CHAPTER 9

REDEFINING SECURITY COOPERATION: NEW LIMITS ON PHASE ZERO AND "SHAPING"

Colonel Thomas M. Rhatican
U.S. Army Reserve

> The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish. . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is foreign to its nature.
>
> —Carl von Clausewitz
> *On War*[1]

In February 2008, the U.S. Army introduced a new operational doctrine to capture and apply recent changes to national security policies and multiservice, joint military doctrine. In U.S. Army *Field Manual (FM) 3-0*, *Operations*, senior Army leaders reaffirmed that the Army has analytically looked into the future and determined that our nation will continue to be "engaged in an era of persistent conflict—a period of protracted confrontation among states, non-state, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends."[2] The new field manual is a self-described revolutionary departure from past doctrine, and it anticipates a complex and multidimensional environment "increasingly fought among the people."[3]

The new FM provides what it calls the intellectual underpinnings of how the Army will train, equip, and fight in this new environment, and boldly notes that "victory in this changed environment of persistent conflict"[4] will only come if met by military operations that are closely coordinated with "diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts."[5]

If we are truly facing an era of complex and persistent conflict, an era that will require the "protracted application"[6] of the military, as well as civilian agencies and organizations, are civilian and military leaders heeding the warning of Carl von Clausewitz? If chaos, chance, and friction dominate pre- and post-conflict operations as much today as in the time of Clausewitz,[7] are today's leaders providing the policy guidance and doctrinal clarity necessary for the military to prepare for and conduct a "perpetual war?"[8]

In the 5 years since the end of the ground war in Iraq, the debate continues about the future use and role of the military against state and nonstate actors, and the complexities of military involvement in both pre- and post-conflict operations. Francis Fukayama warns that pre- or post-conflict nation-building requires that an early distinction be made between a country that requires development, or the complete transformation of the society and its institutions, or a country that requires only reconstruction.[9] Reconstruction is possible when the "underlying political and social infrastructure has survived the conflict or crisis,"[10] and the society can be returned to its pre-conflict state. He warns that "failed states are not modern states minus the resources,"[11] and that as evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan suggests, special skills and precautions are required to effectively intervene and then manage such a complex, volatile, and costly undertaking.

In the capstone publication of joint military doctrine, *Joint Publication (JP) 1*, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are called to be actively engaged in shaping such failed or failing states by "employing all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic."[12] The question must then be asked: Do military commanders and their staffs understand the complexities and subtleties of nation assistance or nation-building? Are they prepared for their new core role in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization? More important, in a pre-conflict environment do they understand the complexities and dangers of trying to intervene and possibly stave off the collapse of a failing state?[13]

It is likely that the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will continue to generate an interest on the part of GCCs to operationalize pre-conflict Theater Security Cooperation activities.[14] But without the benefit of a unifying strategy and a method of interagency control, combatant commanders should be wary of such incremental efforts.[15] In fact, if not carefully coordinated, even well-intended pre-conflict shaping activities designed to improve the training and capabilities of the host military or provide urgent humanitarian relief may actually complicate our foreign policy objectives, or worse yet, undermine our overall national security interests.

This chapter therefore examines the benefits of limiting Phase Zero (shaping) activities to full spectrum military operations,[16] and distinguishing it from pre-conflict security cooperation activities designed to build the economic and security capabilities of our partners and allies. Also examined are the benefits of better linking our security cooperation strategy to the direction and control of the National Security Council (NSC) to ensure that our security cooperation activities are integrated and synchronized with a an overarching security cooperation strategy.

SHAPING EVOLVES WITHOUT A CLEAR PURPOSE

General Anthony Zinni (U.S. Marine Corps, Ret.), never one to shy away from international humanitarian assistance missions or nation-building exercises as commander of U.S. Central Command in the late 1990s, expressed concern about the increased pressure to use military forces to counter asymmetric threats caused by failing states, terrorists, international drug trafficking, and the general threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As early as September 2003, only months after the conclusion of the ground war in Iraq, General Zinni fortuitously shared concerns about the growing complexity of the U.S. military's mission in Iraq and Afghanistan in light of the current trend of peacetime and wartime missions. He observed that simply defeating the enemy in the field was clearly no longer enough to win wars, but also acknowledged that U.S. forces are not properly configured for operations beyond the breaking and killing phase of war, and that "American officers lack the strong mix of non-combat skills needed in order to engage arrays of cultures and organizations at the edge of the empire."[17]

Drawing on his experiences in Vietnam, General Colin Powell also expressed his general wariness to use troops for anything but decisive military engagements for fear of endless entanglements, a position often interpreted to mean his general opposition to the use of troops for peacekeeping or nation-building.[18] Other officers also share concerns about the possible erosion of core military competencies as the number of new missions

and new necessary skills squeeze out training time and resources that could have been used for traditional warfighting. Still others cite the possible loss of legitimacy and trust as a profession if the military assumes too many nontraditional roles and is perceived as stepping outside of its expertise and "jurisdiction."[19]

While current military doctrine is replete with references calling first for the application of nonmilitary resources to resolve potential conflicts,[20] should we be concerned about the emerging role of GCCs in displacing or overshadowing broader U.S. foreign policy objectives? Do GCCs exercise an inordinate amount of influence over the U.S. Department of State and other U.S. Government (USG) agencies operating within the combatant commander's area of responsibility even during periods of relative stability and peace? Some fear that the commanders may take advantage of vague doctrine governing interagency coordination and grant themselves the authority to be first among equals, and perhaps otherwise apply military solutions to regional challenges best resolved through diplomatic and economic measures.[21] Critics believe that with bountiful resources and an open-ended mandate, GCCs are sometimes engaging with "countries that seem far outside the U.S. sphere of influence or concern,"[22] or acting in many ways like Roman proconsuls.[23]

In fairness to the GCCs, overall U.S. security depends in part on the USG's ability to develop viable, long-term security cooperation strategies throughout the world. In an effort to comply with national security strategies, the Department of Defense (DoD) requires the GCCs to develop contingency plans and crisis action plans to respond to security threats, and to likewise develop separate but related Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plans to integrate diplomatic, information, and economic sources of national power to prevent crises that may later warrant military intervention. Integrating diplomatic and economic activities is no easy task, so the question needs to be asked: Are the GCCs and their staffs well-suited to take the lead in developing our nation's security cooperation plans?

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING AND FUNDING

Initiated by President Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen in 1997, Security Cooperation Planning evolved during a period of strategic ambiguity immediately following the end of the Cold War. It was a time for the United States to take a advantage of a strategic opportunity to best promote U.S. national interests.[24] At the time called Theater Engagement Planning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff introduced a new planning methodology for a new type of nonkinetic engagement process. But many leaders within the DoD had reservations about the relevance of the so-called engagement plan. Hadn't they already been engaging with the political and military leaders of the countries within their respective areas of operation (AORs)?[25]

From the time of its inception as an engagement strategy, most of the activities were referred to as shaping activities. In fact, the word *shaping* was used interchangeably to mean almost any activity taken to prepare for a future contingency. The overuse of the word shaping led to real and perceived overlaps with our broader diplomatic and development assistance efforts at the Department of State and at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Adding to the confusion, TSC development in the

early years had been purposefully stovepiped and not shared outside of the DoD until reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense.[26]

Today, overall U.S. Security Cooperation Strategy is derived from the President's National Security Strategy and a number of other defense related strategies, directives, and plans.[27] But the intent of shaping remains much the same as it did in the late 1990s. It includes taking actions to enhance bonds between possible future coalition partners, using the military to prevent or deter crises from developing, and, if a crisis does occur, taking action to secure the use of facilities to best provide access for follow on troops and equipment.[28]

Today, combatant commanders and service chiefs are tasked by the Secretary of Defense to work with DoD staff to promulgate regional and country specific plans and to align resources and activities.[29] These resources and activities are most easily broken down into two categories: (1) Title 10, U.S. Code, or funds and programs managed and funded within the Army's resource planning system (PPBES); and (2) Title 22 U.S. Code, or funds and programs controlled by the State Department but administered within the DoD by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Title 22 activities include peacekeeping operations, International Military Education and Training (IMET), foreign military financing, and foreign military sales (the largest security assistance program).[30] The very popular Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program is also included within Security Assistance.[31]

In recent years, two new programs and nontraditional funding mechanisms have come under scrutiny by several leading members of Congress (and have caused some controversy at the Department of State [DoS]). First, the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1206) granted the DoD the authority and funding to train and equip foreign militaries and police forces at the direction of the President, but without approval by the DoS.[32] Section 1206 funding was increased from $200M in 2006 to $300M in 2007 for use in up to 14 countries, and due to recent changes, may now be used at the sole discretion of the DoD.[33] Authorization for this type of activity would normally require the coordination and approval of the DoS as part of the Title 22 Security Assistance activities.

Second, DoD recently received approval to create a Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) to allow combatant commanders to conduct joint military exercises; military education and training; humanitarian assistance and civic projects to include medical and veterinary care; and the construction of schools, wells, transportation systems, and sanitation systems.[34] The most evident example of the new CCIF is the operation in the Horn of Africa (HOA) operating out of Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.

Congressional criticism and concern appears to be leveled at both the method and the cost of the programs. Without clear strategic doctrine and without a planning process that integrates experts at the DoS and USAID who perform many of these tasks as part of their profession, some fear that well-meaning commanders may not be taking all of the necessary diplomatic precautions. Local populations rarely see our role as benign or disinterested, and external interventions of any kind invariably provoke resentment or even a nationalist reaction by a determined few.[35] So what is it that we gain by deploying small groups of soldiers on reconstruction, development, or humanitarian assistance

missions? As an example, do we lose credibility and acceptance from the Muslim populations in Africa when we overtly link our military with developmental initiatives?[36] And if it is true that "praise for good results is accorded stingily; and blame for problems, freely,"[37] shouldn't we at least assign responsibility for complex stabilization efforts to an agency or organization in the best position to weigh all of the long-term benefits and risks?

RECONCILING NSPD-44 AND DoDD 3000.05

In late 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 to empower the Secretary of State to take action to better coordinate reconstruction and stabilization efforts in countries that are "at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife."[38] NSPD-44 clearly states the primacy of the DoS over all agencies, to include the DoD, for the purpose of coordinating and carrying out all laws and policies related to foreign policy, to include the harmonization of such policies with U.S. military plans and operations. NSPD-44 also contemplates both pre- and post-conflict operations focused on reconstruction and stabilization.

Within weeks of the President's announcing NSPD-44, the DoD issued Directive 3000.05, describing the DoD's plan to support the DoS's new reconstruction and stabilization effort. DoDD 3000.05 directs that the subordinate military services elevate stability operations as a core mission on par with combat operations, and directs all services to be prepared to perform a complete array of civilian tasks as part of stability operations "when civilians cannot do so."[39]

Some would suggest that the DoD's combatant commanders are not organizationally or culturally equipped to conduct a wide array of predominantly civilian-type tasks,[40] and that the military may never be able to adequately adapt to duties that are not part of its culture.[41] Echoing similar concerns, it is argued that civilianizing the core mission of the military may actually break down the jurisdiction of the profession or the very heart of where the military's expert knowledge is applied.[42] As such, the boundaries of the profession become increasingly unclear to leaders outside the profession as well as to the members of the military profession itself, perhaps weakening their professional identity and commitment, but also making it increasingly harder for the military to say no to almost any task.[43]

In the end, did DoD Directive 3000.05 finally resolve any possible disputes over the military's proper jurisdiction and role in nation-building? By directive of the Secretary of Defense, stability operations are now at an equal level of importance as combat operations. As such, it is argued the tasking to develop new required skills, capabilities, and traditions should end "the military's long-standing cultural aversion to the use of the U.S. military power for nation-building,"[44] and that we should refocus our energy and resources on improving the capabilities of the military, and not worry so much about integrating the DoS and the rest of the interagency.[45]

Since the issuance of NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05, it is evident that the DoS has struggled to develop and fund the creation of the civilian response teams needed for civilian led reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Locked in a perceived zero-sum game with Congress, many in the State Department believe that increased spending on

Iraq, Afghanistan, and the GWOT seriously hinders the reconstruction and stabilization operations at State.

In contrast, over the same period and as a result of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Defense budget mushroomed and enabled the DoD to shift resources to humanitarian and development aid at a time when State and USAID had their funding limited by the Congress and the White House.[46] To his credit, the disparity in funding and the limits on operations at the DoS had not gone unnoticed by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates. He has repeatedly spoken in favor of increased funding and support of the DoS and even testified before Congress in support of the DoS request for 1100 new employees in the FY 09 budget.

In November 2007, Secretary Gates also gave a speech calling for the revival of our nonmilitary instruments of national power, and for increased funding of foreign affairs programs that "remain disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military and to the importance of such capabilities."[47] He noted that the total foreign affairs budget for the DoS was less than what the DoD spends on health care coverage alone, and that the entire number of foreign officers equals the crew size of one aircraft carrier. "What is clear to me," he said, "is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communication, foreign assistance, civic action, and reconstruction and development."[48]

Hampered by his role in an administration that left office in January 2009, Secretary Gates called on national military leaders to change the way in which the military approaches security cooperation and stabilization operations. "If forced by circumstances," he said, "service members must be prepared to step up and perform civilian-related tasks,"[49] but he also warned that the preferred method is to always have civilians doing the things that they do best.

In a very practical way, Secretary Gates was also trying to protect and preserve the military's resources and its profession. "After all, civilian participation is both necessary to making military operations successful and to relieving stress" on our armed services.[50] He then noted that more robust civilian capabilities would make it less likely that military forces would need to be used in the first place—where "local problems might be dealt with before they become a crisis."[51]

In 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted that if the DoS and USAID did not improve their expeditionary capabilities to deploy civilians with the necessary skill sets, that the military would continue to step in to perform many civilian functions and create a situation that she warned would erode the core functions of both the DoD and the DoS—a point in which she noted that she and Secretary of Gates were in complete agreement.[52] So until the DoS is adequately funded, and in light of increased pressure to counter nonstate actors and terrorists associated with the GWOT, the key question is: Should the DoD continue to take the lead in creating security cooperation activities and otherwise helping to shape or operationalize our foreign policy?

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION—WHO IS IN CHARGE?

In December 2006, the GOP-led Senate Committee on Foreign Relations released a bi-partisan report critical of the DoD and its policies and practices with regard to TSC

and shaping. In a report titled, "Embassies as Command Posts in the War on Terror," the Committee noted that the demands on U.S. embassies have risen exponentially, and that their vital role in coordinating and supporting a broad, interagency effort to fight terrorism lacks people, equipment, and funding.[53] The report included four major points:

First, it noted that the number of DoD personnel in noncombatant countries has risen dramatically, and has caused blurred lines of authority between the DoD and the DoS that hamper interagency decisionmaking at the embassy level.

Second, inadequate funding of DoS staff and functions have decreased their relative strength to pursue long-term, noncoercive efforts in diplomacy, strategic information program-ming, and economic assistance. Perceived gaps caused by lack of funding have been filled by a well-funded DoD, thus creating a shift to the DoD in setting U.S. foreign policy. For example, the report notes that "just as Defense has ramped up its involvement in humanitarian aid and development aid, State and USAID have had to scale back some operations due to the 'Iraq tax' and budget limitations."[54] The report also noted that budget cuts at USAID affected both personnel and programs, and are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in the U.S. campaign against extremism in susceptible regions of the world.[55]

Third, the Committee noted that increased funding to the DoD for its self-assigned missions is creating an overlap of missions and increased friction with non-DoD agencies. As the role of the military continues to expand, DoS and embassy officials are concerned that the DoD will chafe even more at the methods of operation already coordinated and directed by the embassy leadership.

Fourth, the Senate Report cites evidence that host countries are questioning the increased role of the U.S. military in problems seen as not lending themselves to military solutions. While host nation militaries may welcome U.S. military presence, some elements of their governments and society are suspicious of U.S. coercion—and if the trend continues, it could undermine DoS broad bilateral relationships and efforts is support of the GWOT. For example, in Uganda and then in Ethiopia, military civil affairs teams and humanitarian action teams helping local communities build wells, erect schools, and other small development projects, came under suspicion by local authorities for taking sides. In Ethiopia, they were ordered out of the region to prevent sparking further cross-border hostilities.[56]

During congressional hearings on the creation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in the summer of 2007, testimony echoed many of the concerns identified in the Senate Committee report. The United States was having difficulty convincing the Africans of a shared concern for international terrorism and for the need for an AFRICOM headquarters on the continent. Most African countries continued to broadly define terrorism in terms of local unrest and violence—not as an issue to be dealt with militarily as against a foreign threat. Some African leaders reported that the United States habitually underestimates the significance of local violence to their security, and that the United States believes that the violence is not enough of a significant international threat (by U.S. standards) to warrant notice or action.[57] If true, perhaps the U.S. position is simply a reflection of our military-centric view of the overall security concerns of our allies and partners.

During the Vietnam War, Ambassador Robert W. Komer noted that civilian and military leaders in Washington miscalculated and misunderstood the complexities of the political socio-economic factors at play in the earliest stages of the conflict, and too quickly committed to a military solution that later significantly "unbalanced our response."[58]

Today, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley echoes Ambassador Komer's concerns and argues that the ambassador and embassy country teams are the "critical intersection where plans, policies, programs, and personalities come together," [59] and that interagency country teams are in the best position to measure an appropriate response. In an effort to avoid unintended violence, Oakley recommends that a combatant commander's authority should be limited to the actions of deployed forces only engaged in active hostilities. All other military elements working on missions in-country should be under the authority of the ambassador, to include intelligence personnel and special operations forces—with a memorandum of agreement between the ambassador and the geographic combatant commander making clear the ambassador's authority relative to the increased number of special operations forces and SOF missions.[60] As a small but important practical matter, and as a way to circumscribe the peacetime shaping activities in-country, he recommends that assigned DoD personnel fall within the supervisory rating and evaluation scheme of the ambassador, mirroring the rating scheme of other non-military personnel assigned to the embassy.[61]

Some of Ambassador Oakley's contemporaries within the DoS question whether the DoD has become more robust not only in terms of numbers and resources, but also "in the ways they think they can operate under this still not terribly well-defined authority of the chief of mission."[62] Other foreign service officers argue that the war on terrorism may create a steady-state battlefield, and they worry that if the battlefield is everywhere, then even greater guidance will be needed to deconflict the traditional roles and responsibilities of foreign officers and the military.[63] One senior State Department official asks: Has the military relegated foreign service officers to the usefulness of "third rate soldiers as opposed to first-rate diplomats?"[64]

At a National Press Club event in September, 2007, General David Petraeus hailed Ambassador Ryan Crocker as "my great diplomatic wingman."[65] If war zones are military turf, and diplomats are logically the wingman in that type of operational environment, the question must be asked: When, if ever, under the current doctrine of full spectrum operations, does the general become the wingman to the ambassador? If the conflict is persistent, and requires the protracted application of the military, what are the logical checks on diligent military planners and commanders who feel they need to operationalize Phase Zero to fulfill their role in a new core mission.[66]

LIMITING PHASE ZERO (SHAPING) TO FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

Within 8 months of the issuance of DoDD 3000.05 and the elevation of stabilization to a core mission (and core competency), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Operations*, and *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Operations Planning*. In JP 5-0, security cooperation planning is distinct and separate from joint operations planning.

Joint operations planning includes contingency and crisis action planning for full spectrum military operations, to include stabilization operations; and stabilization operations include Phase Zero (shaping). Unlike joint operations planning, security cooperation plans are promulgated by combatant commanders and service chiefs in accordance with the DoD's Security Cooperation Guidance and in consultation with U.S. agencies that represent other instruments of power to include the U.S. chiefs of mission

(ambassadors) in the commander's area of responsibility.[67] Therefore, and consistent with joint doctrine, Phase Zero (shaping) activities and security cooperation activities are the products of two separate plans.

But while joint doctrine defines separate *planning* processes for Phase Zero (shaping) and security cooperation, it defines the respective *activities* as much the same: enhancing bonds and increasing capabilities of partners, preventing conflicts and crises, and maintaining operational access for follow on forces.[68] So how does the DoD distinguish the two?

Historically, much of the control and funding for security cooperation activities has fallen under the purview of the State Department, and security cooperation activities have been applied throughout the world in areas in which the United States wants to shape our national security. In fact, in an effort to differentiate the respective roles of the DoS and the DoD with respect to security cooperation planning, JP 3-0 still acknowledges that the DoS is always a principal agency (and often the lead agency) responsible for U.S. efforts to "protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict."[69] DoS controls the funding for many critical Title 22 programs, to include foreign military sales and foreign military financing. DoD therefore encourages combatant commanders and other joint force commanders to maintain working relationships with the chiefs of U.S. missions and the State Department, and describes the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plan as the framework in which joint force commanders will "continually employ military forces to *complement and reinforce* other instruments of national power."(emphasis by author.)[70]

But in recent years, and as noted in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, the DoD has willingly assumed a larger role in humanitarian aid, development, and other areas once managed almost exclusively by the State Department and USAID. As a result, the DoD is blurring the line between the historical application of security cooperation activities and the new Phase Zero (shaping) activities.

To maximize the full effect of security cooperation and Phase Zero (shaping), and to add some clarity to their doctrinal application, it would be better to limit the application of Phase Zero (shaping) to the following two methods: First, Phase Zero should only be applied in a linear, progressive manner once a military campaign commences. In this case, Phase Zero operations would immediately follow security cooperation activities. For example, if a GCC had already been gathering information and creating tentative plans for access to a country's airfields and ports as part of its contribution to the TSC plan, shaping activities may include the logical follow on tasks. These tasks may include the completion of necessary contracting services for logistics and support, conducting rehearsals, or completing the final coordination with host nation or multinational military and security forces. Consistent with the joint publications, Phase Zero operations will continue to include actions that prevent conflict but at the same time best facilitate the possible arrival and onward integration of military forces.

Second, Phase Zero activities should only be applied as part of an on-going military campaign with forces engaged in full spectrum operations (or a mix of defensive, offensive, and stability operations). The GCC would be engaged in full spectrum operations where, by definition, Phase Zero operations are conducted in areas of relative peace, and the GCC would try to safeguard the peace while simultaneously taking action to ensure that military forces would have access to the area as needed.

Limiting Phase Zero (shaping) activities to an operational construct, and not letting it freely overlap with security cooperation activities, is consistent with the balance of operations chart in JP 3-0 that depicts and defines shaping operations not in isolation, but as part of the continuous application, a three-part mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.[71] Phase Zero (shaping) activities should therefore remain operationally focused, and in concert with host nation and multinational partners to preserve peace or prevent conflict but with a heavy emphasis on safeguarding military access. Security cooperation, reflecting at times the more complicated nature of a targeted fragile state, focuses on more complex, and long-term interagency solutions to promote stability and peace and requires a different conceptual framework.

A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INTERAGENCY SECURITY COOPERATION

In a study produced by the Atlantic Council of the United States, Colonel Albert Zaccor provides a helpful analytical framework in support of the creation of a new interagency security cooperation plan that supports all foreign policy objectives while maintaining our "focus on forward defense."[72] Zaccor shares the concerns of other critics of the current system, and agrees that if defined too broadly, security cooperation has the potential to be a "surrogate for foreign policy."[73]

His analysis includes a review of three important areas in support of an interagency security cooperation plan: (1) the creation of broad security cooperation goals (to include political will),[74] (2) the need for more integrated planning, and (3) the removal of likely obstacles to the creation of a fiscally sound, integrated, and effective security cooperation plan.

First, security cooperation goals focus on the creation of sound, long-term relationships with civilian and military leaders to secure information (or gain access to the host nation's sources and data), and to secure access to airports, ports, and possible troop facilities. Relationships are based on trust, mutual interest, and a common understanding of the threat,[75] but most importantly, security cooperation relies on the creation of adequate capabilities and the political will to use them.

The United States must leverage the capabilities of our allies and partners to fill the gaps in our own security shortfalls in a region.[76] One of the true tests for measuring the possible effectiveness of military capabilities does not rest with the military, but rather with the careful assessment of the host nation's shared security interests, its political interests, and its record of cooperating with the United States in other areas of mutual interest.[77] For example, do the current leaders of the country have a history of cooperation with the USG in all matters of mutual interest with regard to trade, commerce, alliances, and treaties? In broader terms, do the country's leaders believe that they share a common fate with us, or even a shared interdependence in the international community? If so, they are more likely to see cooperation as beneficial.[78] Or does the country have a pressing political situation that might make cooperation with the United States only temporarily undesirable, as with Germany and Turkey when U.S. diplomats asked for military assistance in Iraq?[79]

To this end, this type of assessment and recommendation necessarily relies on the input of many experts, to include the military. But a final decision on security cooperation

investments and programs will require an interagency decision linked to the broader interests of both the partner country and the United States.

In recent years, the United States met with some success in developing capabilities in partner countries and then securing the cooperation of their leaders to apply their new security capabilities against shared threats. The Georgia Train and Equip Program is widely viewed as a success story because it reflected our ability to create partner capabilities that were later exercised by the Georgian leadership to remedy both Georgia's internal security concerns as well as our international security concerns in that region.[80] The United States pooled $65M from a combination of security cooperation sources to train 2,600 Georgian soldiers who later rooted out terrorists in the Panski Gorge region—the original objective of the program. Bordering on Turkey and Russia, Georgia seeks entry into the European Union (EU) and NATO, and has been a willing partner in U.S.-led coalition operations, to include sending 600 troops for operations in Iraq.[81]

The Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is another example of a successful (but expensive) security cooperation effort in northwestern Africa. Requiring $508M in FY 2008, TSCTI now includes 10 states and a successful program to protect borders, deny safe havens, track movement of terrorists, and improve general cooperation in the region against international terrorism.[82] TSCTI also reflects our ability to improve the military and security capability of select partner countries, as well as generate the political willingness to exercise that capability for mutual gain.

Second, Zaccor identifies the peculiar need for better integrated planning in the current operating environment that includes not only terrorism, drug trafficking, and the proliferation of WMD,[83] but also AIDS epidemics, international organized crime, climate change and population migrations, and the emerging threat of countries like China seeking to secure energy reserves in Africa. As such, the temptation is for the United States to be more fully engaged throughout the world. So the challenge will be one of economizing on our costs in the current counterterrorism campaign, costs that are already high and "almost certainly not sustainable."[84]

To be effective, a new security cooperation strategy must reflect a new institutional culture. The strategy must build broad capabilities in much the same way that the Army has adopted Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Soldier Systems/Personnel, and Finances (DOTLMS-PF) to "capture all of the factors that go into the creation of a truly capable" force.[85] Likewise, and despite our multiplicity of government programs and good intentions, our foreign partners and allies rightfully expect us to speak with one voice.

Finally, Zaccor identified a number of obstacles to achieving a fiscally sound, integrated, and authoritative security cooperation effort. The current system of security cooperation lacks a common conceptual understanding, or doctrine, and the funding system remains "underfunded, fragmented, and inflexible."[86] For example, the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits using Foreign Military Assistance funds to support law enforcement organizations in foreign countries, with exceptions only for counternarcotics and customs.[87] This type of stovepiped funding hinders a broader USG effort to improve host nation law enforcement or gendarmerie, and reflects a lack of organizational structure and lines of authority necessary to best apply our resources.[88] In his conclusion,

Zaccor recommends the elimination of our "hierarchical and program driven approach . . . controlled by policy 'fiefdoms'," [89] and instead, the adoption of an interagency program patterned after the current DoD Security Cooperation model but with national Security Council playing an integral role.[90]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: PROVIDING CLARITY AND BALANCE

In 1947, only 2 years after the conclusion of World War II, national leaders had quickly identified the need for greater interagency coordination. The National Security Act of 1947 was a seminal decision that created the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, and set the stage for the creation of the DoD 2 years later. Most important, it was an acknowledgement by national leaders that while the war had certainly been successful, there were still significant weaknesses or gaps between foreign and military policy, as well as gaps between the military and civilian agencies.[91] Testimony and reports provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee at the time called for the deliberate integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies to keep foreign and military policies mutually supporting and in balance.[92] In the end, the 1947 Act captured the consensus of the wartime policymakers on the need for better interagency coordination in both policy development and execution.[93]

Today, reorganizing and redirecting an even larger national security apparatus will be no easy task. But the continued pursuit of uncoordinated strategies in the current security environment may bear serious long-term consequences. The lessons learned from our immediate post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq are well known, but the response has been slow and inadequate. Instead of clarifying and explaining the strategic role of security cooperation, shaping operations, and stability operations, the USG permits all three to move incrementally forward in fits and starts.

In July 2004, the DoS initiated and created a new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruc-tion and Stabilization (S/CRS) with a broad tasking to lead and coordinate interagency efforts to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations. With little funding, and little support outside the DoS, S/CRS had minimal impact until December 2005, when President Bush issued NSPD-44 designating the DoS as the lead agency for all stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Patterned after a number of similar programs in other countries, S/CRS began to fill three pools of civilian experts to assist in civilian-centric stabilization tasks, and to coordinate and deconflict interagency efforts in selected hot spots around the world.

However, S/CRS lacks the political support and bureaucratic clout necessary to garner the funding needed to fully organize and perform its mission.[94] Its current FY 2009 budget request for $248.6M is for on-going start up costs only. Deployment costs would require additional funding estimated to range in the hundreds of millions of dollars,[95] making it a target for yet more Congressional scrutiny and likely cutbacks.[96] As such, it reflects the same general lack of authority, funding, and capabilities of NSPD-44,[97] limiting it for now as a program with only long-term potential.

Is it possible to create an interagency structure that can close the gaps and effectively handle day-to-day operations while simultaneously preparing for future challenges and opportunities? Can we fashion a proactive, long-term, and sustainable national security

strategy that will help the United States maintain a strategic security advantage? While some call for legislation mirroring the scope and significance of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, others recommend that we first revisit the thought process embraced by President Dwight Eisenhower as he struggled to reconcile the seemingly unsustainable policies contained in National Security Memorandum 68.[98] As a military officer, he knew that long-term planning was difficult to sustain when daily operations kept the commander and the staff preoccupied,[99] and he was determined to fix it.

In an effort to capture all of the many divergent theories of how to counter the growing Soviet threat, President Eisenhower gathered a team of experts from outside the mainstream and outside the controlled chaos of day-to-day operations and planning. He called it "Project Solarium" after the afternoon debate he had with his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in the solarium of the White House; a conversation that the President felt mirrored the great disparity of thought on the subject of the country's long-term national security. The results of the project captured the wide range of opinions and options on how to best deal with the long-term strategic threat presented by the Soviet Union. In the end, the President and the NSC were able to thoughtfully weigh the benefits and risks of each strategy, and to select the strategies that ultimately formed the core of the security policy directive.[100]

With only minor exceptions, the NSC has produced little to no long-term strategic thinking and security guidance since Project Solarium.[101] For over 50 years, the NSC staff system has been marked by an overall trend of "declining ability or willingness . . . to perform strategic threat assessment and planning."[102] As such, calling on the NSC in its present form to take the lead in creating and then managing a long-term, interagency security effort would be unwise. The NSC requires a new mandate, and a new structure capable of providing sound, well-informed, and long-term security guidance, as well as a bureaucracy capable of managing and leading the policy within the interagency.

Michele Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley propose the creation of a holistic, interagency Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) that would identify an overarching strategy and incorporate all instruments of national power. The QNSR would also produce an authoritative classified planning document directing the National Security Advisor and the Cabinet Secretaries to develop particular courses of action.[103] Nested within the NSC, Flournoy and Brimley propose to create a staff of strategic planners "insulated from day-to-day demands and crisis management."[104] Others recommend the creation of long-term planning cells, perhaps with an executive director reporting to the National Security Advisor, and at all times thoroughly insulated from the existing agencies to avoid creating an organization of detailees, serving at the whim of, and still loyal to, their home departments.[105]

It is within this framework that a new security cooperation effort could flourish. As directed in National Security Presidential Directive-1, it is already the duty of the NSC and the NSC System to "coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation" of "domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security."[106] The current DoD theater security cooperation framework offers a suitable starting point from which the NSC could better direct and control the efforts of agencies already engaged in various degrees of security cooperation planning.

CONCLUSION

The DoD deserves credit for its attempts to integrate interagency contributions into Theater Security Cooperation plans. In an age of persistent conflict, the DoD is creating new doctrine and planning models that attempt to integrate all USG security interests. But the pressure of the current operating environment is causing the DoD to reevaluate the limits of its core military functions, and to consider the addition of many new civilian competencies within Phase Zero (shaping) operations as TSC activities. In an effort to avoid the inadvertent creation of a surrogate foreign policy, and to avoid creating the impression that the USG does not speak with one voice, the DoD is more mindful of the strategic hazards created by operationalizing Phase Zero and blurring the lines between the roles and duties of the military and civilian agencies (e.g., the DoS and USAID). Therefore, and in an effort to preserve clarity and understanding, Phase Zero (shaping) activities should be limited to full spectrum military operations. Security cooperation activities, while currently the product of DoD-led planning, should instead be developed and implemented as part of a new NSC organization. If given the authority and organizational structure, the NSC system is in the best position to manage the complexities of engaging our allies and partners, and will provide the strategic guidance, authority, and resources necessary to develop and protect our short- and long-term national security interests.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Carl Von Clauswitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 88.

2. *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 27, 2008, foreword.

3. *Ibid*.

4. *Ibid*, p. viii.

5. *Ibid*.

6. *Ibid*., p. vii.

7. *Ibid*., p. viii.

8. Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*, New York: Berkley Books, 2004, p. 159.

9. Francis Fukuyama, *Nation-building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, pp. 4-5.

10. *Ibid*.

11. *Ibid*.

12. *Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 14, 2007, p. I-1.

13. *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05,* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005, p. 2, available from *www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm*. DoD provides guidance to all services to be prepared to conduct stability operations "across the spectrum of peace to conflict . . . and to perform all tasks necessary . . . when civilians cannot do so."

14. General Charles F. Wald, "New Thinking at EUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 4th quarter 2006, p. 73.

15. Thomas S. Szayna *et al*., *U.S. Army Security Cooperation: Toward Improved Planning and Management,* Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004, p. xv.

16. For specific information on joint strategic planning, see *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995.

17. General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni, speaking at the Marine Corps and U.S. Naval Institute Forum 2003, September 4, 2003, Arlington, VA, quoted in Laurent Guy, "Competing Visions for the U.S. Military," *Orbis*, Fall 2004, pp. 705-706.

18. Colin Powell's overall concerns about the use of military forces, and his specific concerns about the need for an exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement, are often taken together and interpreted to mean that the United States should avoid peacekeeping and nation-building exercises. See also *www.foreignaffairs.org/19921201faessay5851/colin-l-powell/u-s-forces-challenges-ahead.html*.

19. James Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., and Project Director Don M. Snider, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd Ed., Boston, MA: Custom Publishing, 2005, p. 54.

20. JP 1, p. VII-1. JP 1 is the capstone of the joint military doctrine. While it often makes reference to interagency coordination, cooperation, and communication, it does not describe the manner or process in which it will be accomplished. "Military operations must be coordinated, integrated, or deconflicted with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various HN agencies. . . ."

21. Mitchell J. Thompson, "Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power," *Parameters*, Winter 2005-06, p. 65.

22. Dana Priest, *The Mission,* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003, p. 74. In Australia, "extensive military-to-military contacts during the 1990s came under review in 2000. According to Australian defense planners, the review found that, in time, engagement activities were being carried out rather promiscuously, often times under questionable rationales, with ill-defined objectives and without identifiable payoffs to Australian interests."

23. *Ibid*., pp. 61-77.

24. Thomas M. Jordan, Douglas C. Lovelace, and Thomas-Durrell Young, *Shaping the World Through Engagement: Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2000, p. 2.

25. *Ibid*., p. iii.

26. Zinni, pp. 135-136. Today, GCCs are much more inclusive of nonmilitary input in the creation of TSCs and may rely on their Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG), Political Advisor (POLAD), and input from each respective Chief of Mission from each country in the GCC's area of responsibility.

27. Jefferson P. Marquis, Richard E. Darilek, Jasen J. Castillo, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Anny Wong, Cynthia Huger, Andrea Mejia, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Brian Nichiporuk, and Brett Steele, *Assessing the Value of U.S. Army International Activities,* Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2006, p. 5. In addition to the NSS, other documents from the DoD include the *National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, Strategic Planning Guidance, and the Security Cooperation Guidance.*

28. *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 17, 2006, p. V-3.

29. Marquis *et al*., p. 5. An excellent summary of security cooperation planning, with charts is provided on pages 5-10.

30. Szayna, p. 49. It is important to distinguish Title 22 activities controlled by DoS from the Title 10 programs administered by the Army. The Army insists that it does not simply divide its security cooperation resources among the combatant commands, "but rather maintains a global capability and makes allocations to best support the overall strategy." See *U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 11-31, Army International Security Cooperation Policy*, October 24, 2007, p. 3. In addition, JP 5-0 lumps all of the security cooperation activities, Title 10 and 22, into six categories described on p. I-3.

31. *Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 30, 2004, p. V-8.

32. U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign," 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., December 15, 2006, available from *www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/embassies.html*.

33. *Ibid*., pp. 7-8.

34. *Ibid*., p. 9.

35. Richard K. Betts, "A Disciplined Defense: How to Regain Strategic Solvency," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2007, p. 74.

36. Kurt Shillinger, "A New U.S. Command Paradigm and the Challenges of Engagement in Africa in the 21st Century," written testimony submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health in the hearing on "Africa Command," August 2, 2007, available from *foreignaffairs.house.gov/110shi080207.htm*.

37. Betts, p. 74.

38. George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, Washington DC: The White House, December 7, 2005.

39. *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05,* p. 2.

40. Thompson, p. 66.

41. James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Don't Do It,* New York: Basic Books, Inc., 2000, p. 95, quoted in Michael B. Siegel, "Clarity and Culture in Stability Operations," *Military Review*, November/December 2007, p. 102.

42. Burk, p. 49.

43. Don M. Snider, "The U.S. Army as Profession," in Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., and Project Director, Don M. Snider, *The Future of the Army Profession,* 2nd Ed., Boston, MA: Custom Publishing, 2005, pp. 26-27.

44. John F. Troxell, "Presidential Decision Directive-56: A Glass Half Full," Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, eds., *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 44.

45. *Ibid.,* p. 26.

46. Shawn Zeller, "Who's in Charge Here?" *Foreign Service Journal*, December 2007, p. 25.

47. Robert M. Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power," *Military Review,* January-February 2008, p. 8.

48. *Ibid*.

49. *Ibid*.

50. *Ibid*.

51. *Ibid*.

52. Condoleezza Rice, "On Transformational Diplomacy," speech at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, February 12, 2008, available from *www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100703.htm*.

53. U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, p. 3.

54. Zeller, p. 25.

55. *Ibid*.

56. *Ibid*., p. 24.

57. J. Peter Phram, Ph.D., "Africa Command: A Historic Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement—If Done Right," testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, August 2, 2007, available from *foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pha080207.htm*.

58. Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, p. 5.

59. Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, "The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement," *Joint Force Quarterly,* 4th quarter 2007, p. 146.

60. *Ibid*., pp. 152-153.

61. *Ibid*., p. 152.

62. Zeller, p. 20.

63. *Ibid*., p. 28.

64. *Ibid*.

65. General David Petraeus, quoted in Gerald Loftus, "Speaking Out: Expeditionary Sidekicks? The Military Diplomatic Dynamic," *Foreign Service Journal,* December 2007, pp. 16-17.

66. Loftus, p. 16.

67. JP 5-0, p. I-4. Additional planning guidelines and procedures are described in the *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A, Responsibilities for the Management of Security Cooperation*, as well as in *Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 March 2006 Vol. 1.

68. See JP 3-0, p. V-3, and JP 5-0, p. I-3, for a comparison of Phase Zero (shaping) and security cooperation, respectively.

69. JP 3-0, p. VII-1.

70. *Ibid*.

71. JP 3-0, pp. V-1 - V-2.

72. Albert Zaccor, "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy," The Atlantic Council of the United States, Occasional Paper, August 2005, p. 8, available from *www.acus.org/docs/0508-Security_Cooperation_Nonstate_Threats_ Zaccor_Albert.pdf*.

73. *Ibid*., p. 7, footnote 38.

74. *Ibid*., p. 6. Zaccor briefly describes the difference between Security Assistance activities such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the International Military Training and Education Program (IMET), and other programs governed under the Foreign Assistance Act, with policy direction provided by the DoS; and compares it to Security Cooperation, a much broader term that, in addition to Security Assistance, includes categories of activities to include combined exercises, military-to-military contacts, combined education, and humanitarian assistance.

75. *Ibid*., pp. 8-10.

76. Jenifer D. P. Moroney *et al*., *Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007, p. xi.

77. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Adam Grissom, and Jefferson P. Marquis, *A Capabilities-Based Strategy for Army Security Cooperation*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007, p. xiv.

78. Marquis *et al*., p. 42.

79. *Ibid*., p. 41.

80. Maroney *et al*., "*Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations*," pp. 55-61.

81. *Ibid*., p. 59.

82. *Ibid*., pp. 72-73.

83. Zaccor, p. 22.

84. *Ibid*., p. 24.

85. *Ibid*., p. 25.

86. The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, The "Hart-Rudman Report," Draft Final Report, January 31, 2001, p. 53, available from *www.rense.com/general10/roadmap.htm*.

87. Zaccor, p. 38.

88. *Ibid*., p. 33.

89. Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy, *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism*, Washington., DC: The CSIS Pres, 2001, p. 158, quoted in Zaccor, p. 44.

90. Zaccor, p. 41.

91. Charles A Stevenson, "Underlying Assumptions of the National Security Act of 1947," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 1st quarter 2008, p. 130.

92. *Ibid*., p. 131.

93. *Ibid*.

94. Nora Bensahel and Anne M. Moisan, "Repairing the Interagency Process," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 1st quarter 2007, p. 107.

95. John E. Herbst, "Briefing on Civilian Stabilization Initiative," On-The-Record Briefing, Washington, DC, February 14, 2008, available from *www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/100913.htm*.

96. Bensahel and Moisan, p. 107.

97. *Ibid*.

98. Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, "Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 2nd quarter 2006, p. 82.

99. *Ibid*.

100. *Ibid*. The project was named "Project Solarium" after the late-afternoon debate President Eisenhower had with John Foster Dulles on May 8, 1953, in the White House solarium. They discussed and argued about the true nature of the Soviet threat and the necessary long-term security strategy to counter it.

101. *Ibid*., p. 84.

102. *Ibid*.

103. *Ibid*., pp. 85-86.

104. *Ibid*., p. 86.

105. Bensahel and Moisan, p. 107. They propose creating a cell of permanent employees (not detailed from other agencies) within the NSC that would focus separately on three areas: strategic planning, crisis management and coalition building, and liaison and strategic communication. For more information on a project intending to replace the National Security Act of 1947, see the Project on National Security Reform

(PSNR) described by Robert B. Polk, "Interagency Reform: An Idea Whose Time Has Come," Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, eds., *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 321.

106. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, *Organization of the National Security Council System*, Washington, DC: The White House, February 13, 2001.