

INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY UNDER COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS: THE EFFECT OF SEQUENTIAL ELIMINATION

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Abstract

I study individual consistency with preference maximization by examining two choice procedures: namely, the direct procedure, where people choose directly from the menu, and the sequential elimination procedure, where they sequentially eliminate alternatives until only one survives. I first show formally that, in a limited attention framework, the choices made by a decision maker who considers at least two available alternatives under sequential elimination are consistent with preference maximization, whereas this is not necessarily the case under the direct procedure. To test empirically whether sequential elimination facilitates consistency, I implement an experiment in which subjects are randomly assigned to a risky decision-making task involving one of the two procedures. I find evidence that sequential elimination leads to an economically meaningful improvement in individual consistency, especially for subjects with low cognitive ability. Next, I investigate the determinants of individual preference for sequential elimination and the impact of sequential elimination on risk preferences. Finally, I discuss the policy implications of the results.

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1 Introduction

There is broad evidence that individual choices are inconsistent with preference maximization (e.g., Choi et al., 2007; Echenique, Lee and Shum, 2011; Choi et al., 2014; Carvalho, Meier and Wang, 2016; Dean and Martin, 2016). The evidence suggests substantial welfare issues that deserve attention from economists and policymakers. In particular, individual inconsistency may be fundamentally caused by cognitive limitations (Simon, 1955; Burks et al., 2009; Rustichini, 2015), which could be difficult to overcome by public policy. In other words, there is a serious concern about the welfare of a considerable proportion of the population, especially of those with relatively low cognitive ability, plausibly including kids (Harbaugh, Krause and Berry, 2001; Kim et al., 2018) and the elderly (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011, 2016). Despite the wealth of research on individual inconsistency, few studies have addressed the crucial question of how to improve individual consistency under cognitive limitations.

I provide the first study on whether a simple *choice procedure* can improve individual consistency under cognitive limitations. I focus on the notion of *limited attention*, which suggests that people may only pay attention to a limited set of available alternatives (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay, 2012; Dean, Kibris and Masatlioglu, 2017; Lleras et al., 2017).¹ Limited attention may be a primary consequence of cognitive limitations (Kahneman, 1973). Converging evidence from experiments (Krajcich and Rangel, 2011; Reutskaja et al., 2011) and the field (Honka, Hortaçsu and Vitorino, 2017; Barseghyan, Molinari and Thirkettle, 2021) reveals that individuals consider at least two alternatives when faced with a menu of multiple alternatives. I term this the *minimum property* of limited attention. Motivated by these findings, I study a decision maker (DM) with a rational preference relation and limited attention satisfying the minimum property.

Since Simon (1955), the notion of choice procedures has been acknowledged for its fundamental role in shaping choice behavior (e.g., Simon, 1976; Aumann, 2008; Salant, 2011). Drawing on this notion, I develop a formal framework of limited attention to examine the DM's choice consistency in two choice procedures. One is the *direct procedure*, where the DM chooses directly from the menu. Limited attention may cause choice inconsistency in this procedure due to the DM overlooking the best alternatives on the menu. This leads me to the investigation of *sequential elimination*, in which the DM eliminates alternatives sequentially until only one survives. This procedure has been studied widely in marketing, psychology—and more recently,—economics.² It has been shown to reduce choice overload (Besedeš et al., 2015) and to encourage people to consider more alternatives (Huber, Neale and Northcraft, 1987; Yaniv and Schul, 1997, 2000;

¹See also stochastic choice models of limited attention, e.g., Manzini and Mariotti (2014), Brady and Rehbeck (2016), Caplin, Dean and Leahy (2019), Cattaneo et al. (2020), and Dardanoni et al. (2020).

²See Section 1.1 for the literature review of sequential elimination.

[Sokolova and Krishna, 2016](#)). Building on the established evidence, I present the first research on the role of sequential elimination in improving individual consistency.

I show that the DM makes choices consistent with preference maximization under sequential elimination. An intuitive explanation for this result is that one of the best alternatives in a menu survives in every elimination, either by not being considered or by beating the other alternatives in the consideration set. In effect, sequential elimination decomposes a potentially complex (preference) maximization problem into an equivalent sequence of elimination subproblems, each of which is manageable to solve. Based on these results, I formulate the main hypothesis in this paper, which is that individuals make choices with a higher level of consistency under sequential elimination than under the direct procedure. Further, the cognitive-ability interpretation of limited attention implies another key hypothesis; namely, that sequential elimination especially improves the consistency of individuals with low cognitive ability.

To test the hypotheses, I implement an experiment involving risky decision problems, each representing a list of portfolio options from a unique budget line. Each option rewards one of two amounts of money with equal probability. In the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to one of the three choice procedure treatments: (1) *Direct Procedure*; (2) *Sequential Elimination*; and (3) *Free Procedure*, where subjects are allowed to select one of the first two procedures.³ Cognitive ability is expressed as IQ scores obtained from the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) test ([Condon and Reville, 2014](#)). Consistency is measured by the number of Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) violations; GARP is a necessary and sufficient condition for choices to be consistent with preference maximization ([Afriat, 1967](#); [Varian, 1982, 1983](#)).⁴ More GARP violations indicates a lower level of consistency. The hypotheses can be tested causally by comparing the numbers of GARP violations in the first two treatments. In addition, I compute the number of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) violations, which are defined as choosing an option over another that offers better outcomes without additional risk. FOSD violations, while not implying GARP violations, are typically regarded as mistakes. GARP is the minimal criterion for economic rationality, and FOSD complements GARP in decision-making under risk. Lastly, the Free Procedure helps provide insights into individual preference for sequential elimination.

The main experimental results show that Sequential Elimination reduces GARP violations by almost 76% (with statistical significance approaching conventional levels) and FOSD violations by almost 63% (with statistical significance) compared to the Direct Procedure. Furthermore, I find that Sequential Elimination leads to a statistically significant and economically substantial (over 94%) reduction in the number of GARP violations by low-IQ subjects (i.e., those with

³Henceforth, where initially capitalized, the terms Sequential Elimination and Direct Procedure refer to the respective treatments in the experiment; otherwise, they refer to their respective general meanings.

⁴I discuss other consistency measures in Section 3.1.1. See also [Apesteguía and Ballester \(2015\)](#) and [Halevy, Persitz and Zrill \(2018\)](#) for detailed discussion of consistency measures.

below-or-equal-to-median IQ scores) compared to the Direct Procedure. There is no evidence that Sequential Elimination affects the consistency of high-IQ subjects (i.e., those with above-median IQ scores). Nevertheless, the reduction in the number of FOSD violations committed by high-IQ subjects under Sequential Elimination relative to the Direct Procedure (almost 97%) is statistically significant. Importantly, these results provide causal evidence in favor of the hypotheses, thereby narrowing the gap in the literature on improving economic rationality.

I present three other experimental results that contribute to the literature on choice procedures. First, in the Free Procedure, subjects with lower cognitive ability are more likely to select Sequential Elimination than those with higher cognitive ability. This provides empirical evidence for the role of cognitive ability in determining individual preference for choice procedures in the context of decision-making under risk. Second, the experiment explores another choice procedure, choice revision, which has been shown to reduce choice inconsistency with a few normative axioms (e.g., FOSD), but not including GARP (MacCrimmon, 1968; Gaudeul and Crosetto, 2019; Benjamin, Fontana and Kimball, 2020; Breig and Feldman, 2020; Nielsen and Rehbeck, 2020). I find evidence that choice revision corresponds to fewer FOSD violations but not with fewer GARP violations, thus adding to the literature that examines choice revision. Third, the experiment reflects an overall negative relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion, in line with the main findings of prior studies (Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010; Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro, 2013; Falk et al., 2018). Further analysis indicates that this relationship is significant under Sequential Elimination but not under the Direct Procedure. This result connects the literatures on choice procedures and risk preferences by suggesting the role of choice procedures in revealing risk preferences.

This paper gives rise to important policy implications. Most importantly, sequential elimination may boost individuals' economic rationality by mitigating the impacts of limited attention. Sequential elimination is arguably easy and low-cost to implement in a variety of real-world decision problems, e.g., bank loans or health insurance choices involving meaningful consequences. Furthermore, the procedure can be implemented with a reasonably high degree of flexibility. My analysis suggests that individuals with low cognitive ability tend to use sequential elimination when available. Thus, policymakers can offer sequential elimination as an optional procedure and support individuals in using their preferred procedures. Finally, and taken together, the present findings highlight the importance of choice procedures in welfare policies.

1.1 Related Literature

This paper contributes to the literature on limited attention (Eliaz and Spiegel, 2011; Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay, 2012; Dean, Kibris and Masatlioglu, 2017; Lleras et al., 2017), which postulates the direct procedure whereby the DM directly chooses from a limited

set of alternatives on a menu, known as the *consideration set*. Recently, [Dardanoni et al. \(2020\)](#) explicitly model consideration set sizes as a result of cognitive heterogeneity in a stochastic choice framework. I build on this literature by proposing the minimum property of limited attention, which finds firm support in evidence from economics and the cognitive sciences. For example, eye-tracking studies find that subjects attend to at least two alternatives most of the time ([Krajbich and Rangel, 2011](#); [Reutskaja et al., 2011](#)). Field data also suggest that most individuals form consideration sets containing at least two alternatives ([Honka, Hortaçsu and Vitorino, 2017](#); [Barseghyan, Molinari and Thirkettle, 2021](#)). Notably, [Cowan \(2001\)](#), drawing on a survey of studies from the cognitive sciences, suggests that the attention span of normal adult humans stretches beyond the processing of two alternatives. By exploiting the minimum property, I open up the possibility of reducing inconsistency by means of a particular choice procedure, i.e., sequential elimination.

Sequential elimination originates from the marketing and psychology literatures, where it is postulated that individuals use it to simplify decision problems involving criteria, e.g., certain aspects of the alternatives ([Tversky, 1972](#)) or environmental cues ([Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999](#); [Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000](#)). Recently, it has received growing attention in economics. [Masatlioglu and Nakajima \(2007\)](#) propose a model of choice by elimination where the DM eliminates all alternatives that are dominated by some other alternatives in the menu. Inconsistency may arise in this model when the DM chooses the alternatives that are not comparable to any of the others on the menu. Further studies postulate that the DM may eliminate alternatives sequentially based on multiple acyclic relations ([Manzini and Mariotti, 2007](#)), a checklist of desirable properties ([Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti, 2012](#)), or a particular order of binary comparisons ([Apesteguia and Ballester, 2013](#)). A central premise of the models above is that the DM may not be intrinsically endowed with one well-behaved preference relation over all alternatives. In contrast and importantly, this paper’s premise is that the DM compares all alternatives based on a rational preference relation, which can be revealed by means of sequential elimination.

Several experimental studies provide evidence in support of the benefits of sequential elimination for improving decision-making. In the economics literature, [Besedeš et al. \(2015\)](#) find that sequential decision-making reduces choice overload. Specifically, they study a choice procedure known as the “sequential tournament”, where subjects make choices from several rounds of smaller menus randomly separated from a larger one. The cited authors find that subjects are more likely to choose the option with the highest payment likelihood in the sequential tournament than when faced with many at once (i.e., the direct procedure). Marketing and psychology studies show that the elimination process leads to more alternatives being considered ([Huber, Neale and Northcraft, 1987](#); [Yaniv and Schul, 1997, 2000](#); [Sokolova and Krishna, 2016](#)). The general idea of sequential elimination is widely recommended in practice, e.g., career decisions ([Gati, Fassa and Houminer, 1995](#)), managerial decision making ([Stroh et al., 2003](#)), patient counseling

(Zikmund-Fisher, Angott and Ubel, 2011), and criminal identification (Pica and Pozzulo, 2017). The present paper contributes to this strand of literature by examining the effect of sequential elimination on economic rationality.

This paper is also part of the literature strand that investigates the determinants of economic rationality. For example, Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001) find that senior students are more consistent than junior students. List and Millimet (2008) find that individual consistency is facilitated by market experience. Burks et al. (2009) show a positive association between cognitive skills and consistency. Abaluck and Gruber (2011) find that elders tend to make inconsistent choices in the Medicare Part D program; moreover, if they had made consistent choices, they might have achieved a markedly higher level of welfare (about 27%). Choi et al. (2014) find that female, low-income, low-education, and older households have, on average, lower levels of economic rationality in a representative sample of over 2000 Dutch households. Dean and Martin (2016) find that households of retirement age are more consistent than younger households, using scanner data on 977 representative households in Denver. However, Echenique, Imai and Saito (2021) find that younger people (i.e., aged 16-34) comply with rationality more than older people (i.e., aged 65+) based on the datasets from Choi et al. (2014), Carvalho, Meier and Wang (2016), and Carvalho and Silverman (2019). Kim et al. (2018) exploit a randomized controlled field experiment involving the introduction of an education program for female students in a Malawian secondary school. They find causal evidence of education's impact on improving economic rationality, which operates partially through enhancing cognitive ability. Banks, Carvalho and Perez-Arce (2019), on the other hand, find no evidence of education effects in a sample of people who have been affected by a policy on compulsory schooling in England. Despite growing interest in the literature, little is known about the effects of choice procedures on individual consistency. I fill this gap in the literature by proposing a simple theoretical framework, and, most importantly, by providing causal evidence from a randomized controlled experiment.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the framework with which I derive the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the details of the experimental design. Section 4 provides the experimental results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the implications of the results and concludes.

2 Framework

Let $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^k$ an alternative representing a bundle of k goods. Consider a finite data set $D = \{c^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$, where $M^i = \{x_1^i, \dots, x_{|M^i|}^i\}$ is a finite menu of distinct alternatives and a DM chooses c^i from M^i . Let $X = \cup_{i=1}^n M^i$ and \mathcal{X} be the set of all nonempty subsets of X . Let \succeq be a complete, transitive, and monotone preference relation over X .⁵

⁵A preference relation \succeq is monotone if $x \geq x'$ implies $x \succeq x'$ and $x > x'$ implies $x \succeq x'$ but not $x' \succeq x$.

In this paper, I assume that when faced with a menu M , the DM pays attention to a limited set of alternatives on the menu, $\gamma(M)$, known as the *consideration set*. Importantly, the DM's limited attention satisfies the *minimum property*, i.e., he pays attention to at least two alternatives when M comprises multiple alternatives. Formally, a *consideration set mapping* γ assigns to every $M \in \mathcal{X}$ a subset of M such that $|\gamma(M)| \geq \min\{|M|, 2\}$. A consideration set mapping is said to be a *full consideration* if for all $M \in \mathcal{X}$, $\gamma(M) = M$.

2.1 The Direct Procedure

I propose that under the direct procedure, the DM chooses an alternative that is preferred to all the others in his consideration set within a menu. The following definition is adapted from Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012).

Definition 1. The data set $D = \{c^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$ is rationalized by the direct procedure if there exist a preference relation \succeq and a consideration set mapping γ such that for all i , $c^i \in \{x \in \gamma(M^i) | x \succeq x' \forall x' \in \gamma(M^i)\}$. Further, D is rationalized by the direct procedure with full consideration if γ is a full consideration.

I examine choice consistency by GARP, a necessary and sufficient condition for a data set D to be rationalized by a preference relation. The number of GARP violations gives an exact measure of the deviation of the DM's choices from preference maximization. More GARP violations indicate a lower level of consistency with preference maximization. I formally introduce GARP in the present setting by adapting Cosaert and Demuynck (2015)'s axiom of revealed preference for finite choice sets. For any pair of choices c^i, c^j , I denote $c^i R^D c^j$ if there exists $x \in M^i$ such that $x \succeq c^j$. Also, I denote $c^i R c^j$ if there exists some sequence (k, l, \dots, m) such that $c^i R^D c^k, c^k R^D c^l, \dots, c^m R^D c^j$.

Definition 2 (GARP). The data set D satisfies the *Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference* if for any pair of choices, $c^i R c^j$ implies there exists no $x \in M^j$ such that $x > c^i$.

Unless the DM considers every available alternative under the direct procedure, his choices do not necessarily satisfy GARP, as the following example shows. Consider two menus, $M^1 = \{(68, 37), (0, 54), (152, 16)\}$ and $M^2 = \{(135, 0), (15, 96), (80, 44)\}$. Suppose that the DM's preferences are described by $(152, 16) \succeq (80, 44) \succeq (68, 37) \succeq (135, 0) \succeq (15, 96) \succeq (0, 54)$ and his consideration sets are $\gamma(M^1) = \{(68, 37), (0, 54)\}$ and $\gamma(M^2) = \{(135, 0), (15, 96)\}$. Consequently, the DM's choices from M^1 and M^2 under the direct procedure are $c^1 = (68, 37)$ and $c^2 = (135, 0)$. We have that $c^1 R c^2$ but there exists $(80, 44) \in M^2$ such that $(80, 44) > (68, 37) = c^1$, violating GARP.

In other words, a data set does not necessarily satisfy GARP if it is rationalized by the direct procedure with some consideration sets. How may GARP violations depend on the size

of consideration sets under the direct procedure? Consider a different case where the DM has full consideration. He pays attention to more alternatives than in the previous case. His choices under the direct procedure are $\tilde{c}^1 = (152, 16)$ and $\tilde{c}^2 = (80, 44)$, satisfying GARP. Intuitively, the number of GARP violations (weakly) decreases in the expansion of consideration sets, because the DM would not make worse choices by attending to additional alternatives. In fact, it is equivalent for a data set to be rationalized by the direct procedure with full consideration and by standard preference maximization satisfying GARP.

Let $GARP_D$ denote the number of GARP violations in a data set D . The following remark summarizes the above discussion, which will be useful later for the formulation of the hypothesis.

Remark 1. Let $D = \{c^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$ and $\tilde{D} = \{\tilde{c}^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$ be two data sets, the following statements are true:

- (i) $GARP_D \geq 0$ if and only if D is rationalized by the direct procedure.
- (ii) $GARP_D \geq GARP_{\tilde{D}}$ if D (\tilde{D} , respectively) is rationalized by the direct procedure with a preference relation \succeq and a consideration set mapping γ ($\tilde{\gamma}$, respectively) such that $\tilde{\gamma}(M^i) \supseteq \gamma(M^i)$ for all i .
- (iii) $GARP_D = 0$ if and only if D is rationalized by the direct procedure with full consideration.

2.2 Sequential Elimination

Remark 1 implies that the DM may miss the best alternatives under the direct procedure by not giving the menu full consideration. This paper's proposal for addressing this problem is to study sequential elimination, in which the DM eliminates alternatives sequentially until only one survives, i.e., the choice.

To illustrate sequential elimination, consider again that the DM is confronted with M^1 . Under this procedure, he goes through two rounds of elimination to select a alternative from M^1 . In the first round, he eliminates $e_1^1 = (0, 54)$, leaving the menu to be $M^1 \setminus \{(0, 54)\} = \{(68, 37), (152, 16)\}$. In the second round, the DM confronts $\{(68, 37), (152, 16)\}$ as a “new” menu, from which he eliminates $e_2^1 = (68, 37)$, leaving the menu to be $M^1 \setminus \{(0, 54), (68, 37)\} = \{(152, 16)\}$ representing his choice under sequential elimination.

Formally, $E = \{e^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$ is an *elimination* data set, where e^i is a sequence of alternatives $e^i = (e_1^i, \dots, e_{|M^i|}^i) \in \prod_{t=1}^{|M^i|} \mathbb{R}_+^k$ such that $\bigcup_{j=1}^{|M^i|} \{e_j^i\} = M^i$. The sequence e^i fully describes an elimination behavior of the DM with the interpretation that when confronted with a non-singleton menu M^i , he eliminates $e_1^i, \dots, e_{|M^i|-1}^i$ sequentially, and finally chooses $e_{|M^i|}^i$ from M^i . For all i and $j = 1, \dots, |M^i|$, let E_j^i denote the remaining menu before the j th round of elimination by $E_j^i = \bigcup_{l=j}^{|M^i|} \{e_l^i\}$. I propose the following model of sequential elimination (given limited attention) that rationalizes a choice data set.

Definition 3. The data set $D = \{c^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$ is rationalized by sequential elimination if there exist a preference relation \succeq , a consideration set mapping γ , and an elimination data set $E = \{e^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$ such that for all i and $j = 1, \dots, |M^i|$,

- (i) $e_j^i \in \gamma(E_j^i)$.
- (ii) $\{x \in \gamma(E_j^i) | x \succeq e_j^i, x \neq e_j^i\} \neq \emptyset$ if $|E_j^i| \geq 2$.
- (iii) $c^i = e_{|M^i|}^i$.

Definition 3 (i) and (ii) state that the DM eliminates an alternative from the consideration set if he prefers another alternative in this set. In other words, despite limited attention, the DM compares at least two alternatives according to his preferences in every elimination. The last condition relates an elimination data set to a choice data set by imposing the final remaining alternative to be the choice.

The following proposition formally establishes the consistency of the choice behavior under sequential elimination. All proofs are in Appendix A.

Proposition 1. *Let D be a data set. $GARP_D = 0$ if and only if D is rationalized by sequential elimination.*

Proposition 1 shows that the DM always makes choices consistent with preference maximization under sequential elimination. Thanks to the minimum property, one of the best alternatives survives in every elimination, according to one or other of the following two cases. One is that the DM does not consider this alternative, which remains on the menu. The other is that he considers this alternative, which beats all the others in the consideration set. Instead of confronting a taxing problem, the DM sequentially solves an equivalent sequence of elimination subproblems, each of which requires arguably lower cognitive costs.

Note that Remark 1 and Proposition 1 imply that it is impossible to distinguish whether a data set is rationalized by the direct procedure with full consideration or by sequential elimination with the same preference relation. This poses no problem here, given that this paper focuses precisely on individuals whose choices violate GARP under the direct procedure.

2.3 Testable Implications

In light of Remark 1 and Proposition 1, a preference maximizer with limited attention satisfying the minimum property would make consistent choices under sequential elimination but would not necessarily do so under the direct procedure, unless applying full consideration. I take the premise that a sufficiently large portion of the population can be described as preference maximizers with limited attention satisfying the minimum property. Although the proportion of the population applying full consideration is unclear, it may, to some degree, be inferred by taking into account cognitive ability. An individual's cognitive capacity (i.e., his total endowment of

usable mental resources) could limit his attention to the alternatives (Kahneman, 1973). Thus, I argue that individuals with low cognitive ability may attend to fewer alternatives than those with high cognitive ability.

Taking these factors together, I reason that the population may behave in accordance with the implication of Remark 1 and Proposition 1, and more so in the case of those with low cognitive ability. In other words, I expect the following hypotheses to be true:

Hypothesis 1. *Individuals make choices with a higher level of consistency (i.e., fewer GARP violations) under sequential elimination than under the direct procedure.*

Hypothesis 2. *Individuals with low cognitive ability make choices with a higher level of consistency (i.e., fewer GARP violations) under sequential elimination than under the direct procedure.*

There exist two possibilities such that the hypotheses might not be true in a given sample. The first possibility is that the sample contains a sufficient number of individuals with a high enough level of cognitive ability to apply full consideration. As a result, these individuals may make consistent choices irrespective of the choice procedure, and the sequential elimination effect may not be significant. This possibility can be verified by observing that individual choices are highly consistent overall, particularly for those members of the sample with high cognitive ability. The second possibility is that a large fraction of the sample consists of individuals who are intrinsically inconsistent (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Ok, 2002; Gilboa et al., 2010). In this case, I expect to observe a low level of consistency in individual choices under both choice procedures.

3 Experimental Design

Figure 1 presents a global view of the experimental design. After starting the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to one of the three treatments, Direct Procedure, Sequential Elimination, or Free Procedure. Subjects are first asked to make economic decisions under their assigned choice procedures. They are then asked to complete cognitive ability tests. Finally, they are requested to complete a survey on additional information, including individual attitudes towards consistency and demographics. The details of the experimental design are discussed below.

3.1 Main Design

3.1.1 Measuring Consistency

Individual choice consistency with preference maximization is measured based on twenty risky decision problems adapted from Kim et al. (2018). Each decision problem comprises eleven




Figure 1: A Global View of The Experiment

randomly ordered *options* from a budget line with a unique price and endowment combination. An *option* (x_1, x_2) rewards x_1 or x_2 tokens with equal probability. There is also one decision problem to check comprehension.⁶ In addition, there is a choice revision design, the motivation and the details of which will be explained shortly in Section 3.2.1.

Consistency is measured as the number of GARP violations in choices.⁷ GARP is the minimal criterion for economic rationality. The number of GARP violations indicates the degree to which choices can be rationalized by a preference relation, which does not need to be objectively optimal. As a complement to GARP violations, the number of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) violations in choices is also computed.⁸ FOSD is proposed in decision theory as a fundamental criterion for rationality in decision-making under risk (Quiggin, 1990; Wakker, 1993) and has been widely applied in experiments as a measure of decision-making quality (Choi et al., 2014; Carvalho, Meier and Wang, 2016; Kim et al., 2018; Banks, Carvalho and Perez-Arce, 2019). By committing a FOSD violation, subjects forgo an option that yields better outcomes than their choices, with no additional risk. That is, a larger number of FOSD violations signals a lower level of economic rationality.

In robustness checks, consistency is additionally measured by the number of strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP) violations (Rose, 1958), the Houtman–Maks (HM) index (Houtman and Maks, 1985), and the critical cost efficiency index (CCEI, Afriat, 1972), as proposed by the literature. SARP differs from GARP by excluding indifference between alternatives in the preferences. The HM index finds the minimal removal of the observations such that the rest are consistent. The CCEI considers the minimal wealth change such that choices are consistent.⁹ Similarly, more SARP violations, a higher HM index, or a higher CCEI indicate a lower level of

⁶The comprehension check problem comprises nine options: (11, 11), (22, 22), (33, 33), (44, 44), (55, 55), (66, 66), (77, 77), (88, 88), (99, 99). Subjects are identified as having failed the comprehension check if they did not choose (99, 99).

⁷See Appendix B for a graphical illustration of a GARP violation in this setting.

⁸FOSD violations are computed by assuming a symmetric preference for the two values of options. To be specific, subjects commit a FOSD violation if they choose an option (x_1, x_2) when there exists another option (y_1, y_2) in the same problem such that $y_2 > x_1$ and $y_1 > x_2$.

⁹CCEI assumes that choices are made from linear budget sets. It is not sensitive to the total number of GARP violations, which is the paper’s main interest.

consistency.

3.1.2 Experimental Treatments

In every decision problem, the left-hand side of the screen shows a vertical list of options, labeled “Options”. Under the Direct Procedure, subjects are asked to click on their selected options sequentially and place them in a box labeled “Choice List” which appears on the right-hand side of the screen.¹⁰ They are not allowed to move any option from the Choice List back to the Options list. Subjects are asked to choose an option from the Choice List box once it contains all their options. Under Sequential Elimination, subjects are asked to eliminate options sequentially and put them into a box labeled “Trash” on the right-hand side of the screen. Subjects can move any option from the Trash box back to the Options list by clicking on it. Subjects are asked to choose one option by leaving it as the only remaining option on the Options list. These designs minimize the differences in presentation and numbers of clicks between the Direct Procedure and Sequential Elimination. Thus, the difference in choice behavior between the two treatments enables precise testing of the hypothesis. In the Free Procedure, subjects are asked to select either one of the Direct Procedure and Sequential Elimination as their choice procedures. The Free Procedure treatment enables the investigation of individual preference for sequential elimination. Is there any demographic factor that might affect procedure preferences? More importantly, are those with lower cognitive ability—who are arguably prone to limited attention— more likely to adopt sequential elimination than those with a higher level?

3.1.3 Measuring Cognitive Ability

Cognitive ability is expressed as IQ scores derived from the ICAR test. Specifically, subjects are required to complete five matrix reasoning and five three-dimensional rotation questions, both of which are considered the primary measure of problem-solving and reasoning abilities (Nisbett et al., 2012). The number of correct answers (i.e., an integer between 0 and 10) provides the test score. The experiment also includes tests of selective attention and working memory capacity, which are related to the notion of limited attention.¹¹ Selective attention is measured by the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935), where subjects are presented with a word, say, GREEN, printed in the same or a different color, say, red, and asked to name the colors in which the words are printed. Working memory capacity is measured by the Sternberg test (Sternberg, 1966), where

¹⁰See Appendix B for screenshots of all treatments and other designs of the experiment. Under the Direct Procedure, subjects are instructed to “examine” them by clicking on them. Under each treatment, subjects are given a trial problem; specifically, Free Procedure subjects are given a trial problem with the two procedures randomly ordered.

¹¹See Appendix B for the details of the cognitive ability tests. The tests are implemented via the platform of Henninger et al. (2021). Selective attention refers to the differential processing of simultaneous information sources (Johnston and Dark, 1986). Working memory capacity refers to the capacity for “temporary storage and manipulation of the information” (Baddeley, 1992). Oberauer (2019) reviews the close relationship between working memory and attention.

subjects see a sequence of numbers presented singly and are asked to remember them. After a few numbers have been shown, there is a brief pause, and a test number appears. Subjects are asked to answer whether the test number was included in the sequence previously shown. At the end of a trial, subjects are asked to recall the entire sequence of numbers previously shown.

3.2 Other Details of the Experimental Design

3.2.1 Choice Revision

It is important to know whether sequential elimination is more effective than other procedures. There is an emerging literature on the choice revision procedure, i.e., the procedure gives individuals a chance to revise choices (Gaudeul and Crosetto, 2019; Benjamin, Fontana and Kimball, 2020; Breig and Feldman, 2020; Nielsen and Rehbeck, 2020). They document cases of individual choices being revised to comply with axioms of normative decision theory, e.g., FOSD, but not with GARP. Based on this evidence, it is possible that people reduce their GARP violations by revising their choices, although the possibility appears to be unexplored. The present experiment includes a choice revision design with a view to exploring this hypothesis. More importantly, the comparison between the effects of choice revision and sequential elimination may aid interpretation of the latter.

Specifically, subjects are asked to make decisions for two identical blocks of decision problems, Blocks A and B, each containing the set of decision problems described in Section 3.1.1. Subjects are not informed of the identical nature of the two blocks until they enter Block B. The decision problems are ordered randomly within each block and independently between them. In a Block B problem, subjects may either alter the choice they made in the respective problem in Block A by clicking on a different option or keep their Block A choice by clicking on a button.¹² Subjects are informed that they will have to choose one block for payment (referred to as the *payment block*), from which one decision problem is randomly drawn for the payoff.¹³ Thus, the two blocks are equally incentive-compatible. Subjects are labeled as having revised their choices if they alter their choices from Block A to Block B, and then choose Block B for payment.

3.2.2 Attitude towards Consistency

The literature points out that, in some individuals, inconsistency of choices is deliberate (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; DellaVigna, 2009). Consequently, this study accounts for the possible

¹²The literature has employed different choice revision designs. The one used in this study is similar to that used in Gaudeul and Crosetto (2019) and Yu, Zhang and Zuo (2019), where subjects are asked whether they want to revise their choices without further instructions. This design is, furthermore, comparable to sequential elimination in that it too is without normative axioms.

¹³Evidence from Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) suggests that individuals may deliberately make different choices when faced with repetitive problems. Requiring subjects to choose the payment block avoids this issue, as each problem is unique to subjects in terms of providing incentives.

impact of individual attitudes towards consistency on choice consistency. Subjects are presented with a scenario which includes the presence of the attraction effect (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982); a common behavioral phenomenon which violates consistency with preference maximization (Tversky and Simonson, 1993). Subjects are asked to rate how at ease they are with the scenario on a scale of 0 (least at ease) to 10 (most at ease). This rating provides an indicator of individual attitudes towards consistency, i.e., the higher the rating, the less negative the attitude towards inconsistency.

3.3 Experimental Procedure

Subjects were recruited from the Prolific survey pool and the experiment was conducted online between May 31, 2020, and June 1, 2020, using the Qualtrics survey platform. They could withdraw from the experiment at any time with no need for justification. Their earned tokens were converted to money after the experiment. Each subject received £3 as a participation fee for completing the experiment. There was an additional payment of up to £14.6 depending on the economic decisions and the performance in cognitive ability tests. Subjects received their payoffs three days after the experiment via Prolific. The average completion time for the experiment was 42 minutes, and the average payout was £8.14.

The main analysis is based on a sample of 223 subjects (50.2% female) and 73-75 observations per treatment.¹⁴ The sample subjects are plausibly younger and more educated than the population on average. The mean age is approximately 24, and 75% of the subjects are aged between 18 and 25. All subjects have completed at least secondary education. Specifically, 57% of the subjects are currently in undergraduate education, and 39% have completed at least undergraduate education. By design, demographics and cognitive ability are balanced across the Direct Procedure and Sequential Elimination. To examine the hypotheses, subjects are categorized into two groups based on cognitive ability: (1) low-IQ subjects, whose IQ scores are lower than or equal to the sample median; (2) high-IQ subjects, whose IQ scores are higher than the sample median.¹⁵ Table 1 presents the breakdown of subjects by treatment and IQ. In the Free procedure, 32 (82%) of the low-IQ subjects and 17 (47.2%) of the high-IQ subjects choose Sequential Elimination.

¹⁴A total of 253 subjects (53.1% female) were recruited. All subjects speak English as their first language and could complete the experiment only once. 30 subjects who had failed the comprehension check in the first block were filtered out. Appendix C gives the histograms of demographics and cognitive ability for the overall sample and per treatment.

¹⁵The sample median IQ score is 4, the mean is about 4.74, and the standard deviation is about 2.47. In the sample, the IQ scores range from 0 to 10, with 3 and 6 being the first and third quantiles, respectively. Note that low-IQ (high-IQ, respectively) subjects identically match those with IQ scores lower than (higher than, respectively) the sample mean IQ score.

Table 1: Breakdown of Observations

Treatment IQ Group	Direct Procedure	Sequential Elimination	Free Procedure
Low-IQ Subjects	34 (45.3%)	40 (54.8%)	39 (52%)
High-IQ Subjects	41 (54.7%)	33 (45.2%)	36 (48%)
Total	75 (100%)	73 (100%)	75 (100%)

4 Experimental Results

4.1 Main Results

This section examines the hypotheses by analyzing the observed differences between the Direct Procedure and Sequential Elimination. I present descriptive statistics and perform regression analysis to test for treatment effects. The negative binomial regression is used to estimate the sequential elimination effect on GARP and FOSD violations because of their count data nature (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).¹⁶

I start by discussing the evidence for Hypothesis 1. Figure 2(a) shows that the average numbers of GARP violations under Sequential Elimination and the Direct Procedure are roughly 4.3 and 5.9, respectively. This indicates that Sequential Elimination leads to a reduction of about 27% in the number of GARP violations on average when compared with the Direct Procedure, in line with Hypothesis 1. In addition, Figure 3(a) depicts that the cumulative distribution of GARP violations under the Direct Procedure almost (first-order) stochastically dominates that under Sequential Elimination, except on the extreme right tails of the distributions. That is, a subject is more likely to commit more GARP violations under the Direct Procedure than under Sequential Elimination.

Table 2 presents the estimation results.¹⁷ Column (1) indicates that Sequential Elimination reduces the number of GARP violations by nearly 4.5 as compared with the Direct Procedure ($p = 0.07$). Closely approaching the statistical significance, the impact of Sequential Elimination is economically meaningful: it improves consistency by almost 76% relative to the Direct Procedure. The same column shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between high-IQ and consistency ($p = 0.01$), in line with previous studies (e.g., Burks et al., 2009; Cappelen et al.,

¹⁶Nonlinear regressions are widely applied in economics for nonnegative integer data, e.g., R&D patents (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Acemoglu, Moscona and Robinson, 2016), conflicts and wars (Glick and Taylor, 2010; Crost, Felter and Johnston, 2014), level-k reasoning (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004), and revealed preference analysis (Choi et al., 2014). Cameron and Trivedi (2013) recommend the Poisson, negative binomial, and zero-inflated negative binomial models for count data. Appendix E reports the model selection procedure. The negative binomial model is selected based on the Akaike information criterion, Bayesian information criterion, likelihood ratio test, and Vuong Test.

¹⁷Table 2 presents results from the negative binomial regressions, including an interaction between Sequential Elimination and High-IQ, in the form of average marginal effects. P-values of the Sequential Elimination effect (for low-IQ, high-IQ subjects, and overall) are computed based on the null hypothesis that the number of GARP (FOSD) violations under Sequential Elimination is larger than or equal to that under the Direct Procedure. The regressions are reported in the original form in Appendix E.

2020). Indeed, high-IQ subjects are very consistent, both overall (see Figure 2(b)), and per treatment (see Figure 2(c)). Taken together, these results suggest that Sequential Elimination has limited power to improve consistency among high-IQ subjects, which may partially account for the lack of significance. This discussion suggests, furthermore, that the Sequential Elimination effect operates mainly through its impact in improving consistency among low-IQ subjects, which leads to the following discussion on Hypothesis 2.

Figure 2(c) shows that the occurrence of GARP violations among low-IQ subjects is approximately 44.2% lower, on average, under Sequential Elimination than under the Direct Procedure (5.58 vs. 10 GARP violations, respectively), thus supporting Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, Figure 3(b) displays that the cumulative distribution of GARP violations by low-IQ subjects under the Direct Procedure strongly (first-order) stochastically dominates that under Sequential Elimination, except on the extreme right tails of the distributions. Column (1) in Table 2 indicates that Sequential Elimination reduces by over 9.4 the number of GARP violations ($p = 0.04$) among low-IQ subjects as compared with the Direct Procedure.¹⁸ This reduction is substantial (over 94%) relative to their average of 10 GARP violations under the Direct Procedure. The treatment effect on low-IQ subjects is more pronounced than the overall treatment effect, thus confirming that the former is the key driver of the latter. The results demonstrate the effect of sequential elimination on individuals with low cognitive ability, thus lending support to Hypothesis 2.




Figure 2: Mean GARP Violations in the Experiment

Note: Error bars indicate the standard error of means.

Besides consistency, Table 2 depicts the effect of sequential elimination on FOSD violations in Column (2). Overall, Sequential Elimination corresponds to a decrease in the number of FOSD violations by 0.5 ($p = 0.01$), approximately 63% of the average 0.8 FOSD violations under the Direct Procedure. There is no significant difference in FOSD violations between low-IQ and high-

¹⁸For robustness checks, see Appendix D, which reports nonparametric tests of treatment effects, other specifications of the estimation, and estimations on other consistency measures. The robustness checks reveal comparable treatment effects on SARP violations, HM index, and CCEI for low-IQ subjects ($p = 0.04$, $p = 0.11$ and $p = 0.14$), although not all are significant at the conventional levels.




Figure 3: Cumulative Distributions of GARP Violations in the Experiment

IQ subjects. In contrast to what was observed for GARP violations, no significant treatment effect on FOSD violations by low-IQ subjects can be seen. High-IQ subjects, on the other hand, show 0.9 (almost 97%, $p = 0.02$) fewer FOSD violations under Sequential Elimination than under the Direct Procedure (on average about 0.93 FOSD violations). The results provide empirical support for the idea that individuals with high cognitive ability may take advantage of sequential elimination to improve their decision-making quality.

In conclusion, the experimental results provide causal evidence of the role played by sequential elimination in increasing economic rationality, as indicated by the improvement in individual consistency (especially among individuals with low cognitive ability) and the reduction in FOSD violations (especially among individuals with high cognitive ability).

4.2 Other Factors of Economic Rationality

The literature has documented that demographics (i.e., age, education, and gender) have diverse effects on economic rationality, as reviewed in Section 1.1. A partial explanation for this lies in the differences in sample characteristics and choice settings between studies. The present sample of primarily young and educated subjects is arguably unique in comparison to those used in other studies. Thus, an examination of the effects of demographics on economic rationality in this sample may enhance our understanding of their impact.

I found some considerable results for the demographical variables. Table 2 shows that higher age is associated with higher economic rationality (i.e., fewer GARP and FOSD violations), in line with [Dean and Martin \(2016\)](#), but not with [Choi et al. \(2014\)](#) or [Echenique, Imai and Saito \(2021\)](#). The effect of age on economic rationality possibly varies by age group. On the one hand, normal aging can cause cognitive decline; although the evidence also suggests that this is not a substantial problem for young people ([Plassman et al., 1995](#); [Aartsen et al., 2002](#); [Rönnlund et al.,](#)

Table 2: Determinants of Economic Rationality

	(1) GARP Violations	(2) FOSD Violations
Sequential Elimination	-4.480* (3.045)	-0.515** (0.215)
-Low-IQ Subjects	-9.409** (5.246)	-0.226 (0.233)
-High-IQ Subjects	0.799 (1.302)	-0.917** (0.434)
Age	-0.456* (0.253)	-0.064*** (0.024)
Female	0.885 (2.138)	0.170 (0.177)
Education	-1.232 (1.339)	0.212 (0.133)
High-IQ	-7.300** (2.900)	0.145 (0.211)
Selective Attention	-0.283 (0.373)	-0.030 (0.031)
Working Memory	-0.357 (0.500)	-0.045 (0.051)
Response Time (minutes)	-0.491** (0.229)	0.012 (0.020)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	-0.840 (0.511)	0.021 (0.033)
N	148	148

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

2005).¹⁹ On the other hand, age may contribute to the accumulation of knowledge required for decision-making (Eberhardt, de Bruin and Strough, 2019). That is, the marginal returns of aging probably outweigh its marginal costs in the young population, thereby resulting in the positive association between age and economic rationality observed in the sample. The education and gender effects are not significant, in line with Banks, Carvalho and Perez-Arce (2019), and in contrast to Choi et al. (2014) and Kim et al. (2018). This suggests that, at high education levels, the marginal returns to education on consistency may be low, intuitively in line with the hypothesis that marginal returns to education diminish as education levels increase (Harris, 2007; Agüero and Beleche, 2013). Conclusions from other studies are based on measures of economic rationality, which may differ according to their research motivations. More research is needed to evaluate the various implications of demographic factors on different measures of economic rationality.

¹⁹Eberhardt, de Bruin and Strough (2019) find that older age is associated with with more experience-based knowledge, and fewer negative emotions surrounding financial decisions. Evidence from the cognitive sciences (Plassman et al., 1995; Aartsen et al., 2002; Rönnlund et al., 2005) suggests that cognitive decline may begin after age 50 or later.

Lastly, this section examines response times, an emerging topic in economics (e.g., [Woodford, 2014](#); [Fudenberg, Strack and Strzalecki, 2018](#); [Baldassi et al., 2020](#)), and recently as related to revealed preference analysis ([Alós-Ferrer, Fehr and Netzer, 2021](#)). Table 2 shows that longer response time is associated with fewer GARP violations ($p = 0.03$).²⁰ That is, slow decisions are more likely to reveal preferences consistent with preference maximization than fast decisions. This is in line with the well-known trade-off between slow decisions and higher accuracy ([Fitts, 1966](#); [Wickelgren, 1977](#)). Importantly, the results contribute evidence to the vital role of response time in the revelation of individual preferences.

4.3 Individual Preference for Sequential Elimination

This section focuses on the Free Procedure treatment to analyze the determinants of individual preference for sequential elimination. Table 3 presents the results from probit and logit regressions, where the probability of choosing Sequential Elimination is regressed on demographics and cognitive ability.²¹ A positive association is observed between the probability of choosing Sequential Elimination and education. Although further research is needed to determine the main channel of this association, it could indicate that sequential elimination presents a potential challenge to people with relatively low educational attainments. Importantly, as Table 1 shows, over 82% of the low-IQ subjects choose Sequential Elimination. The probability of choosing Sequential Elimination decreases, *ceteris paribus*, as IQ ($p = 0.04$ in probit and $p = 0.03$ in logit), working memory ($p = 0.07$ in probit and $p = 0.05$ in logit), or selective attention ($p = 0.13$ in probit and $p = 0.17$ in logit) increase, although the last of these is not significant at the conventional levels. In other words, subjects with lower cognitive ability are more likely to use sequential elimination than those with higher cognitive ability.

In fact, the negative association between cognitive ability and the choice of Sequential Elimination is strong. Only 18% (seven) low-IQ subjects choose the Direct Procedure over Sequential Elimination. This plausible under-sampling of low-IQ subjects in the Direct Procedure hinders me from examining the effect of sequential elimination when the sample is restricted to Free Procedure subjects.

All in all, the evidence suggests that individuals with low cognitive ability—the central interest of this paper—may tend to use sequential elimination. This could be crucial for policy evaluation. However, due to the constraints of the present study, I here cannot validate sequential elimination’s impact in the context where subjects freely determine the choice procedure. The conclusion from this section is that there is a need for further investigation in this context.

²⁰Appendix E reports that subjects spend more time in Sequential Elimination than in the Direct Procedure, however, there is no strong evidence that response time’s effects depend on choice procedures.

²¹Table 3 presents results from the probit and logit regressions in the form of average marginal effects. The regressions are reported in their original form in Appendix E.

Table 3: Determinants of Preference for Sequential Elimination

	Probability of Choosing Sequential Elimination	
	(Probit)	(Logistic)
Age	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)
Female	0.110 (0.094)	0.115 (0.096)
Education	0.114*** (0.044)	0.111** (0.044)
IQ	-0.042** (0.020)	-0.042** (0.020)
Selective Attention	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.024 (0.018)
Working Memory	-0.038* (0.020)	-0.038* (0.020)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	0.003 (0.019)	0.00339 (0.021)
N	75	75

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

4.4 Choice Revision

This section explores the effects of choice revision. In brief, the resulting evidence shows that choice revision has some potential to reduce FOSD violations as aligned with other studies, but not necessarily GARP violations. This result complements the existing research on choice revision by evaluating its effect in relatively complex decision-making tasks without explicitly presenting the normative axioms.

Table 4 shows the estimation of choice revision effect.²² As shown in Column (1), there is no sound evidence to show that choice revision improves individual consistency overall, whether conditioned on IQ or treatment groups.²³ To some degree, this reveals the limited effect of choice revision in mitigating inconsistency. Column (2) indicates that choice revision corresponds to an overall reduction of 0.42 FOSD violations ($p = 0.04$), that is, approximately 61% fewer than among non-revisers (on average, about 0.69 FOSD violations). The significance of this effect holds when restricted to the low-IQ subjects under Sequential Elimination ($p = 0.03$).

²²Table 3 presents results from the negative binomial regressions, where the triple interaction between Choice Revision, high-IQ, and Sequential Elimination is included. The results are reported in the form of average marginal effects. P-values of choice revision effect are computed based on the null hypothesis that the number of GARP (FOSD) violations of subjects who revise is larger than or equal to that of subjects who do not revise. This estimation is based on the sample of subjects who passed the comprehension check in the payment block. GARP violations in the table are calculated based on choices from the payment block. The complete table and the regression estimates appear in their original form in Appendix E.

²³This is further corroborated by testing its sensitivity to other specifications, as reported in Appendix D.

Collectively, these results suggest that choice revision may complement sequential elimination to further improve economic rationality in low-IQ individuals by reducing their FOSD violations.

Benjamin, Fontana and Kimball (2020), Breig and Feldman (2020), and Nielsen and Rehbeck (2020) show choice revision to have a stronger effect in shifting choices towards normative axioms than observed in the present study. Those studies present the normative axioms in primarily binary choice tasks. In contrast, this study uses eleven-options choice tasks without presenting axioms. Considering the contrast, it is possible that choice revision’s effect may hinge on the comprehensive design of the procedure and complexity of choice settings. This discussion sheds light on the further question of the robustness of choice revision effects across contexts.

Table 4: The Effect of Choice Revision on Economic Rationality

	(1) GARP Violations	(2) FOSD Violations
Choice Revision	-1.833 (2.849)	-0.42** (0.244)
-Low-IQ Subjects under the Direct Procedure	-4.665 (7.004)	-0.612 (0.647)
-High-IQ Subjects under the Direct Procedure	-3.182 (2.695)	0.085 (0.467)
-Low-IQ Subjects under Sequential Elimination	3.487 (3.804)	-0.610** (0.331)
-High-IQ Subjects under Sequential Elimination	-5.078 (6.182)	-0.207 (0.251)
N	151	151

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Control variables not shown in this table: Age, Female, Education, IQ, Selective Attention, Working Memory, and Attitude towards Inconsistency.

4.5 Risk preferences

This section presents the analysis of risk preferences under the expected utility model using the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) revealed from the subjects’ choice data.²⁴ Before stating the results, it is worth mentioning that, although the literature tends to find a negative relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion (Burks et al., 2009; Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010; Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro, 2013; Dohmen et al., 2018), this relationship cannot always be replicated and sometimes even becomes positive (Mather et al., 2012; Tymula et al., 2012; Andersson et al., 2016).²⁵ Specifically, Andersson et al. (2016)

²⁴CRRA coefficients are estimated using the code packages from Halevy, Persitz and Zrill (2018). Based on the CRRA form of the expected utility model, the estimation recovers parameters using nonlinear least squares. The histogram of the CRRA revealed in the experiment is given in Appendix B, where it can be seen that 80% of the values range from 0 to 4.7.

²⁵Dohmen et al. (2018) suggest that the nonsignificant relationships in Mather et al. (2012) and Tymula et al. (2012) may be due to small sample size and measurement error. Andersson et al. (2016) find a positive relationship

argue that the effect of cognitive ability on risk preferences may operate through the channel of decision-making mistakes. Recall the theoretical prediction that individuals may err due to limited attention under the Direct Procedure but not under Sequential Elimination. Also, the existing studies primarily derive their results from simple choice settings, i.e., most decisions comprise of two or three options (e.g., [Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz, 2009](#); [Andersson et al., 2016](#)). Thus, the following analysis contributes to the discussion by examining the relationships between cognitive ability and risk preferences under the two procedures in non-simple choice settings.

Table 5 presents the estimation results based on two specifications.²⁶ In Column (1), CRRA is directly regressed on IQ and a complete set of explanatory variables. Coinciding with early reported findings, overall, there is a negative impact of IQ on CRRA ($p = 0.09$). No other factor, including sequential elimination, appears to be associated significantly with risk aversion. Conjecturally, the sequential elimination effect may depend on cognitive ability, based on the previous results showing its heterogeneous effects on consistency.

The estimation in Column (2) incorporates the interaction between IQ and Sequential Elimination. Verifying the conjecture, the association between IQ and CRRA is significant ($p = 0.04$) under Sequential Elimination but not under the Direct Procedure. Further, this association is stronger under Sequential Elimination than overall. This is also confirmed by the distinction in cumulative CRRA distributions between the low-IQ and high-IQ subjects is sharpest under Sequential Elimination (Figure 4 (b)), where that of the low-IQ subjects almost stochastically dominates that of the high-IQ subjects. Under the Direct Procedure (Figure 4(a)), in contrast, there is no evident distinction between the two groups in this respect.

These results may be driven by the present choice setting comprising eleven options. The choices made by low-IQ subjects under the Direct Procedure may not fully reveal their risk preferences, potentially as a result of mistakes caused by limited attention, as would be consistent with [Andersson et al. \(2016\)](#). In other words, the complexity of the choice task may be determinant in the revelation of risk aversion.

In short, the findings in this section complement the existing evidence for the negative relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion. This relationship is confirmed under sequential elimination, where choice consistency is theoretically established and empirically supported by the previous results of this study. Crucially, these findings raise the question of whether the robustness of this relationship holds for complex choice settings.

in a multiple-price list (MPL) where there are more opportunities to err towards the risky option. They argue that the choice errors cause an underestimation of risk aversion.

²⁶Table 5 Column (2) reports the average marginal effects based on the linear regression, which includes an interaction term between IQ and Sequential Elimination in addition to the specification reported in Column (1). The complete table and the regression estimates appear in their original form in Appendix E.




Figure 4: Cumulative distributions of Estimated CRRA in the Experiment

Table 5: Determinants of Risk Preferences

	(1)	(2)
	Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion	
IQ	-0.397*	-0.358
	(0.230)	(0.227)
-Under the Direct Procedure		0.071
		(0.320)
-Under the Sequential Elimination		-0.799**
		(0.397)
Sequential Elimination	2.010	2.063
	(1.619)	(1.628)
N	148	148

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Control variables not shown in this table: Age, Female, Education, Selective Attention, Working Memory, Response Time, and Attitude towards Inconsistency.

5 Discussion

5.1 Policy Implications

Policymakers and institutions can implement sequential elimination in a wide range of contexts to mitigate the impact of limited attention and improve individual welfare. For example, field evidence indicates that individuals have difficulty in making decisions for retirement plans (Sethi-Iyengar et al., 2004; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004) and bank loans (Bertrand et al., 2010), which typically involve a large number of options. Public policy can promote sequential elimination at a relatively low cost, e.g., by providing it on a governmental website where people choose retirement plans or by regulating it to be installed on banking websites where consumers

choose loan plans. More broadly, sequential elimination might be flexibly applied to numerous meaningful contexts across a person’s life cycle—spanning from education, through career, to retirement decisions—where often the options are complex, and most people long for the “best” choice.

Upon improvement of individual consistency, sequential elimination may complement policymaking based on economic predictions drawn from the premise of rationality. In light of the present results on risk preferences, sequential elimination may help exploit information on individual preferences. Perhaps, this presents an alternative approach that could enhance policymaking based on revealed preferences by incorporating the emerging behavioral findings of human limitation (e.g., [Bernheim and Rangel, 2007, 2009](#)). Importantly, sequential elimination needs not be implemented in a paternalistic fashion. Individuals can be allowed to opt out of making decisions under sequential elimination at no cost. The Free Procedure’s analysis suggests that individuals with limited attention are likely to use the procedure based on their preferences. The non-paternalistic approach of implementing sequential elimination inflicts little or no harm on individuals; thus, it is a desirable advantage in institutional design ([Thaler and Sunstein, 2003](#)).

In light of my theoretical framework, it is sufficient for individuals to consider only two alternatives in every elimination to achieve consistency. It may be efficient for less cognitively constrained individuals to eliminate more than one alternative at a time. In effect, the procedure works as long as each round of elimination remains within the individual’s cognitive ability. Further study is required to evaluate variations in sequential elimination due to individual heterogeneity.

5.2 Concluding Remarks

This paper has shown that sequential elimination—a well-known choice procedure, especially in the cognitive sciences ([Tversky, 1972](#); [Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000](#))—improves individual consistency with preference maximization under cognitive limitations. This paper develops a formal framework to identify the role of sequential elimination in improving individual consistency. Causal evidence for a sequential elimination effect is obtained for subjects participating in a randomized controlled risky decision-making experiment. This effect is statistically significant and economically substantial for individuals with low cognitive ability. The existing literature on the gap between low cognitive ability and choice consistency is enriched by the identification of theoretical and empirical conditions under which this gap narrows. This paper may offer a new insight into the ways in which choice procedures can influence individual consistency with preference maximization, which poses one of the major challenges to neoclassical economics.

Finally, beyond decision-making under risk, it would be desirable to test the robustness of sequential elimination in different choice domains, such as consumer goods, intertemporal choice,

and altruistic choice. Notably, field research into the effect of sequential elimination presents a promising line of research.

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Appendices

Appendix A

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Let $D = \{c^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$ be a data set. Consider the following conditions:

- [1] $GARP_D = 0$.
- [2] D is rationalized by sequential elimination.
- [3] There exists a preference relation \succeq over X (defined by $x \succeq y$ if xRy) such that for all i , $c^i \in \{x \in M^i | x \succeq x' \forall x' \in M^i\}$.

By a theorem of [Cosaert and Demuyne \(2015\)](#), we have that [1] if and only if [3]. Hence in the following proof, I show equivalently that [2] if and only if [3].


[3] implies [2]. Suppose that [3] is true. Define $\gamma(M) = M$ for all $M \in \mathcal{X}$. Define $E = \{e^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$ such that for all i : if $|M^i| \geq 2$, then $e^i = (e_1^i, \dots, e_{|M^i|-1}^i, c^i)$ with $\bigcup_{j=1}^{|M^i|-1} \{e_j^i\} = M^i \setminus \{c^i\}$; if $|M^i| = 1$, then $e^i = (e_1^i)$ with $e_1^i \in M^i$. For all i and $j = 1, \dots, |M^i|$, we have $e_j^i \in \gamma(E_j^i)$ (Definition 3 (i)); $c^i \in \{x \in \gamma(E_j^i) | x \succeq e_j^i, x \neq e_j^i\} \neq \emptyset$ if $|E_j^i| \geq 2$ (Definition 3 (ii)); and $c_i = e_{|M^i|}^i$ (Definition 3 (iii)). Thus, D is rationalized by sequential elimination.

[2] implies [3]. Suppose that [2] is true. Let \succeq , γ , and $E = \{e^i, M^i\}_{i=1}^n$ be the preference relation, consideration set mapping, and elimination data set that satisfy the conditions in Definition 3. Suppose by contradiction that there exists some $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $c^j = e_{|M^j|}^j \notin \{x \in M^j | x \succeq x' \forall x' \in M^j\}$. Since \succeq is complete and transitive, $\{x \in M^j | x \succeq x' \forall x' \in M^j\} \neq \emptyset$. Then there must exist some $l \in \{0, \dots, |M^j| - 1\}$ such that $e_l^j, e_{|M^j|}^j \in E_{-l}^j$, $e_l^j \in \{x \in M^j | x \succeq x' \forall x' \in M^j\}$, and $\{x \in \gamma(E_{-l}^j) | x \succeq e_l^j, x \neq e_l^j\} = \emptyset$. This is a contradiction to Definition 3 (ii). Therefore, we have that for all i , $c^i \in \{x \in M^i | x \succeq x' \forall x' \in M^i\}$.

Appendix B Details of Experimental Design


B.1 Decision Problems and GARP Violations in the Experiment

Figure 5: A Graphical Illustration of A Decision Problem



Notes: The points on the budget line represents a menu in the experiment. Each point on this line indicate an option. Subjects are not presented with this type of graphical illustrations in the experiment.

Figure 6: A Graphical Illustration of A GARP Violation



Note: Each budget line represents a menu of options in the experiment. The red circles indicate a pair of choices from these menus that violate GARP.

B.2 Instructions in the Experiment

B.2.1 Introduction

Welcome to our study on decision-making.

The study consists of three sections. In Section 1, you will make a series of economic decisions. In Section 2, you will participate in some cognitive tasks. In Section 3, you will be asked to imagine yourself in some hypothetical scenarios and answer a few questions related to those scenarios. Detailed instructions will be provided at the beginning of each section.

You will receive £3 as a participation fee for completing the study. You will also earn an additional payment of up to £14.6 depending partly on your decisions and partly on chance. You will be paid within 3 working days after completing the study.

Please pay careful attention to the instructions. During the study, we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of pounds. The sum of tokens you earn in the experiment will be converted to pounds at the following rate:

$$25 \text{ tokens} = \text{£}1$$

Important: Once you have moved on to the next question, you cannot go back and change your choice. Do not close the web browser at any time!

B.2.2 Experimental Section 1

Section 1 consists of two blocks, Blocks A and B. Each block consists of 21 decision problems that share a common format. An example of the decision problem will be provided at the beginning of each block.

In each decision problem, you will be asked to choose **one** option out of multiple options. An option [X, Y] indicates that you will earn either X tokens or Y tokens with **the same** probability. For instance, the option [24, 32] indicates that you will earn 24 tokens with probability 50% and 32 tokens with probability 50%.

In each decision problem, you are encouraged to examine all options and should choose only one option that you prefer. There is no right and wrong answer to each decision problem. We are interested in studying your preferences.

We use the following method to determine your payment in Section 1: At the end of Section 1, you will be asked to make a choice between Blocks A and B for your payment. At the end of the experiment, one of the 21 problems from the block you choose will be drawn at random. Each problem has **the same** probability of being drawn. You will earn tokens according to your choice in this randomly drawn problem.

You will earn real money, depending on your decisions. Please make careful decisions.

The Direct Procedure (Block A)

In this block, you will participate in 21 decision problems. You will make decisions by a procedure called "**sequential examination**". You will be asked to sequentially examine, one by one, options by clicking on them. Then you will be asked to choose only **one** option that you **prefer**. Below, you can see an example of sequential examination:

Example
Examine all the options.

Options
[48, 54]
[88, 24]
[72, 36]
[16, 78]

Choice List

For instance, if you have examined the option [16, 78], you can click on it. It will then be moved to the "**Choice List**".

Example
Examine all the options.

Options
[48, 54]
[88, 24]
[72, 36]

Choice List
[16, 78]

You should examine all the options by clicking on them. Then you can choose the option that you prefer from the "**Choice List**" by clicking on it. Your final choice will be highlighted in yellow. For instance, in the screen below, your choice is [88, 24].

You should click on "Next" to confirm your choice and proceed to the next problem.

Regarding payment, suppose that you choose [88, 24] by sequential examination. If you are paid according to this choice, you would receive 88 tokens with 50% probability and 24 tokens with 50% probability.

Example

Choose the option that you **prefer** from the Choice List.

Options

Choice List

[48, 54]

[88, 24]

[72, 36]

[16, 78]

Next

To familiarize you with the decision problems, you will have a practice problem. It will not affect your payment. Then you will be asked to complete all the problems.

Important: Once you have clicked on "Next", you cannot go back and change your choice.

Sequential Elimination (Block A)

In this block, you will participate in 21 decision problems. You will make decisions by a procedure called "**sequential elimination**". You will be asked to sequentially eliminate, one by one, the options that you do not prefer by clicking on them, until only **one** option remains. The **last remaining option** is your **choice** in the decision problem.

Below, you can see an example of sequential elimination:

Example

Eliminate the options that you **do not prefer** from this list.

Options

Trash

[48, 54]

[88, 24]

[72, 36]

[16, 78]

For instance, if you eliminate [16, 78] by clicking on it, it will be moved to the "**Trash**".

Note that you can **recover** the options in the Trash by clicking on them. For example, if you click on [16, 78] in the Trash, it will be moved back to the "Options".

Regarding your choice, you should eliminate options until only **one** option remains. For

Example
 Eliminate the options that you **do not prefer** from this list.

Options

[48, 54]

[88, 24]

[72, 36]

Trash

[16, 78]

instance, in the screen below, supposed that you have eliminated [16, 78], [72, 36] and [48, 54]. As a result, the **last remaining** [88, 24] is your final **choice** in this problem. Your final choice is highlighted in yellow.

Example 2
 Your final **choice** is

Options

[88, 24]

Trash

[16, 78]

[72, 36]

[48, 54]

Next

You should click on "Next" to confirm your choice and proceed to the next problem.

Regarding payment, suppose that you choose [88, 24] by sequential elimination. If you are paid according to this choice, you would receive 88 tokens with 50% probability and 24 tokens with 50% probability.

To familiarize you with the decision problems, you will have a practice problem. It will not affect your payment. Then you will be asked to complete all the problems.

Important: Once you have clicked on "Next", you **cannot** go back and change your choice.

The Free Procedure (Block A)

First, you have to make a choice between two choice procedures: sequential examination and sequential elimination. The two procedures will be explained below with examples. Then you will participate in 21 decision problems using the procedure chosen by you.

1) **Sequential Examination:** You will be asked to sequentially examine, one by one, options by clicking on them. Then you will be asked to choose only **one** option that you **prefer**.

Below, you can see an example of sequential examination:

Example 1
Examine all the options.
Options
[48, 54]
[88, 24]
[72, 36]
[16, 78]
Choice List

For instance, if you have examined the option [16, 78], you can click on it. It will then be moved to the "**Choice List**".

Example 1
Examine all the options.
Options
[48, 54]
[88, 24]
[72, 36]
Choice List
[16, 78]

You should examine all the options by clicking on them. Then you can choose the option that you prefer in the "**Choice List**" by clicking on it. Your final choice will be highlighted in yellow. For instance, in the screen below, your choice is [88, 24].

Example 1

Choose the option that you **prefer** from the Choice List.

Options

Choice List
[48, 54]
[88, 24]
[72, 36]
[16, 78]

You should click on "Next" to confirm your choice and proceed to the next problem.

2) **Sequential Elimination:** You will be asked to sequentially eliminate, one by one, the options that you do **not prefer** by clicking on them, until only one option remains. The **last remaining option** is your **choice** in the decision problem.

Below, you can see an example of sequential elimination:

Example 2

Eliminate the options that you **do not prefer** from this list.

Options

[48, 54]

[88, 24]

[72, 36]

[16, 78]

Trash

For instance, if you eliminate [16, 78] by clicking on it, it will be moved to the "**Trash**".

Example 2

Eliminate the options that you **do not prefer** from this list.

Options

[48, 54]

[88, 24]

[72, 36]

Trash

[16, 78]

Note that you can **recover** the options in the Trash by clicking on them. For example, if you click on [16, 78] in the Trash, it will be moved back to the "Options".

Regarding your choice, you should eliminate options until only **one** option remains. For instance, in the screen below, supposed that you have eliminated [16, 78], [72, 36] and [48, 54]. As a result, the **last remaining** [88, 24] is your final choice in this problem. Your final **choice** is highlighted in yellow.

You should click on "Next" to confirm your choice and proceed to the next problem.

Example 2

Your final **choice** is

Options

[88, 24]

Trash

[16, 78]

[72, 36]

[48, 54]

Next

Regarding payment, suppose that you choose [88, 24] by sequential examination or sequential elimination. If you are paid according to this choice, you would receive 88 tokens with 50% probability and 24 tokens with 50% probability.

To familiarize you with the decision problems, you will have a practice problem for each procedure. It will not affect your payment. Then you will be asked to choose a procedure and complete all the problems.

Important: Once you have clicked on "Next", you **cannot** go back and change your choice.

The Free Procedure: Procedure Selection

Please indicate which procedure that you would like to use in Section 1.

- Sequential Examination
- Sequential Elimination

The Direct Procedure (Block B)

In this block, you will confront the **same** 21 decision problems as those in Block A. You will see your choice from the corresponding problem in Block A highlighted in yellow. You will be asked to consider if you would like to change you choice.

Below, you can see an example of Block B problem:

Example

Consider if you would like to change your choice.

Options	Choice List
[48, 54]	
[72, 36]	
[88, 24]	
[16, 78]	

The Same Choice

You can choose the same option as you chose in the corresponding problem in Block A by clicking on “The Same Choice”. For instance, if you click on “The Same Choice” in this problem, your choice is [88, 24] and you will proceed to the next problem directly.

If you want to change your choice, you can click on **any** option on the list. Then you can start again the sequential examination. For instance, if you click on [72, 36], you will see the screen below.

Example

Examine all the options.

Options

[48, 54]

[88, 24]

[16, 78]

Choice List

[72, 36]

Regarding payment, suppose that this time you choose [48, 54]. If you are paid according to this choice, you would receive 48 tokens with 50% probability and 54 tokens with 50% probability.

To familiarize you with the decision problems, you will have a practice problem. It will not affect your payment. Then you will be asked to complete all the problems.

Remember that we will ask you to choose between Blocks A and B for payment at the end of Section 1.

Important: Once you have clicked on "Next", you **cannot** go back and change your choice.

Sequential Elimination (Block B)

In this block, you will confront the **same** 21 decision problems as those in Block A. You will see your choice from the corresponding problem in Block A highlighted in yellow. You will be asked to consider if you would like to change you choice.

Below, you can see an example of Block B problem: You can choose the same option as you

Example

Consider if you would like to change your choice.

Options

[48, 54]

[88, 24]

[72, 36]

[16, 78]

Trash

The Same Choice

chose in the corresponding problem in Block A by clicking on “The Same Choice”. For instance, if you click on “The Same Choice” in this problem, your choice is [88, 24] and you will proceed to the next problem directly.

If you want to change your choice, you can click on **any** option on the list. Then you can start again the sequential elimination. For instance, if you click on [72, 36], you will see the screen below.

Example

Eliminate the options that you **do not prefer** from this list.

Options	Trash
[48, 54]	
[88, 24]	[72, 36]
[16, 78]	

Regarding payment, suppose that this time you choose [48, 54]. If you are paid according to this choice, you would receive 48 tokens with 50% probability and 54 tokens with 50% probability.

To familiarize you with the decision problems, you will have a practice problem. It will not affect your payment. Then you will be asked to complete all the problems.

Remember that we will ask you to choose between Blocks A and B for payment at the end of Section 1.

Important: Once you have clicked on ”Next”, you **cannot** go back and change your choice.

Payment Block Selection

Please indicate that which block you would like to choose for your payment in Section 1.

- Block A
- Block B

Individual Satisfaction (The Direct Procedure)

Now, we would like to understand how satisfied you are with the decisions you made in Section 1.

A rating of 0 means that you are not satisfied at all. A rating of 10 means that you cannot

be more satisfied. Please select the number between 0 and 10 that best describes how you feel about the sequential examination procedure and your choices in Section 1.

How satisfied are you with the **sequential examination** procedure in Section 1?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Satisfaction with the sequential examination



How satisfied are you with **your choices** in Section 1?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Satisfaction with your choices:



Individual Satisfaction (Sequential Elimination)

Now, we would like to understand how satisfied you are with the decisions you made in Section 1.

A rating of 0 means that you are not satisfied at all. A rating of 10 means that you cannot be more satisfied. Please select the number between 0 and 10 that best describes how you feel about the sequential elimination procedure and your choices in Section 1.

How satisfied are you with the the **sequential elimination** procedure in Section 1?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


Satisfaction with the sequential elimination



How satisfied are you with **your choices** in Section 1?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Satisfaction with your choices:



Screenshots of Treatments

Figure 7: The Direct Procedure, a subject enters a decision problem

1) Examine all the options.

Options	Choice List
[100, 34]	
[34, 67]	
[134, 17]	
[68, 50]	
[16, 76]	
[0, 84]	
[118, 25]	
[152, 8]	
[84, 42]	
[56, 56]	
[168, 0]	

Figure 8: The Direct Procedure, a subject clicks on an option

1) Examine all the options.

Options	Choice List
[100, 34]	
[34, 67]	
[134, 17]	
[68, 50]	
[16, 76]	
[118, 25]	[0, 84]
[152, 8]	
[84, 42]	
[56, 56]	
[168, 0]	

Figure 9: The Direct Procedure, a subject has clicked on all options

1) Choose the option that you **prefer** from the Choice List.

Options

Choice List
[100, 34]
[34, 67]
[134, 17]
[68, 50]
[16, 76]
[0, 84]
[118, 25]
[152, 8]
[84, 42]
[56, 56]
[168, 0]

Figure 10: The Direct Procedure, a subject chooses an option in the Choice List

1) Choose the option that you **prefer** from the Choice List.

Options

Choice List
[100, 34]
[34, 67]
[134, 17]
[68, 50]
[16, 76]
[0, 84]
[118, 25]
[152, 8]
[84, 42]
[56, 56]
[168, 0]

Next

Figure 11: Sequential Elimination, a subject enters a decision problem

1) Eliminate the options that you **do not prefer** from this list.

Options

[68, 50]
[56, 56]
[84, 42]
[168, 0]
[100, 34]
[16, 76]
[0, 84]
[118, 25]
[134, 17]
[34, 67]
[152, 8]

Trash

Figure 12: Sequential Elimination, a subject eliminates on an option

1) Eliminate the options that you **do not prefer** from this list.

Options

[68, 50]
[56, 56]
[84, 42]

[100, 34]
[16, 76]
[0, 84]
[118, 25]
[134, 17]
[34, 67]
[152, 8]

Trash

[168, 0]

Figure 13: Sequential Elimination, a subject has eliminated all but one options

1) Your final **choice** is

Options

[152, 8]

Trash

[168, 0]
[84, 42]
[100, 34]
[16, 76]
[0, 84]
[118, 25]
[134, 17]
[34, 67]
[56, 56]
[68, 50]

Next

Figure 14: Choice Revision (Block B), a subject enters a decision problem

1) Consider if you would like to change your choice.

Options

[100, 34]
[0, 84]
[168, 0]
[152, 8]
[34, 67]
[68, 50]
[56, 56]
[134, 17]
[118, 25]
[84, 42]
[16, 76]

Trash

The Same Choice

B.2.3 Experimental Section 2

This section has three cognitive tasks. Your payment in this section will depend on your performance in the three tasks. Each task has a different number of questions. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly draw three questions from all the tasks with equal probability. For each correct answer to the random three questions, you will receive 25 tokens.

Task 1 (ICAR)

In this task, you are asked to answer ten questions. Five of them are about matrix reasoning and the other five are about three-dimensional rotation. There is a right answer to each question. You can have at most twelve minutes in this task.

Figure 15: An Example of Matrix Reasoning Problem

Please indicate which is the best answer to complete the figure below.





Figure 16: An Example of Three-dimensional Rotation Problem

Please indicate which is the best answer to complete the figure below.



Task 2 (Stroop Task)

This task measures your concentration. In each round, you are asked to **identify the color of the word shown on the screen**. The word itself is irrelevant — you can safely ignore it. To indicate the color of the word, please use the keys **r**, **g**, **b** and **o** for **red**, **green**, **blue** and **orange**, respectively. A plus sign will be shown before each word, please keep your eyes on the plus sign. You will have only two seconds in each round.

Figure 17: An Example of Stroop Task

blue

What's the *color* of the word shown above?
Please press **r** for red, **g** for green, **b** for blue and **o** for orange.
If the screen does not respond, please click on this bar.

Task 3 (Sternberg Task)

This task measures your working memory. In each round, you are asked to memorize a sequence of digits. The length of this sequence can vary from four to eight digits. After the presentation, we will ask you to indicate whether a certain digit was included in the sequence. Please press **y** if you think that the digit was in the sequence. If not, please press **n**. If your decision is correct, you will see a green circle. Otherwise, you will see a red circle. Then we will ask you to type in the entire sequence.

Figure 18: An Example of Sternbeg Task, Memorization Phase

1

Please memorize these digits.
If the screen does not respond, please click on this bar and then press space.

Figure 19: An Example of Sternbeg Task, Recall Phase

6

Was this digit included in the sequence?

If you think that the digit was in the sequence, press . If not, please press .
If the screen does not respond, please click on this bar.

Figure 20: An Example of Sternbeg Task, Recall Phase

6

Was this digit included in the sequence?

If you think that the digit was in the sequence, press . If not, please press .
If the screen does not respond, please click on this bar.

B.2.4 Experimental Section 3

In this section, you will also be asked to imagine yourself in three hypothetical scenarios and answer a few questions related to those scenarios. There are no right or wrong answers to those questions, simply answer based on your feeling.

Attitude towards Inconsistency

Imagine that you are at a cinema and wish to buy some popcorn. The cinema sells small tubs of popcorn for £3 and large ones for £7. Suppose that you choose the small one. Now consider a different situation. The cinema sells small tubs for £3, medium ones for £6.50 and large ones for £7. This time you choose the large one.

In the first case, you prefer the small size to the large. In the second case, your choice suggests the opposite. How at ease do you feel with your choices? Please rate how at ease you feel on the scale provided. A rating of 0 means that you are not at all at ease with one or more of your choices and would really like to make changes. A rating of 10 means that you could not be more at ease and have no wish to change anything.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ease

Sunk Cost Fallacy

Imagine that you have spent £50 on a ticket for concert A and £100 on a ticket for concert B. You really prefer A to B, but you have discovered that the two concerts are to take place exactly at the same time on the same day. You cannot obtain a refund or sell the tickets. Which concert would you go to?

- Concert A
- Concert B

Non-Consequentialism


Imagine two trips you may make this summer. You plan Trip 1 by yourself. Someone plans Trip 2 for you. The plans for both trips are the same. You will visit the same places, take the same photos and enjoy the same foods. In other words, you will enjoy the same experiences on both trips. Which trip do you prefer to go to?

- Trip 1
- Trip 2
- I am indifferent between the two trips.

Appendix C Descriptive Statistics in the Experiment

C.1 Demographics


Figure 21: Histograms of Demographics (Overall Sample)



Note: The variable *education* takes a numeric value defined as follows: 0=“No Qualifications”, 1=“High school diploma/A-levels” or “Secondary education (e.g., GED/GCSE)”, 2=“Technical/community college”, 3=“Undergraduate degree (BA/BSc/other)”, 4=“Graduate degree (MA/MSc/MPhil/other)”, 5=“Doctorate degree (PhD/other)”.

C.2 Cognitive Ability

Figure 22: Histograms of Cognitive Ability (Overall Sample)



C.3 Balance Checks

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics and Balance

Variable	Direct Procedure	Sequential Elimination	Difference
Age (years)	23.147 (5.082)	24.712 (8.259)	1.566 (1.124)
Female	0.520 (0.503)	0.507 (0.503)	-0.013 (0.083)
Education (highest completed level)	1.973 (1.150)	2.000 (1.190)	0.027 (0.192)
IQ	4.907 (2.291)	4.562 (2.560)	-0.345 (0.399)
Selective Attention	17.173 (3.411)	16.616 (4.192)	-0.557 (0.627)
Working Memory	6.213 (2.164)	6.096 (2.328)	-0.117 (0.369)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	5.800 (2.899)	5.329 (2.911)	-0.471 (0.478)
Observations	75	73	148


Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 7: Detailed Breakdown of Observations

IQ Group \ Treatment	Direct Procedure	Sequential Elimination	Direct Procedure (Free)	Sequential Elimination (Free)
Low-IQ Subjects	34 (45.3%)	40 (54.8%)	7 (26.9%)	32 (65.3%)
High-IQ Subjects	41 (54.7%)	33 (45.2%)	19 (73.1%)	17 (34.7%)
Total	75 (100%)	73 (100%)	26 (100%)	49 (100%)


C.4 Economic Rationality Measures

Figure 23: Economic Rationality in the Experiment (1)



Note: Error bars indicate the standard error of means.

Figure 24: Economic Rationality in the Experiment (2)



Note: Error bars indicate the standard error of means.

Figure 25: Empirical CDFs of Economic Rationality Measures in the Experiment (1)




Figure 26: Empirical CDFs of Economic Rationality Measures in the Experiment (2)






Figure 27: Empirical CDFs of Economic Rationality Measures in the Experiment (3)



C.5 Risk Preferences

Figure 28: Histogram of the Revealed CRRA in the Experiment



Appendix D Robustness Checks

D.1 Economic Rationality

The results presented are robust to several alternative approaches. Two-sample permutation tests allow nonparametric testing of the difference in GARP violations under the two treatments. 10,000 data sets are generated by randomly shuffling the treatment assignments in the sample, and a calculation is made of the total Variation Distance (TVD) between the GARP violation distributions under these assignments. The null hypothesis is that economic rationality of choices under the Direct Procedure and Sequential Elimination come from the same distribution. If the null hypothesis is true, the TVD given by the actual data should appear with a high probability in the shuffled data sets; otherwise, it should appear with a low probability. Figure 29 plots the empirical distribution of the TVD in the permutations, which suggests rejection of the null hypothesis, since the observed differences in the TVD for both GARP and FOSD violations data (indicated by red lines) are statistically significant. This provides evidence for the effect of sequential elimination on economic rationality, not only in the sample but also in the population.

Figure 30 shows permutation tests in the low-IQ subsample and the ones in the high-IQ subsample. In particular, the TVD difference in GARP violations between the Direct Procedure and Sequential Elimination is statistically significant for low-IQ subjects ($p = 0.004$, Figure 30 (a)) but not for High-IQ subjects ($p = 0.1308$, Figure 30 (b)). Reversely, with the switch from Direct Procedure to Sequential Elimination, the TVD difference in FOSD violations is statistically significant for high-IQ subjects ($p = 0.0262$, Figure 30 (c)) but not for low-IQ subjects ($p = 0.2426$, Figure 30 (d)). In sum, the nonparametric results are consistent with our previous regression analysis.

Figure 29: Permutations Test of Sequential Elimination Effect on Economic Rationality





Table 8 shows, in addition to the Table 2, negative binomial regression estimates for SARP violations and the HM index, due to their count data nature. Also shown are the OLS regression estimates for the CCEI, where the OLS coefficients exactly reproduce the marginal effects. Columns (1)-(4) indicate that the effect of sequential elimination on GARP violations remains similar for SARP violations ($p = 0.15$), but differs for HM index ($p = 0.63$) and CCEI ($p = 0.77$). The HM index is sensitive to the total number of decision problems and CCEI is sensitive to the GARP violation associated with the maximum wealth loss, but not to the total number of violations, which is the central interest of this paper.


Figure 30: Permutations Test of Treatments on Economic Rationality in Subsamples

(a) GARP Violations, Low-IQ Sample




Notes: Empirical P-value=0.004

(b) GARP Violations, High-IQ Sample




Notes: Empirical P-value=0.1308

(c) FOSD Violations, Low-IQ Sample



Notes: Empirical P-value=0.2426

(d) GARP Violations, High-IQ Sample



Notes: Empirical P-value=0.0262

The experiment also elicits the subject's tendencies to commit sunk cost fallacy and non-consequentialism. The sunk cost fallacy suggests that individuals influenced by sunk cost concerns (e.g., time, effort, and money) tend to make non-optimal decisions, thereby violating consistency (Thaler (1980, 1999)). Adopting the Arkes and Blumer (1985) scenario, as described in Appendix B, individuals who choose the higher-sunk-cost option are considered subject to sunk cost fallacy. Consequentialism refers to the case where individuals value their choice irrespective of how it is generated. Recent evidence suggests that individuals may make nonoptimal decisions (i.e., those that go against their material interest), motivated in their decision by non-consequential factors such as decision rights (Fehr, Herz and Wilkening (2013); Bartling, Fehr and Herz (2014)). It is possible that non-consequentialist responses have an impact on choice consistency. Subjects are therefore asked to indicate whether they prefer one of two options with identical consequences, or feel indifferent towards them (See Appendix E for the decision problem). Subjects with a declared preference for one or the other is considered a non-consequentialist.

Table 9 reports the robustness of the results to some alternative specifications. Column (1) replicates column (1) of Table 2, including, in addition, the sunk cost fallacy and the non-consequentialism. The effect of sequential elimination for low-IQ individuals (i.e., IQ-Q1 subjects in column (1)) is larger and still statistically significant ($p = 0.04$). Columns (2) and (3) replicate the aforementioned negative binomial estimation where subjects are

Table 8: Determinants of Economic Rationality

	(1) GARP Violations	(2) SARP Violations	(3) HM Index	(4) CCEI	(5) FOSD Violations
Sequential Elimination	-4.480*	-4.100*	-0.003	-0.003	-0.515**
	(3.045)	(2.871)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.215)
-Low-IQ Subjects	-9.409**	-8.762**	-0.014	-0.020	-0.226
	(5.246)	(4.962)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.233)
-High-IQ Subjects	0.799	0.833	0.008	0.014	-0.917**
	(1.302)	(1.532)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.434)
Age	-0.456*	-0.423*	-0.002**	-0.001**	-0.064***
	(0.253)	(0.242)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.024)
Female	0.885	-0.154	-0.005	0.003	0.170
	(2.138)	(2.079)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.177)
Education	-1.232	-0.936	0.002	-0.000	0.212
	(1.339)	(1.287)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.133)
High-IQ	-7.300**	-6.994***	-0.012*	-0.021**	0.145
	(2.900)	(2.711)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.211)
Selective Attention	-0.283	-0.266	-0.001	-0.003	-0.030
	(0.373)	(0.348)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.031)
Working Memory	-0.357	-0.382	-0.003	-0.001	-0.045
	(0.500)	(0.503)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.051)
Response Time (minutes)	-0.491**	-0.442**	-0.001*	-0.002*	0.012
	(0.229)	(0.217)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.020)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	-0.840	-0.815*	-0.001	-0.002	0.021
	(0.511)	(0.478)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.033)
N	148	148	148	148	148

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

categorized by IQ based on their positions in the distribution, first by terciles and then by quartiles. The variable of interest, Sequential Elimination, reduces GARP violations among subjects with IQs in the lowest tercile ($p = 0.04$) and the lowest quartile ($p = 0.03$).

Table 9: Determinants of Economic Rationality (Robustness Checks)

	GARP Violations		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	2-Quantiles	3-Quantiles	4-Quantiles
Sequential Elimination	-4.623*	-3.416*	-3.320*
	(3.079)	(2.648)	(2.554)
–1st IQ quartile	-9.747**	-9.955**	-8.871**
	(5.415)	(5.656)	(4.762)
–2nd IQ quartile	0.799	-2.234	-5.739
	(1.261)	(4.398)	(9.063)
–3rd IQ quartile		1.668	-0.257
		(1.245)	(1.864)
–4th IQ quartile			2.208
			(1.529)
Age	-0.422	-0.275	-0.337
	(0.266)	(0.251)	(0.251)
Female	1.008	-0.653	0.587
	(2.196)	(2.145)	(1.926)
Education	-1.490	-1.135	-1.373
	(1.416)	(1.136)	(1.170)
2nd IQ quartile	-7.413**	0.413	5.121
	(2.937)	(3.546)	(4.844)
3rd IQ quartile		-6.078**	-4.308
		(3.091)	(2.755)
4th IQ quartile			-5.850**
			(2.746)
Selective Attention	-0.232	-0.173	-0.196
	(0.358)	(0.286)	(0.301)
Working Memory	-0.360	-0.257	0.0461
	(0.501)	(0.449)	(0.426)
Response Time	-0.481**	-0.486**	-0.421**
	(0.223)	(0.201)	(0.191)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	-0.778	-0.775*	-0.588
	(0.484)	(0.471)	(0.441)
Sunk Cost Bias	1.509		
	(3.430)		
Non-Consequentialism	1.519		
	(2.252)		
N	148	148	148

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D.2 Choice Revision

Table 10: The Effect of Choice Revision on GARP Violations (Average Marginal Effects)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	GARP Violations			
Choice Revision (CR)	-3.508 (2.449)	-3.387 (2.595)	-1.983 (2.545)	-1.852 (2.583)
-Direct Procedure		-4.541 (3.407)		-4.142 (4.692)
-Low-IQ Subjects				-4.664 (7.004)
-High-IQ Subjects				-3.182 (2.695)
-Sequential Elimination		-2.105 (3.885)		0.469 (3.265)
-Low-IQ Subjects				3.486 (3.803)
-High-IQ Subjects				-5.078 (6.181)
-Low-IQ Subjects			-1.080 (4.682)	-0.978 (4.239)
-High-IQ Subjects			-2.910 (1.921)	-4.039 (3.22)
Sequential Elimination (SE)	-1.565 (2.635)	-0.485 (2.200)	-0.553 (2.356)	-2.017 (2.724)
High-IQ	-7.336*** (2.675)	-6.683*** (2.390)	-7.042*** (2.697)	-7.433** (3.091)
Age	-0.731** (0.304)	-0.665** (0.288)	-0.689** (0.290)	-0.632** (0.300)
Female	-0.599 (2.552)	-0.596 (2.413)	-1.034 (2.586)	-1.590 (2.797)
Education	0.154 (1.220)	0.295 (1.143)	0.204 (1.168)	-0.034 (1.312)
Selective Attention	-0.127 (0.306)	-0.091 (0.260)	-0.019 (0.276)	-0.062 (0.288)
Working Memory	-0.497 (0.517)	-0.422 (0.475)	-0.578 (0.515)	-0.572 (0.533)
Response Time (minutes, Block A)	-0.535** (0.234)	-0.456** (0.226)	-0.551** (0.235)	-0.561** (0.234)
Response Time (minutes, Block B)	0.769 (0.490)	0.625 (0.435)	0.720 (0.461)	0.787 (0.504)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	-0.720 (0.442)	-0.656 (0.409)	-0.696* (0.417)	-0.800* (0.475)
N	151	151	151	151

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11: The Choice Revision Effects on FOSD Violations (Average Marginal Effects)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	FOSD Violations			
Choice Revision (CR)	-0.368** (0.205)	-0.321 (0.211)	-0.423** (0.256)	-0.42** (0.244)
-Direct Procedure		-0.193 (0.370)		-0.379 (0.449)
-Low-IQ Subjects				-0.611 0.646
-High-IQ Subjects				(0.084) 0.466
-Sequential Elimination		-0.433*** (0.200)		-.475 (0.227)
-Low-IQ Subjects				-0.6101 (0.330)
-High-IQ Subjects				(-0.206) (0.251)
-Low-IQ Subjects			-0.830** (0.490)	-0.610 (0.371)
-High-IQ Subjects			-0.011 (0.190)	(-0.070) 0.247
Sequential Elimination (SE)	-0.489*** (0.203)	-0.462*** (0.190)	-0.559*** (0.240)	-0.417*** (0.195)
High-IQ	-0.142 (0.166)	-0.177 (0.167)	-0.258 (0.199)	-0.222 (0.178)
Age	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.055*** (0.018)	-0.063*** (0.023)	-0.058*** (0.020)
Female	0.098 (0.165)	0.130 (0.159)	0.113 (0.176)	0.172 (0.160)
Education	0.139 (0.100)	0.133 (0.096)	0.122 (0.094)	0.112 (0.090)
Selective Attention	0.001 (0.025)	-0.000 (0.027)	0.004 (0.028)	0.010 (0.027)
Working Memory	-0.083 (0.059)	-0.088 (0.060)	-0.069 (0.054)	-0.074 (0.053)
Response Time (minutes, Block A)	0.011 (0.017)	0.007 (0.016)	0.012 (0.017)	0.008 (0.016)
Response Time (minutes, Block B)	-0.019 (0.043)	-0.026 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.050)	-0.022 (0.046)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	-0.013 (0.028)	-0.006 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.027)
N	151	151	151	151

Standard errors in parentheses.


* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix E Details of the Experimental Results

E.1 Model Selection

Figure 31 presents the observed GARP and FOSD violations, together with and their values predicted by OLS, Poisson, negative binomial (*NegBin*) and zero-inflated negative binomial model (*Zinb*) models, showing that the last one provides a good fit for the observed data. The regressors in both models include sequential elimination, high-IQ, sequential elimination \times high-IQ, selective attention, working memory, age, female, education, time, attitude towards inconsistency. The models are compared based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test, and Vuong Test (Vuong (1989)). In Table 12, the negative differences in AIC and BIC suggest that the NegBin can be considered markedly better. The LR test and Vuong Test reject the null hypothesis that OLS and Poisson models perform better than NegBin at the 0.1% significance level. The Vuong test is not performed for comparing NegBin and Zinb, as Wilson (2015) shows that this comparison is incorrect. Finally, Table 12 also shows the LR test for using NegBin versus Zinb, the results of which favor the former. Therefore, this paper uses NegBin for the empirical specifications.

Figure 31: Observed Data and Model-predicted Values



Note: the original plot of OLS-predicted values is nearly a horizontal line because of the continuity of OLS. The graph presents an estimated kernel density based on the OLS-predicted values.

Table 12: Model Selection Criteria and Performance

Models being compared	AIC difference	BIC difference	LR Test	Vuong Test
GARP Violations				
NegBin vs Linear	-561.4985	-561.499	< 0.001	< 0.001
NegBin vs Poisson	-1474.19	-1469.19	< 0.001	< 0.001
NegBin vs Zinb	-1.0848	-34.0541	< 0.05	
FOSD Violations				
NegBin vs Linear	-205.3137	-205.3137	< 0.001	< 0.05
NegBin vs Poisson	-42.42791	-37.4307	< 0.001	< 0.001
NegBin vs Zinb	20.11763	-12.8517	< 0.001	

E.2 Economic Rationality

Table 13: Determinants of Economic Rationality (Original Form)

	(1) GARP Violations	(2) SARP Violations	(3) HM Index	(4) CCEI	(5) FOSD Violations
Sequential Elimination	-1.086*** (0.508)	-0.963*** (0.486)	-0.408 (0.336)	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.413 (0.395)
High-IQ	-1.830*** (0.460)	-1.629*** (0.439)	-0.762** (0.323)	-0.038** (0.015)	0.570 (0.432)
Sequential Elimination×High-IQ	1.386** (0.658)	1.225* (0.641)	0.764 (0.482)	0.034* (0.020)	-1.086* (0.611)
Age	-0.072* (0.038)	-0.064* (0.034)	-0.057** (0.025)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.100*** (0.031)
Female	0.140 (0.330)	-0.023 (0.313)	-0.173 (0.235)	0.003 (0.009)	0.265 (0.280)
Education	-0.195 (0.191)	-0.141 (0.184)	0.060 (0.119)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.332** (0.165)
Selective Attention	-0.045 (0.053)	-0.040 (0.049)	-0.017 (0.034)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.048 (0.045)
Working Memory	-0.056 (0.076)	-0.057 (0.073)	-0.117 (0.076)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.071 (0.075)
Response Time (minutes)	-0.078*** (0.027)	-0.066** (0.027)	-0.035* (0.020)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.019 (0.030)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	-0.133** (0.060)	-0.123** (0.057)	-0.043 (0.039)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.033 (0.051)
Constant	6.888*** (1.143)	6.507*** (1.084)	-0.384 (0.738)	0.166*** (0.047)	1.828* (1.017)
N	148	148	148	148	148

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E.3 Choice Revision

Table 14: The Effect of Choice Revision on Consistency (Original Form)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		GARP Violations		
Choice Revision (CR)	-0.560 (0.364)	-0.676 (0.455)	-0.110 (0.476)	-0.270 (0.620)
Sequential Elimination (SE)	-0.373 (0.482)	-0.269 (0.597)	-0.091 (0.386)	-0.846 (0.631)
High-IQ	-1.631*** (0.477)	-1.323*** (0.362)	-0.807 (0.509)	-1.194* (0.648)
SE×High-IQ	0.607 (0.669)			0.985 (0.986)
Age	-0.117*** (0.035)	-0.113*** (0.036)	-0.113*** (0.035)	-0.101*** (0.036)
Female	-0.096 (0.403)	-0.102 (0.407)	-0.170 (0.412)	-0.253 (0.422)
Education	0.025 (0.195)	0.050 (0.195)	0.034 (0.192)	-0.005 (0.208)
Selective Attention	-0.020 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.044)	-0.003 (0.045)	-0.010 (0.046)
Working Memory	-0.079 (0.078)	-0.072 (0.077)	-0.095 (0.078)	-0.091 (0.078)
Response Time (minutes, Block A)	-0.085*** (0.031)	-0.078** (0.034)	-0.090*** (0.030)	-0.089*** (0.028)
Response Time (minutes, Block B)	0.123* (0.071)	0.106 (0.069)	0.118* (0.069)	0.125* (0.071)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	-0.115* (0.059)	-0.112* (0.061)	-0.114** (0.058)	-0.127** (0.059)
SE×CR		0.322 (0.758)		0.549 (0.862)
High-IQ×CR			-0.883 (0.722)	-0.829 (0.971)
High-IQ×CR×SE				-0.376 (1.406)
Constant	7.096*** (1.159)	6.714*** (1.131)	6.472*** (1.099)	6.722*** (1.140)
N	151	151	151	151

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 15: The Effect of Choice Revision on FOSD Violations (Original Form)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	FOSD Violations			
Choice Revision (CR)	-0.629** (0.320)	-0.229 (0.425)	-1.112** (0.470)	-0.770 (0.648)
Sequential Elimination (SE)	-0.594 (0.388)	-0.404 (0.416)	-0.962*** (0.299)	-0.200 (0.611)
High-IQ	-0.003 (0.378)	-0.310 (0.291)	-0.992** (0.494)	-0.636 (0.650)
SE×High-IQ	-0.838 (0.580)			-0.738 (0.813)
Age	-0.100*** (0.030)	-0.094*** (0.028)	-0.105*** (0.031)	-0.100*** (0.029)
Female	0.167 (0.288)	0.223 (0.279)	0.188 (0.299)	0.295 (0.277)
Education	0.238 (0.152)	0.229 (0.148)	0.205 (0.148)	0.194 (0.146)
Selective Attention	0.002 (0.043)	-0.001 (0.047)	0.006 (0.047)	0.017 (0.046)
Working Memory	-0.142* (0.086)	-0.152* (0.089)	-0.115 (0.080)	-0.128 (0.083)
Response Time (minutes, Block A)	0.018 (0.028)	0.013 (0.028)	0.020 (0.028)	0.013 (0.026)
Response Time (minutes, Block B)	-0.032 (0.073)	-0.045 (0.074)	-0.055 (0.081)	-0.038 (0.078)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	-0.022 (0.047)	-0.011 (0.045)	-0.028 (0.050)	-0.024 (0.047)
SE×CR		-0.927 (0.610)		-0.732 (0.862)
High-IQ×CR			1.086* (0.612)	0.881 (0.831)
High-IQ×CR×SE				0.022 (1.230)
Constant	2.692*** (0.947)	2.592*** (0.926)	3.158*** (1.046)	2.528*** (0.946)
N	151	151	151	151

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.4 Risk Preferences

Table 16: Determinants of Risk Preferences

	(1)	(2)
	Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion	
IQ	-0.397*	-0.358
	(0.230)	(0.227)
-Direct Procedure		0.071
		(0.320)
-Sequential Elimination		-0.799**
		(0.397)
Sequential Elimination	2.010	2.063
	(1.619)	(1.628)
Age	-0.0790	-0.078
	(0.127)	(0.128)
Female	1.964	1.974
	(1.383)	(1.380)
Education	0.702	0.633
	(0.695)	(0.705)
Selective Attention	-0.239	-0.216
	(0.252)	(0.240)
Working Memory	-0.400	-0.449
	(0.347)	(0.364)
Response Time (minutes)	-0.151	-0.164
	(0.196)	(0.192)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	0.164	0.143
	(0.283)	(0.286)
N	148	148

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.5 Response Times

Table 17 shows that subjects under Sequential Elimination spend more time making decision, on average (a); and this is particularly true for low subjects (b). To obtain a precise understanding of the relationship between response time and choice consistency, ?? perform two negative binomial regressions: one includes an interaction term between Sequential Elimination and response time (Column (1)); the other includes triple interaction between response time, Sequential Elimination, and high-IQ (Column (2)). I do not find strong evidence of response times' effects when conditioned on specific subgroups of subjects, given that only the coefficient of the triple interaction term is observed with significance. Plausibly, the analysis of response times in specific subgroups is limited by the sample size of the present experiment.

Table 17: Determinants of Response Times

	Response Time (Minute)
Sequential Elimination	3.788*** (0.996)
-Low-IQ Subjects	4.041** (1.650)
-High-IQ Subjects	3.534*** (0.961)
Age	-0.010 (0.081)
Female	-0.297 (0.910)
Education	0.275 (0.454)
High-IQ	0.006 (0.899)
Selective Attention	-0.256 (0.212)
Working Memory	-0.091 (0.228)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	0.412*** (0.156)
N	148

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 18: The Impacts of Response Times on Consistency

	(1) GARP	(2) Violations
Response Time (minutes)	-0.046 (0.058)	-0.001 (0.075)
Response Time (minutes) \times Sequential Elimination	-0.029 (0.067)	-0.105 (0.083)
Response Time (minutes) \times High-IQ		-0.154 (0.132)
Response Time (minutes) \times Sequential Elimination \times High-IQ		0.299* (0.166)
Sequential Elimination	-0.132 (0.636)	-0.244 (0.807)
Sequential Elimination \times High-IQ		-1.228 (1.543)
High-IQ	-1.159*** (0.352)	
Age	-0.082** (0.037)	-0.066* (0.039)
Female	0.124 (0.346)	0.085 (0.332)
Education	-0.140 (0.201)	-0.229 (0.192)
High-IQ		-0.682 (1.026)
Selective Attention	-0.017 (0.048)	-0.050 (0.053)
Working Memory	-0.054 (0.073)	-0.099 (0.081)
Attitude towards Inconsistency	-0.120* (0.062)	-0.120* (0.066)
N	148	148

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$