

Chapter Title: APPENDIX F COIN Scorecard

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**COIN Scorecard**

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**Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors**

Good Factors	A	B	C
1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors (Score 1 if sum of a through e is at least 2)			
a. COIN force and government actions consistent with messages (delivering on promises) (Score 1 if YES)			
b. COIN force maintains credibility with population in the area of conflict (includes expectation management) (Score 1 if YES)			
c. Messages/themes coherent with overall COIN approach (Score 1 if YES)			
d. COIN force avoids creating unattainable expectations (Score 1 if YES)			
e. Themes and messages coordinated for all involved government agencies (Score 1 if YES)			
2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors (Score 1 if sum of a through j is at least 3)			
a. Flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased, remains dramatically reduced, or largely absent (Score 1 if YES)			
b. Important external support to insurgents significantly reduced (Score 1 if YES)			
c. Important internal support to insurgents significantly reduced (Score 1 if YES)			
d. Insurgents' ability to replenish resources significantly diminished (Score 1 if YES)			
e. Insurgents unable to maintain or grow force size (Score 1 if YES)			
f. COIN force efforts resulting in increased costs for insurgent processes (Score 1 if YES)			
g. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent recruiting (Score 1 if YES)			
h. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent materiel acquisition (Score 1 if YES)			
i. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent intelligence (Score 1 if YES)			
j. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent financing (Score 1 if YES)			
3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor (Score 1 if sum of a and b is at least 1)			
a. Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict (Score 1 if YES)			
b. Majority of citizens in the area of conflict view government as legitimate (Score 1 if YES)			

Good Factors—Continued	A	B	C
4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict (Score 1 if YES)			
5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor (Score 1 if sum of a and b is at least 1)			
a. Intelligence adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on COIN force's terms (Score 1 if YES)			
b. Intelligence adequate to allow COIN force to disrupt insurgent processes or operations (Score 1 if YES)			
6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas (Score 1 if YES)			
7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained (Score 1 if YES)			
8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force (Score 1 if YES)			
9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict (Score 1 if YES)			
10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force (Score 1 if YES)			
11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces (Score 1 if YES)			
12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas (Score 1 if YES)			
13. Government/COIN force reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline (Score 1 if YES)			
14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control (Score 1 if YES)			
15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control (Score 1 if YES)			
Total positive score (Sum of 1–15)			

Bad Factors	A	B	C
1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression (Score 1 if sum of a and b is at least 1)			
a. COIN force employs escalating repression (Score 1 if YES)			
b. COIN force employs collective punishment (Score 1 if YES)			
2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule (Score 1 if YES)			
3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict (Score 1 if YES)			
4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents (Score 1 if YES)			
5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters (Score 1 if YES)			
6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents (Score 1 if YES)			
7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics (Score 1 if YES)			
8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents (Score 1 if YES)			
9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated (Score 1 if YES)			
10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment (Score 1 if YES)			
11. COIN force and government have different goals/level of commitment (Score 1 if YES)			
Total negative score (Sum of 1–11)			
Final score (Good minus Bad)			

Key:

Total > 1 = History says, “You are on the path to victory.”

Total < 0 = History says, “You are in trouble.”