

Chapter Title: APPENDIX E List of All Factors Scored for All Cases

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List of All Factors Scored for All Cases

Table E.1 lists all of the factors scored for each phase of each of the 71 cases that make up the data set for this report. Full data on each case are available in the accompanying spreadsheet. In addition to listing the factor, Table E.1 lists the factor number (indicating the order in which factors are presented in the accompanying spreadsheet); whether the factor was scored at the phase level (P) or case level (C), and thus the same for all phases in a case; and the scale for the factor's scoring. Common scales are as follows:

- (0, 1), which indicates a binary factor
- categorical, which indicates values in categories
- free prose, which indicates a short narrative explanation or answer
- (0, 1, -1, 7), where 0 indicates absent and 1 indicates present for the COIN force/government, -1 indicates present for the insurgents, and 7 indicates present for both the COIN force and the insurgents.¹

¹ When factors were scored using (0, 1, -1, 7) it was because doing otherwise would have necessitated separate factors for the COIN force and the insurgents. That said, many factors have been divided into two (0, 1) factors as a way to encode the same amount of information.

Table E.1
All Factors in the Data, with Factor Number, Scope, and Scale

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|--|---------------|-------------------------------|-------|
| Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force | f1 | P | 0, 1 |
| In area of conflict, COIN force <i>not</i> perceived as worse than insurgents | f2 | P | 0, 1 |
| Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claimed to control | f3 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force established and then expanded secure areas | f4 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict | f5 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force provided or ensured provision of basic services in areas it controlled or claimed to control | f6 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict | f7 | P | 0, 1 |
| Majority of citizens in area of conflict viewed government as legitimate | f8 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force <i>not</i> viewed as an occupying force in area of conflict | f9 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government provided better governance than insurgents in area of conflict | f10 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force <i>avoided</i> excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force | f11 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force collateral damage <i>not</i> perceived by population in area of conflict as worse than insurgents' | f12 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government a functional democracy | f13 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government a partial or transitional democracy | f14 | P | 0, 1 |
| Free and fair elections held | f15 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government respected human rights and allowed free press | f16 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|-------|
| COIN force resettled/removed civilian populations for population control | f17 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgents | f18 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting | f19 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force effectively disrupted insurgent materiel acquisition | f20 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence | f21 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force effectively disrupted insurgent financing | f22 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force effectively disrupted insurgent command and control | f23 | P | 0, 1 |
| Flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely absent | f24 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force employed escalating repression | f25 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force employed collective punishment | f26 | P | 0, 1 |
| Amnesty or reward program in place | f27 | P | 0, 1 |
| Amnesty program reduced number of insurgents | f28 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force and government actions consistent with messages (delivering on promises) | f29 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force maintained credibility with population in area of conflict (includes expectation management) | f30 | P | 0, 1 |
| Messages/themes cohered with overall COIN approach | f31 | P | 0, 1 |
| Messages/themes coordinated for all involved government agencies | f32 | P | 0, 1 |
| Earnest IO/PSYOP/strategic communication/messaging effort | f33 | P | 0, 1 |
| Unity of effort/unity of command maintained (government and COIN force) | f34 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|--|---------------|-------------------------------|-------|
| COIN force avoided creating unattainable expectations | f35 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents' grievances substantially addressed since onset of conflict | f36 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force received substantial intelligence from population in area of conflict | f37 | P | 0, 1 |
| Majority of population in area of conflict supported/favored COIN force (wanted it to win) | f38 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force sought to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict | f39 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force avoided culturally offensive behaviors and messages | f40 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force employed local militias or irregular forces or engaged in/enabled community policing in areas it controlled or claimed to control | f41 | P | 0, 1 |
| Militias/local irregular forces did <i>not</i> work at cross-purposes with COIN force/government | f42 | P | 0, 1 |
| No parts of the area of conflict were no-go or otherwise denied to COIN force | f43 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force did <i>not</i> employ culturally inappropriate outsiders for a significant fraction of operations | f44 | P | 0, 1 |
| Indigenous forces conducted majority of COIN operations | f45 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force or government actions did <i>not</i> contribute to substantial new grievances claimed by the insurgents | f46 | P | 0, 1 |
| Important external support to insurgents significantly reduced | f47 | P | 0, 1 |
| Important internal support to insurgents significantly reduced | f48 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents unable to maintain or grow force size | f49 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents' ability to replenish resources significantly diminished | f50 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|-------|
| Intelligence adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on COIN force's terms | f51 | P | 0, 1 |
| Intelligence adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations | f52 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force <i>failed</i> to adapt to changes in insurgent strategy, operations, or tactics | f53 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents demonstrated potency through impressive or spectacular attacks | f54 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents provided or ensured provision of basic services in areas they controlled or claimed to control | f55 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents discredited/delegitimized COIN force/government | f56 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents made critical strategic errors, failed to make obvious adaptations, or voluntarily exited the conflict | f57 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force engaged in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents | f58 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents delegitimized due to civilian casualties or other unacceptable behavior | f59 | P | 0, 1 |
| Security of population in area of conflict improved from previous phase | f60 | P | 0, 1 |
| External support to COIN from strong state/military | f61 | P | 0, 1 |
| External support to insurgents from strong state/military | f62 | P | 0, 1 |
| External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of government | f63 | P | 0, 1 |
| External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents | f64 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force (and allies) and insurgents (and allies) lacked sophisticated modern military equipment and vehicles | f65 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force (and allies) had significant military equipment mismatch dominance over insurgents (and allies) | f66 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|--|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| COIN force had and used uncontested air dominance | f67 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force had air superiority, but use of airspace was significantly contested or COIN force was unable take advantage of air power | f68 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas (or to prevail in the preponderance of conventional engagements, should overmatched insurgents choose to give battle) | f69 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgent force individually superior to the COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated | f70 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force or allies relied on looting for sustainment | f71 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force and government had different goals/ levels of commitment or both had relatively low levels of commitment | f72 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government/state was competent | f73 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN or insurgent actions precipitated (or constituted) ethnic or religious violence | f74 | P | 0, 1 |
| Expropriable cash crops or mineral wealth in area of conflict | f75 | P | 0, 1 |
| Decisive (probably terminal, but not necessarily) phase of case | f76 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government/COIN win | f77 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgent win | f78 | P | 0, 1 |
| Mixed outcome | f79 | P | 0, 1 |
| <i>Why</i> flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely absent | f80 | P | Free prose |
| COIN force employed indiscriminate force | f81 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force employed substantial indirect fire (air strikes, artillery, or both) | f82 | P | 0, 1 |
| Active minority in area of conflict supported/ favored COIN force or insurgents (wanted them to win) | f83 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| <i>Details</i> of insurgents' critical strategic errors, failure to make obvious adaptations, or voluntary exit from conflict | f84 | P | Free prose |
| <i>Why</i> insurgents were unable to maintain or grow force size | f85 | P | Categorical |
| <i>Why</i> insurgents' ability to replenish resources significantly diminished | f86 | P | Categorical |
| Change in level of popular support for insurgents | f87 | P | 1, 0, -1 |
| <i>Why</i> level of popular support for insurgents changed | f88 | P | Free prose |
| Change in level of popular support for COIN force/government | f89 | P | 1, 0, -1 |
| <i>Why</i> level of popular support for COIN force/government changed | f90 | P | Free prose |
| Phase included significant DDR efforts beyond amnesty | f91 | P | 0, 1 |
| Former Soviet country | f92 | C | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency followed a coup or was a counterrevolution | f93 | C | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency followed withdrawal of a colonial power | f94 | C | 0, 1 |
| Conflict caused significant host-nation economic disruption | f95 | P | 0, 1 |
| Conclusion/suspension externally imposed or due to international pressure or other exogenous event | f96 | P | 0, 1 |
| Conclusion/suspension substantially due to withdrawal of international support for one or both sides | f97 | P | 0, 1 |
| Conclusion/suspension driven by withdrawal of support to which side? | f97a | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Level of violence low/manageable | f98 | P | 0, 1 |
| External support continued to sustain conflict that otherwise would likely have ended | f99 | P | 0, 1 |
| High levels of sectarian or other identity-based tension in area of conflict | f100 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| Grievances leading to initial insurgency substantially resolved, with such reforms as government programs to improve the political process, establishment of an impartial and credible judicial system, reduction of corruption, improved economy, and efforts to address religious or cultural discrimination or to remove other sources of dissatisfaction that caused part of the population to side with the insurgents | f101 | P | 0, 1 |
| Postconflict government fragile/weak/unstable | f102 | C | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency followed by another insurgency, significant terrorism campaign, or other conflict fomented by the same (or lineal) insurgent group | f103 | C | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency followed by another insurgency, significant terrorism campaign, or other conflict fomented by a different insurgent group | f104 | C | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency followed by another insurgency, significant terrorism campaign, or other conflict due to a new grievance (core grievances differed from those motivating the previous insurgency) | f105 | C | 0, 1 |
| Number of years between conclusion of this insurgency and onset of new conflict (or time until end of 2010) | f106 | C | Number (in years) |
| Resolution followed by a next conflict (0 indicates right-censored) | f106a | C | 0, 1 |
| Postconflict government a power-sharing government, with some kind of representation by both sides in the conflict | f107 | C | 0, 1 |
| External power (whether involved in the conflict or not) provided support to victor following the end of the insurgency | f108 | C | 0, 1 |
| Postconflict government democratic | f110 | C | 0, 1 |
| Extranational peacekeeping forces present after conflict | f111 | C | 0, 1 |
| Primary COIN focus on eliminating insurgent threat | f112 | P | 0, 1 |
| Primary COIN focus on diminishing motive for insurgency | f113 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|--|---------------|-------------------------------|-------|
| COIN efforts balanced between eliminating immediate threat and diminishing motive for insurgency (one could still be primary while the other is sufficiently emphasized to constitute balance) | f114 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN campaign included significant (not necessarily primary) focus on physically denying the insurgents access to supportive populations (for example, through removal/resettlement or interdiction) | f114a | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force and government employed an integrated political and military strategy | f115 | P | 0, 1 |
| Military goals routinely took precedence over political goals | f116 | P | 0, 1 |
| Significant government reforms since onset of conflict | f117 | P | 0, 1 |
| Significant ethical/professional/human rights–related military reforms since onset of conflict | f118 | P | 0, 1 |
| Significant government or military reforms in phase | f119 | P | 0, 1 |
| Reforms recognized/appreciated by population in area of conflict | f120 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural institutions | f121 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government repression and/or exclusion of significant societal groups from state power or resources | f122 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government maintained weak policing capacity and infrastructural power | f123 | P | 0, 1 |
| Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic government rule | f124 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government had insufficient ministerial capacity to manage/direct foreign aid | f125 | P | 0, 1 |
| Planned reconstruction/development improvements substantially above historical baseline (trying to “reconstruct” to a level not previously achieved) | f126 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Reconstruction/development succeeded in bringing significant portions of the area of conflict to a level of development above preconflict baseline | f127 | P | 0, 1 |
| Development provided by (or perceived as being provided by) . . . | f128 | P | Categorical |
| Number of these five reconstruction/development criteria met: based on popular demand, initiated mainly at the village level, used local labor/created local jobs, aimed at self-empowerment of the people, was sustainable (score 0–5) | f129 | P | 0–5 |
| Reconstruction/development aid was destabilizing because it dislocated trade patterns/alienated powerful economic interests | f130 | P | 0, 1 |
| Reconstruction/development aid welcomed by population but rejected out of fear of insurgent reprisals for accepting aid from “occupiers” | f131 | P | 0, 1 |
| Significant fraction of development funds squandered, through corruption or through uncompleted or useless projects (or both) | f132 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force employed practices considered beyond the pale by contemporary U.S. ethical standards | f133 | P | 0, 1 |
| <i>What practices?</i> | f134 | P | Categorical |
| <i>What principles motivated COIN force’s employment of practices beyond the pale by contemporary U.S. ethical standards?</i> | f135 | P | Categorical |
| COIN force undertook “clear” of “clear, hold, and build” in area of conflict | f136 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force undertook “hold” of “clear, hold, and build” in area of conflict | f137 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force undertook “build” of “clear, hold, and build” in area of conflict | f138 | P | 0, 1 |
| Resettled population provided with reasonable standard of living (as opposed to level of typical refugee camp or worse) | f140 | P | 0, 1 |
| Census taken/used for population control | f141 | P | 0, 1 |
| ID cards issued/checkpoints established for population control | f142 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|--|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Curfews established for population control | f143 | P | 0, 1 |
| Conflict primarily urban | f144 | P | 0, 1 |
| Conflict had significant urban component | f145 | P | 0, 1 |
| Terrain played a major role in conflict | f146 | P | 0, 1 |
| Type of terrain that played a major role in conflict | f147 | P | Categorical |
| Terrain played a major role because it provided sanctuary for the insurgents (COIN forces could not/would not enter terrain) | f148 | P | 0, 1 |
| Terrain played a major role because it concealed the insurgents from the air | f149 | P | 0, 1 |
| Terrain played a major role because it made it difficult for COIN force to maneuver and stretched COIN force logistics | f150 | P | 0, 1 |
| Terrain played a major role because it allowed insurgents to avoid/overcome COIN force firepower or vehicle advantages | f151 | P | 0, 1 |
| Terrain played a major role for another reason | f152 | P | 0, 1 |
| Primary COIN force composed of conscripts | f154 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force included significant numbers of police, paramilitary, militia, or other nonconventional personnel | f155 | P | 0, 1 |
| Police, paramilitary, militia, or other nonconventional personnel largely absent or ineffective because of poor training, poor armament (relative to the insurgents), cowardice, corruption, human rights abuses, or other reasons | f155a | P | 0, 1 |
| Government employed significant numbers of locally recruited military/paramilitary/militia/police forces (i.e., from the areas in which they operated) | f156 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN forces primarily deployed in a space-domination/passive-presence role | f159 | P | 0, 1 |
| Effective coordination between diverse COIN forces (e.g., police, paramilitary, various military forces, different country forces) | f160 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force morale remained high throughout the phase | f161 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| COIN force employed "counter-gangs," "scouts," or "ferret forces" against insurgents | f162 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force was an alliance or coalition of other countries' forces (if significant external COIN force was involved) | f163 | P | 0, 1 |
| Extent of threat to government | f164 | P | Categorical |
| Rough population, in thousands | f165 | start of C | Approximate number (in thousands) |
| Geographic area, in approximate sq km | f166 | start of C | Approximate number (in sq km) |
| Level of development (high, medium, low) | f168 | start of C | Categorical |
| Scope of conflict | f169 | P | Categorical |
| Fighting in phase primarily force-on-force conventional engagement | f170 | P | 0, 1 |
| Fighting in phase primarily COIN force using conventional forces to hammer insurgents, who mostly fled | f171 | P | 0, 1 |
| Fighting in phase primarily guerrilla/terrorist/ small-unit engagement (even if COIN forces deployed/operated in large conventional formations) | f172 | P | 0, 1 |
| Fighting in phase substantially balanced between conventional and small-unit engagement (hybrid) | f173 | P | 0, 1 |
| Fighting in phase primarily initiated by insurgents | f174 | P | 0, 1 |
| Fighting in phase primarily initiated by COIN force | f175 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: religious | f176 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: secessionist | f177 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: war of liberation/ independence | f178 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: ethno-nationalist | f179 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: greed | f180 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|--|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Insurgency motive: grievance | f181 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: opportunity | f182 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: ideological | f183 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: counterrevolutionary/restorative | f184 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: no clear motive | f185 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgency motive: multiple insurgencies with different mixes of motives | f186 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: mature democracy | f187 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: partial/transitional democracy | f188 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: authoritarian | f189 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: theocracy | f190 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: communist | f191 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: anocracy | f192 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: imperial/colonial | f193 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: monarchy | f194 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: oligarchy | f195 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: kleptocracy | f196 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: transitional government | f197 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: strongman | f198 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: minority | f199 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government type: power-sharing | f200 | P | 0, 1 |
| Type of external participant: alliance/coalition force | f201 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external participant: major power | f202 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external participant: minor/regional power | f203 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external participant: diaspora/refugees | f204 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|--|----------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------|
| Type of external participant: terrorist/insurgent group | f205 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external participant: wealthy/influential individuals | f206 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external participant: nongovernmental organizations/charities/lobbies | f207 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external participant: private security contractors/mercenaries | f208 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external participant: peacekeeping force | f209 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: balance of power | f210 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: colonialism/decolonization | f211 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: religious affinity | f212 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: co-ethnic group | f213 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: resource plunder/exploitation | f214 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: global/regional influence or regional power struggle | f215 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: stabilization/destabilization | f216 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: regime change | f217 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: revenge/payback | f218 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: curry favor with opposition | f219 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: internal security/prophylaxis | f220 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: prestige | f221 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: irredentism | f222 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: ideology | f223 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Motives for external participant: money/pay | f224 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Major external participant switched sides during (or at end of) phase | f225 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|--|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Type of external support included: safe haven/transit | f226 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: logistics | f227 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: fighters | f228 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: public relations/propaganda/diplomatic | f229 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: sanctions, serious political pressure | f230 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: funding/financing | f231 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) | f232 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: training and/or advice (military advisers) | f233 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: direct military support (troops) | f234 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: weapons/materiel | f235 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Type of external support included: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, area interdiction, area security, or other activities involving troops deployed not for direct military support or an advisory mission | f236 | P | 0, 1, -1, 7 |
| Overall importance of external support to conflict: critical/game changer | f237 | P | 0, 1 |
| Overall importance of external support to conflict: valuable/significant | f238 | P | 0, 1 |
| Overall importance of external support to conflict: minor | f239 | P | 0, 1 |
| Overall importance of external support to conflict: counterproductive | f240 | P | 0, 1 |
| Overall importance of external support to conflict: neutral/negligible/none | f241 | P | 0, 1 |
| Regional interests of external actor supporting COIN and the government predominantly aligned | f242 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Host-nation elites had perverse incentives to continue conflict | f243 | P | 0, 1 |
| <i>Detail</i> on perverse incentives of host-nation elites | f244 | P | Categorical |
| Host nation economically dependent on external actor | f245 | P | 0, 1 |
| External actor forces suffered majority of combat casualties of overall COIN force | f246 | P | 0,1 |
| External actor provided majority of the funding for the overall COIN effort | f247 | P | 0, 1 |
| Relationship between external and host-nation forces | f248 | P | Categorical |
| Military action outside of host-nation borders (if insurgents relied on cross-border support or havens) | f249 | P | 0, 1 |
| Military action outside host-nation borders effective in reducing external havens/support | f250 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents exploited deep-seated/intractable issues to gain legitimacy | f251 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents employed unconstrained violence (against civilians) to create or sustain insecurity and instability (purposely or otherwise) | f252 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgent leadership competent, able to develop and change strategy and ensure succession | f253 | P | 0, 1 |
| Government/COIN force's willingness to take casualties was high | f254 | P | 0, 1 |
| External COIN force's willingness to take casualties was high | f255 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents switched from guerrilla to conventional tactics | f256 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents' switch to conventional tactics unsustainable (COIN forces able to prevail in vast majority of engagements) | f257 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents switched from conventional to guerrilla tactics | f258 | P | 0, 1 |
| Insurgents forcibly recruited from civilian population | f259 | P | 0, 1 |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| Insurgents mostly avoided engaging in large-scale operations against better-equipped regular troops and resorted primarily to guerrilla tactics (e.g., sniping, sabotage, small-scale ambushes/hit-and-run attacks, IEDs) | f260 | P | 0, 1 |
| COIN force attempted to use overwhelming force | f261 | P | 0, 1 |
| Successful use of overwhelming force | f262 | P | 0, 1 |
| Majority of population recognized need for occupation (perhaps because ravaged by war and cognizant of needs for reconstruction) | f263 | P | 0, 1 |
| Shared perception by government and external participant of a common threat to the occupied area | f264 | P | 0, 1 |
| Occupied population accepted claim of occupier intent to withdraw its troops under attainable circumstances as credible | f265 | P | 0, 1 |
| External occupier was invited into country by government | f266 | P | 0, 1 |
| Occupying troops and occupied population had predominantly different religions | f267 | P | 0, 1 |
| Occupation/outside intervention created legitimacy gaps exploited by insurgents | f268 | P | 0, 1 |
| Force protection actions by external forces, such as roadblocks and vehicle convoys traveling at high speeds, alienated the population | f269 | P | 0, 1 |
| Newly included case (0 denotes case from original set of 30) | f270 | C | 0, 1 |
| Case fought against the tide of history (end of colonialism, end of apartheid) | f271 | C | 0, 1 |
| External actor primary COIN force in phase | f272 | P | 0, 1 |
| Length of phase, in months | f273 | P | Number (in months) |
| Time from start of conflict to end of phase, in months | endtime | P | Number (in months) |
| Reason for phase change | f274 | P | Categorical |

Table E.1—Continued

| Factor | Factor Number | Scored at Case or Phase Level | Scale |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|-------|
| Host nation was a foreign power (colonial, imperial, occupier) | f275 | P | 0, 1 |
| <i>At end of conflict</i> , separatists got: their own country or de facto administratively separate territory | f276 | C | 0, 1 |
| <i>At end of conflict</i> , separatists got: regional autonomy, but were still administratively part of host nation (and payed host-nation taxes) | f277 | C | 0, 1 |
| <i>At end of conflict</i> , separatists got: improved recognition, representation, fairness, or other redress of grievances short of real regional autonomy | f278 | C | 0, 1 |
| External actor fought/supported another significant conflict or COIN force | f279 | P | 0, 1 |
| An external actor provided significant financial and materiel support to COIN force/government | f280 | P | 0, 1 |
| An external actor provided significant number of advisers/logisticians to COIN force/government | f281 | P | 0, 1 |
| An external actor provided significant direct military support (troops, air power) to COIN force/government | f282 | P | 0, 1 |
| Islamic insurgency | f283 | P | 0, 1 |
| Communist insurgency | f284 | P | 0, 1 |
| External actor's significant direct military support was limited to air power/SOF only—no external conventional ground maneuver forces | f285 | P | 0, 1 |
| External primary COIN force drew down or left prior to end of conflict | f286 | C | 0, 1 |
| External COIN force left government to its own devices | f287 | C | 0, 1 |
| Departing external COIN force transitioned to government forces with good prospects for success | f288 | C | 0, 1 |
| "Good" win—COIN force won in a stable, lasting way (holistic assessment) | f289 | C | 0, 1 |