CHAPTER 8

THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: A CASE STUDY FOR A RETURN TO MULTILATERALISM

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> International partnerships continue to underpin unified efforts to address 21st century challenges. Shared principles, a common view of threats, and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than the United States could achieve independently. These partnerships must be nurtured and developed to ensure their relevance even as new challenges emerge. The ability of the United States and its allies to work together to influence the global environment is fundamental to defeating 21st century threats. Wherever possible, the United States works with or through other nations, enabling allied and partner capabilities to build capacity and develop mechanisms to share the risks and responsibility of today's complex challenges.
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> Joint Publication (JP) 1[1]

States pursue foreign policy interests through a variety of means including multilateralism, an approach in which several states work in concert with one another to achieve their common interests.[2] Multilateralism generally occurs within the framework of an international organization, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), or Organization of American States (OAS). The principal advantages of international organizations are their capacity to make services and expertise available to members, to give voice to consensus, to provide a convenient means of contact between states that are otherwise estranged, to allow verbal argument to substitute for more violent forms of confrontation, to serve as repositories for problems that are not ripe for resolution, and to handle issues while tempering and constraining national rivalries.[3]

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is one such international organization. Within this forum, headquartered in Vienna, Austria, 56 member countries collectively pursue comprehensive security in Europe through dialogue and transparency measures that bind members together in a cooperative framework. The OSCE proved to be an important security forum during the Cold War when mutual distrust over military capabilities gave rise to tensions between the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances. A fear that the Red Army could overrun Western Europe in a surprise attack had existed since the earliest days of the Cold War. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union had 175 army divisions—five times as many as the United States, Britain, and France combined.[4] This concern was reflected in National Security Council (NSC)-68, the U.S. Cold War-era containment strategy that was developed in late 1949-early 1950. NSC-68 stated that "the inability of either side to place any trust in the other puts a premium on a surprise attack against us."[5] However, it was not until the mid-1970s that both sides took concrete steps toward reducing this tension.

These initial steps included a series of measures first agreed to in the Helsinki Accords of 1975. Signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, and 32 European countries

under the auspices of the then-named Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the CSCE became the OSCE in 1994), the Helsinki Accords broke new ground by creating the first confidence and security-building measures in Europe. These politically-binding measures included the prior notification of major military maneuvers for exercises exceeding 25,000 troops and an invitation for observers to witness the maneuvers. As stated in the Helsinki Accords, the purpose of these measures was "to promote contacts and mutual understanding."[6] Following these first measures, a number of subsequent measures have been negotiated and are contained in the *Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures*. Known simply as the Vienna Document, this set of politically-binding measures was agreed upon in 1990 and later updated in 1992 and 1999.

Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) underpinned the belief that if information regarding the numbers of military forces, equipment, and personnel stationed in Europe were provided to all other parties, the tensions that gave rise to two world wars in Europe could be abated. These measures continue to be implemented today and include *inter alia* an annual exchange of information on military forces and major weapon and equipment systems, visits to military installations, demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems, evaluations, and inspections.[7]

The value of CSBMs in enhancing security can be described by the concept of "mutual restraint," the activity by which adversaries mutually wish to restrict the means and places in which they act out their antagonism so as to add stability and predictability to their relationship.[8] Agreed reciprocal measures can reduce the possibility of a surprise attack, limit deployments, reduce armaments, and decrease the size and limit the structure of armed forces to temper the likelihood that differences between states will lead to war.[9] The fact that CSBMs continue to be implemented to the present day attests to their on-going value in contributing to European security.

Another key contribution associated with the OSCE is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which member states often refer to as the cornerstone of European security. All signatory parties to the CFE Treaty are member states of the OSCE. The treaty's implementation and negotiating body is also colocated with the OSCE in Vienna. Signed on November 19, 1990, by the 22 countries which comprised NATO and the Warsaw Pact,[10] the CFE Treaty established parity, transparency, and stability in the balance of conventional military forces and equipment in an area of Europe stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The treaty established equal lower levels for five categories of offensive conventional armaments, including battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters.[11] Prior to the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document, the withdrawal by the Soviet Union of large amounts of equipment beyond the Urals had caused concern in the West.[12]

Reflecting on the value of the OSCE's contributions to European security, U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns recently stated, "There's no question that over the years the OSCE has gained international prominence for the pioneering work it has done on the concept of cooperation and cooperative security. This concept links security among nations with respect for human rights within nations. That has been the secret of the OSCE and that is what made it unique."[13]

THE OSCE: EUROPE'S PREEMINENT SECURITY ORGANIZATION

Our European allies and partners continue to view the OSCE as an important forum for enhancing peace and security in Europe. In addition to implementation of the Vienna Document, the OSCE provides an important forum for political negotiations and dialogue in the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation.[14] Recently, the OSCE has taken on new activities in the management and disposal of excess small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition. The international community has recognized the OSCE for its expertise in these activities. The *OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, published in 2003, was highlighted by the UN during a 2006 conference dedicated to the eradication of these dangerous stockpiles.[15]

Given the value our European allies and partners place in the OSCE and the opportunities for dialogue it provides, the United States should take full advantage of the organization to advance its own politico-military agenda in Europe. This was demonstrated in 2006 when the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) provided OSCE with two briefings that described its Theater Security Cooperation Plan activities in the OSCE region. The briefings, entitled *External Factors Affecting the OSCE Security Environment* and *Addressing Common 21st Century Threats*, were warmly welcomed by the OSCE as important contributions to its security dialogue. The briefings also provided USEUCOM an opportunity to promote its security initiatives before an audience in which 53 of the 56 member countries are located within USEUCOM's area of responsibility or area of interest.

With the recent exception of the U.S. 3-month chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in the fall of 2003,[16] the United States has not played an active role in OSCE politico-military activities since the late 1990s, when the United States was a key player in negotiations for the 1999 revision of the Vienna Document. During the Cold War, the CSCE provided a unique forum in which the United States was able to engage the Soviet Union in constructive dialogue. The parties worked together in implementing the CSBM regime and in conducting CFE treaty inspections. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the CSCE/OSCE helped to shape the post-Cold War security environment. In 1992 the United States was instrumental in establishing the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), the autonomous decisionmaking body which is responsible for politico-military activities in the OSCE. The United States also played an important role during the 1990s in negotiating the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document, and the Treaty on Open Skies,[17] all of which are significant pillars of the European security architecture, with ties to the OSCE. In recent years, however, the United States has largely underutilized the OSCE, and the factors underlying this shift in strategy are examined below.

RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A SHIFT AWAY FROM THE OSCE

Three trends in U.S. policy toward European security and arms control help explain the shift of the U.S. approach to the OSCE. First, the United States has displayed a tendency to focus on NATO to advance its politico-military and security interests in Europe. In his remarks during the 1997 signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, President Bill

Clinton stated that:

> we are building a new NATO. It will remain the strongest alliance in history . . . it will work closely with other nations that share our hopes and values and interests . . . it will be an alliance directed no longer against a hostile bloc of nations but instead designed to advance the security of every democracy in Europe, NATO's old members, new members, and nonmembers alike."[18]

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, U.S. support for NATO enlargement has been an impor-tant goal, as demonstrated by the growth of the Alliance from 16 to 26 nations. In 1999, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic joined NATO; in 2004, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania became Alliance members. A number of other countries have also expressed their interest in joining NATO, including Albania, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Montenegro, and the Ukraine, so further enlargement should be anticipated. Support for a transformed NATO is shared by the U.S. Congress. Indiana Senator Richard Lugar, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in 2007 that "If NATO is to continue to be the preeminent security alliance and serve the defense interests of its membership, it must continue to evolve and that evolution must include enlargement."[19]

NATO has also established a forum to provide a separate dialogue with Russia. The signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997[20] created a cooperative framework and established a new security partnership between Russia and the Alliance. President Clinton highlighted that under the Act, NATO and Russia would "consult and coordinate and work together."[21] This new partnership includes a forum known as the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which provides the parties with opportunities for consultation, joint decision, and joint action on a wide range of issues,[22] although this forum has not had great success.

Another perceived advantage of NATO is a strong sense of cohesion and a set of values closely shared by the Alliance members. Unlike NATO, there is no collective defense arrangement within the OSCE. The OSCE, whose membership includes Russia, countries of the former Soviet Union, and several neutral states, presents a group that is more diverse than NATO. However, while NATO has 26 members, the OSCE provides a broader audience of 56 countries and 11 partner countries.[23] There are many potential opportunities to be gained by tapping into this audience, which comprises the largest regional security organization in the world. On this point, member countries fondly quip that the OSCE region spans from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

A second trend demonstrated by the United States has been a reluctance to adopt new arms control agreements and measures, with the major exceptions of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (2002) and the Convention on Conventional Weapons Agreement on the Explosive Remnants of War (2003). While current CSBMs proved their worth during the Cold War—and their on-going implementation reflect a continuing value—the United States has shown a recent preference not to negotiate new CSBMs, which are a core competency of the OSCE. In 2006, Russia introduced two CSBM proposals that required additional reporting requirements for the deployment of military

forces within the OSCE region. The proposals, which addressed large-scale military transits and the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of other countries, were viewed by many as an attempt to primarily target U.S. military forces, since the United States deploys most of the troops that would be subject to the reporting requirement. The basis for the Russian proposals was summed up by Russian Chief Arms Control Delegate Mikhail Ulyanov, who explained that "less relevant issues from the point of view of European security frequently take priority while the problems that should be at the heart of the Forum's mandate are relegated to second place. As a result, the 'political-military tools' of the OSCE devised in the 1990s are becoming increasingly outdated, and the Forum's current work has lost much of its direction."[24]

While Russia's proposals were not agreed to, the United States also objected to other, more benign, measures. A 2006 proposal coauthored by Belgium and France for a CSBM to establish reporting requirements that would combat the illicit transportation by air of small arms and light weapons was similarly rejected by the United States. A third trend has been U.S. concern that new activities undertaken by the OSCE could duplicate efforts underway in other international bodies. This concern is, in part, driven by limited resources. U.S. Government officials have argued that discussions of most politico-military activities should take place in the appropriate international body where the relevant expertise resides. Discussions within other forums are seen to be duplicative or interruptive, and thus costly. Activities related to export controls over Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), for example, are discussed under the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies Activities, a convention with 40 participants whose secretariat is headquartered in Vienna. Likewise, nonproliferation activities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are discussed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), also headquartered in Vienna; and activities under the Chemical Weapons Convention are discussed in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), headquartered in The Hague, the Netherlands.

This view, however, can be shortsighted. Several members of the OSCE-FSC believe that many politico-military issues are crosscutting in nature, so a complementary discussion should take place within the FSC as well. For example, the FSC adopted a decision in 1996 that required all members to ensure the timely ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Member states were also required to provide each other with written information regarding the status of their ratification processes. The FSC performed a useful contribution with this effort since all OSCE member states are signatory participants to the CWC. In November 2005, the FSC successfully reported 100 percent ratification of the CWC.

Another example is an FSC decision taken in 2004 entitled *OSCE Principles for Export Control of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)*. This decision complemented the Wassenaar Arrangement's efforts to prevent the spread of MANPADS into the illicit market. Under the decision, the FSC adopted the Wassenaar Arrangement's principles governing export controls over MANPADS and made them binding on OSCE member states as well. As these examples demonstrate, the OSCE can provide an important contribution to regional security by raising awareness of activities taking place in other international bodies and by providing reinforcing mechanisms through the adoption of

binding decisions. The illicit proliferation of chemical weapons and MANPADS poses serious threats to all nation-states, so raising these issues in an FSC forum should be seen as a value-added contribution and not a distraction.

A NEW APPROACH FOR ADDRESSING POLITICO-MILITARY ISSUES IN THE OSCE

The United States can promote its security interests by using the OSCE security dialogue. Closer cooperation with the organization should be made an important element of the U.S. strategic relationship with Europe. The principal advantage of the OSCE, dating back to its origin under the Helsinki Accords, has been its ability to bring member countries to the table where they can discuss common security concerns. This offers an opportunity for the United States to enhance this dialogue by addressing the new threats of the 21st century. To do so will require taking concrete steps that the United States could help lead. The United States should seek not only to elevate its own participation, but to improve the forum's activities as well. The United States should pursue three objectives in the OSCE: (1) shift responsibilities within the OSCE to better address security issues, (2) update the FSC agenda to better address 21st century threats and challenges, and (3) reexamine previously-agreed measures for their continuing utility. Each of these objectives is discussed below.

Objective 1: Shift Responsibilities within the OSCE to Better Address Security Issues.

The OSCE divides its activities into three areas of responsibility, or "baskets." They are: (1) politico-military, (2) economic and environmental, and (3) the human dimension. Within the current OSCE organizational structure, activities fall under the authority of one of two bodies, each of which has separate decisionmaking authority: the Permanent Council and the FSC. The Permanent Council is responsible for economic and environmental issues, the human dimension, and the nonmilitary aspects of security. The Permanent Council meets weekly for political consultations and decisionmaking on these activities. Normally, each member country's Permanent Representative to its diplomatic mission to the OSCE is its representative in the Permanent Council.

The other OSCE decisionmaking body is the FSC, which is responsible for politico-military security issues. The FSC is a separate, consultative and decisionmaking body for arms control and CSBMs that meets weekly in Vienna. The head of each member country's arms control delegation to the OSCE, normally a senior diplomat, is its representative in the FSC. Closely associated with the FSC are the international implementation bodies associated with the two major arms control treaties in Europe: the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Treaty on Open Skies. The forums normally meet on a monthly basis in Vienna and are named the Joint Consultative Group and Open Skies Consultative Commission, respectively.

Under this organizational arrangement, security issues are divided between the Permanent Council and the FSC. As earlier noted, the Permanent Council is responsible for the nonmilitary aspects of security. Also known as *soft* security issues, nonmilitary security activities include *inter alia* border security, container security, and passport and

document security. In contrast, the FSC has responsibility for *hard* security issues. These include arms control and CSBMs, as well as recently undertaken activities relating to the management or disposal of small arms and light weapons and excess stockpiles of conventional ammunition. While the Permanent Council is responsible for soft security issues, it normally does not consult on this subject during its weekly plenary meeting. Instead, the Permanent Council assigns these discussions to a sub-Permanent Council Working Group on the Non-Military Aspects of Security. Almost without exception, the representative to this working group discussion is the FSC representative, not the Permanent Representative. This participation reflects a view held by most member states that there is in fact little distinction between military and nonmilitary aspects of security. The OSCE, however, divides the discussion between two separate and autonomous bodies.

To provide better unity of effort, one decisionmaking body should be made responsible for all security issues. This responsibility would best be assigned to the FSC since the preponderance of security issues discussed in the OSCE pertain to the hard security issues under the purview of the Forum. The Permanent Council Working Group on the Non-Military Aspects of Security could be disbanded so that the Permanent Council can focus exclusively on human dimension and economic/environmental issues. Under this arrangement, the nebulous distinction between hard and soft security issues that currently exists would be eliminated. The Permanent Council and the FSC would continue to enjoy separate decisionmaking authority, since neither body has this overall responsibility within the OSCE.

Objective 2: Update the FSC Agenda to Better Address 21st Century Threats.

The current agenda of the FSC is based on two decisions adopted by the FSC in 1996. The first decision, *A Framework for Arms Control*, provides the intellectual basis for the FSC's current work. The decision establishes arms control measures, including disarmament and confidence and security-building, as the foundation for comprehensive and cooperative security in Europe.[25] The second decision, the *Development of the Agenda of the Forum for Security Cooperation*, provides specific issues that the FSC should address; in effect, its mandate. These issues consist of implementing agreed upon arms control measures and seeking ways of strengthening existing arms control agreements and CSBM regimes. An annex to the decision provides a comprehensive list of suggested activities that could be considered so as to strengthen existing agreements and regimes. However, in reviewing the list of suggested topics, one quickly concludes that the suggested activities have little relevance to the reality of 21st century threats. Suggestions include the extension of CSBMs to naval activities; an exchange of information on internal security forces; cooperation in defense conversion; regular seminars on military doctrine; a unilateral declaration of weapons ceilings; transparency with regard to structural, qualitative and operational aspects of armed forces; voluntary participation, on a national basis, in a verification and information exchange of regional regimes; and studying the possibility of creating nuclear-free zones in Europe.[26]

The FSC agenda should be updated to better reflect current security challenges and to facilitate their broader discussion within the forum. The current FSC agenda offers little

flexibility for a discussion of topics outside its current mandate of arms control and the CSBM regime. Where the forum has succeeded in taking on additional topics, agreement has often been reached by exception, and has required the overcoming of bureaucratic obstacles and resistance. Yet to its credit, the FSC has periodically succeeded in taking on new activities; for example, discussions of chemical and nuclear nonproliferation and obligations concerning the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons, and MANPADS. The FSC should continue to focus on pertinent issues and enable their discussion through a broadened and more relevant agenda. This broadened agenda should be captured in a revised decision that outlines a new FSC mandate. Relevant topics that ought to be addressed include counterterrorism, narcotics trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and effects, border security, energy infrastructure security, and pandemic disease, to identify a few. These threats reflect the true challenges of the 21st century, in contrast to the previous Cold War threat of the Warsaw Pact. Today's threats are transnational in character and require the collective efforts of a multilateral body such as the OSCE to effectively address them.

An example of how the United States has engaged the FSC to better address a major challenge of the 21st century was a recent U.S. initiative regarding the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1540. The resolution, adopted in 2004, obligates all 192 UN member states to take certain measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD, related materials, and their means of delivery. Since combating WMD is a vital U.S. national security interest, the White House launched an initiative to encourage implementation of UNSCR 1540 following its adoption by the Security Council. Recognizing the value of the broad OSCE audience, in 2006, the United States proposed that the FSC host an international conference devoted to the implementation of UNSCR 1540. The conference led to similar U.S.-initiated meetings in other regions of the world. Of particular note, the FSC conference produced a binding FSC decision in which all OSCE member states pledged to implement UNSCR 1540 on a national basis. The decision was subsequently endorsed by every OSCE Foreign Minister at the 2006 meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Brussels, Belgium.

It is important to note that the goal of broadening the FSC agenda would be to provide additional opportunities for dialogue, which is the forum's greatest benefit, and not to take responsibility from other international bodies for their activities. First, the FSC, with a limited secretariat staff, lacks the capability to do so, and second, the true strength of the OSCE resides in the contributions of individual member states, not the organization. Also noteworthy is language in the 1996 decision on the *Development of the Agenda of the Forum for Security Cooperation* that recognizes the importance of avoiding duplication. Citing two examples, the decision states that "the participating states will consider . . . measures for complementing (but not duplicating) the international community's efforts in relation to an effective solution regarding anti-personnel landmines and in relation to the fight against terrorism."[27]

An enhanced security dialogue could help raise awareness of common concerns, complement discussions taking place elsewhere, and find useful and unique ways by which the FSC could make value-added contributions. An improved dialogue could greatly complement the advancement of U.S. efforts elsewhere.

Objective 3: Reexamine Previously-Agreed Measures.

Concurrent with the effort to update the FSC agenda, the OSCE should examine the utility of previously-agreed measures. Do these measures continue to be as relevant today as when they were agreed? A reexamination of existing arms control and CSBM activities might reveal that some activities are out-of-date and require revision. To illustrate, Vienna Document reporting thresholds requiring notification of certain major military exercises have long ago become obsolete since military exercises taking place in Europe today are on a much smaller scale than in previous years. This provision has therefore gone unexercised for quite some time. Additionally, Vienna Document activities such as inspections, evaluations, visits to military installations, and demonstrations of new types of major weapons and equipment systems, while proven useful during the Cold War when used to counter the Soviet threat, appear less significant today. Taken at face value, these activities appear to have dubious utility in fighting current threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. However, where certain existing measures require updating, other measures will likely continue to be useful. Several Vienna Document activities, including those just named, have been important mechanisms for continued engagement with Russia and for the promotion of democratic ideals with regard to former republics of the Soviet Union that are now OSCE member states. Therefore, a review of current measures would not automatically call for their elimination, but would likely point to ways to better meet today's threats and challenges.

Under this objective, the CFE and Open Skies Treaties would not be made part of a review. While both treaties are implemented in Vienna, their association with the OSCE is only tangential, owing to the fact that a number of OSCE members are also signatories to the two treaties. A discussion of either treaty, such as the current impasse over ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty, would therefore not belong to an FSC discussion, but in the relevant body such as the Joint Consultative Group, for example.

CONCLUSION

The threats and challenges of the 21st century security environment are too daunting and complex for the United States to address without the participation of other countries, particularly our European allies and partners with whom we successfully navigated the Cold War. The importance of working with multinational partners was underscored by then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in a speech delivered in 2005. Speaking before an international audience in Paris, France, Rice said,

> America stands ready to work with Europe on our common agenda, and Europe must stand ready to work with America. After all, history will surely judge us not by our old disagreements but by our new achievements. The key to our future success lies in getting beyond a partnership based on common threats, and building an even stronger partnership based on common opportunities, even those beyond the transatlantic community.[28]

Rice added that the United States and Europe had to

> adapt to new circumstances—and we are doing that. NATO has enlarged not only its membership, but its vision. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe now operates not only on a continent whole, free, and at peace, but beyond Europe as well. The agenda of U.S.-EU cooperation is wider than ever, and still growing, along with the European Union itself.[29]

The importance of working with multinational partners is similarly captured in the 2007 version of U.S. joint warfighting doctrine. *Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, provides the intellectual and foundational underpinnings for the employment of the U.S. armed forces in the current security environment. In support of this chapter's main argument, the manual states,

> international partnerships continue to underpin unified efforts to address 21st century challenges. Shared principles, a common view of threats, and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than the United States could achieve independently. These partnerships must be nurtured and developed to ensure their relevance even as new challenges emerge. The ability of the United States and it allies to work together to influence the global environment is fundamental to meeting 21st century threats.[30]

The OSCE is specifically singled out in JP 1 as a multilateral structure under which multinational operations can take place.[31] The cooperative framework and set of interlocking agreements established by the Helsinki Accords that gave rise to the OSCE should form a founda-tion for how we can collectively address current challenges today. The greatest contribution the OSCE offers is as a forum for mutual dialogue in which member countries can exchange ideas, keep each other informed, and reach consensus on collective ways to address common threats in the OSCE region. The United States should engage the OSCE to its full advantage in the advancement of U.S. security interests in Europe. To date, much of this potential remains largely untapped.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. *Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 14, 2007, p. VI-1.

2. "Multilateralism," available from *en.wikipedia.org/wiki/multilateralism*.

3. Charles W. Freeman, Jr., *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 38.

4. Ernest R. May, ed., *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68,* Boston, MA: Books of St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 3.

5. The Executive Secretary, "NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 27, May-June 1975, p. 85.

6. "Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament," *The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, August 1, 1975, available from *www1.umn.edu/humanrts/osce/basics/finact75.htm*.

7. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), *Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on CSBMs*, November 16, 1999, available from *www.osce.org/ documents/fsc/1999/11/4265/_en.pdf*.

8. Freeman, Jr., p. 83.

9. *Ibid*.

10. The 16 NATO members at the time were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. The six Warsaw Pact members were: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union.

11. *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)*, available from *www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/cfe-treaty.htm*.

12. *Ibid*.

13. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, "Intervention to the 15th OSCE Ministerial Council," statement, OSCE Ministerial Council, Madrid, Spain, November 29, 2007, available from *osce.usmission.gov/archive/2007/11/Burns_MC_11_29_07.pdf*.

14. *The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Home Page*, available from *www.osce.org/about*.

15. The "United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects" took place in New York, June 26-July 07, 2006.

16. The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) is the decisionmaking body in the OSCE responsible for politico-military issues. Since 2002, the FSC Chairmanship has rotated every 4 months, according to the French alphabetical order.

17. The Treaty on Open Skies establishes a program of unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of the participating states. The treaty was designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants the ability to gather information about military forces and activities that might be of concern to them. The treaty has 34 signatories and entered into force on January 1, 2002. "Treaty on Open Skies," is available from *en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_Open_Skies*.

18. President Bill Clinton, "Remarks at a Signing Ceremony for the NATO-Russia Founding Act," statement, Paris, France, June 02, 1997, available from *findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_n22_v33/ai_19664903*.

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20. *The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation* was signed in Paris on May 27, 1997, by the Heads of States and Governments of the North Atlantic Alliance, the Secretary General of NATO, and the President of the Russian Federation.

21. Clinton.

22. "Fact Sheet: NATO-Russia Council," Washington, DC: The White House, May 28, 2002, available from *www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020528-3.htm*.

23. The OSCE has five Asian Partners for Cooperation (Afghanistan, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and Thailand) and six Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia).

24. Mikhail Ulyanov, "Statement by Mr. Mikhail Ulyanov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Vienna Talks on Military Security and Arms Control at the Meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation," statement, OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), Vienna, Austria, September 13, 2006, available from a limited access website of which the author is a member.

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26. OSCE-FSC, "Development of the Agenda of the Forum for Security Cooperation," Vienna, Austria: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, December 1, 1996, FSC Decision Number 9/96, available from a limited access website of which the author is a member.

27. OSCE, *Lisbon Document 1996*, p. 25, available from *www.osce.org/item/4049.html*.

28. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, "Remarks at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris—Sciences Po," Paris, France, February 8, 2005, available from *www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41973.htm*.

29. *Ibid*.

30. JP 1, p. VI-1

31. *Ibid*.