



OPUS-20

Proposal for funding of a research project

Partisan bias or a climate of indifference? An investigation of actually-existing democratic values and their consequences in Poland.

dr hab. Benjamin David Stanley

SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities

NEW PROPOSAL/PROPOSAL RESUBMITTED

Has the proposal been submitted under the previous OPUS call for proposals?	YES [] / [X] NO
---	------------------

GENERAL INFORMATION

Proposal title in Polish	Plemięność czy obojętność? Badanie rzeczywiście istniejących wartości demokratycznych i ich konsekwencji w Polsce.
Proposal title in English	Partisan bias or a climate of indifference? An investigation of actually-existing democratic values and their consequences in Poland.
Keywords in Polish	Wartości demokratyczne, liberalna demokracja, populizm, eksperymenty wieloczynnikowe, polaryzacja afektywna.
Keywords in English	Democratic values, liberal democracy, populism, conjoint experiments, affective polarisation.
Duration [in months]	36
Research field	HS - Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences
Primary NCN Review Panel	HS6 - Human nature and human society
Auxiliary NCN Review Panels	HS6_002 - Social, political, environmental and intercultural psychology HS6_015 - Sociology of ideas, power, norms, organizations HS5_007 - Political systems and movements; international relations

ABSTRACT

In recent years researchers of democracy have drawn attention to a paradoxical situation in which voters declare a commitment to liberal democracy while supporting political elites who take undemocratic actions. While a majority of citizens say that they prefer democracy over other forms of government and declare a preference for the independence of democratic institutions from political control, the rise of populist parties and movements across the democratic world suggests that voters are more tolerant of illiberal political systems than their declared values might lead us to expect. Recent research into this situation (Carey et al., 2020; McCoy, Simonovits, & Littvay, 2020; Svolik, 2019) has pointed towards an important but still underdeveloped research agenda. The literature on democratic backsliding focuses predominantly on the supply side, with little consideration as yet of the role played by voter demand either in providing electoral incentives for backsliding or in sanctioning the protagonists of such changes. Recent studies of democratic values remain inconclusive, but suggest that consolidated democracies may be more vulnerable than previously assumed to democratic backsliding at the citizen level. This is a conclusion supported by research into populist attitudes and affective polarisation, which highlights the potential for democracy to be undermined through hyper-polarisation and failure to punish backsliding elites for their actions even when those actions are contrary to the pro-democratic values a majority still purport to hold.

The goal of this project is to push forward this research agenda through the study over time of a crucial case in the shape of Poland, a country which has experienced a particularly marked degree of democratic backsliding since 2015 and is characterised by contestation over the legitimacy of the political regime, significant polarisation between the incumbent and a credible alternative executive, and a relatively recent history of democratisation. The project will seek to answer three research questions: (a) whether Poles genuinely value the norms and institutions of liberal democracy, (b) whether Poles regard the post-2015 changes as a process of democratic backsliding, as the pursuit of an alternative model of democracy, or as simply a continuation of ‘politics as usual’, and (c) whether the political polarisation Poland has experienced in recent years adversely affects the capacity of voters to hold illiberal political elites responsible for their actions.

The project will undertake a three-wave panel survey of a representative sample of the Polish population between the summer of 2022 and the winter of 2023. These surveys will have three key characteristics. First, they will contain an innovative new set of questions designed to measure democratic values in ways that overcome the social desirability bias that many researchers believe artificially inflates the level of approval for liberal democracy. Second, the surveys will use conjoint experiments to test the extent to which Poles act in accordance with liberal-democratic principles when making political choices. Third, the panel nature of the research design will measure the views and attitudes of voters over an 18-month period, allowing us to establish whether pro-democratic attitudes and behaviours remain stable or are prone to fluctuate.

We expect to find that levels of “actually-existing” democratic values are lower than those typically declared in standard survey questions, but that they remain stable over time. However, in line with similar research conducted primarily in the United States, we expect to find that political polarisation interferes (a) with the extent to which Polish citizens view post-2015 changes as legitimate or illegitimate from the perspective of democratic values, and (b) with their capacity to ‘punish’ political elites for taking illiberal and undemocratic actions.

APPLICANT

Polish entity legal status	1. University
----------------------------	---------------

PARTICIPATING ENTITIES

1. SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities	
Entity's name in English	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
Address of registered office	ul. Chodakowska 19/31, 03-815 Warszawa, mazowieckie, Poland
Contact address	ul. Chodakowska 19/31, 03-815 Warszawa, mazowieckie, Poland
Contact information	Phone Number: (22) 517-99-00, (22) 517-98-56 E-mail: badania@swps.edu.pl WWW: www.swps.pl
Electronic delivery box ESP (ePUAP)	/Uniwersytet_SWPS/badania
Does the organisation belong to the public finances sector?	YES [] / [X] NO
Is the organisation under receivership, in liquidation or subject to bankruptcy proceedings?	YES [] / [X] NO
Head of the entity / authorised representative	dr hab. profesor Uniwersytetu SWPS Aleksandra Cisłak-Wójcik, Prorektor ds. nauki
NIP (tax identification number)	1180197245
REGON (statistical identification number)	011947981
KRS (court register number)	-
Does the organisation receive any operating support for research?	YES [X] / [] NO

SHORT DESCRIPTION

Partisan bias or a climate of indifference? An investigation of actually-existing democratic values and their consequences in Poland.

dr hab. Benjamin David Stanley

SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities

Short description

Scientific goal of the project

The recent phenomenon of democratic backsliding in countries whose citizens profess a high level of attachment to democratic values has created an unresolved intellectual puzzle that inspires this project: "*Why do voters who routinely profess a commitment to democracy simultaneously support leaders who subvert it?*" (Svolik, 2019, p. 23). This is a puzzle particularly relevant to the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), several of which have broken with the "imitative modernisation" that defined the first quarter century of post-communist democracy (Krastev & Holmes, 2018, p. 118). In Poland the controversial process of departure from liberal democracy since 2015 (Sadurski, 2019) has thus far failed to result in electoral punishment for the incumbent Law and Justice party despite any significant opposition to liberal democratic principles and institutions (Markowski, 2016, p. 1320; Tworzecki, 2019, p. 99).

Either we have been asking Poles the wrong questions about their attitudes to democracy, or we have been asking questions in the wrong way. Attempting to explain similar processes in the United States, Svolik (2019) has argued that political polarisation is often in conflict with democratic values to the extent that even pro-democratic citizens are sometimes willing to tolerate breaches of democratic principle if upholding those principles would conflict with their partisan interests. While such a conclusion may be warranted in the case of more mature democracies, it remains unclear to what extent citizens in relatively new democracies genuinely do hold pro-democratic views, and to what extent they recognise departures from the orthodox model of liberal democracy as "subversion" of democracy. The case of Poland provides an excellent opportunity to test these distinct (and potentially reinforcing) explanations of the apparently paradoxical tolerance for acts of democratic backsliding amid substantial approval for democracy.

The three research questions this project seeks to answer are:

1. Do Polish citizens *genuinely* value liberal democracy as a set of principles and as a political system, and to what extent?
2. Do Polish citizens view the post-2015 changes as a subversion of liberal democracy, the pursuit of a *different* democratic model, or as "more of the same"?
3. Does political partisanship inhibit the capacity of Polish voters to hold illiberal political elites to account?

Significance of the project

The proposed project emerges from, and will contribute to, an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the related topics of democratic backsliding, democratic values, affective polarisation and populism.

The increased prominence and electoral success of populist parties in recent years and the pursuit by parties in power of explicitly or implicitly illiberal agendas has led to diagnoses of "autocratisation" (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019), "democratic backsliding" (Bermeo, 2016), or "democratic decay" (Daly, 2019). Much of the recent literature has conceived of this process as strategic and agent-led (Ganev, 2012; Sitter & Bakke, 2019), positing a leading role for an over-powerful executive through the nullification of institutions of accountability (Landau, 2013, p. 189), strategic manipulation of electoral processes instead of outright fraud (Bermeo, 2016, p. 13) and gradual, cumulative repression of civil society and the media (Huq & Ginsburg, 2018, pp. 137-138).

Yet executive aggrandisement requires not only a powerful executive with the will to pursue significant change, but also propitious contexts such as 'fading conditionalities, corruption, and economic crisis' (Dawson & Hanley, 2016, p. 23) and crucially the consent, or at least indifference, of the governed. To understand democratic backsliding, we also need to understand the nature of public attitudes regarding democracy and democratic institutions, and the extent to which those attitudes influence their responses to the actions of political elites.

The diagnosis of a decline in pro-liberal-democratic values has been strongly disputed (Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017; Zilinsky, 2019). However, the persistence of democratic backsliding and the relative absence to date of punishment for its most egregious practitioners has prompted questions about the susceptibility of standard measures of democratic attitudes to social desirability bias (McCoy, Simonovits, & Littvay, 2020) and research

into populist attitudes as a “disposition” towards monism and majoritarianism that may undercut a tokenistic attachment to liberal democratic norms and institutions (Castanho Silva, Jungkunz, Helbling, & Littvay, 2019; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019).

Recent developments in the literature on affective polarisation also point in a similar direction. The authors of an influential recent overview of the field posit a causal chain linking societal polarisation to democratic backsliding: where crises or perceptions of injustice foster resentment, a populist “us versus them” rhetoric organises interests, loyalties and group identifications around a quasi-tribal cleavage, leading to a deepening of mutual antipathies and perceptions of the “Other” as a threat to the nation, to acceptance of actions incompatible with liberal democratic values, and ultimately to the normalisation of such actions (McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018, p. 26). A radical “us versus them” polarisation in which identity-based ideology overwhelms policy orientations as a locus of difference between competing groups (Mason, 2018) threatens to destabilise democracies by destroying consensus over the legitimacy of neutral democratic institutions and incentivising ostensibly pro-democratic voters to sanction undemocratic actions rather than punish their own side.

A new line of research uses conjoint experiments to examine these processes. Studies of the US case find that only a small minority of American voters punish otherwise favoured candidates for violating democratic norms (Graham & Svolik, 2020) and that toleration of breaches of democratic norms is significantly greater when respondents’ favoured parties are in power and affective polarisation is greater (McCoy et al., 2020). Although little comparable research has been conducted outside the US context, a study of the Hungarian case found that partisanship strongly conditioned attitudes to the legitimacy of controversial electoral reforms in 2014 (Ahlquist, Ichino, Wittenberg, & Ziblatt, 2018).

These findings highlight an important but still underdeveloped research agenda for which Poland can serve as a crucial case. Attempts to theorise the democratic backsliding observed in Poland since 2015 have focused primarily on elite-level factors such as the collectively irrational outputs of autocratically governed parties (Markowski, 2018) or an “autocracy trap” created by a perverse set of incentives at the EU level (Kelemen, 2020). While there have been studies of polarisation (Tworzecki & Markowski, 2014) and populist attitudes (Stanley, 2018) that have found *correlations* of these phenomena with voting for backsliding parties, there has been no attempt to theorise and study *causal* linkages between actually-existing democratic values, political polarisation and the failure to sanction backsliders.

To understand why it has been possible for political elites in one of the frontrunners of the CEE region to depart so swiftly and decisively from liberal democracy, we need to have better measures of democratic attitudes and ways of modelling the causal links between the values and actions of Polish citizens. Recalling the second research question, we also need to ensure we have a better understanding of Polish voters’ *awareness* of transgressions of democratic norms. As Ahlquist (2018, p. 907) observes, to punish such transgressions, voters must be aware of them in the first place, and view them as illegitimate. Existing data on democratic values and contentment with Polish democracy do not furnish information on the extent to which Poles consider the events of the last five years to consist in a breach with the liberal-democratic order, or which other conceptions of democracy they might consider more compelling.

The data which are available are insufficient to answer the research questions in several respects. First, questions about democratic values and institutions in existing surveys are susceptible to the social desirability bias discussed above. It is therefore necessary to test and collect new data about democratic values that are less affected by these biases. Second, current data are only tractable for observational analyses. These datasets allow us to identify relationships between key variables of interest, but cannot be used to explore the theorised causal relationships between democratic values, political partisanship and approval for (or opposition to) non-democratic outcomes. Third, the cross-sectional nature of existing datasets makes it impossible to observe changes over time. While there is a long-running panel survey conducted by the POLPAN project at the University of Warsaw, it does not contain the key variables of interest, nor does it employ the experimental element we require.

The purpose of this project is not simply to explain the relationship between democratic values, polarisation and political behaviour in the Polish case, but also to generate concepts and hypotheses for further comparative investigation. While the choice of Poland is motivated in part by pragmatic considerations concerning the realisability of the project, in particular the adjacency of Poland to the research team and the expertise of the principal investigator in that area, the primary reason for the choice of country is its potential as a crucial case study.

First, Poland has experienced a sustained process of democratic backsliding in recent years, as evidenced by the V-Dem measures of democratisation (Coppedge et al., 2020). Against the backdrop of other democracies in CEE (the exception being Hungary), it can be treated as a case of a country in the vanguard of democratic backsliding, and one whose experiences may foreshadow more general tendencies in the coming years. Second, the process of backsliding has been accompanied by significant polarisation on both sides of the political divide (Leszczyński, 2019). Unlike Hungary, the opposition in Poland remains relatively coherent and viable as an alternative power holder. This makes the case for treating Poland as a crucial case study more compelling, as it will be possible to observe not only the consequences of polarisation over Law and Justice, but also of attitudes to a credible alternative executive. Third, the choice of a case in which there is a recent history of democratic backsliding allows us to explore the impact of the memory of *actual* political events, rather than relying only on hypothetical breaches of democratic norms. This will add to the realism of our experimental manipulations and improve the external validity of our findings. Finally, until now, the majority of research in the area of our research questions has been conducted in the context of the US. While these findings are suggestive with respect to the cases of other democratic countries, it ought not to be assumed that the concepts and theories thus generated can simply be transferred to European contexts. A crucial case study approach such as the one proposed here will help generate hypotheses and confirm and infirm theories for more contextually adjacent cases.

This project thus has significant potential to open up new lines of enquiry in the study of European democracies, party politics and voting behaviour. The proposal is pioneering in three respects. First, it applies emergent theories of the trade-off between democratic values and political partisanship to a key European case where these questions have not yet been adequately investigated. Second, the use of experimental and panel survey methods will move forward the investigation of political causality in a case where research remains dominated by observational data, advance beyond moncausal explanations of the political consequences of polarisation and actually-existing democratic values, and explore the impact (or non-impact) of changing political circumstances on the relationships we observe. Thirdly, the project will lead to new ways of measuring democratic values, advancing the re-conceptualisation of demand-side aspects of the study of democracy in a field where most rethinking currently concerns the supply side of parties, movements and elite institutions.

Concept and work plan

The research project will consist of four distinct stages. The first is a preparatory stage (October 2021 - December 2022) during which the PI will undertake conceptual and methodological preparation of the conjoint analysis aspects of the survey, and recruit a post-doctoral student to join the research team.

The second stage (January 2022 - June 2022), will focus on survey design, with the creation of new survey questions measuring attitudes to democracy and their testing in a pilot survey, and the preparation of the survey questionnaire for the first panel survey.

The third stage (July 2022 - December 2023) will consist in the implementation of the panel surveys, with the initial plan to field the first survey in the third quarter of 2022, the second in the second quarter of 2022, and the final panel survey in October or November 2023.

The fourth stage of the project (January 2024 - September 2024) will be dedicated to analysis and interpretation of the data and the writing of several journal articles to be submitted to peer-reviewed journals both nationally and internationally. During the third and fourth stages findings of the project will be disseminated at national and international conferences.

The main risk to the successful execution of the project is the dropout of survey panel participants. To ensure that the continuity of the panel survey is not adversely affected by dropouts over the three waves, we will recruit a larger sample for the first wave to ensure that we retain at least 1250 respondents over the three waves.

Research methodology

Data for the project will be collected using a three-wave panel survey with embedded survey experiments, preceded by a pilot survey to develop new questions measuring democratic values. The observational aspect of the pilot and main surveys will consist in a range of standard variables concerning political and social attitudes, voting behaviour and socio-demographic characteristics. The experimental aspect of the surveys will consist in the administration of conjoint survey experiments. This method will allow us to measure the causal impact of attitudes to democracy and political partisanship on the decision to reward or to punish political elites for acts of democratic backsliding. Surveys will be carried out using computer-aided web interviews

(CAWI), as this survey infrastructure is best suited to the administration of complex conjoint survey experiments and is the most accessible and cost-effective means of reaching a representative sample of the Polish population.

The choice of conjoint analysis over classical experimental designs is motivated by the multidimensional character of decision-making over this issue. As Hainmueller et al (Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2014, p. 2) observe, traditional survey experiments that vary only one aspect of an experimental treatment at once have two major drawbacks: they lack realism in circumstances where respondents are being asked to consider scenarios in which multiple attributes may potentially be of relevance, and as a result they often yield limited findings given the cost outlay of implementing survey experiments.

Our interest is in determining the causal impact of polarisation and democratic values on willingness to sanction democratic backsliding, while also accounting for other aspects that influence electoral choices. By allowing the researcher to vary a number of factors in a single experiment, conjoint analysis makes it possible to estimate the impact of multiple components of an experimental treatment in the determination of an outcome, enabling the simultaneous testing of competing hypotheses (Hainmueller, Hopkins, et al., 2014, p. 3; Knudsen & Johannesson, 2018, p. 260). Conjoint analysis also improves the external validity of survey experiments by replicating real-world choice processes more realistically (Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Yamamoto, 2015) and mitigates the social desirability problems associated with asking about democracy by giving respondents a variety of reasons to justify their choices (Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Yamamoto, 2014, p. 3).

Three broad types of quantitative analysis will be undertaken using these data. First, confirmatory factor analysis will be used to identify latent attitudes to liberal democracy among respondents elicited by our observed variables. Second, multivariate regression modelling will be used to measure the impact of key independent variables of interest on dependent variables relating to democratic attitudes, party identification, party political polarisation and vote choice. Third, the results of the conjoint experiments will be analysed using estimations of the average marginal component effect (AMCE), which gives the effect of the value of interest after taking into account the effects of the other attributes, and the conditional AMCE, a measure which gives this effect conditional on a characteristic of the survey respondent. These quantities of interest will allow us to assess the extent to which democratic values affect preferences conditional on the level of partisanship.

With data collection outsourced to a survey organisation, the only equipment necessary to carry out research is the computers available to the project team. Quantitative analyses will primarily be carried out using the free statistical programming language *R*. Supplementary analyses, particularly those requiring the use of structural equation modelling and latent variable analysis, will be conducted using the proprietary software *Mplus*, for which SWPS University already holds a licence.

Project literature

- Ahlquist, J. S., Ichino, N., Wittenberg, J., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How do voters perceive changes to the rules of the game? Evidence from the 2014 Hungarian elections. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 46(4), 906-919. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2018.01.001
- Bermeo, N. (2016). On Democratic Backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 5-19. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0012
- Castanho Silva, B., Jungkunz, S., Helbling, M., & Littvay, L. (2019). An Empirical Comparison of Seven Populist Attitudes Scales. *Political Research Quarterly*, 1065912919833176. doi:10.1177/1065912919833176
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., . . . Ziblatt, D. (2020). V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v10. *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project*. doi:<https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20>
- Daly, T. G. (2019). Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*. doi:10.1007/s40803-019-00086-2
- Dawson, J., & Hanley, S. (2016). The Fading Mirage of the “Liberal Consensus”. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 20-34. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0015
- Ganev, V. I. (2012). Post-Accession Hooliganism: Democratic Governance in Bulgaria and Romania after 2007. *East European Politics and Societies*, 27(1), 26-44. doi:10.1177/0888325412465086
- Graham, M. H., & Svolik, M. W. (2020). Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2), 392-409. doi:10.1017/s0003055420000052

- Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2014). Do Survey Experiments Capture Real-World Behavior? External Validation of Conjoint and Vignette Analyses with a Natural Experiment. *Unpublished.*
- Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2015). Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 112(8), 2395-2400. doi:10.1073/pnas.1416587112
- Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J., & Yamamoto, T. (2014). Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments. *Political Analysis*, 22(1), 1-30. doi:10.1093/pan/mpt024
- Hawkins, K., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. b. (2019). Introduction: the ideational approach. In K. Hawkins, R. E. Carlin, L. Littvay, & C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.), *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory and Analysis* (pp. 1-24): Oxford University Press.
- Huq, A., & Ginsburg, T. (2018). How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy. *UCLA Law Review*(1), 78-169.
- Kelemen, R. D. (2020). The European Union's authoritarian equilibrium. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 27(3), 481-499. doi:10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455
- Knudsen, E., & Johannesson, M. P. (2018). Beyond the Limits of Survey Experiments: How Conjoint Designs Advance Causal Inference in Political Communication Research. *Political Communication*, 36(2), 259-271. doi:10.1080/10584609.2018.1493009
- Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2018). Imitation and Its Discontents. *Journal of Democracy*, 29(3), 117-128. doi:10.1353/jod.2018.0049
- Landau, D. (2013). Abusive Constitutionalism. *UC Davis Law Review*, 47(1), 189-260.
- Leszczyński, A. (2019, 25/01/2019). Prof. Bilewicz: nienawidzimy zwolenników PiS bardziej niż oni nas. A to partia jest winna. *OKO.press*. Retrieved from <https://oko.press/bilewicz-zwolennicy-opozycji-bardziej-nie-lubia-zwolennikow-pis-niz-na-odwrot/>
- Lührmann, A., & Lindberg, S. I. (2019). A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it? *Democratization*, 1-19. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029
- Markowski, R. (2016). The Polish parliamentary election of 2015: a free and fair election that results in unfair political consequences. *West European Politics*, 39(6), 1311-1322. doi:10.1080/01402382.2016.1177305
- Markowski, R. (2018). Creating Authoritarian Clientelism: Poland After 2015. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*. doi:10.1007/s40803-018-0082-5
- Mason, L. (2018). Ideologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 82(S1), 866-887. doi:10.1093/poq/nfy005
- McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 62(1), 16-42. doi:10.1177/0002764218759576
- McCoy, J., Simonovits, G., & Littvay, L. (2020). *Democratic Hypocrisy: Polarized citizens support democracy-eroding behavior when their own party is in power*.
- Norris, P. (2017). Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks. *Journal of Democracy, Online exchange*.
- Sadurski, W. (2019). *Poland's Constitutional Breakdown*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sitter, N., & Bakke, E. (2019). Democratic Backsliding in the European Union. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1476
- Stanley, B. (2018). A New Populist Divide? Correspondences of Supply and Demand in the 2015 Polish Parliamentary Elections. *East European Politics and Societies*, 33(1), 17-43. doi:10.1177/0888325418783056
- Svolik, M. W. (2019). Polarization versus Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 30(3), 20-32. doi:10.1353/jod.2019.0039
- Tworzecki, H. (2019). Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681(1), 97-119. doi:10.1177/0002716218809322
- Tworzecki, H., & Markowski, R. (2014). Knowledge and Partisan Bias: An Uneasy Relationship. *East European Politics and Societies*, 28(4), 836-862. doi:10.1177/0888325414535626
- Voeten, E. (2017). Are people really turning away from democracy? *Journal of Democracy Web Exchange*.
- Zilinsky, J. (2019). Democratic deconsolidation revisited: Young Europeans are not dissatisfied with democracy. *Research & Politics*, 6(1), 2053168018814332. doi:10.1177/2053168018814332

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Partisan bias or a climate of indifference? An investigation of actually-existing democratic values and their consequences in Poland.

dr hab. Benjamin David Stanley

SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities

Detailed description

Scientific goal of the project

Research into democratic values is at an impasse. On the one hand, citizens in democratic countries apparently maintain a preference for democracy over other forms of government, and declare a preference for pluralism protected and enforced by independent institutions. On the other hand, the rise in many countries of populist challengers to the liberal democratic model suggests that there is more of a tolerance for illiberal, monarchic forms of democracy than standard survey questions allow us to measure. The unresolved intellectual puzzle that inspires this project has been concisely articulated as "*Why do voters who routinely profess a commitment to democracy simultaneously support leaders who subvert it?*" (Svolik, 2019, p. 23).

This is a puzzle particularly relevant to the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). If the first quarter-century since transition to democracy was defined largely by the pursuit of an approach to democratisation in which countries of the region sought to become "normal" by copying Western political systems, economic models and cultural values (Krastev & Holmes, 2018, p. 118), then during the last decade several countries of the region have broken with this "imitative" path, explicitly rejecting the liberal model of democracy in favour of an "illiberal democracy" or "democracy without adjectives".

While there have been signs of discontent with the institutional and normative strictures of liberal democracy in many CEE countries, Hungary and Poland - both previously considered among the forerunners of post-communist democratisation - have moved significantly away from the liberal-democratic model in recent years, as illustrated by both countries' substantial decline on the *V-Dem* indicators of democracy (Coppedge et al., 2020). If Hungarian governments have been able to rely upon constitutional majorities in their reshaping of their country's political system, in Poland the process of departure from liberal democracy has required outright breaches of the constitution, politicisation of independent institutions, and bending of ordinary legislation in a manner contrary to its intended spirit (Sadurski, 2019). That this has been able to occur since 2015 without - as yet - any electoral punishment for the incumbent Law and Justice party is puzzling in light of the absence, prior to 2015, of any significant opposition to liberal democratic principles and institutions (Markowski, 2016, p. 1320; Tworzecki, 2019, p. 99), and in the stability after 2015 of approval for normative principles of democracy and actually-existing democracy in Poland (CBOS, 2020).

These considerations give rise to two possibilities: either we have been asking Poles the wrong questions about their attitudes to democracy, or we have been asking questions in the wrong way. Both of these things may be true. The aim of this project is to discover whether they are. In a recent article, Svolik (2019, pp. 21-23) identifies three potential ways to answer the question of why pro-democratic voters fail to punish political elites who depart from liberal-democratic norms: one, that "voters have not had enough time or clarity to recognize a subversion of democracy for what it is"; two, that they "do not care much about democracy in the first place"; and finally, that "[d]eep social cleavages and acute political tensions ... undercut the public's ability to curb the illiberal inclinations of elected politicians."

Svolik (2019, p. 23) opts for the latter explanation, arguing that political polarisation is often in conflict with democratic values to the extent that even pro-democratic citizens are sometimes willing to tolerate breaches of democratic principle if upholding those principles would conflict with their partisan interests. Yet while such a conclusion may be warranted in the case of more mature democracies, it remains unclear to what extent citizens in relatively new democracies genuinely do hold pro-democratic views, and to what extent they recognise departures from the orthodox model of liberal democracy as "subversion" of democracy.

The case of Poland provides an excellent opportunity to test these distinct (and potentially reinforcing) explanations of the apparently paradoxical tolerance for acts of democratic backsliding amid substantial approval for democracy. The three research questions this project seeks to answer are:

1. Do Polish citizens *genuinely* value liberal democracy as a set of principles and as a political system, and to what extent?
2. Do Polish citizens view the post-2015 changes as a subversion of liberal democracy, the pursuit of a *different* democratic model, or as “more of the same”?
3. Does political partisanship inhibit the capacity of Polish voters to hold illiberal political elites to account?

In the first stage of the project (see section *Research plan* for details) the principal investigator will specify more detailed hypotheses for investigation, and subsidiary research questions as appropriate. However, in general terms we expect to find that levels of “actually-existing” democratic values - which we define as those which correlate with pro-democratic actions, rather than those which are simply a declarative commitment to democracy - are lower than those typically declared in standard survey questions, but that they remain stable over time. However, we expect to find that political polarisation interferes (a) with the extent to which Polish citizens view post-2015 changes as legitimate or illegitimate from the perspective of democratic values, and (b) with their capacity to ‘punish’ political elites for taking illiberal and undemocratic actions.

Answering these three questions will serve three main project objectives, each of which contribute to the broader comparative literature on democratic values and voting behaviour. The first is to contribute empirical insights from the Polish case to emerging comparative literatures (see subsection *State of the art* for further details) on the causes and characteristics of democratic backsliding, the role of democratic values and populist attitudes in influencing vote choice, and the impact of affective polarisation on exacerbating the strains experienced by contemporary democracies.

The second objective is methodological in character. The development of new questions for the measuring of attitudes towards liberal democracy and liberal-democratic institutions will contribute to a broader literature on question design that seeks to address the social desirability biases inherent in many standard questions on these issues. The use of a research design based on survey experiments (see sections *Concept and work plan* and *Research methodology* for further details) will provide an opportunity to confirm the utility of these methods for identifying what respondents *really* think about democracy and how they respond to the often-conflicting imperatives of adherence to democratic values and support for their preferred party. The use of a panel survey design will move beyond existing cross-sectional studies to explore the nature and consequences of persistence and changeability in these attitudes over time, allowing us to draw conclusions about the stability (or otherwise) of democratic values, the “pernicious consequences for democracy” of deepening polarisation (McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018, pp. 34-35) and potentially to explore the dynamics of a pre- and post-election situation on the relationships we observe (Ahlquist, Ichino, Wittenberg, & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 910).

Both the empirical findings and the methodological innovations will enable this project to contribute to the building of theories about the causal and interactive relationship between democratic values and polarisation on the one hand, and voting behaviour on the other. Most research in this area so far concerns the case of the United States, but the theoretical intuitions that lie behind that research are of global applicability and importance. It is imperative that these ideas be tested in other contexts, particularly where for historical reasons democracies, their institutions, and the values that underpin them may be expected to be more fragile than elsewhere. The findings of this research project will confirm, challenge or nuance the US case in ways that will have comparative implications for other countries of the CEE region, and for European democracies more broadly.

Significance of the project

State of the art

The proposed project emerges from, and will contribute to, an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the related topics of democratic backsliding, democratic values, affective polarisation and populism.

The increased prominence and electoral success of populist parties in recent years and the pursuit by parties in power of explicitly or implicitly illiberal agendas has led to diagnoses of “autocratisation” (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019), “democratic backsliding” (Bermeo, 2016), or “democratic decay” (Daly, 2019). While accounts vary in terms of the agency they ascribe to political actors and the emphasis they place on particular factors such as electoral malpractice or abuse of constitutional process, each makes the basic claim that liberal democracy is under significant challenge.

In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the dominant post-1989 understanding of democratic transition centred on the consolidation of key liberal democratic institutions through the actions of political elites. Consistent with this tendency, much of the recent literature aimed at conceptualising and understanding cases of de-democratisation has conceived of this process as strategic and agent-led (Ganev, 2012; Sitter & Bakke, 2019). These approaches posit a leading role for an over-powerful executive through the nullification of institutions of accountability (Landau, 2013, p. 189), strategic manipulation of electoral processes instead of outright fraud (Bermeo, 2016, p. 13) and gradual, cumulative repression of civil society and the media (Huq & Ginsburg, 2018, pp. 137-138).

It is certainly true that cases of backsliding in the region have been driven by the decisions of political elites. Yet for executive aggrandisement to be possible, it requires not only a powerful executive with the will to pursue significant change in the teeth of often substantial domestic and international elite opposition, but also propitious contexts such as ‘fading conditionalities, corruption, and economic crisis’ (Dawson & Hanley, 2016, p. 23) and crucially the consent, or at least indifference, of the governed. The challenge of understanding democratic backsliding thus requires us to attend not only to the intentions and actions of de-democratising executives, but also to the nature of public attitudes regarding democracy and democratic institutions, and the extent to which those attitudes influence their responses to the actions of political elites.

Scholarly interest in cases of democratic backsliding has also drawn attention to the question of democratic values. Against studies that offer an optimistic picture of a rise in pro-liberal-democratic values (Norris, 2011; Welzel, 2013), some have argued that these values are in decline in consolidated democracies (Foa & Mounk, 2016, 2017a) and that this decline has contributed to the increased success of anti-establishment parties and the authoritarian political solutions they offer (Foa & Mounk, 2017b).

The diagnosis of a decline in pro-liberal-democratic values has been strongly disputed (Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017; Zilinsky, 2019). However, the persistence of democratic backsliding and the relative absence to date of punishment for its most egregious practitioners has prompted questions about the adequacy of standard measures of democratic attitudes. For example, McCoy et al (2020, p. 3) have speculated that the normatively positive associations of democracy in liberal-democratic polities may lead social desirability bias to inflate the proportions of respondents who genuinely hold pro-democratic attitudes and who act in accordance with those attitudes.

The intuition that standard measures of democratic values are insufficient for understanding the demand-side drivers of democratic backsliding has driven a recent line of research into populist attitudes. The broad message of an extensive literature on populism that has emerged over the last few years is that contemporary liberal democracies are moving away from moderation and pluralism towards a zero-sum monism (Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo, & Ostiguy, 2017). While populism is not opposed to democracy *per se* (Mudde, 2004), the anti-elite, manichaean and anti-pluralist character of populist discourse is certainly compatible with the cultivation of attitudes that run contrary

to liberal-democratic values. Castanho Silva et al (2019, p. 11) find that while a number of proposed populist attitude scales have limitations with respect to validity and conceptual breadth, some of them are indeed predictive of identification with populist parties. While this literature remains at a relatively early stage of development, it raises the possibility that a “*pro-forma*” approval for liberal-democratic values may be undercut by a less socially desirable but more politically efficacious “disposition” towards populism that is activated in propitious contexts (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019, p. 7).

Recent developments in the literature on affective polarisation also point in a similar direction. The authors of an influential recent overview of the field posit a causal chain linking societal polarisation to democratic backsliding: where crises or perceptions of injustice foster resentment, a populist “us versus them” rhetoric organises interests, loyalties and group identifications around a quasi-tribal cleavage, leading to a deepening of mutual antipathies and perceptions of the “Other” as a threat to the nation, to acceptance of actions incompatible with liberal democratic values, and ultimately to the normalisation of such actions (McCoy et al., 2018, p. 26).

This self-reinforcing dynamic has the potential to be highly destructive for democracy. Traditional social cleavages helped stabilise democracies by channelling class, confessional and ethnic differences into more or less predictable patterns of interaction that fostered pluralism and moderation. In these circumstances, polarisation may serve positive ends by increasing the palette of policy options on offer to the electorate (Dalton, 2008) and thereby making party competition about issues rather than party identification (Lachat, 2011). However, if polarisation leads to excessive policy bifurcation, voters may become *more* entrenched in their partisan bias (Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013), to the extent that “inter-party animus” becomes a matter of affect rather than ideology (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012). A radical “us versus them” polarisation in which identity-based ideology overwhelms policy orientations as a locus of difference between competing groups (Mason, 2018) threatens to destabilise democracies. Such polarisation destroys consensus over the legitimacy of neutral democratic institutions, infuses politics with a “winner-takes-all” logic (Vegetti, 2019, p. 88), disrupts social cohesion (McCoy et al., 2018, p. 17) and collapses the mechanisms of winners’ magnanimity and losers’ consent (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2005) that are crucial to the continued functioning of democracy.

The hypothesised mechanisms behind this destabilisation draw on insights from social psychology and the study of communication. Klar (2013) finds that voters commonly resort to motivated reasoning, a process by which people access evidence and evaluate arguments in a biased fashion to reach a preferred conclusion. Bolen, Druckman and Cook (2014, p. 236) have argued that priming citizens to pay attention to the need to be consistent with a partisan identity leads to acts of ‘partisan motivated reasoning’, in which the consumption of information is undertaken to protect that identity, with partisans “interpret[ing] information in ways that conform with their pre-existing partisan commitments rather than updat[ing] their beliefs about political actors” (Ahlquist et al., 2018, p. 907). The presence of acute polarisation in democracies, argues Svolik (2019, p. 24), enables would-be authoritarian leaders to exploit this mechanism. If punishing departures from democratic norms means supporting a party or a person on the other side of the partisan divide, many ostensibly pro-democratic voters may see the cost of sanctioning undemocratic actions as too high a price to pay. Furthermore, perceptions of what is and what is not a breach of democratic norms may also vary in accordance with partisan attachments, particularly where there is fundamental disagreement over the legitimacy of the norms and institutions of the political regime itself (Ahlquist et al., 2018, p. 908).

A new line of research uses conjoint experiments to examine the consequences of the acute version of polarisation for attitudes towards democracy and the sanctioning of those who breach democratic principles. Graham and Svolik (2020, p. 407) find that only around 10-13% of American voters “value democracy enough to punish otherwise favored candidates for violating democratic principles” such as ignoring court rulings, closing polling stations, or gerrymandering constituencies. Using similar methods, Carey et al (2020, p. 6) find that while Democrats were willing to punish politicians for

supporting voter ID requirements that would disproportionately disenfranchise racial minorities, Republicans were likely to *reward* candidates for such a stance. However, on the questions of obeying or disregarding court decisions or supporting independent rather than partisan investigations of politicians and their associates, partisan groups punished politicians who transgress democratic norms regardless of which side of the political divide they represent (Carey et al., 2020, p. 7). McCoy et al (2020) build on these studies by introducing power and opposition as a variable. They find that not only do a significant minority of Americans actively encourage, rather than just tolerate, policies and actions that erode democratic norms, this support is significantly greater when respondents' favoured parties are in power, and this "democratic hypocrisy" is more pronounced the stronger a respondent's partisan identity is. This last finding is obversely echoed in Svolik's (2019, p. 27) observation that centrist moderates tend to "punish undemocratic candidates more severely".

Although the majority of this nascent strand in the literature refers to the US case, there is evidence to suggest that similar dynamics may obtain elsewhere. Hungary is a prominent case of a polity in which acute polarisation has resulted in an "electoral immobilism" with supporters of the dominant Fidesz party and those of opposition parties devolving into two distinct affective and organisational camps (Vegetti, 2019, p. 92). Using a panel survey with experiments, Ahlqvist et al (2018) find that this partisan structure strongly conditioned attitudes to the legitimacy of controversial and broadly unpopular electoral reforms around the 2014 parliamentary elections. While information about the nature of the reforms themselves did not have an impact on people's opinions, partisan cues about Fidesz's sponsorship of the reforms led opponents of Fidesz to express much more negative views, while supporters of Fidesz did not change their minds. This outcome suggests that in situations of acute partisanship, partisan motivated reasoning may impede the capacity of voting publics to express common dissatisfaction with suboptimal reforms, and produce "perverse incentives for de-democratization." (Vegetti, 2019, p. 79)

Justification for tackling the research question

Cumulatively, these lines of enquiry highlight an important but still underdeveloped research agenda. The literature on democratic backsliding focuses predominantly on the supply side, with little consideration as yet of the role played by voter demand either in providing electoral incentives for backsliding, or in sanctioning the protagonists of such changes. Recent studies of democratic values remain inconclusive about the direction in which attitudes are moving, but suggest that consolidated democracies may be more vulnerable than previously assumed to democratic backsliding at the citizen level. This is a conclusion supported by research into populist attitudes and affective polarisation, which highlights the potential for democracy to be undermined through hyper-polarisation and failure to punish backsliding elites for their actions, even when those actions are contrary to the pro-democratic values a majority still purport to hold.

However, as yet we have little insight into these questions in some of the countries at the forefront of democratic backsliding. Poland in particular poses a puzzle on this front: as Tworzecki (2019, p. 98) observes, it "lacks any of the major risk factors identified by previous literature" for departures from democratisation. Attempts to theorise the phenomenon of backsliding with reference to Poland have focused primarily on elite-level factors such as the collectively irrational outputs of autocratically governed parties (Markowski, 2018) or an "autocracy trap" created by a perverse set of incentives at the EU level which discourages EU intervention to counteract backsliding while maintaining errant regimes with funding and investment (Kelemen, 2020). However, the demand-side drivers of these processes - in particular, the linkages between *actually-existing* democratic values, awareness of political developments and political polarisation in creating a climate of indifference toward backsliding, remain under-theorised.

This is reflected at the empirical level. On the one hand, there have been important recent studies pointing to the interactions of political knowledge, polarisation and partisanship in the behaviour of Polish voters. Tworzecki and Markowski's (2014) 2014 study of the cumulative effects of partisan

bias and political knowledge in evaluating policy outcomes foreshadows the distorting effects of increased polarisation on democratic accountability. Stanley's (2018) study of the determinants of partisanship and the vote at the 2015 election suggests that populist and anti-populist attitudes correlate significantly with allegiances to the two sides of Poland's main political divide. Tworzecki's (2019, pp. 111-113) study of attitudes to democracy concludes that there is no partisan gap with respect to normative commitments to democracy, but that there *was*, prior to the 2015 election, such a divide on the question of overturning rather than maintaining the political order. In the light of the comparative literature discussed above, these studies identify a number of factors that may plausibly contribute to an explanation of why subversions of democracy have as yet gone unpunished. However, they do not warrant the drawing of firm conclusions.

This highlights a third issue, which is methodological in nature. Thus far, studies of Polish voting behaviour, party affiliation and democratic values have predominantly relied on observational data, in particular the long-running Polish National Election Study (2015). While these surveys contain a wealth of information on affective polarisation, declared normative orientations towards democracy and evaluations of actually-existing democracy, they do not measure *actually-existing democratic values* in ways that avoid the aforementioned social desirability biases. Furthermore, the observational character of these data do not allow us to isolate the causal impact of those values (or the absence of such) on acceptance for or rejection of illiberal actions. To answer this research puzzle, we need to ask different questions, and to ask them differently.

The justification for the proposed research is thus threefold, and relates to the aforementioned gaps in the literature. To recall the original research problem, while we know that Polish voters *say* they value democratic values and institutions, we do not know why, that being the case, at least some of them are willing to tolerate departures from those norms rather than punishing them. Research conducted in the US context suggests that polarisation may account for this, but the relative youth of CEE democracies is a reason to be cautious about ruling out other explanations, such as insufficient *genuine* attachment to democratic values in the first place. The first justification, then, is empirical: to understand why it has been possible for political elites in one of the frontrunners of the CEE region to depart so swiftly and decisively from liberal democracy, we need to have better measures of democratic attitudes and to model the links between the values and actions of Polish citizens in ways hitherto impossible with the data we have at our disposal. Recalling the second research question, we also need to ensure we have a better understanding of Polish voters' *awareness* of transgressions of democratic norms. As Ahlquist (2018, p. 907) observes, to punish such transgressions, voters must be aware of them in the first place, and view them as illegitimate. Existing data on democratic values and contentment with Polish democracy do not furnish information on the extent to which Poles consider the events of the last five years to consist in a breach with the liberal-democratic order, or which other conceptions of democracy they might consider more compelling.

This brings us to the second justification, which is methodological. The data available to researchers of the Polish case are insufficient to answer the research questions in several respects. First, questions about democratic values and institutions in existing surveys are susceptible to the social desirability bias discussed above. It is therefore necessary to test (in a pilot survey) and collect new data about democratic values that are less affected by these biases. Second, current data are only tractable for observational analyses. These datasets - in particular the aforementioned PNES - allow us to identify relationships between key variables of interest, but cannot be used to explore the theorised causal relationships between democratic values, political partisanship and approval for (or opposition to) non-democratic outcomes. Third, the cross-sectional nature of existing datasets makes it impossible to observe changes over time. As explained in more detail below (see section *Concept and work plan*) the project will use a panel survey to observe patterns of stability and change over time in the context of what is likely to be a politically volatile period, thereby permitting retesting of hypotheses and improving the robustness of our conclusions. While there is a long-running panel survey conducted by the POLPAN project at the University of Warsaw, it does not contain the key variables of interest, nor does it employ the experimental element we require.

The third justification for this project concerns its contribution to theory. The purpose of this project is not simply to explain the relationship between democratic values, polarisation and political behaviour in the Polish case, but also to generate concepts and hypotheses for further comparative investigation. While the choice of Poland is motivated in part by pragmatic considerations concerning the realisability of the project, in particular the adjacency of Poland to the research team and the expertise of the principal investigator in that area, the primary reason for the choice of country is its potential as a crucial case study.

First, Poland has experienced a sustained process of democratic backsliding in recent years, as evidenced by the V-Dem measures of democratisation (Coppedge et al., 2020). Against the backdrop of other democracies in CEE (the exception being Hungary), it can be treated as a case of a country in the vanguard of democratic backsliding, and one whose experiences may foreshadow more general tendencies in the coming years. Second, the process of backsliding has been accompanied by significant polarisation on both sides of the political divide (Leszczyński, 2019). Unlike Hungary, the opposition in Poland remains relatively coherent and viable as an alternative power holder. This makes the case for treating Poland as a crucial case study more compelling, as it will be possible to observe not only the consequences of polarisation over Law and Justice, but also of attitudes to a credible alternative executive. Third, the choice of a case in which there is a recent history of democratic backsliding allows us to explore the impact of the memory of *actual* political events, rather than relying only on hypothetical breaches of democratic norms. This will add to the realism of our experimental manipulations and improve the external validity of our findings. Finally, until now, the majority of research in the area of our research questions has been conducted in the context of the US. While these findings are suggestive with respect to the cases of other democratic countries, it ought not to be assumed that the concepts and theories thus generated can simply be transferred to European contexts. A crucial case study approach such as the one proposed here will help generate hypotheses and confirm and infirm theories for more contextually adjacent cases.

Justification for the pioneering nature of the project

As the foregoing discussion suggests, this project has significant potential to open up new lines of enquiry in the study of European democracies, party politics and voting behaviour. The proposal is pioneering in three respects. First, it applies emergent theories of the trade-off between democratic values and political partisanship to a key European case where these questions have not yet been adequately investigated. The findings of the project will advance our knowledge of the political dynamics at work in contemporary European democracies hitherto assumed to be on a smooth teleological path to ever more consolidated democracy. Second, the use of experimental and panel survey methods will move forward the investigation of political causality in a case where research remains dominated by observational data. By using conjoint experiments (see *Research methodology* for more details), the project will allow us to move beyond monocausal explanations of the political consequences of polarisation and actually-existing democratic values, while the use of panel surveys will make it possible to explore the impact (or non-impact) of changing political circumstances on the relationships we observe. Thirdly, the project will lead to new ways of measuring democratic values, advancing the re-conceptualisation of demand-side aspects of the study of democracy in a field where most rethinking currently concerns the supply side of parties, movements and elite institutions.

Concept and work plan

General work plan

The research project will consist of four distinct stages, although there will be some elements of overlap between them. The first is a preparatory stage to be undertaken by the principal investigator. During this period, the PI will develop the conceptual and methodological instruments to be used in the research project, focusing in particular on the creation of scenarios for the conjoint analysis aspect of the surveys. The second key task during this period will be to recruit a post-doctoral student to join the research team. This stage will take place during the period October 2021 - December 2022.

The second stage of the project, lasting from January 2022 to June 2022, will focus on survey design. The first major task here will be the creation of new survey questions measuring attitudes to democracy. This will be undertaken by the PI together with the co-investigator, who will join the research team at the beginning of this stage. The second key task will be the fielding of a pilot survey in March 2022, in which the new questions on attitudes to democracy will be tested. On the basis of the results of the pilot survey, the PI and co-investigator will prepare the survey questionnaire for the first panel survey.

The third stage of the project, from July 2022 to December 2023, will consist in the implementation of the panel surveys. The first panel survey will be put into the field in the third quarter of 2022, followed by the second in the second quarter of 2022, and the final panel survey in October or November 2023. These dates are provisional, as the intention is to carry out one of the surveys in the immediate aftermath of a general election, if possible. The next scheduled election is for the autumn of 2023, but there is a non-negligible possibility that snap elections may be called earlier. During this period, the PI, co-investigator and post-doctoral student (whose tenure on the project will cover the period of the implementation of the surveys) will work on data cleaning, initial interpretation of the data, and any corrective work that may be necessary.

The fourth stage of the project, from January 2024 to September 2024, will be dedicated to analysis and interpretation of the data and the writing of publications. During this stage, the PI and co-investigator will create an integrated dataset incorporating all panel waves, and a data codebook and associated documentation.

Specific research goals

The main output of the project, aside from the dataset itself, will be several journal articles to be submitted to peer-reviewed journals both nationally and internationally. The number of articles to be written and the specific journals to be targeted will be determined at a later stage. The PI will take the lead for the writing of articles for international publications, while the co-investigator will take the lead for Polish-language publications. While the majority of the articles will be written after the period of employment of the post-doctoral student has come to an end, co-authorship will be offered on all project outputs.

Findings of the project will be disseminated at national and international conferences, with the budget assuming three international conferences and one domestic conference for the PI, two international conferences and two domestic conferences for the co-investigator, and one international and one domestic conference for the post-doctoral student.

Results of preliminary research

Given the novelty of the research questions, there is no preliminary research that the project can draw on at this stage. However, the creation of the pilot survey questions will be informed by the results of the PI's recent study of populist attitudes and the importance to voters of the authenticity of political leaders (NCN Miniatura 2018/02/X/HS5/03339).

Risk analysis

There are two main risks with respect to the realisation of the research plan outlined above. The first of these concerns the aforementioned possibility of a snap election being held. There is little that can be done to mitigate this risk, but in any case the post-election survey is not central to the research design. While it would be substantively interesting for the panel surveys to incorporate a general election, and the research plan has been set out with this possibility in mind, it is not an absolute prerequisite of the panel design, which has been set up primarily to examine change over time.

The most significant risk faced by the project concerns the dropout of panel survey participants over the three waves. This creates two potential problems for the successful realisation of the project. First,

it will be impossible to measure change over time for those respondents who drop out of the survey. Second, selective dropout will potentially bias our findings with respect to the remaining participants (de Leeuw & Lugtig, 2015). To mitigate this problem, we will recruit a larger sample for the first wave and add replacements that replicate the socio-demographic profile of the dropouts for the two subsequent waves. This will ensure that we retain at least 1250 respondents over the three waves of the survey. The addition of replacements will maintain the overall representativeness of the sample for cross-sectional analyses, and will also enable us to measure change between at least two waves for many of those recruited at wave 2.

Research methodology

Underlying scientific methodology

The proposed project employs a quantitative approach utilising both observational and experimental elements. The underlying assumption driving the observational element of the research project is that democratic values measured by standard observational surveys deviate from “actually-existing” democratic values due to the distorting impact of social desirability bias, and that more accurate measures of these values can be obtained by asking questions that are less prone to this bias. The experimental element of the project is driven by the hypothesis that democratic values have an important causal impact on voting behaviour, although this may be moderated by partisanship.

Methods, techniques and research tools

The key research tool that will allow us to collect the data needed to answer our research questions will be a three-wave internet-based (CAWI) panel survey of a representative sample of the Polish population, with embedded survey experiments. An additional research tool will be the fielding of a separate CAWI pilot survey to develop new questions measuring democratic values. As the success of our main analyses depends on the use of less positively-biased measures of attitudes to democracy, this is a crucial first research step that will allow us to test, accept and reject new survey questions on democratic values prior to the panel research wave.

The observational aspect of the pilot and main surveys will consist in a range of standard variables concerning political and social attitudes, voting behaviour and socio-demographic characteristics. Many of these variables will be drawn from the long-running NCN-funded Polish National Election Study (PNES) survey, thereby ensuring that the novel elements of our survey will be grounded in a set of measures that conform to validated international standards of measurement and data quality (the Polish National Election Study has provided the Polish data for all five modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems to date). The PNES measures of normative attitudes to democracy and evaluations of actually-existing democracy in Poland will also be important points of comparison for the new survey items in the pilot study. By repeating these questions alongside putative new measures, it will be possible to control for shifts in attitudes attributable to changes over time in the social desirability of certain responses. The linkage of our data to the PNES survey will also contribute to further iterations of that study by developing questions that better measure some of its key variables.

The experimental aspect of the surveys will consist in the administration of conjoint survey experiments. This method will allow us to measure the causal impact of attitudes to democracy and political partisanship on the decision to reward or to punish political elites for acts of democratic backsliding. While observational methods can identify whether democratic values and evaluations of the actions of politicians are correlated with specific types of voting behaviour, they cannot unambiguously identify causal relationships. To understand whether political partisanship inhibits the capacity of voters to hold political elites to account in spite of their commitment to democratic values, a causal design is needed.

The choice of conjoint analysis over classical experimental designs is motivated by the multidimensional character of decision-making over this issue. As Hainmueller et al (Hainmueller, Hopkins, &

Yamamoto, 2014, p. 2) observe, traditional survey experiments that vary only one aspect of an experimental treatment at once have two major drawbacks: they lack realism in circumstances where respondents are being asked to consider scenarios in which multiple attributes may potentially be of relevance, and as a result they often yield limited findings given the cost outlay of implementing survey experiments. In the present case, our interest is in determining the causal impact of polarisation and democratic values on willingness to sanction democratic backsliding, while also accounting for other aspects that influence electoral choices both from the demand side (e.g. socio-demographic characteristics, issue preferences, contextual influences such as media consumption and the behaviours of close personal networks) and the supply side (e.g. the perceived competence and trustworthiness of leaders, the status of parties as incumbents or in opposition).

Conjoint analysis offers a methodological paradigm that is much more advantageous for multidimensional analyses of this nature. Most importantly, by allowing the researcher to vary a number of factors in a single experiment, conjoint analysis makes it possible to estimate the impact of multiple components of an experimental treatment in the determination of an outcome, enabling the simultaneous testing of competing hypotheses (Hainmueller, Hopkins, et al., 2014, p. 3; Knudsen & Johannesson, 2018, p. 260). For example, rather than only varying whether a party has or has not violated a particular democratic norm we can also vary whether that party is currently in power or in opposition, allowing for the estimation of the interactive impact of incumbency and norm-breaching on the actions of voters. Conjoint analysis also addresses some of the problems identified above. By replicating real-world choice processes more realistically conjoint designs improve the external validity of survey experiments (Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Yamamoto, 2015), and by giving respondents a variety of reasons to justify their choices they mitigate the social desirability problems that often afflict experiments where the sole treatment concerns a variable susceptible to such problems (Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Yamamoto, 2014, p. 3). Finally, conjoint analyses are a more cost-effective use of resources. The multidimensional character of the experiments conducted in this project will mean that they will be of use not only for the purposes of addressing the hypotheses in this study, but also for answering other hypotheses that do not directly pertain to the research questions.

The use of CAWI panels is preferred over traditional face-to-face (CAPI) and telephone (CATI) modes for three reasons. The first is the availability of panel-survey infrastructure. An increasing number of survey companies are moving to CAWI panels, as an online infrastructure with user-friendly mobile applications and easy disbursement of incentives facilitates the retention of respondents. The second reason is the ease with which conjoint experiments - which often involve thousands of configurations of the vignettes seen by respondents - can be administered using CAWI surveys, and response times accurately monitored to filter out satisficers. CAPI and CATI survey infrastructures are more unwieldy in this regard. The third reason for choosing CAWI panels is that they are more cost-effective: in those cases where CAPI and CATI panels were offered, the quoted cost was higher than the equivalent CAWI surveys.

Methods of analysis and presenting results

The key empirical material for our analyses will be the datasets generated by our surveys. Three broad types of quantitative analysis will be undertaken using these data. First, confirmatory factor analysis will be used to identify latent attitudes to liberal democracy among respondents elicited by our observed variables. Second, multivariate regression modelling will be used to measure the impact of key independent variables of interest on dependent variables relating to democratic attitudes, party identification, party political polarisation and vote choice. Third, the results of the conjoint experiments will be analysed using estimations of the average marginal component effect (AMCE), which gives the effect of the value of interest after taking into account the effects of the other attributes, and the conditional AMCE, a measure which gives this effect conditional on a characteristic of the survey respondent. These quantities of interest will allow us to assess the extent to which democratic values affect preferences conditional on the level of partisanship.

All analyses will be carried out within the framework of Bayesian inference, as this approach allows the incorporation of prior information from previous studies into our analyses (Gelman, Hill, & Vehtari, 2020, p. 15). The Bayesian framework also handles missing data more flexibly, which is an important consideration when analysing data which previous experience suggests are likely to contain high rates of missingness on some variables.

Equipment to be used in research

With data collection outsourced to a survey organisation, the only equipment necessary to carry out research is the computers available to the project team. Quantitative analyses will primarily be carried out using the free statistical programming language *R*, which offers the most powerful and flexible implementation of Bayesian modelling via the *brms* implementation of the *Stan* programming language and, in the form of the *tidyverse* packages, a highly flexible set of routines for data management, calculation of quantities of interest, and data visualisation. Supplementary analyses, particularly those requiring the use of structural equation modelling and latent variable analysis, will be conducted using the proprietary software *Mplus*, for which SWPS University already holds a licence.

Project literature

- Ahlquist, J. S., Ichino, N., Wittenberg, J., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How do voters perceive changes to the rules of the game? Evidence from the 2014 Hungarian elections. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 46(4), 906-919. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2018.01.001
- Anderson, C. J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Listhaug, O. (2005). *Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bermeo, N. (2016). On Democratic Backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 5-19. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0012
- Bolsen, T., Druckman, J. N., & Cook, F. L. (2014). The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion. *Political Behavior*, 36(2), 235-262. doi:10.1007/s11109-013-9238-0
- Carey, J., Clayton, K., Helmke, G., Nyhan, B., Sanders, M., & Stokes, S. (2020). Who will defend democracy? Evaluating tradeoffs in candidate support among partisan donors and voters. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 1-16. doi:10.1080/17457289.2020.1790577
- Castanho Silva, B., Jungkunz, S., Helbling, M., & Littvay, L. (2019). An Empirical Comparison of Seven Populist Attitudes Scales. *Political Research Quarterly*, 1065912919833176. doi:10.1177/1065912919833176
- CBOS. (2020). Polacy o demokracji. *Komunikaty z badań*, 95/2020. Retrieved from https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2020/K_095_20.PDF
- Centre for the Study of Democracy. (2015). Polish National Election Study (PGSW) 2015. *Unpublished dataset*.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., . . . Ziblatt, D. (2020). V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v10. *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project*. doi:<https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20>
- Dalton, R. J. (2008). The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(7), 899-920. doi:10.1177/0010414008315860
- Daly, T. G. (2019). Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*. doi:10.1007/s40803-019-00086-2
- Dawson, J., & Hanley, S. (2016). The Fading Mirage of the “Liberal Consensus”. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 20-34. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0015
- de Leeuw, E. D., & Lugtig, P. (2015). Dropouts in Longitudinal Surveys. *Wiley Stats Ref: Statistics Reference Online*.
- Druckman, J. N., Peterson, E., & Slothuus, R. (2013). How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation. *American Political Science Review*, 107(1), 57-79. doi:10.1017/s0003055412000500
- Foa, R. S., & Mounk, Y. (2016). The Democratic Disconnect. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(3), 5-17. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0049

- Foa, R. S., & Mounk, Y. (2017a). The End of the Consolidation Paradigm: A Response to Our Critics. *Journal of Democracy Web Exchange*.
- Foa, R. S., & Mounk, Y. (2017b). The Signs of Deconsolidation. *Journal of Democracy*, 28(1), 5-15. doi:10.1353/jod.2017.0000
- Ganev, V. I. (2012). Post-Accession Hooliganism: Democratic Governance in Bulgaria and Romania after 2007. *East European Politics and Societies*, 27(1), 26-44. doi:10.1177/0888325412465086
- Gelman, A., Hill, J., & Vehtari, A. (2020). *Regression and Other Stories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Graham, M. H., & Svolik, M. W. (2020). Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2), 392-409. doi:10.1017/s0003055420000052
- Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2014). Do Survey Experiments Capture Real-World Behavior? External Validation of Conjoint and Vignette Analyses with a Natural Experiment. *Unpublished*.
- Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2015). Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 112(8), 2395-2400. doi:10.1073/pnas.1416587112
- Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J., & Yamamoto, T. (2014). Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments. *Political Analysis*, 22(1), 1-30. doi:10.1093/pan/mpt024
- Hawkins, K., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. b. (2019). Introduction: the ideational approach. In K. Hawkins, R. E. Carlin, L. Littvay, & C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.), *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory and Analysis* (pp. 1-24): Oxford University Press.
- Huq, A., & Ginsburg, T. (2018). How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy. *UCLA Law Review*(1), 78-169.
- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, Not Ideology. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 76(3), 405-431. doi:10.1093/poq/nfs038
- Kelemen, R. D. (2020). The European Union's authoritarian equilibrium. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 27(3), 481-499. doi:10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455
- Klar, S. (2013). The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(4), 1108-1124. doi:10.1017/s0022381613000698
- Knudsen, E., & Johannesson, M. P. (2018). Beyond the Limits of Survey Experiments: How Conjoint Designs Advance Causal Inference in Political Communication Research. *Political Communication*, 36(2), 259-271. doi:10.1080/10584609.2018.1493009
- Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2018). Imitation and Its Discontents. *Journal of Democracy*, 29(3), 117-128. doi:10.1353/jod.2018.0049
- Lachat, R. (2011). Electoral Competitiveness and Issue Voting. *Political Behavior*, 33(4), 645-663. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41488880>
- Landau, D. (2013). Abusive Constitutionalism. *UC Davis Law Review*, 47(1), 189-260.
- Leszczyński, A. (2019, 25/01/2019). Prof. Bilewicz: nienawidzimy zwolenników PiS bardziej niż oni nas. A ta partia jest winna. *OKO.press*. Retrieved from <https://oko.press/bilewicz-zwolennicy-opozycji-bardziej-nie-lubia-zwolennikow-pis-niz-na-odwrot/>
- Lührmann, A., & Lindberg, S. I. (2019). A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it? *Democratization*, 1-19. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029
- Markowski, R. (2016). The Polish parliamentary election of 2015: a free and fair election that results in unfair political consequences. *West European Politics*, 39(6), 1311-1322. doi:10.1080/01402382.2016.1177305
- Markowski, R. (2018). Creating Authoritarian Clientelism: Poland After 2015. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*. doi:10.1007/s40803-018-0082-5
- Mason, L. (2018). Ideologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 82(S1), 866-887. doi:10.1093/poq/nfy005

- McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 62(1), 16-42. doi:10.1177/0002764218759576
- McCoy, J., Simonovits, G., & Littvay, L. (2020). *Democratic Hypocrisy: Polarized citizens support democracy-eroding behavior when their own party is in power.*
- Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 541-563. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
- Norris, P. (2011). *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, P. (2017). Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks. *Journal of Democracy, Online exchange*.
- Rovira Kaltwasser, C., Taggart, P., Espejo, P. O., & Ostiguy, P. (2017). Populism: The State of the Art. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (pp. 1-24). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sadurski, W. (2019). *Poland's Constitutional Breakdown*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sitter, N., & Bakke, E. (2019). Democratic Backsliding in the European Union. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1476
- Stanley, B. (2018). A New Populist Divide? Correspondences of Supply and Demand in the 2015 Polish Parliamentary Elections. *East European Politics and Societies*, 33(1), 17-43. doi:10.1177/0888325418783056
- Svolik, M. W. (2019). Polarization versus Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 30(3), 20-32. doi:10.1353/jod.2019.0039
- Tworzecki, H. (2019). Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681(1), 97-119. doi:10.1177/0002716218809322
- Tworzecki, H., & Markowski, R. (2014). Knowledge and Partisan Bias: An Uneasy Relationship. *East European Politics and Societies*, 28(4), 836-862. doi:10.1177/0888325414535626
- Vegetti, F. (2019). The Political Nature of Ideological Polarization: The Case of Hungary. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681(1), 78-96. doi:10.1177/0002716218813895
- Voeten, E. (2017). Are people really turning away from democracy? *Journal of Democracy Web Exchange*.
- Welzel, C. (2013). *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Zilinsky, J. (2019). Democratic deconsolidation revisited: Young Europeans are not dissatisfied with democracy. *Research & Politics*, 6(1), 2053168018814332. doi:10.1177/2053168018814332

ABSTRACT FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC

Partisan bias or a climate of indifference? An investigation of actually-existing democratic values and their consequences in Poland.

dr hab. Benjamin David Stanley

SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities

Streszczenie popularnonaukowe w języku polskim

W ostatnich latach badacze demokracji zwracali uwagę na paradoksalną sytuację, w której wyborcy deklarują przywiązywanie do wartości demokracji liberalnej jednocześnie wspierając elity polityczne, które podejmowały niedemokratyczne działania. O ile większość obywateli mówi, że woli demokrację od innych form rządzenia i deklaruje przywiązywanie do niezależnych od polityków demokratycznych instytucji to rosnące poparcie dla populistycznych ugrupowań na świecie sugeruje, że wyborcy są bardziej tolerancyjni wobec nieliberalnych systemów politycznych niż wynikałoby to z ich wypowiedzi.

Celem tego projektu jest lepsze zrozumienie związku pomiędzy wartościami demokratycznymi a preferencjami wyborczymi w Polsce; kraju, który od 2015 roku doświadczył pogorszenia się standardów liberalnej demokracji. Nasz projekt chce zbadać (a) czy Polacy rzeczywiście cenią sobie normy i instytucje liberalnej demokracji; (b) czy oceniąją zmiany po 2015 roku jako pogorszenie stanu demokracji lub tylko inny jej model oraz (c) czy polityczna polaryzacja w Polsce negatywnie wpływa na zdolność wyborców do pociągania nieliberalnych elit politycznych do odpowiedzialności za ich działania.

W ramach projektu przeprowadzimy trzy badania na reprezentatywnej próbie dorosłych Polaków w okresie od lata 2022 roku do zimy 2023. Te sondaże będą charakteryzować się trzema cechami. Po pierwsze, będą zawierały innowacyjny zestaw pytań mających na celu zbadać realne pojmowanie wartości demokratycznych w sposób, który pozwoli na uniknięcia efektu społecznych oczekiwani (tj. tendencji do odpowiadania w sposób, który wydaje się ankietowanemu pozytywny), który zdaniem wielu badaczy sztucznie podnosi poziom poparcia dla liberalnej demokracji.

Po drugie, badania będą prowadzone z wykorzystaniem analizy łączonej, tj. metody pozwalającej na zidentyfikowanie przyczyn odpowiedzi udzielanych przez respondentów, w celu zbadania tego, którzy Polacy rzeczywiście kierują się liberalnodemokratycznymi wartościami w procesie podejmowania politycznych decyzji.

Po trzecie, powtarzanie ankiet w tej samej grupie panelowej pozwoli na prześledzenie ewentualnych zmian poglądów i postaw wyborców na przestrzeni 18 miesięcy. Dzięki temu będziemy mogli obserwować to, czy pro-demokratyczne podejście badanych będzie niezmienne czy też jest podatne na wahania.

Spodziewamy się wyników, które wskażą, że poziom realnego poparcia dla wartości demokratycznych będzie niższy od deklarowanego w standardowych sondażach, ale jednocześnie nie ulega większym zmianom. Zgodnie z podobnymi badaniami przeprowadzonymi głównie w Stanach Zjednoczonych spodziewamy się też, że projekt potwierdzi, że polaryzacja polityczna wpływa na to, (a) w jaki sposób Polacy oceniają zmiany zachodzące po 2015 roku jako demokratyczne lub nie, a także (b) na ich gotowość do "ukarania" politycznych elit za podejmowanie nieliberalnych i anty-demokratycznych decyzji.

Abstract for the general public in English

In recent years researchers of democracy have drawn attention to a paradoxical situation in which voters declare a commitment to liberal democracy while supporting political elites who take undemocratic actions. While a majority of citizens say that they prefer democracy over other forms of government and declare a preference for the independence of democratic institutions from political control, the rise of populist parties and movements across the democratic world suggests that voters are more tolerant of illiberal political systems than their declared values might lead us to expect.

The goal of this project is to reach a better understanding of the relationship between democratic values and political preferences in Poland, a country which has experienced a process of ‘democratic backsliding’ since 2015 according to standard measures of liberal democracy. The project will seek to establish (a) whether Poles genuinely value the norms and institutions of liberal democracy, (b) whether Poles view the post-2015 changes as a process of democratic backsliding or as the pursuit of a *different* model of democracy, and (c) whether the political polarisation Poland has experienced in recent years adversely affects the capacity of voters to hold illiberal political elites responsible for their actions.

The project will undertake a three-wave panel survey of a representative sample of the Polish population between the summer of 2022 and the winter of 2023. These surveys will have three key characteristics. First, they will contain an innovative new set of questions designed to measure democratic values in ways that overcome the “social desirability bias” (the tendency to want to be associated with something society considers positive when answering survey questions) that many researchers believe artificially inflates the level of approval for liberal democracy. Second, the surveys will use “conjoint experiments” (a survey technique for identifying causal explanations for the choices respondents make), to test the extent to which Poles act in accordance with liberal-democratic principles when making political choices. Third, the panel nature of the research design will measure the views and attitudes of voters over an 18-month period, allowing us to establish whether pro-democratic attitudes and behaviours remain stable or are prone to fluctuate.

We expect to find that levels of “actually-existing” democratic values are lower than those typically declared in standard survey questions, but that they remain stable over time. However, in line with similar research conducted primarily in the United States, we expect to find that political polarisation interferes (a) with the extent to which Polish citizens view post-2015 changes as legitimate or illegitimate from the perspective of democratic values, and (b) with their capacity to ‘punish’ political elites for taking illiberal and undemocratic actions.

ETHICAL ISSUES

1. Studies on human embryos or human embryonic and fetal tissue	
Does your research involve the use of human embryos?	YES [] / [X] NO
Does your research involve the use of human embryonic or fetal tissues/cells?	YES [] / [X] NO
Does your research involve Human Embryonic Stem Cells (hESCs)?	YES [] / [X] NO
2. Humans	
Does your research involve human participants?	YES [X] / [] NO
Does your research involve physical or psychological interventions on the study participants?	YES [] / [X] NO
Does your research involve processing of genetic information?	YES [] / [X] NO
Is your research considered as medical experiment under the Act of 5 December 1996, the professions of doctor and dentist?	YES [] / [X] NO
Does the proposed research include applicable non-commercial clinical trial that must be registered in Central Register of Clinical Trials (https://www.clinicaltrialsregister.eu/) under the Act of 6 September 2001 (as amended) Pharmaceutical Law or the Act of 20 May 2010 (as amended) on medical devices?	YES [] / [X] NO
3. Human cells/tissues	
Does your research involve human cells or tissues (other than from Human Embryos, i.e. section 1) commercially available?	YES [] / [X] NO
Does your research involve human cells or tissues obtained within the project or from another project, laboratory or institution (non-commercial)?	YES [] / [X] NO
4. Personal data	
Does your research involve personal data processing?	YES [X] / [] NO
Does your research involve further processing of personal data (secondary use) from other sources outside the research entity?	YES [] / [X] NO
5. Animals	
Does your research involve vertebrate animals or cephalopods?	YES [] / [X] NO
Does your research involve the use of animal biological specimens (e.g. blood, urine or others)?	YES [] / [X] NO
Does your research involve animal cells or tissues commercially available?	YES [] / [X] NO
6. Scientific collaboration with countries outside the European Union	
In case non-EU countries are involved, do the research-related activities undertaken in these countries raise potential ethics issues?	YES [] / [X] NO

Do you plan to use local human, cultural or natural resources (e.g. animal and/or human tissue samples, genetic material, live animals, human remains, materials of historical value, endangered fauna or flora samples, etc.)?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
Do you plan to import or export any material from non-EU countries into the EU?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
If your research involves low and/or lower middle income countries, are benefits-sharing measures foreseen?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
Could the situation in the country put the individuals taking part in the research at risk?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO

7. Environment, Health and Safety (including genetically modified material)

Does your research involve the use of organisms and microorganisms, tissues or cells genetically modified (GMO, GMM)?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
Does your research deal with endangered fauna and/or flora and/or protected areas?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
Does your research involve the use of elements that may cause harm to humans, including research staff?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO

8. Cultural heritage

Does the research involve the usage of cultural heritage resources, such as humans, flora, fauna, their material remains, tangible and intangible cultural achievements or sites protected due to their cultural value?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
---	--

9. Abuse and dual use

Does your research involve dual-use items in the sense of Regulation 428/2009, or other items for which an authorisation is required?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
Does your research output have the potential for malevolent/criminal/terrorist abuse?	YES [] / <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO

Description of the measures taken to ensure that the research will be carried out in compliance with the rules of good scientific practice in the given field/discipline. Information on any permissions already issued or description of how the relevant requirements will be fulfilled [in English]

The data collection will be outsourced to a research agency that belongs to the Polish Association of Public Opinion and Marketing Research Firms, an organisation of research agencies which ensures compliance with good scientific practice in the collection and management of data, including the personal data of survey participants. All data will be fully anonymised before datasets are supplied to the research team. If the project is financed, we will apply to the SWPS University's research ethics committee for permission to go ahead with the surveys prior to commencing data collection, and apply any additional measures they recommend to ensure compliance with ethical standards. As the experimental element of our survey pertains to opinions and choices rather than the manipulation of emotion, we do not anticipate there will be any concerns in this regard.

Declaration

I hereby declare that:

- if any approvals, opinions or permits of competent authorities/committees are required for the research, I shall obtain them beforehand;
- I am aware of my obligation to provide the NCN with the approvals, opinions and permits required for the project with the annual and final reports;
- I am also aware that if a research project is carried out without the required approvals, opinions and permits, there is a possibility that it will not be settled and the funds will have to be reimbursed in their entirety or in part.

YES [X] / [] NO

RESEARCH TASKS

No.	Name of the research task	Entities
1	Koncepcyjne i metodologiczne przygotowanie scenariuszy eksperymentów conjoint. Conceptual and methodological preparation of conjoint experiment scenarios.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
2	Stworzenie nowych pytań ankietowych dotyczących postaw wobec demokracji. Creation of new survey questions on attitudes to democracy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
3	Badanie pilotażowe z wykorzystaniem nowych pytań. Piloting of new survey questions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
4	Przygotowanie głównego kwestionariusza sondażowego. Preparation of full survey questionnaire.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
5	Przeprowadzenie pierwszego badania panelowego. Carrying out of first panel survey.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities

6	Przeprowadzenie drugiego badania panelowego. Carrying out of second panel survey.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
7	Przeprowadzenie trzeciego badania panelowego. Carrying out of third panel survey.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
8	Tworzenie zintegrowanej bazy danych. Creation of an integrated dataset from each panel wave.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
9	Tworzenie zintegrowanej książki kodowej. Creation of integrated data codebook.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
10	Analiza statystyczna zbioru danych i opracowanie wyników. Statistical analysis of dataset and preparation of results.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
11	Formułowanie wniosków projektowych. Formulation of project conclusions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities

SIMILAR RESEARCH TASKS

Is the PI applying for funding of the research tasks included in this proposal also from other sources?	YES [] / [X] NO
Is PI currently working or has he/she completed research tasks similar in scope to the tasks included in this proposal?	YES [] / [X] NO
PI is	THE AUTHOR OF THE PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS [X] / [] A CO-AUTHOR OF THE PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS

Description of the similar tasks and justification of the need to fund them [in English]

Entities

SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities	
Is the entity applying for funding of the research tasks included in this proposal also from other sources?	YES [] / [X] NO

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Is the project carried out as international cooperation?	YES [] / [X] NO
--	------------------

RESEARCH TEAM

1. Benjamin Stanley, PI	
Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
Scope of work [in English]	<p>Aside from general oversight of the timely and effective achievement of project goals, the Principal Investigator will take the lead in several aspects of the project at each of the four envisaged stages. During the first, preparatory, stage, the PI will undertake a comprehensive review of the existing theoretical, empirical and methodological literature on the project topics, developing detailed hypotheses for investigation and designing vignettes for the conjoint experiments in the panel survey (Research Task 1). During the second stage the PI will draft new survey questions measuring attitudes to democracy (Research Task 2) and prepare and implement the pilot survey (Research Task 3). In the third stage, the PI will oversee the design of the full survey questionnaire (Research Task 4) and implementation of the panel surveys (Research Tasks 5, 6, 7). In the fourth stage of the project, the PI will take the lead in data analysis and interpretation (Research Task 10) and the formulation of project conclusions (Research Task 11).</p>

2. Wykonawca_1, Co-Investigator	
Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
Scope of work [in English]	The co-investigator will work closely with the Principal Investigator in most aspects of the project, with the exception of Research Task 1, which will be undertaken exclusively by the PI. The co-investigator will work with the post-doctoral student in the creation of an integrated dataset (Research Task 8) and an integrated data codebook (Research Task 9).
Required professional qualifications [in English]	The co-investigator will need to have a PhD in political science, sociology or social psychology, and will need to have documented competences in survey design and administration and quantitative data analysis.

3. Post-doc_1, Post-doc	
Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
Scope of work [in English]	The post-doc will be responsible for assisting the Principal Investigator with the implementation of the panel surveys (Research Tasks 5, 6, 7). The post-doc will have primary responsibility for the creation of the integrated dataset (Research Task 8), the integrated data codebook (Research Task 9) and the statistical analysis of the dataset (Research Task 10).
Required professional qualifications [in English]	The post-doc will have a PhD in political science, sociology or social psychology and skills in quantitative analysis, with strong preference given to candidates who have previous experience of conducting conjoint analysis and other forms of survey experiments.

PI

dr hab. Benjamin Stanley	
Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities
Scope of work [in English]	Aside from general oversight of the timely and effective achievement of project goals, the Principal Investigator will take the lead in several aspects of the project at each of the four envisaged stages. During the first, preparatory, stage, the PI will undertake a comprehensive review of the existing theoretical, empirical and methodological literature on the project topics, developing detailed hypotheses for investigation and designing vignettes for the conjoint experiments in the panel survey (Research Task 1). During the second stage the PI will draft new survey questions measuring attitudes to democracy (Research Task 2) and prepare and implement the pilot survey (Research Task 3). In the third stage, the PI will oversee the design of the full survey questionnaire (Research Task 4) and implementation of the panel surveys (Research Tasks 5, 6, 7). In the fourth stage of the project, the PI will take the lead in data analysis and interpretation (Research Task 10) and the formulation of project conclusions (Research Task 11).

PhD	
Is the Principal Investigator a PhD holder?	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> / <input type="checkbox"/> NO
Year of the PhD award	2010
Academic branch / branch of art in Polish	Nauki społeczne
Academic branch / branch of art in English	Social sciences
Academic discipline / discipline of art in Polish	Politologia
Academic discipline / discipline of art in English	Political science
Awarded by	
Entity's name in the original language [transcription to Latin]	University of Essex
Entity's name in English	University of Essex

Information on career breaks - scientific track record	
Long-term (over 90 days) evidenced sickness benefits or physiotherapy benefits on account of unfitness for work collected over a period of 10 years before the proposal submission year	No Data
Parental leaves granted pursuant to the Labour Code	No Data

Young researcher	
PhD data	2010-06-30

Academic disciplines (according to the classification of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education)		
No.	Code and name	Main scientific discipline
1	5.5 - Political and administrative sciences	Main scientific discipline
2	5.8 - Sociology	

Personal data	
Name	Benjamin
Middle name	David
Surname	Stanley
Previous surname	
PESEL	79051720456
Date of birth	1979-05-17
Gender	Male [X] / [] Female
Citizenship	Ireland

Contact information	
Phone Number	798814801
E-mail	bstanley@swps.edu.pl
Electronic delivery box ESP (ePUAP)	

Address	
Country	Poland
Voivodeship	mazowieckie
Postcode	05-101
Town/City	Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki
Street, Street No., Apartment No.	ul. Wojska Polskiego 49B m. 30

Address for correspondence

Country	Poland
Voivodeship	mazowieckie
Postcode	05-101
Town/City	Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki
Street, Street No., Apartment No.	ul. Wojska Polskiego 49B m. 30

Reasercher's electronic identifier	
Reasercher's electronic identifier	0000-0001-6932-1046
Identifier's type	ORCID

Employment				
No.	Employer's name in Polish	Employer's name in English	Position in Polish	Position in English
1	SWPS Uniwersytet Humanistyczno-Społeczny z siedzibą w Warszawie; Wydział Nauk Humanistycznych i Społecznych; Instytut Nauk Społecznych	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities; Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences; Institute of Social Science	profesor nadzwyczajny	associate professor

TEAM MEMBERS' SURVEYS

dr hab. Benjamin David Stanley, PI

ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH CAREER

Academic and Research Career [in English]

Information on academic degrees:

- *Habilitation*, Social Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences, 30 January 2019.
 - Cycle of papers: Populism as a normal feature of post-communist politics.
- *Ph.D*, Government (Political Science), The University of Essex, 30 June 2010.
 - Dissertation: Populism in the Polish party system: party appeals and voter mobilisation.
- *M.A.*, European Politics (distinction), The University of Essex, 17 November 2005.
 - Thesis: The controversial concept of populism.
- *M.A.*, International Studies (distinction), The University of Durham, 8 December 2001.
- *B.A.*, English Literature (First Class with distinction), The University of Warwick, 13 July 2000.

Academic career:

- *Associate professor*, Centre for the Study of Democracy, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, 2018 - present.
- *Assistant professor*, Centre for the Study of Democracy, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, 2015 - 2018.
- *Marie Curie Intra-European Research Fellow*, School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex, Brighton, 2013 - 2015.
- *Assistant professor*, Institute of Political Science, Faculty of History and Social Sciences, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warsaw, 2011 - 2015.
- *Guest researcher*, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, Stockholm, March 2011 - June 2011.
- *Marie Curie Post-Doctoral Fellow*, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, 2010.
- *Graduate Teaching Assistant*, The University of Essex, Colchester, 2008.

PUBLICATION RECORD

1. Stanley Bill, Ben Stanley , <i>Whose Poland Is It To Be? The Struggle Between Monism and Pluralism in Democratic Poland</i>	
Authors	Stanley Bill, Ben Stanley
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	Whose Poland Is It To Be? The Struggle Between Monism and Pluralism in Democratic Poland
Paper/book/chapter	paper
Journal	East European Politics
Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	Volume 36, Issue 3
Year of publication	2020
Open Access	No
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	0
Publication status	Published
DOI	10.1080/21599165.2020.1787161
PDF file	

2. Ben Stanley , <i>Backsliding Away? The Quality of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe</i>	
Authors	Ben Stanley
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	Backsliding Away? The Quality of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe
Paper/book/chapter	paper
Journal	Journal of Contemporary European Research
Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	Volume 15, Issue 4
Year of publication	2019

Open Access	Yes
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	5
Publication status	Published
DOI	10.30950/jcer.v15i4.1122
PDF file	

3. Ben Stanley, Radosław Markowski, Mikołaj Cześniak , *Marginalization, not mainstreaming: Explaining the failure of fringe parties in Poland*

Authors	Ben Stanley, Radosław Markowski, Mikołaj Cześniak
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	Marginalization, not mainstreaming: Explaining the failure of fringe parties in Poland
Paper/book/chapter	paper
Journal	Party Politics
Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	Online publication, awaiting print version.
Year of publication	2019
Open Access	No
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	0
Publication status	Published
DOI	10.1177/1354068819863616
PDF file	1354068819863616.pdf

4. Ben Stanley , *A New Populist Divide? Correspondences of Supply and Demand in the 2015 Polish Parliamentary Elections*

Authors	Ben Stanley
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	A New Populist Divide? Correspondences of Supply and Demand in the 2015 Polish Parliamentary Elections
Paper/book/chapter	paper
Journal	East European Politics and Societies

Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	Volume 33, Issue 1
Year of publication	2018
Open Access	No
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	19
Publication status	Published
DOI	10.1177/0888325418783056
PDF file	Stanley-2018.pdf

5. Ben Stanley , *Populism in Central and Eastern Europe*

Authors	Ben Stanley
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	Populism in Central and Eastern Europe
Paper/book/chapter	chapter
Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), <i>The Oxford Handbook of Populism</i> (pp. 140-160). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Year of publication	2017
Open Access	No
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	60
Publication status	Published
DOI	10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001
PDF file	

6. Ben Stanley, Mikołaj Cześniak , *Poland's Palikot Movement: Voice of the disenchanted, missing ideological link or more of the same?*

Authors	Ben Stanley, Mikołaj Cześniak
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	Poland's Palikot Movement: Voice of the disenchanted, missing ideological link or more of the same?

Paper/book/chapter	paper
Journal	Party Politics
Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	Volume 22, Issue 6
Year of publication	2016
Open Access	No
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	17
Publication status	Published
DOI	10.1177/1354068814560911
PDF file	Stanley-2016.pdf

7. Ben Stanley , *Confrontation by default and confrontation by design: strategic and institutional responses to Poland's populist coalition government*

Authors	Ben Stanley
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	Confrontation by default and confrontation by design: strategic and institutional responses to Poland's populist coalition government
Paper/book/chapter	paper
Journal	Democratization
Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	Volume 23, Issue 2
Year of publication	2016
Open Access	No
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	27
Publication status	Published
DOI	10.1080/13510347.2015.1058782
PDF file	

8. Ben Stanley , *Defenders of the Cross: Populist politics and religion in post-communist Poland*

Authors	Ben Stanley
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	Defenders of the Cross: Populist politics and religion in post-communist Poland
Paper/book/chapter	chapter
Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	In N. Marzouki, D. McDonnell, & O. Roy (Eds.), Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion (pp. 109-128). London: Hurst Publishers.
Year of publication	2016
Open Access	No
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	13
Publication status	Published
DOI	does not have one
PDF file	

9. Ben Stanley , *The Dynamics of Party-System Supply and Demand in Poland, 1997–2007. Cleavage Change or Shapeless Shifting?*

Authors	Ben Stanley
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	The Dynamics of Party-System Supply and Demand in Poland, 1997–2007. Cleavage Change or Shapeless Shifting?
Paper/book/chapter	paper
Journal	Europe-Asia Studies
Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	Volume 66, Issue 8
Year of publication	2014
Open Access	No
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	4
Publication status	Published
DOI	10.1080/09668136.2014.939522

PDF file	
10. Ben Stanley , <i>Populism, nationalism, or national populism? An analysis of Slovak voting behaviour at the 2010 parliamentary election</i>	
Authors	Ben Stanley
Title in the original publication language [with translation into English]	Populism, nationalism, or national populism? An analysis of Slovak voting behaviour at the 2010 parliamentary election
Paper/book/chapter	paper
Journal	Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Additional information, eg: monograph title in the original publication language, publisher, place of publication, volume/issue, pages, ISBN/ISSN, editors, etc.	Volume 44, Issue 44
Year of publication	2011
Open Access	No
Total number of citations (without self-citations)	98
Publication status	Published
DOI	10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.10.005
PDF file	

ARTISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS

n/a

NCN-FUNDED RESEARCH

AUTOMATICALLY DOWNLOADED DATA

Title in Polish	Mierząc populizm: badanie pilotażowe mające na celu udoskonalenie istniejących pytań.
Registration number	2018/02/X/HS5/03339
Source(s) of funding	NCN
Name of the call	MINIATURA-2
Ammount of funding	43,972 PLN
Entity's name in Polish	SWPS Uniwersytet Humanistyczno-Społeczny z siedzibą w Warszawie; Wydział Nauk Humanistycznych i Społecznych
Start date (yyyy-mm-dd)	2019-04-24
End date (yyyy-mm-dd)	2020-04-23
Final report evaluation result	no evaluation result – project in progress / report being prepared / report being evaluated
List of the most important publications resulting from the project (copied automatically from the last report accepted by NCN)	
Publications added by the editor	
If no papers have been published, a brief description of other research results	This project resulted in two journal articles. One, which is currently under review, concerns the main research question of the project: the measurement of populist attitudes, and finds - in accordance with expectations - that current measures of populist attitudes are inadequate when populists are in power. The second article explores the impact of populist attitudes on voting among socio-demographic and ideological subsets, to explore the idea that populist attitudes may be distorted by political polarisation.

MANUALLY ENTERED DATA

n/a

EUROPEAN PROJECTS

Title	The Winner-Loser Divide? A Comparative Analysis of Voting Behaviour and Cleavage Formation in Post-Communist Party Systems (WINLOSE).
Registration number	327413
Participation in the project	Coordinator/Principal Investigator of a research project
Source(s) of funding	FP7-PEOPLE
Ammount of funding	231,283 EUR
Entity's name	THE UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX
Start date (yyyy-mm-dd)	2013-09-01
End date (yyyy-mm-dd)	2015-08-31
List of the most important publications resulting from the project	
If no papers have been published, a brief description of other research results	<p>The project did not result in publications for journals. The original intention was to write a monograph on the overall project findings, but a suitable agreement to publish could not be found after the culmination of the project. Instead an updated version of the project findings will form the basis of four chapters of the Principal Investigator's monograph on Central and Eastern European Politics that is under contract at Springer and expected to be published in October 2021.</p> <p>Some of the research findings of the project were published in the article Stanley, B. (2017). Populism in Central and Eastern Europe. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), <i>The Oxford Handbook of Populism</i> (pp. 140-160). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.</p>

OTHER NON-NCN RESEARCH PROJECTS

Title	DIASPOLitic: Understanding the Political Dynamics of Émigré Communities in an Era of European Democratic Backsliding
Registration number	287738
Source(s) of funding	EUROPA/UTENRIKS scheme of the Research Council of Norway 2019-2020
Ammount of funding	221,880 PLN
Entity's name	Research Council of Norway
Start date (yyyy-mm-dd)	2019-01-01
End date (yyyy-mm-dd)	2020-12-31 Project in progress
List of the most important publications resulting from the project	
If no papers have been published, a brief description of other research results	A database of diaspora voting and contextual data for 12 Central and Eastern European countries has been collected. Two journal chapters are currently being prepared for submission to academic journals in December 2020.

RESEARCH ACHIEVEMENTS

Information on the most important research achievement [in English]

The Principal Investigator's most important research achievement to date is his contribution to the field of populism studies. This contribution is most clearly evident in two respects. The first is his publication "The Thin Ideology of Populism", which as of November 2020 had gained 849 citations and has, since its publication in 2008, helped shape the theoretical and conceptual foundations of the ideational school of populist theory. The second contribution is his work in measuring populist attitudes. In his article "Populism, nationalism or national populism? An analysis of Slovak voting behaviour at the 2010 parliamentary election" he devised and carried out one of the first attempts to measure populist attitudes among voters, and this article and its findings have been cited by the most prominent subsequent attempts to derive a measure of these attitudes. The Principal Investigator has built on these findings in a recent study of populist attitudes funded by the NCN Miniatura scheme, which found some significant flaws with the measurement of populist attitudes when populist parties are in power.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research experience gained in Poland and abroad [in English]

- Visiting Fellow (2016 - present): School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.
- Marie Curie Intra-European Research Fellow, School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex, Brighton, 2013 - 2015.
- Assistant professor, Institute of Political Science, Faculty of History and Social Sciences, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warsaw, 2011 - 2015.
- Guest researcher, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, Stockholm, March 2011 - June 2011.
- Marie Curie Post-Doctoral Fellow, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, 2010.

PRIZES AND AWARDS

The most important national or international distinctions resulting from conducting scientific research and other scientific and artistic activity [in English]

Dean's Award for Research Achievement, SWPS University, 2019.

PERSONNEL COSTS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

No.											
			Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024					
1	Name	dr hab. Benjamin David Stanley		9,000	36,000	36,000					
	Nature of contribution to the project	PI									
	Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities									
	Type of employment	additional salary									
	Project-related remuneration period [in months]	36									
Total salary cost on grant [PLN]			108,000								
2				Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024				
	Name	Wykonawca_1		0	18,000	18,000	13,500				
	Nature of contribution to the project	Co-Investigator									
	Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities									
	Type of employment	additional salary									
	Project-related remuneration period [in months]	33									
Total salary cost on grant [PLN]			49,500								

			Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024
3	Name	Post-doc_1	0	60,000	120,000	0
	Nature of contribution to the project	Post-doc				
	Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities				
	Type of employment	full time salary				
	Project-related remuneration period [in months]	18				
	Total salary cost on grant [PLN]					180,000

RESEARCH EQUIPMENT

OTHER DIRECT COSTS

No.	Other direct costs					
1.			Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024
1.	Name / description [in English]	Pilot survey	0	23,370	0	0
	Category	Outsourced services				
	Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities				
Total cost [PLN]			23,370			
Calculation and merit-based justification for the purchase [in English]		<p>An internet-based pilot survey is necessary to test approximately 20 new survey questions measuring democratic values before we deploy them in the main surveys. It should consist of 1000 respondents to ensure a fully representative sample of Polish citizens.</p> <p>We approached several survey organisations for a quote for this survey. While costings were similar across all agencies, to maintain consistency with the costings for the main surveys (see below) we have based our budgeting on the quote given by the research agency Kantar, who have quoted a cost of 19000 PLN net, which with 23% value added tax gives an overall cost of 23370.</p>				

2.			Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024
Name / description [in English]	First panel survey		0	153,750	0	0
Category	Outsourced services					
Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities					
Total cost [PLN]						153,750
Calculation and merit-based justification for the purchase [in English]	<p>The first of our panel surveys is a CAWI panel survey of approximately 9000 respondents, comprising approximately 50 original survey questions plus standard socio-demographic data. Given an estimated retention of 40% of survey respondents between the waves of our panel, a large initial sample is needed in order to ensure that we have the target number of 1500 cases in the third panel. This has the added advantage of enabling us to administer the conjoint survey experiment to a much larger sample than would usually be obtainable, permitting more fine-grained analyses of subgroups within the data.</p> <p>We consulted several Polish research agencies for preliminary quotes. The quote offered by Kantar forms the basis for our costings for three reasons: first, it offers the greatest likelihood of ensuring the retention of a representative sample of Polish citizens through the three waves of the project, a criterion of particular importance for the realisation of the project aims. Secondly, it combines flexibility with a relatively low cost in comparison with most of the other survey agencies. Third, Kantar were the only agency to offer an estimate that took into consideration possible price rises over the course of the project.</p> <p>For the first wave, they have quoted a figure of 125000 PLN, or 153750 inclusive of value added tax. This quote includes the costs of panel recruitment, the administration of the first survey wave, socio-demographic variables, and cleaning of data.</p> <p>In early 2022 we will send out requests for a quote to the same survey organisations we contacted when preparing this proposal, and make a decision on the basis of the offers we receive then.</p>					

3.			Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024
Name / description [in English]	Second panel survey		0	0	55,350	0
Category	Outsourced services					
Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities					
Total cost [PLN]						55,350
Calculation and merit-based justification for the purchase [in English]	The second CAWI panel survey will, based on expected retention of panellists from the first survey, include approximately 3800 respondents and will comprise approximately 50 original survey questions plus standard socio-demographic data. According to Kantar's calculations, the cost of this survey will be approximately 45000 PLN net, or 55350 inclusive of value added tax. For the justification of this purchase, see comments relating to the first panel survey.					
4.			Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024
Name / description [in English]	Third panel survey		0	0	31,980	0
Category	Outsourced services					
Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities					
Total cost [PLN]						31,980
Calculation and merit-based justification for the purchase [in English]	The final CAWI panel survey is projected to include 1500 respondents and will comprise approximately 50 original survey questions plus standard socio-demographic data. On this basis, Kantar have calculated the cost at 26000 PLN net, or 31980 inclusive of value added tax. For the justification of this purchase, see comments relating to the first panel survey.					

5.			Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024
Name / description [in English]	Conference presentations	0	7,060	14,120	18,860	
Category	Business trips					
Entity	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities					
Total cost [PLN]						40,040
Calculation and merit-based justification for the purchase [in English]	<p>Participation in international and domestic conferences is necessary to ensure dissemination of our project results and feedback on preliminary findings. We therefore budget for participation in six international and four domestic conferences, with three international conferences and one domestic conference allocated to the Principal Investigator, two international conferences and two domestic conferences to the co-investigator, and one international and one domestic conference to the post-doctoral student. We anticipate that this will consist in one international conference and one domestic conference in 2022, two international conferences and two domestic conferences in 2023, and three international conferences and one domestic conference in 2024.</p> <p>At this stage, the costs of conference attendance must be estimated. On the basis of average figures derived from past experience and projected fees for forthcoming conferences in 2021, we estimate costs according to the following calculation.</p> <p>Domestic conferences = 1160 PLN, comprising: conference fee = 500 PLN; transport = 200 PLN; accommodation = 400 PLN (two nights); per diems = 60 PLN (two days).</p> <p>International conferences = 5900 PLN, comprising: conference fee = 1500 PLN; transport = 2000 PLN; accommodation = 1800 PLN (three nights); per diems = 600 (three days).</p>					

OPEN ACCESS

1. SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities		
Indirect costs of Open Access [PLN]		12,840

STATE AID

1. SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities	
Does the requested funding constitute state aid?	Yes [] / [X] No
PI and authorised representatives of the entity are familiar with the state aid rules.	Yes [X] / [] No

TOTAL COSTS OF THE ENTITIES

SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities					
General indirect costs (%)	20				
Indirect costs of OA (%)	2.00				
	Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024	Total [PLN]
Direct costs, including:	9,000	298,180	275,450	59,360	641,990
- costs of salaries and scholarships, including:	9,000	114,000	174,000	40,500	337,500
-- full-time salaries	0	60,000	120,000	0	180,000
-- additional salaries	9,000	54,000	54,000	40,500	157,500
-- student and PhD student scholarships and salaries	0	0	0	0	0
- research equipment/device/software costs	0	0	0	0	0
- other direct costs	0	184,180	101,450	18,860	304,490
Indirect costs, including:	14,640	59,636	55,090	11,872	141,238
- general indirect costs	1,800	59,636	55,090	11,872	128,398
- indirect costs of OA	12,840	0	0	0	12,840
Total costs	23,640	357,816	330,540	71,232	783,228

TOTAL COSTS BROKEN DOWN BY IMPLEMENTATION YEARS

	Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024	Total [PLN]
Direct costs, including:	9,000	298,180	275,450	59,360	641,990
- costs of salaries and scholarships, including:	9,000	114,000	174,000	40,500	337,500
-- full-time salaries	0	60,000	120,000	0	180,000
-- additional salaries	9,000	54,000	54,000	40,500	157,500
-- student and PhD student scholarships and salaries	0	0	0	0	0

- research equipment/device/software costs	0	0	0	0	0
- other direct costs	0	184,180	101,450	18,860	304,490
Indirect costs, including:	14,640	59,636	55,090	11,872	141,238
- general indirect costs	1,800	59,636	55,090	11,872	128,398
- indirect costs of OA	12,840	0	0	0	12,840
Total costs	23,640	357,816	330,540	71,232	783,228

DATA MANAGEMENT PLAN

1. Data description and collection or re-use of existing data

How will new data be collected or produced and/or how will existing data be re-used?

Data will be collected by outsourcing the realisation of four surveys (a pilot survey and three panel surveys) to a professional public research agency. The agency will supply the Principal Investigator with datasets that will be checked and validated by the project team.

What data (for example the kinds, formats, and volumes) will be collected or produced?

The research project will result in the production of four distinct matrix-based quantitative datasets, corresponding to the pilot survey and each of the three panel surveys. The three panel survey datasets will be amalgamated into a single master dataset. As part of the data processing tasks in the final months of the project, the pilot survey dataset and the master dataset will be converted into formats most commonly used by the political science community (.R, .sav, .dta, .csv).

2. Documentation and data quality

What metadata and documentation (for example methodology or data collection and way of organising data) will accompany data?

The research agency commissioned to carry out the surveys will supply the project team with documentation describing the survey methodology and collating the frequency distributions of the dataset variables. On the basis of this documentation the project team will create a full English-language codebook to be disseminated with the datasets at the end of the project.

What data quality control measures will be used?

Data quality assurance will be the responsibility of the research agency commissioned to collect the data. The project team will ensure the highest data quality standards by commissioning data collection from an agency that is a member of the Polish Association of Public Opinion and Marketing Research Firms (OFBOR), a body which certifies that research agencies carry out surveys in accordance with high professional standards.

3. Storage and backup during the research process

How will data and metadata be stored and backed up during the research process?

Once data are delivered to the project team, they will be stored on SWPS University's central servers, which are backed up daily. Computers and data devices used by the project team are fully encrypted, and an encrypted VPN link is available for accessing data remotely.

How will data security and protection of sensitive data be taken care of during the research?

Data are fully anonymised by the research agency that collects the data. No sensitive data will be available to the research team. SWPS University has recently adopted a new internal ordinance with respect to data protection that fully accords with GDPR standards for the protection of personal data. SWPS University has appointed a Data Protection Inspector who can be consulted by all employees concerning any issues relating to data protection.

4. Legal requirements, codes of conduct

If personal data are processed, how will compliance with legislation on personal data and on data security be ensured?

Compliance with this legislation will be ensured by the research agency collecting the data in accordance with OFBOR standards.
How will other legal issues, such as intellectual property rights and ownership, be managed? What legislation is applicable?
All data collected for the purposes of this project will be the property of SWPS University, and all participants in the project will assign to SWPS University their intellectual property rights concerning project outputs.
5. Data sharing and long-term preservation
How and when will data be shared ? Are there possible restrictions to data sharing or embargo reasons?
A full dataset will be shared in October 2024 at the end of the project. Depending on the extent of collaborative work and the need to make datasets available to peer reviewers, some limited sharing of parts of the dataset is envisaged prior to the end of the project. If outputs from the project are published prior to the end date of the project, the relevant data will be made available from the moment of publication onwards.
Data will be archived by SWPS University for a minimum of five years after the end date of the project.
How will data for preservation be selected, and where will data be preserved long-term (for example a data repository or archive)?
All data will be preserved, including the pilot survey. A Polish-language version of the datasets and codebook will be deposited in the Polish Social Data Archive (Archiwum Danych Społecznych, http://www.ads.org.pl/). An English-language version of the datasets and codebook will be deposited in the Harvard Dataverse repository (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/).
What methods or software tools will be needed to access and use the data?
The data will be accessible with the statistical packages R, Stata and SPSS, and with any spreadsheet or text programme that can access .csv files.
How will the application of a unique and persistent identifier (such us a Digital Object Identifier (DOI)) to each data set be ensured?
A DOI will be conferred on the datasets when they are deposited at the Harvard Dataverse repository. This will serve as the canonical reference for the data, with information about the Harvard Dataverse DOI included in the deposition information when depositing the data at the Polish Social Data Archive.
6. Data management responsibilities and resources
Who (for example role, position, and institution) will be responsible for data mangement (i.e the data steward)?
The Principal Investigator will be responsible for the management of the data.
What resources (for example financial and time) will be dedicated to data management and ensuring the data will be FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, Re-usable)?
No separate financial resources will be dedicated to data management; rather, it will form one of the project tasks of the Principal Investigator, co-investigator and post-doctoral student.

ADMINISTRATIVE DECLARATIONS

DECLARATIONS BY THE PI

I hereby declare that:

1. the research tasks specified in this proposal are not and have not been funded from the NCN resources and/or from other sources;
2. should I apply for or receive funding of the research tasks specified in this proposal from another source than the NCN, I shall:
 - a) in the event that funding is received from the NCN:
 - resign from applying for funding from another source
or
 - notify the authorised representative of the entity acting as the applicant of my resignation from funding of research tasks allocated by the NCN Director or
 - b) in the event that funding is received from another source:
 - notify the authorised representative of the entity acting as the applicant of my resignation from applying for funding under this call of proposal organised by the NCN
or
 - resign from accepting funding from other source;
3. should the proposal be recommended for funding, the results generated during the research project shall be evaluated and published in a journal/journals of international impact;
4. should the proposal be recommended for funding, I agree to have the project abstract for the general public published on the National Science Centre's and National Information Processing Institute's websites alongside the information on the call's results;
5. I have read the rules according to which the decision of the NCN Director is delivered;
6. I agree to have the application verified using anti-plagiarism software and the contents of the application placed in the software database;
7. I have read the Code of the National Science Center on Research Integrity and Applying for Research Funding and undertake to use it;
8. In the event that funding is granted by the NCN, I will stay on the territory of Poland for at least 50% of the project duration according to regulations set forth in the Regulations on awarding funding for research tasks funded by the National Science Centre.

Acceptance of declarations	YES [X] / [] NO
----------------------------	------------------

DECLARATIONS BY THE HEAD OF THE ENTITY / AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE

I hereby declare that:

1. the research tasks specified in this proposal are not and have not been funded from the NCN resources and/or from other sources;
2. should I apply for or receive funding of the research tasks specified in this proposal from another source than the NCN, I shall:
 - a) in the event that funding is received from the NCN:
 - resign from applying for funding from another source
 - or
 - resign from funding of research tasks allocated by the NCN Director or
 - b) in the event that funding is received from another source:
 - resign from applying for funding under this call of proposal organised by the NCN
 - or
 - resign from accepting funding from other source;
3. should the research project be awarded funding, acting on behalf of the entity I represent, I shall:
 - a) include the research project in the financial plan of the entity;
 - b) employ the principal investigator and investigators necessary to conduct the research project in compliance with the proposal and terms of the call;
 - c) employ the principal investigator for the project duration period pursuant to at least a part-time employment contract;
 - d) provide the conditions required for the completion of the research, including access to laboratory/office premises and research equipment required for the completion of the research;
 - e) provide the project with administrative and accounting assistance;
 - f) supervise the completion of the research project and proper disbursement of project monies;
4. should the proposal be recommended for funding, I agree to have the project abstract for the general public published on the National Science Centre's and National Information Processing Institute's websites alongside the information on the call's results;
5. I have read the rules according to which the decision of the NCN Director is delivered;
6. I agree to have the application verified using anti-plagiarism software and the contents of the application placed in the software database; and
7. I have read the Code of the National Science Center on Research Integrity and Applying for Research Funding and undertake to use it.

Acceptance of declarations	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> / <input type="checkbox"/> NO
----------------------------	---

PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION

INFORMATION ON PERSONAL DATA PROCESSING

Acting pursuant to Article 13 (1) and (2) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 2016, No 119, p.1), this is to inform all those applying for funding of a research project, scientific activity, fellowship, doctoral scholarship or research component that:

- a) the National Science Centre ("NCN") with its registered office in Krakow at ul. Twardowskiego 16, 30-312 Kraków, is the controller of your personal data,
- b) the NCN's designated Data Protection Officer can be contacted via electronic mail at iod@ncn.gov.pl, by phone at +48 12 341 9126 or directly at the registered office of the data controller,
- c) the NCN shall process your personal data pursuant to Article 6 (1) (c) of the General Data Protection Regulation, in conjunction with Article 20 of the Act on the National Science Centre of 30 April 2010 (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 947, as amended),
- d) your personal data shall be processed for the purpose of:
 - examining the proposal for funding of a research project, scientific activity, fellowship, doctoral scholarship or research component,
 - supervision, financial and accounting operations, audits performed in the course of and after the completion of the research project, scientific activity, fellowship, doctoral scholarship or research component, evaluation of implementation thereof and settlement of funding agreements, if funding is granted for the completion of a research project, scientific activity, fellowship, doctoral scholarship or research component, and
 - evaluating the NCN's own tasks, reporting, dissemination of the information on funding awarded by the NCN throughout the scientific community, implementation of other activities regulated by generally applicable laws and for archiving purposes,
- e) your personal data shall be processed from the moment it has been collected for as long as it is necessary to achieve the purposes indicated in point d) and to pursue related claims, for the period required by generally applicable laws and for the period of storage as defined by the NCN's records management procedures and the Uniform File Classification System,
- f) provision of your personal data is a statutory requirement and without its disclosure the purposes described in point d) cannot be achieved,
- g) the recipients of your personal data may only be entities authorised to collect personal data pursuant to generally applicable laws and, to the extent specified in Article 31 of the Act on the National Science Centre of 30 April 2010 (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 947, as amended), individuals using the NCN's website,
- h) your personal data may be transferred for processing to third parties, such as the National Information Processing Institute with its registered office at al. Niepodległości 188b, 00-608 Warsaw. Such third parties process data based on personal data transfer contracts and are also bound to keep the data being processed confidential,
- i) you have the right to access your personal data, correct your personal data and restrict the processing of your personal data, and
- j) you have the right to lodge a complaint with the President of the Personal Data Protection Office if the General Data Protection Regulation is violated.