



CS1699: Blockchain Technology and Cryptocurrency

21. Atomic Swaps, Sidechains, and SPV Proofs

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The Problem

- ❖ Assume you want to convert some of your coin X to coin Y. How do you do it?
- ❖ Most-common way: centralized exchange (e.g. shapeshift.io)
- ❖ Less common way: "decentralized" exchange (e.g. <https://localmonero.co/?language=en>)
- ❖ Even truly "decentralized" exchanges often have a single point of failure (See EtherDelta lawsuit: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2018/11/09/new-sec-cyber-chief-puts-cryptocurrency-exchanges-on-notice/#796a89552fb8>)
- ❖ How can we ensure our system continues to operate with high availability using only the blockchains themselves and not a third-party or escrow service?

Atomic Cross-Chain Swaps

- ❖ We have seen that we can combine multiple transactions into a single "atomic" transaction in CoinJoin
- ❖ Can we do the same thing on multiple blockchains simultaneously, so that I can have a transaction that gives you X amount of Coin X while you give me Y amount of Coin Y, and vice versa?
- ❖ Yes, although it is complex and a bit slow!

Alice and Bob Swapping Litecoin for Bitcoin

- ❖ Alice generates a refundable deposit of a litecoin
- ❖ Bob generates a refundable deposit of b bitcoin
- ❖ Alice claims b bitcoin by time T_1 ($T_1 < T_2$)
- ❖ Bob claims a litecoin by time T_2 ($T_2 > T_1$)

Alice Generates Refundable Deposit of Litecoin

1. Alice generates a random string x and computes $h = H(x)$
2. Alice generates **DepositA** transaction (which to unlock requires EITHER (knowing x and signed by Bob) OR (signed by Alice and Bob)) on Litecoin network, but does not publish it
3. Alice generates time-locked **RefundA** (which cannot be claimed until after some time T_2) transaction and gets Bob's signature on it
4. Alice now publishes **DepositA** but holds back **RefundA**

Bob Generates Refundable Deposit of Bitcoin

1. Bob generates **DepositB** (which to unlock requires EITHER (knowing x and signed by Alice) OR (signed by Alice and Bob)) but does not publish it
2. Bob generates time-locked **RefundB** (which cannot be claimed until after some time T_1) and gets Alice's signature on it
3. Bob now published **DepositB** but holds back **RefundB**

Decision Point

- ❖ Alice decides to complete the swap
 - ❖ Alice claims bitcoin by time T_1 , thus revealing x
 - ❖ Bob now knows x and can claim litecoin by time T_2
- ❖ Alice changes her mind
 - ❖ Bob claims his refund (pre-signed by Alice)
 - ❖ Alice claims her refund (pre-signed by Bob)

"Good" Atomic Swap Timeline



Alice

Generates x

Generates DepositA
and RefundA

Publishes $h=H(x)$
and DepositA

Alice
claims Bitcoin
from DepositB,
revealing x

A

B

C

T1

T2

Time

Generates DepositB
and RefundB

Publishes
DepositB

Bob claims Litecoin
using x



Bob

Can Be Rolled Back at Any Point

- ❖ Before **A**: No transaction broadcast - no danger
- ❖ Between **A** & **B**: Alice can use refund transaction after **T2**
- ❖ Between **B** & **C**: Bob can get refund after **T1** but before **T2**. Alice can get refund after **T2**.
- ❖ After **C**: Transaction is completed (Alice must spend coin before **T1**, or Bob can claim refund and keep coins ; Bob must spend coin before **T2**, or Alice can claim refund)

"Bad Alice" Atomic Swap Timeline



Alice

Generates x

Generates DepositA
and RefundA

~~Publishes $h=H(x)$
and DepositA~~

Alice CANNOT
claim Bitcoin
from DepositB

Alice refunded
her own Litecoin
from RefundA

Time

A

B

C

T1

T2

Generates DepositB
and RefundB

DOES NOT
Publish
DepositB

Bob CANNOT claim
Litecoin since x
was never revealed;
instead gets his Bitcoin
back from RefundB



Bob

"Bad Bob" Atomic Swap Timeline



Alice

Generates x

Generates DepositA
and RefundA

Publishes $h=H(x)$
and DepositA

Alice CANNOT
claim Bitcoin
from DepositB

Alice refunded
her own Litecoin
from RefundA

A

B

C

T1

T2

Generates DepositB
and RefundB

~~Publish~~
~~DepositB~~

Bob CANNOT claim
Litecoin since x
was never revealed;
instead gets his Bitcoin
back from RefundB



Bob

Time

Benefits of Atomic Swaps

- ❖ No middleman
- ❖ No counterparty risk
- ❖ Entirely decentralized from a trading perspective
- ❖ Can be rolled back at any point

Problems with Atomic Swaps

- ❖ Slow (MUCH slower than a centralized exchange)
- ❖ Need to find a trading partner - might lead to being centralization at this level
- ❖ Time-bounded; if you don't claim your coins at the proper time, you will lose them!
- ❖ Vulnerable to DOS (by Alice / Bob backing out after coins committed)
- ❖ Very slim chance that block production times line up in such a way that (as block production time is *essentially* random following a power distribution)

Sidechains

- ❖ "Altcoins on Bitcoin" - Provide additional functionality while providing a bilateral peg to Bitcoin
- ❖ Escrow Bitcoin, but allow users to transfer back and forth between sidechain and main chain
- ❖ To truly do this, would need to extend Bitcoin - but can essentially have all the features by a simple hack

"The SPV Trick"

- ❖ Use SPV (Simplified Payment Verification) to look for evidence that transactions they care about are in longest branch that has received x verifications
- ❖ Scripts could just verify that a particular transaction occurred in the sidechain using SPV


SPV Proofs

- ❖ Need Bitcoin to verify legitimacy of sidechain coins
- ❖ User provides:
 - ❖ Proof of inclusion in sidechain transactions
 - ❖ Sidechain block headers showing certain number of confirmations
- ❖ Can be contested; must wait a provisional period after submitting proof
- ❖ Not foolproof from a sidechain perspective; but DOES ensure that Bitcoin itself is not harmed by any sidechain

SPV Proofs via PoW Samples

- ❖ What if we have very "fast" (i.e., short time between blocks) sidechains? Even a SPV Bitcoin node may not be able to keep up.
- ❖ We can use skiplists to "sample" PoW and estimate total work generated in a sublinear manner
- ❖ Skiplist points only to blocks where $h < \text{target} / m$
 - ❖ Should be evenly distributed since hash for each block should be in a uniform distribution $(0, \text{target})$

Skiplist with $h < target/4$



B_1 Block where $h < (target/4)$

B_2 Block where $h \geq (target/4)$ and $h < target$

Notable Bitcoin Sidechains

- ❖ Mastercoin, later rebranded Omni - Used for asset and token management - <https://www.omnilayer.org/>
- ❖ Drivechain - Platform for generating your own sidechains - <http://www.drivechain.info/>
- ❖ Liquid Network- Bilateral peg to Bitcoin (with native asset L-BTC) with faster settlement times - <https://blockstream.com/liquid/>