CHAPTER TWO

The Cases

Seventy-one cases of insurgency form the empirical foundation for this research. This chapter begins by describing the process used to select the cases and to collect data for them, as well as how we determined whether the outcome of a case was a win or a loss for COIN forces. The bulk of the chapter, however, is devoted to brief summaries of each of the 71 cases. More extensive case-study details can be found in the accompanying volume, *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (for the 41 new cases), and in the previously published case-study volume, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (for the 30 cases studied as part of that earlier research effort).[1]

Case Selection and Data Collection

The 71 cases explored here were drawn, in part, from a larger list of historical insurgencies developed by Martin Libicki as part of a previous RAND COIN study.[2] That initial list included 89 cases and purports

[1] Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunigan, 2013; Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010a.

[2] Martin C. Libicki, "Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings," in David C. Gompert, John Gordon IV, Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns, and Robert E. Hunter, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-595/2-OSD, 2008, pp. 373–396. The initial case list was drawn from James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003.

to be an exhaustive collection of insurgencies from 1934 to 2010. All cases met the following criteria:

- They involved fighting between states and nonstates seeking to take control of a government or region or that used violence to change government policies.
- The conflict killed at least 1,000 people over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100.
- At least 100 people were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels).
- They were not coups, countercoups, or insurrections.

To this set of 89, we added four cases from a separate list prepared by the Center for Army Analysis and The Dupuy Institute that were missing but appeared to meet Libicki's criteria, giving us a total of 93 cases.[3] From these 93 cases, we excluded 17 conflicts still considered ongoing or unresolved, which included not only conflicts listed as unresolved on Libicki's list but also two conflicts listed as resolved whose completion our analysts disputed: Burma (1948–2006) and Philippines (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) (1977–2006). We then excluded one conflict that began before WWII: China (1934–1950); two conflicts that were not clear-cut cases of insurgency but were, rather, insurrections followed by massive superpower interventions: Lebanon (1958–1959) and Dominican Republic (1965–1966); one case that was more akin to a "police action": Congo/Katanga (1960–1965); and one case that was less an insurgency and more of a coup (and thus should have been excluded by Libicki): Biafran Secession (1967–1970). These reductions left 71 cases, 30 of which were examined as case studies in the *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* research and 41 new cases. This set of 71 cases captures all insurgencies worldwide begun and completed between WWII and 2010. The cases span 61 countries and much of the globe (see Figure 2.1). Appendix A provides further detail on the case selection process.

[3] See Christopher A. Lawrence, "The Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Different Counterinsurgency Tactics and Strategies," *The Cornwallis Group XIII: Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counterinsurgency*, Nova Scotia, Canada: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2008.

Figure 2.1
Map of 71 COIN Case Dates, Countries, and Outcomes



NOTE: Green shading indicates that the COIN force prevailed (or had the better of a mixed outcome), while red shading indicates that the outcome favored the insurgents (thus, a COIN loss). Green and red stripes indicate multiple cases in a single country with different outcomes; in these instances, the color of the case name and time span corresponds to the outcome.

RAND *RR291/1-2.1*

We collected data for the case studies from secondary sources. The analyst assigned to each case thoroughly reviewed the available English-language history and secondary analysis of the conflict. Documentation proved voluminous for some cases (particularly those in Central and South America but also cases in which Russian or Soviet forces were involved); it was much more sparse for other cases (particularly those in Africa). In all cases, available information was sufficient to meet our data needs for the quantitative analyses (presented in Chapters Four, Five, and Six). The references listed at the end of the accompanying volume of case studies demonstrate the range and depth of the available literature.

Phased Data

Because the approach and behavior of the COIN force, the actions of insurgents, and other important conditions can all change over the course of an insurgency, we broke all of the cases into between one and five phases. A detailed discussion of each phase of each case for the 41 new cases can be found in the accompanying volume; full narratives for the 30 cases included in the earlier research can be found in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*.[4] Appendix A includes additional discussion of the phase assignment process in the section "Phased Data."

The phases are not uniform in duration. A new phase was declared when the case analyst recognized a significant shift in the COIN approach, in the approach of the insurgents, or in the overall conditions of the case. Phases were *not* intended to capture microchanges or tight cycles of adaptation and counteradaptation between the insurgents and the COIN force; rather, these were macro-level and seachange phases. Throughout the report, *case data* refers to the data for a single phase, the decisive phase of the case. Almost all analyses are at the case level and consider only the decisive phase, but some analyses consider data across phases within a case.

Assessing Case Outcomes

Because our analysis focuses on correlates of success in COIN, one of the most important elements of our case studies is the identification of the outcome of the cases (i.e., whether COIN forces actually succeeded). Many of these cases have complicated outcomes, in which neither side realized all of its stated objectives, and when the conflict was officially over—that is, when the fighting ceased—it was not exactly clear which side prevailed. While we report mixed outcomes in our case narratives, we also identify each case as either a COIN win or a COIN loss.

[4] Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunigan, 2013; Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010a.

To adjudicate unclear case outcomes, we followed the logic illustrated in Figure 2.2. First, for each case, we asked whether the government targeted by the insurgency stayed in power through the end of the conflict and whether it retained sovereignty over the region of conflict. If insurgents either deposed (or otherwise led to the fall of) the government or won de facto control of a separatist region, then the COIN force did *not* win. If the government remained in power and the country intact, then we further considered whether the government had been forced to (or chose to) make major concessions to the insurgents, such as through power sharing or loss of territory or other sovereign control, or was otherwise forced to yield to insurgent demands. If the government stayed in power, the country remained intact, and no major concessions were granted to the insurgents, then the COIN force unambiguously won. If, however, major concessions were made,

Figure 2.2
Logic for Assignment of Case Outcomes



SOURCE: Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010b, p. xiv, Figure S.2.
RAND *RR291/1-2.2*

then the outcome was mixed. In all cases, what constituted a "major" concession and who (the COIN force or the insurgents) had the better of a mixed outcome was determined at the discretion of the individual case analyst and was based on the distinct narrative of that case.

Applying this logic to the 71 cases resulted in 29 COIN wins and 42 COIN losses. Table 2.1 lists the insurgencies, the dates they spanned, and their respective outcomes.

Table 2.1
Countries, Date Spans, and Outcomes of the 71 Case-Study Insurgencies

Country (Insurgency)	Years	Outcome
UK in Palestine	1944–1947	COIN loss
Greece	1945–1949	**COIN win**
Indochina	1946–1955	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Philippines (Huk Rebellion)	1946–1956	**COIN win**
Colombia (La Violencia)	1948–1958	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Malaya	1948–1955	**COIN win**
Kenya	1952–1956	**COIN win**
Algerian Independence	1954–1962	COIN loss
Cyprus	1955–1959	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Cuba	1956–1959	COIN loss
Oman (Imamate Uprising)	1957–1959	**COIN win**
Indonesia (Darul Islam)	1958–1962	**COIN win**
Tibet	1956–1974	**COIN win**
Guatemala	1960–1996	**COIN win**
Laos	1959–1975	COIN loss
Namibia	1960–1989	COIN loss
South Africa	1960–1990	COIN loss
South Vietnam	1960–1975	COIN loss
Eritrea	1961–1991	COIN loss
Iraqi Kurdistan	1961–1975	**COIN win**
Angolan Independence	1961–1974	COIN loss
Guinea-Bissau	1962–1974	COIN loss

Table 2.1—Continued

Country (Insurgency)	Years	Outcome
Mozambique Independence	1962–1974	COIN loss
Yemen	1962–1970	COIN loss
Uruguay	1963–1972	**COIN win**
Oman (Dhofar Rebellion)	1965–1975	**COIN win**
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia	1965–1980	COIN loss
Argentina	1969–1979	**COIN win**
Cambodia	1967–1975	COIN loss
Northern Ireland	1969–1999	**COIN win (mixed, favoring COIN)**
Jordan	1970–1971	**COIN win**
Bangladesh	1971	COIN loss
Philippines (Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF])	1971–1996	**COIN win (mixed, favoring COIN)**
Baluchistan	1973–1978	**COIN win**
Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA])	1975–2002	**COIN win**
Indonesia (East Timor)	1975–2000	COIN loss
Lebanese Civil War	1975–1990	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Western Sahara	1975–1991	**COIN win (mixed, favoring COIN)**
Indonesia (Aceh)	1976–2005	**COIN win (mixed, favoring COIN)**
Mozambique (Mozambican National Resistance [RENAMO])	1976–1995	**COIN win (mixed, favoring COIN)**
Sri Lanka	1976–2009	**COIN win**
Nicaragua (Somoza)	1978–1979	COIN loss
Afghanistan (anti-Soviet)	1978–1992	COIN loss
Kampuchea	1978–1992	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
El Salvador	1979–1992	**COIN win (mixed, favoring COIN)**
Somalia	1980–1991	COIN loss
Peru	1980–1992	**COIN win**

Table 2.1—Continued

Country (Insurgency)	Years	Outcome
Nicaragua (Contras)	1981–1990	COIN loss
Senegal	1982–2002	**COIN win**
Turkey (Kurdistan Workers' Party [PKK])	1984–1999	**COIN win**
Sudan (Sudan People's Liberation Army [SPLA])	1984–2004	COIN loss
Uganda (Allied Democratic Forces [ADF])	1986–2000	**COIN win**
Papua New Guinea	1988–1998	COIN loss
Liberia	1989–1997	COIN loss
Rwanda	1990–1994	COIN loss
Moldova	1990–1992	COIN loss
Sierra Leone	1991–2002	**COIN win**
Algeria (Armed Islamic Group [GIA])	1992–2004	**COIN win**
Croatia	1992–1995	**COIN win**
Afghanistan (post-Soviet)	1992–1996	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Tajikistan	1992–1997	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Georgia/Abkhazia	1992–1994	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Nagorno-Karabakh	1992–1994	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Bosnia	1992–1995	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Burundi	1993–2003	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Chechnya I	1994–1996	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)
Afghanistan (Taliban)	1996–2001	COIN loss
Zaire (anti-Mobutu)	1996–1997	COIN loss
Kosovo	1996–1999	COIN loss
Nepal	1997–2006	COIN loss
Democratic Republic of the Congo (anti-Kabila)	1998–2003	COIN loss (mixed, favoring insurgents)

NOTE: For details on outcome scoring and categories, see the section "Outcome Assessment" in Appendix A.

The remainder of this chapter presents brief summaries of the historical cases. They are presented chronologically by start date. Analyses of the relationships between specific concepts and factors and the case outcomes are presented in Chapters Three and Four. For completeness, all 71 cases used in these analyses are summarized here, even though only 41 of the cases are new to this effort. Those familiar with the histories of these cases are welcome to skip ahead.

UK in Palestine, 1944–1947

Case Outcome: COIN Loss
Fought against the tide of history (postcolonialism)

In 1923, following its confirmation by the League of Nations, the British Mandate for Palestine became the legal commission for the administration of Palestine. It was British limitations on Jewish immigration into Palestine—which had been established as a Jewish homeland under the terms of the mandate—that spurred three underground Jewish organizations to launch an insurgency against the mandatory government. During the conflict, as many as 100,000 British soldiers, plus mandatory police and British Special Air Service forces, were involved in the conflict. The counterinsurgents' tactics included extensive cordon-and-search operations, massive numbers of arrests and detentions, and the imposition of martial law in some areas. Although these tactics were generally successful, the British were not as highly motivated as the insurgents in this conflict. Fighting against the tide of history, they ultimately capitulated in late 1947, withdrawing from Palestine.

Greece, 1945–1949

Case Outcome: COIN Win

As the Nazi occupation of Greece during WWII drew to a close and the Greek government in exile returned, the country's predominant communist insurgent group, the National Popular Liberation Army, decided not to demobilize. Instead, it attempted to seize power in Athens to avoid a return to the prewar political status quo. The British quickly came to the government's rescue, defending Athens with 75,000 British troops and forcing a quick and apparently successful

surrender by the insurgents. However, many of the insurgents merely went underground, only to reemerge almost two years later to lead the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), which aimed to democratize the country. With the Greek military still in the process of rebuilding itself after WWII, the insurgents were able to seize the upper hand in the second phase of the conflict. The DSE benefited substantially from the safe havens and external support provided by Greece's communist neighbors, which enabled the group to withstand the extensive military troops, training, and assistance that the British provided to the COIN effort. During the final phase of the conflict, external conditions led to a withdrawal of British support and its replacement by U.S. military aid, provided under the Truman Doctrine. At the same time, the insurgents' primary ally, Yugoslavia, closed its borders to their operations. Meanwhile, the insurgents made the strategic miscalculation of adopting conventional tactics prematurely, thus aiding the COIN force in securing a victory over the insurgency.

Indochina, 1946–1955

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

French efforts to reclaim their lost colony after the conclusion of WWII appeared to get off to a good start but ultimately became too costly (in blood, treasure, and concessions). While the French maintained air and conventional battlefield superiority throughout the conflict, Viet Minh insurgents learned to expose themselves to that technical superiority only when the French could be significantly outnumbered, leading to a mixed conflict of constant low-intensity guerrilla warfare punctuated by short, sharp, and numerically overwhelming conventional engagements. Jungle and mountain terrain decisively supported this approach.

The conflict turned to favor the insurgents after the Chinese Revolution in 1949, with 1950 bringing support to the insurgents from both the Chinese and the Soviets. Even with a massive influx of U.S. money and materiel, French firepower and political concessions were insufficient to defeat a numerically superior foe that could and did use the jungle to blunt French air power, constrain French maneuver capabilities, stretch French supply lines, and conceal insurgent movements.

After the ignominious defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the 1954 Geneva conference divided Indochina at the 17th parallel and set the stage (or perhaps, baited the trap) for much greater U.S. investment in fighting communists in Vietnam.

Philippines (Huk Rebellion), 1946–1956

Case Outcome: COIN Win

An agrarian peasant movement aimed at reducing economic and social inequality, the Hukbalahap ("Huk," for short) insurgency was initially successful in winning extensive local support and perpetrating guerrilla attacks and robberies against a newly independent Philippine government. However, the Huks' increasing violence and the addition of common criminals to their ranks led the government to appoint a liberal congressman and former provincial military governor, Ramon Magsaysay, to the post of secretary of defense in September 1950. Magsaysay's appointment marked a turning point in the conflict, and he instituted sweeping reforms that succeeded in drying up civilian support for the insurgency, decreasing government and military corruption, and increasing the COIN force's tactical effectiveness against the Huks. These reforms fortuitously coincided with strategic errors on the part of the insurgents, as well as the addition of U.S. financial and military support. All of these factors combined to lead the COIN force to victory in the conflict's final phase.

Colombia ("La Violencia"), 1948–1958

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

"La Violencia" in Colombia was a distinctive case in which an internal political conflict rose to the level of all-out civil war for a decade before culminating in a negotiated powersharing agreement. Beginning as an ideologically and politically motivated insurgency/revolution fought by Liberal Party members and supporters against the suppression of their political power by Conservatives in the government, La Violencia morphed into an economically motivated conflict involving extensive rural banditry. The COIN force, composed of both the national police and the armed forces, employed a number of good practices at times,

such as measures designed to win popular support. However, they did so inconsistently over the course of the conflict. In the final phases of the conflict, the government and COIN forces under President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla became so repressive, and the Colombian economy deteriorated to such an extent, that Liberal and Conservative Party leaders on the sidelines were willing to overlook their differences and reach a compromise to both unseat Rojas Pinilla and form a coalition government.

Malaya, 1948–1955

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The British had already begun to cede government control back to the Malayan states following WWII, establishing a system whereby the states retained sovereignty under British protection. Still, dismayed at the extent of their disenfranchisement under the new government, Chinese communists launched a Maoist guerrilla war to expel the British from the country in 1948. Beginning the conflict with an understrength military and police force, the British immediately created a sizable special constabulary, employing conventional tactics and large-scale jungle sweeps that proved wholly ineffective. However, the COIN force ultimately adapted to shifts in insurgent strategy over the course of the conflict, and the second phase ushered in a COIN strategy focused on population and spatial control as part of the Briggs Plan's massive resettlements. These strategies were largely successful and were continued and improved upon under the policies of Sir Gerald Templer. Along with efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of the population, Templer's focus on improved intelligence, as well as a better organized and larger COIN force and efforts to reach a political settlement to the conflict, contributed to the COIN force's success by 1960 by the time the conflict officially ended in 1960 (violence was infrequent following parliamentary elections in 1955). Notably, the Britain's efforts in Malaya are often held up as a paradigm of effective British COIN practice.

Kenya, 1952–1956

Case Outcome: COIN Win
Fought against the tide of history (postcolonialism)

The Mau Mau Rebellion was a brutal conflict that affected all of Kenya's Kikuyu people. The rebellion was an anticolonial struggle aimed at expelling the British colonial government from Kenya due to grievances over land rights, pay for African workers, and the underrepresentation of the Kikuyu people in politics. Entailing gross humanitarian abuses on both sides throughout all phases of the conflict, the main COIN strategies employed involved large-scale sweeps, arrests, detentions, and resettlement programs that were quite indiscriminate in nature. While the COIN force enjoyed the support of a majority of the Kikuyu people at the outset of hostilities, repressive COIN tactics were pushing the Kikuyu over to the insurgents' side by the second phase of the conflict. British and local COIN forces did win back some extent of popular support (particularly in the detention centers), but popular support, on the whole, does not appear to have been decisive in this conflict. Rather, it was the repressive, indiscriminate, and overwhelming force employed by the COIN force that eventually broke the back of the insurgency. This COIN success did not prevail over the long term, however, and Britain ultimately granted Kenya's independence less than a decade after the conclusion of the rebellion.

Algerian Independence, 1954–1962

Case Outcome: COIN Loss
Fought against the tide of history (postcolonialism)

Three hundred members of the National Liberation Front (FLN) guerrilla movement launched the French-Algerian conflict in 1954 with a series of uncoordinated bombing attacks, seeking an end to French colonial rule. Initially dismissed as "traditional banditry," the FLN attacks drew an increasingly forceful response from France as the insurgents gained strength and began targeting the French settler community. As a result, the French military employed brutal COIN tactics against Algeria's native Muslim population. France became more entrenched in battle in 1957 after the FLN initiated a campaign of

urban terrorism in the city of Algiers. French special forces responded with roundups of civilians, "disappearances," and the systematic use of torture in interrogations that roused international condemnation. While the army was able to make significant tactical gains against the FLN with its subsequent employment of a system of quadrillage and the construction of *cordons sanitaires* along Algeria's borders, France was unable to recover from the political losses it incurred in the Battle for Algiers. After President Charles de Gaulle assumed power in 1958, the French army adopted more effective COIN tactics that targeted the FLN and provided humanitarian assistance to local communities, yet de Gaulle eventually announced his support for Algerian autonomy. This decision was violently opposed by members of the French settler community and radical army officers and led to the outbreak of a wave of attacks against Algerian Muslims and French officials. The violence ultimately failed to impede negotiations on France's withdrawal, however. After eight years of brutal conflict, the French government was forced to succumb to the growing pressure from the Algerian population, the public in metropolitan France and the international community to end the war and concede its political, if not its military, defeat.

Cyprus, 1955–1959

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)
Fought against the tide of history (postcolonialism)

The National Organization of Cypriot Struggle (EOKA), a nationalist, anti-colonialist insurgent organization composed of Greek Cypriots, launched a guerrilla conflict against the British colonial government in Cyprus in April 1955. Its aim was to compel the British colonial government to disperse its forces and cede Cyprus to Greece. Greek Cypriots were the predominant ethnic group in Cyprus at the time, and EOKA was a predominantly youth-based movement that had the support of more than 80 percent of the population and was also popular in neighboring Greece. Due to this extensive support, the insurgents were able to prevail despite the British colonial administration's reorganization of its COIN force structure, its imposition of martial law, and the creation of a Turkish-Cypriot paramilitary organization that actively supported the British in the second phase of the conflict.

The hostilities ended in 1959 with a settlement negotiated by Britain, Greece, and Turkey that called for Cyprus to be granted its independence under a power-sharing constitution designed to allow representation for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, this settlement did little more than intensify the acrimony between the two ethnic groups, and another war broke just four years later that left the country divided along ethnic lines.

Cuba, 1956–1959

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

Leading a socialist insurgency in Cuba beginning in 1956, Fidel Castro presented himself as aiming to restore a legitimate democratic system on the island. He was successful due to both internal and external factors. Internally, Castro's mastery of propaganda and his appreciation of the importance of local support for an insurgency paid off, and he continually won both local civilians and Cuban army personnel over to his side. In contrast, the COIN force opposing Castro was poorly trained, corrupt, and suffered from low morale, which led it to engage in activities that alienated the population. External support to the COIN force from the United States, primarily in the form of military equipment and weapons, served only to prolong the conflict by propping up a corrupt and mismanaged Cuban regime. The United States eventually withdrew its support following Cuban President Fulgencio Batista's loss of popular legitimacy on the island. The conflict subsequently ended with an insurgent win and Batista's exile on January 1, 1959.

Oman (Imamate Uprising), 1957–1959

Case Outcome: COIN Win

Long-standing tensions between sultanate rulers in the coastal regions of Oman and rebellious tribes in the interior of the country fueled a separatist insurgency led by the religious Imamate in 1957. Saudi Arabia and Egypt supported the imamate forces, enabling them to maintain the upper hand in the conflict until the British intervened to shore up the sultan's limited defenses. The British initially contained the rebels' advance by offering minimal ground troops and air support

to the Omani armed forces. Later, when the rebels retreated and began an intensive guerrilla campaign from their safe haven in the northern Jebel Akhdar Mountains, London offered more targeted military assistance, which included designated Royal Air Force aircraft and seconded British officers to command the sultan's armed forces. It was not until the British engaged its Special Air Service in the conflict to conduct an assault on the rebels' mountain redoubt, however, that the sultanate forces were able to establish full control over the interior of the country and achieve a decisive victory over the imamate insurgency.

Indonesia (Darul Islam), 1958–1962

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The Darul Islam insurgency was a politically and religiously motivated rebellion that challenged the centralization policies of the newly independent Indonesian government and sought to establish sharia law. Throughout the 1950s, Darul Islam conducted an increasingly effective guerrilla campaign in West Java against a weak Indonesian army that was unable to provide adequate security to the population. As the insurgency threatened to spread to other regions of the country and pose a legitimate challenge President Sukarno's regime, the Indonesian government adopted a comprehensive pacification strategy in 1959 that was able to change the course of the conflict. The strategy combined civic action with cordon-and-search tactics and the forced engagement of the local population in security operations through a technique called *pagar bettis*, or "fence of legs." Within the course of three years—and benefiting from a lack of international scrutiny of its harsh COIN policies—the Indonesian army was able to restrict the insurgents' territory and eliminate the leadership of the Darul Islam movement to achieve a decisive victory over the insurgents.

Tibet, 1956–1974

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The National Volunteer Defense Army at first posed a significant challenge to a heavy-handed Chinese occupying COIN force and, later, occupying government. While the COIN force practiced excessively

brutal and demeaning tactics to assimilate Tibetans into the Chinese way of life, the relative deprivation of the population precluded any possibility of civilian assistance to the insurgents. External support from the United States and India prolonged the conflict and bought time for (and the possibility of) an insurgent win. However, a series of tactical and operational errors by the insurgents, exacerbated by intermittent suspensions of external aid and the overwhelming force employed by the Chinese to crush the insurgency, eventually led to the insurgents' downfall. The conflict ended with a COIN win following Nepal's withdrawal of territorial access from the insurgents in 1973.

Guatemala, 1960–1996

Case Outcome: COIN Win

For a 36-year period between 1960 and 1996, Guatemala suffered the effects of a bloody insurgency in which approximately 200,000 people were killed or "disappeared," with an additional 2 million internally displaced or exiled as refugees. The COIN force consisted of the Guatemalan government and armed forces, the traditional elite, and landowners, while the insurgents were a mix of leftists, nationalistic-socialist reformers, middle-class intellectuals, and peasants. Guatemala's COIN campaign employed extremely brutal tactics against the insurgents and their base of support, particularly the country's indigenous population. U.S. support during the first phase of the conflict included training and funding, which assisted the Guatemalans in smashing the insurgency and sending its remaining fighters fleeing to the hills. Not bound to the same standards as its U.S. partners, the Guatemalan government looked the other way as right-wing paramilitaries routinely raped, murdered, and mutilated civilians at will, leading Washington to distance itself from any tacit affiliation for extended periods of the conflict. Eventually, a war-weary population and a beleaguered government agreed to negotiations with an umbrella group of guerrillas, addressing a wide range of grievances and working to rebuild a country whose infrastructure was decimated by ongoing violence and instability.

Laos, 1959–1975

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

Lamented as "the forgotten war," the insurgency in Laos was heavily influenced (and often overshadowed) by the conflict in neighboring Vietnam. A victim of geography, Laos experienced half-hearted fighting between different factions and may well have worked itself out in a lasting compromise if not for pressure from North Vietnamese communists to control areas of the country for the infiltration of troops and materiel into South Vietnam (the Ho Chi Min trail) and U.S. efforts to oppose the communist presence and influence.

Beginning in earnest in 1959, fighting pitted variously rightist Royal Lao forces supported by Hmong guerrillas against the leftist Pathet Lao (indigenous communists) and their North Vietnamese supporters. These participants were joined at times by other players, including U.S. advisers, Filipino troops, U.S. air power, Thai commandos and artillery formations, and "neutralist" Lao forces. Of the domestic forces, only the Hmong guerrillas were ever particularly effective. When fighting was primarily among the Lao, it tended toward stalemate. Periods of heavy North Vietnamese involvement, however, always led to substantial gains by the insurgents, who were fought off only with significant intervention on the government's side. After months of wrangling, 1962 finally saw another Geneva agreement, this time for a neutralized Laos with a coalition government representing the three major factions: the rightists, the leftists, and the neutralists. Part of the neutralization agreement included the removal of foreign forces from Laos. This agreement was only ever marginally embraced by the various external players, and ultimately served to improve the communist position. Consolidating their gains and marshaling their strength, the communists again quit the government and fighting increased in intensity.

By the time of the 1973 cease-fire and neutralization, the government of Laos controlled little more than the capital and the Mekong River valley—and that only by virtue of the Hmong and U.S. air power. With the withdrawal of U.S. support (both air power and funding) in 1973, the Hmong were demobilized and the Lao government was left to its fate; it would ultimately fall relatively quickly to the communists.

During the conflict, Laos was underdeveloped in every way: The government was corrupt and ineffective, the economy wholly dependent on outside support, and the military corrupt and ineffective.

Namibia, 1960–1989

Case Outcome: COIN Loss
Fought against the tide of history (apartheid)

To quell a burgeoning insurgency in southwestern Africa, South Africa initially deployed the South African Police Service, even as South African COIN forces were stretched thin by the African National Congress (ANC)–led insurgency within the country's own borders. The first decade of the war involved low-level but consistent fighting and an increasingly assertive insurgent force. Terrain significantly aided the guerrillas in their ability to elude South African security forces that were operating beyond their traditional zones of comfort. At the end of the first phase, the South African military took over responsibility for prosecuting the war and employed a significant special forces component. The COIN force was able to deny the insurgents permanent bases within Namibia and was effective in raiding Angola to strike at South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) fighters based in that country. SWAPO insurgents teamed with ANC fighters at different stages of the insurgency to conduct joint operations both within and outside Namibian territory. As the COIN forces did in neighboring South Africa, those deployed to Namibia consistently practiced good COIN techniques but fell victim to shifting political tides sweeping the region. The conflict ended when the South African Defense Force agreed to withdraw from Namibia in exchange for Cuban troops' withdrawal from Angola. Subsequently, SWAPO emerged victorious from a United Nations (UN)–monitored election for a constituent assembly.

South Africa, 1960–1990

Case Outcome: COIN Loss
Fought against the tide of history (apartheid)

Nelson Mandela and the ANC fought against the apartheid government of white minority rule in South Africa over a period of more

than 30 years. Along with other antigovernment groups, including the South African Communist Party and various black nationalist groups, the ANC agitated for political change while also following a path toward political violence. The ANC and its armed wing, Umkhunto we Sizwe, or "Spear of the Nation," waged a protracted campaign of sabotage, assassination, and bombing against a militarily superior South African Defense Force. In the early stages of the conflict, the ANC was unable to establish a robust presence within South Africa itself, so instead, the insurgents operated from bases in other countries favorable to the ANC, including Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique, at different times throughout the conflict. The COIN force was never seriously at risk of being defeated by the insurgents militarily, though the ANC was adept at cultivating political support, both inside and outside of South Africa. COIN force heavy-handedness also took away from the legitimacy of the government. By 1990, international opinion had turned against the government in Pretoria, and apartheid as a system of government was deemed illegitimate, paving the way for Mandela's ascension to power and the end of white rule in South Africa in 1994.

South Vietnam, 1960–1975

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

Historical accounts of the conflict in Vietnam vary widely in the points emphasized and the explanations offered. Disputes are facilitated by the personal experiences of many direct observers who saw or participated in sometimes very different slices of the conflict at different times, at different operational levels, and in different parts of the country. What, if anything, could have been done to change the outcome of the war (and who is to blame for the outcome) remains fairly hotly contested. What the outcome was, however, is not contested: U.S. forces withdrew in 1973, and the Saigon government fell to the combined pressure of the insurgency and North Vietnamese regular forces in April 1975—unequivocally a COIN loss.

The 1954 Geneva agreement divided what is now Vietnam roughly in half. In the few years before the insurgency began in earnest, South Vietnam sought, with U.S. assistance, to build a state to

govern itself and an army to defend itself. Neither effort proved particularly effective. A vigorous rural insurgency that began in 1960 would remove the government's representatives from rural villages and govern in their stead. With significant support from communist North Vietnam, the insurgents spread rapidly. South Vietnamese COIN efforts were heavy-handed, often alienating the rural population and increasing the ease of the insurgents' recruiting. U.S. military aid increased, often at the expense of other forms of development aid, and the United States became increasingly frustrated with the failure of the Saigon government to heed its advice regarding political liberalization and government reform. The year 1963 saw the first of roughly a dozen coups or other changes of government in succession, none being any more effective at governance or COIN than the previous.

The domestic insurgency, bolstered by infiltrations of personnel and materiel from North Vietnam, put sufficient pressure on government forces to prompt the United States to commit combat forces beginning in 1964. This commitment rapidly surged to more than 180,000 U.S. troops by the end of 1965 on the way to a peak of more than 500,000 in 1969. Constrained by a desire to avoid drawing China into the war, U.S. action against North Vietnam would never stem the flow of soldiers and resources to the south, and large-scale sweeps of jungle territory did little to pacify insurgent cadres and their peasant supporters. After 1965, U.S. forces regularly fought not only insurgent guerrillas but also substantial formations of North Vietnamese regulars. Employing air support and overwhelming firepower, the United States almost always prevailed in these engagements, but the southbound flow of support did not abate.

The infamous Tet Offensive, timed to coincide with the celebration of the lunar new year in early 1968, gave the lie to American claims of a "light at the end of the tunnel" as the insurgents staged coordinated attacks in virtually every urban center in Vietnam. Though psychologically devastating, these attacks were quickly beaten back, with heavy losses inflicted on the communists. The insurgents would never fully recover their strength, especially in the face of a subsequent new U.S. emphasis on the identification and elimination of their political apparatus and on security and pacification in rural villages. However,

the damage had been done. Although the United States gained ground against the domestic insurgency, pressure from Chinese- and Soviet-armed North Vietnamese regulars continued to increase as domestic American support for the war waned. When the United States withdrew in 1973, it left a large and well-equipped South Vietnamese army that was no match for the combined might of the domestic insurgency and communist regular forces.

Eritrea, 1961–1991

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

Ethiopia gained control of the former Italian colony of Eritrea and unilaterally annexed the region in 1962, which led to the outbreak of an insurgency. Initially limited to a small group of guerrilla fighters supported by Arab nationalist regimes, the insurgency developed into a broad-based secessionist movement supported by both the Muslim and Christian Eritrean communities. This broadening of the conflict occurred after the Ethiopian government launched a brutal COIN campaign that resulted in a high number of civilian casualties and significant population displacement. By the mid-1970s, the insurgency posed a serious threat to the Ethiopian regime and contributed to a Marxist coup against the monarchy. The new revolutionary government continued to employ repressive COIN tactics against the Eritrean population. Although it benefited from extensive Soviet military assistance, it could not defeat an increasingly resilient insurgency. Finally, weakened by years of war and famine and suffering from a withdrawal of Soviet support, Ethiopian forces were defeated in Eritrea. As a result, the government in Addis Ababa was toppled in 1991. Insurgent leaders were then able to establish a provisional government in Eritrea and were guaranteed a referendum on independence, which passed in 1993.

Iraqi Kurdistan, 1961–1975

Case Outcome: COIN Win

After decades of contention between the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and the central government, a rebellion was sparked in 1961 by growing frustration with the nationalist Iraqi government's failure to

deliver on its promise to provide the Kurds with political autonomy. Initially, Kurdish guerrillas, known as *peshmerga*, launched limited small-scale attacks on government forces. The Iraqi army responded with conventional counteroffensives, which served to widen the war and alienate the population. Despite various attempts to reach a cease-fire, fighting grew more intense as both sides benefited from increasing levels of external support from the Soviet Union, Iran, and the United States. Finally, in 1974, *peshmerga* forces, advised by their Iranian and U.S. supporters, attempted to launch a direct conventional attack on the Iraqi regime. This mistaken attempt was met with a full-scale counterassault that enabled the Iraqi forces to penetrate deep into Kurdish territory and threaten their mountain safe havens. Having obtained the military advantage, Iraq solidified its gains by negotiating an agreement with the Shah of Iran to withdraw his critical military support to the Kurds in exchange for a territorial claim to the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Once the Kurdish forces lost the support of the Iranian military, the rebellion was crushed.

Angolan Independence, 1961–1974

Case Outcome: COIN Loss
Fought against the tide of history (postcolonialism)

The Angolan war of independence began in earnest in 1961 and continued unabated for the next 13 years. (A follow-on insurgency began immediately afterward and lasted for an additional 27 years.) The insurgency was divided among three separate insurgent groups for most of the first phase but still managed to inflict significant damage on the Portuguese COIN force. In the second phase, the COIN force implemented military and political reforms, separated the insurgents from the population, instituted development programs, and enlisted locals into the security forces. Toward the end of the insurgency, the COIN force had reduced troop casualty rates and began making tangible progress in pacifying the population. However, the April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal led Lisbon to withdraw from Angola, essentially handing a tailor-made victory to the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Guinea-Bissau, 1962–1974

Case Outcome: COIN Loss
Fought against the tide of history (postcolonialism)

Led by Amílcar Lopes Cabral, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) waged an insurgency to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau. The composition of the insurgency was divided sharply along ethnic lines; the leadership of the PAIGC was almost exclusively Cape Verdean, while most of its foot soldiers were ethnic Guineans. Throughout the conflict, both sides grew weary of the other's intentions, making cohesion more challenging. Of Portugal's three African COIN campaigns, Guinea-Bissau was considered the least valuable, and, as a result, troops fighting there were often left wanting for supplies and resources. The insurgents enjoyed several important advantages, including external sponsorship from a number of countries and safe havens in neighboring French Guinea (Guinea-Conakry). Relentless attacks by PAIGC guerrillas confined the Portuguese to large garrisons, further alienating the COIN force from the population. Despite a change in leadership in the second phase, which resulted in a reequipped and resupplied COIN force conducting operations beyond their garrisons, domestic political events in Portugal led to a withdrawal of troops and the establishment of an independent Guinea-Bissau.

Mozambique Independence, 1962–1974

Case Outcome: COIN Loss
Fought against the tide of history (postcolonialism)

Mozambique was one of three concurrent insurgencies that Portuguese colonial forces battled throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. In the first phase of this conflict, General António Augusto dos Santos prosecuted a low-intensity population-centric COIN campaign characterized by psychological warfare and limited operations. In Phase II, General Kaúlza de Arriaga switched course, taking a comprehensive approach that included development, resettlement, recruitment of indigenous troops, and an increase in airborne search-and-destroy operations in an attempt to win the war decisively and bring the con-

flict to a victorious end for the Portuguese. Despite a largely successful COIN campaign, the 1974 Carnation Revolution led Portugal to withdraw from its overseas colonies, leading to an insurgent victory and the ascension of the Mozambique Liberation Front.

Yemen, 1962–1970

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

An insurgency was launched in North Yemen after the country's ruling imam was overthrown in a coup by Egyptian-trained military officers in 1962. Seeking to restore the old order, the imam rallied tribal forces, with support from Saudi Arabia, to launch a guerrilla campaign against the new republican government, which maintained a weak hold on the country. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser responded to the growing insurgent threat by providing an increasing level of military support to the Yemeni government. Initially supplying military advisers and special forces teams, Egypt sent 60,000 troops to Yemen by 1965 and became the primary COIN force. Despite their overwhelming land and air power, the Egyptian forces could not adequately defend against the imam's attacks or achieve popular support due to their brutal COIN tactics and modern socialist ideology that was antithetical to traditional Yemeni culture. Nasser briefly agreed to mediation efforts after experiencing heavy losses but subsequently recommitted a large contingent of Egyptian troops to Yemen as he sought to fill the strategic vacuum left by Great Britain's withdrawal from South Yemen. It was only after experiencing a humiliating defeat in the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War in 1967 that Nasser decided to withdraw from the country. The Yemeni conflict continued at a reduced pace after Egypt's withdrawal, finally ending two years later when new leaders emerged on both sides and agreed to establish a more moderate government that provided the imam's supporters with significant political autonomy.

Uruguay, 1963–1972

Case Outcome: COIN Win

A Marxist-Leninist urban insurgency perpetrated by the Tupamaros in Uruguay, this conflict was motivated by the rapid decline of the country's previously successful economy in the early 1960s. The innovative Tupamaros—who at first were masters at solidifying public support and turning the populace against the government—were easily able to overcome Uruguay's inept COIN force, which was composed of police and, later, paramilitary forces, during the first two phases of the conflict. However, the insurgents' increasingly aggressive and violent tactics in the later years of the war led to an increase in popular support for the COIN effort and aided in the supply of human intelligence to COIN forces. At the same time, the COIN effort was strengthened by the Uruguayan president's decision to order the army to take control of the conflict from the inadequately trained and understrength police force. The army rapidly prevailed over the Tupamaros once it became directly involved in the conflict, in part by initiating psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign to inform the populace of the threat posed by the insurgents. Ultimately, the army was so successful that it became a menace in its own right, dissolving the country's democratic parliament and imposing military rule in Uruguay immediately following its defeat of the insurgents. The military continued to rule the country for 12 years after the end of the conflict.

Oman (Dhofar Rebellion), 1965–1975

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The Dhofar rebellion began as a separatist movement by tribes seeking independence from the repressive rule of the reactionary Sultan Said ibn Taimur. After a Marxist government gained power in neighboring South Yemen, the insurgency adopted a communist ideology, and the conflict evolved into a regional war involving multiple external actors. Great Britain, Iran, and Jordan supported the sultan, while South Yemen, China, and the Soviet Union supported the "communist" insurgents. Despite extensive external support, the Omani military was unable to contain the rebellion due to the sultan's refusal to

modernize his forces or to provide even the most basic government services to his subjects. After the sultan's son, Sultan Qaboos, took power in a coup, the Omani forces and their British advisers adopted a more effective COIN strategy that combined conventional operations with civil development and political reform. Once Qaboos addressed the needs of his population, seized the military initiative, and reduced the insurgents' access to support and sanctuary, he was able to achieve a decisive victory.

Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1965–1980

Case Outcome: COIN Loss
Fought against the tide of history (apartheid)

The Rhodesian conflict began when the British colony of Southern Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence and asserted its right to maintain white-minority rule. This declaration prompted the country's two major black African nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), to launch a rural guerrilla insurgency to achieve political rights for the black majority. Initially, the guerrillas launched small-scale attacks against white settlers from bases in Zambia. The insurgency then expanded as ZANU and ZAPU established training and logistical bases along the eastern and western borders of the country and drew support from the local population in Rhodesia. The guerrillas were unable to gain the upper hand in the conflict, however, as the Rhodesian security forces adopted a series of innovative COIN tactics in road security, tracking, and reconnaissance and intelligence gathering that constrained the number of insurgent attacks and preserved military control over the country. It was only when political tensions became too great and external pressure weighed in against the government that Salisbury was willing offer concessions to the black majority and concede defeat.

Argentina, 1969–1979

Case Outcome: COIN Win

Initially a socialist insurgency aimed primarily at restoring the power of exiled president Juan Perón, the insurgency in Argentina evolved into revolt against the government of the reinstated Perón and eventually became much more focused on military goals in lieu of political aims. Throughout the conflict, the country's political system morphed from military government to an elected socialist government, before shifting back to a military regime with the ousting of Isabel Perón's administration in 1976. Through these transitions, the government's COIN strategy shifted from one of relative leniency focused on legal mechanisms to one that adopted increasingly illegal, brutal tactics, culminating in the indiscriminate "dirty war" waged against large swathes of Argentine society after 1976 that ultimately crushed the insurgency.

Cambodia, 1967–1975

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

As the conflict in neighboring Vietnam led North Vietnamese forces to make more and more use of logistics lines passing through Cambodia, and under U.S. pressure to join forces with the South Vietnamese, Cambodia's mercurial Prince Norodom Sihanouk walked a tightrope of pseudo-neutrality, allowing the North Vietnamese to operate unopposed in his country's hinterland but refusing to be drawn further into the war. This led to some peculiar situations. For example, Chinese materiel found its way from the North Vietnamese to both the Cambodian army (for the favor of port access) and the Cambodian communist rebels whom the Cambodian army had been fighting since an outbreak of leftist violence in 1967. Sihanouk's balancing act ended up alienating many key stakeholders both within and outside Cambodia and came to an end in 1970, when his government fell to a coup.

The new government declared war against the communists and joined the broader conflict on the side of the South Vietnamese and the United States, a move that dissolved the tenuous restraint previously shown by the North Vietnamese. North Vietnamese forces, when directly engaged by the Cambodians, cut them to ribbons in a series

of campaigns in 1970 and 1971. They also bolstered their forces with Cambodian communists whom they had sheltered in exile since 1955.

The year 1972 brought a cease-fire in Vietnam as a prelude to the communist victory there, and Vietnamese troops began to withdraw from Cambodia. Assuming them to be puppets of the Hanoi regime, many were surprised when the Cambodian communists continued to fight. Massive U.S. bombing in the first half of 1973 postponed a communist victory (and killed an inestimable number of innocent Cambodians), but U.S. congressional action stopped the bombing and ended all hope for the feeble and kleptocratic Cambodian government. The communists' slow advance toward victory ended in April 1975, when they captured the capital, ushering in the horror of the Pol Pot era.

Northern Ireland, 1969–1999

Case Outcome: COIN Win (Mixed, Favoring COIN)

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) waged a three-decade-long insurgency against the British Army and various Protestant paramilitaries during a period widely referred to as "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland. Support for the PIRA by Northern Ireland's Catholic minority, the Republic of Ireland, and the United States increased substantially following a clumsy and inchoate British COIN campaign in the first seven years of the conflict. In the late 1970s, the police assumed primacy over the army, and the COIN force focused on improving its intelligence capabilities. As a military stalemate settled in, efforts to transition away from violence and toward peace gained momentum on both sides. By the final phase of the conflict, both the Protestants and Catholics were war-weary. It was during this final phase that the insurgent leadership shifted the majority of its resources away from the PIRA and toward the organization's political wing, Sinn Fein. In 1998, after 30 years of fighting, the insurgents agreed to lay down their arms and joined a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland's parliament.

Jordan, 1970–1971

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The Palestinian insurgency in Jordan was strongly influenced by political forces in the Middle East in 1970. The conflict evolved after the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, which led the Palestinian national liberation movement and its *fedayeen* militia to establish their headquarters in Jordan. As the *fedayeen* gained political and military power, they posed a challenge to the legitimacy of the Hashemite regime, leading King Hussein to initiate a COIN campaign culminating in a full military assault on Palestinian strongholds in Amman and northern Jordan. Ten days of intense fighting followed, during which the *fedayeen* received only limited reinforcement from neighboring Arab armies whose support they had counted on. As a result, the insurgency was nearly crushed. Leaders in the Arab world provided sufficient support to the Palestinian fighters to enable them to sustain a low-level insurgency for an additional ten months. However, overriding concerns over the political stability of their own regimes, and the region more generally, prevented them from providing the military support necessary to turn the tide of the war. In July 1971 the Jordanian regime succeeded in defeating the guerrillas and from expelling the *fedayeen* from the country.

Bangladesh, 1971

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

The 1971 insurgency in Bangladesh was a separatist conflict launched in response to the Pakistani government's efforts to subjugate the Bengali people socially, economically, politically, and militarily. The impetus for the conflict was the overwhelming victory of an East Pakistani (Bengali) political party in the country's first general election, which spurred the West Pakistani leaders of the country to arrest the leader of the winning party and launch a military offensive throughout East Pakistan. The Bengali response, to declare Bangladesh an independent state and foment an insurgency, was met with overwhelming force, indiscriminate killing, torture, looting, the destruction of villages, and the mass, systematic rape of women and girls throughout the region.

With growing international attention being paid to the extent of the violence, India eventually launched a direct military intervention, bringing a decisive end to the conflict in two weeks. However, the COIN response to the insurgency was so brutal that it is widely considered to have constituted a genocide. In the nine short months of the conflict, an estimated 3 million were killed, 10 million fled to India as refugees, and 30 million were displaced within Bangladesh. Additionally, it is estimated that 200,000 women and girls were raped during the war.

Philippines (MNLF), 1971–1996

Case Outcome: COIN Win (Mixed, Favoring COIN)

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim separatist movement in the southern provinces of the Philippines, waged an on-and-off insurgency against the government of the Republic of the Philippines for approximately 15 years. Although its original aims included the establishment of an independent Muslim state in the province of Mindanao, it soon shifted its goals to the withdrawal of government troops from the southern Philippines, the return of lands taken from the Moros (Muslim Filipinos), increased autonomy, and the ability to implement Islamic law in Muslim-dominated areas. The government initially responded to MNLF activity with the imposition of martial law, and the Philippine armed forces engaged the insurgents in large-scale conventional battle in the conflict's first phase. This was followed by a series of cease-fires and negotiations—some more successful than others—and a shift on the part of the MNLF from conventional to guerrilla tactics. In the middle of the second phase of the conflict, a change in the political players involved brought a new COIN strategy focused on civilian population protection combined with offensive force and a continued willingness to negotiate. It was this change in strategy that eventually led to the COIN force's mixed success in this conflict.

Baluchistan, 1973–1978

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The 1973 conflict in Baluchistan was the fourth in a series of separatist insurgencies in the region since its incorporation into Pakistan in 1947. The Baluch People's Liberation Front (later, the Baluch Liberation Front) had widespread support from the Baluch people and employed standard guerrilla tactics to cut off major supply lines and transportation routes between Baluchistan and neighboring provinces. However, the insurgents were unable to prevail against the larger and better-equipped COIN force composed of Pakistan's army and a special forces unit, which successfully employed overwhelming force to crush the insurgency. Interestingly, the "crush them" concept worked somewhat more gradually and indirectly than in other cases, as the insurgents established bases in Afghanistan after the decisive period of the conflict and continued to wage a low-level insurgency across the border when possible. The basing of insurgents in Afghanistan did little more than prolong the conflict, however, which had essentially been decided before they moved across the border.

Angola (UNITA), 1975–2002

Case Outcome: COIN Win

Shortly after the end of Angola's war of independence, the country descended into bitter fighting as the victors against the Portuguese failed to agree on which group would rule the postcolonial government. The United States and South Africa supported Jonas Savimbi and his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents against the Cuban- and Soviet-backed People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) COIN forces. This conflict was a classic Cold War proxy battle and a centerpiece of the Reagan Doctrine to contain and confront communism throughout the globe. By the end of the 1980s, as Soviet support for its proxies dried up, UNITA seemed to be in a position to overtake the MPLA. Instead of capitalizing on COIN force weakness, however, Savimbi ordered an internal purge of his organization, which included both his fighters and the Angolan population. In the final phase of the conflict, no longer the beneficiary

of U.S. or South African support, the insurgents turned to financing the conflict through diamond trafficking. The insurgency soon degenerated into criminality, and the COIN force finished off UNITA by killing Savimbi and bringing the conflict to a close.

Indonesia (East Timor), 1975–2000

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

The conflict in East Timor began soon after Portugal ended its colonial rule and departed from the region, leaving a Marxist-leaning group, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), as the strongest party in the Timorese independence movement. Indonesia responded to this potential communist threat by invading and annexing the region in July 1976. This conventional intervention by the Indonesian army devolved into a brutal COIN campaign over the next two decades that resulted in the deaths of as many as 200,000 civilians but failed to crush the insurgency. It was only in the mid-1990s that the course of the conflict changed, as FRETILIN adopted a more subversive urban strategy and drew greater international attention to its fight for independence. At the same time, the end of the Cold War left Indonesia without a clear rationale for its occupation of East Timor, and without the tacit support of the West. By 1999, Jakarta was ultimately forced to cede to international pressure and agree to grant sovereignty to East Timor, thus ending its COIN campaign in defeat.

Lebanese Civil War, 1975–1990

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

The Lebanese Civil War lasted from 1975 to 1990 and quickly led to the breakdown of government structures as Lebanon was engulfed by anarchy, earning the nickname the "militia republic."[5] The multidimensional nature of the conflict saw "several phases, each marked by complex shifting alliances and dozens of failed cease-fire agreements."[6]

---

[5] Michael C. Hudson, "Trying Again: Power Sharing in Post–Civil War Lebanon," *International Negotiation*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1997, p. 112.

[6] Hudson, 1997, p. 109.

In 15 years of fighting, the war included both large-scale massacres of civilians (the most notable of which was the infamous slaughter of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1982) and vast numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees. Besides the myriad Lebanese actors involved in the civil war, regional rivalries between Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), between the PLO and Israel, between Israel and Syria, and between Iran and Iraq all contributed to the chaos in Lebanon.[7] Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the insurgency was the birth of Hizballah, a radical Shi'a militia, funded, trained, and equipped by Iran, which has grown into a considerable force in the Middle East. The Israelis continued to occupy southern Lebanon for a decade after the civil war officially ended, resulting in on-again, off-again fighting between Hizballah and the Israeli Defense Forces.

Western Sahara, 1975–1991

Case Outcome: COIN Win (Mixed, Favoring COIN)

The conflict in Western Sahara began in 1975 after Spain withdrew as a colonial power, allowing Morocco to occupy the region. Morocco's occupation was contested by the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) movement, which launched an effective guerrilla campaign against the Moroccan army with external support from Algeria and Libya. By the mid-1980s, the Moroccan army was able to gain the upper hand against the Polisario by obtaining attracting military assistance from the United States and France and building more than 1,000 miles of defensive sand berms that cut the insurgents off from Saharan population centers and their sources of material support. A stalemate developed in 1988, with Morocco achieving the military advantage and the Polisario maintaining a diplomatic edge, as well as UN support for Western Sahara's right to self-determination. Yet, unlike in similar conflicts, the international community did not place sufficient pressure on the Moroccan government to agree to a political settlement. While a 1991 agreement call-

[7] Hudson, 1997, p. 112.

ing for a referendum on independence effectively ended active fighting between the Polisario and Moroccan forces, the vote was repeatedly postponed, and diplomatic skirmishes continued, leaving the conflict largely unresolved for decades and the contested land in Morocco's possession.

Indonesia (Aceh), 1976–2005

Case Outcome: COIN Win (Mixed, Favoring COIN)

The Aceh conflict began as a limited insurgency triggered by the centralization policies of the Indonesian government and the imposition of petroleum rents in the mid-1970s. Over the course of three decades, the insurgency evolved into a broader conflict of ethnic separatism prompted largely by the human rights abuses perpetrated by Indonesian COIN forces. Only after the fall of Indonesian President Suharto's regime in 1998 did the separatist group known as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) gain widespread public support. The Indonesian government offered the GAM limited political autonomy in an effort to reach a negotiated settlement to end the insurgency. When this effort failed, the government imposed a state of emergency and launched a large-scale military initiative against the GAM. These forceful actions left GAM forces severely weakened and reduced their base of popular support. Still, the insurgency dragged on until a natural disaster altered the course of the conflict. In December 2004, an earthquake and tsunami devastated the province and left both sides more willing to compromise and eager to conclude a peace agreement to secure relief from the international community. A peace agreement, signed in 2005, provided for expanded political autonomy for Aceh but fell short of delivering full independence to the region.

Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976–1995

Case Outcome: COIN Win (Mixed, Favoring COIN)

From 1976 to 1995, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) waged a protracted campaign of violence against the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in an insurgency that wracked the country and dragged in several outside actors, including Rhodesia,

South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Over a 17-year period, insurgent and state-sponsored violence contributed to more than 1 million casualties, resulted in massive refugee flows and internal population displacement, and paralyzed the country's economy.[8] Even against a lackluster COIN force, the insurgents were never able to muster enough strength to overtake Maputo, the capital. The most intense period of fighting ended in October 1992, when both sides signed the Rome General Peace Accords. Shortly thereafter, FRELIMO won the country's elections, and RENAMO quit the fight. This set the stage for one of the most comprehensive reintegration programs ever conducted under the auspices of a UN peacekeeping operation.

Sri Lanka, 1976–2009

Case Outcome: COIN Win

Years of discrimination by the Sinhala majority against the Tamil minority boiled over in Sri Lanka during the Black July riots of 1983. Shortly thereafter, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the most capable Tamil insurgent group, prepared to wage a campaign of violence and terror against the Sri Lankan state and non-Tamil civilians. Throughout its tenure, the LTTE was led by Velupillai Prabhakaran, a ruthless leader who continuously purged threats, both real and imagined, to his authoritarian rule. Over time, the LTTE distinguished itself as perhaps the most capable insurgent force in modern history. By the third phase of the conflict, the group boasted a navy, an air force, and an elite suicide commando unit used to assassinate several heads of state and numerous COIN force commanders. A transnational diaspora network provided funding and weaponry to sustain the Tigers for most of the group's existence, and a change from guerrilla to conventional fighting in the fifth and decisive phase of the insurgency doomed the LTTE. In the end, however, a combination of factors—including insurgent defections, a revamped Sri Lankan military, and displacement from the 2004 tsunami—allowed the COIN force to

[8] Chris Alden, "The UN and Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, March 1995, p. 103.

triumph while employing brutal tactics in snuffing out the remnants of a once-powerful insurgency.

Nicaragua (Somoza), 1978–1979

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

Four decades of neopatrimonial rule by a corrupt and unpopular government led to an uprising in the rural parts of Nicaragua that quickly spread from the countryside to the cities and towns surrounding the capital, Managua. The murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, an extremely popular newspaper editor, served to add fuel to an already smoldering fire as widespread dissatisfaction with the Somoza regime quickly galvanized into an insurgency.

Four important factors converged to allow the insurgents to dislodge a qualitatively and quantitatively superior COIN force. First, the three main insurgent groups reconciled their respective differences and combined their efforts to fight the government. Second, indiscriminate violence by the counterinsurgents turned the population toward the Sandinistas and swelled their ranks with recruits. Third, the Carter administration decided that it could no longer back Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza following egregious human rights violations committed by his forces. Finally, Venezuela, Cuba, and Panama afforded the insurgency the weapons and safe haven necessary to defeat a stronger opponent. The combination of effective political organization by the Sandinistas, repressive policies by the government, loss of support for Somoza in the United States, and a steady supply of weapons from various Latin American nations to the insurgents led to an insurgent victory in a short but bloody conflict.

Afghanistan (Anti-Soviet), 1978–1992

Outcome: COIN Loss

The Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union has been referred to as a "textbook study of how a major power can fail to win a war against guerrillas."[9] Despite their overwhelming political and military supe-

[9] Anthony James Joes, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook*, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996, p. 119.

riority, the Soviets encountered unexpected opposition to their invasion in 1979 and were unprepared to face the challenge of sustaining a weak, unpopular communist government against highly motivated Islamic fighters, or mujahadeen. While Moscow and its proxy regime in Kabul were able to develop more effective COIN policies in the mid-1980s, they were at a disadvantage against the mujahadeen, who not only benefited from extensive external support (including the provision of highly effective Stinger missiles from the United States) and religious fervor but were also in a position to "win by simply not losing." The mujahadeen failed to unify as an insurgent force or offer an alternative form of governance, yet they were able to delegitimize the Kabul regime and defeat the Soviets after more than a decade of guerrilla war.

Kampuchea, 1978–1992

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

Fed up with the policies and cross-border incursions of Kampuchea's Khmer Rouge government, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in December 1978. Initially welcomed for freeing the people of Cambodia from the depredations of Pol Pot, the Vietnamese quickly wore out their welcome. With the support of Thailand (and others further abroad), the Khmer Rouge reconstituted itself as a significant insurgency, and several other insurgent movements formed and contested the occupation. The 1984–1985 dry season saw the Vietnamese and their Cambodian proxies aggressively sweep the border regions free of insurgents and then build a "bamboo curtain" (with cleared ground, minefields, and defensive road networks) with their K5 plan. This ambitious operation was effective over the short term, but the bamboo curtain did not keep the insurgents out, and the use of forced labor in its construction further alienated the population. After several years of expensive stalemate, Vietnamese forces abandoned Cambodia to their indigenous proxies in 1989. The puppet government managed to hang on through the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 and into the UN peacekeeping mission period. It was then soundly defeated at the polls.

Although the government unambiguously lost this insurgency, it is scored as a mixed outcome for two reasons. First, the principal insurgent group, the Khmer Rouge, also "lost" in that it was not particu-

larly favored in the settlement or an important part of the postconflict governing coalition (other, more modestly sized and more moderate insurgent groups were). Second, although it withdrew and its puppet government was ultimately displaced, the government of Vietnam realized many of its more modest long-term political goals for Cambodia.

El Salvador, 1979–1992

Case Outcome: COIN Win (Mixed, Favoring COIN)

The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) offered a significant challenge to a kleptocratic and dictatorial Salvadoran government and a corrupt, barracks-bound Salvadoran military whose only significant victories were against the civilian population. With time bought by massive amounts of U.S. aid during the 1980s, the government of El Salvador democratized and increased its legitimacy, while the military increased its competence and improved its respect for human rights. By the end of the conflict, real evidence of reform corresponded with government and military statements and helped generate and sustain credibility and legitimacy. The conflict reached a stalemate in the late 1980s and was ultimately resolved through a settlement favorable to the government as external support to the insurgents dwindled and participation in the political process became an increasingly tenable approach to redressing grievances.

Somalia, 1980–1991

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

Mohamed Siad Barre's dictatorial regime was ousted by a decade-long insurgency that featured several insurgent groups fighting against the government. COIN forces repeatedly resorted to brutal tactics, which only served to galvanize the opposition and turn local populations against the military. Barre continuously underestimated the threat posed by the various insurgent factions while also failing to take heed of growing antigovernment sentiment among average Somalis. After years of wanton violence against civilians and any persons thought to be associated with certain tribes, Barre's government lost any support it

once had, and the population actively supported the various insurgent groups in their quest to overthrow the dictator.

As the insurgency progressed, the two main insurgent groups operating in the north, the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) began to capture territory throughout the country. Moreover, the SNM received material support from neighboring Ethiopia. Growing discord between Barre's regime and the military, coupled with a lack of a coherent COIN approach, contributed to his downfall. No longer able to bribe and coerce the myriad clans and tribes he had tactfully manipulated for so long, and facing a more organized and aggressive insurgency, Barre's forces eventually succumbed to defeat as he fled the country in the wake of his government's collapse. Somalia's clan- and tribal-based society was an ideal setting for guerrilla warfare, and the country has not had a functioning government since 1991.

Peru, 1980–1992

Case Outcome: COIN Win

Abimael Guzmán's Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, proved to be a surprisingly resilient threat to democratic Peru. Arising in the midst of a significant economic crisis that corrupt and squabbling government officials did little to resolve, Sendero was first treated as a law-enforcement problem. The threat grew largely unabated until 1982, when states of emergency were declared in many of the country's departments, allowing the military to enter the conflict. Massive repression and indiscriminate violence did little to help the government's cause. The late 1980s saw shifts in government strategies, with reduced repression and new attempts to encourage development. These initiatives were marred, however, by corruption and lack of unity of effort. Though Sendero never had the support of most of the population (the group was too violent and too radical), government and military incompetence led to widespread belief that the insurgents would win. All this changed with the 1990 election of Alberto Fujimori to the presidency and his administration's commitment to local defense forces and an intelligence-focused strategy that ultimately led to the capture of Guzmán and the disintegration of Sendero. Under Fujimori, for the

first time in the conflict, the government, police, and military made effective use of what would now be called strategic communication, with a greater emphasis on government credibility and consistency between actions and messages.

Nicaragua (Contras), 1981–1990

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

Various opposition groups came together to fight against the Sandinista government shortly after its victory over the Somoza regime in late 1979. This insurgency is heralded as a classic example of the Reagan Doctrine in action. Backed by the Central Intelligence Agency, Contra insurgents gained momentum early in the conflict by catching the Sandinistas by surprise. After regrouping and improving intelligence collection during the second phase of the insurgency, the Sandinistas regained the upper hand. Ultimately, however, the Contras emerged victorious as a result of better training and organization, as well as considerable pressure exerted on the Sandinista government by the United States. Militarily, the support provided by the United States in the form of training, weapons, and money allowed the Contras to avoid defeat just long enough for the political elements of the insurgency to work in their favor. Politically, the U.S.-backed candidate, Violeta Chamorro, benefited significantly from the nearly $3 million spent by the National Endowment for Democracy on "technical assistance."

Senegal, 1982–2002

Case Outcome: COIN Win

A separatist insurgency, the Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC), troubled the government of Senegal for two full decades. Early on, the group "capitalized upon the grievances of the local populations, and received support from them."[10] However, in the early 1990s, the insurgency began receiving external support from neighboring countries the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, which led it to

[10] Wagane Faye, *The Casamance Separatism: From Independence Claim to Resource Logic*, thesis, Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006, p. v.

escalate its tactics and turn on the local population. As the government of Senegal sought to improve relations with its neighbors in an effort to stem the flow of support for the insurgency, it also attempted to cut off any remaining internal support for the MFDC through what Wagane Faye has called a "politics of 'charm.'" "In response, the MFDC [became] engaged in the illegal exploitation of [Senegal's] natural resources."[11] Ultimately, after dividing the insurgents through co-optation and amnesty, the government was able to settle with the majority of the insurgents, and the bandit activities of the remainder subsided to the level of a law-enforcement problem. At no point during this lengthy though relatively small and low-intensity insurgency was the government of Senegal ever seriously threatened.

Turkey (PKK), 1984–1999

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) began its insurgency as the outlawed party of an ethnic minority whose very existence was denied by the Turkish Constitution. The PKK struggled initially to develop support among a Kurdish population familiar with Turkish repression and not keen on further quixotic resistance. Over time, the PKK established itself as the premiere Kurdish cultural, political, and resistance organization and won significant regional popular support for its secessionist violence. This growth in support was a product not only of PKK successes but also of the repressive and heavy-handed response by Turkish authorities.

The PKK was defeated in 1999 after several years of "big stick" COIN by the Turks. Turkish forces had taken drastic measures to separate the insurgents from the population in the mountain villages in the area of conflict, aggressively pursued the insurgents into the mountains, sought to cut off cross-border support to them, and, most tellingly, made a political deal with extranational hosts to capture the authoritarian leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan.

[11] Faye, 2006, p. v.

Sudan (SPLA), 1984–2004

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

The civil war in Sudan pitted the developed Arab Muslim government in the north against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), representing Christians and animists in the rural, oil-rich south. The northern-based government sought to extend Islamic law throughout the country and benefit from the south's oil wealth, while the southern rebels fought to obtain autonomy. An ineffective COIN strategy motivated by religious convictions and a "military-first" approach hampered the Sudanese government's attempts to crush the insurgency. Despite factionalism within the SPLA and changes in its external sources of support, the insurgents were able to continue to launch attacks on government forces and Sudan's oil pipelines and infrastructure in the south. After two decades of fighting and widespread famine, the government bowed to significant international pressure and agreed to a negotiated settlement with the SPLA that included a power-sharing agreement with the south and the promise of a referendum on secession.

Uganda (ADF), 1986–2000

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) launched an insurgency against the Ugandan government in 1986, undertaking brutal attacks on civilians in the western region of the country. While a nominally Muslim group, the ADF did not have a clear religious agenda. Its vaguely stated goals were to overthrow the government and rid Uganda of Rwandan Tutsis. ADF attacks against civilians and military outposts increased in 1998, aided by external support from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Initially, the Ugandan government was unable to maintain security in the region, but it eventually contained the insurgency by attacking the ADF's rear bases in the DRC and by developing special COIN units trained in mountain warfare.

Papua New Guinea, 1988–1998

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

The insurgency on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea was sparked by protests by local landowners against the policies of outside mining companies. The protests became increasingly violent after the government sent in troops to defend the mines, leading to the evolution of a wider secessionist movement. Attempts by the Papua New Guinea army to crush the rebellion by employing local militia forces and instituting a military and economic blockade of the island failed. After six years of low-intensity conflict, the president of Papua New Guinea contracted with a private military firm to aid his COIN efforts. This decision led to the collapse of the government and a decline in public support for the military effort. The government then pursued political negotiations, leading to agreement on a cease-fire in 1998 that promised broad powers of self-governance for Bougainville.

Liberia, 1989–1997

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

What began as a civil war soon descended into a frenzy of violence, with as many as seven armed insurgent groups vying for power simultaneously. Under the command of Samuel Doe, the Liberian army and its ethnic Krahn counterparts attacked other tribes seen as threatening Doe's power, specifically those in Nimba County. In response, Charles Taylor organized a rebel force across the border in Côte d'Ivoire, where the insurgents organized, trained, and prepared for battle.

Soldiers from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), supplanted a deteriorating government as the primary COIN force. Atrocities were committed by all sides, including the COIN forces, as each side sought to gain control over valuable natural resources, such as diamonds, gold, iron ore, and timber. Accusations of brutality, collusion, and corruption, especially among the Nigerian contingent, plagued the COIN force throughout the conflict and certainly contributed to its dearth of credibility. With the civilian population suffering from war fatigue and the combatants themselves battle-weary, the fighting began

to ebb. After 13 failed attempts to reach a peace agreement, the conflict was finally terminated when Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia received the tacit approval of Nigeria to sit for elections. Receiving an overwhelming 75 percent of the vote, Taylor and his National Patriotic Party defeated the 12 other candidates contesting for power in an election marred by widespread voter intimidation.

Rwanda, 1990–1994

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

The civil war in Rwanda began in 1990 when the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded the country from its base in Uganda, seeking to establish democracy and the right of return for Tutsi refugees. After the RPF was turned back by Rwandan and French forces, it conducted an effective guerrilla campaign that ultimately led to the negotiation of a power-sharing agreement with the Hutu-led government. The political agreement with the RPF raised fears among the Hutu population over a reassertion of Tutsi power, however. In 1994, tensions came to a head when the plane carrying the Rwandan president was shot down and a genocidal campaign was declared by the radical Hutus who gained control of the provisional government. Over the next few months, the government became preoccupied with eliminating Tutsis and moderate Hutus. French forces withheld direct military support, which allowed the RPF to regroup and quickly defeat the Rwandan army, gaining control of the capital with little opposition.

Moldova, 1990–1992

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

Situated at the ethnic crossroads of several former empires, Moldova was host to violence that pitted pro-Romanian ethnic Moldovans against pro-Russian Dniesters in the early 1990s.[12] Suspicious that ethnic Moldovans in the government were planning to unite Moldova with Romania following independence, various elements in the

[12] Moldova lies at the "ethnic crossroads" of greater Bessarabia, the intersection of German, Russian, Turkic, Romanian, and Ukrainian populations, history, and culture.

Transdniester region, along the Moldova-Ukraine border, agitated for attacks against the Moldovan police. COIN forces were woefully underequipped and lacked a full-spectrum force. Furthermore, they were incapable of conducting high-intensity tactical assaults, despite having air supremacy and artillery superiority. The insurgents, on the other hand, acquired arms and heavy weapons from the Russian 14th Army, which was stationed in the region and provided seemingly unending tangible support to its ethnic kin. The support of a professional military proved to be the decisive factor in this lopsided insurgency.

The Moldovan government tried relentlessly and to no avail to resolve the conflict through diplomacy, with the Moldovan leader Mircea Snegur unwilling to unleash the full fury of his COIN force against his enemies. The insurgents then defeated the COIN forces in a short but bloody battle with the assistance of the Russian 14th Army and various mercenaries. The Transdniester region retains de facto independence and is still under supervision by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Sierra Leone, 1991–2002

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The COIN force in this conflict comprised a series of actors and lasted for more than a decade. The insurgents terrorized the population through looting, rape, mutilation, and murder. Control of the diamond fields was a central focus of the conflict and served as the primary motivation for the insurgents. Money gained from the sale of diamonds was used to pay fighters and acquire sophisticated weaponry.

During one stage in the conflict, the government of Valentine Strasser and the National Provisional Ruling Council hired the South African mercenary firm Executive Outcomes to conduct COIN operations. Ultimately, British-led COIN forces adopted good COIN practices, quelled the fighting, and restored order to the country. Indeed, the lack of continuity between COIN forces—the Sierra Leonean army, Executive Outcomes, ECOMOG, and the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)—certainly contributed to the prolonged nature

of the insurgency. However, by reorganizing UNAMSIL into a more modern force with new leadership and better coordination at all levels, the COIN force was eventually able to adopt positive COIN practices in the later stages of the conflict. In addition to acquiring helicopter gunships, deploying a full signals battalion, and using detailed maps and satellite imagery, the COIN force was able to maintain regular contact for the first time between troop-contributing countries, the UN Security Council, and the secretariat through the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Furthermore, the COIN force kept its promise to protect the citizens during elections, providing the security necessary for Sierra Leoneans to vote at the polls with little fear of being attacked. Approximately 47,000 excombatants turned in their weapons, making the use of force by the counterinsurgents largely unnecessary during the final phase of the insurgency and lending a sense of credibility to the nearly disgraced UNAMSIL mission.

Some have called UNAMSIL the "model mission." To be sure, the COIN force was not without its shortcomings. However, at its height, UNAMSIL had roughly 17,000 troops and a large civilian staff operating at a cost of $700 million per year. Although it was not recognized as such at the time, adherence to strategic communication principles was a major factor in the mission's success. Indeed, the COIN force was able to maintain credibility with the local population, achieve unity of effort, and keep consistency in its message. This was accomplished by coordinating a large-scale disarmament program, successfully organizing elections, and, above all, providing a secure environment for the population.[13] These factors ultimately converged to allow the COIN force to prevail. In the 2002 elections, the government- and COIN force–backed President Tejan Kabbah won the election while the insurgent-supported Revolutionary United Front Party failed to win a single seat.

[13] Funmi Olonisakin, *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, p. 111.

Algeria (GIA), 1992–2004

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The insurgency by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was prompted by the Algerian government's decision to cancel an election that was expected to put an Islamic party in power. The GIA initiated an urban terror campaign that became increasingly violent and targeted toward civilians. While the military government in Algiers took brutal repressive actions against the insurgency, the GIA's attacks were viewed as even more violent and threatening. After a series of civilian massacres, by 1998, the GIA had lost much of its public support. The government then pursued a more effective COIN strategy, implementing an amnesty program, targeting the GIA hardliners, and offering political concessions, which helped to defeat an already weakened and fragmented GIA.

Croatia, 1992–1995

Case Outcome: COIN Win

The insurgency in Croatia was fought between the Croatian army (HV) and various elements of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and other Serb insurgent forces, which attempted to form their own independent enclave within Croatia known as the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

This three-year conflict saw innumerable failed cease-fires and egregious human rights violations committed by both sides. After two and a half years of on-again, off-again fighting, the government prevailed as a result of two overarching factors: First, the Croatian military completely revamped itself from a second-rate fighting force into a formidable army with the assistance of the United States. Second, and equally important, the insurgents were abandoned by Belgrade as Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic diverted his support elsewhere in the Balkans in an attempt to capitalize on insurgent success in neighboring Bosnia.

Following its transformation into a respected military, the HV was able to reduce tangible support to the insurgents and was strong enough to force the Serbs to fight as guerrillas. As a result, the government in Zagreb soon garnered the perception of a competent and

capable state. While the Croats fought valiantly throughout the conflict, it was not until the final phase that they were able to put all the pieces together, launching two devastating COIN operations (Flash and Storm in May and August 1995, respectively).

Despite employing many poor COIN practices, including severe repression, the Croats exhibited enough positive practices on balance to prevail and secure the country's independence with its capital in Zagreb.

Afghanistan (Post-Soviet), 1992–1996

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

After the fall of the Soviet-supported Najibullah regime in 1992, Afghanistan lacked a legitimate central government. Kabul was governed by a coalition of former mujahadeen who competed for power among themselves, leading the country to devolve into a state of warlordism. The Taliban rose to prominence in 1994 by establishing a devout and disciplined militia that promised to restore order and security to the country. Taliban leaders received support from Pakistan and the war-weary Afghan population and were able to defeat what remained of the divided mujahadeen government, seize control of Kabul, and establish their own unified yet brutal government.

Tajikistan, 1992–1997

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

Less than a year after gaining independence from the Soviet Union, a mix of democrats, Tajik nationalists, and Islamists joined together to form the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) to challenge the communist-based government in Dushanbe. The UTO briefly gained control of the capital before being forced out by former government leaders, aided by Russian and Uzbek forces, employing brutal methods and inflicting significant civilian casualties. Upon its retreat, the UTO began launching attacks from bases in Afghanistan and became more closely associated with the Islamic movement.

The new government of Tajikistan subsequently did little to meet the needs of its populace and relied increasingly on Russian military

support. While Tajik leader Emomali Rahmonov bowed to pressure to make some changes to his government and military leadership, they were not sufficient for the rebels, who continued to launch attacks. Only after the Taliban gained control of Afghanistan did Russia and Uzbekistan force the Tajik government to make greater concessions. This outside pressure led to the signing of the Peace and National Reconciliation Accord that met most of the UTO's political demands.

Georgia/Abkhazia, 1992–1994

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

Long a hotbed of unrest, the disputed Abkhaz region was one of many areas that erupted in violence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Georgia/Abkhazia border region became host to an insurgency after the kidnapping of Georgian government officials in 1992. Control of the capital, Sukhumi, switched hands several times, and the two-year conflict featured numerous failed cease-fires. Abkhazian insurgents defeated Georgian COIN forces in a conflict characterized by atrocities on both sides, which fits the general pattern of insurgency warfare in the post-Soviet Transcaucasus. Volunteers from the Confederation of Peoples of the North Caucasus and Russian soldiers supplemented the insurgent force. The COIN force's inability to seal the country's borders allowed insurgent fighters, weapons, and materiel to prolong the conflict and provided the Abkhaz with the resources necessary to emerge victorious.

In addition to fighting Abkhaz insurgents, Georgian COIN forces were simultaneously engaged in a civil war against Georgian rebels and a war in South Ossetia. Ultimately, Russian soldiers tipped the balance in favor of the insurgents. Eager to end the fighting, Georgia begrudgingly accepted membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States as a precondition to Moscow's influence in bringing intra-Georgian fighting to a halt. Abkhazia gained de facto independence following the end of the insurgency and expelled the majority of the Georgian population living within its borders.

Nagorno-Karabakh, 1992–1994

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

In another case of post-Soviet separatism, Azerbaijani authorities had governed Nagorno-Karabakh[14] directly with tacit approval from the Kremlin beginning in the late 1980s. When its Armenian majority declared the territory an independent state completely free from Azerbaijani rule, the two sides mobilized for war.

A more disciplined, better organized Karabakh Armenian insurgency defeated Azerbaijani COIN forces with the assistance of Russia, which provided weapons and troops to both sides in the conflict at various points. Political discord in Baku contributed significantly to the counterinsurgents' inability to muster an organized fighting force capable of defeating the insurgency. This case is a clear example of how ineffectual political leadership can adversely affect battlefield performance. Moreover, the Armenians possessed superior fighting skills from their experience in the former Soviet army. By the time the fighting came to an end, Armenian insurgents controlled not only Nagorno-Karabakh proper but also approximately 15 percent of Azerbaijani territory. Russia helped negotiate a cease-fire in May 1994, with a major stipulation being the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as a third party in the war. The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved today and is commonly referred to as a "frozen conflict" because of the inability to find a lasting resolution that is acceptable to all sides.

Bosnia, 1992–1995

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

Following Bosnia's independence after the breakup of Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serb insurgents battled both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats for control of territory. COIN forces were underequipped and frequently fought with each other, while the insurgents were more organized, highly motivated, and better equipped. "Arkan's Tigers" were an extremely brutal but highly effective paramilitary unit oper-

[14] Sometimes referred to in the literature as Nagorny-Karabagh or simply Qarabagh.

ating throughout the country during the course of the insurgency. Bosnia was also the scene of the Srebrenica massacre, a campaign of ethnic cleansing orchestrated by Bosnian Serb insurgents that led to the deaths of more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims and the exodus of an additional 25,000–30,000 refugees.

The Srebrenica massacre and another large-scale slaughter of civilians in Markale prompted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to intervene to end the fighting in the waning stages of the conflict, but Bosnian Serb insurgents secured a significant portion of territory and established the autonomous Republika Srpska, with close ties to Belgrade. The insurgency officially ended with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Paris on December 14, 1995.

Burundi, 1993–2003

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

Burundi has long been plagued by ethnic conflict between the Tutsi minority, which maintained control of the government, and the majority Hutu population. In 1993, a series of ethnic massacres occurred after the country's first democratically elected Hutu president was assassinated. Subsequent instability led the Tutsi-dominated army to reassert control and reinstall a Tutsi-led government under Pierre Buyoya. The Buyoya regime implemented harsh COIN tactics, including widespread forcible resettlements, which served to reduce popular support for the government. Only after a decade of fighting, tens of thousands of deaths, and hundreds of thousands of displacements was a peace agreement finally reached with the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD, one of the two major Hutu insurgent groups), in which the FDD agreed to abandon its armed struggle in exchange for guaranteed representation in the government.

Chechnya I, 1994–1996

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

After failing to put down a rebellion by proxy in the breakaway Republic of Chechnya, Russian forces entered Grozny in December 1994.

As the COIN force, the Russian army was plagued by a lack of training, severely disjointed command and control, and an unclear mission. Chechen insurgents, however, were highly motivated, familiar with the terrain, and able to marshal the resources necessary to exploit the Russians in asymmetric engagements.

The insurgents proved to be as adaptable and flexible as the COIN force was cumbersome. Realizing that hit-and-run tactics would require a high degree of mobility, the Chechens used light and portable grenade launchers, machine guns, and antitank weapons. The Chechens employed a technique known as "hugging," in which they stayed close to the Russian infantry in urban areas (usually less than 50 meters) to reduce casualties from COIN artillery and air attacks. Furthermore, the insurgents had an extensive support network among the population, which provided them with real-time intelligence, food, weapons, and fuel. The conflict devolved into carnage with widespread atrocities committed by both sides before a Russian withdrawal in 1996.

Afghanistan (Taliban), 1996–2001

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

The Taliban took power from an unstable mujahadeen government in Kabul in 1996 and consolidated control over much of the country over the course of the next two years (with the help of Pakistani and foreign jihadist fighters). It failed, however, to establish an effective administrative apparatus that could provide services to the population or gain popular support for the regime. Welcomed at first for imposing order after years of chaos and bloodshed, the Taliban alienated many Afghans and isolated itself from the international community with its brutal imposition of Islamic law. Ultimately, the Taliban's decision to host Osama bin Laden and allow him to establish al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan led the Taliban to be driven from power by a U.S.-led coalition in November 2001.

Zaire (anti-Mobutu), 1996–1997

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

The eastern region of Zaire was destabilized by the civil war in neighboring Rwanda and the influx of Hutus across the border. The displaced Hutus threatened the native Tutsi population in Zaire and established a base for rebel attacks against the new Rwandan government. In response to this threat, local Tutsis and the Rwandan army launched a preemptive attack on the Hutu militia and the Zairian army that supported it. A national rebel group under the leadership of Laurent Kabila was then formed to lead the fight against Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko's regime. Kabila faced little resistance from Mobutu's poorly equipped army. Aided by the Rwandan, Ugandan, and Angolan armies, Kabila was able to take control of the capital within a matter of months.

Kosovo, 1996–1999

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) insurgents battled Federal Republic of Yugoslavia COIN forces to a stalemate for most of the duration of this conflict. The KLA received financial assistance from the Kosovar Albanian diaspora and also benefited from the implosion of the government in neighboring Albania, which resulted in significant amounts of weaponry flooding across the border into the hands of the KLA.

The Racak massacre carried out by COIN forces prompted NATO to intervene on the side of the insurgents in an attempt to prevent ethnic cleansing and defeat the Milosevic regime. NATO forces conducted a three-month air campaign while KLA insurgents fought Serbian troops on the ground, resulting in Milosevic's capitulation and the imposition of a UN-backed peacekeeping force. While various commentators speculate on the motives for Milosevic's concession of the war, the primary reason is unequivocal: NATO air power was *the* deciding factor in bringing the conflict to a close. Following its unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 as the Republic of Kosovo, the country is recognized as an independent nation by 63 UN member states, including the United States.

Nepal, 1997–2006

Case Outcome: COIN Loss

A democracy since 1990, Nepal fell prey to problems common to nascent democracies: corruption, excessive interparty politicking, and general paralysis and ineffectiveness.[15] This left the citizenry very open to the criticism offered by Maoist insurgents beginning in 1996. The insurgents' criticism of the state was further validated by the ineffective yet brutal COIN campaign launched by local police, which targeted both the insurgents and civilians. The one government institution with any kind of legitimacy, the monarchy, was shattered in a 2001 regicide. That same year, Nepal's army was unleashed on the insurgents for the first time and proved no more effective than the police had been. Largely a ceremonial force, though substantially better equipped than the police or insurgents, the army made no headway against the Maoists and could not provide security for itself let alone the larger population. King Gyanendra's 2005 royalist seizure of the government cast much of Nepali civil society into opposition. The Maoist insurgents opportunistically joined with a prodemocracy coalition and secured a significant place for themselves in the new government after the combination of military and civil pressure forced the king to capitulate in 2006.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (anti-Kabila), 1998–2003

Case Outcome: COIN Loss (Mixed, Favoring Insurgents)

The second Congolese war began in 1998 with the invasion of Rwandan and Ugandan forces seeking to overthrow DRC President Laurent Kabila, their former ally. Kabila countered the threat to his government by engaging Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian forces and local militia groups in his defense. The war then devolved into a conflict of pillage and partition as the various regional forces battled for control of the country's resources. Efforts toward political compromise and international negotiation began in 2001 after the president was

[15] Thomas A. Marks, *Insurgency in Nepal*, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2003, p. 4.

assassinated and replaced by his son, Joseph. Joseph Kabila eventually concluded a cease-fire agreement with the Ugandan, Rwandan, and other foreign forces and a power-sharing deal with the major rebel groups, which greatly reduced the level of fighting by 2003.

Case Narrative Results

These narratives provide some context for the quantitative analysis, presented in the next chapter. The accompanying volume provides more detail on the 41 new cases (see *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* for the same material on the 30 cases previously studied), including

- a short summary of the case
- a summary of each phase of the case, including key factors for that phase
- a discussion of the conventional explanations for the outcomes of the case, as offered in existing secondary analysis
- a list of distinct features of the case.[16]

Beyond this, we offer no separate analysis of the individual cases; all of the analyses are of aggregate-level data across all of the cases together or across relevant subsets of cases. In fact, one of our most striking findings is that we do not need to discuss any of the distinct features or unique narrative peculiarities of the individual cases to wholly explain the outcomes: The patterns of presence or absence of factors common to all of the cases are sufficient to explain the outcomes (see Chapter Five). In fact, our analysis supports the idea that it can be a mistake to learn too many "lessons" from a single case, as the peculiarities and distinctions of a single case may obfuscate otherwise critical and enduring relationships between COIN practices and outcomes.

[16] See Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunigan 2013; Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010a.