

Data Availability

Matic Network

ABSTRACT

We address the scalability issue in present blockchain architecture and propose a design which decouples the data hosting, execution and verification. We discuss some constructions of the data hosting layer that guarantee data availability.

1 PRESENT DAPP ARCHITECTURE

In present day Ethereum-like ecosystems, there are mainly three types of peers - validator nodes, full nodes and light clients. A block is appended to the blockchain by a validator node which collects transactions from the mempool, executes them, generates the block before propagating it across the network. The block contains a small block header containing digest and metadata related to the transactions included in the block. The full nodes across the network receive this block and verify its correctness by re-executing the transactions included in the block. The light clients only fetch the block header and fetch transaction details from neighbouring full nodes on an as-needed basis. The metadata inside the block header enables the light client to verify the authenticity of the received transactional details.

While this architecture is extremely secure and has been widely adopted, it has some serious practical limitations [11]. Because every transaction is executed by all the full nodes in the system, it becomes a bottleneck resulting in limited throughput. With wide adoption of such DApps, the number of transactions grow rapidly resulting in increased cost of including a transaction into a block. To counter these issues, layer 2 solutions have been proposed.

Layer 2 solutions like Matic work by creating a Plasma chain anchored to the main chain like Ethereum. In such an architecture, DApps reside on the Plasma chain and only periodic checkpoints are recorded on the main chain. The throughput in such a system depends on the transaction processing rate of the Plasma chain whereas any dispute resolution can be performed on the main chain. The benefit of such a decoupled execution and dispute resolution is that it gives much higher throughput while retaining the security properties. In practice, multiple such Plasma chains may function in parallel resulting in improved processing power of the system, while retaining the security of the main chain.

2 PLASMA, OPTIMISTIC ROLLUP AND ZK ROLLUP

A major part of a successful layer 2 solution is the execution and verification framework. Plasma based sidechain approach, like the one followed by Matic, can process thousands of transactions and submit only a single hash as checkpoint to the main chain. However, it faces an important issue. In case of a dispute on the sidechain, Plasma lacks an efficient mechanisms for users to exit the sidechain.

Also, Plasma lacks the ability to process arbitrary instructions although they are supported by a quasi Turing-complete main chain like Ethereum.

Optimistic Rollups like Arbitrum and Optimism use the optimistic execution paradigm where a manager/operator executes the sidechain transactions and submits an assertion on the main chain. In case of dispute, other participants can challenge the assertion on chain within a fixed timeout and then the main chain performs the dispute resolution. While this scales up the transaction processing rate, it has a few downsides like delayed finality for non-fungible assets among others.

Zero-knowledge based rollups like Starkware and zkSync take the ZK based approach to off-chain execution. The operators execute the transactions and submit a ZK proof to the main chain. The main chain can quickly verify the proof and on-chain participants can be assured that only valid state transitions were performed.

Another class of rollup is Validium which is a hybrid between Plasma and ZK based rollups. They make use of Zero-knowledge based proofs of execution and at the same time keep the transactional data off-chain. Although this improves the throughput of the system, they suffer similar problems to that of Plasma. User funds can be frozen or seized and other crypto-economic attacks are also possible on such a system. [7] provides a detailed discussion on the approach and possible attacks.

While there is still debate inside the community about which of these approaches is the best, we envision multiple such roll-ups operating simultaneously together forming the execution layer of our design.

3 THE DATA AVAILABILITY PROBLEM

While the off-chain execution based architecture improves throughput, it is still limited by the amount of data that the main chain like Ethereum can handle. This is because although the execution is off-chain, the verification or dispute resolution is strictly on-chain. The transactional data is submitted as calldata on Ethereum to ensure that the data is available for future reconstruction. This is extremely important. In case of optimistic rollups, the operator may submit invalid transactions and then suppress parts of the block to the world. This way, the other full nodes in the system will not be able to verify whether the submitted assertion is correct. Due to lack of data, they will not be able to produce any fraud proof/challenge to show that the assertion is indeed invalid. In case of Zero-knowledge based roll-ups, the ZKP soundness ensures that accepted transactions are valid. However, even in the presence of such guarantees, not revealing the data backing a transaction can have serious side effects. It may lead to other validators not being able to calculate the current state of the system. [4] contains a detailed discussion on the subject.

We recognize that to achieve higher throughput, we not only need to put execution off-chain but also need to have a scalable

data hosting layer that guarantees data availability. In later sections we discuss a design of such a decentralized Data Availability layer.

4 SYSTEM OVERVIEW

4.1 Decoupling the components

On a high level, a successful blockchain design needs to address the following components:

- **Data Hosting and Ordering:** This component would receive transactional data and order it without any execution. It would then store the data and ensure complete data availability in a decentralized manner. We call this component the *DA layer*.
- **Execution:** The execution component should take ordered transactions from the *DA layer* and execute them. It should create a checkpoint/assertion/proof and submit it to the *DR layer*. We call this the *Exec layer*.
- **Verification/Dispute Resolution:** This component represents the main chain to which the system is anchored. The security of the design is dependent on the robustness and security properties of this component. The checkpoint/assertion/proof submitted by *Exec layer* is processed by this layer to guarantee that only valid state transitions are accepted in the system (provided that the data is available). We refer to this component as the *DR layer*.

In this work, we are proposing the *DA layer*. We envision the multiple roll-up initiatives or legacy execution layers to form the *Exec layer*. The *DR layer* can be any secure blockchain layer which supports the execution verification.

4.2 Participants and System Goals

4.2.1 Types of Nodes. We consider the following types of nodes for our *DA layer*:

- **Full Nodes:** The full nodes download the blocks and validate their correctness but do not participate in consensus. They store the blockchain but are not incentivized to participate or remain honest.
- **Validator Nodes:** The validator nodes take part in block generation and decide on transaction inclusion and ordering. These nodes are incentivized to participate in consensus and host the blockchain. Essentially, they are also full nodes with stake in the system.
- **Light Clients:** These are clients with resource constraints who keep only the block header and query transactional data from other full nodes on an as-needed basis. They want to have high confidence that the block is available, and when querying data they want a proof that the data belongs to the block.

4.2.2 System Goals. Our design for the *DA layer* should provide the following guarantees:

- (1) The decentralized data availability blockchain keeps producing a canonical chain of blocks even in the presence of an adversary that controls $< \frac{1}{3}$ of the validator nodes in the network.
- (2) The honest participants of the system with access to the canonical chain of block headers will not accept a block

whose underlying data is unavailable even if a very powerful adversary is controlling all the other nodes in the system.

We want to guarantee achieving both these system goals. We want to emphasize that both the goals have different adversarial assumptions. Goal 1 ensures that the blockchain system continues to function in a decentralized manner as long as a super-majority of validator nodes remain honest. Goal 2 ensures that an outside participant like an application running a light node, who has access to the canonical chain of block headers, need not trust any full node to have the guarantee that the underlying data for a particular block is available. This is an extremely strong assumption which eliminates any trust assumption to detect data hiding attempt. In the next sections we discuss our construction ideas and argue that they achieve these goals.

5 DESIGNING THE DATA AVAILABILITY LAYER

5.1 Primitives

5.1.1 Why is redundancy important in ensuring Data Availability?

Suppose we have a block B divided into data chunks D_1, \dots, D_n . The block producer wants to suppress one chunk. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the first chunk is hidden by the block producer. Clients can query one chunk at random to get guarantees that data is indeed available. It can repeat this process many times so as to get sufficient confidence that the data is accessible. Hence, for each query, the block producer needs to be lucky enough that D_1 is not queried.

However, with redundancy included by schemes like erasure coding, suppose the n chunks are encoded into $2n$ chunks. Erasure coding ensures that any n out of the $2n$ chunks are sufficient to recreate the data. This makes the hiding task harder for the block producer. To hide one particular chunk, it needs to make at least $n + 1$ chunks unavailable. As a client, querying constant number of times gives a very high confidence that the data is indeed available. Hence, redundancy plays a vital role in the data availability. An erasure coding based design along with the related tradeoffs are discussed in [2].

5.1.2 Fraud Proofs. In the previous section although we discussed the advantage of redundancy in data, we omitted the case when the erasure coded chunks are misconstructed by the block producer. In these cases, even though most chunks are indeed available, the entire block data might not be accessible. Hence, fraud proofs are constructed by other full nodes in the system and propagated to the light nodes. The light nodes verify the fraud proof and get convinced that the received block header is that of an erroneous block. An interesting property of fraud proofs is that they function even under a minority honest assumption. This is because having a single honest full node as a neighbour is sufficient for an honest light node to be guaranteed that it receives the fraud proof.

An important factor to consider during design of *DA layer* is the size of fraud proofs. In simple erasure coded chunks, to prove that the encoding is incorrect, the entire original data block needs to be propagated to the light client. Hence, the fraud proof size is at least linear to the size of the block. Although we do not discuss the

higher dimensional erasure coding based design here, we refer to [2] for a detailed analysis of fraud proof sizes.

5.1.3 Commitment Size. In a one dimensional erasure coding based design, once a block producer selects data chunks D_1, \dots, D_n , it encodes the chunks to generate D_1, \dots, D_{2n} (assuming coding rate to be 0.5). It then constructs a Merkle tree over the chunks and keeps the root of it in the block header which acts as the commitment. A light client fetching D_i gets a Merkle membership proof along with the data chunk so that it can quickly verify that a legitimate chunk has been supplied. The commitment (root of Merkle tree) size is an important factor to consider in any design. With large commitments, block headers become larger resulting in increased network traffic. While higher dimensional erasure coding based schemes achieve shorter fraud proof size, it comes at the cost of larger commitments.

5.2 Coded Merkle Tree based Design

We briefly discuss the Coded Merkle Tree (CMT) based approach [12] proposed by Yu *et al.* The novelty of this approach is that it gives constant sized commitments with logarithmic sized fraud proofs.

The design uses systematic erasure codes at each layer of the Merkle tree. In particular, at the base layer, it takes k data chunks and extends it to n data chunks in such a manner that the first k out of n chunks are the original chunks and the rest are parity symbols. Each chunk in the next layer of the tree is made from hashes of q chunks of the previous layer. Similar systematic erasure code is applied on that layer as well and we keep building successive levels of the tree until we have t hashes which we keep as the commitment inside the block header.

When a light node samples a base layer chunk, the chunk along with a Merkle membership proof is given in such a manner that not only availability of base layer is ensured but also the higher layer availability is guaranteed. A light client sampling s base layer chunks the Merkle membership proof will automatically sample s intermediate layer chunks with high probability.

For a full client, decoding the tree and generation of fraud proof is also extremely efficient. With access to the root layer of the CMT present in the header and some coded chunks of the previous layer, the hash-aware peeling decoder decodes the previous layer getting access to all the hashes of the preceding layer. The decoder continues until all the chunks in the base layer is decoded or it finds evidence of an incorrect coding. In case of the former, the full node gets access to the entire data and in case of the latter, it generates the fraud proof and broadcasts it.

A detailed description of the construction along with performance analysis is present in [12].

5.3 Kate Commitment based Design

In this section we first discuss polynomial commitments proposed by Kate *et al.* [8]. Then we go on to discuss a *DA layer* design based on Kate commitments as proposed in [5].

Given a polynomial $\phi(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[x]$ over a bilinear pairing group, Kate *et al.* proposed a scheme to have a commitment to the polynomial using a single group element. Moreover, the scheme supports opening of a commitment at a point i to get $\phi(i)$ using constant

sized witness that allows a verifier to confirm that $\phi(x)$ was indeed evaluated at i to get $\phi(i)$. The commitment scheme is both computationally hiding and binding. The commitment scheme is additively homomorphic and supports a single witness for a batch of openings on multiple points of the same polynomial.

Given such a scheme, the block producer breaks the block data into chunks such that each chunk is an element of the field. It arranges the chunks into n rows and m columns such that it forms an $n \times m$ matrix D . It uses the evaluation form to construct a polynomial from each row to obtain $\phi_1(x), \dots, \phi_n(x)$. It then commits each polynomial to get C_1, \dots, C_n respectively. For redundancy, it extends C_1, \dots, C_n to C_1, \dots, C_{2n} . It puts C_1, \dots, C_{2n} inside the block header and broadcasts it. Figure 1 shows the data arrangement and the corresponding commitments.




Figure 1: Data Arrangement in Kate Commitment based *DA layer*

The light clients querying a data block will sample some chunk $D[i][j]$. Along with the data, the light client gets a witness $w[i][j]$ and it can immediately verify the validity using the Kate Commitment scheme discussed above. If it queries multiple chunks of the same row, the batch commitment scheme helps have a single witness for all the sampled points. Hence the membership proofs are extremely efficient.

For full nodes, the system can have two types of full nodes: 1. classical full nodes having entire block, 2. Column full nodes which keep only a single column of the data. For classical ones, it takes the entire matrix D , extends each column to $2n$ points and getting an extended matrix D' .

It then verifies for each row of D' whether the commitment to i^{th} row is C_i for $1 \leq i \leq 2n$.

For the column full nodes, they can fetch and keep only a column of the matrix D . They would extend each column to check whether they belong to the extended set of commitments. This is possible because of the homomorphic nature of the commitments and witnesses. In particular, having $D[1][j], \dots, D[n][j]$ and $w[1][j], \dots, w[n][j]$, the node can extend both to $2n$ points

and immediately verify whether the extended openings are valid. If the number of such column full node is $O(m)$, and each column full node ensures at least one column is available, then collaboratively the entire data is available within the column full nodes.

As the block size grows, so does the number of commitments (keeping number of columns fixed, the number of rows grow). Hence the Commitment size grows linear to that of the block size. However, we do not need any fraud proofs in such a system. For each light client, the communication and computational overhead is constant. For each full node, the computational overhead is $O(m * n \log(n))$ as it needs to perform m FFTs, one for each column, along with some pairing checks for verification. However, a column node has to only perform $O(n \log(n))$ work because it works on a single column of data.

5.4 Consensus

We need our validators to reach consensus on the next block which contains the ordered set of transactions. To achieve that, we use a consensus protocol that satisfies the following:

- **Safety:** No two honest nodes have finalized chain of blocks with two conflicting blocks. In our context, this means that all honest nodes agree on a unique ordering of transactions.
- **Liveness:** Irrespective of previous events, new blocks can always be added to the chain and finalized. In our context, this ensures that new transactions are always added in the chain.

Although there exists many possible blockchain consensus, we opted for the Proof-of-Stake family of consensus algorithms. In particular we chose the hybrid consensus used by Polkadot [9] called BABE [3] and GRANDPA [10]. It is called a hybrid consensus as it has two separate layers for block production (BABE) and finality (GRANDPA). Together, they ensure fast production with provable finality in a partially synchronous network model.

6 ANALYSIS

6.1 Attack Vectors

Any *DA layer* needs to counter the following attacks on data availability:

- (1) A super-majority of the validators in the *DA layer* wants to change the ordering of an already finalized block.
- (2) A super-majority of the validators create a wrong block header, i.e., the commitment of the data present in the header is wrong.
- (3) A super-majority of the validators want to hide at least one chunk of the block. For a light node, this would mean not being able to detect hiding of data with a non-negligible probability. For a full node, this would mean not being able to reconstruct the data.

We take the case of the super-majority of validators attacking the *DA layer* because we want to minimize honesty assumption required for our design.

Under the assumption that finality is reached, the reordering attack (attack 1) is hard to mount. This is because, to successfully mount this attack the attacker would need to break the non-equivocation property of the underlying consensus. In particular,

the finality layer ensures that if equivocation occurs, the dishonest parties can be identified and their stake slashed.

In the subsequent sections we show how Attack 2 and Attack 3 is countered in each of the two design choices - CMT and Kate Commitments.

6.2 Coded Merkle Trees

In the CMT based approach, the block proposer(s) may attempt to construct wrong header in two ways:

- The erasure coding in one or more layers is wrong.
- The Merkle tree construction is wrong.

In both cases, the fraud proof captures such an attack. A full node, with access to the data, can build the incorrect-coding proof and broadcast it for the light clients. [12] contains a detailed description of such a fraud proof.

The random sampling from base layer by a light client also samples higher layers. As each layer is erasure coded, hence, probability of hiding any chunk from any of the layers of the Merkle tree is extremely low for sufficiently many samplings. A full client who wants to reconstruct the Merkle tree needs access to the block header which contains the root hashes. Along with that, it needs $(1 - \alpha)n$ samples of the each layer, where n is the total chunks in the layer and α is the minimum fraction of coded symbols a malicious block producer needs to make unavailable to prevent full decoding. With these information it can decode the entire tree. The entire decoding strategy along with the hash-aware peeling decoder construction is given in [12].

Hence, the CMT approach can mitigate both attack 2 and 3. We however note that the mitigation assumes a single honest full node, which is not as strong as Goal 2 defined in Section 4.2.2.

6.3 Kate Commitments

In the Kate commitment based approach, attack 2 amounts to a wrong commitment by the block producer. Without loss of generality, suppose C_1 is wrong. This would mean that at least one out of $D[1][1]$ to $D[1][n]$ does not belong to C_1 . Again, let us assume $D[1][1] \notin C_1$. This would mean that at least one of this is true: $D[n+1][1] \notin C_{n+1}, \dots, D[2n][1] \notin C_{2n}$. This is because C_{n+1}, \dots, C_{2n} are extended from C_1, \dots, C_n and $D[n+1][1], \dots, D[2n][1]$ are extended from $D[1][1], \dots, D[n][1]$. Hence, such an attack is caught by a light client with overwhelming probability.

In case of attack 3, a light client querying constant samples can achieve arbitrarily high confidence that the data is indeed available. This is due to the redundancy in the data as discussed previously. For a full node, it needs to download the at least n chunks from each column so that it can reconstruct the entire extended data. It checks the commitments to know whether the downloaded data is correct. A column full node needs to perform similar operations but only for one column of data.

Hence, this approach mitigates all discussed attacks and achieves the goals set in Section 4.2.2.

7 ADDITIONAL MODULES

7.1 Application Specific Data Retrieval

We would want our construction to allow applications to download data which is only relevant to them. To enable this, we want the full nodes (or column full nodes) to prove to an application client that the complete set of data relevant to the application has been communicated.

For the CMT based approach, we can use a Namespaced Merkle Tree as described in [1]. We would need to make some alterations to the original construction to make it work with the CMT. We leave the exact construction details for future work.

For the Kate Commitment based approach, let us assume that each data chunk is prepended with an application identifier (ID) which is unique to the application. Let the data matrix $D_{n \times m}$ be filled up column-wise and let the ordering be such that all transactions relevant to a particular application are put in contiguous chunks of data. Incomplete data chunks are padded appropriately. Let the application data be spread from $D[i_1][j_1]$ to $D[i_2][j_2]$, where $1 \leq i_1, i_2 \leq n$ and $1 \leq j_1 \leq j_2 \leq m$.

With this setup, an application client can query its data from a full node. The full node need to give openings to all chunks from $D[i_1][j_1]$ to $D[i_2][j_2]$, taken column-wise. On top of that, it also needs to give openings to $D[i_1-1][j_1]$ (or $D[n][j_1-1]$ if $i_1 = 0$) and $D[i_2+1][j_2]$ (or $D[0][j_2+1]$ if $i_2 = n$). The client can then verify that for all openings within $D[i_1][j_1]$ to $D[i_2][j_2]$, the data starts with the correct ID and for the remaining two openings, the data has a different ID. This would prove the client that it has received all relevant data, under the assumption that the ordering is done correctly (equivalently, that supermajority of validators are honest in *DA layer*).

In case the client approaches column full nodes, it would need to approach atmost $(\lceil size/n \rceil + 2)$ column full nodes.

7.2 Light Client as Ethereum Smart Contract

The *DR layer* layer, when validating proofs or resolving dispute, need assurance that the underlying data is indeed available (as discussed in Sec 2). To enable this in an organic manner, we plan to deploy a light client as a smart contract on Ethereum (or any main chain which supports this logic). This would allow the checkpoint/assertion/proof accepting smart contract to communicate with this light client contract and directly get DA assurance. We still need to figure out how to implement such a contract. Specifically, how do the sampling take place in practice?

8 RELATED WORK

Lazyledger [1] proposes a *DA layer* construction using higher dimensional erasure coding. TODO: compare and contrast.

9 OPEN ISSUES

We note that a successful implementation of a *DA layer* will need to address these issues:

- In Kate Commitment based scheme, a trusted setup phase is needed. A deeper look into the details of it is needed. Some representative numbers are present in [6].

- Aligning data chunks into field elements needs some engineering. Also, choosing a formally verified bilinear pairing library with high performance is critical. A good place to start would be blst library.
- Choice of parameters need to be carefully addressed. In CMT approach, the number of hashes in the root, coding rate, hashes per chunk, base layer data per chunk, etc., need to be chosen. In Kate commitment approach, the number of columns, choice of underlying group, etc., need to be fixed. In both approaches, simple parallelisation is possible which would increase efficiency.

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