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CHAPTER 17

STABILITY OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT: AN INHERENTLY MILITARY FUNCTION

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The writer can testify to the baleful consequences of military invasion . . . where no military government was set up and where no army commander took responsibility for the country and its inhabitants. Outside of the relative security of army posts, anarchy and civil war prevailed. . . .

—Major General Barrows, Siberia 1918-20¹

History has frequently revealed that the most complex phase in achieving peace with security comes after the formal end of fighting.² Since the end of major combat operations, the United States has been playing catch-up in Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan, in an attempt to stabilize both countries and transition to viable democratic governments. Following unquestionable initial military victories, long-term success has eluded policymakers. Many argue that the United States was as ill-equipped and unprepared for the instability that followed in Iraq and Afghanistan as it was in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo.³ As a result of these recent experiences, there is a growing renaissance in thinking about stability operations. Yet, disagreement continues among policymakers, theorists, and pundits concerning who should control and conduct stability operations. Many argue that stability operations are inherently a civil issue, and it is only the dysfunctional nature of the interagency that make stability operations so challenging.⁴ Others see the lead role as inherently military.⁵ This chapter examines the nature of American stability operations through historical examples to determine if they are in the domain of others, or are inherently military in character.

As the United States continues to come to grips with stability operations in Iraq, policymakers are struggling with the harsh realization that Iraq is far more difficult than anticipated.⁶ Even though the U.S. Government had over a year to plan and prepare for what might follow the toppling of Saddam's regime, the challenges have been both difficult and extensive.⁷ U.S. responses have been improvised and poorly executed. In the war's immediate aftermath, a security vacuum led to looting which moved from government ministries, to hospitals, to schools, and finally evolved into structural anarchy.⁸ Social chaos transitioned rapidly into insurgency, which further facilitated the degeneration of governance, public services, and functional infrastructure. Lacking both local and international support, the predominantly American coalition military force has as of January 11, 2008, sustained over 32,785 casualties; 3,915 deaths and 28,870 wounded, most of which occurred following the cessation of major combat operations in 2003.⁹ Less time was available for stability operations planning in Afghanistan, and like Iraq, much of the stabilization effort was accomplished ad hoc.¹⁰ Fortunately, immediately after

defeating the Taliban, U.S.-led coalition forces experienced good local and international support and took fewer casualties in Afghanistan, with 472 deaths and 1,851 wounded as of January 2008.¹¹ While many argue that immediate stability operations have been more successful in Afghanistan, most agree that severe deficiencies in our stabilization and reconstruction processes continued to be problematic in both Afghanistan and Iraq.¹²

Most critics point to poor planning and a lack of appropriate resources as the key reasons for the difficulties seen in recent stability operations.¹³ Moreover, they argue that these problems were caused by ambivalence toward who should *own* stability operations. Some believe recent military leaders focused too heavily on planning for major combat operations with the expectation of dealing with stability and reconstruction efforts later in the campaign.¹⁴ Another view argues that meandering guidance has befuddled command and control by alternating the responsibility for stability operations among a National Security Council (NSC) Executive Committee, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the State Department (DoS), allowing no one to be properly prepared and resourced.¹⁵ Yet another position contends the military was reluctant to consider stability operations to be a core competency, and thus, was unwilling to embrace stability operations until faced with the difficult realities on the ground.¹⁶ While there are many reasons why stability operations have been problematic, most agree the military did not welcome the mission and the government policy was not carefully considered.

A RENAISSANCE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS THINKING

At the end of the Cold War, a renaissance in stability operations thinking began when the internal collapse of the Soviet Union released destabilizing forces around the globe.¹⁷ A renaissance suggests a rebirth or revival and is used in this case because the development of stability operations theory and practice has an extensive history in the U.S. military. After a series of fumbled conflict resolution efforts, a more systematic and informed approach has emerged.¹⁸

In the past, the military and other federal agencies lacked theory and doctrine in regard to who should be responsible for resolving the issues of peacekeeping and nation-building. Consequently, in 1994, President William J. Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25 to better focus on better interagency planning and coordination.¹⁹ Some joint publications also sought to provide guidance for conflict resolution efforts.²⁰ While welcomed, federal agencies believed further presidential guidance was needed.²¹ As a result, President Clinton signed PDD-56 in 1997, ordering the DoD, State Department, and other agencies to create a unified program for educating and training personnel for complex interagency contingency operations.²² Future conflict resolution efforts were to be led by a NSC Executive Committee, formed on an as-needed basis.²³ Less than 2 years later, a DoD study found that the White House and its various agencies were not following the guidance, and the NSC was not stepping forward in a leadership role.²⁴

With the election of President Bush in 2001, PDD's were rescinded and replaced with National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD).²⁵ NSPD-1, the first of those directives, established an interagency methodology using NSC Policy Coordination Committees as the vehicle for coordination of national security policy.²⁶ After an apparent military success

in Afghanistan and less than 2 months prior to the invasion of Iraq, President Bush signed NSPD-24, deviating from NSPD-1 guidance by putting the DoD in charge of stability operations with the establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). After events on the ground proved to be ineffective, President Bush signed NSPD-44; which acknowledges the need for unity of effort, but reversed NSPD-24 and designated the DoS as the focal point for stability operations with DoD in support.²⁷ At nearly the same time, the DoD released Directive (DoDD) 3000.5, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. DoDD 3000.5 designates stability operations as a “core military mission,” and while it recognizes some stability operation tasks are best performed by others, it specifies “military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”²⁸ With belated recognition, stability operations assumed a key role in successful military operations which has further stimulated interest in theory and doctrine.

Numerous contemporary authors and scholars have developed models related to the purpose and functions of stability operations. Charles Bailey has proposed applying A. H. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs as an outline from which to develop stability operations campaign plans.²⁹ As one of the most researched human psychology theories, Maslow’s basic premise is that human beings are motivated to satisfy needs, and lower or more basic needs must be satisfied before higher ones can be fulfilled.³⁰ Bailey theorized that violence and other atrocities are rooted in unfulfilled human needs and believed Maslow’s physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, and self-actualization needs can be used to frame and prioritize future strategy and stability operations.³¹

While useful, Maslow’s theory is based on individual motivations versus societal provisions, providing only a partial framework.³² William Zartman has advanced a theory of state collapse based on the misplaced governmental and political character of present-day African nations.³³ He believes signposts provide warning symptoms of state failure and states collapse when “they can no longer perform the functions required for them to pass as a state.”³⁴ Similarly, Robert Rotberg argued nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering “political goods.”³⁵ When a nation-state cannot provide the necessary components of a successful society and state, which also correlate on an individual basis to Maslow’s safety needs, the result is state failure.³⁶ An obvious relationship exists among Zartman’s and Rotberg’s state-collapse theories and Bailey’s insights in regard to Maslow’s theory of human motivation. In a more comprehensive approach, Professor William Flavin, a member of the U.S. Army War College faculty, defined the fundamentals for successful conflict termination and presented a decision matrix to help military planners track necessary functions to achieve the desired military end-state.³⁷ Flavin’s analysis suggests that in stability operations, governments must adhere to six fundamental principles and focus on seven sectors for success. There are clear crosscutting elements and functions among all four theories, as seen in Figure 1. Flavin’s decision matrix reflects a coherent synthesis of the previous three theoretical models and augments their premises with his fundamentals that he believes are necessary to achieve successful conflict termination. In doing this, Flavin provides the theory from which to develop effective doctrine for stability operations and successful conflict resolution.




Figure 1. Relevant Theories for Stability Operations.

A number of terms and expressions are related to or used instead of stability operations. Some of the other more frequently used expressions include stability and reconstruction (S&R); stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR), Phase IV; post-conflict operations; and transition operations.³⁸ Stability operations can follow major combat operations or arise as part of peace operations or other interventions. The *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms* defines *stability operations* as:

An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.³⁹

Hence, the DoD definition of stability operations encompasses the meaning behind Flavin's sectors of the post-conflict environment. Consequently, his theory is a useful heuristic with which to evaluate historical case studies on stability operations so as to answer the questions of how to and who must conduct stability operations.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

There are four historical roles of military landpower: destruction of enemy forces, close contact, defensive occupation, and physical control and occupation.⁴⁰ Through a series of early military occupations from the Mexican War to the aftermath of the Civil War and the frontier experiences, the U.S. military gained an inherent appreciation for the value of stability operations. This experience gained formal recognition with "The Hunt Report" in 1920, which captured the occupation experiences in Germany following

World War I.⁴¹ During the interwar period, “The Hunt Report” was followed by the initial releases of *Field Manual (FM) 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare* (1939), *Field Manual (FM) 27-5, Military Government & Civil Affairs* (1940), and the Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* (1940).⁴² In particular, lessons learned from the Philippine War and World War I occupations were vital to the advocacy for and establishment and curriculum of the Army and Navy Schools of Military Government in 1942.⁴³

Past military experience can serve as a test of Flavin’s theory. While the stability operations in each conflict were unique due to a host of contextual factors, recurring themes surface when they are examined against Flavin’s fundamentals for conflict termination. According to Flavin, the six keys to successful stability operations include conducting early interagency planning; establishing workable objectives, goals, and end-states; providing for adequate intelligence and signaling; ensuring unity of effort; harmonizing the civil with the military effort; and establishing the appropriate post-conflict organization.⁴⁴ Taken together, these case studies provide evidence of the inherent nature of stability operations and validate Flavin’s fundamentals.

As Flavin’s first premise states, “Planning for termination and post-conflict operations should begin as early as possible,” with the flexibility to adjust to altering objectives and contextual factors.⁴⁵ Colonel Irwin L. Hunt concluded in his report on World War I German occupation activities, that civil affairs-military government is a specialized military function and needs to have trained personnel who can begin planning as soon as possible.⁴⁶ Thus, the U.S. Army took two essential steps to prepare for future military occupations during the interwar years.⁴⁷ First, with information developed from U.S. Army War College committees and “The Hunt Report,” two field manuals were published to provide long-needed doctrine.⁴⁸ FM 27-10 and FM 27-5 came to be known, respectively, as the Old and New Testaments of American military government during World War II.⁴⁹ Second, understanding the imminent need, the development of the framework for the American Military Government began shortly before entering World War II.⁵⁰ Significant effort and resources were devoted to identifying future requirements prior to entering World War II; but, detailed planning and force structure development for the post-surrender occupations were conducted primarily in parallel with combat operations.⁵¹ While delays were often unavoidable due to international uncertainties, the Department of War concluded that waiting to prepare was not a good strategy to counter such enormous challenges.⁵² Built from the difficult lessons of past stability operations, the U.S. Army recognized that “military government . . . is a virtually inevitable concomitant of modern warfare,” thus early preparation through doctrine, organization, and training provided a solid foundation for World War II stability operations.⁵³

The foremost goal in stability operations planning, according to Flavin’s second premise, is to “establish an achievable end state based on clear objectives.”⁵⁴ But first the National Command Authority needs to provide clear policy guidance.⁵⁵ Yet, as Flavin admits, “this is more the ideal than the reality.”⁵⁶ Preceding the Spanish-American War, President William McKinley, Jr., had not identified a desired end state when he swiftly deployed additional military forces to the Philippines.⁵⁷ To make matters worse, McKinley’s policy evolved throughout the conflict in what Brian M. Linn refers to as an “accidental and incremental” desired end-state.⁵⁸ From these lessons, military leaders during World War II attempted to garner clear policies and objectives from the Secretary

of War and the President. In Germany and Japan, policy was at times very broad and at other times very prolific; but always shifting due to complex international politics. The German effort was enormously complicated due a quadripartite government, of which the United States administered the American Zone of Occupation.⁵⁹ After several revisions during hostilities, the final version of the shifting policy was general in nature and left both the interpretation and application of relevant international agreements and policies to the discretion of General Lucius D. Clay, the Military Governor of Germany.⁶⁰ Reminiscent of the German experience, complex international challenges in Japan eventually created political fog and friction during the occupation. Nevertheless, in all three military occupations, a clear definition of American foreign policy was nonexistent, but was compensated for by preparation, good judgment, and a unified and agile military government.⁶¹

According to Flavin's third premise, "Before any conflict starts, the intelligence community must include factors affecting the termination and post-conflict operational area" in the campaign plan.⁶² Unfortunately, in the Philippines, due to the speed at which President McKinley dispatched his forces, military leaders were unable to conduct early intelligence and campaign planning.⁶³ Consequently, only through a painful process of learning and adaptation was the U.S. Army able to determine and set the necessary conditions for a peaceful outcome in the Philippines. While the size of the regular Army was small, many U.S. senior ranking members were battle-hardened from the Civil War, Reconstruction, and Indian campaigns from which they had developed an "informal but widely accepted pacification doctrine that balanced conciliation and repression."⁶⁴ From difficult challenges such as these and others in Siberia and World War I, the U.S. military recognized as early as 1940 that the earlier experiences would be dwarfed by the enormous and multifaceted tasks the United States would face in Germany and Japan.⁶⁵ As such, planning and preparation included the analysis of the complex geostrategic factors for the two World War II theater campaigns.⁶⁶ However, their information was not always correct. For example, early interpretations of Japan as a homogenous modern society led many to mirror-image their analysis. While the homogenous trait was undeniable, the Japanese were far from being a contemporary modern culture. As General Douglas MacArthur stated, "Supposedly, the Japanese were a 20th-century civilization. In reality, they were more nearly a feudal society . . . akin to ancient Sparta," complicating occupation efforts.⁶⁷ Thus, while geostrategic analysis was important, adaptation was critical to shaping the post-surrender environment.⁶⁸

According to Flavin's fourth premise, unity of effort is critical to stability operations success, but the current dysfunctional nature of the interagency often prevents effective preparation, planning, and focus.⁶⁹ Correspondingly, in the Philippines, policy and bureaucratic challenges were also prevalent; however, they were offset by military ingenuity and flexibility, and a focused military government effort balancing civic action and coercion.⁷⁰ Similarly, while international politics affected the organization, policies, and challenges faced by the military governments in World War II differently, not only unity of effort, but unity of command was a predominate theme. "Sound practice required the complete concentration of authority in the military governor," who was ultimately responsible and accountable for the entire complex occupation environment, and was of paramount importance.⁷¹ The tailored, comprehensive, and unified approach to military

government was integral to achieving the desired end states in the Philippines and in World War II Germany and World War II Japan.

In his fifth premise, Flavin states, "Harmonization is essential and must occur across a variety of institutions and agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, both horizontally and vertically."⁷² In the past, synchronization of the extremely complex and numerous occupation functions was accomplished by leveraging the vast wealth of knowledge and expertise of the United States and its people, but centrally executed by the U.S. military. The past military did not administer the duties of military government alone. In the case of World War II, most of the American military government and civil affairs officers were civilians in peacetime, working primarily within their realm of experience.⁷³ Additionally, while the War Department was responsible for administering national policies, State and the other Departments of the U.S. Government were responsible for formulating their respective policies, and providing critical reach back expertise and capabilities.⁷⁴ As the experience in the Philippines indicates, "The military leader on the scene was the best agent for local pacification," and only through central direction and ownership was the military able to ensure unity of effort and harmonization.⁷⁵ That is not the same as saying civilian expertise was not integrated.

Flavin's final premise states; "Successful termination and transition into post-conflict peace operations requires an appropriate organization to ensure multinational, interagency, and international harmony."⁷⁶ In the Philippines, the policy vacuum and failure to recognize the emerging independent Filipino movement made the difficult task of organizing an expeditionary force even more complicated.⁷⁷ Cuba had been America's focus in the planning for war with Spain, not the Philippines.⁷⁸ Through an agonizing process, the organization of the military government in the Philippines emerged over time. To a great extent, the lessons learned were applied in the organizational framework and preparation for the American Military Government occupation organizations and command structures in Germany and Japan.⁷⁹ In essence, an agile military government solution enabled the U.S. military to satisfy Flavin's fundamentals for post-conflict success in the Philippines and World War II.

Flavin's theory further advocates a decision matrix with seven key sectors that must be addressed in the post-conflict environment to achieve the desired military end state: security, humanitarian assistance, human rights and social reconciliation, governance and civil administration, civil law and order, infrastructure and economic restoration, and public diplomacy/information operations.⁸⁰ The inherent nature of the post-surrender environment of the Philippines, Germany, and Japan historical examples reinforces the conviction that most in the U.S. Government have now come to accept the belief that peaceful transfer to civil government occurs through the successful fulfillment of Flavin's seven sectors, or what Rotberg referred to as "political goods."⁸¹

In the Philippines, through painful experiences, the U.S. Army recognized the crucial relationship between civil affairs work and the level of security, with the establishment of law and order being the most urgent priority in stability operations.⁸² An entrenched Filipino insurgency followed the formal end of fighting when the political objectives of the revolutionaries and the McKinley administration diverged.⁸³ The breakdown of public order and services along with the loss of legitimate central authority were all compounded when the initiative was lost by the inability to provide security to the

Filipino population.⁸⁴ However, for all of President McKinley's policy failings in the Philippines, he provided the U.S. Army with excellent guiding principles for the conduct of the provisional military government.⁸⁵ According to President McKinley, the U.S. Army, through direction of the military governor, was directed to:

Possess and hold the Philippines, giving to the people there peace and order and beneficent government, affording them every opportunity to prosecute their lawful pursuits, and encouraging them in thrift and industry; making them feel and know that we are good friends . . . and that they will be aided in every possible way to be a self-respecting and self-governing people . . .⁸⁶

As such, the U.S. Army used benevolence through every possible means, including humanitarian relief; the extension of individual liberties and rights; organizing self-government; establishment of schools, public health programs, and public works; astute propaganda; and payment for weapons.⁸⁷ However, early progress made by humanitarian efforts was often offset by a revolutionary insurgency and their terror tactics.⁸⁸ Unlike his predecessor, Major General Elwell S. Otis, Major General Arthur MacArthur, Jr., understood the survival of the insurgency depended on the revolutionaries' capacity to control the civilian populace through intimidation and terrorism.⁸⁹ Accordingly, MacArthur changed operations and tactics by widely dispersing his forces with increased surveillance to detect insurgents, terrorists, and supporters.⁹⁰ Despite the fact they were often criticized for a heavy-handed approach, continuous patrols by American forces impeded insurgent efforts.⁹¹ Under MacArthur's leadership, the U.S. Army adapted by integrating benevolent counterinsurgency policies and methods with effective security, which in the end defeated the revolutionary movement.⁹²

Viewed as the most important American precedent by interwar doctrine writers, the critical civil affairs and security best-practices from the Philippines were applied to the American School of Military Government's detailed development of training, doctrine, regulations, and capabilities for World War II occupations.⁹³ In both cases, the U.S. military applied a large military security force in post-surrender Germany and Japan, to counter potential insurgencies and to solidify the psychological security of the populace absent basic needs and essential services. The American Military Government model also prepared the framework for numerous other transition capabilities to include: establishing and mentoring civil functions and supporting institutions; establishment of public order and governance; management of public funds; public health; public relief; public works; markets; and education.⁹⁴ Furthermore, the U.S. Army developed a vast number of detailed training publications for civil services; Bank Accounting and Operations in Japan, Agriculture and Food in Japan, Field Protection of Objects of Art and Archives, and Sickness Insurance in Germany, to name a few.⁹⁵ The level of detailed preparation for the World War II occupations reflects a remarkable grasp of both the nature and magnitude of the challenges of stability operations.

Every conflict has unique and complex factors which prove problematic in achieving the desired end states. Yet, lessons learned from the Philippines, and other conflicts prior to World War II, validated the military need for and issues concerning stability operations.

Scholars such as John Gates and Brian Linn believe the success in defeating the Philippine insurgency and stabilizing the islands can be traced to a comprehensive decentralized approach. Widely dispersed U.S. commanders creatively dealt with complex essential service and security challenges, guided by the centralized framework and conduct of military government.⁹⁶ Acceptance of stability operations as a necessity of war, early preparation, and a unified and agile military government solution in World War II made it “possible to organize the civil administration of foreign territories from the outset with a view to the ultimate war and peace aims.”⁹⁷ Painful experiences, yielding successful occupations, proved that a military government is a viable solution to future stability operation challenges.⁹⁸ Still, oddly the U.S. military lost its way and the reasons for this still preclude the willing embrace for what is professionally obvious.

LOSING OUR WAY

After World War II, the U.S. military misplaced and rejected the experience and knowledge from its past, thus the military government solution faded from both doctrine and practice. Three key things contributed to this dissolution. First, since its inception, the controversial nature of military government has made it equally objectionable in civilian and military communities. To civilians, the term rang unkindly, sounding too imperialistic and “vaguely unconstitutional.”⁹⁹ In today’s sensitive political climate, the term military government is arguably even more offensive to many of the ideological and political elites in national and international level communities. Additionally, since before the Philippine experience, military leaders have alleged that civil-military operations (CMO) and stability operations draw so heavily on personnel and resources as to affect combat efficiency.¹⁰⁰ Most recently, seen as “nontraditional” functions, the CMO specialty has often been viewed as a “subculture” involved in areas many commanders do not understand and consider “mission creep” as opposed to mission essential.¹⁰¹

Second, the responsibility for this essential phase of war has been ineffectively fixed with the unintended consequences of no one being capable or accountable. In an attempt to clearly define civil-military control and fix responsibilities and requirements following the occupations during World War II, the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 created the National Security Council with the initial purpose to serve as a mechanism to coordinate political and military questions.¹⁰² In reality, the NSA of 1947 shifted the responsibility for leading complex political-military challenges away from the military, including those integral to war, to untested bureaucratic organizations that were neither capable nor resourced for the complexity and challenges of stability operations.

Third, the U.S. military quickly adjusted its strategies, doctrine, and capabilities to those based heavily on deterrence during the Cold War.¹⁰³ As such, *Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations*, superseded FM 27-5, and the procedural and doctrinal framework for military government slowly atrophied as the military focused on the monolithic threat of the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁴ As the requirement for trained military government officers in Japan and Germany dwindled with success, the training, resources, and infrastructure also contracted, leaving only a civil affairs shell with its capabilities predominantly in the reserves to play supporting roles in CMO. Despite the evidence of Vietnam, CMO has been the comprehensive term used to describe the general activities performed by a niche

in the military who are capable of coordination with, and providing support to civilian organizations in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and nation-building operations.¹⁰⁵ In the end, as these changes undid a successful doctrine and military government solution; they also helped corroborate the concept of stability operations as inherently nonmilitary and something outside the conduct of war.

IMPLICATIONS TO CURRENT AND FUTURE EFFORTS

Even with such prominent historical successes, the current U.S. military has struggled to relearn the lessons from the past. One likely reason is that the apparent parallels between the Iraq and World War II occupations have been widely criticized. Many critics believe U.S. nation-building efforts in conflicts such as Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo are more relevant.¹⁰⁶ Several of these same critics point to the early failure of the ORHA experiment in Iraq as the reason why the military should not be charged with stability operations. Yet others recognize ORHA as an “inadequate, notoriously slow-moving substitute for an interim occupation government.”¹⁰⁷ Distinct contextual factors serve to complicate some analogies, but the aggregate historical experience validates Flavin’s theory and suggests relevant doctrine. Moreover, newly emerging doctrine, capabilities, and practice provide both promise and caution for the future. Current experience, evaluated through history and context, provides three key harbingers of good and bad for the future.

First, as in the past, the U.S. Army has recently taken the lead in the interpretation of past experiences and adapting ways and means to counter current stability operations challenges. As a result of successful on-the-ground efforts, such as those by Major General Peter Chiarelli and the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq, the U.S. military again accepts that full-spectrum stability operations are a necessary phase of warfare.¹⁰⁸ Some of the lessons learned have recently been incorporated into the new U.S. Army *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations*, which acknowledges stability operations as a core military mission and refocuses on “full-spectrum operations.”¹⁰⁹ In correlation with Flavin’s insights and the military’s past experience, FM 3-0 also outlines what it calls a “whole of government approach” to “post-conflict stability sectors.”¹¹⁰ Yet, much remains disconcerting. The focus on the primarily civil-nature of the logical lines of operation, as outlined in FM 3-0, could encourage persistent stovepiped efforts, limited success, and interagency finger-pointing. While debatable, some critics claim the failures in Iraq were really due to the lack of planning for Phase IV of the campaign.¹¹¹ However, DoD Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith undertook the development of a comprehensive postwar plan, suggesting the problem was a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of the operations.¹¹² According to Colonel Kevin Benson, CFLCC/J5, his staff painstakingly developed the Iraq Phase IV plan.¹¹³ Benson says the real challenge was translating those plans into effective lines of operation while dealing with guidance and assumptions from higher echelons, deployment processes, interagency concerns, and evolving policy.”¹¹⁴ Further complicating the effort, General Tommy R. Franks did not advocate subordinating stability operations under his command; thus, the U.S. military purposely averted the military government solution as a template for success.¹¹⁵ Recent experience again points out that without complete ownership of the problem, as was the case in the military government solution, critical components of success are overlooked or ignored.

As Major General David P. Barrows, Director of Education in the Philippines, member of the AEF Staff in 1919 Siberia, and President of the University of California, told the 1943 School of Military Government class members,

The necessity for military government exists plainly in the character of war itself . . . For the protection of this army itself, as well as for the protection, security, and well-being of the inhabitants of the territory which it occupies, the establishment of the government, at least of some provision kind, is imperative.¹¹⁶

Second, the new Counterinsurgency FM (2007) incorporates critical instruction from past occupations.¹¹⁷ Likewise, the new DoD Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (2006) consolidates much of the tutelage from history including main mission elements and fundamentals of stability operations.¹¹⁸ In addition, the Army's recently formed Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) is making progress in facilitating policies, concepts, and doctrine to "address the challenging SSTRO strategic and operational issues facing the nation."¹¹⁹ Organizations such as these will help prepare core military capabilities for future stability operations. However, risk exists in relation to preparation and planning for future stability operations. Unlike World War II, modern rapid decisive operations, such as were seen in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, no longer allow the luxury for detailed and complex planning efforts during the hostilities phase.¹²⁰ In addition, the myopic nature of our nation makes it difficult to continue the current stability operations momentum once the immediate challenge fades. As Secretary Gates recently acknowledged, "On numerous occasions in the past, the [United States] concluded that the nature of man and the world had changed for the better, and turned inward, unilaterally disarming and dismantling institutions important to our national security."¹²¹

Third, after again recognizing the relationship between civil affairs and security, the U.S. military and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) developed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which stressed governance, security, and impact development projects to "win hearts and minds" in Afghanistan.¹²² Similar reconstruction teams modeled from these experiences have been developed in Iraq. Yet, PRT success has suffered from a lack of coordination and oversight. Many PRT veterans believe that the PRT program needs a concept of operations and an effective command and control structure, the very benefits the military government model provided in the past.¹²³ As previous military leaders came to understand so painfully, it is not only a necessary evil, it is both a humanitarian obligation and good strategy for the military to fill the *political goods* void. According to General Barrows, "It is the right and duty of a commander . . . to declare the establishment of military government, even though not directly instructed to do so by the War Department."¹²⁴ However, as mentioned before and in a reversal of roles, NSPD-44 puts the State Department in the lead, with the military merely in support for stability operations. Many in government and academia are now troubled about the consequences of such changes. After more than 2 years since the NSPD-44 policy change, the lack of State Department capabilities and Congress' reluctance to support such capabilities provides clear warning signs for the future.

CONCLUSION

Inherently military can be defined as: A function that is so intimately related to achieving the desired end-state in war as to mandate performance by the military. In American military history, stability operations have been inherently military whenever Americans have occupied others' territory. Yet following World War II, the U.S. military lost its perspective of the role and importance of this critical phase of warfare for achieving a successful peace. Iraq and Afghanistan have refocused our attention on the questions of what stability operations are and how they should be conducted. In this regard, DoDD 3000.05 reinforces the historical experience in saying, "Military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so."¹²⁵ In the ongoing renaissance of thinking about stability operations, Flavin's fundamentals and sectors constitutes an appropriate theory for the development of 21st century doctrine. Although his theory does not directly advocate for a military government solution, its implications as well as the Congress' continuing unwillingness to substantially increase funding for other departments of government points directly at such a solution. The U.S. military's historical experience, the realities of Iraq and Afghanistan, the implications of theory for practice, and the gap between strategic objectives and resources argue for a military lead in stability operations. Since stability operations remain an inherently military function of 21st century warfare, the U.S. military must be prepared to establish a unified and agile military government.¹²⁶

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 17

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