

Dynamic Process Isolation

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
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
• Cloudflare Workers is one of the top edge-computing systems







- Cloudflare Workers is one of the top edge-computing systems
- Single-process design







Isolate model







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- Single-process design
- Vulnerable to Spectre attacks?



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


- Cloudflare Workers is one of the top edge-computing systems
- Single-process design
- Vulnerable to Spectre attacks?
- No local timers
- Number of memory, (sub-)requests, runtime is limited
- If an attack is possible, we need a low-overhead solution!




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
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








































ATTACKER


flush
access

Shared Memory




VICTIM





























ATTACKER

flush
access


















```
if (index < data_size)</pre>
  v = lut[data[index]*4096]
```





































































































































Spectre Mitigations







System-Level

Spectre Mitigations







System-Level



Hardware-Level





• Freeze the time during execution





- Freeze the time during execution
- No native code





- Freeze the time during execution
- No native code
- No shared-memory






- Freeze the time during execution
- No native code
- No shared-memory
- No multithreading






Same virtual address space























• Amplify timing either:







- Amplify timing either:
 - Encode secret into multiple cache lines





- **Amplify** timing either:
 - Encode secret into multiple cache lines
 - Loop over gadget *n* times






- **Amplify** timing either:
 - Encode secret into **multiple** cache lines
 - Loop over gadget *n* times

```
for (int i = 0; i < N; i++) {
    // evict A and B
    // ...
    if (secret_bit) { access A } // transient
    else { access B }
    access A
}</pre>
```









• No native code execution



Andreas Kogler (♥@0xhilbert)



- No native code execution
 - Cannot Flush & Reload memory





- No native code execution
 - Cannot Flush & Reload memory
 - Cannot even build eviction sets





- No native code execution
 - Cannot Flush & Reload memory
 - Cannot even build eviction sets
 - ✓ Evict the whole cache iterating over a huge array





JavaScript is optimized and deoptimized





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 - Use **assumptions** on variables





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 - Use **assumptions** on variables
 - Deoptimize if invalidated





- JavaScript is optimized and deoptimized
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 - Deoptimize if invalidated
 - Hide the attack behind a mispredicted branch





- JavaScript is optimized and deoptimized
 - Use **assumptions** on variables
 - Deoptimize if invalidated
 - ✓ Hide the attack behind a mispredicted branch
 - ✓ Prevent inlining and further optimizations using huge functions





• JavaScript objects cannot index the whole memory





- JavaScript objects cannot index the whole memory
- To leak from different workers you need **64-bit addresses**



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- To leak from different workers you need **64-bit addresses**
- ✓ Use **ArrayBuffers** to leak the whole 64-bit address space





- JavaScript objects cannot index the whole memory
- To leak from different workers you need **64-bit addresses**
- ✓ Use ArrayBuffers to leak the whole 64-bit address space
- ✓ Create objects of different types and confuse branch predictor



```
map_p
 prototype<sub>p</sub>
   0×1337
ArrayBuffer*
  Object P
```


```
obj = {
  i: 0x1337,
  . . . ,
  ptr: new ArrayBuffer(0x1000),
};
  leak(obj.ptr[0])
```



```
map<sub>n</sub>
 prototype<sub>p</sub>
   0 \times 1337
ArrayBuffer*
  Object P
backing_store
    length
ArrayBuffer
```


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




```
map;
prototype;
  0 \times 1337
0xdeadbeef
 Object I
```

```
obj = {
  i: 0x1337,
  . . . ,
  ptr: Oxdeadbeef,
};
  leak(obj.ptr[0])
```







```
map;
    prototype;
     0 \times 1337
   0xdeadbeef
    Object I
   target_addr
      0×100
Fake ArrayBuffer
```

```
obj = {
  i: 0x1337,
  . . . ,
  ptr: Oxdeadbeef,
};
  leak(obj.ptr[0])
```




















• Leak 120 bit/hour over the network




- Leak 120 bit/hour over the network
- Works within the offered runtime of 30 seconds




- Leak 120 bit/hour over the network
- Works within the offered runtime of 30 seconds
- Use speculative **type confusion** to create 64-bit leak primitive

Defense
































How to observe the Attacker?



- How to observe the Attacker?
 - ✓ Performance Monitoring Counters






Branch Accesses / ITLB Accesses


- How to observe the Attacker?
 - ✓ Performance Monitoring Counters
- Branch Misses





- How to observe the Attacker?
 - ✓ Performance Monitoring Counters
- Branch **Misses**
- Branch Accesses





- How to observe the Attacker?
 - ✓ Performance Monitoring Counters
- Branch Misses
- Branch **Accesses**
- Per Code Executed

Dynamic Process Isolation - Overhead





• What is the overhead?

Dynamic Process Isolation - Overhead





- What is the overhead?
- Different Interfaces
 - PERF
 - rdmsr
 - rdpmc






- What is the overhead?
- Different Interfaces
 - PERF
 - rdmsr
 - rdpmc
- ✓ rdpmc \rightarrow 2% overhead

Dynamic Process Isolation - Success Rate






• What is the success rate?

Dynamic Process Isolation - Success Rate






BTB Accesses / ITLB Accesses

- What is the success rate?
- Detection vs leakage rate

Dynamic Process Isolation - Success Rate






- What is the success rate?
- Detection vs leakage rate
- ✓ Strong reduction

Dynamic Process Isolation - False Positives






• Are there false positives?


Dynamic Process Isolation - False Positives






- Are there false positives?
- Different CPUs






- Are there false positives?
- Different CPUs
- $\checkmark \ 4096 \rightarrow 0.61\%$






Can the observer be tricked?






- Can the observer be tricked?
- Additional Code Pages






- Can the observer be tricked?
- Additional Code Pages
- Increase ITLB Accesses





- Can the observer be tricked?
- Additional Code Pages
- Increase ITLB Accesses
- Reduction factor






- Can the observer be tricked?
- Additional Code Pages
- Increase ITLB Accesses
- Reduction factor
- ✓ Not compiled by JavaScript


Dynamic Process Isolation - Implementation






Dynamic Process Isolation - Implementation





Dynamic Process Isolation - Implementation







• Remote Spectre attacks were possible on Cloudflare Workers







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- Our solution detects all state-of-the-art Spectre attacks





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- Production-deployed with a low false-positive rate





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- Our solution detects all state-of-the-art Spectre attacks
- Production-deployed with a low false-positive rate

Dynamic Process Isolation

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