

Chapter Title: References

Book Title: Paths to Victory

Book Subtitle: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies

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Published by: RAND Corporation. (2013)

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhtb4.23>

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