#### 走过2013

吴建强

漏洞报告: bugreport@vip.sohu.com




# 今天要讲


- DDOS
- Security as Service
- Active & Passive Web 2.0 App Scanner
- Struts2
- lass、Paas对安全的提升
- Mobile & GSM Security

## **DDOS**



- Spamhaus "300" G
  - 利用dns反射
  - 攻击二级提供商及网络交换中心
  - The DDoS That Almost Broke the Internet






#### **DDOS**



```
Protocol
                                         173.212.222.159
    212 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216695 173.212.222.
213 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216698 89.31.103.70
                                                                                                                     DMS
                                                                                                                              Standard query response RRSIG DS DS
                                                                                                                              Standard query response, Refused
                                                                                                                     DNS
     214 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216700 89.23.16.1
                                                                                                                              Standard query response NS 1.root-servers.net NS a.root-server
                                                                                                                     DNS
    215 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216703 89.23.8.1
                                                                                                                              Standard query response NS m.root-servers.net NS
                                                                                                                                                                                       f.root-server:
    218 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216710 89.22.97.13
                                                                                                                              Standard query response NS k.root-servers.net
    219 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216712 173.220.17.174 221 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216717 89.23.16.1
                                                                                                                              Standard query response SPF DNSKEY DNSKEY NAPTR 20 0 S AAAA 20 Standard query response NS f.root-servers.net NS k.root-server
                                                                                                                     DNS
                                                                                                                     DMS
    222 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216719 89.23.16.1
223 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216724 89.23.8.1
                                                                                                                     DNS
                                                                                                                              Standard query response NS k.root-servers.net NS h.root-server
                                                                                                                              Standard query response NS c.root-servers.net NS i.root-server
                                                                                                                     DNS
                                                                                                                              Standard query response NS g.root-servers.net NS d.root-server
Standard query response SPF DNSKEY DNSKEY NAPTR 20 0 S AAAA 20
     224 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216726 89.23.8.1
                                                                                                                     DNS
    226 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216825 158.255.43.143
    228 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216828 173.244.160.252
                                                                                                                     DNS
                                                                                                                              Standard query response RRSIG SPF RRSIG RRSIG DNSKEY DNSKEY RR
    229 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216829 89.23.16.1
                                                                                                                     DMS
                                                                                                                              Standard query response NS h.root-servers.net NS g.root-server
     231 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216832 89.23.8.1
                                                                                                                     DNS
                                                                                                                              Standard query response NS i.root-servers.net NS h.root-server
     232 2013-04-18 18:08:28.216833 89.23.8.1
                                                                                                                              Standard query response NS b.root-servers.net NS i.root-server
                                                                                                                     DNS
⊞ Frame 29: 1514 bytes on wire (12112 bits), 1500 bytes captured (12000 bits)
⊕ Internet Protocol version 4, Src: 94.60.41.1 (94.60.41.1), Dst:
user Datagram Protocol, Src Port: domain (53), Dst Port: 50241 (50241)
Domain Name System (response)
    Transaction ID: 0xe456
```





```
Ip src summary(768):
        94.46.248.29 1678 PT
        89,46,103,130 1252 RO
        89.23.16.1 991 RU
        89.23.8.1 865 RU
        89.31.103.70 769 NL
        200.4.145.138 660 MX
        89.31.2.8 638 DE
        94.60.120.1 483 RO
        89.22.97.13 473 None
Ip src Country summary (768):
        US 255
        TW 63
        FR 49
        CN 40
        JP 33
        DE 30
        HK 24
        RU 24
        KR 23
```

# 搜 狐

## **DDOS**

- 如何解决
  - 收益分析
  - 自建清洗中心
  - anycast
  - 云清洗
  - 运营商URPF






## **DDOS**



- 打造你的"黑洞"
  - 主动牵引
    - zebra(bgp), netfilter, nginx
  - 被动牵引
    - 在被攻击服务器实施网络层牵引
      - iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth1 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 80 -j DNAT --to-destination X.X.X.X:80
    - 在防护设备实施清洗后代理到被攻击服务器

# Security As Service



En(de)crypt、Captcha

Phish, Malware, Scanner

**Blacklist** 

#### • 降低使用难度

ACCESS\_KEY = "DG74KC39ZC6BJC5312A74D7BWURW42"

SECRET\_KEY = "1LCJ4f#CV6JY6pYdcXJG"

ENCRYPT\_SERVICE\_ENDPOINT = "https://sasp/CipherServices/encrypt"

DECRYPT\_SERVICE\_ENDPOINT = "https://sasp/CipherServices/decrypt"

#### encrypt:


{"sign":"3fb9c19841315fe70ca54788af5b87698f91f210","status":0,"cipher":"AAAAANVsKvYbwsiK32MVSnqIYI28vYYUSXj\_x5fSQmzced-R"}

|key\_version|iv|ciperdata|

#### decrypt:

{"sign":"ab5fde10e6607e2fbda4ed0095974894fb90d3e3","status":0,"plain":"abcdef"}







### Active & Passive Web 2.0 App Scanner

- Active WEB2.0 App Scanner
  - 复杂的登陆及会话管理
  - 遍历、点击、遍历、填表、点击、onsubmit...
  - QtWebKit
- Passive Web 2.0 App Scanner
  - 基于Proxy的被动扫描

• ...



- S2-005、S2-009、S2-016
- S2-012、S2-013
  - 受限访问...
- 一个神奇的框架、一个筛子

10781094	2013-07-17 18:37:21	111.196.172.229	POST   struts1006				
URI	Predirect:\${%23a%3d(new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new%20java.lang.String[]{%27ls%27,%27%2fexport%2fdata%2ftomcatRoot%2fshop.3 com%2f%27})).start(),%23b%3d%23a Stream(),%23c%3dnew%20java.io.lnputStreamReader(%23b),%23d%3dnew%20java.io.BufferedReader(%23c),%23e%3dnew%20char[50000],%23d.read(%23e),%23matt%3d%23context.get(%27cormphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse%27),%23matt.getWriter().println(%23e),%23matt.getWriter().flush(),%23matt.getWriter().close()}						
Alert	redirect: \$\far{\text{\$ = (new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new java.lang.String[]{'ls','/export/data/tomcatRoot/shop.3 .com/'})).start(), \$\phi = \phi a.getInputStream(), \$\phi = \phi a.getInputStream(						
UA	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:12.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/12.0						
Referer							



- 如果我有个灵活定义的WAF就好了
  - 商业WAF VS 开源WAF
  - 如何整合到现有的CDN、GateWay系统
  - 如:安恒明御web应用防火墙等



加速乐官网 V: 【Struts2再曝高危漏洞,加速乐紧急防御】7月13日Struts官方发布漏洞升级补丁,其中包含一个高危远程任意代码执行漏洞补丁,攻击者利用该漏洞可以轻易控制被攻击者网站,目前@SCANV网站安全中心已经发出红色警报,同时@加速乐官网已经可以防御针对该漏洞的攻击...http://t.cn/zQGIJUn

7月17日18:17 来自专业版微博

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### • 如果我用了Security Manager

```
permission java lang. reflect.ReflectPermission "suppressAccessChecks";
permission java lang. RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage. sum.util.logging.resources";
permission java lang. RuntimePermission "accessDeclaredMembers";
permission java io.FilePermission "D:\\tomcat\\lib\\-", "read";
permission java io.FilePermission "D:\\tomcat\\", "read";
permission java io.FilePermission "jar:file:\\D:\\tomcat\\webapps\\Using_Tags_Struts2_Ant\\WEB=INF\\lib\\struts2-core-2.2.1.jar", "read";
permission java io.FilePermission "jar:file:\\D:\\tomcat\\webapps\\struts2-blank\\WEB=INF\\lib\\struts2-core-2.3.15.1.jar", "read";
rmission java io.FilePermission "jar:file:\\D:\\tomcat\\webapps\\struts2-blank\\WEB=INF\\lib\\struts2-core-2.3.15.1.jar!\\template\\xhtml\\theme.properties",
permission ognl.OgnlInvokePermission "invoke.com.opensymphony.xwork2.*";
permission ognl.OgnlInvokePermission "invoke.org.apache.struts2.*";
permission ognl.OgnlInvokePermission "invoke.org.apache.struts.*";
permission ognl.OgnlInvokePermission "invoke.org.apache.struts.*";
permission ognl.OgnlInvokePermission "invoke.java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime";
permission ognl.OgnlInvokePermission "invoke.*";
```



• 如果我有自定义过补丁

public Object callMethod(Map context, Object, String string, Object[] objects)

• 布置"锚"点

#### http://t.cn/zlnNPn6

```
throws MethodFailedException

{
    if (object.getClass().getName().startsWith("java.")) {
        return null;
    }

public Object callStaticMethod(Map context, Class aClass, String string, Object[] objects;

throws MethodFailedException

{
    return null;
}
```

#### http://www.inbreak.net/?p=507



#### • 如果我准备了一个web filter

private final String[] STRUTSAttackPattern = { "StaticMethodAccess", "denyMethodExecution", "java.lang", "redirect:", "action:", "java.io", "Runtime", "context[", "#\_", "org.apache.struts2" };

```
<filter>
   <filter-name>securityFilter</filter-name>
   <filter-class>com.utils.SecurityFilter</filter-class>
   <init-param>
     <param-name>SQL_PROTECT</param-name>
     <param-value>0</param-value>
   </init-param>
   <init-param>
     <param-name>STRUTS_PROTECT</param-name>
      <param-value>1</param-value>
   </init-param>
   <init-param>
     <param-name>DEBUG</param-name>
      <param-value>1</param-value>
   </init-param>
   <init-param>
     <param-name>BLOCK</param-name>
      <param-value>1</param-value>
   </init-param>
   <init-param>
     <param-name>REDIRECT</param-name>
      <param-value>/</param-value>
   </init-param>
      <init-param>
       <param-name>ENCODING</param-name>
       <param-value>UTF-8</param-value>
       </init-param>
 </filter>
 <filter-mapping>
   <filter-name>SecurityFilter</filter-name>
   <url-pattern>/*</url-pattern>
 </filter-mapping>
```



- 选择并管理基础技术框架
  - 实现有充分了解?
  - 以往的漏洞类型、数量、级别?

10960009	2013-08-02 05:36:07	220.181.50.104		POST   struts1006				
URI	/pvpb.gif?url=C							
Alert	% #= memberAccess.allowStaticMethodAccess = true, #context['xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution'] = false, #= memberAccess.excludeProperties = {}, #a_str='814F60BD-F6DF-4227-', #b_str='86F5 - 8D9FBF26A2EB', #a_resp=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse(), #a_resp.getWriter().println(#a_str+#b_str), #a_resp.getWriter().flush(), #a_resp.getWriter().close()}							
UA	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; InfoPath.2; CIBA; inf-ssl-duty-scan)							
Referer	http://f3.mi.baidu.com/folder_mod?url=http://pv.hdinf-ssl-duty-scan							

#### lass、Paas对安全的提升

- IAAS
  - 可定义的安全镜像
  - 灵活的升级机制
  - 强制访问控制措施
- PAAS(java)
  - 统一的Security Policy
  - Javaagent, instrument
  - 代码热替换

### **Mobile & GSM Security**

- Andiod Security
  - Webview
  - Uncovering Android Master Key





### **Mobile & GSM Security**

- 伪基站
- 短信监听
- 基于手机号的用户名认证方式



# 感谢

- 协助搜狐改进产品安全的研究者及厂商
- 业界同仁的分享
- 同事的努力

漏洞报告:bugreport@vip.sohu.com