CHAPTER 4

AFRICA COMMAND AND THE MILITARIZATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Dennis R. Penn
Department of Defense

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War brought about a new era of remarkable changes in the strategic perspective of the U.S. Government (USG). Within this confluence of changes, two independent threads of thought emerged, evolved, and eventually started to converge. The first thread pertains to the continent of Africa and its rise in strategic value vis-à-vis U.S. national interests. Once relegated to the diplomatic dustbin, Africa surprisingly roared to the top of the foreign policy heap—it was suddenly very strategically important. The March 2006 National Security Strategy states that, "Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration . . . our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity."[1] The genesis of U.S. renewed commitment to Africa is rooted in large part to its value as an important source of "energy supplies; a possible safe haven for terrorist groups; a transit node of illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, and people; and a growing voice in multilateral institutions."[2] The second thread relates to a momentous shift in U.S. military mission focus. Whereas the military at one time focused almost exclusively on waging war, based largely on the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences, it began a conscious shift in thinking towards preventing war—this is due to the strategic realization that it is more cost effective to prevent war than it is to wage it. The U.S. military adjusted, and continues to adjust, its policy, strategies, and doctrine to include an emphasis on proactive peacetime engagement as a way to achieve national strategy objectives.[3]

The two threads first converged at the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. A geographic combatant command (GCC), USEUCOM's area of responsibility included all of Europe, Russia, Israel, and most of Africa.[4] Through its efforts in the global war on terror (GWOT), USEUCOM pioneered a new approach to theater security cooperation (TSC) and traditional warfighting—a new kind of campaign construct referred to as "Phase Zero."[5] The command operationalized their TSC and capacity-building efforts by collaborating with regional allies and focusing on terrorism's long-term, underlying conditions.[6] With its emphasis on interagency cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, Phase Zero represented a natural evolution in the concept of proactive peacetime engagement. Concurrently, in recognition of the need for a unified response to Africa's growing military, strategic, and economic importance, the Bush administration established a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), on February 6, 2007.[7] USAFRICOM is not like other traditional unified commands in that its focus is first and foremost on war prevention rather than warfighting.[8] Resourced in large part from within USEUCOM itself, the new GCC retains the pioneering TSC and capacity-building focus initiated under the auspices of its parent

organization.[9] In addition, USAFRICOM is also pioneering new modes of interagency interaction.[10] The creation of USAFRICOM suggests these threads are inextricably linked, but this is not necessarily true.

Unsurprisingly, not everyone thinks USAFRICOM's approach to proactive peacetime engagement is a good idea. Some in Africa worry that the new command signals a new "western colonialism."[11] Furthermore, Africans are not the only ones expressing apprehension. There are elements within the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) who voice concern that the military may "overestimate" its capabilities as well as its "diplomatic role" in Africa.[12] The foreign press, never shy about voicing their opinions on U.S. policy, print denouncements such as, "It is therefore disturbing to note that democracy, health, education, economic growth and development are being tied to military interests."[13] Still others contend the GCCs are examples of American proconsuls plying foreign policy.[14] The implication for the new command is that USAFRICOM, as a GCC, represents the next step in the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.

Does USAFRICOM signal a deliberate militarization of U.S. foreign policy? The author posits that this may very well be the case, and the role of USAFRICOM must be managed thoughtfully or it will not engender the intended long-term advantage to the United States. But whether or not the United States is intentionally militarizing its foreign policy may not be the point—what is important is that many perceive it to be the case. Here, perception trumps reality, and in the case of USAFRICOM, perceptions are shaping how the command is accepted within the region and what it can hope to accomplish. If left unchecked, the problem of perception may cause the aforementioned threads to diverge. If this were to occur, the United States would not only waste an opportunity to realize the full potential of what is arguably a genuine revolution in military affairs in regard to prevention of war, but would also fall far short of our stated national objectives in regard to Africa. Over the long term, if they should unravel it would have deleterious effects on U.S.-African relations and spur African states to turn to others, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), for assistance and strategic partnership.

This chapter argues that the efforts to date represent steps in the right direction, but they are overly reliant on the military for implementation. Consequently, U.S. initiatives only serve to underscore and highlight the appearance of policy militarization. Ultimately this weakens rather than strengthens the link between the two threads. It is therefore ironic that the harder the U.S. military works to implement proactive peacetime engagement, the weaker and more distant the bond becomes between those the military is trying to help and U.S. interests. However, if the proactive peacetime engagement thread were to reflect a nonmilitary lead and include diverse USG participation, the link between threads might actually strengthen. To some degree, the USG is striving to do just this. However, USG efforts to date fall short of the scale of change required, and they do not adequately address the perceptions of militarizing our foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. This author submits that bold reform is required to ensure the two convergent threads are appropriately interweaved. The policy changes recommended in this chapter could prove to be the level of change required to shift the balance in favor of strengthening the two threads. These changes must be transformational at the strategic level, permanent in nature, and appropriately resourced. To do less will likely mean that the United States, at best, maintains the status quo, and as a direct consequence, it will fall short of meeting

its goal of "an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity."[15] Perhaps more importantly, the failure to pursue these changes would cause the nation to fall short of capturing an essential security paradigm for the emerging 21st century.

AFRICA RISING

Africa is a continent growing in strategic importance. First among the reasons for Africa's rise in strategic value is the continent's underdeveloped natural resources. In some circumstances, Africa will be as important a source for U.S. energy imports as is the Middle East.[16] U.S. interests in Africa also reflect marked concern over transnational issues such as potential terrorist safe havens; transit nodes for illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, and people; Africa's growing stature in multilateral institutions; armed civil conflict; humanitarian crises; the rise of pandemic diseases; and the growing influence of potential competitors.[17] Equally important, as the atrocities in Darfur bear witness, certain elements within Africa continue to "test the resolve of the international community and the United States to prevent mass killings and genocide."[18] Moreover, other nations are also expressing increased interest in Africa; the world's major powers are working aggressively to seek out investments, win contracts, peddle influence, and build political support on the African continent.[19] With respect to access to Africa's oil, natural gas, and other natural resources, the United States is in direct competition with numerous nations to include India, Europe, and the PRC.[20] In many ways, Africa represents the nature and range of security issues confronting the United States in the 21st century. Clearly, Africa demands, and is now getting long wanted and much deserved attention from U.S. policymakers.

U.S. national policy statements in recent years reflect Africa's rise in strategic importance. In July 2003, the Bush administration's African Policy stated that "promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty" and that this "threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror."[21] In July 2005, President Bush garnered G-8 partner commitment for initiatives that advance U.S. priorities in Africa to include forgiving debt, fighting malaria, addressing urgent humanitarian needs, improving education, boosting development assistance, increasing trade and investment, and broadening support for peace and stability.[22] The March 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy states, "Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration," and "the U.S. recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies."[23] On February 6, 2007, the Bush administration announced its decision to establish a new unified GCC, USAFRICOM.[24]

The formation of USAFRICOM represents a unique internal reorganization of the joint military command structure, creating a new combatant command focused solely on Africa and collaboratively designed with other agencies to help to coordinate USG contributions across the continent.[25] Unlike more traditional unified commands, USAFRICOM concentrates its efforts on war prevention rather than warfighting.[26] The new command supports two primary missions: (1) strengthening security cooperation by creating new opportunities to bolster capabilities; and, (2) enhancing efforts to help

bring peace and security by promoting development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth.[27] USAFRICOM works in close partnership with not only other USG elements, but also with African states, regional security organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and a variety of other actors.[28] At full operational capability, USAFRICOM's innovative interagency structure will pursue nonkinetic missions across Africa.[29] USAFRICOM will conduct traditional military operations only when directed.[30] As one expert in defense policy and foreign affairs accurately opines, "In many ways, USAFRICOM is a post-Cold War experiment that radically rethinks security in the early 21st century based on peace-building lessons learned since the fall of the Berlin Wall."[31]

To meet its goals and objectives, USAFRICOM must leverage all the elements of U.S. national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—through a coordinated interagency effort.[32] Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the other elements of national power, and guides the relationship with NGOs and international organizations.[33] For interagency efforts to be successful, they must be fully integrated and synchronized, achieving unity of effort across the whole of government and beyond.[34] This is no small task, and though the USG has largely come to grips with the critical importance of interagency coordination, it has to date performed poorly in developing and implementing interagency solutions.[35] To avoid repeating previous U.S. interagency missteps, USAFRICOM's architects pioneered a unique approach to interagency coordination within a GCC, placing a senior State Department official as one of two deputy commanders and including an unprecedented number of interagency civilians in key leadership roles throughout the command.[36] The infusion of civilians into the command structure alone will not guarantee success; USAFRICOM must also be able to identify commonly understood objectives and translate those objectives into demonstrable action in a coherent and efficient collective operation.[37] Unity of purpose and effort will flow from interagency integration and other needed changes in policy, strategy, and doctrine.

A REVOLUTION IN POLICY, STRATEGY, AND DOCTRINE

In what constitutes a genuine Revolution in Military Affairs, the U.S. military has fundamentally adjusted its policy, strategies, and doctrine over the past 15 years to emphasize proactive peacetime engagement as a way to achieving national strategy objectives.[38] Proactive peacetime engagement is based on the principle that it is "much more cost effective to prevent conflict than it is to stop one once it has started,"[39] and its efforts are designed to "reassure allies and partners, promote stability and mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict."[40] Evolving to meet the emerging challenges of an uncertain and complex security environment, the concept of proactive peacetime engagement aims to shape the international milieu to meet national interests by creating partnerships and building the capacity of allies and partners.[41] While some may argue that the military has always performed these functions, the military's current focus in conflict prevention did not take root in policy until the fall of the Soviet Empire—the post-Cold War era.[42] This philosophical shift away from a focus on fighting wars to preventing them is at the core of USAFRICOM's mission.[43]

In a critically important step in this evolutionary design, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO), published in August 2005, reintroduced the proactive peacetime

engagement philosophy via two new joint doctrine concepts designed to minimize the use of armed force and integrate interagency and multinational partners across the full range of military operations.[44] With respect to the first, shaping operations, the ability to maintain peace and prevent conflict or crises is portrayed as equal in importace to the ability to wage major combat operations.[45] The primary focus of peacetime shaping operations, it argues, is to spread democracy by "creating an environment of peace, stability, and goodwill."[46] Concerning the second, stability operations, it states achieving desired political aims by winning war "requires resolving crises, winning conventional combat operations, and ensuring stability in affected areas."[47] This may require the military to help provide a secure environment, initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and similar types of assistance.[48] The doctrinal emphasis on shaping and stability operations represents the first step in codifying the military's changing mission focus; that is, do everything you can to prevent war when you can, and then, if you must wage war, do everything you can to end the conflict quickly and reintroduce stability.

Shaping operations fall under the joint doctrine rubric of military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.[49] In shaping operations, the military collaborates with numerous domestic and foreign agencies and organizations across a wide range of activities "to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict."[50] Combatant commanders complement and reinforce the other instruments of national power and the capabilities of regional allies to shape their areas of responsibility through security cooperation activities.[51] Through its efforts to prosecute the GWOT in Africa, USEUCOM operationalized TSC and capacity-building efforts in a new kind of campaign plan construct called Phase Zero.[52] Also known as the Shape Phase, these operations are continuous and adaptive nonkinetic shaping activities that encompass "everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place."[53]

The ultimate goal of Phase Zero operations is to "promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts."[54] In addition, these operations also aim "to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives."[55] With respect to counterterrorism activities, Phase Zero operations address the underlying conditions that fuel and enable terrorism.[56] Of note, during typical Phase Zero operations, the military will likely play a supporting role rather than a supported role, and the military's programs will be only one part of the much larger overall USG effort.[57] Because these operations are an open-ended, long-term approach to preventing conflict, some consider it "more appropriate to describe Phase Zero as a campaign in and of itself—a new kind of campaign that must be continuously fought by U.S. joint forces in concert with the interagency community and in cooperation with allies and partner nations."[58]

The military's role in stability operations is clarified and codified in Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, published in November 2005.[59] The landmark directive defines stability operations as joint military and civilian efforts to establish or maintain order and stability across the full spectrum of a campaign.[60] More notably, DoD Directive 3000.05 establishes stability operations as a core military mission that "shall be given priority comparable to combat operations."[61] In keeping with the ideals outlined in the CCJO, the directive shifts the military's focus from enemy-centric to population-centric effects, emphasizing activities that benefit the indigenous peaceful population

over traditional activities that direct action against enemy forces.[62] Successful stability operations require fully integrated and synchronized civil-military efforts.[63] To this end, DoD Directive 3000.05 tasks the military, be it in a leading or supporting role during an operation, to work in close coordination with its interagency and cooperative counterparts to include other U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments, security forces, global and regional international organizations, foreign and domestic NGOs, and the private sector.[64]

The introduction and inculcation of shaping and stability operations into military policy, strategy, and doctrine since 2005 signals the categorical support of senior leadership for the concept of war prevention. Given the emphasis, it comes as no surprise that the military's take charge, "can do" attitude, coupled with its large resource pool, has literally catapulted the military to the forefront of other government agencies in its ability to implement and support stability operations. As is the case with USAFRICOM, the military is now taking the lead among U.S. agencies in implementing the concept.[65] However, the question remains—should the military be the lead? Both policy and doctrine describe successful shaping and stability operations as closely integrated interagency efforts where the military often plays a supporting vice a supported role.[66] To address the question of who should be the lead, and therefore maximize strategic effect, the Bush administration issued a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) in December 2005 assigning a focal point for leading reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related efforts across the USG departments and agencies.[67]

NSPD-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, assigns the Department of State (DoS) the responsibility to "coordinate, lead, and strengthen USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization missions and to harmonize efforts with U.S. military plans and operations."[68] The directive also establishes a framework to integrate civilian-military coordination and planning activities citing that, when relevant and appropriate, the Secretaries of State and Defense are to integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans.[69] Furthermore, NSPD-44 charges the DoS with two added functions. First, the DoS is responsible for coordinating stability and reconstruction activities and preventive strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, NGOs, and other private sector entities.[70] Second, the DoS is also responsible for developing strategies to build partnership capacity abroad and for leveraging NGO and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization activities.[71] It is clear in this policy that the Bush administration recognized the criticality of DoS as the central lead in pre-crisis and preventive security cooperation efforts.

PROBLEMS WITH PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

USAFRICOM's unique approach to proactive peacetime engagement reflects the evolution in policy, strategy, and doctrine described above.[72] In keeping with the precepts of emerging policy and doctrine, USAFRICOM planners are organizing along highly nontraditional lines, designing the command to build both indigenous African security capacities and U.S. interagency collaboration capabilities.[73] To underscore its departure from the norm, USAFRICOM has dropped the traditional "J-code" organizational structure normally associated with combatant command staffs.[74] The formal integration

of other department and agency personnel into the organizational structure is another statement of change.[75] USAFRICOM's nontraditional emphasis on development and war-prevention in lieu of warfighting is garnering much widespread praise throughout the USG.[76]

However, the less traditional military focus is also engendering mixed feelings within certain quarters of the government.[77] Some elements within the DoS and USAID express concern that the military may "overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role in Africa, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate."[78] These concerns are, to a certain extent, justifiable. Though the authority for international engagement belongs to the DoS, the department has no more than 4,000 to 5,000 Foreign Service Officers in the field—far less manpower than what DoD can leverage through its TSC efforts.[79] The DoS also lacks comparable funding and resources required to conduct extensive partner engagement activities such as school and medical projects, coordination visits, training exercises, equipment, and other cooperative activities.[80] The disparity exists in part because Congress made deep cuts in the DoS and other civilian agencies during the 1990s, significantly reducing manpower and foreign aid budget authorizations while retaining significant military capability.[81] In a concerted effort to assuage concerns over its role in the foreign policy arena, DoD press releases are emphatic in pointing out that USAFRICOM is not assuming "a leadership role, rather it will be one in support of efforts of leading countries through our binational and bilateral relationships and the African Union and other multinational organizations."[82]

Yet, despite DoD's statements to the contrary, there are those who believe that USAFRICOM—like the other GCCs—is another example of U.S. military proconsuls plying foreign policy.[83] In ancient Rome, proconsuls were essentially provincial military governors responsible for overseeing military operations, justice, and administration within their provinces.[84] Later, the title referenced colonial governors with similar far-reaching powers.[85] Today, pundits note that U.S. GCCs have "evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire's proconsuls—well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of U.S. foreign policy."[86] The GCC's rise in preeminence reflects not only the void left by a weakened DoS, it also reflects a trend in the USG of increasing dependency on the military to carry out foreign affairs in recent decades.[87]

The historic 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act represents a discernable effort to expand GCC powers with the legislation increasing GCC responsibilities and influence as warfighters.[88] As the Goldwater-Nichols Act took root and began to flourish, the Clinton administration further expanded the role of the GCCs by tasking the commands with the mission to shape their regions using multilateral approaches in ways that exceeded the traditional role of the military.[89] The Clinton administration also learned during this period that it could direct DoD to perform more and more duties, to include jobs formerly spread out among the civilian agencies, and that the military would accept them and carry on.[90] Moreover, in addition to executive and legislative efforts to expand the military's mission, the DoD's self-driven shift in emphasis towards proactive peacetime engagement also pushed the military into expanded diplomatic and political roles.[91] By the end of the 1990s, the GCCs were far more than warfighters.[92] The GCCs had grown to "transcend military matters and encroach into all the elements of national power."[93]

The apparent militarization of U.S. foreign policy, though unnoted by most average Americans, is glaringly obvious to foreign audiences acutely aware of shifts in U.S.

policy—particularly in Africa where USAFRICOM is being met with less than euphoria in many states.[94] The Africans, fearing both the reintroduction of Cold War-era arms sales and U.S. support for repressive regimes, are quick to cite hundreds of years of colonial subjugation and "accuse the U.S. of neo-imperialism and resource exploitation."[95] African nations are also concerned that USAFRICOM "will incite, not preclude, terrorist attacks."[96] To exacerbate African fears, poorly conceived references to USAFRICOM as a combatant command "plus" only serve to call greater attention to the command's military mission. Again, concerns such as these are not without foundation. Despite USAFRICOM's focus on a broader soft power mandate designed to build a stable security environment, it is still a military command and, as such, it has "all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead military operations."[97]

Regardless of the concerns of Africans and others, USAFRICOM's mission is nonetheless a genuine attempt to establish security through a blend of soft and hard power.[98] To alleviate concerns and offset strategic communication gaffs, both USAFRICOM and the Bush administration continuously emphasized and reiterated the "command's benevolent intentions and nonmilitary character."[99] U.S. strategic communications continue to reassure external audiences, particularly the African nations, that the United States is not pursuing colonial or imperial aspirations on the continent. In an environment where overcoming the challenges Africa faces requires partnership, it is an imperative that the multinational partners do not see the U.S. efforts as predatory or paternalistic.[100]

Yet, despite an aggressive strategic communications campaign, actions continue to speak louder than words and, as a result, there are fundamental questions which have yet to be addressed—questions that serve to undermine both the command's and the USG's credibility in the USAFRICOM initiative. The critical question is why is the military leading an organization whose stated mission is, by definition, largely the responsibility of the DoS? Correspondingly, what message is the USG trying to impart to its foreign partners and those it professes to be helping, when it intentionally places a military commander in a position of authority over his DoS counterpart? Intentional or not, the USG is, via its implementation of USAFRICOM, feeding the perception of a militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Here perception trumps reality and, in the case of USAFRICOM, external perceptions are in turn shaping how the command represents and shapes itself, and limiting U.S. strategic options.

While efforts to date represent steps in the right direction, they are still overly reliant on the military for implementation and, as such, persist in portraying an appearance of policy militarization. This appearance weakens the link between the two threads of an increased strategic focus on Africa and the military recognition of the value of war prevention. Without bold reform to ensure the proper integration of the two convergent threads, they may well unravel to the detriment of U.S. long-term interests. If the threads do diverge, the United States would not only waste an opportunity to realize the full potential of what is arguably a genuine revolution in military affairs; it would also risk falling short of its stated strategic objectives. In the end, Africa may turn elsewhere for aid and assistance—a country like the PRC would like nothing more than to increase its already growing status in Africa. Ironically, as the military increases its proactive peacetime engagement efforts, the weaker the bond grows between the two threads. Yet, the military is a necessary part of any U.S. effort.

On the other hand, if the proactive peacetime engagement thread were to reflect a nonmilitary lead, coupled with a greater diversity in USG participation, the bond between threads may actually strengthen. Today the USG is striving to do just this, but the efforts fall short of the level of change required and do not adequately address the perceptions of militarizing our foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. The bold steps recommended below, if adopted, might prove to be the degree of change necessary to shift the balance in favor of the proper integration of the two threads and thus ensure success. These steps must be permanent, come with the appropriate resources, provide transformational change starting at the strategic level, and take the next evolutionary leap initiated in the revolution in military affairs noted above—establishing a genuinely integrated and proactive security engagement framework for the 21st century.

MAKING IT RIGHT

What needs to be done is already known. According to a senior USAID official, "It is clearly in the U.S. Government's interest to utilize our toolkit of diplomacy, defense, and development to counter the destabilizing effects that poor governance, corruption, and weak rule of law have on political and economic systems. . . and the threats they pose to vital American interests."[101] Similarly, in a statement regarding the military's role in Africa, the USAFRICOM commander refers to a three-pronged USG approach, with DoD taking the lead on security issues, but "playing a *supporting* role to the Department of State, which conducts diplomacy, and USAID, which implements development programs." [emphasis added][102] Together, these two statements provide a brief glimpse of a solution for prevention of security threats and the demilitarization of U.S. foreign policy—a concept referred to as 3D security engagement. The 3D concept advocates three equal pillars of engagement—diplomacy, development, and defense—all working in unison to address potential security issues such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, pandemics, etc.[103] By including development and diplomacy efforts as equal elements of the security strategy equation, the 3D security engagement concept broadens strategic, operational, and tactical options and deemphasizes the militaristic aspect of security engagement. The 3D concept also advances the strategic outlook reflected in policy and doctrine such as the NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and CCJO—that focusing on the root causes of insecurity and preventing conflict leads to stable and sustainable peace.[104]

Within the USG today, the departments and agencies whose mission capabilities most closely represent the 3D security engagement concept are the DoS, DoD, and USAID. These organizations have the responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities needed to reassure allies and partners, promote stability, and mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict.[105] Other elements of the USG, intergovernmental global and regional organizations, NGOs, and even private enterprise and individuals may be integrated into the 3D security engagement process as appropriate. The 3D security engagement concept is not a replacement for the traditional idea of integrated interagency interaction; rather, it is a better way to conceptualize, organize, and implement war prevention activities by circumventing many of the traditional weaknesses of the interagency. Since the "interagency" is not a person, place, or thing, it is not an organizational department or agency of the government. It has no leader and no workforce.[106] The interagency is simply the meeting point where the DoD, DoS, and the other formal agencies of the USG

coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate to achieve some objective.[107] It is a process where lines of authority are unclear, and vested interests are often pursued by bureaucratic players.[108] Similarly, the 3Ds do not specifically refer to a particular department or agency, but they do imply lead and hierarchy of common interest. For example, "development" does not refer exclusively to USAID. Instead, it refers more appropriately to the "activity of development" for which USAID plays a leading role and in which DoD or NGOs might be large participants in support of juxtaposed or common interests.

To successfully implement the 3D security engagement concept and mitigate concerns over the militarization of foreign policy, extraordinary political and military leadership at the strategic level and bold reforms in several areas are required. In regard to the latter, the four fundamental impediments outlined below hamper a proper implementation of the 3D security engagement concept. If not resolved, confusion over the militarization of foreign policy will persist, and U.S. strategic objectives will be correspondingly frustrated. The reforms required to overcome these impediments are generally known and easily achievable, even if somewhat contentious. Hence, the recommendations for reform proffered below are not individually novel in and of themselves, but the synergistic effect of their collective implementation could make the 3D security engagement concept a successful security paradigm for a large part of the defense dilemma posed by the 21st century environment. In effect, they address perceptions of foreign policy militarization and complete the revolution in military affairs that started with proactive peacetime engagement.

First, there is no common system for regionally viewing the world within the USG. Departments and agencies define regions differently to facilitate their planning and operational needs. For example, Algeria is considered part of Europe by the DoS and falls under USAFRICOM in DoD. The lack of common regional definitions creates policy seams and overlaps with individual states and in the regions as a whole that often lead to poor coordination and ineffective or conflicting policy decisions and implementation.[109] In addition, the complete absence of consideration of economic and information "regions" further undermines common national strategic direction at the regional level.[110] The simple fix is to require all USG departments and agencies to view the world using the same geographical templates so that regions, seams, and overlaps are commonly understood and addressed.[111]

Second, there is no senior USG functional lead to oversee security engagement efforts in each region. Consequently, efforts lack common purpose, unity of effort, and synergistic effects. Departments and agencies develop individual strategies and compete separately for resources based on ideas that often conflict or are not prioritized and appropriately sequenced. A potential solution is to establish a forward-deployed National Security Council (NSC)-level representative to oversee and lead the 3D efforts in each region. The NSC is the "President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with the administration's senior national security advisors and cabinet officials," advising and assisting the President with integrating all aspects of domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic national security policy.[112] Given the high degree of insight into national strategic objectives inherent within the NSC, placing a senior NSC representative to oversee the 3D efforts within each region would ensure that the principal 3D elements—DoD, DoS, and USAID—work toward the same national-level objectives with a common understanding of national-level guidance. It would also

lower the perception of a militarized U.S. foreign policy, bringing the use of military power more obviously under civilian control.

Third, currently there are no regional physical constructs—organizations, facilities, or manpower—sufficient to host regional 3D security engagement efforts apart from those of the combatant commands. Establishing 3D centers in each region separate and apart from the existing combatant commands may be costly to implement, but this initiative is essential to develop and implement a successful regional strategy and eliminate all vestiges of a militarized foreign policy. It empowers the senior NSC representative and ensures a balanced and well-reasoned application of U.S. national power. A key consideration for where to place 3D centers should be based on our allies within a region; current and potential partners who may find value and prestige in having such centers located within their nation.

Fourth, DoS and USAID resources are grossly insufficient to implement proactive security engagement activities worldwide. Iraq and Afghanistan have largely overwhelmed current capacity. Forced by circumstance and by policy direction, the U.S. military has taken on many burdens that in the past were the purview of civilian agencies in these theaters and elsewhere; yet, despite its gallant efforts, the military is not suitable as a long-term replacement for civilian involvement and expertise.[113] To provide much needed civilian expertise, free up military forces for other demands, and mitigate the perception and potential for a militarization of foreign policy, the USG should significantly increase civilian capacity and funding for DoS and USAID. Much like the DoS initiative to build a civilian response corps, the USG needs to develop a permanent, sizeable cadre of deployed and immediately deployable civilian experts with disparate skills to supplement or replace existing DoD efforts and meet emerging needs.[114] A robust civilian capability cannot but help to reduce the military footprint in shaping and stability operations.[115] An enhanced civilian capability reduces the temptation to use the military as a first choice and contributes to positive perceptions abroad.

CONCLUSION

Africa is a continent worthy of increased U.S. attention. It is symbolic of security issues confronting the USG in various regions around the world. Founded in the necessity to forge a new security paradigm and an emerging revolution in military affairs in regard to preventing war, the creation of USAFRICOM was a positive but incomplete step forward. The 3D security engagement concept is a further positive step toward a new security paradigm for the United States in the 21st century. The USG must follow these first steps to their logical conclusion. These recommendations offer the additional steps to create a new and viable security paradigm that promises successful implementation of national security objectives throughout the regions of the world. To do less would waste the opportunity to realize the full potential of an ongoing revolution in military affairs and ignore the strategic importance of Africa and other dynamic regions vital to U.S. security interests in the globalized world order of the 21st century.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006, p. 37.

2. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Co-Chairs, *CSIS Commission On Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America*, Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, The CSIS Press, 2007, p. 22.

3. Gregory J. Dyekman, *Security Cooperation: A Key To The Challenges Of The 21st Century,* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2007, p. 1.

4. Charles F. Wald, "New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign," *Joint Forces Quarterly,* Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006, p. 72.

5. *Ibid*.

6. *Ibid*., p. 73.

7. "U.S. To Establish New U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, February 9, 2007, available from *fpc.state.gov/fpc/80454.htm*.

8. William E. Ward, "Questions And Answers About AFRICOM," available from *www.africom.mil/africomFAQs.asp*.

9. *Ibid*.

10. Sean McFate, "U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?" *Military Review*, January-February 2008, p. 17.

11. Robert G. Berschinski, *AFRICOM's Dilemma: The "Global War on Terrorism," "Capacity Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy In Africa,* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2007, p. 8.

12. Lauren Ploch, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa," *CRS Report for Congress*, December 7, 2007, p. 6.

13. Michele Ruiters, "Africa: Why U.S.'s AFRICOM Will Hurt Africa," *Business Day*, February 14, 2007, available from *allafrica.com/stories/200702140349.html*.

14. Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America's Military*, New York: Norton, 2004, p. 70.

15. Bush, *The National Security Strategy, p. 37*.

16. Anthony Lake and Christine Todd Whitman, Chairs, "More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa," *Council On Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report No. 56*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, p. 9.

17. McFate, p. 12.

18. Lake and Whitman, p. 5.

19. *Ibid*., pp. 9-10.

20. *Ibid*., p. 9.

21. "An Overview of President Bush's African Policy," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, July 11, 2003, available from *www.state.gov/p/af/rls/22364.htm*.

22. "Fact Sheet: U.S. and G8 Renew Strong Commitment to Africa," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, July 8, 2005, available from *www.state.gov/p/af/rls/75310.htm*.

23. McFate, p. 15.

24. "U.S. To Establish New U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM."

25. Ward.

26. *Ibid*.

27. "President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa," Washington, DC: The White House, February 6, 2007, available from *www.whitehouse.gov/newsreleases/2007/02/20070206-3.html*.

28. "Interagency Update," briefing slides with scripted commentary, U.S. Africa Command, December 14, 2007, available from *www.cpms.osd.mil/africom/docs/InteragencyUpdate14Dec2007.pdf*.

29. *Ibid*.

30. *Ibid*.

31. McFate, p. 10.

32. *Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 17, 2006, p. I-1.

33. *Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 8, 2001, p. IV-2.

34. *Ibid*., p. xi.

35. Susanna P. Campbell and Michael Hartnett, "A Framework for Improved Coordination: Lessons Learned from the International Development, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Humanitarian and Conflict Resolution Communities," presented to The Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review Program, Washington, DC, October 31, 2005, p. 4.

36. McFate, p. 17.

37. JP 3-57, p. IV-1.

38. Dyekman, p. 1.

39. James L. Jones, "Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, United States European Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee,"March 7, 2006, available from *armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/March/Jones%2003-07-06.pdf*.

40. *Ibid*.

41. Dyekman, p. 1.

42. McFate, p. 16.

43. *Ibid*., pp. 16-17.

44. Richard B. Myers, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 2.0*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, p. 8.

45. *Ibid*., p. 9.

46. *Ibid*.

47. *Ibid*.

48. *Ibid*.

49. *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 17, 2006, p. VII-1.

50. *Ibid*.

51. *Ibid*.

52. Wald, 73.

53. *Ibid*.

54. *Ibid*.

55. JP 3-0, p. IV-27.

56. Wald, p. 73.

57. *Ibid*.

58. *Ibid*., p. 75.

59. *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005, p. 1-11.

60. *Ibid*., p. 2.

61. *Ibid*.

62. Secretary of Defense, *Report To Congress On The Implementation Of DoD Directive 3000.05 Military Support For Stability, Security, Transition And Reconstruction, SSTR, Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1, 2007, p. 1.

63. *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05*, p. 3.

64. *Ibid*.

65. Ploch, pp. 5-6.

66. JP 3-08, Vol I, p. viii.

67. George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, Washington, DC: The White House, December 7, 2005, p. 2.

68. JP 3-08, p. I-6.

69. U.S. Department of State, "President Issues Directive to Improve the United States' Capacity to Manage Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts," December 14, 2005, available from *www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/58067.htm*.

70. *Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 2006, p. 33.

71. *Ibid*.

72. Berschinski, p. iii.

73. *Ibid*., p. 6.

74. *Ibid*.

75. McFate, p. 17.

76. Berschinski, p. 7.

77. Ploch, p. 6.

78. *Ibid*.

79. Clarence J. Bouchat, *An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2007, p. 6.

80. *Ibid*.

81. Dana Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?" *The Washington Post,* September 28, 2000, sec A01, available from *listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0010&L=justwatch-l&D=1&O=D&P=17195*.

82. U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM, Update," June 22, 2007, available from *fpc.state.gov/fpc/87094.htm*.

83. Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America's Military,* p. 70.

84. "Proconsul, in Ancient Rome," *The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th Ed.,* New York: Columbia University Press, 2001-07, available from *www.bartleby.com/65/pr/proconsu.html*.

85. *Ibid*.

86. Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?"

87. Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America's Military*, p. 14.

88. Tom Clancy, Tony Zinni, and Tom Koltz, *Battle Ready*, New York: Putnam, 2004, p. 319.

89. *Ibid*.

90. Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America's Military*, p. 45.

91. Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?"

92. Clancy *et al*., p. 319.

93. Mitchell J. Thompson, "Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power," *Parameters*, Winter 2005-06, p. 64.

94. Berschinski, p. 7.

95. *Ibid*., p. 8.

96. *Ibid*.

97. Ploch, p. 4.

98. Donna Miles, "Gates Assesses 'Soft,' 'Hard' Power Applications in Djibouti," December 3, 2007, available from *www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48292*.

99. Berschinski, p. 8.

100. Bush, *The National Security Strategy*, p. 37.

101. "Poor Governance a Threat to Democracy in Latin America, U.S. Says: Violence, Corruption, Weak Institutions Can Undermine Progress," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 25, 2005, available from *usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/May/25-60682.html*.

102. Ploch, p. 5.

103. Lisa Schirch and Aaron Kishbaugh, "Leveraging '3-D' Security: From Rhetoric to Reality," *Foreign Policy In Focus, Policy Brief,* Vol. 11, No. 2, November 15, 2006, p. 1.

104. *Ibid*.

105. Jones, p. 12.

106. Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, "In Search of Harmony: Orchestrating 'The Interagency' for the Long War," *Armed Forces Journal*, July 2006, pp. 36-39.

107. JP 3-08, Vol I, p. vii.

108. Flournoy and Brimley, pp. 36-39.

109. Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy, "Creating a More Integrated and Effective National Security Apparatus," in Dr. Kent Hughes Butts and Mr. Jeffrey C. Reynolds, eds., *The Struggle Against Extremist Ideology: Addressing the Conditions That Foster Terrorism*, Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, p. 88.

110. Bouchat, p. 6.

111. John E. Pulliam, *Lines On a Map: Regional Orientations and United States Interagency Cooperation*, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2005, p. 12.

112. JP 3-08, Vol I, p. II-2.

113. Robert M. Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power," *Military Review*, January-February 2008, p. 6.

114. *Ibid*., p. 7.

115. *Ibid*., p. 8.