

#### Welcome to

## 10. Auditing and Intrusion Detection

# KEA Kompetence Computer Systems Security 2020

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Slides are available as PDF, kramse@Github 10-forensics-auditing-intrusions.tex in the repo security-courses

## Plan for today



#### Subjects

- Auditing and logging
- Volatility and file systems
- Intrusion Detection
- Host and Networks Based Intrusion Detection (HIDS/NIDS)
- Network Security Monitoring

#### Exercises

- Centralized syslogging and example system
- Various Elasticsearch and Kibana related exercises
- Open a file system dump file system forensics

## **Reading Summary**



Bishop chapter 25: Auditing

Bishop chapter 26: Intrusion Detection

Forensics Discovery, ch 1-4 and appendix B

Defensive Security Handbook ch 19-20

Download and browse the ENISA papers listed under Computer Forensics in the reading list

Sorry, should have been more specific regarding reading for today! Curriculum will be Bishop book and Defensive Security Handbook

## Goals for today:



#### Todays goals:

- Known about auditing, audit logs, audit systems
- Intrusion detection
- Bro which is now named Zeek
- IDS systems I recommend Suricata and SELKS
- See some example procedures for investigation
- Know the name ENISA

Bonus: We should visit Elasticsearch and discuss their SIEM extensions

## Auditing and logging



**Definition 25-1** Logging is the recording of events and statistics to provide information about system use and performance

**Definition 25-2** <u>Auditing</u> is the analysis of records to present information about the system in a clear and understandable manner.

Goal, logs provide a mechanism for analyzing the system security state

Which information to log and which information to audit

Audit typically also comprises checking system settings, or doing a firewall audit of the rule sets in place

#### Anatomy of an Auditing System



Logger - collect

Analyzer - analyze it

**Notifier** - report results

Example systems IBM main frame RACF and Windows Event Logs service swatchdog is an old skool, but simple tool that works Logs should be protected and considered confidential information

Sample logs from login with Secure Shell (SSH) and performing sudo su -

```
Jun 5 11:53:15 pumba sshd[64505]: Accepted publickey for hlk from 79.142.233.18 port 43902
ssh2: ED25519 SHA256:180JMcywyBcraJiCWJ06uZ2yzHfu0VuiArqVvlVyfEI

Jun 5 11:53:19 pumba sudo: hlk: TTY=ttyp2; PWD=/home/hlk; USER=root; COMMAND=/usr/bin/su -
1/2
```

## Log Sanitization



Data sets released may be combined with others to demask users/persons Book examples, governor medical data - health records, Netflix data Other examples:

"New York City has released data of 173m individual taxi trips – but inadvertently made it "trivial" to find the personally identifiable information of every driver in the dataset.- but used MD5 hashing for some data with only 24 million possible inputs

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/27/new-york-taxi-details-anonymised-data-researchers-warn

"Fitness tracking app Strava gives away location of secret US army bases"

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-away-location-of-secret-us-army-bases

#### Intrusion Detection



A model of a real-time intrusion-detection expert system capable of detecting break-ins, penetrations, and other forms of computer abuse is described. The model is based on the hypothesis that security violations can be detected by monitoring a system's audit records for abnormal patterns of system usage.

Source: An Intrusion-Detection Model, Dorothy E. Denning IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering (Volume: SE-13, Issue: 2, Feb. 1987)


**Definition 26-1** Anomaly detection analyzes a set of characteristics of the system and compares their behavior with a set of expected values. It reports when the computed statistics do not match the expected measurements.

Uses thresholds, statistics, machine learning, artificial intelligence, neural networks, ...

Dont forget we talked about wedge, pledge, unveil recently - putting processes into prisons

#### Host and Networks Based Intrusion Detection (HIDS/NIDS)





Host-based IDS (HIDS) local to system, log files etc.


Network-based (NIDS) typically uses mirrored data

Recommend Zeek https://www.zeek.org/ and Suricata https://suricata-ids.org/ with Emerging Threats rule sets https://rules.emergingthreats.net/ - available as PRO (paid and recommended) or OPEN (free)

Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) - when is a firewall an IPS?

## **Network Security Monitoring**






Network Security Monitoring (NSM) - monitoring networks for intrusions, and reacting to those Recommend the book The Practice of Network Security Monitoring Understanding Incident Detection and Response by Richard Bejtlich July 2013

Example systems are Security Onion https://securityonion.net/or SELKS https://www.stamus-networks.com/open-source/

## **Book: Applied Network Security Monitoring (ANSM)**






Applied Network Security Monitoring: Collection, Detection, and Analysis 1st Edition

Chris Sanders, Jason Smith eBook ISBN: 9780124172166 Paperback ISBN: 9780124172081 496 pp. Imprint: Syngress, December 2013

https://www.elsevier.com/books/applied-network-security-monitoring/unknown/978-0-12-417208-1

#### Logging today





Log analysis is required today - and we have many logs Gather logs, parse logs, explain logs - fix stuff Search your logs with the Elastic stack Show sample logs from Suricata, Sudo, SSH, ... what we have

## How to get started



How to get started searching for security events?

Collect basic data from your devices and networks

- Netflow data from routers
- Session data from firewalls
- Logging from applications: email, web, proxy systems

#### Centralize!

Process data

- Top 10: interesting due to high frequency, occurs often, brute-force attacks
- ignore
- Bottom 10: least-frequent messages are interesting

#### Centralized syslog



Logfiler er en nødvendighed for at have et transaktionsspor

Logfiler giver mulighed for statistik

Logfiler er desuden nødvendige for at fejlfinde

Det kan være relevant at sammenholde logfiler fra:

- routere
- firewalls
- webservere
- intrusion detection systemer
- adgangskontrolsystemer
- ...

Husk - tiden er vigtig! Network Time Protocol (NTP) anbefales Husk at logfilerne typisk kan slettes af en angriber - hvis denne får kontrol med systemet

## syslog



#### syslog er system loggen på UNIX og den er effektiv

- man kan definere hvad man vil se og hvor man vil have det dirigeret hen
- man kan samle det i en fil eller opdele alt efter programmer og andre kriterier
- man kan ligeledes bruge named pipes dvs filer i filsystemet som tunneller fra chroot'ed services til syslog i det centrale system!
- man kan nemt sende data til andre systemer
  - Man bør lave en centraliseret løsning

#### syslogd.conf eksempel



```
*.err; kern.debug; auth.notice; authpriv.none; mail.crit
                                                          /dev/console
*.notice; auth, authpriv, cron, ftp, kern, lpr, mail, user.none /var/log/messages
kern.debug;user.info;syslog.info
                                                          /var/log/messages
                                                          /var/log/authlog
auth.info
                                                          /var/log/secure
authpriv.debug
# Uncomment to log to a central host named "loghost".
#*.notice;auth,authpriv,cron,ftp,kern,lpr,mail,user.none
                                                                  @loghost
#kern.debug,user.info,syslog.info
                                                                  @loghost
#auth.info,authpriv.debug,daemon.info
                                                                  @loghost
```

#### Andre syslogs syslog-ng



- der findes andre syslog systemer eksempelvis syslog-ng
- konfigureres gennem /etc/syslog-ng/syslog-ng.conf

```
options {
    long_hostnames(off);
    sync(0);
    stats(43200);
};

source src unix-stream("/dev/log"); internal(); pipe("/proc/kmsg");;
destination messages file("/var/log/messages");;
destination console_all file("/dev/console");;
log source(src); destination(messages);;
log source(src); destination(console_all);;
```

Kan eksempelvis TCP og garanteret aflevering af beskeder

#### Exercise





Now lets do the exercise

# Centralized syslog 15min

which is number 22 in the exercise PDF.

#### Web server access log




```
root# tail -f access log
::1 - - [19/Feb/2004:09:05:33 +0100] "GET /images/IPv6ready.png
HTTP/1.1" 304 0
::1 - - [19/Feb/2004:09:05:33 +0100] "GET /images/valid-html401.png
HTTP/1.1" 304 0
::1 - - [19/Feb/2004:09:05:33 +0100] "GET /images/snowflake1.png
HTTP/1.1" 304 0
::1 - - [19/Feb/2004:09:05:33 +0100] "GET /~hlk/security6.net/images/logo-1.png
HTTP/1.1" 304 0
2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df - - [19/Feb/2004:09:57:35 +0100]
"GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 1456
2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df - - [19/Feb/2004:09:57:35 +0100]
"GET /apache pb.gif HTTP/1.1" 200 2326
2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df - - [19/Feb/2004:09:57:36 +0100]
"GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" 404 209
2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df - - [19/Feb/2004:09:57:36 +0100]
"GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" 404 209
```

Web server logs are pretty standardized, common log format.

## Big Data tools: Elasticsearch





Elasticsearch is an open source distributed, RESTful search and analytics engine capable of solving a growing number of use cases.

https://www.elastic.co

We are all Devops now, even security people!

#### Ansible configuration management



```
- apt: name= item   state=latest
   with_items:
```

- unzip
- elasticsearch
- logstash
- redis-server
- nginx
- lineinfile: "dest=/etc/elasticsearch/elasticsearch.yml state=present regexp='script.disable dynamic: true' line='script.disable dynamic: true'"
- lineinfile: "dest=/etc/elasticsearch/elasticsearch.yml state=present regexp='network.host: localhost' line='network.host: localhost'"
- name: Move elasticsearch data into /data
  command: creates=/data/elasticsearch mv /var/lib/elasticsearch /data/
- name: Make link to /data/elasticsearch
  file: state=link src=/data/elasticsearch path=/var/lib/elasticsearch

only requires SSH+python http://www.ansible.com

#### Kibana





Highly recommended for a lot of data visualisation

Non-programmers can create, save, and share dashboards

Source: https://www.elastic.co/products/kibana

## Logstash pipeline



Logstash is an open source, server-side data processing pipeline that ingests data from a multitude of sources simultaneously, transforms it, and then sends it to your favorite "stash." (Ours is Elasticsearch, naturally.) https://www.elastic.co/products/logstash

```
input { stdin { } }
output {
  elasticsearch { host => localhost }
  stdout { codec => rubydebug }
}
```

- Logstash receives via input
- Processes with **filters** grok
- Forward events with **output**

## Logstash as SNMPtrap and syslog server



```
input {
    snmptrap {
        host => "0.0.0.0"
        type => "snmptrap"
        port => 1062
        community => "xxxxx"      }
    tcp {
        port => 5000
        type => syslog      }
    udp {
        port => 5000
        type => syslog     }
}
```

- We run logstash on port 5000 but use IPtables port forwarding
- Have you even configured SNMP traps?
- Maybe you have a device sending SNMP traps right now ...

#### IPtables forwarding



```
*nat
:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]

# redirect all incoming requests on port 514 to port 5000
-A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 514 -j REDIRECT --to-port 5000
-A PREROUTING -p udp --dport 514 -j REDIRECT --to-port 5000
-A PREROUTING -p udp --dport 162 -j REDIRECT --to-port 1062
COMMIT
```

Inserted near beginning of /etc/ufw/before.rules on Ubuntu

Remember defense in depth, dont run a privileged Java VM process as root ©

#### **Grok expresssions**



• Logstash filter expressions grok can normalize and split data into fields

Source: Config snippet from recommended link

http://logstash.net/docs/1.4.1/tutorials/getting-started-with-logstash

## Grok expresssions, sample from my archive




```
filter {
# decode some SSHD
if [syslog program] == "sshd" {
 grok {
# May 20 10:27:08 odn1-nsm-01 sshd[4554]: Accepted publickey for hlk from
10.50.11.17 port 50365 ssh2: DSA 9e:fd:3b:3d:fc:11:0e:b9:bd:22:71:a9:36:d8:06:c7
match => { "message" => "%{SYSLOGTIMESTAMP:timestamp} %{HOSTNAME:host target}
sshd\[%{BASE10NUM}\]: Accepted publickey for %{USERNAME:username} from
 %{IP:src ip} port %{BASE10NUM:port} ssh2" }
# "May 20 10:27:08 odn1-nsm-01 sshd[4554]: pam unix(sshd:session):
session opened for user hlk by (uid=0)"
match => { "message" => "%{SYSLOGTIMESTAMP:timestamp} %{HOSTNAME:host target}
sshd\[%{BASE10NUM}\]: pam unix\(sshd:session\): session opened for user
%{USERNAME:username}" }
```

• Logstash filter expressions grok can normalize and split data into fields

## View data efficiently





View data by digging into it easily - must be fast Logstash and Kibana are just examples, but use indexing to make it fast! Other popular examples include Graylog and Grafana

#### Exercise





Now lets do the exercise

# Getting started with the Elastic Stack 15 min

which is number 23 in the exercise PDF.

#### Suricata with Dashboards





Picture from Twitter

https://twitter.com/nullthreat/status/445969209840128000

http://suricata-ids.org/

#### IP reputation



Zeek documentation Intel framework

https://docs.zeek.org/en/stable/frameworks/intel.html

Suricata reputation support

https://suricata.readthedocs.io/en/suricata-4.0.5/reputation/index.html

#### Exercise





Now lets do the exercise

## Use Ansible to install Elastic Stack

which is number 24 in the exercise PDF.

#### Exercise





Now lets do the exercise

## Create Kibana Dashboard 15min

which is number 25 in the exercise PDF.

#### Collect Network Evidence from the network



#### Network Flows

Cisco standard NetFlow version 5 defines a flow as a unidirectional sequence of packets that all share the following 7 values:

- Ingress interface (SNMP ifIndex)
- Source IP address
- Destination IP address
- IP protocol
- Source port for UDP or TCP, 0 for other protocols
- Destination port for UDP or TCP, type and code for ICMP, or 0 for other protocols
- IP Type of Service

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetFlow

#### **Netflow**



Netflow is getting more important, more data share the same links

Accounting is important

Detecting DoS/DDoS and problems is essential

Netflow sampling is vital information - 123Mbit, but what kind of traffic

NFSen is an old but free application http://nfsen.sourceforge.net/


Currently also investigating sFlow - hopefully more fine grained

sFlow, short for "sampled flow", is an industry standard for packet export at Layer 2 of the OSI model,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SFlow


## **Netflow using NFSen**





#### **Netflow NFSen**





An extra 100k packets per second from this netflow source (source is a router)

## Netflow processing from the web interface



Figure   State   Sta	ack Forward	Reload	Stop	New Tab	Home	S http:	s://nfsen	-demo/nfser	n-demo/nfse	n.php#proc	essing	<u>@</u> ▼ ▶	∭ • Ca	mbridge	Dictiona	rie Q	3
## Site   467.1 /s   8.9 k/s   6.1 k/s   2.0 k/s   181.7 /s   613.3 /s   38.8 Mb/s   28.3 Mb/s   7.4 Mb/s   104.0 kb/s   2.9 Mb/s	▽ peer2	3.3 k/s	76.2 k/s	66.9 k/s	7.0 k/s	621.0 /s	1.7 k/s	484.6 Mb/s	459.9 Mb/s	12.5 Mb/s	437.3 kb/s	11.7 Mb/s					
## site	▽ gateway	1.0 /s	651.0 /s	600.8 /s	46.6 /s	0 /s	3.7 /s	6.2 Mb/s	6.1 Mb/s	36.4 kb/s	0 b/s	4.4 kb/s					
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Bringing the power of the command line forward

#### Next steps




Always improving things:

Suricata IDS http://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/
More graphs, with automatic identification of IPs under attack
Identification of short sessions without data - spoofed addresses
Alerting from existing devices
Dashboards with key measurements

**Conclusion: Combine tools!** 

## Network Security Through Data Analysis





Low page count, but high value! Recommended.

Network Security through Data Analysis, 2nd Edition By Michael S Collins Publisher: O'Reilly Media 2015-05-01: Second release, 348 Pages

New Release Date: August 2017

#### Network tools - more examples



#### **Using PacketQ**

Let's have a practical look at how PacketQ works by trying to figure out what kind of DNS ANY queries are being sent towards our name-server.

DNS ANY traffic is currently commonly abused for DNS amplification attacks (See Blog post "DDoS-Angriffe durch Reflektierende DNS-Amplifikation vermeiden" in German). The first thing I want to know is what are the IP addresses of the victims of this potential DNS amplification attack:

packetq -t -s "select src\_addr,count(\*) as count from dns where qtype=255 group
by src\_addr order by count desc limit 3" lolo.20130118.070000.000179
"src\_addr" ,"count"
"216.245.221.243",933825
"85.126.233.70" ,16802
"80.74.130.55" ,91

- DNS: DSC and PacketQ https://github.com/DNS-OARC/PacketQ
- Packetbeat https://www.elastic.co/products/beats/packetbeat
- http://securityblog.switch.ch/2013/01/22/using-packetq/
- http://jpmens.net/2013/05/27/server-agnostic-logging-of-dns-queries-responses/

#### Volatility and file systems



 Table 1.2 The expected life span of data

Type of Data	Life Span
Registers, peripheral memory, caches, etc.	Nanoseconds
Main memory	Ten nanoseconds
Network state	Milliseconds
Running processes	Seconds
Disk	Minutes
Floppies, backup media, etc.	Years
CD-ROMs, printouts, etc.	Tens of years

Order of volatility (OOV) of evidence <u>Forensic Discovery</u> Dan Farmer, Wietse Venema, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2005

http://fish2.com/security/wf-book.pdf - full book available!

#### **Network Forensics ENISA**



The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is a centre of expertise for cyber security in Europe.

ENISA is contributing to a high level of network and information security (NIS) within the European Union, by developing and promoting a culture of NIS in society to assist in the proper functioning of the internal market.

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/

ENISA has published a number of network forensics documents which are free to use, so these are our basics.

#### Forensic analysis



Network forensics is a sub-branch of digital forensics relating to the monitoring and analysis of computer network traffic for the purposes of information gathering, legal evidence, or intrusion detection 5.

Systems used to collect network data for forensics use usually come in three forms:

- Packet capture: All packets passing through a certain traffic point are captured and written to storage
- Intrusion detection systems
- Network flow sensors

The acronym OSCAR 8 stands for: Obtain information, Strategize, Collect evidence, Analyse, Report

Source: Forensic analysis Network Incident Response Handbook, Document for teachers 1.0 DECEMBER 2016, ENISA EXE2\_Forensic\_analysis\_II-Handbook.pdf

#### **ENISA**



- We will use these as examples:
- ENISA Presenting, correlating and filtering various feeds Handbook, Document for teachers
   https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/trainings-for-cybersecurity-specialists/online-training-rdocuments/presenting-correlating-and-filtering-various-feeds-handbook
- ENISA Forensic analysis, Network Incident Response
   https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/trainings-for-cybersecurity-specialists/online-training-rdocuments/2016-resources/exe2\_forensic\_analysis\_ii-handbook
- ENISA Network Forensics, Handbook, Document for teachers
   https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/trainings-for-cybersecurity-specialists/online-training-redocuments/network-forensics-handbook

#### Exercise





Now lets do the exercise

# File System Forensics 30min

which is number 26 in the exercise PDF.

#### For Next Time





Think about the subjects from this time, write down questions Check the plan for chapters to read in the books Visit web sites and download papers if needed Retry the exercises to get more confident using the tools