Reverse Engineering of Android Malware

Overview:

This document aims at explaining the steps to perform *static* analysis of an Android malware using the **Androguard** tool and provide the findings. This document has two parts. The first part explains the limited analysis that could be performed using **Androguard** on Santoku Platform. However, Part 2 provides deeper analysis performed using **Androguard** on Kali Linux platform.

Android Malware File Details:

The following screenshot captures the MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 of the android malware file downloaded from VirusShare website. We saved this malware under the name *Andromal1.apk* on our system.

MD5	e3b272aec09c0825892a87407c966475
SHA1	f4cf85f7c3e5eb6d4456946ea91ff5935bf975f2
SHA256	251842af76026fd6a2c0278a0219f4f9af09490df616ae4724c22a7ab32a87d6

Part 1

Tool used: Androguard.

OS Platform: Santoku

Analysis

To start the analysis of the .apk file using androguard, we need to decompile (extract the source code) the apk first. Androguard works with three different decompilers for the apk: (1) dex2jar, (2) dad (this is the default decompiler), (3) ded.

- For interactive analysis of the .apk, run the Androlyze tool of Androguard as follows, this will start an interactive Ipython shell as shown in the screen shot:

```
$ androlyze.py – s
```



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Extracting information about the APK

- Next in the interpreter window load the apk file for analysis by running the following command:
  `a, d, dx = AnalyzeAPK("Andromal1.apk", decompiler = "dad")`
  The wrapper functions *AnalyzeAPK* , returns three objects. `a` is an *APK object*, `d` is an array of *DalvikVMFormat* object and `dx` is an *Analysis object*.
- Once we have the APK object, we can extract more detail information of the apk file.
  - Getting the permissions used by the apk:
    Command: `a.get_permissions()`
    Demo output:



  - List of activities of the apk:
    Command: `a.get_activities()`
    Demo output:



  - Package of the apk:
    Command: `a.get_package()`
    Demo output:

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```
In [5]: a.get_package()
Out[5]: u'com.bmob.nearpeople'
```

- Get the numeric version and the version string, and the minimal, maximal, target SDK version:

```
In [8]: a.get_androidversion_code()
Out[8]: u'1'

In [9]: a.get_androidversion_name()
Out[9]: u'1.0'

In [10]: a.get_min_sdk_version()
Out[10]: u'8'

In [11]: a.get_max_sdk_version()

In [12]: a.get_target_sdk_version()
Out[12]: u'14'
```

- Get the AndroidManifest.xml:



- Extract the files contained in the apk:

```
In [23]: a.get_files()
Out[23]:
['META-INF/MANIFEST.MF',
 'META-INF/NEARPEOP.SF',
 'META-INF/NEARPEOP.RSA',
 'AndroidManifest.xml',
 'assets/',
 'assets/CMRequire.dat',
 'assets/Icon_bus_station.png',
 'assets/Icon_end.png',
 'assets/Icon_line_node.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark1.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark10.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark2.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark3.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark4.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark5.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark6.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark7.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark8.png',
 'assets/Icon_mark9.png',
 'assets/Icon_start.png',
 'assets/Icon_subway_station.png',
```

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Beyond these, no other Androguard functionalities worked on Santoku.

Androguard is a python based tool to perform extensive analysis on android files. It is supported by python3. However, the default python installation for Santoku is 2.7. Hence, perform the following steps to change the python3 installation as default:

1. Open the .bashrc file on an editor `vim ~/.bashrc`
2. Type `alias python=python3` and save the file.
3. At the command line run `source ~/.bashrc`

Even after upgrading python and the Androguard, the tool did not produce any further analysis. Hence, we switched to Kali Linux platform and the static analysis performed on this platform are presented in the following section.

Part 2

Start by extracting the source code of the .apk file using the following command, it will start an ipython shell.

1. Executing the following command:

```
androguard analyze Andromal1.apk
```



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2. From the interactive iphthon shell, we can extract the android version code, resources, path to app logo and the app name as follow:

```
In [3]: a.get_androidversion_code()
Out[3]: '1'

In [4]: a.get_android_resources()
Out[4]: <androguard.core.bytecodes.axml.ARSCParser at 0x7f6eacef4828>

In [5]: a.get_androidversion_code()
Out[5]: '1'

In [6]: a.get_app_icon()
Out[6]: 'res/drawable/logo.png'

In [7]: a.get_app_name()
Out[7]: '附近的人'
```

The app logo was:



Using google translate we could understand the app name is in Chinese and the app name in English:



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3. Then we extracted the detailed permissions as:



Androguard tags the permissions as normal or dangerous, and why it the app needs that permission as shown in the following text file:

```
PERMISSIONS:
        android.permission.USE_CREDENTIALS ['dangerous', 'use the authentication credentials of an account', 'Allows an application to request
authentication tokens.']
        android.permission.READ_LOGS ['signatureOrSystemOrDevelopment', 'read sensitive log data', "Allows an application to read from the system's
various log files. This allows it to discover general information about what you are doing with the phone, potentially including personal or private
information."]
        android.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS ['dangerous', 'intercept outgoing calls', 'Allows application to process outgoing calls and change
the number to be dialled. Malicious applications may monitor, redirect or prevent outgoing calls.']
        android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION ['dangerous', 'coarse (network-based) location', 'Access coarse location sources, such as the
mobile network database, to determine an approximate phone location, where available. Malicious applications can use this to determine approximately
where you are.']
        android.permission.CAMERA ['dangerous', 'take pictures and videos', 'Allows application to take pictures and videos with the camera. This
allows the application to collect images that the camera is seeing at any time.']
        android.permission.INTERNET ['dangerous', 'full Internet access', 'Allows an application to create network sockets.']
        android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS ['dangerous', 'manage the accounts list', 'Allows an application to perform operations like adding and
removing accounts and deleting their password.']
        android.permission.SEND_SMS ['dangerous', 'send SMS messages', 'Allows application to send SMS messages. Malicious applications may cost you
money by sending messages without your confirmation.']
        android.permission.ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION ['dangerous', 'mock location sources for testing', 'Create mock location sources for testing.
Malicious applications can use this to override the location and/or status returned by real-location sources such as GPS or Network providers.']
        android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE ['normal', 'view network status', 'Allows an application to view the status of all networks.']
        android.permission.GET_TASKS ['dangerous', 'retrieve running applications', 'Allows application to retrieve information about currently and
recently running tasks. May allow malicious applications to discover private information about other applications.']
        android.permission.ACCESS_GPS ['normal', 'Unknown permission from android reference', 'Unknown permission from android reference']
        android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE ['dangerous', 'modify/delete SD card contents', 'Allows an application to write to the SD card.']
        android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION ['dangerous', 'fine (GPS) location', 'Access fine location sources, such as the Global Positioning
System on the phone, where available. Malicious applications can use this to determine where you are and may consume additional battery power.']
        android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED ['normal', 'automatically start at boot', 'Allows an application to start itself as soon as the
system has finished booting. This can make it take longer to start the phone and allow the application to slow down the overall phone by always
running.']
        android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ['dangerous', 'read contact data', 'Allows an application to read all of the contact (address) data stored
on your phone. Malicious applications can use this to send your data to other people.']
        android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS ['dangerous', 'act as an account authenticator', 'Allows an application to use the account
authenticator capabilities of the Account Manager, including creating accounts as well as obtaining and setting their passwords.']
        com.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS ['normal', 'Unknown permission from android reference', 'Unknown permission from android
reference']
        android.permission.BROADCAST_STICKY ['normal', 'send sticky broadcast', 'Allows an application to send sticky broadcasts, which remain after
the broadcast ends. Malicious applications can make the phone slow or unstable by causing it to use too much memory.']
```

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4. Extract the dex file contained in the root directory of the APK and the receivers and services list as follow:

```
In [15]: a.get_dex_names()
Out[15]: <filter at 0x7f6ead6a16a0>

In [16]: a.get_receivers()
Out[16]: ['cn.bmob.push.PushReceiver', 'com.bmob.im.demo.MyMessageReceiver']

In [17]: a.get_services()
Out[17]:
['com.baidu.location.f',
 'csvl.kgne.wqdg.uwil.wviz',
 'cn.bmob.push.lib.service.PushService',
 'cn.bmob.im.poll.BmobPollService']

In [18]: a.get_signature()
Out[18]: b'0\x82\x05\x1d\x06\t*\x86H\x86\xf7\r\x01\x07\x02\xa0\x82\x05\x0e0\x82\
x05\n\x02\x01\x011\x0b0\t\x06\x05+\x0e\x03\x02\x1a\x05\x000\x0b\x06\t*\x86H\x86\
xf7\r\x01\x07\x01\xa0\x82\x03[0\x82\x03W0\x82\x02?\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x04xt
&Q0\r\x06\t*\x86H\x86\xf7\r\x01\x01\x0b\x05\x000[1\x0b0\t\x06\x03U\x04\x06\x13\x
02CN1\x0b0\t\x06\x03U\x04\x08\x13\x02GD1\x0b0\t\x06\x03U\x04\x07\x13\x02GZ1\x0e0
\x0c\x06\x03U\x04\n\x13\x05YouMi1\r0\x0b\x06\x03U\x04\x0b\x13\x04Tech1\x130\x11\
x06\x03U\x04\x03\x13\nnearpeople0 \x17\r150511083629Z\x18\x0f2115041708362 9Z0[1\
x0b0\t\x06\x03U\x04\x06\x13\x02CN1\x0b0\t\x06\x03U\x04\x08\x13\x02GD1\x0b0\t\x06
\x03U\x04\x07\x13\x02GZ1\x0e0\x0c\x06\x03U\x04\n\x13\x05YouMi1\r0\x0b\x06\x03U\x
04\x0b\x13\x04Tech1\x130\x11\x06\x03U\x04\x03\x13\nnearpeople0\x82\x01"0\r\x06\t
```

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5. Androguard provides commands, that generate the control flow graphs of the methods and it is a very useful way to visualize the app.

```
androguard decompile -d output_folder -f jpg Andromal1.jpg
```



6. Call graph: Androguard provides functionality to present the methods as the node of a graph and the calls to the methods as the edge. The call graph can be generated using the following command:

```
androguard cg Andromal1.apk
```

This command will generate a .gml file which can further be visualized using a network visualization tool (e.g: Gephi):



The following table shows the snapshot of the methods label and their node id details:

Data Table

Nodes | Edges | Configuration | Add node | Add edge | Search/Replace | Import Spreadsheet | Export table | More actions

Id	Label	Interval	external	entrypoint
0	Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApplication;-><init>()V [...		0	0
1	Landroid/app/Application;-><init>()V		1	0
2	Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApplication;->ChangeTo...		0	0
3	Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApplication;->interface7...		0	0
4	Ljava/lang/Exception;->printStackTrace()V		1	0
5	Landroid/app/Application;->getBaseContext(...		1	0
6	Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApplication;->copy(Land...		0	0
7	Ljava/lang/StringBuilder;-><init>()V		1	0
8	Landroid/content/Context;->getResources()...		1	0
9	Ljava/io/BufferedInputStream;->close()V		1	0
10	Landroid/content/res/Resources;->getAsset...		1	0
11	Ljava/io/FileOutputStream;-><init>(Ljava/la...		1	0
12	Ljava/lang/StringBuilder;->append(Ljava/lan...		1	0
13	Ljava/io/File;-><init>(Ljava/lang/String;)V		1	0
14	Ljava/io/FileOutputStream;->close()V		1	0
15	Ljava/io/InputStream;->close()V		1	0
16	Ljava/io/BufferedInputStream;-><init>(Ljav...		1	0
17	Ljava/lang/StringBuilder;->toString()Ljava/la...		1	0
18	Landroid/content/res/AssetManager;->open(...		1	0
19	Ljava/io/File;->exists()Z		1	0
20	Ljava/io/FileOutputStream;->write([B I I)V		1	0
21	Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApplication;->isSameFile...		0	0
22	Ljava/io/InputStream;->read([B)I		1	0
23	Ljava/io/File;->mkdir()Z		1	0
24	Ljava/io/FileInputStream;-><init>(Ljava/io/Fi...		1	0
25	Ljava/io/IOException;->printStackTrace()V		1	0
26	Ljava/io/BufferedInputStream;->available()I		1	0
27	Ljava/io/BufferedInputStream;->read([B)I		1	0
28	Ljava/io/FileNotFoundException;->printStack...		1	0
29	Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApplication;->getNewAp...		0	0
30	Ljava/lang/Class;->newInstance()Ljava/lang...		1	0
31	Landroid/content/Context;->getClassLoader...		1	0
32	Ljava/lang/ClassLoader;->loadClass(Ljava/la...		1	0
33	Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApplication;->isX86Arch(...		0	0

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References:

[1] Androguard Documentation. Release 3.4.0.
https://buildmedia.readthedocs.org/media/pdf/androguard/latest/androguard.pdf

[2] androguard - RE.wiki

https://code.google.com/archive/p/androguard/wikis/RE.wiki

[3] androguard - The swiss army knife

https://androguard.readthedocs.io/en/latest/tools/androguard.html