CHAPTER 10

KNOW BEFORE YOU GO: IMPROVING ARMY OFFICER SOCIO-CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

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> On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody; On the other hand, you have to feed somebody. On the other hand, you have to build an economy, restructure the infrastructure, build the political system. And there's some poor Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier General down there, stuck in some province with all that saddled onto him, with NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and political wannabes running around, with factions and a culture he doesn't understand. These are now [the] culture wars that we're involved in. We don't understand that culture.
>
> —General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni[1]

Language capabilities and cultural knowledge have emerged as closely related but separately identified critical capabilities during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. The United States found itself with significant forces deployed to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations where the support of the indigenous population and daily contact with that same population combined with the support to indigenous government agencies and security forces were critical to success. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army found itself in this same situation about 40 years ago. In Vietnam, the Army lacked the language skills and the cultural knowledge necessary to interact positively with indigenous populations and allied armed forces. Consequently, it attempted to correct these deficiencies with temporary solutions. To address the current dearth of culture-related capabilities, the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Army have belatedly started initiatives to overcome these shortfalls. Some programs are focused on the civil education arena, while others seek to enhance military education and training.

This chapter examines these Army programs to determine if they are sufficient to meet the current and future challenges associated with developing the *socio-cultural* knowledge needed to operate effectively in another country. For the purpose of this chapter, "socio-cultural knowledge" includes, but is not limited to society, social structure, culture, language, power and authority structures, and interests.[2] In conducting this examination, this chapter will first define the character of war that is expected to challenge the United States in an era of persistent conflict. As the character of the war will be more focused on irregular warfare (IW) and stability, essential components of these types of warfare, and support and transition to reconstruction operations (SSTRO), are described.

Since history informs decisionmakers, this paper illustrates several lessons learned from our decades-long experience in Vietnam. Then our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, as related to socio-cultural skills, are examined to frame the subsequent discussion of the DoD and Army policies, programs, and initiatives to provide these needed skills.

Since this research identifies deficiencies, it concludes by providing observations and recommendations for pre- and post-commissioning education that improves the language proficiency of the officer corps and provides incentives for officers to improve their educational background in other areas of socio-cultural knowledge.

AN ERA OF CONSTANT CONFLICT

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was unambiguous when he told senior Army leaders and others that "unconventional wars—[are] the ones most likely to be fought in the years ahead, . . . [that these wars are] . . . fundamentally political in nature, . . . [and] . . . success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between."[3]

General George Casey, the Chief of Staff of the Army, has agreed publicly with the Secretary that we are in "a period of protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors, . . . [and that] . . . we're seeing the precursors of that now in Iraq and Afghanistan."[4] A key strategic issue is to understand the nature and character of these wars in order to meet their diverse challenges.

The character of war is what differentiates types of war from one another. For example, conventional conflict, counterinsurgency, and strategic nuclear war are three distinctly different types of war. Furthermore, individual wars within a type can be different from each other as illustrated by the insurgencies in Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland. The character of war informs us as to the specific causes of the conflict, how the war is prosecuted, and the objectives of the belligerents. It is the character of war that determines the requirement for socio-cultural knowledge.

Multiple guest speakers at the U.S. Army War College during the 2007-08 academic year commented that "the nature of war has changed"[5] or "the nature of war changed on 9/11."[6] However, noted strategic thinker Colin S. Gray is correct when he cites and interprets recognized theorist Clausewitz, noting that "the use of warfare to pursue political goals . . . is eternal in nature yet ever-changing in character . . . war is violence threatened or waged for political purpose."[7] This distinction is more than academic. It provides the general objective and *raison d'être*, if not the precise *casus belli* of a war. Characterizing the types of conflicts that the United States is likely to face helps us to develop capabilities and concepts to achieve our strategic and operational objectives.

Secretary Gates and General Casey, as cited above, have spoken of unconventional war with Iraq and Afghanistan as the precursors of the type of conflicts that we are likely to find ourselves facing in the future. Academics, former senior military officers from other countries, and civilian defense analysts agree and have provided additional detail and analysis. Rupert Smith, a retired British General that commanded forces in Ireland, United Nations (UN) forces in Bosnia, and was the Deputy Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces during Operation ALLIED FORCE believes that the "new . . . paradigm of war [is] war amongst the people . . . in which the people . . . all the people . . . are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force."[8] Civilian analyst Colin Gray noted that "irregular warfare may be the dominant form of belligerency for some years to come," while Ralph Peters agrees that we will fight unconventional opponents in failed or failing states.[9]

The message is clear as senior Defense officials, senior Army leaders, and leading defense analysts all believe that counterinsurgency and stability operations like those in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo are not atypical conflicts that the Army or the nation can ignore once they are over as occurred following the Vietnam war. We find ourselves most likely to engage in conflicts that demand irregular warfare (IW); major combat operations (MCO); and stability, support, and transition to reconstruction (SSTRO) operations as illustrated in Figure 1. SSTROs and counterinsurgency (COIN), a main subset of irregular warfare, are likely to be the most commonly encountered mission sets.



Figure 1. Irregular Warfare, Major Combat Operations, and Stability, Support, and Transition to Reconstruction Operations Interrelationship.[10]

THE CHARACTER OF IRREGULAR WARFARE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

The character of IW, particularly the COIN subset, and stability operations is different than the character of conventional conflict associated with MCO. Conventional conflicts associated with MCO typically involve two warring nation states, and combat is characterized by kinetic force-on-force operations until one side surrenders or can no longer continue to fight. The focus of MCO is on the opposing government and the opposing military. The objective of these conventional operations and conflicts can range from limited tactical operations to regime change.

Insurgencies are civil wars, and they occur because a government has sufficiently alienated a portion of the populace to the extent where that faction has taken up arms against the government. SSTROs occur because an event caused the collapse of legitimate governance and essential services. The focus of COIN and stability operations shifts from the opposing government and military forces to the population and the government, as illustrated in Figure 2, and typically we are working with a host-nation government.



Figure 2. Focus of Operations: Conventional versus Irregular.[11]

Our strategic objective in COIN and SSTRO is to create or strengthen legitimate government institutions that meet the economic and social needs of the populace. Our intermediate objective, as retired General Rupert Smith observes, is to:

> . . . establish a condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other [nonmilitary] means and in other [nonkinetic] ways. We seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create a desired political outcome of stability, and if possible democracy.[12]

Achieving these conditions and objectives means that the majority of the populace must consent to be governed, and that armed insurrection becomes socially unacceptable.

The population in a nation beset by insurgency generally falls into three categories. There is a portion of the population that supports the government, a portion that supports the insurgency, and a portion that is unallied. The population generally is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the COIN force, with the unallied portion of the populace a critical vulnerability and capability for both sides. For the COIN or SSTRO force to win over the populace, it must "be able to offer the populations of countries effected by war the hope that life will be better for them and their children because of our presence, not in spite of it."[13]

Figure 3 shows lines of activity and strategic objectives for COIN and SSTRO that are designed to win over the populace and establish a legitimate government capable of providing for the population's social and economic needs. Security and civil-military operations that place our troops in a close and regular relationship, if not a partnership, with the populace are necessary to support each line of operation. Obviously, the institutions and services provided must achieve political "buy-in" and acceptance from the population, or they will not receive popular support. This means that junior leaders must have socio-cultural knowledge, not just awareness. COIN expert David Kilcullen was blunt when he wrote in an article targeting company commanders, "neglect this knowledge, and it will kill you."[14]



Figure 3. Lines of Activity to Strategic Aim Linkage.[15]

Theory and doctrine tell us that the focus of COIN and SSTRO is on the population and the host-nation government. The campaign in both cases is designed to gain the consent of the population for the establishment of a capable government, and to remove their support for the insurgents in the case of COIN. To do this, U.S. and allied forces must establish relationships with the population that range from the acquiescence of the populace to the presence of our forces, to outright partnership. Socio-cultural knowledge is critical to establishing those relationships according to accepted theory.

The United States has engaged in COIN operations before and is currently engaged in two major COIN operations. Two key questions that this chapter will now answer are: (1) Has the historical record borne out the necessity for socio-cultural skills? (2) How has

the Army fared in ensuring that deploying Soldiers had the socio-cultural knowledge to effectively operate? One historical case study of Vietnam and two modern ongoing case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan provide insights to help answer these questions. These case studies are used because they required the large-scale use of U.S. conventional units and personnel as COIN forces in advisory roles and in the civil operations and reconstruction role. The scope of missions in these countries exceeded, or exceeds, the capacity of Special Forces units specifically organized and trained for the COIN and SSTRO mission set, and this was not the case in other late 20th century and early 21st century operations.

THE ARMY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE IN VIETNAM

The United States began its active involvement with COIN operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) by sending advisors to the country in 1955. The advisory effort peaked in 1970, with 14,332 personnel in the country. Beginning in 1965, U.S. combat units deployed to the country, with troop strength peaking at 550,000 in 1968-69. U.S. Soldiers found themselves on a battlefield that placed them among the South Vietnamese people on a daily basis—a culture completely different from their own in terms of religion, social mores, language, and environment. Advisors were faced with the additional task of trying to train and influence Vietnamese counterparts. In order to prepare combat troops and advisors for their mission, the Army developed a variety of training courses during the course of the conflict.[16]

Officer Education and Training.

From 1962-65, generic COIN doctrine, theory, and techniques were taught in classes at West Point and Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) departments. These classes emphasized counterguerilla operations, the requirement to win the support of the populace, and the need to improve conditions within the assisted country. Classes continued at branch level courses, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and at the U.S. Army War College. Vietnam-specific education and training was limited to tactical scenarios in kinetic operations, although a guest lecture component of training courses utilizing Vietnam veterans might have included some socio-cultural topics.[17]

In 1966, psychological operations (PSYOP) was added as a mandatory topic for Cadets and within branch schools. The objective of the courses was to educate officers to evaluate all of their actions in a COIN campaign "with an eye toward its possible psychological and political effects," and former Chief of Staff of the Army General Harold K. Johnson provided additional guidance in 1967 with the intent that all military personnel would have a greater understanding of the elements of the socio-cultural aspects of counterinsurgency.[18] The overall impact was that COIN topics received an even greater emphasis, and increased course time devoted to generic socio-cultural topics in the officer education system from 1966-72. After 1972, the "no more Vietnams" mindset, combined with the focus on conventional operations in Europe, resulted in a steady reduction of COIN and SSTRO topics in the Officer Education System.[19]

Conventional troops, including officers, received training on the general principles of COIN operations such as patrolling and ambushes, and troops arriving in Vietnam received a lecture emphasizing humane and legal conduct towards the populace. Vietnam-bound infantrymen received a 16-hour orientation before leaving the United States.[20] In spite of this training, "racism, ethnocentrism, haughtiness, and callousness" were exhibited by U.S. Soldiers who "had difficulty relating to the Vietnamese, whose non-western culture, alien language, and comparatively primitive standard of living made them appear inferior in the minds of some Soldiers."[21] This type of conduct exhibited by even a relatively limited number of Soldiers, with the My Lai Massacre the most extreme example, can easily have a strategic impact on a COIN campaign in terms of domestic and international opinion, as well as sowing mistrust among the populace in the area of operations.

Advisor Education and Training.

Personnel assigned to advisory duty in Vietnam received additional specialized training beyond that given to officers and enlisted men in U.S. combat units. The U.S. advisory effort in the RVN started in 1955 with just 342 personnel and culminated with over 14,000 advisors deployed in 1970. The U.S. advisor role was originally limited to support for the Army of the RVN (ARVN) units as they trained and conducted operations. These advisors found themselves with "three roles: a US Army officer following orders and supervising US subordinates, a member of an [ARVN] unit sharing its experiences and bonding with his [ARVN] counterpart, and a mediator interpreting and communicating between his [ARVN] counterpart and US superiors."[22] Thousands of officers found themselves fulfilling these three functions. Socio-cultural knowledge would have assisted in the bonding process and in translating perspectives and actions between U.S. and ARVN units and personnel. As we shall see later, the Army was not particularly successful in equipping advisors to meet these challenges.

As the conflict and U.S. involvement evolved, advisory teams were added at the Province and District level, which involved approximately 88 locations. The number of personnel assigned to these teams expanded with the creation of the Civil-Operations and Revolutionary Development System (CORDS) and the mission of providing economic, governance, and security assistance at the local level.[23] CORDS was charged with the pacification of the populace by improving governance, security, and the economy at the local level. This meant that officers assigned to CORDS advisory positions found themselves involved with social, political, and economic issues at the lowest levels of Vietnamese society, which required an even greater degree of socio-cultural knowledge than needed by the advisors in ARVN units. Training and education underwent substantial changes to prepare advisors to meet these increased requirements.

The initial advisor course, attended by officers destined for assignment with ARVN units, was 4 weeks long. After a small number of iterations, the course was expanded to 6 weeks, which included just 46 hours of Vietnamese language training and 25 hours of area studies.[24] Language training eventually constituted 50 percent of the course content and included native speakers as the instructors. By contrast, a 1970 U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) advisor course included 6 weeks of immersion language training. Personnel designated

for advisory assignments at the battalion, province, and district level eventually received 8-12 weeks of language training at the Defense Language Institute. [25]

In the later stages of the war, the senior advisers assigned to the province and district levels as part of CORDS attended a total of 48 weeks of training prior to deployment. These advisors received over 195 hours of area studies and country orientations/ updates, roughly equivalent to four or five three-credit courses at a university; and 1,139 hours of language training, roughly equivalent to 16 five-credit language courses. [26] The heavy investment made in language training and the most extensive area studies training offered to U.S. personnel belies the complexity and challenge of meaningful socio-cultural education. The Army found, despite early attempts to provide socio-cultural education on the cheap in terms of time, that there was no quick fix for providing advisors with the required education that would allow them to accomplish their missions.

Despite the increases in educational content, the advisors and their Vietnamese counterparts provided feedback that indicated that the advisors still lacked the necessary socio-cultural knowledge. Advisors noted that language was the most important capability that they lacked since "Interpreters, although useful, have many drawbacks . . . they introduce inevitable inaccuracies into conversations [and] discourage frank exchange of views . . . permitted by private talk between a counterpart and his advisor."[27] One immediate effect described by an advisor was that the advisors became "victims of the language barrier . . . not fully aware of what was going on around them . . . This . . . was a crippling weakness, since few interpreters could or would render faithfully what they heard."[28] Another advisor summarized the impact of the lack of socio-cultural knowledge, thus:

> We did not understand what was going on in Vietnam. We were in a foreign land among people of a different culture and mindset. . . . The information sent across the cultural divide was not the information received. There was a disconnect. One thing was said and another thing was heard. One thing was meant and another thing was understood. . . . Meaning, intent, and truth were lost in translation.[29]

We can conclude that the Army tried to conduct the advisory mission in Vietnam on the cheap in terms of the time devoted to educating the advisors. When the short training courses were identified as inadequate, the Army did adapt and provide increased time for educating advisors, focusing on the key area of language and other socio-cultural knowledge topics. What the Army determined, though, was that a dedicated corps of officers devoted to the nation-building skill set was needed.

Vietnam: Genesis of the Foreign Area Officer Program.

In 1966 the Army created a board, led by Lieutenant General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., tasked with evaluating officer education. The board recommended the expansion of the Foreign Area Specialist Program, an intelligence focused specialty, and the merger of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations into a specialty designated the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). The vision for the MAOP program was to create a cadre of

6,000 officers to fill G-5, S-5, advisor, and other positions requiring nation-building and politico-military expertise.[30]

The MAOP officers were to receive "language training and civilian graduate schooling in anthropology, economics, foreign affairs, government, international relations, political science, psychology, public administration, or sociology."[31] However, the program was cut in the post-war period when the Army refocused itself on conventional operations. The MAOP program and the Foreign Area Specialist Program were merged to form the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program, which is still with us today. In contrast to the 6,000 MAOP officers envisioned by the Haines Board, there are only 1,083 FAOs in the Army as of 2006 and 1,414 FAOs in all of the services.[32]

Final Thoughts on Vietnam and Socio-Cultural Awareness.

The Army devoted significant resources and time to education and training on the broad principles of COIN. It was clearly aware of the importance of the criticality of the nonmilitary lines of operations required for victory in a COIN, and in the case of the officer corps, it implemented pre- and post-commissioning education and training programs. Despite this effort, the United States generally, and the Army specifically, had a difficult time winning over the Vietnamese populace. There are numerous reasons for this failure that go well beyond the scope of this chapter—tour lengths, the quality of the draftee Army, and the constant movement of units to different areas are just three factors that arguably contributed to U.S. failure.

In the area of socio-cultural education and training, the Army's efforts were largely unsuccessful. Conventional units received minimal training, and the troops were unable to bridge the socio-cultural divide to win over the Vietnamese people. Advisors to ARVN units fared somewhat better since they received increased levels of language and cultural education and were given the opportunity to establish a rapport with a limited group of South Vietnamese. The CORDS Program had the greatest success. Its personnel, particularly the senior advisors, received up to a year of education in socio-cultural knowledge areas, worked in one area of the country, and were in a position to establish a rapport with Vietnamese counterparts.

There are five broad conclusions that emerge from the Vietnam socio-cultural training and education effort. First, counterinsurgency education and training needs to include COIN theory, socio-cultural education and training specific to the area of operations, and training in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Second, language training is the most important knowledge area since fluency is key to situational awareness and, in the case of advisors, allows for accurate private conversations with counterparts. Third, socio-cultural knowledge areas are only slightly less important than language as societal thought processes, norms, and historical factors shape the worldview of allies and the target population. Socio-cultural knowledge provides the required background for mutual understanding, and for the development of programs that do not alienate the indigenous population. Fourth, effective socio-cultural education requires a significant investment in resources and there is no quick fix or shake-and-bake solution. Finally, finding the time and resources to provide comprehensive socio-cultural education, and

education regarding the nonmilitary components of a COIN campaign, was virtually impossible outside the most extensive advisor courses.

When the Army finished its involvement in Vietnam, it shifted its focus back toward conventional operations designed to defend NATO against the threat from the Warsaw Pact. The COIN and nation-building emphasis of the 1960s fell largely by the wayside and became the domain of the Special Operations Forces (including Civil Affairs and PSYOP). By the time U.S. forces entered Afghanistan and Iraq the Army did not "have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency. . . . After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything to do with irregular warfare or insurgency because it had to do with how we lost that war."[33]

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

How the United States, and the Army in particular, entered Afghanistan in October 2001, and Iraq in March 2003, is well-documented. In both countries, the Army found itself engaged in long-term COIN and nation-building operations on a scale not seen since Vietnam and for which it was unprepared, as noted above. There is no metric that this author has found that measures the level of cultural awareness. There are several indicators that, with caution, are usable. These indicators, which are based on vignettes from both countries as well as comments of Iraqis and American soldiers, point to a shortfall in socio-cultural skills.

Indicators.

The anecdotal evidence from Afghanistan and Iraq provide compelling testimony to the Army's lack of socio-cultural preparedness. In Afghanistan, the Special Forces units, which belonged to the Special Forces Group tasked with linguistic and cultural specialization in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), were reduced to showing tribal and village elders a narrated digital video disc (DVD) on a laptop computer due to a lack of language capacity. The DVD explained why the U.S. units were in Afghanistan. All fine and well, but how were the Soldiers supposed to follow-up the DVD so as to establish a rapport and gain the support of the local Afghan leaders? The situation did not improve by 2006, when only six of the more than 55,000 officers in the U.S. Army had a documented ability to speak Pashto, the dominate language of the area along the Pakistani border and southern Afghanistan, where the security situation is the least stable.[34]

In Iraq our strategic assessment of culture was flawed on two counts. First, we interpreted membership in the Ba'ath Party as being pro-Saddam instead of realizing that some individuals were party members for employment purposes. We also interpreted anti-Saddam attitudes as pro-American, and we misjudged the resentment that the long-term presence of foreign forces in the country would create.[35] At the operational level, U.S. Commanders engaged local tribal sheikhs in the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad in the belief that they could control the insurgency and other types of violence without understanding tribal structures or the credibility of the sheikhs.[36] These missteps

clearly indicate a lack of knowledge in several of the areas that constitute socio-cultural knowledge.

Ample anecdotal evidence is available regarding a lack of socio-cultural knowledge at the tactical level in Iraq. A lack of language capability, independent of any other socio-cultural knowledge, negatively impacted the ability of U.S. forces to recognize individuals wanted for detention. For example, immediately after the fall of Baghdad, U.S. units received lists of license plate numbers for key leaders of the Saddam regime that were still at large. The concept was for U.S. vehicle checkpoints to compare license plates with the list. Unfortunately, the list was printed using English letters and Arabic numbers while Iraqi license plates use Arabic letters and numbers.

Two National Public Radio reports, one in 2007 and the other in February 2008, highlighted continuing language issues. A lack of language capability among U.S. units resulted in a dependence on indigenous translators and negatively impacted the ability of our troops to determine the reliability of Iraqi security forces, identify problems affecting the local population, or to win the trust of the populace. In the 2007 report, U.S. troops operating with Iraqi forces in Baghdad conducted a raid on a suspected Shi'a militia weapons cache site. Nothing was found. The Iraqi translator later translated what one Iraqi soldier said to his comrades in the presence of the U.S. Soldiers, none of whom spoke Arabic. The Iraqi soldier told his comrades that the weapons the search was intended to find were, in fact, at the house of his mullah a short distance away.

In the 2008 story, U.S. forces were conducting a patrol in a Sunni Arab neighborhood of Mosul, a city where the Sunni Arab and Kurdish tensions are high, with the Arabs viewed as outsiders and whom the Kurds wished to push out of the city. The U.S. platoon leader asked a resident, through his Iraqi Army interpreter (a Kurd), what problems, if any, the resident was having. The translated response was that there was trouble with insurgents in the area. The translator with the NPR team later told the U.S. news personnel that the resident had actually complained about searches, theft, and harassment by Iraqi Army units composed of Kurdish personnel. The U.S. Army unit left ignorant of the real complaint and, in fact, allied with the unit that the residents view as oppressors and thieves.

Statements by both American and Iraqi personnel also point to deficiencies in the other areas of socio-cultural knowledge and their negative impact on operations. Multiple junior officers indicated that they were not prepared to overcome the cultural issues, which were described by one officer as "overwhelming."[37] Iraqi officers agree with the assessment of the junior officers.

This author met with Iraqi officers on multiple occasions from 2003-06 to include a meeting in 2006 with Iraqi officers ranging in rank from major to colonel who came from all of the major ethnic and sectarian groups in the country. When asked if U.S. troops were any better at relating to the Iraqi populace in 2006 versus 2003, the answer was a resounding "no" from all Iraqis. As the discussion went on, they acknowledged that there were incremental improvements, but cited racial epithets that the Iraqi populace now understands, a lack of language capability, and multiple examples of Arab and Islamic custom that still caused problems with the populace. The Iraqi officers also pointed out that the assignment of advisors junior in rank created real discipline issues within Iraqi

units. Additionally, a lack of socio-cultural skills and linguist support crippled the initial advisor effort.

The initial U.S. advisor teams fielded in 2003-04, were largely pulled from units already deployed in Iraq. A Center for Army Lessons Learned report found that there was no standardized training for advisors. These advisors had no language capability and no specialized socio-cultural education to prepare them to work with Iraqi units. Advisors complained of support from native linguists who were not conversant in English or a lack of any interpreter support at all.[38] The Army also established a training base for advisors at Fort Riley, KS, in mid-2006 with a program of instruction that is reminiscent of its Vietnam predecessors. The 8-week long course consists of 24 hours of culture immersion training, 10 hours of simulated meetings with indigenous officials, and 42 hours of language training (30 hours of classroom instruction and 12 hours of language lab). Note that these class hours almost exactly mirror the 25 cultural and 46 language training hours given in the 6-week long Vietnam Advisors Course, which provided inadequate socio-cultural knowledge and skills for bridging the socio-cultural gap.[39]

Successes.

This is not to say that the entire picture is bleak, and that there are not significant examples of socio-cultural knowledge among leaders and Soldiers. General David Petraeus during each of his three tours in Iraq, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, and Colonel H. R. McMaster all conducted operations based on socio-cultural knowledge, and their units enjoyed significantly greater success than those units that did not bridge the cultural gap.[40]

In Tal Afar, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment under the command of Colonel McMaster underwent a relatively thorough socio-cultural awareness training and education program prior to deployment. Colonel McMaster produced a 7-page reading list on COIN, Islam, Arab customs, and Iraqi history and politics. The officers of the Regiment held discussion groups on the readings, and any trooper could expect Colonel McMaster to ask pointed questions. The regiment also sent two troopers per platoon to basic Arabic language courses at a local college for 5 weeks prior to deployment. This gave some platoons one Soldier out of every eight that possessed a basic knowledge of Arabic, which Middle East Foreign Area Officer Mike Eisenstadt noted "pays huge dividends, for it demonstrates the kind of respect for the local population and their traditions that helps establish rapport and build relationships."[41]

This training and education enabled the regiment to establish a rapport with the local populace, who in turn provided intelligence. One cavalryman related the story of how residents in one neighborhood insisted on fixing a Bradley Fighting Vehicle that had thrown a track, providing chai (tea) for the Soldiers while the residents did all of the work.[42] Such was the rapport with the local Iraqis that the mayor of the city appealed directly to General Casey (the MNF-I commander at the time), Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and President George Bush to have the unit remain beyond its scheduled return to the United States. McMaster's local training and education effort had

produced a unit that could successfully wage a COIN campaign in a very alien cultural environment. His was not the only success, but it stands out as one of the best publicized.

It is apparent that U.S. forces have enjoyed local successes, failures, and many challenges in the socio-cultural arena. Success in the early years of both conflicts appears to have depended heavily on unit leaders and less on the training and education provided by the institutional Army. The next key issue that deserves examination is to determine what the Army and the DoD have done to educate and train forces for the current and future operating environment, and what impact this training has had.

CURRENT POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND CAPABILITIES

Awareness of our shortfall in socio-cultural knowledge started soon after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks. The rediscovery of COIN theory and doctrine as the long-term nature of the U.S. commitments in both Iraq and Afghanistan became apparent and brought the socio-cultural knowledge topic to the forefront of capabilities discussions in concert with other topics. Between 2004 and the end of 2006, *Military Review* published 19 articles on COIN and SSTRO related topics, a trend that was matched in *Parameters*. Socio-cultural knowledge, referred to by some authors as cultural awareness, cultural savvy, and cultural understanding, along with language skills, were commonly mentioned as required knowledge areas in these professional journal articles.

More official studies echoed the opinions presented in the professional journals. *The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities* found that the DoD lacked adequate capacity for language and knowledge of other cultures. *The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap* notes that, "Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of Defense needs a significantly improved organic capability in languages . . . and regional area skills."[43] Army officer language qualifications and degree backgrounds supported this assessment.

As of October 2006, 5 years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Army had just six officers, four in Special Forces, with an official Pashto language rating. Table 1 displays the number of officers that had ratings in a selection of languages that might serve well in the crisis spots of the post-Cold War and post-Colonial world. Language capacity for the Arab world is particularly limited to just 910, or just 1.6 percent of the Army officer corps at the time the data was compiled.[44]

Language	Total
Egyptian Arabic	80
Standard Arabic	693
Mandarin Chinese	230
French	1358
Hindi	36
Kurdish	1
Pashtu	6
Farsi	99
Russian	861
Spanish	3370
Urdu	31
Total	6765

Table 1. Army Officer Selected Language Capacity.

As Table 2 shows, officers with degrees directly relevant to socio-cultural knowledge or that might have a socio-cultural knowledge application (e.g., general history, political science, public policy, and administration) were held by 16.5 percent of the officer corps. Eliminating degrees in economics, history, political science, and public policy and administration reduces the number of relevant degree holders to just 2.6 percent of the officer population. Area or regional studies degree holders comprise just 1.28 percent of Army officers.[45] These numbers are almost certain to climb in the coming years as the DoD and the Army respond to the recognized shortfall in socio-cultural knowledge as major DoD policies, and the supporting service programs, take effect.

	BA	MA	PhD	Total
African Studies	0	26	0	26
Anthropology	0	0	0	0
Arabic and Arab Studies	0	20	0	20
Area Studies	76	36	0	112
Asian Studies	20	160	0	180
Economics	527	33	1	560+
History	3438	274	46	3758
International Studies	22	16	3	41
International Relations	682	362	13	1057
Latin American Studies	5	142	0	147
Middle East Studies	6	57	0	63
Political Science	3103	139	19	3261
Public Policy and Public Admin	0	47	2	49
Russian and Soviet Area Studies	11	148	0	159
Sociology	0	0	0	0
Strategic Intelligence	N/A	233	N/A	233
			Total	9107
			Area or regional studies	707

Table 2. Army Officer Degrees Relevant to Socio-Cultural Knowledge.

National and DoD Socio-Cultural Policy Initiatives.

Two federal programs open to the civil populace are designed to increase the number of citizens with socio-cultural knowledge. The National Security Education Program provides opportunities for undergraduate students to study abroad in countries other than those in Western Europe. Students that accept the grants or fellowships must then serve in the federal government, preferably in a national security position. Another component of this program provides assistance to citizens with fluency in a foreign language to learn English. A third component seeks to create a civilian reserve language corps by funding college education and volunteers who will serve the nation in times of crisis.[46]

The purpose of the National Security Language Initiative is to increase K-16 language education in strategic languages such as Mandarin Chinese and Standard Arabic. Funds are provided to public school systems and universities to increase and improve their

language education capacity. The stated goal of the program is to educate "2,000 advanced speakers of Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Persian, Hindi, and Central Asian languages by 2009."[47]

The DoD has produced separate instructions for the management of FAOs and the management of DoD language and regional proficiency capabilities. An annual FAO program assessment and a Defense Language Roadmap are supporting documents. The FAO policy directed the agencies, services, and combatant commands to identify their FAO requirements in a relatively unconstrained manner. The instruction also directed the services to ensure that FAOs have a career path that includes general officer or flag rank opportunities.[48] In response to this instruction, the Services will increase the number of FAOs from 1,164 in 2005 to 2,159 by 2012, with the Army having the greatest increase from 739 in 2005 to 1,021 by 2012.[49]

The DoD language management instruction and its roadmap details the departmental oversight of language and regional proficiencies; establishes goals for improving the number of active, reserve, and civilian personnel that can speak a foreign language; and tracks the careers of language specialists and FAOs. Some of the tasks detailed include the requirement for junior officers to have language training, improve study abroad opportunities, and incorporate regional studies topics into "professional military education and predeployment training."[50] The instruction also details regional proficiency levels in order to standardize the assessment of an "individuals awareness and understanding of the historical, political, cultural (including linguistic and religious), sociological (including demographic), economic, and geographic factors of a foreign country."[51]

Socio-Cultural Education and Training for Army Officers.

In response to the demands of the current and future operating environment, the requirements of the DoD instructions regarding language, regional proficiency, and FAO management, the Army instituted changes in education at the U.S. Army Military Academy at West Point, NY, and in ROTC programs. West Point Cadets are required to take two semesters of a foreign language, and starting with the class of 2009, the nontechnical majors must take four semesters of a foreign language. The Academy also increased the number of Cadets that are participating in Foreign Academic Individual Advanced Development Program with its semester abroad programs and shorter 7-10 day programs. In academic year 2007-08, approximately 140 Cadets participated in semester abroad programs, while a further 390 attended the shorter overseas programs.[52]

ROTC Cadets are encouraged to take language courses when it is feasible, in the words of one defense official speaking on a nonattribution basis. Additionally, Cadets in their senior year receive instruction on cultural awareness from their ROTC instructors, and as part of the National Security Education Program, DoD provided $24 million to four universities to provide enhanced language education and overseas studies opportunities.[53] Finally, ROTC Cadets can compete for Olmstead Scholarships, which fund study opportunities, or overseas opportunities offered through their universities.

Socio-cultural education for commissioned officers has changed little. The socio-cultural education requirements of the Infantry Officer Basic Course are an excellent example. Socio-cultural knowledge training consists of self-taught modules on the

country specific culture for either Iraq or Afghanistan. The Iraq requirement consists of just 89 pages of material on Iraqi culture, history, customs, and geography. A foreign language requirement utilizing the self-paced Rosetta Stone software takes approximately 12 hours to complete. Online testing is the method for tracking student completion of these course requirements. Classroom time with a live instructor consists of just 1 hour on cultural awareness, although more than an additional 39 hours are dedicated to Stability Operations and course field training is COIN focused.[54] While the author was unable to find any socio-cultural training requirements for the Captain's Career Course, the TRADOC Cultural Center at Fort Huachuca, AZ, has prepared training support packages for these courses.

Officers attending Intermediate Level Education receive 201 hours of COIN related education, of which just 6 hours are on general socio-cultural topics. Students are also required to take a regional studies course and can pick from four electives that are focused on the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, China, or Korea. Students with orders sending them to Iraq or Afghanistan receive 24 hours of classroom language instruction and are required to complete an additional 32 hours of computer-based education using the Rosetta Stone software. As Figure 4 shows, the Rosetta Stone Software does not bring the student anywhere near achieving a minimal official language rating.[55]



Source: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
Figure 4. Language Proficiency Upon Completion of Rosetta Stone Training.

Senior Service College (SSC) students are required to take a regional studies elective course that consists of 30 hours of class time in the case of the U.S. Army War College. Other blocks of instruction in the curriculum provide single class periods covering COIN and stability operations theory, and some practical discussion of the strategic and operational level factors for COIN and SSTRO. Guest speakers, depending on the topic, contribute to the socio-cultural portion of SSC education. There is no language education requirement, but language classes and the Rosetta Stone software are available.

The Army has clearly tried to adapt precommissioning education and professional military education to provide officers with some socio-cultural knowledge, with the focus obviously upon operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While some knowledge is better

than no knowledge, the Army should be realistic about the level of regional expertise or language fluency that officers will achieve. The regional studies hours are, at best, comparable with the regional studies education provided in the 6-week Vietnam advisors course. Officers today receive fewer hours of language training than the Vietnam era advisors, and a large percentage of today's training is not with an interactive human instructor.

Just as the Vietnam advisors found themselves inadequately trained to bridge the language and cultural barriers, our officers today are almost certain to find themselves in the same situation. Our training and education system finds itself in the same situation that instructors noted in the early stages of the Vietnam War as they lamented the lack of time and other resources needed to properly train their students as illustrated by the following comment:

> We cannot give a complete course in geography, political science, applied psychology, comparative religions, ethnology, aesthetics, economics, and the tactics and techniques of counter guerrilla operations—it just cannot be done. Yet knowledge in all of these areas is vital to success in counterinsurgency operations. . . . [56]

At best, today's socio-cultural knowledge education for officers can provide them with survival level capabilities that will prevent them from making egregious errors and demonstrate an effort to learn on the part of U.S. military personnel. With this examination completed, five observations that identify shortcomings in the DoD and Army programs are now identified.

Observations on Policies, Programs, and Foreign Area Officers.

This chapter's first observation is that the National Security Education Program, the National Security Language Initiative, and the DoD instruction for language and regional proficiency management are too language-centric. The clear emphasis of these programs is on increasing language capacity, a critical operational capability. Brigadier General Michael Vane and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Fagundes observed that "a Soldier might speak a language, but unless he has solid political, military, and strategic knowledge, he is useless as an adviser . . . the reverse is not necessarily true, however."[57] Nonlanguage education in socio-cultural topics can produce officers that can plan and lead effective operations in a foreign culture.

Second, the goal of creating a language corps of 2,000 civilian linguists by 2009, particularly linguists that will deploy when and where needed seems optimistic. Compare this goal to the fact that, as noted earlier, the Army officer corps had just six Pashto speakers by 2006, 5 years after invading Afghanistan. Language courses are typically long, often taking a year or more to achieve minimal fluency. Effective courses also require a low instructor to student ratio, making student throughput a real constraint on producing trained personnel. We should also remain aware that many foreign officers are extremely rank conscious when dealing with advisors, which means that we should provide officers with the requisite language ability to fill these assignments.

Third, while the increase in the number of FAOs is a good personnel decision since they provide the best combination of service experience, language capability, and regional expertise, they are not a panacea for the current shortfall in language or regional expertise among the officer corps. It seems unlikely that the Army will substantially increase the number of FAOs in the force beyond what is currently planned, although this would make an excellent use of some of the authorized increase in total Army end strength. FAOs are expensive to produce, costing the Army an average of $143k, and it takes 4 to 5 years to produce a qualified FAO.[58]

Furthermore, increasing the number of FAOs to match the force of 5,000-6,000 Military Assistance Officers that was recommended during the Vietnam conflict would cost at least $570m and would take an unknown number of years, given the limited capacity of our graduate area studies and language programs. Finally, there are nine regional FAO specialties.[59] This means that the anticipated force of 1,021 Army FAOs will provide an average of 113 of these socio-cultural experts per region—a number that is clearly insufficient to meet the requirements of the tactical force in operations of the same scope as Iraq or Afghanistan, and also to fill the higher level (and often Joint Duty Assignments List [JDAL]) assignments the FAO corps is intended to fill. Additionally, FAOs are not suited to fill some tactical level assignments, since their tactical skills will have certainly eroded during the years spent in the educational pipeline.

Fourth, the current effort to provide some socio-cultural knowledge in the Officer Basic, Captain's Career, and Intermediate Level Education (ILE) courses appears boiler plated. Sheila Miyoshi Jager differentiated between "the kinds of cultural knowledge that are required at the tactical level . . . is quite separate from the cultural knowledge that are required to formulate grand strategy and policy."[60] This implies that the socio-cultural portion of the ILE curriculum, already noted as too short, does not provide the socio-cultural knowledge needed for majors that will go to joint duty assignments in the J-2, J-3, and J-5 directorates at the combatant commands, or joint and Department of the Army assignments in Washington, where they are involved in the operational and strategic levels of war.

Finally, not all senior Army leaders appear to agree with the need for U.S. Soldiers to bridge the language and culture gap. Brigadier General Daniel Bolger, in a article on how to be an advisor in Iraq, writes of enabling the Iraqis to reach across the culture and language barriers.[61] This appears to miss the point that attempts by U.S. personnel to reach across the language and culture divides makes a favorable impression on the Iraqis, and the ability to do so allows the U.S. advisors to have situational awareness, as opposed to their predecessors in Vietnam.

In summary, current programs and policies appear to either focus too heavily on language skills as a panacea, vice an enabler, for socio-cultural awareness. Current education programs are focused on tactical level skills, and the task of providing socio-cultural education that provides real language and regional expertise, like the 48-week training program for senior CORDS advisors in Vietnam, exceeds time and other resource requirements the Army can, or will, provide. With these observations, this chapter identifies options that could increase the socio-cultural education level of the officer corps.

THE WAY AHEAD

Improving the socio-cultural knowledge of our officer corps would improve the Army's strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. Colin S. Gray noted that while cultural expertise is not a panacea for the difficulties that we have encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq, "there is no mode of warfare, conducted in any environment, wherein the enemy's strategic culture is of no importance."[62] Gray adds that this is particularly true in irregular wars which "are won or lost in the minds of the local people . . . If we do not understand what is in those minds, what they value and how much they value it, success secured . . . will most likely only be temporary."[63]

The FAOs are our socio-cultural experts. Their training program includes 2 years at a university studying the history, sociology, economics, geography, and politics of their target region or country. This is followed by attendance at language school and then 1 year of in-country training. The key point is that the FAOs are educated at universities and not at military schools for the nonlanguage portion of their education. The Army needs to leverage the universities in the precommissioning phase of an officer's career beyond the current level of effort.

Precomissioning Initiatives.

First, the United States Military Academy (USMA) is overdue for a comprehensive reassessment of its curriculum, particularly for Cadets majoring in the humanities or social sciences. The academy, in keeping with its roots as the nation's first engineering school, has a curriculum that requires Cadets majoring in these subject areas to take four semesters of advanced mathematics, four semesters of science, and three semesters of engineering. Math majors are also required to take the three semester engineering sequence. As former Army officer Andrew Exum observes, these academic requirements are unmatched in any similar curriculum at a civilian university and are questionable as to whether they truly prepare officers to meet the needs of the nation in the contemporary operating environment.[64]

Simply cutting the math and science requirements in half and dropping the superfluous engineering courses would allow the addition of seven more semesters relevant to socio-cultural knowledge or the relevant major for the individual. This would allow an addition of two more semesters of language education, which brings the total semesters of language to six for humanities and social science majors and four for math majors. Language training for the humanities and social sciences majors would continue through the senior year instead of terminating at the end of the junior year, which currently gives the Cadet 1 year for the language skills to perish. Additionally, there would still be room after the addition of more language courses to add courses that contribute to socio-cultural knowledge. The result would come closer to producing the pentathlete officer the Army seeks for its ranks upon commissioning, and this adjustment appears, on the surface, to be a no-cost or low-cost initiative.

The second main precommissioning initiative involves the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). ROTC is the true center of gravity for the Army officer corps because 55.2

percent of Army officers were commissioned out of the ROTC programs in 2000, and ROTC accounted for two-thirds of new Army officers in 2006.[65] ROTC Cadets should also face more stringent language requirements, and the Army should create programs that encourage Cadets to major in fields that are more directly related to socio-cultural expertise. ROTC programs currently lack even the minimal two semesters of language required by West Point, ROTC Cadets are simply encouraged to take foreign language courses. Nearly 100 percent of ROTC Cadets have French or Spanish language classes available to them, 60 percent have access to Russian classes, and over 30 percent have standard Arabic and Mandarin Chinese instruction available.[66] Nonscholarship ROTC Cadets should have a two-semester language requirement, while Cadets on scholarship should have a four-semester requirement, similar to Cadets at USMA. This is a no-cost initiative. A low-cost initiative might provide an additional stipend for successful completion of coursework in the more difficult languages or pay for the language courses of the nonscholarship Cadets if they take the more difficult languages.

The Army should also consider prioritizing scholarship awards to applicants or currently enrolled Cadets that choose to major in a field directly relevant to socio-cultural knowledge such as area studies, regional or country history, politics, and anthropology. Again, this is a no-cost initiative. Other alternatives could provide additional stipend funds or scholarships for Cadets majoring in these relevant fields. Finally, the Army should reopen or expand ROTC programs in the large cities, particularly those in the northeast where there are large immigrant populations.[67]

Officer Professional Military Education Initiatives.

Post-commissioning education initiatives will tend to be more expensive in terms of money and manpower than precommissioning initiatives. Military or U.S. Government run programs have costs that include training base overhead (personnel and facilities) and a loss of personnel time when officers attend the education or training opportunity. Attendance at civilian institutions or those run by other government agencies still incurs a period where the officer is drawing pay but is not in a normal duty assignment, and there are tuition costs as well.

The Army currently sends approximately 250 officers per year to advanced civil schooling. These officers are given 12-18 months to complete all degree requirements before returning to a regular assignment. For many officers this is perceived as a relatively poor deal; since school attendance usually follows assignments in units that deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan; requires the officer to compress 2 years of course work into a shorter time frame; and the officer probably returns to a deploying unit. The Army should study the cost effectiveness of the following three initiatives, which are relatively high-cost compared to other proposals in this chapter. First, the Army should grant these officers an additional 6 months for degree completion if they are working towards a socio-cultural knowledge related degree. Second, the Army should create a secondary specialty code that designates officers completing an advanced degree that focuses on a critical region as a provisional FAO, with eligibility to serve in nonlanguage coded FAO positions on COCOM staffs or in Washington. These officers could serve in language coded positions if they have a documented capability. Third, the Army should guarantee a follow-on

assignment of up to 12 months for some form of in-country study or 24 months in an interagency duty position (e.g., USAID or the State Department) following graduate school if the degree is in an SSTRO or socio-cultural knowledge related field.

The Army should propose a review of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School curriculum. Currently officers attending the course take one regional elective that meets once per week. If there is empty space in the curriculum, it might allow more additional time for regional studies courses or other socio-cultural knowledge course work. This would allow more time for students to transition from the tactical level socio-cultural knowledge they developed as junior officers to operational and strategic level socio-cultural knowledge. It would also better prepare them for follow-on assignments at the regional combatant commands.

Two other initiatives, one no cost and the other relatively high, conclude this chapter's recommendations. The no cost initiative is the implementation of regionally-focused management for the 34A Strategic Intelligence career field. All 34A officers attend graduate school at the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC). The majority of their subsequent assignments are at the COCOM level or higher, typically working regional or country-desk intelligence accounts. Currently FA34 officers are assigned worldwide wherever an opening at the right grade is available. For example, this means that an officer who focused his or her graduate studies on the Middle East and then spends 3 years at U.S. Central Command becoming a regional or subregional expert, may never work the region again following that initial assignment. Consequently, Human Resources Command should work to assign FA34 officers in billets that build deep socio-cultural expertise in a region, as opposed to moderate or shallow expertise in several regions. A Middle East focused officer might, for example, attend the NDIC and regionally focus on the Middle East, then serve at U.S. CENTCOM, move to the Middle East Division of DIA, and then move to Army-Central Command or its supporting intelligence brigade. At the end of that last theoretical tour, the officer would have 8-10 years experience working Middle Eastern issues. Our current assignment process almost guarantees that this hypothetical officer would follow the CENTCOM tour with an assignment to USPACOM or Korea, and then move to a CONUS assignment that focused on neither the Middle East nor the Pacific.

Finally, for long-term advisor commitments like Iraq and Afghanistan that exceed the capacity of Special Forces to carry out the mission, the Army should develop lengthy advisor training courses similar to those for CORDS personnel in Vietnam. To recoup the training time and expense, advisors would need to serve tours of more than 1 year in duration or serve repeatedly in advisor duty positions. The Army developed special incentive programs during Vietnam to attract officers to the CORDS program and could easily do so again. This is a high-cost option compared to the 6-week advisor training we currently have.

CONCLUSION

Socio-cultural knowledge matters at all levels of warfare. Socio-cultural expertise is required for developing national level policy, theater engagement plans, operational plans at all levels of war, and for the conduct of tactical operations. Individuals with

socio-cultural expertise, or at least deep socio-cultural awareness, matter. Well-known senior leaders like General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli in Iraq, General John Abizaid in Central Command, and Lieutenant General David Barno in Afghanistan were all recognized as successful commanders. They all possessed educational backgrounds that provided them with, at the least, an appreciation for the importance of socio-cultural factors in a COIN environment.

Social cultural awareness also matters at the operational or tactical levels. Colonel H. R. McMaster, the commander of the highly effective clear, hold, and build operations in Tal Afar later helped develop the surge strategy and continues to advise General Petraeus, holds a Doctorate in Military History with an emphasis on Vietnam and COIN. Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl also has an advanced degree and was a key member of the team that wrote the new COIN manual. Major Greg Ryckman, a South Asia Foreign Area Officer, had focused his thesis research on a forgotten country called Afghanistan while living in Pakistan, and was the only officer in the CENTCOM headquarters in the fall of 2001 and winter of 2002 with relevant socio-cultural knowledge of that country.

The point is this, it does not take thousands of officers with relevant knowledge or academic backgrounds to have a significant and positive impact on current and future operations, or on the Army as an institution. Even relatively modest increases in the number of officers with advanced socio-cultural knowledge or academic fields relevant to irregular warfare and SSTRO will significantly increase the effectiveness of our armed forces as they continue to protect U.S. interests in an era of persistent conflict.

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55. Ralph O. Doughty, "Irregular Warfare & Stability Operations at USACGSC," June 26, 2007, briefing slides, available from *www.oft.osd.mil/initiatives/ncw/docs/SSTR%20and%20PME%20Presentations/Doughty.ppt*.

56. Quote from Infantry School Report, Report of the Infantry Instructors' Conference, July 15-19, 1963, pp. 105-106, 108-109, as quoted in Birtle, p. 262.

57. Brigadier General Michael A. Vane and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Fagundes, "Redefining the Foreign Area Officer's Role," *Military Review*, May-June 2004, available from *usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac/milreview/download/English/MayJun04/vane.pdf*.

58. *U.S. Department of Defense 2006 Annual Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Report*, p. 5.

59. *Ibid*.

60. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, *On The Uses Of Cultural Knowledge*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 4.

61. Brigadier General Daniel Bolger, "So You Want To Be An Adviser," *Military Review*, March-April 2006, available from *usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr06/Bolger.pdf*.

62. Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies And The Essence Of Strategy: Can The American Way Of War Adapt?* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006, p. 34, available from *www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=650*.

63. *Ibid*., p. 25.

64. Andrew Exum, "Are U.S. Military Academies Preparing Graduates for Today's Wars?" January 29, 2007, available from *www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template= C05&CID=2559*; and "Curriculum Overview," briefing slides, available from *www.dean.usma.edu/Curriculum/CurriculumBriefing.pps*.

65. "Population Representation in the Military Services," Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management Policy, November, 2001, available from *www.defenselink.mil/prhome/poprep2000/html/chapter4/chapter4_3.htm*; and Greg Jaffe, "Urban Withdrawal: A Retreat from Big Cities Hurts ROTC Recruiting," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 22, 2007, available from *www.classroomedition.com/archive/07apr/ 07apr_additional_urbanwithdrawal.pdf*.

66. Gail H. McGinn, "Statement of Mrs. Gail H. McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans and the Department of Defense Senior Language Authority before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities," April 25, 2007, available from *www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testMcGinn070425.pdf*.

67. Jaffe's article highlights St. Johns University, one of two remaining ROTC programs in New York City, where 40 of the 120 Cadets speak a second language. Jaffe also points out that there is no ROTC program in the greater Detroit area with its large Arab-American population, and that New York City (population 8.2m) currently produces fewer officers for the Army (34) than Alabama (pop. 4.5m, 174 officers).