

Applications can **ONLY** be submitted via the electronic application system [ISAAC](#). Notes per section can be found in the Call for Proposals. A guide on how to submit an application, national eligibility requirements and answers to frequently asked questions are also available on the NORFACE website. Note that your application must follow the structure of this form, and incomplete applications or applications not using this form will not be evaluated.

A. Registration form

1. Agents and Dynamics of Democratic Erosion (ADDE)

2. Summary of the project max. 250 words, add word count

Word count: 250

ADDE will study democratic erosion, which we define as processes of democratic decline that are i) gradual, ii) driven, at least partly, by incumbent leaders, and iii) occur in regimes that initially display high levels of democracy. The main objective of ADDE is obtaining new knowledge of what characterizes and causes (different paths of) democratic erosion. We focus on the agents that propel such processes, termed authoritarian entrepreneurs. These are typically chief executives or party leaders, who might either be empowered or constrained by their environment. We examine how certain structural factors may facilitate actions that erode democracy, focusing on economic inequalities and crises. Further, we study whether, and how, party organizations and citizen attitudes constrain or enable authoritarian entrepreneurs.

The outcome studied by ADDE is relevant to the call's emphasis on *changing authorities of institutions and representation*, while our explanatory variables pertain to *politics of threat, inequality and redistribution*, and *shifting identities*. ADDE is organized into four work packages, with participants from University of Oslo, PRIO, University of Gothenburg, University of Nottingham, and SWPS, Warsaw. The work involves conceptualizing and measuring democratic erosion, developing an explanatory theory to account for why it happens, and testing this theory by collecting and analysing new data at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. By furthering our understanding of how and why democratic erosion happens, we hope to inform policy makers in European and other countries at risk on how to identify symptoms of democratic erosion and which strategies can help prevent such developments.

Please include the following information: relevance of the research topic to the Call; objectives, potential outcome and impact of the project; explanation on how the project will be organised. This summary should be identical to the summary you are asked to provide in ISAAC.

3. Details of the Main Applicant

Name, title(s)	Carl Henrik Knutsen, Professor, PhD	M/F/U	M
University/institute/organisation	University of Oslo		
Department/lab	Department of Political Science		
Postal address	Oslo		
Postal code	0318	Town/city	Oslo
Telephone	0047 22854244	E-mail	c.h.knutsen@stv.uio.no
Completion date doctorate ¹	29.09.2011		
Percentage of working time spent on the project (indicative)	40%		
Applicant in another Outline Proposal(s)?	No		

4a. Details of the Co-Applicants copy and add lines in table if required

Please name only one Co-Applicant per university/research institution. Other project team members should be listed under section 5 'Team Members'.

Co-Applicant 1

Name, title(s)	Anna Lührmann, PhD/Ass. Professor	M/F/U	F
University/institute/organisation	University of Gothenburg		
Department/lab	Department of Political Sciences/V-Dem Institute		
Postal address	Box 711		
Postal code	SE-405 30	Town/city	Göteborg
Telephone	0046317861191	E-mail	anna.luhrmann@gu.se
Completion date doctorate	27.07.2015		
Percentage of working time spent on the project (indicative)	20%		
Applicant in another Outline Proposal(s)?	Yes		

Co-Applicant 2

Name, title(s)	Fernando Casal Bertoa, Associate Professor, PhD.	M/F/U	M
University/institute/organisation	University of Nottingham		
Department/lab	School of Politics & IR/Research Centre for the Study of Parties & Democracy (REPRESENT)		
Postal address	University Park Campus		
Postal code	NG72RD	Town/city	Nottingham
Telephone	00487580734055	E-mail	Fernando.Casal.Bertoa@nottingham.ac.uk
Completion date doctorate	10.06.2011		
Percentage of working time spent on the project (indicative)	30%		
Applicant in another Outline Proposal(s)?	No		

¹ Include the completion date (the day when the Applicant received his/her PhD).

NORFACE Governance Application Template – Outline Proposal

Deadline: 19 February 2019, 14.00 CET

Co-Applicant 3

Name, title(s)	Benjamin Stanley, Associate Professor, PhD.	M/F/U	M
University/institute/organisation	SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities		
Department/lab	Centre for the Study of Democracy, Institute of Social Sciences		
Postal address	ul. Chodakowska 19/31		
Postal code	03-815	Town/city	Warsaw
Telephone	0048798814801	E-mail	bstanley@swps.edu.pl
Completion date doctorate	30.06.2010		
Percentage of working time spent on the project (indicative)	20%		
Applicant in another Outline Proposal(s)?	No		

Co-Applicant 4

Name, title(s)	Sirianne Dahlum, Senior Researcher, PhD.	M/F/U	F
University/institute/organisation	Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)		
Department/lab	Conditions of Violence and Peace (CVP)		
Postal address	Oslo		
Postal code	NO-0186	Town/city	Oslo
Telephone	0047 91181579	E-mail	sirdah@prio.org
Completion date doctorate	17.08.2017		
Percentage of working time spent on the project (indicative)	16%		
Applicant in another Outline Proposal(s)?	No		

4b. National Contact Points add lines if required

In case there is more than one applicant from a single country, please indicate who will act as National Contact Point. The Main Applicant should always be listed as the National Contact Point of that country. If this information is not clearly provided, the NORFACE Coordination Office will consider the first person named as National Contact Point.

Country	National Contact Point
Norway	Carl Henrik Knutsen
Sweden	Anna Lührmann
United Kingdom	Fernando Casal Bértoa
Poland	Benjamin Stanley

5. Team Members add lines if required

Please include here the information about other researchers working on the project proposed. Please also mention the indicative percentage of working time spent on this project. Where the names of PhD students or Postdocs are not yet known, please include them as NN, but do include as much information as possible.

Participant no.	Name and title	University/Institute/Organisation	Dept/Lab	Percentage of working time (indicative)	Completion date doctorate ¹	Participant in another NORFACE outline Proposal?
NORWAY						
	Elin Haugsgjerd Allern	University of Oslo	Department of Political Science	20	07.06.2007	NO
	Tore Wig	University of Oslo	Department of Political Science	20	25.09.2015	NO
	Magnus Rasmussen	University of Oslo	Department of Political Science	15	27.06.2016	NO
	NN (Postdoc 1)	University of Oslo	Department of Political Science	67 (100 percent over two years)	--	--
	NN (Postdoc 2)	University of Oslo	Department of Political Science	67 (100 percent over two years)	--	--
SWEDEN						
	Seraphine Maerz	University of Gothenburg	V-Dem Institute	10	15.12.2017	NO
POLAND						
	NN (PhD student)	SWPS University	Centre for the Study of Democracy, Institute of Social Sciences	100	--	--

6. Co-operation Partners add lines if required

Please include here information about partners in the project who will be cooperating, but are not eligible for NORFACE funding, e.g. researchers from countries not participating in this NORFACE Call and stakeholders not performing research. These partners should provide their own funding and in the Full Proposal stage they will be asked to demonstrate this. Please also mention the indicative percentage of working time spent on this project.

Name and title	University/Institute/Organisation	Percentage of working time (indicative)	Source of funding

7. Keywords (max. 8 separated by a semicolon “;”)

Democracy; Democratic decline; Democratic erosion; Political parties; Executives; Citizens; Crisis; Inequality

8. Discipline or disciplines of the project

Political Science

9. Duration of the project

Duration (months): 36 to commence on (date): August 2020

10. Have you submitted the same idea elsewhere or have you requested any additional grants for this project from any other institution?

No.

B. Research proposal

11. Project description max. 2500 words, excluding references, add word count

Word count: 2499.

1.1. Research question and relevance

While democracies, historically, have been comparatively durable regimes (Knutsen and Nygård 2015), they can also be vulnerable. Recently, several established democracies – including Hungary and Poland in Europe, but also India, Brazil and perhaps even the United States – have experienced democratic decline (Lührmann et al. 2018). While democracy scholars for decades focused on processes of democratization, the drivers of reverse processes – and how to stop them – have become key topics of scholarly attention very recently (e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt 2017; Mounk 2018). Still, there is a lacuna of systematic theorizing and empirical research, particularly on **democratic decline in established democracies**. This subset of reverse processes, which we term “**democratic erosion**”, are gradual and occur in (initially) well-established democracies.

Agents and Dynamics of Democratic Erosion (ADDE) will study **why and how some established democracies erode** while others remain stable. In this way, the project differs from, but adds to, the literature on democratic decline in young (and poor) semi-democracies, as scholars here tend to assume that established democracies are close to “immune” to democratic reversals (e.g., Linz and Stephan 1996), and thus fail to account for democratic decline in established democracies such as Hungary and Poland. Developing new theoretical and empirical knowledge on democratic erosion will thus contribute to the democracy literature. Yet, such knowledge is critical also for European policy makers and citizens facing prospects of democratic erosion in their own or neighboring countries.

A key *empirical* insight, serving as our starting point for theory development and further empirical studies, is that many recent processes of democratic decline share several features. In short, recent such episodes are often **stepwise and slow-moving**, and, importantly, typically **driven by incumbents** selected through free and fair elections (see Lührmann et al.

2018) – current democracies seldom end by military coups, as was common historically (Svolik 2015). Further, the manipulation strategies employed by these incumbents are often covert and quite subtle – for example the stepwise altering of electoral rules that affect the fairness of elections or incentivizing media outlets to self-censor on government criticism – in contrast to overt and tumultuous forms of democratic breakdown, ushered in by coups d'état or wars. To understand these “modern” processes of democratic decline, we must model how the **trio of incumbent chief executives, citizens and political parties** interact.

Conceptually, we explicate one form of democratic decline; *democratic erosion*. Such processes are i) gradual, ii) driven, at least partly, by incumbent leaders, and iii) occur in regimes that initially display high levels of democracy. **Theoretically**, we focus on citizens, political party actors, and executives. While disparate literatures cover executives (e.g., Fish 2006) or citizens (e.g., Welzel 2007) in democratic decline, few treatments simultaneously address multiple types of actors unless focusing on specific countries or events. Data limitations, which we aim to rectify, have so far hindered a dynamic and comprehensive comparative study of different actors in democratic erosion.

While focusing on actors, we will also theorize interactions with structural forces. We anticipate that democratic erosion is more likely when structural changes such as increasing inequality, or various crises, enable incumbents and party actors to polarize the political discourse and weaken citizens’ commitments to democratic ideals. We propose that structural factors and crises enhance democratic erosion through de-institutionalizing two core functions of political parties, namely a) effectively mediating between key social groups and political elites and b) party organizations’ abilities to constrain leaders.

The application call lists five key challenges to governance in democracies, and explicitly acknowledges their potential interlinkages. While existing literatures often analyze these challenges in isolation, ADDE studies how they are causally related. Our focus on democratic erosion touches on *changing authority of institutions* and *representation*. We also consider *inequality and the politics of redistribution* as structural factors shaping the environment for authoritarian entrepreneurs. Our focus on authoritarian entrepreneurs and how they communicate with the populace, e.g. in whipping up anti-immigrant sentiment, covers *politics of threat*. Finally, our analysis of citizen attitudes, e.g. commitments to democracy, links to *shifting identities*. Thus, ADDE touches on four of five challenges listed in the call.

2. *Conceptual and theoretical innovations*

Drawing on team members’ complementary expertise, we will build a comprehensive, agency-centered theory of democratic erosion. We propose that democratic erosion happens when **authoritarian entrepreneurs**, usually chief executives, take advantage of (and partly manipulate) **structural forces**, using a repertoire of **erosion strategies** that enable **rigging institutions** and influencing **informal norms** to benefit their own hold on power. Under the right structural conditions, and especially when parties and core voter groups face dealignment, the sentiments of **citizens** and preferences and constraints provided by **party organizations** may not deter authoritarian entrepreneurs, but rather aid them in pursuing actions conducive to democratic erosion. Let us detail the theory’s key components, as summarized by Figure 1:




Figure 1: Key components and relationships studied in ADDE

First, we will **conceptualize democratic erosion**, and anchor it in a multi-dimensional typology of democratic decline. The typology's dimensions pertain to the actor(s) driving the process, initial regime characteristics, what institutions are affected, and speed and length of the process. Thus, we consider democratic erosion a sub-category of democratic decline, constituting a *gradual unwinding of democratic institutions and norms in established democracies driven, at least partly, by incumbent leaders*. Further, we will categorize and map different democratic-erosion paths – in different periods and regions - using existing data (notably V-Dem, see Coppedge et al. 2018).

We anticipate that democratic erosion results from actions of what we term “**authoritarian entrepreneurs**”. Drawing on parts of Linz’ (1978) classification of authoritarian behavior among politicians, one might define authoritarian entrepreneurs as politicians who i) reject or are weakly committed to the democratic rules of the game, ii) deny the legitimacy of political opponents, iii) are ready to curtail civil liberties of opponents of third parties, including the media. Presumably, effective such entrepreneurs are typically executives and party leaders. Nonetheless, authoritarian entrepreneurs are willing to pursue actions that directly or indirectly degrade democracy in order to achieve other goals. They may rhetorically attack democratic institutions and norms, if this builds up their own power base. Once in power, they may try to alter the electoral or other “rules of the game” (Schedler 2002) to extend their tenure.

Second, having conceptualized the outcome and key actors, we will develop a multivariate explanatory model of democratic erosion. The first building block is **structural factors** that conduce the emergence (and relative strength) of authoritarian entrepreneurs. First, we expect inequality to be a conducive factor. Various kinds of economic inequality lead to differences in access to politically relevant resources, resulting in deficits in representation and participation for sub-groups of citizens (Przeworski 2011). A second factor is immigration and resulting labor-market insecurities. Recent qualitative work on authoritarian populism suggests that immigration is a key factor in driving this outcome (Mounk 2018), and

(perceptions of) immigration and labor-market insecurities might be linked. Relatedly, economic crisis correlates with democratic decline (Kennedy 2010). We anticipate that deep crises, or shocks in factors such as inequality or immigration, will provide “windows of opportunities” for prospective authoritarian entrepreneurs.

Third, we consider the links between authoritarian entrepreneurs and **political parties**. Actors in party organizations presumably consider short-term *and* long-term consequences for the party when constraining or supporting authoritarian entrepreneurs in their ranks. They are also likely to consider what tools they have available for contesting/supporting such entrepreneurs, including formal party rules and regulations. When structural changes or crises alter the incentives of party actors, and provide opportunities for authoritarian entrepreneurs, party-organizational features will help shape the outcome. Some parties (and party-systems) emphatically check authoritarian entrepreneurs, while others have fewer guardrails (Casal Bétoa and Weber 2018). Related, structural changes in the form of increased inequalities and different types of (perceived or real) crises may alter voter sentiments so that supporting authoritarian entrepreneurs entails losing fewer votes for the party. Further, these conditions may contribute to the dealignment of political parties with their support bases (Mair 2013) – one hypothesis is that de-aligned voters become easy prey for authoritarian entrepreneurs.

Fourth, we will explicate how authoritarian entrepreneurs exploit and influence the attitudes of citizens. Popular support for authoritarian entrepreneurs is a key precondition of democratic erosion, and we want to explore the conditions under which citizens accept violations of democratic norms. For instance, citizens may more often accept violations when polarization is high (Svolik 2018). We propose that the rhetoric and actions of authoritarian entrepreneurs play a key role in shaping such conditions and relevant perceptions. For example, when salience of immigration as an issue increases, leaders can engage in polarizing nationalist rhetoric, emphasizing in- and out-group distinctions. This entails **endogenous polarization**, whereby a structural force (immigration- or income-shock from a financial crisis) enables leaders to polarize their electorate to gather support for authoritarian reforms.

An implication of our theoretical argument is that autocratic entrepreneurs and facilitating structural conditions can set off endogenous cycles that create “anti-democratic spirals”. For instance, leaders can profit from stoking anti-system grievances in the electorate, which in turn can enable these leaders to concentrate power, which can create further polarization.

3. *Data and project plans*

ADDE has four work packages (WPs). Most empirical studies will require collection of new data of different kinds. These new data will be combined with relevant, existing micro- (e.g., European Values Survey and EU-SILC), meso- (e.g., Political Party Database) and macro-level data (e.g., V-Dem and WhoGovern).

WP1 concerns conceptualization and the overarching theoretical framework. We will work out precise and detailed conceptual and operational definitions of democratic erosion, distinct from other forms of democratic decline, and a typology of different paths of democratic erosion. We will also develop the concept of authoritarian entrepreneurs. These two tasks will be followed by work on the overall explanatory framework for democratic erosion.

WP2 investigates how structural factors relate to the rise of authoritarian entrepreneurs and different paths of democratic erosion. For this work (but also for WP3 and WP4), we will leverage and help fund updates of a novel cross-country survey in the V-Dem dataset that may be used to identify authoritarian entrepreneurs, focusing on chief executives, party leaders, and party organizations. In WP2, we will mainly employ panel analysis on cross-country time series data to test several empirical expectations from our theory. For example, we expect the presence of economic crises, immigration shocks or changes in income inequality to increase the probability of authoritarian entrepreneurs emerging, and, subsequently, processes of democratic erosion to occur. Yet, we will also address “reverse causal processes”, assessing how behavior of authoritarian entrepreneurs may influence above-mentioned structural factors and cause democratic erosion.

WP3 explores the links between authoritarian entrepreneurs and features of political parties, taking into consideration the multiple functions that political parties have. The empirical work in this WP will rely on the mentioned new, expert-coded data from V-Dem, but also generate survey-experimental data on party members, activists and leadership from different parties and European countries. We will draw on existing networks and infrastructure constructed by team members to execute these surveys and use the resulting data to investigate the conditions under which party actors are likely to constrain or aid authoritarian entrepreneurs in processes of democratic erosion.

WP4 considers how authoritarian entrepreneurs affect citizen attitudes pertinent to democratic erosion under different conditions. We will, for example, address how “rhetorical erosion strategies” affect citizen attitudes to democracy – we expect that citizens’ commitments to democracy will weaken in response to polarizing rhetorical acts of authoritarian entrepreneurs. We will test such propositions using different kinds of data.

First, we will collect real-time event-data on the behavior of authoritarian entrepreneurs, as identified in the datasets from WP2, including rhetorical acts in major speeches and media appearances. Thus, we will build an event-database sourced from news-data, linked to each identified entrepreneur, using automated web scraping techniques.

Second, we will run survey experiments – varying the framing of events such as immigration inflows or economic crises, as filtered through the speech acts of authoritarian entrepreneurs – to see how citizen responses vary in different settings. In other words, we will construct a range of treatments mimicking different kinds of “exposure” to authoritarian entrepreneurs, under different conditions (e.g., presence vs. absence of crises), to test the expectation that citizen attitudes to democracy can be partly endogenous to erosion strategies as well as structural factors. We plan to run various iterations of these experiments in Hungary and Poland, at different points in time, but also in Norway, a stable democracy that has not experienced notable erosion. We will also set aside funds to do comparable surveys in two-three other systems that diverge on theoretically relevant variables such as democratic history and current regime type.

Third, team members will pursue qualitative analysis on secondary source-material and in-depth interviews with citizens as well as relevant party, government and civil society actors. The qualitative analysis will allow us to more precisely map out sequences of major political initiatives, conflictual events and institutional change for case studies of various countries undergoing processes of democratic erosion, notably including Hungary and Poland.

4. Project organization

The main applicant is Carl Henrik Knutsen, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. Knutsen leads the research group Comparative Institutions and Regimes, where all ADDE members in Oslo partake, and is co-PI of V-Dem. Knutsen has published extensively on the topics studied in ADDE, including regime change and authoritarian politics. Knutsen will participate in all WPs, especially focusing on WP1 and WP2.

Other UiO members include Elin H. Allern (UiO; work in WP3), Magnus Rasmussen (UiO; WP2 and WP4) and Tore Wig (UiO; co-lead WP4), all excellent researchers working on different topics covered by ADDE, such as organization of political parties or citizen protest. Two postdocs at UiO will be given methodological and empirical tasks in WP3 and WP4, but may work on other WPs according to interests. We will recruit one postdoc with requisite skills and knowledge for designing survey experiments (WP3 and WP4). The second postdoc should have skills in automated web scraping techniques and quantitative textual analysis to, respectively, help construct and analyze the event dataset in WP4.

The co-applicants are also excellent researchers that have worked on topics of ADDE. First, Sirianne Dahlum from PRIO, has worked on popular mobilization and protest, and the role of education in regime change. She will lead WP2.

Second, Anna Lührmann, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, has worked on the measurement and conceptualization of various processes of “autocratization” – democratization in reverse. She will lead WP1 and participate in WP3. Seraphine Maerz, UoG, will bring key skills in textual analysis and work in WP4.

Third, Fernando Casal Bértoa, University of Nottingham, has published worked on regulation and institutionalization of political parties and their role in maintaining democracy. He will lead WP3.

Fourth, Ben Stanley, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, has worked theoretically and empirically on populism, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. He will co-lead WP4. A PhD Fellow at SWPS will also work in WP4, qualitatively analyzing democratic erosion processes in one or more recent European cases.

12. References

- Casal Bértoa. F. and M. Weber. 2018. Restrained Chain: Party Systems in Times of Economic Crisis. *Journal of Politics* 81(1): 233–245.
Coppedge, M, J Gerring, CH Knutsen, SI Lindberg, SE Skaaning, J Teorell, D Altman, M

- Bernhard, MS Fish, A Cornell, S Dahlum, H Gjerløw, A Glynn, A Hicken, J Krusell, A Lührmann, KL Marquardt, K McMann, V Mechkova, J Medzihorsky, M Olin, P Paxton, D Pemstein, J Pernes, Jv Römer, B Seim, R Sigman, J Staton, N Stepanova, A Sundström, E Tzelgov, Y Wang, T Wig, S Wilson & D Ziblatt. 2018. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset. v.8. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
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- Svolik M. 2018. When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents. Yale University: Working Paper.
- Welzel, C. 2007. Are Levels of Democracy Affected by Mass Attitudes? Testing Attainment and Sustainment Effects on Democracy. *International Political Science Review* 28(4): 397–424.

13. Timetable max. 500 words, add word count

Word count: 499

ADDE will start in August 2020 and last 36 months. Figure 2 visualizes the proposed timeline, specifying time intervals for planning and executing data collection, the four work packages (WPs), and the hiring of the PhD student and two Postdocs. The chart also displays the timing of the three planned workshops and core dissemination activities.




Figure 2: Chart displaying the timing of various tasks, events, and hired personell

Concerning data collection, the expert surveys on authoritarian entrepreneurs and parties will run in tandem with other V-Dem surveys. Experts code each January, and we have scheduled the process from preparatory- to cleaning work to run from November to March, in three consecutive years.

The automated data scraping and other coding for the events dataset on rhetorical and other acts of authoritarian entrepreneurs will start in month 4 (M4) and this extensive and important task will continue to M30. Coinciding with this, we will hire “Postdoc 2” who will be tasked with oversee and administering this data collection.

Finally, planning for the survey experiments will start up already in M1, and we aim to finalize this data collection in M24. The long-time period is necessary, as we expect to do follow up experiments following the first surveys to replicate original findings and pursue interesting avenues that we might become aware of after initial trials. At the outset, we plan to first run the experiments focusing on party members and leaders (for WP3), and thereafter turn to survey citizens in various countries (for WP4). Postdoc 1 will be hired already in M2 since s/he will be tasked to contribute to designing and undertaking the survey-experiments.

We plan to start up all WPs in M1, though most focus early on will be placed on the conceptual and theoretical work in WP1. WP1 will finish in M18, whereas WP2 on structural macro-factors and democratic erosion will finish in M24. WP3 and WP4 will both extend to M36. The PhD will expectedly contribute to WP4, and will be hired from M1-M36

The first workshop (WS1), in M3, will invite core team members and other scholars experienced in relevant data collection to discuss the three data collection tasks. WS2, in M15 will center on ongoing research articles by ADDE members and other relevant scholars, with a special focus on conceptual and theoretical contributions from WP1. WS3, in M30, will focus on empirical studies from WP3-4, and planning the dissemination strategy for the final part of the project.

Concerning dissemination, this will occur continuously throughout the project, for instance with conference presentations (for academic audiences) and op-eds and blog posts for broader audiences. Yet, we will intensify our dissemination efforts towards the end of the project. Then, we will produce three policy briefs (M30-35), one for one empirical study each from WP2-WP4, and disseminate them to relevant policy-makers and civil society actors. We will also produce several about 5-minute long Youtube videos (M31-35). These will sum up ADDE studies and findings, and be accessible to a broader audience.

C. Cost estimates

14. Budget

Please include the total requested funding per participating national agency and the total budget requested from NORFACE. For Applicants from countries outside the Euro-zone, please transfer your budget to Euro and indicate the exchange rate used. If a Co-operation Partner contributes to the project, please also include their contribution in the budget if possible.

Please consider the national eligibility requirements.

We make the following notes to the budget:

First, the exchange rates used for the budget were 9.12 NOK/Euro; 10.27 SEK/Euro; 0.770 GBP/Euro 4.2024 PLN/Euro.

Second, we highlight that the distribution of resources in the budget **does not** perfectly reflect the expenses incurred by researchers located at different partner institutions and countries. The reason is simply that we **for administrative and efficiency reasons have opted to centralize certain budget posts**, and these are mainly **allocated to the main applicant at the University of Oslo**. This implies that the academic conference travel budgeted under dissemination costs for University of Oslo will also cover conference travel for participants from the University of Gothenburg, University of Nottingham, and PRIO. Likewise more than 100 000 Euro is allocated to running the various survey experiments in different countries, and these costs are also all budgeted to the University of Oslo. Further, costs pertaining to publication costs, creating Youtube videos and dissemination through policy briefs – which pertain to the entire project team – are also all budgeted with the main applicant. In sum, the activity in the project is more balanced between the partners than what the raw budget numbers might indicate, as parts of the costs budgeted at the University of Oslo/Norway are **intended to cover expenses pertaining to the wider project**.

NORFACE Governance Partners	Requested funding (€)
Austria (FWF)	
Belgium – federal (BELSPO)	
Belgium – Flanders (FNRS)	
Belgium – Wallonia and Brussels Federation (FWO)	
Czech Republic (CAS)	
Denmark (IRFD)	
Estonia (ETAg)	
Finland (AKA)	

France (ANR)	
Germany (DFG)	
Ireland (IRC)	
Lithuania (RCL)	
Luxembourg (FNR)	
The Netherlands (NWO)	
Norway (RCN)	1 079 274
Poland (NCN)	113 032
Slovenia (ARRS)	
Spain (AEI)	
Sweden (VR)	166 935
Switzerland (SNSF)	
United Kingdom (UKRI - ESRC)	140 692
Total budget requested from NORFACE	1 499 932
Co-operation partner(s)	Contribution (€)
.....	-
Total contribution Co-operation Partners	-

Please specify the budget for the Main Applicant (MA) and Co-Applicants (CA) in the overview below.

BUDGET ITEMS	Estimate of Funding MA (in Euros)	Estimate of Funding CA 1 (in Euros)	Estimate of Funding CA 2 (in Euros)	Estimate of Funding CA 3 (in Euros)	Estimate of Funding CA 4 (in Euros)
Name of Applicant	Carl Henrik Knutsen (UoO)	Sirianne Dahlum (PRIO)	Anna Lührmann (UoG)	Fernando Casal Bértoa (UoN)	Benjamin Stanley (SWPS)
Country	Norway	Norway	Sweden	United Kingdom	Poland
1. Employment costs					
Postdoc researchers(s)	339 589				
PhD Student(s)			13 050		38 549
Administrative personnel			10 726		
Senior Researcher	159 431	60 000	41 832	82 188	25 700
Research Assistants	29 563				
Expert Coders			53 631		
Subtotal Employment costs	528 584	60 000	119 239	82 188	64 249
2. Equipment					
Item 1					
Item 2					
Item					
Subtotal Equipment	0	0	0	0	0
3. Travel and meeting costs					
Conferences					
Fieldwork					
Project meetings	19 572			6 738	4 997
Other (please specify)					
Subtotal Travel and meeting costs	19 572	0	0	6 738	4 997

**NORFACE Governance Application Template – Outline Proposal**

Deadline: 19 February 2019, 14.00 CET

4. Consumables						
Laptop PhD						1 666
Mplus license, PhD						895
Sundry Office materials, PhD						366
<i>Subtotal Consumables</i>	0	0	0	0	0	2 927
5. Dissemination and knowledge exchange costs,						
YouTube Videos	8 333					
Publication (Open Access, editing etc.)	21 807					
Academic conference participation	76 842					8 567
Policy briefs	8 333					
<i>Subtotal Dissemination and KE costs</i>	115 316	0	0	0	0	8 567
6. Overheads (if applicable)	195 802	40 000	47 696	51 766	32 292	
7. Survey Experiments	120 000					
T O T A L	979 274	100 000	166 935	140 692	113 032	

1. **Employment costs** should comprise gross salary and all additional taxes, social insurance payments etc. The employment costs should not be detailed by person but by position (e.g. please do not indicate the costs of each senior researcher, PhD student, etc. if there are more than one involved, but the total cost for all senior researchers, PhD students, etc. involved).
2. **Equipment** is material used for the project. Equipment/material with a cost below € 1.000 should be listed under the category "Other costs". Costs related to collection and usage of data should be mentioned here.
3. **Travel and meeting costs** also include subsistence costs as well as other costs necessary for the organisation of the project meetings (e.g. hiring venues, catering, etc.).
4. **Consumables** are goods that must be replaced regularly (e.g. office supplies).
5. **Dissemination and Knowledge Exchange costs** may include both the costs for scientific publications (e.g. Open Access publications) and other dissemination materials (e.g. reports, leaflets, websites, etc), events, exhibitions or other knowledge exchange activities targeting users and the general audience.
6. **Overheads** are all eligible costs which cannot be identified as being directly allocated to the project, but which can be justified in line with the national eligibility rules. They usually comprise costs connected with infrastructures and the general operation of the organisation such as rental or depreciation of buildings, water/gas/electricity, maintenance, insurance, supplies and petty office equipment, communication and connection costs, postage, etc. and costs connected with horizontal services such as administrative and financial management, human resources, training, legal advice, documentation, etc.
7. **Other costs** should list any other costs that cannot be categorized in the above sections.

D. Annexes**15. Curriculum vitae**

Provide short cv's of the Main Applicant and the Co-Applicants, and of individuals representing Co-operation Partners if applicable. Cv's of Team Members are not allowed. Each cv may cite a maximum of five relevant publications, and should be no longer than one page. The cv of the Main Applicant should include the information on her/his experience leading national or international collaboration research projects. Only include manuscripts which have been accepted for publication or which have already been published as part of the recognised literature. Therefore, publications that are currently being written, under review, etc. should not be included.

No other annexes are allowed.

E. Signature

- I declare that I have completed this form truthfully.**
- I agree on behalf of the consortium that this application and all information in it may confidentially be shared amongst the NORFACE partners.**

Main Applicant

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date</i>
Carl Henrik Knutsen	16.02.2019

It is not necessary to send a hard-copy of the application to NORFACE. Adding a scanned/digital signature in the form is also not necessary, please only type your name and the date. The submission of the application via the ISAAC-account of the Main Applicant will be considered as an electronic signature.

Please submit the completed application form and annexes to NWO in pdf format via the electronic application system [ISAAC](#).