

Discovery Issues

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Summary



- Framing
 - Reserialization of TD and TD elements/fragments
 - Needed for TD round-tripping with SPARQL queries
- Pagination
- Signing and canonicalization
 - JSON-LD stability, RDF round-tripping, metadata in "enriched TDs"
- Validation
- Security and Privacy Considerations
- Geolocation
- JSON Path
- Security Bootstrapping

Framing



- Need JSON-LD 1.1 Framing Document
 - Necessary for any kind of RDF processing that produces TDs compliant with the specification
 - In particular: necessary for TD Directories to support SPARQL queries
- Discussion:
 - Is this an implementation issue, or a spec issue?
 - Should we be publishing an "official" framing document?

Pagination



- Much discussion recently about how to break up long responses with multiple TDs, or long TDs
- Various options
- Mostly we have focused on paging through TDs as opposed to breaking up long TDs
 - But then long TDs might break buffer limits, etc.
- Problem is easier if we adopt standard but HTTP-specific pagination
 - Then pagination controls are handled in HTTP headers and do not complicate body

Signing and Canonicalization



- Security has been discussing adding signing to preserve TD integrity
- This requires a canonical form of TDs
 - Needs to be specified in TD spec
 - Foundation is JSON canonicalization, but TD-specific elaborations needed, for example, the handling of default values, ordering to simplify processing, etc.
- Various other operations might break signing, or require chaining:
 - Insertion of metadata by directories in TDs ("enhanced TDs" must trust directory)
 - Protocol translation (eg proxies can use chaining, must trust proxy)
- Modification of TDs can be handled by chaining
- Also need to consider whether outputs of SPARQL queries need to be canonicalized, signed; alternatively, can be chained.
- Fallback plan: just keep the original string and make it available on demand

Validation



- A formal definition of "TD Validation" is needed
- This is because directories should only store "valid" TDs
- Of course a valid TD is one that "satisfies the TD specification" but not everything in the spec can be validated just by looking at the TD
- What about semantics?
- Proposal 1: Define a subset of assertions that can be validated just by using JSON Schema (we already know this subset) for "syntactic validation". MANDATORY.

 Note: does not cover extensions, allows random additional properties... When (IF) JSON Schema becomes an actual standard, we can swap it in.
- Proposal 2: Define semantic validation based on SHACL for directories supporting semantic queries; these can also validate extensions if the SHACL can be accessed (TD SHACL also needs to be fetchable). OPTIONAL, but mandatory for those that do SPARQL.

Security and Privacy Considerations



- Contexts: Institutional, Personal, various combinations
- Security and Privacy Considerations
 - Mitigating denial of service attacks (security)
 - Protection against location tracking (privacy)
- Other issues
 - What authentication and authorization are suitable for directories, in what circumstances?
 - Protection against code-injection attacks (e.g. JSON Path)

Geolocation



1. Information Model

- How geolocation data is to be encoded in TDs
- Needs to be flexible enough to handle both static and dynamic situations

2. Query Model

- How geolocation data can be used during discovery to filter results
- In dynamic situations, don't necessarily want to have to update directories constantly
- Don't want directories to have to contact Things themselves during queries

Proposal:

- https://github.com/w3c/wot-discovery/blob/main/proposals/geolocation.md
- So far, information model only; query model WIP
- Needs to be aligned with existing geolocation standards

JSON Path



- Currently support is required
- Popular, nicer syntax for JSON content like TDs
- To use in Directory API, need formal specification
 - Ideally an external specification we can simply cite
- Need certain issues like JavaScript code injection addressed
- IETF proposal is a good start:
 - https://ietf-wg-jsonpath.github.io/draft-ietf-jsonpath-jsonpath/
 - However we will have to discuss timing of when and if this will become an actual standard
- Fallback would be to use XPath, which is (mostly) equivalent

Security Bootstrapping



- Exploration requires secure authentication and authorization before a TD is provided
- How does a client know what security scheme is needed to fetch the TD without access to the TD??? (see wot-discovery issue 135)
- Mostly a problem for self-description (directories may use nosec for the TD as it has no private information; maybe?)
- Options:
 - Specified default
 - Protocol-specific negotiation (e.g. HTTP headers)
 - Two-phase (proposed in issue above)
 - Error response or other mechanism provides security scheme to fetch TD
 - But where does this scheme come from? Proposal: use "default security scheme"

Other



- Addressing WebThings feedback
 - Use of mDNS for local discovery
- Addressing CoreRD feedback
 - We want to limit how much metadata is distributed/leaked in "introductions"
- Directory Federation
 - Need link relation type to allow directories to point at other directories
 - Not clear how to do semantic summaries of the contents of directories
 - Consumer needs to follow links and send queries (if directory did it, it would be nicer for the consumer, but unfortunately this leads to amplification and can be exploited in a DoS attack)
- Directory Semantic Extensions
 - Directory has a context, should be given an official URL