

Welcome to

Encrypting the Network Layer

Communication and Network Security 2019

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Slides are available as PDF, kramse@Github 4-Encrypting-the-Network-Layer.tex in the repo security-courses

IPsec



Sikkerhed i netværket

RFC-2401 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol

RFC-2402 IP Authentication Header (AH)

RFC-2406 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

RFC-2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) - dynamisk keying

Både til IPv4 og IPv6

MANDATORY i IPv6! - et krav hvis man implementerer fuld IPv6 support


god præsentation på http://www.hsc.fr/presentations/ike/


Der findes IKEscan til at scanne efter IKE porte/implementationer

http://www.nta-monitor.com/ike-scan/index.htm

IPsec er ikke simpelt!









RFC-2402 IP AH




0	1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+
Next Header Pa	yload Len	RESERVED	1
+-			
Security Parameters Index (SPI)			
+-			
Sequence Number Field			
+-			
+ Auth	entication Data (va	riable)	
1			1
+-			

RFC-2402 IP AH




Indpakning - pakkerne før og efter Authentication Header:



RFC-2406 IP ESP



Pakkerne før og efter:



ipsec konfigurationsfiler



Der er følgende filer tilgængelige

- konfigurationsfiler i NetBSD/FreeBSD/Mac OS X format med setkey kommandoen
- konfigurationsfil til OpenBSD server med ipsecadm kommandoen

IPsec setup



Client: Mac OS X/NetBSD/FreeBSD - samme syntaks

rc.ipsec.client

Server: OpenBSD - bruger ipsecadm kommando

rc.ipsec.server

Øvelse til læseren: lav samme i Cisco IOS

Det vil ofte være relevant at se på IOS og IPsec i laboratoriet

Dette setup når vi ikke at demonstrere

rc.ipsec.client - client setup - adresser



```
#!/bin/sh
# /etc/rc.ipsec.client - IPsec client configuration
# built from http://rt.fm/~jcs/ipsec wep.phtml
# FreeBSD/NetBSD syntaks! - used on Mac OS X
# TPv4
SECSERVER=10.0.42.1
SECCLIENT=10.0.42.53
# TPv6
#SECSERVER=2001:618:433:101::1
#SECCLIENT=2001:618:433:101::153
ESPKEY=`cat ipsec.esp.key`
AHKEY=`cat ipsec.ah.key`
# Flush IPsec SAs in case we get called more than once
setkey -F
```

setkey -F -P



rc.ipsec.client - client setup - SAs



```
# Establish Security Associations
# 1000 is from the server to the client
# 1001 is from the client to the server
setkey -c <<EOF
add $SECSERVER $SECCLIENT esp 0x1000 \
-m tunnel -E blowfish-cbc Ox$ESPKEY -A hmac-sha1 Ox$AHKEY;
add $SECCLIENT $SECSERVER esp 0x1001 \
-m tunnel -E blowfish-cbc Ox$ESPKEY -A hmac-sha1 Ox$AHKEY;
spdadd $SECCLIENT $SECSERVER any -P out \
ipsec esp/tunnel/$SECCLIENT-$SECSERVER/default;
spdadd $SECSERVER $SECCLIENT any -P in \
```

ipsec esp/tunnel/\$SECSERVER-\$SECCLIENT/default; EOF



rc.ipsec.server - server setup - adresser



```
#!/bin/sh
# Henrik Lund Kramshøj
# /etc/rc.ipsec - IPsec server configuration
# built from http://rt.fm/~jcs/ipsec_wep.phtml
# OpenBSD syntaks!
SECSERVER=10.0.42.1
SECCLIENT=10.0.42.53
#SECSERVER6=2001:618:433:101::1
#SECCLTENT6=2001:618:433:101::153
ESPKEY=`cat ipsec.esp.key`
AHKEY=`cat ipsec.ah.key`
# Flush IPsec SAs in case we get called more than once
```

ipsecadm flush



rc.ipsec.server - server setup - SAs



```
# Establish Security Associations
#
# 1000 is from the server to the client
ipsecadm new esp -spi 1000 -src $SECSERVER -dst $SECCLIENT \
-forcetunnel -enc blf -key $ESPKEY \
-auth sha1 -authkey $AHKEY

# 1001 is from the client to the server
ipsecadm new esp -spi 1001 -src $SECCLIENT -dst $SECSERVER \
-forcetunnel -enc blf -key $ESPKEY \
-auth sha1 -authkey $AHKEY
```

rc.ipsec.server - server setup - flows



```
# Create flows
# Data going from the outside to the client
ipsecadm flow -out -src $SECSERVER -dst $SECCLIENT -proto esp \
-addr 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 $SECCLIENT 255.255.255.255 -dontacg
# TPv6
#ipsecadm flow -out -src $SECSERVER -dst $SECCLIENT -proto esp \
# Data going from the client to the outside
ipsecadm flow -in -src $SECSERVER -dst $SECCLIENT -proto esp \
-addr $SECCLIENT 255.255.255.255 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 -dontacq
# IPv6
#ipsecadm flow -in -src $SECSERVER -dst $SECCLIENT -proto esp \
#-addr :: :: $SECCLIENT ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff-dontacq
```

World Wide Web fødes





Tim Berners-Lee opfinder WWW 1989 og den første webbrowser og server i 1990 mens han


arbejder for CERN

Kilde: http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/



World Wide Web udviklingen





Udviklingen på world wide web bliver en stor kommerciel success

Kilde: Hobbes Internet time-line

http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/



Nogle HTTP og webrelaterede RFC'er



- 1945 Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.0. T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, H. Frystyk. May 1996.
- 2068 Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.1. R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, T. Berners-Lee. January 1997. (Obsoleted by RFC2616)
- 2069 An Extension to HTTP: Digest Access Authentication. J. Franks, P. Hallam-Baker, J. Hostetler, P. Leach, A. Luotonen, E. Sink, L. Stewart. January 1997. (Obsoleted by RFC2617)
- 2145 Use and Interpretation of HTTP Version Numbers. J. C. Mogul, R. Fielding, J. Gettys, H. Frystyk. May 1997.
- 2518 HTTP Extensions for Distributed Authoring WEBDAV. Y. Goland, E. Whitehead, A. Faizi, S. Carter, D. Jensen. February 1999.
- 2616 Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.1. R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, L. Masinter, P. Leach, T. Berners-Lee. June 1999. (Obsoletes RFC2068) (Updated by RFC2817)
- 2818 HTTP Over TLS. E. Rescorla. May 2000.

HTTP er basalt set en sessionsløs protokol bestående at individuelle HTTP forespørgsler via TCP forbindelser

Infokager og state management



- 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism. D. Kristol, L. Montulli. February 1997. (Format: TXT=43469 bytes) (Obsoleted by RFC2965) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
- 2965 HTTP State Management Mechanism. D. Kristol, L. Montulli. October 2000. (Format: TXT=56176 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC2109) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
 - 1. ABSTRACT This document specifies a way to create a stateful session with HTTP requests and responses. It describes two new headers, Cookie and Set-Cookie, which carry state information between participating origin servers and user agents. The method described here differs from Netscape's Cookie proposal, but it can interoperate with HTTP/1.0 user agents that use Netscape's method. (See the HISTORICAL section.)

(Citatet er fra RFC-2109)

Transport Layer Security

