D}_j$ s and  $\mathcal{DR}$  to decrypt related messages. When  $\mathcal{C}$  wants to transfer money to a new payee, it signs into the standard online banking system. Then, it generates an update request that specifies the new payee's detail, encrypts the request, and sends the result to  $\mathcal{S}$ . After that,  $\mathcal{B}$  decrypts and checks the request's validity, e.g., whether it meets its internal policy or the requirements of the "Confirmation of Payee" [6]. Depending on the request's content,  $\mathcal{B}$  generates a pass or warning message. It encrypts the message and sends the result to  $\mathcal{S}$ . Then,  $\mathcal{C}$  checks  $\mathcal{B}$ 's message and depending on the content of this message, it decides whether it wants to proceed to made payment. If it decides to do so, then it sends an encrypted payment detail to  $\mathcal{S}$ . This allows  $\mathcal{B}$  to decrypt the message and locally transfer the amount of money specified in  $\mathcal{C}$ 's message. Once the money is transferred,  $\mathcal{B}$  sends an encrypted "paid" message to  $\mathcal{S}$ .

Once  $\mathcal{C}$  realises that it has fallen victim to an APP fraud, it raises a dispute. In particular, it generates an encrypted complaint that could challenge the effectiveness of the warning and/or any payment inconsistency (as explained in Section 2.3). It can also include in the complaint an evidence/certificate, e.g., to claim that it falls into the vulnerable customer category as defined in [11].  $\mathcal{C}$  encrypts the complaint. It also encrypts the secret key (under arbiters' public key) that it uses to encrypt the messages. It sends to  $\mathcal{S}$  the ciphertexts along with a proof asserting the secret key's correctness. Upon receiving  $\mathcal{C}$ 's complaint, each committee member verifies the proof. If the verification passes, it decrypts and compiles  $\mathcal{C}$ 's complaint to generate a (set of) verdict. Then, each committee member encodes its verdict and sends the encryption of the encoded verdict to  $\mathcal{S}$ . To resolve a dispute between  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ , either of them can invoke  $\mathcal{DR}$ . To do so, they directly send to it one of the above secret keys and a proof asserting that key was generated correctly.  $\mathcal{DR}$  verifies the proof. If the verification passes it locally decrypts the encrypted encoded verdicts (after retrieving them from  $\mathcal{S}$ ) and then combines the result to find out the final verdict. If the final verdict indicates the legitimacy of  $\mathcal{C}$ 's complaint, then  $\mathcal{C}$  must be reimbursed. Note, the verdicts are encoded in such a way that even after decrypting them, the dispute resolver cannot link a verdict to a committee member or even figure out how many 1 or 0 verdicts have been provided (except when all verdicts are 0). However, it can find out whether at least threshold committee members voted in favour of  $\mathcal{C}$ . Shortly, we present novel verdict encoding-decoding protocols that offer the above features.

### 4.2 A Subroutine for Determining Bank's Message Status

As we stated earlier, in the payment journey the customer may receive a "pass" message or even nothing at all, e.g., due to a system failure. In such cases, a victim of an APP fraud may complain that if the pass

or missing message was a warning message, then it would have prevented the victim from falling to the APP fraud. To assist the committee members to deal with such complaints deterministically, we propose a process, called **verStat**. It is run locally by each committee member. It outputs 0 if a pass message was given correctly or the missing message could not prevent the scam, and outputs 1 otherwise. The process is presented in figure 1.




Fig. 1: Process to Determine a Bank's Message Status

### 4.3 A Subroutine for Checking Warning's Effectiveness

To help the committee members deterministically and accurately compile a victim's complaint about the effectiveness of a warning (that bank provides during the payment journey) we propose a process, called **checkWarning**. This process is run locally by each committee member. It also allows the victims to provide a certificate/evidence as part of their complaints. The process outputs a pair  $(w_2, w_3)$ . It sets  $w_2 = 0$  if the given warning message is effective, and sets  $w_2 = 1$ , if it is not. It sets  $w_3 = 1$  if the certificate that the victim provided is valid (or empty) and sets  $w_3 = 0$  if it is invalid. This process is presented in figure 2.

### 4.4 Subroutines for Encoding-Decoding Verdicts

In this section, we present verdict encoding and decoding protocols. They let a third party  $\mathcal{I}$ , e.g.,  $\mathcal{DR}$ , find out whether threshold arbiters voted 1, while satisfying the following requirements. The protocols should (1) generate unlinkable verdicts, (2) not require arbiters to interact with each other for each customer, and (3) be efficient. Since the second and third requirements are self-explanatory, we only explain the first one. Informally, the first property requires that the protocols should generate encoded verdicts and final verdict in a way that  $\mathcal{I}$ , given the encoded verdicts and final verdict, should not be able to (a) link a verdict to an arbiter (except when all arbiters' verdicts are 0), and (b) find out the total number of 1 or 0 verdicts when they provide different verdicts. In this section, we present two variants of verdict encoding and decoding protocols, where each variant contains two protocols. The first variant is highly efficient and suitable for the case where the threshold is 1. The second variant is generic and works for any threshold. The latter variant is less efficient than the former one, but it is still efficient. Below, we explain each variant.




Fig. 2: Process to Check Warning's Effectiveness

**Variant 1: Highly Efficient Verdict Encoding-Decoding Protocols.** Below, we present two efficient verdict encoding and decoding protocols; namely, Private Verdict Encoding (PVE) and Final Verdict Decoding (FVD) protocols, that lets  $\mathcal{I}$  find out whether at least one arbiter voted 1, while satisfying the above requirements. The protocols rely on the observation that if a set of random values and 0s are XORed, then the result reveals nothing, e.g., about the number of non-zero and zero values. Below, we formally state and prove it.

**Theorem 1.** *Let set  $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_m\}$  be the union of two disjoint subsets  $S'$  and  $S''$ , where  $S'$  contains non-zero random values pick uniformly from a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ ,  $S''$  contains zeros,  $|S'| \geq c' = 1$ ,  $|S''| \geq c'' = 0$ , and pair  $(c', c'')$  is public information. Then,  $r = \bigoplus_{i=1}^m s_i$  reveals nothing beyond the public information.*

*Proof.* Let  $s_1$  and  $s$ , be two random values picked uniformly at random from  $\mathbb{F}_p$ . Let  $\bar{s} = s_1 \oplus \underbrace{0 \oplus \dots \oplus 0}_{|S''|}$ .

Since  $\bar{s} = s_1$ , two values  $\bar{s}$  and  $s$  have identical distribution. Thus,  $\bar{s}$  reveals nothing in this case. Next, let  $\tilde{s} = \underbrace{s_1 \oplus s_2 \oplus \dots \oplus s_j}_{|S'|}$ , where  $s_i \in S'$ . Since each  $s_i$  is a uniformly random value, the XOR of them is a

uniformly random value too. That means values  $\tilde{s}$  and  $s$  have identical distribution. Thus,  $\tilde{s}$  reveals nothing in this case as well. Also, it is not hard to see that the combination of the above two cases reveals nothing too, i.e.,  $\bar{s} \oplus \tilde{s}$  and  $s$  have identical distribution.  $\square$

At a high level, the protocols work as follows. The arbiters only once for all customers agree on a secret key of a pseudorandom function. This key will let each of them generate a pseudorandom masking value such that if all masking values are XORed, they would cancel out each other and result in 0.<sup>1</sup> Each arbiter represents its verdict by (i) representing it as a parameter which is set to either 0 if the verdict is 0 or a random value if the verdict is 1, and then (ii) masking this parameter by the above pseudorandom value. It sends the result to  $\mathcal{I}$ . To decode the final verdict and find out whether any arbiter voted 1,  $\mathcal{I}$  does XOR

<sup>1</sup> This is similar to the idea used in the XOR-based secret sharing [14].

all encoded verdicts. This removes the masks and XORs are verdicts' representations. If the result is 0, then all arbiters must have voted 0; therefore, the final verdict is 0. However, if the result is not 0 (i.e., a random value), then at least one of the arbiters voted 1, so the final verdict is 1. We present the encoding and decoding protocols in figures 3 and 4 respectively.

Not, the protocols' correctness holds with an overwhelming probability. Specifically, if two arbiters represent their verdict by an identical random value, then when they are XORed they would cancel out each other which can affect the result's correctness. The same holds if the XOR of multiple verdicts' representations results in a value that can cancel out another verdict's representation. Nevertheless, the probability that such an event occurs is negligible in the security parameter  $|p| = \lambda$ , i.e., at most  $\frac{1}{2^\lambda}$ . It is evident that PVE and FVD protocols meet properties (2) and (3). The primary reason they also meet property (1) is that each masked verdict reveals nothing about the verdict (and its representation) and given the final verdict,  $\mathcal{I}$  cannot distinguish between the case where there is exactly one arbiter that voted 1 and the case where multiple arbiters voted 1, as in both cases  $\mathcal{I}$  extracts only a single random value, which reveals nothing about the number of arbiters which voted 0 or 1 (due to Theorem 1). We will use this variant in the PwDR protocol.

**Variant 2: Generic Verdict Encoding-Decoding Protocols.** Now, we present two efficient generic verdict encoding-decoding protocols, denoted by GPVE and GFVD, that let  $\mathcal{I}$  find out whether at least  $e$  arbiters voted 1, where  $e$  can be any integer in the range  $[1, n]$ . This variant is built upon the previous one; however, it also relies on our observation that a Bloom filter that encoded a set of random values reveals nothing about the set's elements, except with a negligible probability. Below, we formally state and prove it.

**Theorem 2.** *Let set  $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_m\}$  be a set of random values picked uniformly from  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , where the cardinality of  $S$  is public information. Let  $\mathbf{BF}$  be a Bloom filter encoding all elements of  $S$ . Then, Bloom filter  $\mathbf{BF}$  reveals nothing about any element of  $S$ , beyond the public information, except with a negligible probability in the security parameter, i.e., with a probability at most  $\frac{|S|}{2^\lambda}$ .*

*Proof.* □

We use the above idea along with a novel combination of Bloom filter and combinatorics to design the GPVE and GFVD protocols. At a high level, the encoding protocol works as follows. The arbiters (similar to Variant 1) agree on a secret key of a pseudorandom function. As before, each arbiter will use this key to generate a pseudorandom masking value such that if all arbiters' masking values are XORed, they would cancel out each other. Then, each arbiter represents its verdict by a parameter. In particular, if its verdict is 0, then it sets the parameter to either 0. However, if its verdict is 1, it sets the parameter to a fresh *pseudorandom* value  $\alpha_j$  (instead of a random value used in Variant 1), where this pseudorandom value is derived from the above key. Therefore, there would be a set  $A = \{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n\}$  from which  $\mathcal{D}_j$  would pick  $\alpha_j$  to represent its verdict if its verdict is 1. Next, each arbiter masks its verdict representation by its masking value. It sends the result to  $\mathcal{I}$ .

Arbiter  $\mathcal{D}_n$  also generates a new set  $W$  that contains all combinations of verdict 1's representations that satisfy the threshold,  $e$ . More specifically, for every integer  $i$  in the range  $[e, n]$ , it computes the combinations (without repetition) of  $i$  elements from set  $A = \{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n\}$ . In the case where multiple elements are taken at a time (i.e.,  $i > 1$ ), the elements are XORed with each other. Note,  $\mathcal{D}_n$  generates set  $B$  regardless of whether a certain arbiter's vote is 0 or 1. Let  $W = \{(\alpha_1 \oplus \dots \oplus \alpha_e), (\alpha_2 \oplus \dots \oplus \alpha_{e+1}), \dots, (\alpha_1 \oplus \dots \oplus \alpha_n)\}$  be the result. For instance, when  $n = 3$  and  $e = 2$ , we would have  $W = \{(\alpha_1 \oplus \alpha_2), (\alpha_2 \oplus \alpha_3), (\alpha_1 \oplus \alpha_3), (\alpha_1 \oplus \alpha_2 \oplus \alpha_n)\}$ . After that, it generates an empty Bloom filter and inserts all elements of  $W$  into this Bloom filter. Let  $\mathbf{BF}$  be the Bloom filter that encodes  $W$ 's elements. It sends  $\mathbf{BF}$  to  $\mathcal{I}$ . To decode and extract the final verdict, as in Variant 1,  $\mathcal{I}$  does XOR all masked verdict representations which removes the masking values and XORs all verdicts' representations. Let  $c$  be the result. If  $c = 0$ , then  $\mathcal{I}$  concludes that all arbiters must have voted 0 (with a high probability); so, it sets the final verdict to 0. However, if  $c$  is a non-zero value, then it checks whether  $c$  is in the Bloom filter. If it is, then it concludes that at least threshold arbiters voted 1, so it sets the final vector to 1. Otherwise (if  $c$  is not in the Bloom filter), it concludes that less than threshold arbiters

voted 1; therefore, it sets the final verdict to 0. Figures 5 and 6, in Appendix B, present the GPVE and GFVD protocols in detail. Note that since **BF** contains all possible combinations of verdict 1's representations that meet the threshold, then  $\mathcal{DR}$  can always find out if  $c$  meets the threshold by just checking if  $c$  is in the **BF**. The number of the combinations, i.e., the cardinality of  $W$ , is relatively small when the number of arbiters is not very high. In general, due to the binomial coefficient formula, the cardinality of  $W$  is:

$$\sum_{i=e}^n \frac{n!}{i!(n-i)!}$$

For instance, when  $n = 10$  and  $e = 6$ , then  $W$ 's cardinality is only 476.




Fig. 3: Private Verdict Encoding (PVE) Protocol

#### 4.5 The PwDR Protocol

In this section, we present the PwDR protocol in detail.

1. Generating Certificate Parameters.  $\text{keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk, pk)$   
The certificate generator takes step 1a and an arbiter takes step 1b below.
  - (a) calls  $\text{Sig.keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk_{\mathcal{G}}, pk_{\mathcal{G}})$  to generate signing secret key  $sk_{\mathcal{G}}$  and verifying public key  $pk_{\mathcal{G}}$ . It publishes the public key,  $pk_{\mathcal{G}}$ .
  - (b) calls  $\text{keyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (sk_{\mathcal{D}}, pk_{\mathcal{D}})$  to generate decrypting secret key  $sk_{\mathcal{D}}$  and encrypting public key  $pk_{\mathcal{D}}$ . It publishes the public key  $pk_{\mathcal{D}}$  and sends  $sk_{\mathcal{D}}$  to the rest of arbiters.
Let  $sk := (sk_{\mathcal{G}}, sk_{\mathcal{D}})$  and  $pk := (pk_{\mathcal{G}}, pk_{\mathcal{D}})$ . Note, this phase takes place only once for all customers.
2. Bank-side Initiation.  $\text{bankInit}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (T, pp, \mathbf{l})$   
 $\mathcal{B}$  takes the following steps.
  - (a) picks secret keys  $\bar{k}_1$  and  $\bar{k}_2$  for symmetric key encryption scheme and pseudorandom function  $\text{PRF}$  respectively. It sets two private statements as  $\pi_1 = \bar{k}_1$  and  $\pi_2 = \bar{k}_2$ .




Fig. 4: Final Verdict Decoding (FVD) Protocol

- (b) calls  $\text{SAP.init}(1^\lambda, \text{adr}_{\mathcal{B}}, \text{adr}_{\mathcal{C}}, \pi_i) \rightarrow (r_i, g_i, \text{adr}_{\text{SAP}})$  to initiate agreements on statements  $\pi_i \in \{\pi_1, \pi_2\}$  with customer  $\mathcal{C}$ . Let  $T_i := (\tilde{\pi}_i, g_i)$  and  $T := (T_1, T_2)$ , where  $\tilde{\pi}_i := (\pi_i, r_i)$  is the opening of  $g_i$ . It also sets parameter  $\Delta$  as a time window between two specific time points, i.e.,  $\Delta = t_i - t_{i-1}$ . Briefly, it is used to impose an upper bound on a message delay.
- (c) sends  $\tilde{\pi} := (\tilde{\pi}_1, \tilde{\pi}_2)$  to  $\mathcal{C}$  and sends public parameter  $pp := (\text{adr}_{\text{SAP}}, \Delta)$  to smart contract  $\mathcal{S}$ .
3. Customer-side Initiation.  $\text{customerInit}(1^\lambda, T, pp) \rightarrow a$   
 $\mathcal{C}$  takes the following steps.
  - (a) calls  $\text{SAP.agree}(\pi_i, r_i, g_i, \text{adr}_{\mathcal{B}}, \text{adr}_{\text{SAP}}) \rightarrow (g'_i, b_i)$ , to check the correctness of parameters in  $T_i \in T$  and (if accepted) to agree on these parameters, where  $(\pi_i, r_i) \in \tilde{\pi}_i \in T_i$  and  $1 \leq i \leq 2$ . Note, if both  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  are honest, then  $g_i = g'_i$ . It also checks  $\Delta$  in  $\mathcal{S}$ , e.g., to see whether it is sufficiently large.
  - (b) if the above checks fail, it sets  $a = 0$ . Otherwise, it sets  $a = 1$ . It sends  $a$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ .
4. Generating Update Request.  $\text{genUpdateRequest}(T, f, \mathbf{l}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{C})}$   
 $\mathcal{C}$  takes the following steps.
  - (a) sets the inputs of algorithm  $\mathcal{I} \in \{\text{setupNewPayee}(\cdot), \text{ammendExistingPayee}(\cdot)\}$  as below.
    - if  $\text{setupNewPayee}(\cdot)$  is called, then it sets  $m_1^{(\mathcal{C})} := (\phi, f)$ , where  $f$  is new payee's detail.
    - if  $\text{ammendExistingPayee}(\cdot)$  is called, then it sets  $m_1^{(\mathcal{C})} := (i, f)$ , where  $i$  is the index of the element in  $\mathbf{l}$  that should be changed to  $f$ .
  - (b) at time  $t_0$ , sends to  $\mathcal{S}$  the encryption of  $m_1^{(\mathcal{C})}$ , i.e.,  $\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{C})} = \text{Enc}(\bar{k}_1, m_1^{(\mathcal{C})})$ .
5. Inserting New Payee.  $\text{insertNewPayee}(\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{C})}, \mathbf{l}) \rightarrow \hat{\mathbf{l}}$   
 $\mathcal{S}$  takes the following steps.
  - if  $\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{C})}$  is not empty, it appends  $\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{C})}$  to the payee list  $\hat{\mathbf{l}}$ , resulting an updated list,  $\hat{\mathbf{l}}$ .
  - if  $\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{C})}$  is empty, it does nothing.
6. Generating Warning.  $\text{genWarning}(T, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \text{aux}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$   
 $\mathcal{B}$  takes the following steps.
  - (a) checks if the most recent list  $\hat{\mathbf{l}}$  is not empty. If it is empty, it halts. Otherwise, it proceeds to the next step.
  - (b) decrypts each element of  $\hat{\mathbf{l}}$  and checks their correctness, e.g., checks whether each element meets its internal policy or CoP requirements stated in  $\text{aux}$ . If the check passes, it sets  $m_1^{(\mathcal{B})} = \text{"pass"}$ . Otherwise, it sets  $m_1^{(\mathcal{B})} = \text{warning}$ , where  $\text{warning}$  is a string that contains a warning's detail concatenated with the string "warning".

- (c) at time  $t_1$ , sends to  $\mathcal{S}$  the encryption of  $m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$ , i.e.,  $\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{B})} = \text{Enc}(\bar{k}_1, m_1^{(\mathcal{B})})$ .
7. Generating Payment Request.  $\text{genPaymentRequest}(T, in_f, \hat{l}, \hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{B})}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{C})}$   
 $\mathcal{C}$  takes the following steps.
- at time  $t_2$ , decrypts the content of  $\hat{l}$  and  $\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$ . It sets a payment request  $m_2^{(\mathcal{C})}$  to  $\phi$  or  $in_f$ , where  $in_f$  contains the payment's detail, e.g., the payee's detail in  $\mathbf{l}$  and the amount it wants to transfer.
  - at time  $t_3$ , sends to  $\mathcal{S}$  the encryption of  $m_2^{(\mathcal{C})}$ , i.e.,  $\hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{C})} = \text{Enc}(\bar{k}_1, m_2^{(\mathcal{C})})$ .
8. Making Payment.  $\text{makePayment}(T, \hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{C})}) \rightarrow \hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{B})}$   
 $\mathcal{B}$  takes the following steps.
- at time  $t_4$ , decrypts the content of  $\hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{C})}$ , i.e.,  $m_2^{(\mathcal{B})} = \text{Dec}(\bar{k}_1, \hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{C})})$ .
  - at time  $t_5$ , checks the content of  $m_2^{(\mathcal{C})}$ . If  $m_2^{(\mathcal{C})}$  is non-empty, i.e.,  $m_2^{(\mathcal{C})} = in_f$ , it checks if the payee's detail in  $in_f$  has already been checked and the payment's amount does not exceed the customer's credit. If the checks pass, it runs the off-chain payment algorithm,  $\text{pay}(in_f)$ . In this case, it sets  $m_2^{(\mathcal{B})} = \text{"paid"}$ . Otherwise (i.e., if  $m_2^{(\mathcal{C})} = \phi$  or neither checks pass), it sets  $m_2^{(\mathcal{B})} = \phi$ . It sends to  $\mathcal{S}$  the encryption of  $m_2^{(\mathcal{B})}$ , i.e.,  $\hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{B})} = \text{Enc}(\bar{k}_1, m_2^{(\mathcal{B})})$ .
9. Generating Complaint.  $\text{genComplaint}(\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{B})}, \hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{B})}, T, pk, aux_f) \rightarrow (\hat{z}, \hat{\pi})$   
 $\mathcal{C}$  takes the following steps.
- decrypts  $\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$  and  $\hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{B})}$ ; this results in  $m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$  and  $m_2^{(\mathcal{B})}$  respectively. Depending on the content of the decrypted values, it sets its complaint's parameters  $z := (z_1, z_2, z_3)$  as follows.
    - if  $\mathcal{C}$  want to make one of the two below statements, it sets  $z_1 = \text{"challenge message"}$ .
      - the "pass" message (in  $m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$ ) should have been a warning.
      - $\mathcal{B}$  has not provided any message (i.e., neither pass nor warning) and if  $\mathcal{B}$  provided a warning then the fraud would have been prevented.
    - if  $\mathcal{C}$  wants to challenge the effectiveness of the warning (in  $m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$ ), it sets  $z_2 = m || sig || pk_g || \text{"challenge warning"}$ , where  $m$  is an evidence,  $sig \in aux_f$  is the evidence's certificate (obtained from the certificate generator  $\mathcal{G}$ ), and  $pk_g \in pk$ .
    - if  $\mathcal{C}$  wants to complain about the inconsistency of the payment (in  $m_2^{(\mathcal{B})}$ ), then it sets  $z_3 = \text{"challenge payment"}$ . Otherwise, it sets  $z_3 = \phi$ .
  - at time  $t_6$ , sends to  $\mathcal{S}$  the following values:
    - the encryption of complaint  $z$ , i.e.,  $\hat{z} = \text{Enc}(\bar{k}_1, z)$ .
    - the encryption of  $\hat{\pi} := (\hat{\pi}_1, \hat{\pi}_2)$ , i.e.,  $\hat{\pi} = \tilde{\text{Enc}}(pk_{\mathcal{D}}, \hat{\pi})$ . Note,  $\hat{\pi}$  contains the openings of the private statements' commitments (i.e.,  $g_1, g_2$ ), and is encrypted under each  $\mathcal{D}_j$ 's public key.
10. Verifying Complaint.  $\text{verComplaint}(\hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, g, \hat{m}, \hat{l}, j, sk_{\mathcal{D}}, aux, pp) \rightarrow \hat{w}_j$   
Every Arbiter,  $\mathcal{D}_j \in \{\mathcal{D}_1, \dots, \mathcal{D}_n\}$ , takes the following steps.
- at time  $t_7$ , decrypts  $\hat{\pi}$ , i.e.,  $\hat{\pi} = \tilde{\text{Dec}}(sk_{\mathcal{D}}, \hat{\pi})$ .
  - checks the validity of  $(\hat{\pi}_1, \hat{\pi}_2)$  in  $\hat{\pi}$  by locally running the SAP's verification, i.e.,  $\text{SAP.verify}(\cdot)$ , for each  $\hat{\pi}_i$ . It returns  $s$ . If  $s = 0$ , it halts. If  $s = 1$  for both  $\hat{\pi}_1$  and  $\hat{\pi}_2$ , it proceeds to the next step.
  - decrypts  $\hat{m} = [\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{C})}, \hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{C})}, \hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{B})}, \hat{m}_2^{(\mathcal{B})}]$  using  $\text{Dec}(\bar{k}_1, \cdot)$ , where  $\bar{k}_1 \in \hat{\pi}_1$ . Let  $[m_1^{(\mathcal{C})}, m_2^{(\mathcal{C})}, m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}, m_2^{(\mathcal{B})}]$  be the result.
  - checks whether  $\mathcal{C}$  made an update request to its payee's list. To do so, it checks if  $m_1^{(\mathcal{C})}$  is non-empty and (its encryption) was registered by  $\mathcal{C}$  in  $\mathcal{S}$ . Also, it checks whether  $\mathcal{C}$  made a payment request, by checking if  $m_2^{(\mathcal{C})}$  is non-empty and (its encryption) was registered by  $\mathcal{C}$  in  $\mathcal{S}$  at time  $t_3$ . If either check fails, it halts.
  - decrypts  $\hat{z}$  and  $\hat{l}$  using  $\text{Dec}(\bar{k}_1, \cdot)$ , where  $\bar{k}_1 \in \hat{\pi}_1$ . Let  $z := (z_1, z_2, z_3)$  and  $\mathbf{l}$  be the result.
  - sets its verdicts according to the content of  $z := (z_1, z_2, z_3)$ , as follows.
    - if "challenge message"  $\notin z_1$ , it sets  $w_{1,j} = 0$ . Otherwise, it runs  $\text{verStat}(add_{\mathcal{S}}, m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}, \mathbf{l}, \Delta, aux) \rightarrow w_{1,j}$ , to determine if a warning (in  $m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$ ) should have been given (instead of the "pass" or no message).
    - if "challenge warning"  $\notin z_2$ , it sets  $w_{2,j} = w_{3,j} = 0$ . Otherwise, it runs  $\text{checkWarning}(add_{\mathcal{S}}, z_2, m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}, aux') \rightarrow (w_{2,j}, w_{3,j})$ , to determine the effectiveness of the warning (in  $m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$ ).



- if “challenge payment”  $\in z_3$ , it checks whether the payment has been made. If the check passes, it sets  $w_{4,j} = 1$ . If the check fails, it sets  $w_{4,j} = 0$ . If “challenge payment”  $\notin z_3$ , it checks if “paid” is in  $m_2^{(C)}$ . If the check passes, it sets  $w_{4,j} = 1$ . Otherwise, it sets  $w_{4,j} = 0$ .
- (g) encodes its verdicts  $(w_{1,j}, w_{2,j}, w_{3,j}, w_{4,j})$  as follows.
  - i. locally maintains a counter,  $o_{adr_C}$ , for each  $C$ . It sets its initial value to 0.
  - ii. calls  $PVE(\cdot)$  to encode each verdict. In particular, it performs as follows.  $\forall i, 1 \leq i \leq 4$  :
    - calls  $PVE(\bar{k}_0, adr_C, w_{i,j}, o_{adr_C}, n, j) \rightarrow \bar{w}_{i,j}$
    - $o_{adr_C} = o_{adr_C} + 1$ .
  - iii. uses  $\bar{k}_2 \in \bar{\pi}_2$  to further encode/encrypt  $PVE(\cdot)$ ’s outputs as follows.  $\hat{w}_j = \text{Enc}(\bar{k}_2, \bar{w}_j)$ .
- (h) at time  $t_8$ , sends to  $\mathcal{S}$  the encrypted vector,  $\hat{w}_j$ .
- 11. *Resolving Dispute*.  $\text{resDispute}(T_2, \hat{w}, pp) \rightarrow v$   
 $\mathcal{DR}$  takes the below steps at time  $t_9$ , when it is invoked by  $\mathcal{C}$  or  $\mathcal{S}$  which sends  $\bar{\pi}_2 \in T_2$  to it.
  - (a) checks the validity of  $\bar{\pi}_2$  by locally running the SAP’s verification, i.e.,  $\text{SAP.verify}(\cdot)$ , that returns  $s$ . If  $s = 0$ , it halts. Otherwise, it proceeds to the next step.
  - (b) computes the final verdicts, as below.
    - i. uses  $\bar{k}_2 \in \bar{\pi}_2$  to decrypt the arbiters’ encoded verdicts, as follows.  $\forall j, 1 \leq j \leq n$  :  
 $\bar{w}_j = \text{Dec}(\bar{k}_2, \hat{w}_j)$ , where  $\hat{w}_j \in \hat{w}$ .
    - ii. constructs four vectors,  $[\mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_4]$ , and sets each vector  $\mathbf{u}_i$  as follows.  $\forall i, 1 \leq i \leq 4$  :  
 $\mathbf{u}_i = [\bar{w}_{i,1}, \dots, \bar{w}_{i,n}]$ , where  $\bar{w}_{i,j} \in \bar{w}_j$ .
    - iii. calls  $FVD(\cdot)$  to extract each final verdict, as follows.  $\forall i, 1 \leq i \leq 4$  : calls  $FVD(n, \mathbf{u}_i) \rightarrow v_i$ .
  - (c) outputs  $v = [v_1, \dots, v_4]$ .

Customer  $\mathcal{C}$  must be reimbursed if the final verdict is that (i) the “pass” message or missing message should have been a warning or (ii) the warning was ineffective and the provided evidence was not invalid, and (iii) the payment has been made. Stated formally, the following relation must hold:

$$\left( \underbrace{(v_1 = 1)}_{(i)} \vee \underbrace{(v_2 = 1 \wedge v_3 = 1)}_{(ii)} \right) \wedge \underbrace{(v_4 = 1)}_{(iii)}.$$

Note that in the above PwDR protocol, even  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  that know the decryption secret keys,  $(\bar{k}_1, \bar{k}_2)$ , cannot link a certain verdict to an arbiter, for two main reasons; namely, (a) they do not know the masking random values used by arbiters to mask each verdict and (b) the final verdicts  $(v_1, \dots, v_4)$  reveal nothing about the number of 1 or 0 verdicts, except when all arbiters vote 0.

**Theorem 3.** *The above PwDR scheme is secure, with regard to definition 7, if the digital signature is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks, the blockchain, SAP, and pseudorandom function  $\text{PRF}(\cdot)$  are secure, and the encryption schemes are semantically secure.*

## 5 Security Analysis of the PwDR Protocol

To prove the main theorem (i.e., Theorem 3), we show that the PwDR scheme satisfies all security properties defined in Section 3. We first prove that it meets security against a malicious victim.

**Lemma 1.** *If the digital signature is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks, and the SAP and blockchain are secure, then the PwDR scheme is secure against a malicious victim, with regard to Definition 4.*

*Proof.* First, we focus on event I :  $\left( (m_1^{(\mathcal{B})} = \text{warning}) \wedge \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{1,j} \geq e \right) \right)$  which considers the case where  $\mathcal{B}$  has provided a warning message but  $\mathcal{C}$  manages to convince at least threshold arbiters to set their verdicts to 1, that ultimately results in  $\sum_{j=1}^n w_{1,j} \geq e$ . We argue that the adversary’s success probability in this event is

negligible in the security parameter. In particular, due to the security of SAP,  $\mathcal{C}$  cannot convince an arbiter to accept a different decryption key, e.g.,  $k' \in \tilde{\pi}'$ , that will be used to decrypt  $\mathcal{B}$ 's encrypted message  $\hat{m}_1^{(\mathcal{B})}$ , other than what was agreed between  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  in the initiation phase, i.e.,  $k_1 \in \tilde{\pi}_1$ . To be more precise, it cannot persuade an arbiter to accept a statement  $\tilde{\pi}'$ , where  $\tilde{\pi}' \neq \tilde{\pi}_1$  except with a negligible probability,  $\mu(\lambda)$ . This ensures that honest  $\mathcal{B}$ 's original message (and accordingly the warning) is accessed by every arbiter with a high probability. Next, we consider event II :  $\left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{1,j} < e \right) \wedge (v_1 = 1) \right)$  that captures the case where only less than threshold arbiters approved that the pass message was given incorrectly or the missing message could prevent the APP fraud, but the final verdict that  $\mathcal{DR}$  extracts implies that at least threshold arbiters approved that. We argue that the probability that this event occurs is negligible in the security parameter. Specifically, due to the security of the SAP,  $\mathcal{C}$  cannot persuade (a) an arbiter to accept a different encryption key and (b)  $\mathcal{DR}$  to accept a different decryption key other than what was agreed between  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  in the initiation phase. Specifically, it cannot persuade them to accept a statement  $\tilde{\pi}'$ , where  $\tilde{\pi}' \neq \tilde{\pi}_2$  except with a negligible probability,  $\mu(\lambda)$ .

Now, we move on to event III :  $\left( (\text{checkWarning}(m_1^{(\mathcal{B})}) = 1) \wedge \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{2,j} \geq e \right) \right)$ . It captures the case where  $\mathcal{B}$  has provided an effective warning message but  $\mathcal{C}$  manages to make at threshold arbiters set their verdicts to 1, that ultimately results in  $\sum_{j=1}^n w_{2,j} \geq e$ . The same argument provided to event I is applicable to this even too. Briefly, due to the security of SAP,  $\mathcal{C}$  cannot persuade an arbiter to accept a different decryption key other than what was agreed between  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  in the initiation phase. Therefore, all arbiters will receive the original message of  $\mathcal{B}$ , including the effective warning message, except a negligible probability,  $\mu(\lambda)$ . Now, we consider event IV :  $\left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{2,j} < e \right) \wedge (v_2 = 1) \right)$ , which captures the case where at least threshold arbiters approved that the warning message was effective but the final verdict that  $\mathcal{DR}$  extracts implies that they approved the opposite. The security argument of event II applies to this event as well. In short, due to the security of the SAP,  $\mathcal{C}$  cannot persuade an arbiter to accept a different encryption key, and cannot convince  $\mathcal{DR}$  to accept a different decryption key other than what was initially agreed between  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ , except a negligible probability,  $\mu(\lambda)$ . Now, we analyse event V :  $\left( u \notin Q \wedge \text{Sig.ver}(pk, u, sig) = 1 \right)$ . This even captures the case where the malicious victim comes up with a valid signature/certificate on a message that has never been queried to the signing oracle. Nevertheless, due to the existential unforgeability of the digital signature scheme, the probability that such an event occurs is negligible,  $\mu(\lambda)$ . Next, we focus on event VI :  $\left( \left( \sum_{j=1}^n w_{3,j} < e \right) \wedge (v_3 = 1) \right)$  that considers the case where less than threshold arbiters indicated that the signature (in  $\mathcal{C}$ 's complaint) is valid, but the final verdict that  $\mathcal{DR}$  extracts implies that at least threshold arbiters approved the signature. This means the adversary has managed to switch the verdicts of those arbiters which voted 0 to 1. However, the probability that this even occurs is negligible as well. Because, due to the SAP's security,  $\mathcal{C}$  cannot convince an arbiter and  $\mathcal{DR}$  to accept different encryption and decryption keys other than what was initially agreed between  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ , except a negligible probability,  $\mu(\lambda)$ . Therefore, with a negligible probability the adversary can switch a verdict for 0 to the verdict for 1.

Moreover, a malicious  $\mathcal{C}$  cannot frame an honest  $\mathcal{B}$  for providing an invalid message by manipulating the smart contract's content, e.g., by replacing an effective warning with an ineffective one in  $\mathcal{S}$ , or excluding a warning from  $\mathcal{S}$ . In particular, to do that, it has to either forge the honest party's signature, so it can send an invalid message on its behalf, or fork the blockchain so the chain comprising a valid message is discarded. In the former case, the adversary's probability of success is negligible as long as the signature is secure. The adversary has the same success probability in the latter case, because it has to generate a long enough chain that excludes the valid message which has a negligible success probability, under the assumption that the hash power of the adversary is lower than those of honest miners and due to the blockchain's liveness property an honestly generated transaction will eventually appear on an honest miner's chain [8].  $\square$

Now, we first present a lemma formally stating that the PwDR scheme is secure against a malicious bank and then prove this lemma.

**Lemma 2.** *If the SAP and blockchain are secure, and the correctness of verdict encoding-decoding protocols (i.e., PVE and FVD) holds, then the PwDR scheme is secure against a malicious bank, with regard to Definition 5.*

*Proof.* We first focus on event I :  $\left(\left(\sum_{j=1}^n w_{1,j} \geq e\right) \wedge (v_1 = 0)\right)$  which captures the case where  $\mathcal{DR}$  is convinced that the pass message was correctly given or an important warning message was not missing, despite at least threshold arbiters do not believe so. We argue that the probability that this event takes place is negligible in the security parameter. Because,  $\mathcal{B}$  cannot persuade  $\mathcal{DR}$  to accept a different decryption key, e.g.,  $k' \in \bar{\pi}'$ , other than what was agreed between  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  in the initiation phase, i.e.,  $\bar{k}_2 \in \bar{\pi}_2$ , except with a negligible probability. Specifically, it cannot persuade  $\mathcal{DR}$  to accept a statement  $\bar{\pi}'$ , where  $\bar{\pi}' \neq \bar{\pi}_2$  except with probability  $\mu(\lambda)$ . Furthermore, as discussed in Section ??, due to the correctness of the verdict encoding-decoding protocols, i.e., PVE and FVD, the probability that multiple representations of verdict 1 cancel out each other is negligible too,  $\frac{1}{2^\lambda}$ . Thus, event I occurs only with a negligible probability,  $\mu(\lambda)$ . To assert that events II :  $\left(\left(\sum_{j=1}^n w_{2,j} \geq e\right) \wedge (v_2 = 0)\right)$ , III :  $\left(\left(\sum_{j=1}^n w_{3,j} \geq e\right) \wedge (v_3 = 0)\right)$ , and IV :  $\left(\left(\sum_{j=1}^n w_{4,j} \geq e\right) \wedge (v_4 = 0)\right)$  occur only with a negligible probability, we can directly use the above argument provided for event I. To avoid repetition, we do not restate them in this proof. Moreover, a malicious  $\mathcal{B}$  cannot frame an honest  $\mathcal{C}$  for providing an invalid message by manipulating the smart contract's content, e.g., by replacing its valid signature with an invalid one or sending a message on its behalf, due to the security of the blockchain.  $\square$

Next, we prove the PwDR protocol's privacy. As before, we first formally state the related lemma and then prove it.

**Lemma 3.** *If the encryption schemes are semantically secure, and the SAP and encoding-decoding schemes (i.e., PVE and FVD) are secure, then the PwDR scheme is privacy-preserving with regard to Definition 6.*

*Proof.* We first focus on property 1, i.e., the privacy of the parties' messages from the public. Due to the privacy-preserving property of the SAP, that relies on the hiding property of the commitment scheme, given the public commitments,  $g := (g_1, g_2)$ , the adversary learns no information about the committed values,  $(\bar{k}_1, \bar{k}_2)$ , except with a negligible probability,  $\mu(\lambda)$ . Thus, it cannot find the encryption-decryption keys used to generate ciphertext  $\hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{z}$ , and  $\hat{\mathbf{w}}$ . Moreover, due to the semantic security of the symmetric key and asymmetric key encryption schemes, given ciphertext  $(\hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, \hat{\mathbf{w}})$  the adversary cannot learn anything about the related plaintext, except with a negligible probability,  $\mu(\lambda)$ . Thus, in experiment  $\text{Exp}_3^{\mathcal{A}_1}$ , adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1$  cannot tell the value of  $\gamma \in \{0, 1\}$  significantly better than just guessing it, i.e., its success probability is at most  $\frac{1}{2} + \mu(\lambda)$ . Now we move on to property 2, i.e., the privacy of each verdict from  $\mathcal{DR}$ . Due to the privacy-preserving property of the SAP, given  $g_1 \in g$ , a corrupt  $\mathcal{DR}$  cannot learn  $\bar{k}_1$ . So, it cannot find the encryption-decryption key used to generate ciphertext  $\hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}$ , and  $\hat{z}$ . Also, public parameters  $(pk, pp)$  and token  $T_2$  are independent of  $\mathcal{C}$ 's and  $\mathcal{B}$ 's exchanged messages (e.g., payment requests or warning messages) and  $\mathcal{D}_j$ 's verdicts. Furthermore, due to the semantic security of the symmetric key and asymmetric key encryption schemes, given ciphertext  $(\hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{z}, \hat{\pi})$  the adversary cannot learn anything about the related plaintext, except with a negligible probability,  $\mu(\lambda)$ . Also, due to the security of the PVE and FVD protocols, the adversary cannot link a verdict to a specific arbiter with a probability significantly better than the maximum probability,  $Pr'$ , that an arbiter sets its verdict to a certain value, i.e., its success probability is at most  $Pr' + \mu(\lambda)$ , even if it is given the final verdicts, except when all arbiters' verdicts are 0. We conclude that, excluding the case where the all verdicts are 0, given  $(T_2, pk, pp, g, \hat{\mathbf{m}}, \hat{\mathbf{l}}, \hat{z}, \hat{\pi}, \hat{\mathbf{w}}, \mathbf{v})$ , adversary  $\mathcal{A}_3$ 's success probability in experiment  $\text{Exp}_4^{\mathcal{A}_2}$  to link a verdict to an arbiter is at most  $Pr' + \mu(\lambda)$ .  $\square$

## 5.1 Extensions

**Micro-enterprise or Charity Customer.** There is a clause in the CRM code that allows a bank to refuse reimbursing a victim of an APP scam, if (i) the victim is an organisation (i.e., Micro-enterprise or

Charity), (ii) the organisation has internal payment procedures that are effective in preventing the APP scam, and (iii) the victim has not followed those procedures. Below, we outline how the PwDR protocol can be extended to capture these requirements. The modified PwDR allows a customer to prove it has followed those requirements (or to prove there were not such procedures), which ultimately benefits an honest customer during the dispute resolution phase (i.e., phase 11). We present the extension in two phases. In phase I, we provide a subprotocol that determines whether the customer has met the above requirements. In phase II, we show how the subprotocol can be integrated into the PwDR protocol.

*Phase I.* In this phase, we provide an overview of a subprotocol that determines if the customer has met the above requirements. At a high level, this subprotocol works as follows.

- (A)  $\mathcal{C}$  sends the organisation's internal procedure specification and the specification's certificate to  $\mathcal{S}$ . Moreover, it sends to  $\mathcal{S}$  a proof,  $p$ , asserting that it has followed the above procedure.
- (B) Every  $\mathcal{D}_i$  takes the following steps:
  - (a) checks the certificate by running procedure  $\text{Sig.ver}(\cdot) \rightarrow h_i$ . It sends  $h_i$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ . It waits until all arbiters provide their inputs. Then, it locally runs  $\text{f.verdict}(h_1, \dots, h_n)$  to determine if the certificate has been approved (by the majority of arbiters). It only proceeds to the next step if  $\text{f.verdict}(\cdot)$  returns 1.
  - (b) checks whether the procedure could prevent the APP scam. If the check passes, then it sends  $v'_i = 1$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ ; otherwise, it sends  $v'_i = 0$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ . Again, it waits until all arbiters provide their inputs. Next, it locally runs  $\text{f.verdict}(v'_1, \dots, v'_n)$ . It only proceeds to the next step if  $\text{f.verdict}(\cdot)$  returns 1.
  - (c) verifies proof  $p$ . If the check passes, then it sends  $v''_i = 1$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ . Otherwise, it sends  $v''_i = 0$  to  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- (C)  $\mathcal{S}$  computes and stores the following values:
  - $h = \text{f.verdict}(h_1, \dots, h_n)$ .
  - if  $h = 1$ , then  $v' = \text{f.verdict}(v'_1, \dots, v'_n)$ .
  - if  $v' = 1$ , then  $v'' = \text{f.verdict}(v''_1, \dots, v''_n)$ .
  - sets  $g = 1$ , if one of the following two conditions holds:
    - \*  $h = 0$ .
    - \*  $h \wedge v'' = 1$ .
  - otherwise (if neither condition holds), sets  $g = 0$ .

*Phase II.* Now describe how the above subprotocol's phases can be integrated into the PwDR protocol. First, phases (A) and (B), of the subprotocol, are added to steps 9a and 10f, of the PwDR protocol, respectively. Second, the checks in phase ?? of the PwDR protocol need to also ensure that  $g = 1$ , by taking the steps of phase (C) in the subprotocol.

Note that in step (B)b of the subprotocol, it is assumed that each arbiter uses a well-defined process to evaluate whether the customer's internal payment procedures could have prevented the APP scam. Nevertheless, effective payment procedures that prevent the APP fraud have not been appropriately defined by the CRM code. This leads to a manual and inefficient evaluation process. Therefore, one may ask:

*Q1: which measures exactly should be included in the internal payment procedures of an organisation to prevent APP scams?*

Given an explicit list of payment procedures that prevent APP scams, we could make the above evaluation procedure autonomous and transparent. In particular, such a list could be encoded into the smart contract  $\mathcal{S}$  which receives inputs from the customer (and possibly arbiters) and check if those internal payment procedures were effective in preventing the APP scam.

**Security against exploitative victim.** Having in place a transparent deterministic procedure (e.g., the PwDR protocol) for evaluating victims' requests for reimbursement could potentially create opportunities for exploitations. In particular, an honest victim of the APP fraud who had been reimbursed in the past due to the payment system's vulnerability, e.g., ineffective payment, may be tempted to exploit the same known vulnerability multiple times. Below, we outline two cases in which the malicious victim may exploit a known vulnerability and describe how they can be dealt with.

- Case 1: A genuine victim, who previously had been reimbursed, colludes with a certain payee. In this case, the malicious victim uses the previous working strategy (e.g., the same certificates and complaints) to declare that it has been a victim of the APP fraud but this time it exploits the weakness (e.g., ignores the ineffective warning). Note, the colluding payee acts exactly the same way as a real scammer does in the APP scam, e.g., after receiving the payment, it transfers the money to another account abroad.
- Case 2: A genuine victim shares (or sells) its knowledge of the vulnerability to a malicious customer who colludes with a payee to claim it has been a victim of the APP scam. Therefore, this case is similar to Case 1 with the main difference that the claimant’s identity changes each time a claim is made.

Ideally, the bank should patch the vulnerability as soon as the first incident occurs; however, this may not be the case in the real world as the cost of improving a (payment) system to deal with such an incident may far exceed the bank’s monetary loss in that incident. Currently, neither the CRM code nor the “Payment Services Regulations” [15] explicitly offer any solution for the above cases. To address the issue in Case 1, we propose the following remedy. First, we introduce two (set of) parameters; namely, threshold and counters. We let bank  $\mathcal{B}$  define the value of the threshold in the smart contract,  $\mathcal{S}$ . Also, we require the protocol to keep track of the number of times the same customer is reimbursed for the same complaint, e.g., ineffective warning. Now we outline how these parameters can assist the protocol to rectify the issue. Each time the protocol receives a customer’s complaint, it checks whether the total number of times the same customer is reimbursed for that specific complaint exceeds the predefined threshold; if so, the protocol discards that complaint. Otherwise, it proceeds as before. More specifically, we amend the PwDR protocol as follows.

- $\mathcal{S}$  maintains a counter vector,  $\mathbf{q}^{(c)} = [(q_e, e), (q_x, x), (q_y, y)]$ , for each customer  $\mathcal{C}$ , where  $q_e, q_x$ , and  $q_y$  are initially set to 0 while  $e, x$  and  $y$  are the types of complaint, as they were defined in the PwDR scheme.
- $\mathcal{B}$  defines a fixed threshold  $t$  in  $\mathcal{S}$ , where  $t > 1$ .
- In Phase 11,  $\mathcal{S}$  increments counter  $q_j$  by 1, each time  $\mathcal{C}$  is reimbursed for complaint  $j$ , where  $j \in \{e, x, y\}$ .
- Algorithm `verComplaint(.)` takes extra parameters  $\mathbf{q}^{(c)}$  and  $t$  as inputs.
- In Phase 10, when a committee member,  $\mathcal{D}_i$ , wants to examine  $\mathcal{C}$ ’s complaint, it reads the content of  $\mathbf{q}^{(c)}$  and  $t$  from  $\mathcal{S}$  and passes them to `verComplaint(.)`, which first checks whether the counter in  $\mathbf{q}^{(c)}$  exceeds  $t$  for the complaint that  $\mathcal{C}$  is making. If the check passes, it sets  $d_i = v_i = \bar{v}_i = w_i = \phi$  and outputs  $(d_i, v_i, \bar{v}_i, w_i)$  without requiring  $\mathcal{D}_i$  to process  $\mathcal{C}$ ’s claim. Otherwise,  $\mathcal{D}_i$  checks the claim as before.

Now, we move on to the issue in Case 2 which is harder to identify than the one in Case 1. Because, in the former case, the identity of a malicious customer which wrongly claims that it has fallen victim to the APP fraud changes continuously and is hardly distinguishable from a genuine victim without the assistance of extra information (e.g., phone records, emails) that is not trivial to attain without external intervention, e.g., a subpoena. To address this issue, we propose the following mitigation. Briefly, we require  $\mathcal{B}$  to enhance its system and rectify the issue when the number of complaints related to the same issue exceeds a global threshold. Specifically,  $\mathcal{B}$  defines in  $\mathcal{S}$  a *global* threshold  $gt$  and global counter vector  $\mathbf{g} = [(g_e, e), (g_x, x), (g_y, y)]$ , where the vector’s elements are defined the same way as those are defined in  $\mathbf{q}$ , with the difference that they are global and are not for a specific customer. Each time a customer is reimbursed for a reason the related counter in  $\mathbf{g}$  is incremented by 1. When a counter exceeds the value of  $gt$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  notifies  $\mathcal{B}$  which patches the issue and then sets the related counter to 0. Note that the value of  $gt$  can be set such that when the monetary loss exceeds the upgrade costs, then  $\mathcal{B}$  upgrades the system.

## 6 Discussion

### 6.1 Effective Warning

In the protocol, in step 7, to which value  $\mathcal{C}$  sets its message  $m_2^{(c)}$  is not totally deterministic and depends on various (external) factors, e.g., warning effectiveness, human factors. It is very likely that if  $m_1^{(b)} = \text{“pass”}$ , then  $\mathcal{C}$  acts deterministically, by asking  $\mathcal{B}$  to make the payment, i.e.,  $\mathcal{C}$  sets  $m_2^{(c)} = in_p$ . However, to which value  $\mathcal{C}$  sets  $m_2^{(c)}$  when (a)  $m_1^{(b)} = \text{warning}$  or (b) no message is provided by  $\mathcal{B}$  at time  $T_2$ , depends on many

factors. For instance, if the warning is not effective and does not concern  $\mathcal{C}$ , then  $\mathcal{C}$  still would set  $m_2^{(c)} = in_p$ . Similarly, if  $\mathcal{B}$  does not send  $m_1^{(b)}$ , it is still possible that  $\mathcal{C}$  sets  $m_2^{(c)} = in_p$ , for instance when it is distracted and does not pay attention to the absence of the message that was supposed to be provided by  $\mathcal{B}$  on time. On the other hand, if the warning is effective, or  $\mathcal{C}$  in general is highly sensitive to warnings and the absence of  $\mathcal{B}$ 's message, then it does not make any payment, i.e., it sets  $m_2^{(c)} = \phi$ . Despite the above challenges, the proposed protocol ensures that  $\mathcal{C}$  will be identified as the party who should be reimbursed, if it acts according to the protocol, makes a payment but the warning was ineffective or no message was provided by  $\mathcal{B}$  in step 7. Therefore, the following questions would follow:

*Q2: what percentage of customers after encountering the warning do still proceed to make a payment (i.e., set  $m_2^{(c)} = in_p$ )?*

*Q3: how to make the above rate negligibly small?*

There exists a comprehensive research line in determining the effectiveness of warnings, e.g., in [10,4,7]. These traditional research line studies which factors make warnings effective and how a warning recipient is attracted to and follows the warning message. However, in the context of APP scams, there is a vital unique factor that can directly influence a warning effectiveness; the factor is *the ability of the scammer to interact directly with the victim* (or warning recipient). This lets a scammer to actively try to negate the effectiveness of banks' warnings and persuade the warning recipient to ignore the warning (and make payment). Such a factor was not (needed to be) taken into account in the traditional study of warnings. Therefore, one may ask:

*Q4: to what extent can a scammer negate a warning effectiveness in the oncontext of APP scams?*

One way to answer the above question is to study each individual bank's statistics and find out how successful they have been in combatting the APP scams, as each bank designs its payment system and warnings independent of other banks. Thus, it would be interesting to find out:

*Q5: which bank does have the lowest rate of APP scams and how did its warnings contribute to the low rate?*

Furthermore, in step 10f, it is implicitly assumed that in order for each arbiter,  $\mathcal{D}_i$ , to judge the effectiveness of the warning and reach a verdict, it has access to the payment system and it can interact with  $\mathcal{C}$  offline, e.g., to obtain further evidence from it. Nevertheless, this process can be time consuming and a verdict may not be released in the real time once  $\mathcal{C}$  sends its complaint to  $\mathcal{S}$ . Thus, it is natural to ask:

*Q6: to what extent can the role of the arbiters be automated and accurately played by a computer program?*

## 6.2 Ensuring the Payment is for Genuine Goods and Services

There are a set of terms in the CRM code that states:

*"In all the circumstances at the time of the payment, in particular the characteristics of the Customer and the complexity and sophistication of the APP scam, the Customer made the payment without a reasonable basis for believing that:*

- (i) *the payee was the person the Customer was expecting to pay;*
- (ii) *the payment was for genuine goods or services; and/or*
- (iii) *the person or business with whom they transacted was legitimate".*

We argue that clause (ii) plays a minor role in preventing a APP scam, as it is effective only when the seller wrongly claims it is in possession of a certain goods or can deliver certain services. It is ineffective when a customer ensures goods or services it wants to receive are indeed genuine but the seller avoids delivering the goods/services. In this case, a seller (regardless of whether it is legitimate or not) may prove to the customer that the goods and services are genuine and belong to it (e.g., by sending a copy of related genuine document), but it still avoids delivering them once it receives the money. To capture the above issue as well, the above clause should be modified as follows:

*“... the delivery of genuine goods or services are guaranteed...”.*

There are at least two ways to have the above guarantee: (a) involving a reputable trusted third-party intermediary which can compensate the customer if the seller misbehaves, e.g., eBay, amazon, or (b) using a secure “contingent service payment” scheme (e.g., in [5]) that supports the fair exchange of digital goods or services and money without the involvement of the above trusted third-party intermediary. In this case, there would be no need for the customer to ensure if the seller is legitimate, because it pays only if genuine goods or services are delivered. The existing fair exchange schemes allow a seller and buyer to trade with each other *outside of the bank payment system* by using a blockchain. However, these schemes can be embedded into the bank payment system such that the bank (or a group of banks) maintains the blockchain and converts internally a customer’s fiat currency to a digital one when the customer wants to trade in a fair manner with a party whose authenticity cannot be verified.

### 6.3 Ensuring the Legitimacy and Authenticity of Payee

We highlight that even though clauses (i) and (iii), presented in Section 6.2, can prevent a customer from falling to an APP scam, only in certain cases they would benefit a victim of an APP fraud during the process of allocating liability or dispute resolution. In particular, if the victim declares that (a) it has used a secure authentication mechanism (e.g., digital signature) to ensure the legitimacy and authenticity of the payee or (b) it has not performed any authentication, then it would not receive the reimbursement. In the former case, it has transferred the money to the party it knows. However, this is not an APP scam, according to the scam’s general definition. In the latter case, the firm can avoid reimbursing it, according to the CRM code (as the customer has not performed its part). The only case in which the customer might be reimbursed is when it (a) uses an insecure means for authentication (e.g., phone call) and (b) can prove it has done such a check. For instance, in the case where the victim has been asked by a scammer to make a phone call to its bank while the scammer answers the phone call that the victim makes later. In this case, the victim needs to prove that it has made a phone call to the bank, which may not be always possible (e.g., if the scammer uses a method to reply to the call before the real connection between the customer and bank is made). In this case, in order for the customer to be reimbursed it needs to provide an evidence while there is no evidence left behind by the scammer. Thus, it is natural to ask:

*Q7: how can the victim prove it has been a victim of an APP scam, in the above case?*

### 6.4 Lack of Gross Negligence Definition

One of the conditions in the CRM code that allows a bank to avoid reimbursing the customer is clause R2(1)(e) which states:

*“The Customer has been grossly negligent. For the avoidance of doubt the provisions of R2(1)(a)-(d) should not be taken to define gross negligence in this context.”*

Nevertheless, neither the CRM code nor the Payment Services Regulations explicitly define under which circumstances the customer is considered “grossly negligent” in the context of the APP scam. In particular, in the CRM code, the only terms that discuss customer’s misbehaviour are the provisions of R2(1)(a)-(d); however, as stated above, they should be excluded from the definition of the term gross negligence. On the other hand, in the Payment Services Regulations, this term is used three times, i.e., twice in regulation 75 and once in regulation 77. But in all three cases it is used for frauds related to *unauthorised payments* which are different types of frauds from the APP scams. Therefore, even the Payment Services Regulations does not define the term in the context of the APP scam.

When an accurate definition of the term is in place, its conditions can be encoded into the smart contract of the PwDR protocol. This allows the PwDR protocol to transparently resolve disputes between the bank and customer, if the bank claims that the customer has been grossly negligent.

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## A Bloom Filter

In this work, we use Bloom filters to let parties (in Feather) identify real set elements from errors. A Bloom filter [2] is a compact data structure for probabilistic efficient elements’ membership checking. A Bloom filter is an array of  $m$  bits that are initially all set to zero. It represents  $n$  elements. A Bloom filter comes along with  $k$  independent hash functions. To insert an element, all the hash values of the element are computed and their corresponding bits in the filter are set to 1. To check an element’s membership, all its hash values are re-computed and checked whether all are set to one in the filter. If all the corresponding bits are one, then the element is probably in the filter; otherwise, it is not. In Bloom filters false positives are possible, i.e. it is possible that an element is not in the set, but the membership query shows that it is. According to [3], the upper bound of the false positive probability is:  $q = p^k(1 + O(\frac{k}{p}\sqrt{\frac{\ln m - k \ln p}{m}}))$ , where  $p$  is the probability that a particular bit in the filter is set to 1 and calculated as:  $p = 1 - (1 - \frac{1}{m})^{kn}$ . The efficiency of a Bloom filter depends on  $m$  and  $k$ . The lower bound of  $m$  is  $n \log_2 e \cdot \log_2 \frac{1}{q}$ , where  $e$  is the base of natural logarithms, while the optimal number of hash functions is  $\log_2 \frac{1}{q}$ , when  $m$  is optimal. In this paper, we only use optimal  $k$  and  $m$ . In practice, we would like to have a predefined acceptable upper bound on false positive probability, e.g.  $q = 2^{-40}$ . Thus, given  $q$  and  $n$ , we can determine the rest of the parameters.



## B Generic Verdict Encoding-Decoding Protocols

Figures 5 and 6 present the generic verdict encoding-decoding protocols (i.e., GPVE and GFVD), that let a semi-honest third party  $\mathcal{I}$  find out if at least  $e$  arbiters voted 1, where  $e$  can be any integer in the range  $[1, n]$ .




Fig. 5: Generic Private Verdict Encoding (GPVE) Protocol




Fig. 6: Generic Final Verdict Decoding (GFVD) Protocol