

# Homework 23

Joe Baker, Brett Schreiber, Brian Knotten

March 19, 2018

## 39

### a

The interactive protocol to show that  $\text{coNP} \subseteq \text{IP}$  has a problem when a boolean formula  $\phi$  with variables  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  is arithmetized and products are expanded. When  $\phi$  is arithmetized to create function  $f$ , expanding the product will multiply the variables in such a way that the exponent of each variable can double in size, making the size of  $f$  exponential. Since the verifier runs in polytime, it may not be able to read the function  $f$ .

To solve this problem, assume that  $\phi$  has the property that its variables  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  occur in order in  $\phi$  and that for each  $x_i$  there is at most a single universal quantifier for variable  $x_j$  appearing before the last occurrence of  $x_i$ . Now when  $\phi$  is arithmetized, the resulting function  $f$  will have a maximum degree of size  $O(n)$ .

To see how the maximum degree is  $O(n)$ , consider how the  $f$  will have the product for each variable expanded. At any point in the expansion we will have one of the two following scenarios:

1.  $\dots \Pi_{x_i=0}^1 f_{x_i} \dots \Pi_{x_j=0}^1 f_{x_j} \dots$
2.  $\dots \Pi_{x_{j'}=0}^1 f_{x_{j'}} \dots \Pi_{x_i=0}^1 f_{x_i} \dots \Pi_{x_j=0}^1 f_{x_j} \dots$

In case 1, when each product is expanded from right-to-left we will have:

$$(\dots \Pi_{x_i=0}^1 f_{x_i} \dots) f_{x_j=0} f_{x_j=1}$$

and the part where  $f_{x_j=0}$  will prevent the degrees of the variables from doubling for  $x_j$ . Additionally, any variables  $x_k$  with  $k > j$  will not be doubled in future expansions because they are not in future  $f$  by definition (with the exception mentioned in case 2). By similar logic, variables  $x_h$  with  $h < i$  will not have been doubled in previous expansions.

In case 2, we will have the same situation, but there will be one extra occurrence of the variable  $x_j$ , so the degree of  $x_j$  will increase once from 1 to 2.

Finally, each of the  $n$  variables will have a max degree of 2, so the degree of  $f$  will be  $O(n)$  and the verifier can validate the prover's response.

### b

Every size  $n$  boolean formula  $\phi$  can be transformed into a boolean formula  $\psi$  with the sorted-variable property mentioned above and size  $O(n^2)$ .

To transform  $\phi$  into  $\psi$  apply the following procedure from right to left until  $\psi$  meets the sorted-variable property:

- Find the rightmost "fragment" of  $\psi$  of the form:  $\forall x_i \dots \forall x_j \dots \forall x_{i'} f(x_i, \dots)$  where  $i' > j > i$   
Replace the fragment with the following:  $\forall x_i \exists y_i \text{ s.t. } (y_i = x_i) \wedge \dots \forall x_j \dots \forall x_{i'} f(y_i, \dots)$

Each of the  $n$  variables can be out of place out of place (meaning there is a fragment) less than  $n$  times, so there will be at most  $O(n^2)$  fragments to fix. Since fixing each fragment adds 1 new variable (without adding a new fragment, because a fixed fragment adds an  $\exists$  and a variable in correct order), the resulting formula  $\psi$  will have a maximum size of  $O(n^2)$ .

## 40

Alice and Bob both know a secret key  $k$ , a one time pad, which is the same bitlength as the message  $m$ . Carol does not know any information about this secret key, and her best course of action for determining a random bit of the key is to guess. So Carol has probability  $1/2$  of guessing any bit of the key using a randomized polynomial algorithm  $A$ .

The xor operation has the property such that  $m \oplus k = c$ , where  $c$  is the ciphertext, and  $c \oplus k = m$ . Moreover, the xor function is one-to-one, meaning that no other  $k$  can derive  $c$  from  $m$  and vice versa.

Alice can encrypt her message  $m$  using a one time pad  $k$  to get  $c$  using xor. Bob can similarly decrypt  $c$  into  $m$  using xor. Since no other  $k$  can derive  $m$ , and since Carol cannot determine any bit of  $k$  with probability greater than  $1/2$ , it follows that Carol cannot derive any bit of  $m$  with the same probability greater than  $1/2$ . So Alice and Bob have computational security on  $m$ .

## 41

Assume  $P = NP$ , let  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$  be a one-way function, and let  $y$  be an output of  $f$ . Let  $A$  be a non-deterministic poly-time Turing Machine that tries every possible  $x$  until  $f(x) = y$  and then returns  $x$  i.e.  $A$  solves the problem of inverting  $f$ .

Because  $A$  solves the problem of inverting a one-way function in poly-time, the problem is in  $NP$ . By our assumption  $P = NP$ , so there the problem is also in  $P$  and exists an efficient algorithm for inverting one-way functions. Therefore one-way functions do not exist.