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Who am I

Head of NSFOCUS Tianji Lab

Security Researcher

Microsoft Mitigation Bypass Bounty Winner

Pwnie Awards Nominee



What is CFG

Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a highly-optimized platform security feature that was created to combat memory corruption vulnerabilities. By placing tight restrictions on where an application can execute code from, it makes it much harder for exploits to execute arbitrary code through vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows. CFG extends previous exploit mitigation technologies such as /GS, DEP, and ASLR.

- Prevent memory corruption and ransomware attacks.
- Restrict the capabilities of the server to whatever is needed at a particular point in time to reduce attack surface.
- Make it harder to exploit arbitrary code through vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows.

This feature is available in Microsoft Visual Studio 2015, and runs on "CFG-Aware" versions of Windows—the x86 and x64 releases for Desktop and Server of Windows 10 and Windows 8.1 Update (KB3000850).

We strongly encourage developers to enable CFG for their applications. You don't have to enable CFG for every part of your code, as a mixture of CFG enabled and non-CFG enabled code will execute fine. But failing to enable CFG for all code can open gaps in the protection. Furthermore, CFG enabled code works fine on "CFG-Unaware" versions of Windows and is therefore fully compatible with them.



History of CFG

June 2013, first introduced in Windows 8.1 Preview

October 2013, disabled in Windows 8.1

July 2015, enabled in Windows 10 version 1507

August 2016, add longjmp protection in Windows 10 version 1607

April 2017, add Export Suppression and Strict Mode in Windows 10 version 1703



How Dose CFG Work

CFG implements **coarse-grained control-flow integrity** for indirect calls

Compile time

Runtime

void Foo(...) {
 // SomeFunc is address-taken
 // and may be called indirectly
 Object->FuncPtr = SomeFunc;
}

Metadata is automatically added to the image which identifies functions that may be called indirectly

void Bar(...) {
 // Compiler-inserted check to
 // verify call target is valid
 _guard_check_icall(Object->FuncPtr);
 Object->FuncPtr(xyz);
}

A lightweight check is inserted prior to indirect calls which will verify that the call target is valid at runtime

Process Start

•Map valid call target data

Image Load

•Update valid call target data with metadata from PE image

Indirect Call

- •Perform O(1) validity check •
- •Terminate process if invalid target
- •Jmp if target is valid

CFG is a deterministic mitigation, its security is not dependent on keeping secrets.

For C/C++ code, CFG requires no source code changes.

```
ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget:
00007ffb 4e100e10 4c8b1d59e50d00 mov
                                          r11, gword ptr
[ntdl1!LdrSystemDllInitBlock+0xb0]
00007ffb 4e100e17 4c8bd0
                                          r10,rax
00007ffb'4e100e1a 49c1ea09
                                          r10.9
                                          r11, qword ptr [r11+r10*8]
00007ffb 4e100e1e 4f8b1cd3
00007ffb 4e100e22 4c8bd0
                                          r10,rax
00007ffb 4e100e25 49c1ea03
                                          r10,3
00007ffb'4e100e29 a80f
                                         al.0Fh
                                 test
00007ffb 4e100e2b 7509
                                          ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget+0x26
ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget+0x1d:
00007ffb 4e100e2d 4d0fa3d3
                                          r11,r10
                                          ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget+0x26
00007ffb 4e100e31 7303
ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget+0x23:
00007ffb`4e100e33 48ffe0
```



Previous CFG Bypass

case 19158: AtlThunkPool RWX Page

case 20267: Predict JIT Page

case 31464: JIT Heap Management Cheating

case 32706: Wrapper Functions

case 33039: Make AtlThunkPool Great Again

case 36944: Bad Hook

case 38460: Export Suppression Logical Flaw

case 42895: Manipulate CFG Bitmap



Previous CFG Bypass

Mitigation	In scope	Out of scope
Control Flow Guard (CFG)	Techniques that make it possible to gain control of the instruction pointer through an indirect call in a process that has enabled CFG.	 Hijacking control flow via return address corruption
		 Bypasses related to limitations of coarse- grained CFI (e.g. calling functions out of context)
		Leveraging non-CFG images
		 Bypasses that rely on modifying or corrupting read-only memory
		 Bypasses that rely on CONTEXT record corruption
		 Bypasses that rely on race conditions or exception handling
		Bypasses that rely on thread suspension
		 Instances of missing CFG instrumentation prior to an indirect call
		Code replacement attacks



Previous CFG Bypass

Mitigation In scope Out of scope

Control Flow Guard (CFG)

Techniques that make it possible to gain control of the instruction pointer through an indirect call in a process that has enabled CFG.

Mitigated by CET

- Bypasses related to limitations of coarsegrained CFI (e.g. calling functions out of context)
- Mitigated by Strict Mode
- Bypasses that rely on modifying or corrupting read-only memory
- Bypasses that rely on CONTEXT record corruption
- Bypasses that rely on race conditions or exception handling
- Bypasses that rely on thread suspension
- Instances of missing CFG instrumentation prior to an indirect call
- Code replacement attacks



How about Chrome

CFG is enabled in Chrome Beta 97.0.4692.20



We have enabled CFG for Chrome Beta 97.0.4692.20 - please give it a try!

翻译推文

```
ALWAYS_INLINE void* ShimMalloc(size_t size, void* context) {
  const base::allocator::AllocatorDispatch* const chain head = GetChainHead(
  void* ptr;
    ptr = chain_head->alloc_function(chain_head, size, context);
  } while (!ptr && g call new handler on malloc failure &&
           CallNewHandler(size));
  return ptr;
@$scopeip
                                         Follow current instruction
fc`78059ef6 4889f2
                                   rdx, rsi
fc 78059ef9 4531c0
fc 78059efc ff150ef1ac07
                                   qword ptr [chrome! guard dispatch icall f
fc 78059f02 803d3f9a410700 cmp
                                   byte ptr [chrome! anonymous namespace'::g
                                   dl
c 78059f09 0f94c2
                           sete
```



How about Chrome

Export Suppression is not enabled

```
[+0x000 ( 1: 1)] ControlFlowGuardExportSuppressionEnabled : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 2: 2)] ControlFlowGuardStrict : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 3: 3)] DisallowStrippedImages : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 4: 4)] ForceRelocateImages : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 5: 5)] HighEntropyASLREnabled : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 6: 6)] StackRandomizationDisabled : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (7:7)] ExtensionPointDisable : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 8: 8)] DisableDynamicCode : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 9: 9)] DisableDynamicCodeAllowOptOut : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (10:10)] DisableDynamicCodeAllowRemoteDowngrade : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (11:11)] AuditDisableDynamicCode : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (12:12)] DisallowWin32kSystemCalls : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (13:13)] AuditDisallowWin32kSystemCalls : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (14:14)] EnableFilteredWin32kAPIs : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (15:15)] AuditFilteredWin32kAPIs : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (16:16)] DisableNonSystemFonts : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (17:17)] AuditNonSystemFontLoading : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (18:18)] PreferSystem32Images : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (19:19)] ProhibitRemoteImageMap : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (20:20)] AuditProhibitRemoteImageMap : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (21:21)] ProhibitLowILImageMap : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (22:22)] AuditProhibitLowILImageMap : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x000 (23:23)] SignatureMitigationOptIn : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x000 (24:24)] AuditBlockNonMicrosoftBinaries : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (25:25)] AuditBlockNonMicrosoftBinariesAllowStore : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (26:26)] LoaderIntegrityContinuityEnabled : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (27:27)] AuditLoaderIntegrityContinuity : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (28:28)] EnableModuleTamperingProtection : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (29:29)] EnableModuleTamperingProtectionNoInherit : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (30:30)] RestrictIndirectBranchPrediction : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (31:31)] IsolateSecurityDomain : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
```



How about Chrome

Strict Mode is not enable

```
(*((ntdl1!_EPROCESS *)0xffffc00320909080)).MitigationFlagsValues [Type: <unnamed-tag>]
[+0x000 ( 0: 0)] ControlFlowGuardEnabled : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    I+0x000 (1:1) ControlFlowGuardExportSuppressionEnabled 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 2: 2)] ControlFlowGuardStrict : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 3: 3)] DisaliowStrippedImages : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 4: 4)] ForceRelocateImages : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 5: 5)] HighEntropyASLREnabled : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 6: 6)] StackRandomizationDisabled : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 7: 7)] ExtensionPointDisable : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 8: 8)] DisableDynamicCode : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 ( 9: 9)] DisableDynamicCodeAllowOptOut : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (10:10)] DisableDynamicCodeAllowRemoteDowngrade : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
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    [+0x000 (12:12)] DisallowWin32kSystemCalls : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
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    [+0x000 (15:15)] AuditFilteredWin32kAPIs : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (16:16)] DisableNonSystemFonts : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (17:17)] AuditNonSystemFontLoading : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (18:18)] PreferSystem32Images : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (19:19)] ProhibitRemoteImageMap : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
     [+0x000 (20:20)] AuditProhibitRemoteImageMap : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (21:21)] ProhibitLowILImageMap : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (22:22)] AuditProhibitLowILImageMap : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
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     [+0x000 (28:28)] EnableModuleTamperingProtection : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (29:29)] EnableModuleTamperingProtectionNoInherit : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
     [+0x000 (30:30)] RestrictIndirectBranchPrediction : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x000 (31:31)] IsolateSecurityDomain : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
```



Issue 1: RWX memory still exists

→ WebAssembly.Instance

0:008> dq 5df30829a768 + 60 11 00005df3 0829a7c8 00007bcb c5d21000 0:008> !address 00007bcb c5d21000

Usage: <unknown>

Base Address: 00007bcb`c5d21000 End Address: 00007bcb`c5d22000

Region Size: 00000000`00001000 (4.000 kB)
State: 00001000 MEM_COMMIT

Protect: 00000040 PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE

Type: 00020000 MEM_PRIVATE

Allocation Base: 00007bcb`c5d20000

Allocation Protect: 00000001 PAGE_NOACCESS



Issue 2: Export Suppression is not enabled

Most export functions can be called out of context

Sensitive API blocklist is prone to miss wrapper functions

```
_int64 __fastcall RtlpLoadUmsDebugRegisterState(__int64 a1)
{
  char v2[1232]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-4E8h] BYREF

  if ( !a1 )
    return 0xC000000Di64;
  RtlpCopyLegacyContext(a1, v2, 1048592, a1 + 16);
  return ZwContinue(v2, 0i64);
}
```



Issue 3: Strict Mode is not enabled

All address of non-CFG image are valid indirect call target


There are still dozens of in-box non-CFG DLLs in the latest version of Windows

The renderer process run in Untrusted IL make it hard to load such a DLL



Issue 4: JIT Compiler is CFG unenlightened

Missing CFG instrumentation in JIT generated code





Issue 4: JIT Compiler is CFG unenlightened

PAGE_TARGETS_INVALID is not used when allocate executable memory

PAGE_TARGETS_INVALID

Ox4000000

Sets all locations in the pages as invalid targets for CFG. Used along with any execute page protection
like PAGE_EXECUTE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE and
PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY. Any indirect call to locations in those pages will fail CFG checks and the
process will be terminated. The default behavior for executable pages allocated is to be marked valid call
targets for CFG.

This flag is not supported by the VirtualProtect or CreateFileMapping functions.



Issue 5: Memory Management can be deceived

Plant evil code into executable memory

v8::internal::Factory::CodeBuilder::TryBuild

v8::internal::Factory::CodeBuilder::BuildInternal

v8::internal::Factory::CodeBuilder::AllocateCode => The whole code space becomes RWX

v8::internal::Code::CopyFromNoFlush

v8::internal::Code::clear_padding => Only clear a small padding block

v8::internal::Heap::ProtectUnprotectedMemoryChunks

v8::internal::MemoryChunk::SetDefaultCodePermissions => The whole code space becomes R-X



Issue 5: Memory Management can be deceived

Make read-only memory writeable

v8::internal::wasm::NativeModule::~NativeModule

v8::internal::wasm::WasmCodeAllocator::~WasmCodeAllocator

v8::internal::wasm::WasmCodeManager::FreeNativeModule

v8::internal::win64_unwindinfo::UnregisterNonABICompliantCodeRange

VirtualProtect => The code range becomes RW-



Issue 6: System Weakness

Writeable critical data structs

TOCTOU


Thread suspension



Optimize WebAssembly to eliminate RWX memory

At least eliminate long-standing RWX memory

The best practice is to implement OOP code generation





Enable all CFG enhancement

CFG Export Suppression

CFG Strict



Make JIT Compiler CFG enlightened

Add CFG instrumentation before indirect call or jump

Use PAGE_TARGETS_INVALID when allocating executable memory

Use SetProcessValidCallTargets to explicit validate entry points which may be called indirectly

Use SetProcessValidCallTargets to invalidate those entry points when releasing them



Switch to the more efficient XFG

```
Improving Control Flow Integrity
    XFG design: basics
     Assign a type signature-based tag to each address-taken function
     For C-style functions, could be:
               hash(type(return_value), type(arg1), type(arg2), ...)
     For C++ virtual methods, could be:
                hash(method_name, type(retval), highest_parent_with_method(type(this), method_name), type(arg1), type(arg2), ...)
     Embed that tag immediately before each function so it can be accessed through function pointer
     Add tag check to call-sites: fast fail if we run into a tag mismatch
                                                                                         .align 0x10
CFG instrumentation: Call Site
                                                                           Target
                                                                                         function:
                                                                                              push rbp
        mov rax, [rsi+0x98]
                                            ; load target address
                                                                                              push rbx
        call [ guard dispatch icall fptr]
                                                                                              push rsi
                                                                                          .align 0x10
xFG instrumentation : Call Site
                                                                           Target
                                                                                          dq Oxccccccccccccc; just alignment
                                                                                          dq Oxdeadbeefdeadbeef ; function tag
        call [ guard_dispatch_icall_fptr_xfg] ; will check tag
                                                                                               push rbx
                                                                                               push rsi
```



Browse more safely with Microsoft Edge

Article • 02/18/2022 • 4 minutes to read • 2 contributors



This article describes how Microsoft Edge provides enhanced security on the web.


① Note

This article applies to Microsoft Edge version 98 or later.

Overview

Microsoft Edge is adding enhanced security protections to provide an additional layer of protection when browsing the web and visiting unfamiliar sites. The web platform is designed to give you a rich browsing experience using powerful technologies like JavaScript. On the other hand, that power can translate to more exposure when you visit a malicious site. With enhanced security, Microsoft Edge helps reduce the risk of an attack by automatically applying more conservative security settings on unfamiliar sites and adapts over time as you continue to browse.







What this mode do?

Disabling just-in-time (JIT) JavaScript compilation

Disabling WebAssembly (WASM) currently

Enabling Hardware-enforced Stack Protection (CET)

Enabling Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG)



What this mode means?


There are no more RWX memory at all

There are no JIT Compiler at all

There are no extra executable memory at all



Can we still bypass CFG in this mode?



0:015>

b















Takeaways

Enabling CFG is not just as simple as open compiler switches

JIT Compiler should be CFG enlightened to avoid abusing

Consider switch to the more efficient XFG



Thanks!