

Chapter Title: Table of Contents

Book Title: Paths to Victory

Book Subtitle: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies

Book Author(s): Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigan

Published by: RAND Corporation. (2013)

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhtb4.3>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



This book is licensed under a RAND Corporation License. To view a copy of this license, visit <https://www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html>.



RAND Corporation is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Paths to Victory*

Contents

Preface iii
Figures xi
Tables xiii
Summary xvii
Acknowledgments xxxvii
Abbreviations xxxix

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction 1
Purpose of This Study 1
Defining COIN and the Implications of the Term 2
Theoretical Underpinnings of Counterinsurgency 4
Data and Analyses 8
About This Report and Accompanying Case Studies 9

CHAPTER TWO

The Cases 13
Case Selection and Data Collection 13
Phased Data 16
Assessing Case Outcomes 16
 UK in Palestine, 1944–1947 21
 Greece, 1945–1949 21
 Indochina, 1946–1955 22
 Philippines (Huk Rebellion), 1946–1956 23
 Colombia (“La Violencia”), 1948–1958 23
 Malaya, 1948–1955 24

Kenya, 1952–1956	25
Algerian Independence, 1954–1962	25
Cyprus, 1955–1959	26
Cuba, 1956–1959	27
Oman (Imamate Uprising), 1957–1959	27
Indonesia (Darul Islam), 1958–1962	28
Tibet, 1956–1974	28
Guatemala, 1960–1996	29
Laos, 1959–1975	30
Namibia, 1960–1989	31
South Africa, 1960–1990	31
South Vietnam, 1960–1975	32
Eritrea, 1961–1991	34
Iraqi Kurdistan, 1961–1975	34
Angolan Independence, 1961–1974	35
Guinea-Bissau, 1962–1974	36
Mozambique Independence, 1962–1974	36
Yemen, 1962–1970	37
Uruguay, 1963–1972	38
Oman (Dhofar Rebellion), 1965–1975	38
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1965–1980	39
Argentina, 1969–1979	40
Cambodia, 1967–1975	40
Northern Ireland, 1969–1999	41
Jordan, 1970–1971	42
Bangladesh, 1971	42
Philippines (MNLF), 1971–1996	43
Baluchistan, 1973–1978	44
Angola (UNITA), 1975–2002	44
Indonesia (East Timor), 1975–2000	45
Lebanese Civil War, 1975–1990	45
Western Sahara, 1975–1991	46
Indonesia (Aceh), 1976–2005	47
Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976–1995	47
Sri Lanka, 1976–2009	48
Nicaragua (Somoza), 1978–1979	49

Afghanistan (Anti-Soviet), 1978–1992.....	49
Kampuchea, 1978–1992	50
El Salvador, 1979–1992	51
Somalia, 1980–1991	51
Peru, 1980–1992	52
Nicaragua (Contras), 1981–1990.....	53
Senegal, 1982–2002	53
Turkey (PKK), 1984–1999	54
Sudan (SPLA), 1984–2004	55
Uganda (ADF), 1986–2000	55
Papua New Guinea, 1988–1998	56
Liberia, 1989–1997	56
Rwanda, 1990–1994.....	57
Moldova, 1990–1992.....	57
Sierra Leone, 1991–2002.....	58
Algeria (GIA), 1992–2004.....	60
Croatia, 1992–1995.....	60
Afghanistan (Post-Soviet), 1992–1996	61
Tajikistan, 1992–1997.....	61
Georgia/Abkhazia, 1992–1994.....	62
Nagorno-Karabakh, 1992–1994	63
Bosnia, 1992–1995	63
Burundi, 1993–2003	64
Chechnya I, 1994–1996.....	64
Afghanistan (Taliban), 1996–2001	65
Zaire (anti-Mobutu), 1996–1997	66
Kosovo, 1996–1999.....	66
Nepal, 1997–2006	67
Democratic Republic of the Congo (anti-Kabila), 1998–2003.....	67
Case Narrative Results.....	68

CHAPTER THREE

Considering the “Right” Cases: Identifying Relevant Subsamples	69
Every Insurgency Is Unique . . . Or Is It?	70
Eliminating Poor Comparisons and Getting to the 59 Core Cases.....	71
Iron Fist and Motive-Focused Subpopulations	74

External COIN Actor Subpopulations	76
Some Preliminary Observations About the Subpopulations	78

CHAPTER FOUR

Testing Concepts for Counterinsurgency	81
Representing the Concepts in the Data	83
Analysis of the Relationships Between Case Factors and Case Outcomes	84
Factor Stacks	85
Tests of Each Concept	86
Classic COIN Concepts	87
Contemporary Concepts for COIN	111
Summary of the Tests of the Concepts	136

CHAPTER FIVE

Broader Findings	139
Scorecard: Balance of Good Versus Bad Practices	140
Every Insurgency May Be Unique, but Not at This Level of Analysis	144
Factors Not in the Scorecard	146
Which Supported COIN Concepts Are Most Essential?	
Qualitative Comparative Analysis	148
Additional Observations	150
External Actors on the Insurgent Side	150
COIN Forces: Quality Versus Quantity and Force Mix	152
Phase Outcomes	154
Sequence	156
Duration of Insurgencies	158
Scorecard and Duration	162
Peace Intervals and Win Durability	164

CHAPTER SIX

Results for Motive-Focused, Iron Fist, and External-Actor Cases	169
Iron Fist and Motive-Focused Subpopulations	169
The COIN Concepts and the Iron Fist and Motive-Focused Subpopulations	169

Additional Observations About the Iron Fist and Motive-Focused Subpopulations.....	172
Qualitative Comparative Analyses for the Motive-Focused Subpopulations.....	173
External Actor Subpopulations.....	174
The COIN Concepts and External Actors.....	174
Additional Observations Regarding External Actor Cases	176
QCA and External Actors	178
 CHAPTER SEVEN	
Conclusions and Recommendations	179
Key Findings.....	179
The Iron Fist COIN Path, Focused Primarily on Eliminating the Insurgent Threat, Is Historically Less Successful	180
Seventeen of 24 COIN Concepts Tested Receive Strong Support, and One (“Crush Them”) Has Strong Evidence Against It.....	181
Effective COIN Practices Run in Packs, and Some Practices Are Always in the Pack: Tangible Support Reduction, Commitment and Motivation, and Flexibility and Adaptability.....	181
Every Insurgency Is Unique, but Not So Much That It Matters at This Level of Analysis	183
Quality Is More Important Than Quantity, Especially Where Paramilitaries and Irregular Forces Are Concerned	184
Governments Supported by External Actors Win the Same Way Others Do	185
COIN Takes Time, but Some COIN Practices Help End Insurgencies Sooner and Lead to More Durable Postconflict Peace.....	185
After Good COIN Practices Are in Place, the Average Insurgency Lasts Roughly Six More Years.....	186
Poor Beginnings Do Not Necessarily Lead to Poor Ends.....	187
Recommendations	187
Recommendations for Defeating Insurgencies	188
Recommendations for Helping Others Fight an Insurgency.....	189
Recommendations for COIN Doctrine and Theory	190

Questions for Further Research	190
Big Footprint or Small Footprint?	191
What Factors Lead to <i>Insurgent</i> Success?.....	191
How Do Insurgencies End?.....	191
How Many Troops Are Required?.....	192
APPENDIXES	
A. Methods and Data	193
B. Details of Qualitative Comparative Analysis	217
C. Details of Survival Analyses	223
D. Key Findings from <i>Victory Has a Thousand Fathers</i> in Light of New Data and Analyses	235
E. List of All Factors Scored for All Cases	251
F. COIN Scorecard	269
G. Scorecard Scores for the 59 Core Cases	273
References	277