

Dissecting a real life IoT attack

Asaf Shen, VP Secure Devices, Emerging Businesses Group, Arm

The Architects of Global Possibilities

The global leader in the development of licensable technology

- R&D outsourcing for semiconductor companies

Focused on freedom and flexibility to innovate

- Technology reused across multiple applications

With a partnership based culture & business model

- Licensees take advantage of learnings from a uniquely collaborative ecosystem

1,650+

licenses, growing by >100 every year

138bn+

Arm-based chips, shipped to-date

6.2L

Arm-based chips shipped in 03 FY2018

525+ Licensees

Industry leaders and highgrowth start-ups; chip companies and OEMs

The Fifth Wave of computing

Data-driven computing era





The Internet of Things

A 'hyper-connected' world of devices

Now Future

- 3+ billion Smartphones
- 2 billion Personal computers
- 8.4 billion of devices



1 trillion

Connected devices by 2035

Source: Gartner, Statista, Strategy Analytics, Arm Estimates

Delivers Value Through Digital Transformation

Productivity gains - automation, sensor driven insights, smart manufacturing

New business models - from a 'product sale' to 'as a Service' revenue


Enhanced customer experience - access to real-time data, agile support **The Value of this Digital Transformation: \$11 Trillion**

Global economic value of IoT by 2025

*McKinsey Global Institute, 2017

The Complexity of IoT





IoT's Commercial Challenges

Investment return
What is the value of
data to my business?

Security concerns Can the data be trusted?

Lan the data be trusted? Does it make me vulnerable?

Interoperability hurdles
What is required to integrate
lof with current systems?

Network infrastructure

Is the network architected to cope with 1 trillion connected devices?

Arm's Approach to loT

Enable Choice, Underpinned by Trust



The Cost of Security Inaction is Significant

>300%

Increase in malware loaded onto IoT devices2

Increase in industrial control system vulnerabilities1

600% Increase in IoT

device attacks1




Cost of damage related to cybercrime by 20213

- Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2018 Kaspersky Labs, New Trends in the World of IoT Threats 2018
- Annual Cuber Crime Report, Cuber Security Ventures 2019

The Road Ahead is Exciting... and Scary...


Arm vision: A trillion securely connected devices, from device to cloud



Arm's Security Vision

- Security needs to be built from the ground up... and at the core of every device
- No single point of ownership, whole IoT value chain needs to share the responsibility
- Simple and seamless integration of security from foundational architecture to cloud service is key





Plenty of Vulnerabilities and Exploits to Choose

From...

The Mirai botnet explained: How teen scammers and CCTV cameras almost brought down the internet

On October 12, 2016, a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack left much of the internet inaccessible on the U.S. east coast. The attack, which authorities initially feared was the work of a hostile nation-state, was in fact the work of the Mirai botnet. This attack, which initially had much less grand



Hackers can peek through surveillance cameras, report says

A researcher in Argentina showed he could log into tens of thousands of DVR cameras and view the video stream live, according to Bleeping Computer.

BlueBorne: Critical Bluetooth Attack Puts Billions of Devices at Risk of Hacking

FDA issues recall of 465,000 St. Jude pacemakers to patch security holes

Heart patients will have to visit their doctors to have their pacemakers patched for the "voluntary" recall -- but

Criminals Hacked A Fish Tank To Steal Data From A Casino

A DEEP FLAW IN YOUR CAR LETS HACKERS SHUT DOWN SAFETY FEATURES

https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1047.pdf

Scenario

IoT devices infect each other with a worm that rapidly spreads over large areas (depending on critical mass).



Impact

Starts with infecting a single street lamp with a worm. The worm spreads to wider network of street lamps. Enables an attacker to control and abuse city lights and perform massive DDOS attack.

Interesting note: In Paris (~105 Sq.Km), critical mass is fewer than 15,000 randomly selected smart street lamps



How did attackers gain control of an already installed lamp?

"We overcame the first problem by discovering and exploiting a major bug in the implementation of the Touchlink part of the ZigBee Light Link protocol..."

How did attackers perform an un-authorized overthe-air firmware update?

"...They found out that all lamps (from the same product type) were using the same global AES-CCM key for the firmware update process."



How was the global AES-CCM key compromised?

"... using novel side channel attacks..... a side channel attack to extract the global RES-CCM key (for each device type) that manufacturer uses to encrypt and authenticate new firmware"

"...Once we obtained these secret values, we could create any new firmware and upload it into any... lamp"

Interesting note: The equipment used in the SCA attack costs just a few \$100



Security Issues Demonstrated in This Attack…

Protocol implementation bug in the Zigbee light link was not revealed in protocol validation...

Usage of symmetric keys shared within a large class of devices

- A Zigbee light link master key, used by all Zigbee light link certified products for "commissioning" (initial delivery of a network key)
- A key for firmware update is shared across all devices of a certain type

Not protecting these keys very well...

- Zigbee light link master key leaked long ago...
- The firmware update key was extracted through a side channel attack



Platform Security Architecture

A framework for building secure devices - openly published





Smart Water Meter TMSA





Analyze

















A Plethora of Threats

side channel attack to expose the FW undate keu

Communications

· Man-in-the-middle

Weak RNG

· Code vulnerabilities

Zigbee touchlink implementation bua

Lifecycle

- Code downgrade
- Change of ownership or environment
- Unauthorized overproduction

Physical

- Non-invasive: e.g. clock or power glitch or SCA
- Invasive: package removal, e.g. microprobe station FIB

Software

- ROP, e.g. buffer overflows
- Interrupts
- Malware

Ziabee light link master keu leak

Shared

keys for

large class of devices

System Security: You're Only as Strong as Your Weakest Link



The Fourth PSA Stage: Certification












brightsight*

Emerging threats : Deep Learning based SCA



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Deep Learning and SCA - Summary of the Threat

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DL-5CA is rapidly approaching weapon grade

DL-SCA will become dominant tool for attackers.

Traditional mitigations might fall short to protect against DL-5CA.

4

DL-SCA "Push-button Attack" scenario is optimistic at this point

SCA still requires a lot of expertise and background knowledge. Experience of the user is still essential.

Deep learning is computationally intense technique.

Connecting Chip-to-Cloud Securely

System-level solutions to simplify IoT development and deployment

Secure | Scalable | Configurable | Power efficient | Consistent



Energy efficient processing, with right-fit security



Secure devices trusted data, secure identity



Secure, open OS - designed ground-up for IoT



Device, connectivity & data management

