Signatures without RO

Anonymous Submission

No Institute Given

1 Preliminaries

1.1 Signatures

A digital signature scheme consists of three algorithms $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sgn}, \mathsf{Ver})$. A key generation algorithm Gen, a signing algorithm Sgn and a verification algorithm Ver. Gen is a randomised algorithm that produces a random key pair consisting of a public key pk and a secret key sk. The probabilistic signing algorithm Sgn requires a secret key and a message from the message space M and produces a signature σ. Finally, the verification algorithm Ver takes a public key, a message and a signature as input and returns either 0/reject or 1/accept. A signature scheme is called correct, if every signature on a message generated with a secret key is accepted under the corresponding public key.

Definition 1 (RMA security). *A signature scheme $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sgn}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is said to be (t, q, ϵ)-secure against existential forgery under the random message attack (EUF-RMA), if for all adversary $\mathcal{A}$ running in time at most t we have*

$$\Pr[q\text{-}\mathsf{EUF\text{-}RMA}_{\Pi}(\mathcal{A})] = 1] \leq \epsilon.$$

We say $\mathcal{A}$, (t, q, ϵ)-breaks the EUF-RMA security of the signature if

$$\Pr[q\text{-}\mathsf{EUF\text{-}RMA}_{\Pi}(\mathcal{A}) = 1] > \epsilon$$

Game $q\text{-}\mathsf{EUF\text{-}RMA}_{\Pi}(\mathcal{A})$

$(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}$
$\mathcal{Q} \leftarrow \emptyset$
for $i \in [q]$
 $m_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{M}$
 $\sigma_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Sgn}(sk, m_i)$
 $\mathcal{Q} \leftarrow \mathcal{Q} \cup (m_i, \sigma_i)$
$(m*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, \mathcal{Q})$
if $\mathsf{Ver}(pk, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1 \land m^* \notin \{m_1, .., m_q\}$ **then return** 1
else return 0

Figure 1.

1.2 Hash Functions

Let $\mathbb{G} = (\mathsf{G}_k)$ be a family of groups, indexed by the security parameter $k \in \mathbb{N}$. We omit the subscript when the reference to the security parameter is clear, thus write G for G_k.
A *group hash function* H over G with input length $l = l(k)$ consists of two efficient algorithms $\mathsf{PHF.Gen}$ and $\mathsf{PHF.Eval}$. The probabilistic algorithm $\kappa \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.Gen}(1^k)$ generates a hash key κ for the security parameter k. Algorithm $\mathsf{PHF.Eval}$ is a deterministic algorithm, taking as input a hash function key κ and $X \in \{0,1\}^l$, and returning $\mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, X) \in \mathsf{G}$. In the context were κ is clear we write $\mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, X)$ as $\mathsf{H}(X)$.

Definition 2 (Correlation Interactibilty). *We say an adversary $\mathcal{A}$, $(t,\epsilon)-$breaks the correlation intractability of a hash function $\mathsf{H} = (\mathsf{PHF.Gen}, \mathsf{PHF.Eval})$ with regards to function g if $\mathcal{A}$ runs in time t and*

$$\Pr[x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}, \mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, x) = g(x); \kappa \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.Gen}] \geq \epsilon.$$

We call the hash function $(t,\epsilon)-$correlation intractable if such an adversary does not exist.

Definition 3. *A group hash function $H = (\mathsf{PHF.Gen}, \mathsf{PHF.Eval})$ is a $(m, n, n\gamma, \delta)-$programmable, if there is an efficient trapdoor key generation algorithm $\mathsf{PHF.TrapGen}$ and an efficient trapdoor evaluation algorithm $\mathsf{PHF.TrapEval}$ with the following properties.*

1. *The probabilistic trapdoor generation algorithm $(\kappa, \eta) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.TrapGen}(1^k, g_1, g_2)$ takes as input group elements $g, h \in \mathsf{G}$, and produces a hash function key κ together with trapdoor information η.*
2. *For all generators $g_1, g_2 \in \mathsf{G}$, the keys $\kappa \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.Gen}(1^k)$ and $\kappa' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.Gen}(1^k, g_1, g_2)$ are statistically γ-close.*
3. *On input $X \in \{0,1\}^l$ and trapdoor information η, the deterministic trapdoor evaluation algorithm $(a_X, b_X) \leftarrow \mathsf{PHF.TrapEval}(\eta, X)$ produces $a_X, b_X \in \mathbb{Z}$ so that for all $X in \{0,1\}^l$,*

$$\mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, X) = g_1^{a_X} g_2^{b_X}.$$

4. *For all $g_1, g_2 \in \mathsf{G}$, all κ generated by $\kappa \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.TrapGen}(1^k, g_1, g_2)$, and all $X_1, .., X_m \, in \{0,1\}^l$ and $Z_1, ..., Z_n \in \{0,1\}^l$ such that $X_i \neq Z_j$ for all i, j, we have*

$$\Pr[a_{X_1} = ... = a_{X_m} = 0 \wedge a_{Z_1}, ..., a_{Z_n} \neq 0] \geq \delta$$

where $(a_{X_i}, b_{X_i}) = \mathsf{PHF.TrapEval}(\eta, X_i)$ and $(a_{Z_i}, b_{Z_i}) = \mathsf{PHF.TrapGen}(\eta, Z_j)$, and the probability is taken over the trapdoor η produced along with κ.

2 Identification Scheme

Definition 4 (Canonical Tag-based Identification Scheme). *A canonical tag-based identification (tag-ID) scheme is defined as the probabilistic algotithms* $\mathsf{ID} := (\mathsf{IGen}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V})$ *where*

- IGen *returns a public key and secret key* (pk, sk)*. We assume that* pk *defines the challenge set* ChSet *and tag space* TgSet*.*
- *The prover algorithm* $\mathsf{P} = (\mathsf{P}_1, \mathsf{P}_2)$ *is split into two algorithms.* P_1 *takes the secret key* sk *and a tag* τ *from the tag space* M *as the input and returns a commitment* Com *and a state* St*.* P_2 *takes the secret key* sk*, the state* St *and a challenge* C *as an input and returns a response* s*.*
- *The deterministic verifier algorithm* V *takes the public key* pk*, the tag* τ*, the commitment* Com*, the challenge* C *and the response* s *as an input and outputs a decision, 1 (acceptance) or 0 (rejection).*

For correctness we require that for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$*,* $(pk, sk) \in \mathsf{IGen}(1^k)$*, all* $(Com, St) \in \mathsf{P}_1(sk, \tau)$*, all* $C \in \mathsf{ChSet}$ *and all* $s \in \mathsf{P}_2(sk, St, C)$*, we have*

$$\mathsf{V}(pk, Com, C, s) = 1.$$

Prover(sk, τ)		**Verifier**(pk)
$(Com, St) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_1(sk, \tau)$	$\xrightarrow{\tau, Com}$	
	$\xleftarrow{C}$	$C \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{ChSet}$
$s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_2(sk, St, C)$	$\xrightarrow{s}$	
		$d := \mathsf{V}(pk, Com, C, s)$

Figure 2. Canonical Tag-based Identification Scheme

Definition 5 (Dual Tag-ID). *A dual canonical tag based identification scheme (dual tag-id) is a identification scheme* ID*, with an additional algorithm* $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}$ *called the alternative verification algorithm that takes the secret key* sk*, the tag* τ*, the commitment* Com*, the challenge* C *and the response* s *as an input and outputs a decision, 1 (acceptance) or 0 (rejection).*
For the correctness of this scheme in additional to the correctness defined before we require that for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$*,* $(pk, sk) \in \mathsf{IGen}(1^k)$*, all* $(Com, St) \in \mathsf{P}_1(sk, \tau)$*, all* $C \in \mathsf{ChSet}$ *and all* $s \in \mathsf{P}_2(sk, St, C)$*, we have*

$$\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(sk, \tau, Com, C, s) = 1.$$

Definition 6 (Existential Unforgeablilty against Passive Attacks). *A dual tag-ID scheme is said to be* (t, q, ϵ)-UF-PA *secure, if for all adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *running in time at most* t *we have*

$$\Pr[q\text{-}\mathsf{PA}_{\mathsf{ID}}(\mathcal{A})] = 1] \leq \epsilon.$$

Unlike most commonly used identification schemes the canonical tag based ID schemes we use are not Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK) and instead have some different soundness property.

Game $q\text{-}\mathsf{PA}_{\mathsf{ID}}(\mathcal{A})$

$(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{IGen}$
$\mathcal{Q} \leftarrow \emptyset$
for $i \in [q]$
  $\tau_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{M}$
  $(Com_i, St_i) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_1(sk, \tau_i)$
  $C_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{ChSet}$
  $s_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_2(sk, St_i, C_i)$
  $\mathcal{Q} \leftarrow \mathcal{Q} \cup (\tau_i, Com_i, C_i, s_i)$
$(\tau^*, Com^*, C^*, s^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, \mathcal{Q})$
if $\tau^* \notin \{\tau_1, ..., \tau_q\} \wedge \tilde{\mathsf{V}}(sk, \tau^*, Com^*, C^*, s^*) = 1$
 then return 1
else return 0

Figure 3.

Definition 7 (Uniqueness). *We say the identification scheme* $\mathsf{ID} := (\mathsf{IGen}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{ChSet}, \mathsf{V})$ *is unique if for every* $(sk, pk) \in \mathsf{IGen}$ *and every* $(Com, St) \in \mathsf{P}_1(sk, \tau)$,

$$\left|\{C \in \mathsf{ChSet} \mid \exists\, s : \mathsf{V}(pk, Com, C, s) = 1 \wedge \tilde{\mathsf{V}}(sk, Com, \mathcal{C}, s) \neq 1\}\right| = 1.$$

This means there exist a (not necessarily polynomial time) function we call the uniqueness function such as f *that*

$$f(pk, Com) = C.$$

3 Constructions

To construct a signature $\mathsf{Sig}[\mathsf{ID}, \mathsf{H}] := (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sgn}, \mathsf{Ver})$ from a cannonical tag-based identification scheme $\mathsf{ID} := (\mathsf{IGen}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V})$ we proceed as in Figure 4.

$\underline{\mathsf{Gen}:}$

$(pk_0, sk_0) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{IGen}$
$(pk_1, sk_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{IGen}$
$pk \coloneqq (pk_0, pk_1)$
$sk \coloneqq (sk_0, sk_1)$
$\textbf{return } (sk, pk)$

$\underline{\mathsf{Ver}(pk, \sigma, m):}$

$\textbf{parse } \sigma = (Com_0, C_0, s_0, Com_1, C_1, s_1)$
$\textbf{if } C_0 \oplus C_1 \neq \mathsf{H}(pk, Com_0, Com_1)$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 0$
$\textbf{if } \mathsf{V}(pk_0, Com_0, C_0, s_0) = 0$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 0$
$\textbf{if } \mathsf{V}(pk_1, Com_1, C_1, s_1) = 0$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 0$
$\textbf{else return } 1$

$\underline{\mathsf{Sgn}(sk, m):}$

$\textbf{parse } sk = (sk_0, sk_1)$
$(Com_0, St_0) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_1(sk_0, m)$
$(Com_1, St_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_1(sk_1, m)$
$k = \mathsf{H}(pk, Com_0, Com_1)$
$e \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{ChSet}$
$C_0 = d \oplus e$
$C_1 = e$
$s_0 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_2(sk_0, St_0, C_0)$
$s_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_2(sk_1, St_1, C_1)$
$\sigma \coloneqq (Com_0, C_0, s_0, Com_1, C_1, s_1)$
$\textbf{return } \sigma$

Figure 4. Instantiation 1

$\underline{\mathsf{G}_0 - \mathsf{G}_3}$

$b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ $\quad /\!\!/ \mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
$\mathtt{BAD}_2 \leftarrow \textbf{true}$ $\quad /\!\!/ \mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
$(pk_0, sk_0) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{IGen}$
$(pk_1, sk_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{IGen}$
$pk \coloneqq (pk_0, pk_1)$
$sk \coloneqq (sk_0, sk_1)$
$\textbf{for } i \in [q]$
$\quad m_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{M}$
$\quad (Com_{0,i}, St_{0,i}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_1(sk_0, m_i)$
$\quad (Com_{1,i}, St_{1,i}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_1(sk_1, m_i)$
$\quad k_i = \mathsf{H}(pk, Com_{0,i}, Com_{1,i})$
$\quad e_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{ChSet}$
$\quad C_{0,i} = k_i \oplus e_i$
$\quad C_{1,i} = e_i$
$\quad s_{0,i} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_2(sk_0, St_{0,i}, C_{0,i})$
$\quad s_{1,i} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_2(sk_1, St_{1,i}, C_{1,i})$
$\quad \sigma_i \coloneqq (Com_{0,i}, C_{0,i}, s_{0,i}, Com_{1,i}, C_{1,i}, s_{1,i})$
$\quad \mathcal{Q} \leftarrow \mathcal{Q} \cup (m_i, \sigma_i)$
$(m*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, \mathcal{Q})$
$\textbf{parse } \sigma^* = (Com_0^*, C_0^*, s_0^*, Com_1^*, C_1^*, s_1^*)$
$\textbf{if } \tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_0, Com_0^*, C_0^*, s_0^*) = 0 \wedge \tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_0, Com_0^*, C_0^*, s_0^*) = 0$ $\quad /\!\!/ \mathsf{G}_1 - \mathsf{G}_3$
$\textbf{then } \mathtt{BAD}_1 \leftarrow \textbf{true}; \mathsf{abort}$ $\quad /\!\!/ \mathsf{G}_1 - \mathsf{G}_3$
$\textbf{if } \tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_b, Com_b^*, C_b^*, s_b^*) = 0$ $\quad /\!\!/ \mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
$\textbf{then } \mathtt{BAD}_2 \leftarrow \textbf{true};$ $\quad /\!\!/ \mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_2$
$\quad \mathsf{abort}$ $\quad /\!\!/ \mathsf{G}_3$
$\textbf{if } C_0^* + C_1^* \neq \mathsf{H}(pk, Com_0^*, Com_1^*)$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 0$
$\textbf{if } \mathsf{V}(pk_0, Com_0, C_0, s_0) = 0 \vee \mathsf{V}(pk_1, Com_1, C_1, s_1) = 0$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 0$
$\textbf{if } m^* \notin \{m_1, .., m_q\}$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 0$
$\textbf{else return } 1$

$\underline{\mathsf{G}_4}$

$b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$
$\mathtt{BAD}_2 \leftarrow \textbf{true}$
$(pk_0, sk_0) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{IGen}$
$(pk_1, sk_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{IGen}$
$pk \coloneqq (pk_0, pk_1)$
$sk \coloneqq (sk_0, sk_1)$
$\textbf{for } i \in [q]$
$\quad m_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{M}$
$\quad (Com_{0,i}, St_{0,i}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_1(sk_0, m_i)$
$\quad (Com_{1,i}, St_{1,i}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_1(sk_1, m_i)$
$\quad k_i = \mathsf{H}(pk, Com_{0,i}, Com_{1,i})$
$\quad e_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{ChSet}$
$\quad C_{b,i} = e_i$
$\quad C_{1-b,i} = k_i \oplus e_i$
$\quad s_{0,i} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_2(sk_0, St_{0,i}, C_{0,i})$
$\quad s_{1,i} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{P}_2(sk_1, St_{1,i}, C_{1,i})$
$\quad \sigma_i \coloneqq (Com_{0,i}, C_{0,i}, s_{0,i}, Com_{1,i}, C_{1,i}, s_{1,i})$
$\quad \mathcal{Q} \leftarrow \mathcal{Q} \cup (m_i, \sigma_i)$
$(m*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, \mathcal{Q})$
$\textbf{parse } \sigma^* = (Com_0^*, C_0^*, s_0^*, Com_1^*, C_1^*, s_1^*)$
$\textbf{if } \tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_0, Com_0^*, C_0^*, s_0^*) = 0 \wedge \tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_0, Com_0^*, C_0^*, s_0^*) = 0$
$\textbf{then } \mathtt{BAD}_1 \leftarrow \textbf{true}; \mathsf{abort}$
$\textbf{if } \tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_b, Com_b^*, C_b^*, s_b^*) = 0$
$\textbf{then } \mathtt{BAD}_2 \leftarrow \textbf{true};$
$\quad \mathsf{abort}$
$\textbf{if } C_0^* + C_1^* \neq \mathsf{H}(pk, Com_0^*, Com_1^*)$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 0$
$\textbf{if } \mathsf{V}(pk_0, Com_0, C_0, s_0) = 0 \vee \mathsf{V}(pk_1, Com_1, C_1, s_1) = 0$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 0$
$\textbf{if } m^* \notin \{m_1, .., m_q\}$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 0$
$\textbf{else return } 1$

Figure 5.

3.1 Security

We say the signature $\sigma = (Com_0, C_0, s_0, Com_1, C_1, s_1)$ is partially valid if $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_0, Com_0, C_0, s_0) = 1$ or $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_1, Com_1, C_1, s_1) = 1$ not partially valid if $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_0, Com_0, C_0, s_0) = 0$ and $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_1, Com_1, C_1, s_1) = 0$.

Theorem 1. *Let* ID *be a unique dual tag-based ID scheme with the uniqueness function* f *and* H *be a* (t'', ϵ'') *correlation intractable hash function with regards to function* g *where*

$$g :=$$

Suppose there exists a (t, q, ϵ)*-forger* $\mathcal{F}$ *breaking the security of* $\mathsf{Sig}_{\mathsf{ID},\mathsf{H}}$ *against the existential forgery under the random message attack. Then there exists an adversary that* (t', q, ϵ')*-breaks the* $\mathsf{UF\text{-}PA}^{\tilde{\mathsf{V}}}$ *security of* ID *with* $t' \approx t$ *and*

$$\epsilon \leq \epsilon'' + 2\epsilon'$$

Proof. We define the event of Game G_i winning (returning 1) as X_i. Let (m_i, σ_i) denote the i-th random message and its signature. Let (m^*, σ^*) be the forgery output by $\mathcal{F}$.

Game 0. We define Game 0 as the existential unforgeability experiment with forger $\mathcal{F}$ on the signature scheme$\mathsf{Sig}_{\mathsf{ID},\mathsf{H}}$ as shown in Figure 5. By definition, we have

$$\Pr[X_0] = \epsilon.$$

Game 1. In G_1 we check if the signature is partially valid or not and set $\mathtt{BAD}_1$ to **true** and abort if it isn't. Which according to Lemma 1 and H being (t'', ϵ'') correlation intractable happens with at most ϵ'' probability and so we have

$$|\Pr[X_1] - \Pr[X_0]| \leq \epsilon''.$$

Game 2. In G_2 we pick a random bit b in the beginning of the game and after getting the forged signature σ^* which we parse as

$$\sigma^* = (Com_0^*, C_0^*, s_0^*, Com_1^*, C_1^*, s_1^*),$$

we check whether $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(pk_b, Com_b^*, C_b^*, s_b^*)$ is zero and set the tag $\mathtt{BAD}_2$ to **true** if it is. Since this change is only internal to the game

$$\Pr[X_1] = \Pr[X_2].$$

Game 3. In G_3 we abort if $\mathtt{BAD}_2$ that we defined in the last game is set to **true**. Since the game would have already aborted if the forged signature was not partially valid signature and b was chosen randomly in the beginning, we have $\Pr[\mathtt{BAD}_2] \leq \frac{1}{2}$, which implies

$$\Pr[X_3] = \Pr[X_2 \wedge \neg\mathtt{BAD}_2] \geq \frac{1}{2}\Pr[X_2].$$

Game 4. Game G_4 is exactly like G_3 except instead of always choosing $C_{0,i}$ randomly from the ChSet and then calculating $C_{1,i}$ accordingly, we choose $C_{b,i}$ first and then calculate $C_{1-b,i}$. Since the distribution of $(C_{0,i}, C1, i)$ does not change we have

$$\Pr[X_4] = \Pr[X_3].$$

We point out that in this game we can choose $(m_i, Com_{b,i}, C_{i,b}, s_{b,i})$ first and then calculate $(Com_{1-b,i}, C_{1-b,i}, s_{1-b,i})$ and thus the signature σ_i accordingly.

Now adversary $\mathcal{A}$ simulates game G_4. The $\mathcal{A}$ receives pk_b and $(\tau_i, Com_{b,i}, C_{b,i}, s_{b,i})$ from the alternative impersonation game and proceeds to run IGen to obtain pk_{1-b} and calculate signatures on message $m_i := \tau_i$. As pointed out before it is possible to calculate σ_i according to $(\tau_i, Com_{b,i}, C_{b,i}, s_{b,i})$.

It remains to show how $\mathcal{A}$ can break the alternative impersonation from the forged signature $\sigma^* = (Com_0^*, C_0^*, s_0^*, Com_1^*, C_1^*, s_1^*)$ on message m^* output by $\mathcal{F}$. We know that $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(sk_b, m^*, Com_b^*, C_b^*, s_b^*) = 1$ (by game 2). So $\mathcal{A}$ can win the alternative impersonation game by outputting $(m^*, Com_b^*, C_b^*, s_b^*)$. ■

Lemma 1. *Let $\mathcal{F}$ be a forger that (t, q, ϵ)-breaks the RMA security of the signature such that the forged signature it outputs is not partially valid. Then there exists adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that (t'', ϵ'')-breaks the correlation intractability of the hash function H with $t \approx t''$ and*

$$\epsilon'' \geq \epsilon.$$

Proof. The correlation intractability adversary $\mathcal{A}$ runs the unforgeability experiment by running IGen twice and obtaining two pairs of keys we name (sk_0, pk_0) and (sk_1, pk_1). The adversary now return $pk := (pk_0, pk_1)$ to $\mathcal{F}$ as the public key and also chooses random messages $m_1, ..., m_q$ and signs them with the secret key $sk := (sk_0, sk_1)$ to obtain the signatures $\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_q$ and returns the (m_i, σ_i) pairs to $\mathcal{F}$.

Eventually, $\mathcal{F}$ returns a message and signature pair (m^*, σ^*), from which $\mathcal{A}$ extracts the solution that breaks the hash intractability as follows.

First $\mathcal{A}$ parses σ^* as $(Com_0^*, C_0^*, s_0^*, Com_1^*, C_1^*, s_1^*)$. We assume that the forged signature is valid and since it is not partially valid, due to the uniqueness of the identification scheme we can write

$$C_0^* = f(pk_0, Com_0^*)$$

$$C_1^* = f(pk_1, Com_1^*).$$

Since we have assumed the forged signature is valid

$$\mathsf{H}(pk, Com_0^*, Com_1^*) = C_0^* + C_1^* = f(pk_0, Com_0^*) + f(pk_1, Com_1^*) = g(pk, Com_0^*, Com_1^*)$$

must hold. So $\mathcal{A}$ can (t, ϵ') break the g-correlation intractability of H where g is defined as

$$g(pk = (pk_0, pk_1), Com_0, Com_1) = f(pk_0, Com_0) + f(pk_1, Com_1).$$

Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds at giving a solution that breaks the correlation intractability of H whenever $\mathcal{F}$ succeeds at forging a valid signature so

$$\epsilon'' \geq \epsilon.$$

■

4 Instantiation of dual tag ID from q-SDH

Throughout thus section let $\mathsf{par} := (p, \mathsf{G})$ be a set of system parameters, where G is a cyclic group of prime order p.

Definition 8 (q-SDH Assumption). *We say an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ breaks the q-strong Diffie Hellman (q-SDH)assumption if it's running time is bounded by t and*

$$\Pr[(s, g^{\frac{1}{s+x}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(g, g^x, ..., g^{x^q})] \geq \epsilon,$$

where $g \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{G}$ and $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

$\underline{\mathsf{IGen}(\mathsf{par})\text{:}}$

$g \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{G}$
$x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$
$sk := (g, x)$
$X = g^x$
$pk := (g, X)$
$\mathsf{ChSet} := \mathbb{Z}_p$
return (sk, pk)

$\underline{\mathsf{V}(pk, \tau, Com, C, s)\text{:}}$

parse $Com = (\hat{g}, R, \hat{R})$
if $R = g^s \cdot (X \cdot g^{\tau})^{-C} \wedge$
  $\hat{R} = \hat{g}^s \cdot (g \cdot \hat{g}^{-\tau})^C$
  then return 1
else return 0

$\underline{\mathsf{P}_1(sk, \tau)\text{ :}}$

$r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$
$St := (\tau, r)$
$\hat{g} := g^{\frac{1}{x+\tau}}$
$R := g^r$
$\hat{R} := \hat{g}^r$
$Com := (\hat{g}, R, \hat{R})$
return (Com, St)

$\underline{\mathsf{P}_2(sk, St, C)\text{ :}}$

parse $St = (\tau, r)$
parse $sk = x$
return $s = C \cdot (x + \tau) + r \mod p$

$\underline{\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(sk, \tau, Com, C, s)\text{:}}$

parse $Com = (\hat{g}, R, \hat{R})$
parse $sk = x$
if $\hat{g} = g^{\frac{1}{x+\tau}}$
  then return 1
else return 0

Figure 6. Instantiation 1

We describe the identification scheme $\mathsf{ID}_{q-\mathrm{SDH}} := (\mathsf{IGen}, \mathsf{P} = (\mathsf{P}_1, \mathsf{P}_2), \mathsf{ChSet}, \mathsf{V})$ and it's alternative verification $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}$ as depicted in figure 4.

Theorem 2. *Suppose that there exists a (t, q, ϵ)-forger $\mathcal{F}$ breaking the* $\mathsf{UF\text{-}PA}^{\tilde{\mathsf{V}}}$ *of the* ID_{q-SDH} *identification scheme. Then there exists an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that $(t', q+1, \epsilon')-$ breaks the $q+1$-SDH assumption with $t \approx t'$ and $\epsilon' \geq \epsilon$.*

Proof. The q-SDH adversary $\mathcal{A}$ receives $d_0, ..., d_q$ as inputs where $d_i = g^{x^i}$ and simulates the q-SDH experiment as follows

Key Generation:

The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ first chooses random $\tau_1, ..., \tau_q$ from $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Let f be a univariate polynomial defined as $f(X) = \prod_{i=1}^{q}(X + \tau_i)$. Expand f and write $f(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{q} \alpha_i X^i$ where $\alpha_0, ..., \alpha_q \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are coefficients of the polynomial f. Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ chooses a random $\theta \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and computes

$$g_1 \leftarrow \prod_{i=0}^{q} d_i^{\theta \alpha_i}$$

which essentially means $g_1 = g^{\theta f(x)}$. $\mathcal{A}$ can also calculates $X = g_1^x = g^{x f(x)}$ similarly since $X f(X)$ has a degree equal to $q+1$.
Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ returns (g_1, X) as the public key to $\mathcal{F}$. This is indistinguishable from the normal key generation for $\mathbb{F}$ since g_1 is randomly distributed in G and X is correctly computed.

Transcript Generation:

Now adversary $\mathcal{A}$ compute (Com_i, C_i, s_i) for τ_i.
$\mathcal{A}$ computes $\hat{g}_i = g_1^{\frac{1}{x+\tau_i}}$ for $i = 1, .., q$. To do so, let f_i be defined as

$$f_i(X) = \frac{f_i(X)}{X + \tau_i} = \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^{q} (X + \tau_j).$$

As before, we write f_i as $f_i(X) = \sum_{j=0}^{q-1} \beta_j X^j$ while calculating its coefficient. Now $\mathcal{A}$ can compute

$$\hat{g}_i = \prod_{j=0}^{q-1} d_j^{\theta \beta_j}$$

hence

$$\hat{g}_i = g^{\theta f_i(X)} = g_1^{\frac{1}{x+\tau_i}}.$$

Then $\mathcal{A}$ chooses $C_i, s_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes

$$R = g_1^{s_i} \cdot (X \cdot g_1^{\tau})^{-C_i}$$

$$\hat{R} = \hat{g}_i^s \cdot (g \cdot \hat{g}^{-\tau})_i^C.$$

Now $\mathcal{A}$ returns $(Com_i = (\hat{g}, R, \hat{R}), C_i, s_i)$ to $\mathcal{F}$ and this is indistinguishable from the normal transcript generation for $\mathcal{F}$ since if we define r to be $r = s - Cx$ then $R = g_1^x$ and $\hat{R} = \hat{g}^x$ and also since s and C are uniformly distributed in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ so is r.

Breaking the $q+1$-SDH:

Eventually forger $\mathcal{F}$ returns a forgery $(\tau^*, Com^*, C^*, s^*)$ we assume that $\mathcal{F}$ wins the game and thus $\tau^* \notin \{\tau_1, ..., \tau_q\}$ and $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(sk, \tau^*, Com^*, C^*, s^*) = 1$ which means if we parse Com^* as $(\hat{g}^*, R^*, \hat{R}^*)$

$$\hat{g} = g_1^{\frac{1}{x+\tau^*}} = g^{\frac{\theta f(x)}{x+\tau^*}}$$

Using long division we can write $f(X)$ as $f(X) = (X+\tau^*)\alpha(X) + \beta$ where the coefficients of $\alpha(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} \alpha_i X^i$ are easily computable. So we can write $\frac{f(X)}{X+\tau^*}$ as $\alpha(X) + \frac{\beta}{X+\tau^*}$ and

$$\hat{g} = g^{\theta\cdot(\alpha(X)+\frac{\beta}{X+\tau^*})}.$$

Since $\{\tau_1, ..., \tau_q\}$ are the set of roots for $f(X)$ and τ^* is not in this set $X+\tau^*$ does not divide $f(X)$ and so $\beta \neq 0$. Now adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can compute

$$w \leftarrow \left(\hat{g}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \prod_{i=0}^{q-1} d_i^{-\alpha_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}}$$

Hence,

$$w = \left(g_1^{\alpha(X)} \cdot g_1^{\frac{\beta}{x+\tau^*}} \prod_{i=0}^{q-1} d_i^{-\alpha_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} = g_1^{\frac{1}{x+\tau^*}}.$$

Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ returns the pair (τ^*, w) as the solution to the $q+1-$SDH problem. ∎

5 Instantiation of dual tag ID from q-DH

We describe the identification scheme as in figure 5. Throughout this section we will write $D(\tau)$ shorthand for $\mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, \tau)$ and $d(\tau)$ shorthand for the function computing $(a, b) \leftarrow \mathsf{PHF.TrapEval}(\eta, \tau)$ and returning $ax + b$.

Definition 9 (q-DH Assumption). *We say an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ breaks the q-Diffie Hellman (q-DH) assumption if it's running time is bounded by t and*

$$\Pr[g^{\frac{1}{x}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(g, g^x, ..., g^{x^q})] \geq \epsilon,$$

where $g \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{G}$ and $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. We require that the q-DH assumption holds meaning that no adversary can (t, ϵ) break the q-DH problem for a polynomial t and a non-negligible ϵ.

Theorem 3. *Suppose that there exists a (t, q, ϵ)-forger $\mathcal{F}$ breaking the $\mathsf{UF\text{-}PA}^{\tilde{\mathsf{V}}}$ of the ID_{q-DH} identification scheme. Then there exists an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that $(t', q+1, \epsilon')-$ breaks the $q+1$-SDH assumption with $t \approx t'$ and $\epsilon' \geq ?$.*

$\underline{\mathsf{IGen}(\mathsf{par})\text{:}}$

$g_1, g_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{G}$
$x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$
$X = g_2^x$
$(\kappa, \eta) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.TrapGen}(g_2, X)$
$pk := (g_1, g_2, \kappa)$
$sk := (pk, x, \eta)$
$\mathsf{ChSet} := \mathbb{Z}_p$
$\textbf{return } (sk, pk)$

$\underline{\mathsf{V}(pk, \tau, Com, C, s)\text{:}}$

$\textbf{parse } Com = (\hat{g}, R, \hat{R})$
$\textbf{if } R = g_2^s \cdot D(\tau)^{-C} \wedge$
$\quad \hat{R} = \hat{g} \cdot g_1^{-C}$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 1$
$\textbf{else return } 0$

$\underline{\mathsf{P}_1(sk, \tau)\text{:}}$

$r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$
$St := (\tau, r)$
$\hat{g} := g_1^{\frac{1}{d(\tau)}}$
$R := g_2^r$
$\hat{R} := \hat{g}^r$
$Com := (\hat{g}, R, \hat{R})$
$\textbf{return } (Com, St)$

$\underline{\mathsf{P}_2(sk, St, C)\text{:}}$

$\textbf{parse } St = (\tau, r)$
$\textbf{parse } sk = x$
$\textbf{return } s = C \cdot d(\tau) + r \mod p$

$\underline{\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(sk, \tau, Com, C, s)\text{:}}$

$\textbf{parse } Com = (\hat{g}, R, \hat{R})$
$\textbf{parse } sk = (pk, x, \eta)$
$\textbf{if } \hat{g} = g_2^{\frac{1}{d(\tau)}}$
$\quad \textbf{then return } 1$
$\textbf{else return } 0$

Figure 7. Instantiation 1

Proof. We define the event of Game G_i winning (returning 1) as X_i. Let τ_i denote the i-th random tag in the alternative impersonation game. Let $(\tau^*, Com^*, C^*, s^*)$ be the forgery output by $\mathcal{F}$.

Game 0. We define Game 0 as the alternative impersonation game and so by definition

$$\Pr[X_0] = \epsilon.$$

Game 1. In this game we choose the tags $\tau_1, ..., \tau_q$ all in the beginning. This does not effect the success probability of the adversary so

$$\Pr[X_1] = \Pr[X_0].$$

Game 2. In this game we compute $(l_i, k_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, \tau_i)$ for every τ_i and set `BAD` to **true** if for any i, l_i is zero. We also compute $(l^*, k^*) \leftarrow \mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, \tau^*)$ when the adversary has output the forgery and set `BAD` to **true** if l^* is not zero. By the $(1, \mathsf{poly}, \gamma, \delta)-$programmability of D we have

$$\Pr[\neg\texttt{BAD}] \geq \delta$$

Game 3. This game is exactly like the last game except that we abort the game if `BAD` is **true** which means

$$\Pr[X_3] = \Pr[X_2 \wedge \neg\mathsf{abort}] \geq \delta \cdot \Pr[X_2]$$

$\underline{\mathsf{G}_0 - \mathsf{G}_3}$

$\mathtt{BAD} \leftarrow \mathbf{false}$ // $\mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
$\mathbf{for}\ i \in [q]$ // $\mathsf{G}_1 - \mathsf{G}_3$
  $\tau_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ // $\mathsf{G}_1 - \mathsf{G}_3$
$g_1, g_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{G}$
$x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$
$X = g_2^x$
$(\kappa, \eta) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.TrapGen}(g_2, X)$
$pk := (g_1, g_2, \kappa)$
$sk := (pk, x, \eta)$
$\mathcal{Q} \leftarrow \emptyset$
$\mathbf{for}\ i \in [q]$
  $\tau_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ // G_0
  $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$
  $St_i := (\tau_i, r_i)$
  $(l_i, k_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, \tau_i)$ // $\mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
  $\mathbf{if}\ l_i = 0$ // $\mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
    $\mathbf{then}\ \mathtt{BAD} \leftarrow \mathbf{true}$ // $\mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
  $\hat{g}_i := g_1^{\frac{1}{d(\tau_i)}}$
  $R_i := g_2^{r_i}$
  $\hat{R}_i := \hat{g}^{r_i}$
  $Com_i := (\hat{g}_i, R_i, \hat{R}_i)$
  $C_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$
  $s_i = C_i \cdot d(\tau_i) + r_i$
  $\mathcal{Q} \leftarrow \mathcal{Q} \cup (\tau_i, Com_i, C_i, s_i)$
$(\tau^*, Com^*, C^*, s^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, \mathcal{Q})$
  $(l^*, k^*) \leftarrow \mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, \tau^*)$ // $\mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
  $\mathbf{if}\ l^* \neq 0$ // $\mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
    $\mathbf{then}\ \mathtt{BAD} \leftarrow \mathbf{true}$ // $\mathsf{G}_2 - \mathsf{G}_3$
  $\mathbf{if}\ \mathtt{BAD}$ // G_3
    $\mathbf{then}$ abort // G_3
$\mathbf{if}\ \tau^* \notin \{\tau_1, ..., \tau_q\} \wedge \tilde{\mathsf{V}}(sk, \tau^*, Com^*, C^*, s^*) = 1$
 $\mathbf{then\ return}\ 1$
$\mathbf{else\ return}\ 0$

Figure 8.

The q-DH adversary $\mathcal{A}$ receives $d_0, ..., d_q$ as inputs where $d_i = g_2^{x^i}$ and simulates the soundness experiment as follows

Key Generation:

The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ first chooses random $\tau_1, ..., \tau_q$ from $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Now $\mathcal{A}$ has g_2 as d_0 and sets

$$X \coloneqq d_1 = g_2^x.$$

Now $\mathcal{A}$ runs run the following

$$(\kappa, \eta) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.Gen}(g_2, X)$$

just like the original key generation algorithm. Then using η, $\mathcal{A}$ runs

$$(k_i, l_i) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\eta, \tau_i)$$

for every $i \in [1, q]$.

Let f be a univariate polynomial defined as $f(Y) \coloneqq \prod_{i=1}^{q}(k_i + l_i Y)$. Expand f and write $f(Y) = \sum_{i=0}^{q} \alpha_i Y^i$ where $\alpha_0, ..., \alpha_q \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are coefficients of the polynomial f. Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ chooses a random $\theta \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and computes

$$g_1 \leftarrow \prod_{i=0}^{q} d_i^{\theta \alpha_i}$$

which essentially means $g_1 = g_2^{\theta f(x)}$. $\mathcal{A}$ can also calculates $X = g_1^x = g_2^{x f(x)}$ similarly since $Y f(Y)$ has a degree equal to $q + 1$.
Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ returns (g_1, g_2, κ) as the public key to $\mathcal{F}$. This is indistinguishable from the normal key generation for $\mathbb{F}$ since g_1 is randomly distributed in G.

Transcript Generation:

Now adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has compute (Com_i, C_i, s_i) for all τ_i where $i \in [1, q]$.

To do this $\mathcal{A}$ first computes $\hat{g}_i = g_1^{\frac{1}{d(\tau_i)}}$ for $i \in [1, q]$. To do so, let f_i be defined as

$$f_i(Y) = \frac{f(Y)}{k_i + l_i Y} = \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^{q} (k_i + l_i Y).$$

As before, we write f_i as $f_i(Y) = \sum_{j=0}^{q-1} \beta_j Y^j$ while calculating its coefficient. Now $\mathcal{A}$ can compute

$$\hat{g}_i = \prod_{j=0}^{q-1} d_j^{\theta \beta_j}$$

hence

$$\hat{g}_i = g_2^{\theta f_i(x)} = g_1^{\frac{f_i(x)}{f(x)}} = g_1^{\frac{1}{d(\tau_i)}}.$$

Then $\mathcal{A}$ chooses $C_i, s_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes

$$R = g_2^{s_i} \cdot D(\tau)^{-C_i}$$

$$\hat{R} = \hat{g} \cdot g_1^{-C_i}.$$

Now $\mathcal{A}$ returns $(Com_i = (\hat{g}, R, \hat{R}), C_i, s_i)$ to $\mathcal{F}$ and this is indistinguishable from the normal transcript generation for $\mathcal{F}$ since if we define r to be $r = s - Cx$ then $R = g_1^x$ and $\hat{R} = \hat{g}^x$ and also since s and C are uniformly distributed in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ so is r. ■

Breaking the $q+1$-DH:

Eventually forger $\mathcal{F}$ returns a forgery $(\tau^*, Com^*, C^*, s^*)$ we assume that $\mathcal{F}$ wins the game and thus $\tau^* \notin \{\tau_1, ..., \tau_q\}$ and $\tilde{\mathsf{V}}(sk, \tau^*, Com^*, C^*, s^*) = 1$ which means if we parse Com^* as $(\hat{g}^*, R^*, \hat{R}^*)$

$$\hat{g}^* = g_1^{\frac{1}{d(\tau^*)}} = g_2^{\frac{\theta f(x)}{d(\tau^*)}}$$

Now we can run

$$(k^*, l^*) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{PHF.Eval}(\kappa, \tau^*)$$

and long division we can write $f(Y)$ as $f(Y) = (k^* + l^*Y)\alpha(Y) + \beta$ where the coefficients of $\alpha(Y) = \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} \alpha_i Y^i$ are easily computable. So we can write $\frac{f(Y)}{k^*+l^*Y}$ as $\alpha(Y) + \frac{\beta}{k^*+l^*Y}$ and

$$\hat{g}^* = g_2^{\theta\cdot(\alpha(x) + \frac{\beta}{k^*+l^*x})} \overset{(*)}{=} g_2^{\theta\cdot(\alpha(x) + \frac{\beta}{l^*x})}$$

Where $(*)$ uses that $k^* = 0$ by Game 3. Since $k_i + l_iY$ divides $f(Y)$ for all $i \in [1, q]$ and $f(Y)$ has a degree of q, $l * Y$ does not divide $f(Y)$ and thus β is non zero and $\mathcal{A}$ can compute

$$w \leftarrow \left(\hat{g}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \prod_{i=0}^{q-1} d_i^{-\alpha_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{l^*\beta}}$$

Hence,

$$w = \left(g_1^{\alpha(X)} \cdot g_1^{\frac{\beta}{l^*x}} \prod_{i=0}^{q-1} d_i^{-\alpha_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{l}^*\beta} = g_1^{\frac{1}{x}}$$

and return w as the solution to the $q+1-$DH problem.