

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS*

By

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1. *Introduction*

Peaceful co-existence presupposes a process of disarmament ending in complete disarmament under international control. The retention of national or regional military power as the basis of national or regional security is incompatible with lasting peaceful co-existence. But the system of 'national power as the basis of national security' is of great antiquity and is deeply embedded in ideas and habits. Besides, it has led to extensive vested interests in the current system, interest groups formed by the military, the arms industries, arms research, and civil defence. Those who belong to these groups commonly tend to think of security as dependent on the traditional system. It is only natural for everyone to develop an outlook upon life in which his occupation and pursuits have a useful place.

This accounts for the fact that especially the groups mentioned above are, in good faith, the upholders of the traditional view, and act as a powerful pressure group in the controversy of armament versus disarmament.

The question is whether in opposition to this powerful and influential pressure group it is possible that a public opinion should develop which thinks in terms of a deliberate breach with the old system. The facts — particularly the danger of weapons which from being means of asserting one's strength have become means of mutual destruction — would in every way justify such a public opinion. But there prevails an indeterminate fear that disarmament

may lead to crisis and unemployment. Until recently communist propaganda was based on the thesis that the capitalist system was largely dependent on armament. Cases of cancellation of certain armament projects in America and consequent unemployment strengthened the fears that disarmament would necessarily involve unemployment. The uncertainty on this point gives free play to the military-industrial complex to influence public opinion in the direction of the ancient 'si vis pacem para bellum'.

If the armament versus disarmament debate is to be conducted in a pertinent way, an insight into the economic consequences of disarmament is essential. Impressive broad studies have already been made, but detailed studies are still needed for the different countries and the different kinds of economic activities. These detailed studies, as they have already been carried out for the U.S.A. and for the U.K., have a twofold task: first of all to supply the basic material for over-all surveys in this field; in addition to this they are indispensable for giving the smaller groups involved a clear insight into what disarmament would entail for them in particular. To be specific: to obtain a Dutch public opinion in favour of disarmament it will be necessary for the Dutch public to have a clear idea of what the economic consequences in the Netherlands will be. The same is true of other countries, and of the different kinds of economic activities. Hence this report on the economic consequences of disarmament in the Netherlands.

2. *The importance of the defence sector in the Netherlands*

2.1 *Military expenditure*

The importance of the defence sector in the Dutch economy determines the nature and extent of the effects of a complete disarmament on this economy.¹ Table 1 gives an impression of the relative importance of the defence expenditures in recent years.

The Minister of Defence aims at keeping the percentage in the last column constant.

The sharp fluctuations in the figures of Table 2 are due to non-recurring large orders such as the Starfighter project in 1962.

2.3 *The labour market*

The number of persons employed in the defence sector in 1964 is estimated at:

Civilian personnel c.	31,500
Military personnel		
a. regulars c.	50,000
b. conscripts c.	76,000
Total c.	157,500

Table 1. *The defence expenditures of the Netherlands*

Year	Military expenditures in millions of guilders	Military expenditures in percentages of the net national income	Military expenditures in percentages of the total government exp.
1960	1717	4.4	18.2
1961	2002	4.9	17.9
1962	2240	5.2	19.4
1963	2250	4.9	18.4
1964	2330	4.6	17.8
(estimated)			

2.2 *The balance of payments*

The economic-military relations with other countries are fairly intensive, as is the case with the whole Dutch economy. From 1959 to 1963 military exports averaged 1.6 per cent of the total exports in those years; for imports the corresponding figure was 2.0 per cent. By military exports and imports are meant the purchases by governments for their armies, navies and air forces.

This number is nearly 4 per cent of the total working population. The age distribution of the defence personnel differs considerably from that of the working population owing to the large numbers of mainly youthful conscripts.

3. *Short-term consequences of disarmament for the Netherlands*

3.1 *Assumptions*

In case of disarmament part of the ex-

Table 2. *Imports and exports of military goods, in millions of guilders*

Year	Military exports			Military imports		
	industrial products	foodstuffs	Total	industrial products	foodstuffs	Total
1959	121.9	58.1	180.0	99.9	1.7	101.6
1960	112.6	61.3	173.9	403.3	2.7	406.0
1961	259.4	57.0	316.4	467.0	3.4	470.4
1962	650.0	62.6	712.6	602.3	3.0	605.3
1963	c. 150.0	c. 60.0	c. 210.0	298.1	2.5	300.6

penses and part of the employment will continue to exist, e.g. pensions, payments to personnel on half-pay and indemnifications, and a few services such as the Topographic Agency, the Hydrographic Agency, etc. Of the amount on the 1964 national budget (a good 2,300 million guilders) it is estimated that *c.* 100 million guilders of running costs would remain and *c.* 500 million guilders for pensions etc. In 1964, therefore, expenses would be reduced by some 1,700 million guilders. In later years the reduction would be greater.

Taking the above considerations as a starting-point we might imagine that general and complete disarmament in 1964 would have the following consequences.

Reduction of military expenditures on material	1,000 mill. guilders
Reduction of expenditures on defence personnel	700 mill. guilders
Reduction of employment in the defence sector	156,000 persons

3.2 *Short-term consequences of disarmament*

The Central Planning Bureau has with great willingness calculated the effects of the above-mentioned measures and of the counter-measures to be mentioned in part 3.3.² The author bears the entire responsibility for the assumptions, the interpretation of the results and the manner of presenting the figures.

The calculation has been made with the aid of an input-output Table for the

Table 3. *Short-term consequences of disarmament*

Industry	Year 1960		Decline in			
	added value (net, market prices)		imports		employment	
	millions of guilders	per cent	millions of guilders	per cent	1,000 man- years	per cent
1. agriculture, forestry and fishing ...	1.25	—	0.09		0.04	
2. coal mining, crude petroleum and salt mining, sand pits, etc.	8.67	1.3	0.98	1.4	0.65	1.1
3. food manufacturing industries	0.89	0.1	1.46	0.1	0.07	0.1
4. beverage industries and tobacco manufacturers	0.96	0.1	0.20	0.1	0.03	0.1
5. manufacture of textiles, footwear and other wearing apparel.	3.38	0.2	3.03	0.2	0.47	0.2
6. manufacture of chemicals, petro- leum refineries	38.02	2.1	48.89	2.1	1.65	1.8
7. metal industry	114.82	2.3	79.30	2.6	10.28	2.3
8. other industries	21.93	1.0	9.77	0.7	1.99	1.0
9. construction	39.66	1.4	13.90	1.4	4.07	1.3
10. electricity, gas and waterworks	9.78	1.6	3.46	1.6	0.12	0.3
11. wholesale and retail trade	22.63	0.7	3.84	0.7	1.57	0.6
12. ownership of dwellings						
13. transport and communication	45.21	1.6	7.62	0.5	2.99	1.1
14. other personal services	26.80	0.6	0.53	0.4	3.26	0.5
15. activities not adequately described .			8.83	3.5		
Government	500.00				156.00	
Imports of finished products			249.94			
Total for industries	334.00	1.0	181.90	1.2	27.19	0.9
Grand Total	834.00	2.2	431.84	2.1	183.19	5.3

Netherlands for 1960. This model is completely static; no lagged influences via or on investments or consumers' demand are taken into account. As in 1960 the military expenditures were considerably less than now, a reduction of 1,700 million guilders would exaggerate the effects of disarmament. We have lowered the amount of part 3.1 proportionally, so that we assume in the input-output model a reduction of military expenditures of 1,300 million guilders, consisting of 500 million in personnel expenditures and 800 million in material expenditures. In this way the percentage results of Tables 3 and 4 can be assumed to be valid for 1954 as well. As for 1964, the reduction of employment in the defence sector is estimated at 156,000 persons. The effects, if any, via consumers' demand are neglected.

From Table 3 it appears that the metal and chemical industries suffer most from disarmament, followed by the public utilities and transport. Imports fall sharply. The very marked decline in employment (5.3 per cent) should not be understood as an equal increase in unemployment; see part 3.5.

3.3 *Effects of disarmament together with a complex of counter-measures*

Without any doubt, a disarming Dutch Government will take counter-measures against the harmful effects. In view of the present political priorities the following complex of counter-measures may be indicated:³

- | | |
|---------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Tax reduction | 700 mill. guilders |
| 2. Public works | 400 » » |
| 3. Export promotion | 200 » » |
-
1. The reduction of wage and income taxes will lead, according to the calculations of the Central Planning Bureau and based upon the macro-economic relations in the Dutch economy, to an increase in private consumption of 455 million guilders and to an increase

in private investments of 154 million guilders. The distribution of the consumption expenditures over the industries was done with the use of the consumption elasticities of each industry. The investment outlays were distributed according to the distribution of 1962, being a more 'normal' year than 1960.

2. We assume that the extra government expenditure of 400 million guilders will go to housing and public works.
3. We assume that the Government increases the aid to underdeveloped areas by 200 million guilders with a package of export goods consisting of:

Machinery	50 mill. guilders		
Electrical appliances . . .	50 » »		
Technical products (e.g. pesticides, fertilizers, etc.)	50 » »		
Medical services	25 » »		
Technical assistance . . .	25 » »		

It might be imagined that the Dutch Government will give the main benefit of these exports to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles (cf. section 5).

The effects of this complex of measures are indicated in Table 4.

It appears that industrial production increases by slightly over 1 per cent; the total of the added value, the government sector included, hardly changes to an appreciable extent. Four sectors — chemicals, metals, public utilities and transport — appear on balance to lose. As might be expected on the basis of our assumptions, the building industry experiences an enormous boom.

3.4 *The balance of payments*

In Table 4 it appears that on balance imports decrease by 49 million guilders. Exports increase by 200 millions guilders; this, however, is coupled with an equal increase of capital exports, so that the net

Table 4. *Effects of disarmament and compensating measures*

	Year 1960					
	Increase (+) or decrease (–) of					
	added value (net, market prices)		imports		employment	
	millions of guilders	per cent	millions of guilders	per cent	1,000 man- years	per cent
1. agriculture, forestry and fishing....	17.63	0.5	1.25	0.6	0.50	0.5
2. coal mining, crude petroleum and salt mining, sand pits, etc.	1.77	0.2	0.09	0.1	0.06	0.2
3. food manufacturing industries	9.95	0.5	14.79	0.5	0.85	0.5
4. beverage industries and tobacco manufacturers	12.47	1.2	2.58	1.2	0.34	1.0
5. manufacture of textiles, footwear and other wearing apparel.....	15.66	1.2	11.69	1.0	2.39	1.0
6. manufacture of chemicals, petroleum refineries	– 6.88	–0.4	– 8.84	–0.4	– 0.27	–0.2
7. metal industry	– 6.48	–0.1	–14.71	–0.4	– 1.20	–0.5
8. other industries	36.92	1.7	13.68	1.0	3.73	1.5
9. construction	171.17	6.2	59.97	5.4	19.75	5.5
10. electricity, gas and waterworks	– 0.59	–0.1	– 0.21		0.09	
11. wholesale and retail trade	75.95	1.0	4.56	0.9	4.51	1.0
12. ownership of dwellings	7.92	1.1	—		—	
13. transport and communication	–14.28	–0.5	– 4.11	–0.3	– 1.04	–0.3
14. other personal services	109.04	2.5	3.11	2.5	13.45	2.2
15. activities not adequately described .			– 2.24	–0.8		
Government	–500.00				–156.00	
Imports of finished products			–130.61			
Total for industries	430.25	1.3	81.61	0.6	43.16	1.4
Grand Total	–69.75	–0.3	–49.00	–0.2	–112.84	–3.3

effect on the balance of payments may be said to be an amelioration of 49 million guilders; compared with the 'normal' balance of payments surpluses or deficits, a negligible mutation.

3.5 *The labour market*

The supply of labour will be increased by:

- a) incoming defence personnel;
- b) dismissed employees from private business.

The demand for labour will be increased by the assumed compensating government measures. As a result business and industry will have extra employment for 70 thousand man-years. As appears from Table 3, 27 thousand man-years would become available through dismissal, so

that 43 thousands of man-years are open to the dismissed defence personnel. According to Table 4, there would still be a shortage of employment for 113 thousands of man-years. As was already mentioned this figure needs re-interpretation.

The defence personnel — 156,000 persons — consists of:

- a) 76,000 conscripts;
 - b) 50,000 regulars;
 - c) 30,000 civilian personnel.
- a) We assume that 80 per cent of the conscripts will increase the labour supply; the other 20 per cent will first follow some course of training. On balance, therefore, an initial increase of the labour supply by 61,000 followed later by the remaining 15,000.

b) and c) We assume that of the regular soldiers the men over 45, and of the civilian personnel the men over 50, will not have to find other employment, but will be pensioned off by the government. If we assume that the age distribution of these categories is the same as that of the Dutch population, this assumption means that c. 63,000 employees will increase the labour supply. On balance we find an increase in the labour supply of 124 thousands of man-years, so that ultimately unemployment will be increased by 81 thousands of man-years or 2.6 per cent.

Whether this increase will actually occur is entirely dependent on the tension on the labour market at the moment of disarmament. Of course it is possible to eliminate this unemployment by taking stronger counter-measures. These would then be accompanied by, e.g., a deficit on the balance-of-payments and the Government budget.

3.6 Conclusion

It appears to be possible to meet the consequences of disarmament for the Netherlands, provided that the Government devises and executes counter-measures well in advance. It may be recalled that in our analysis this condition was fulfilled; if in reality it should not be fulfilled the result would be more unfavourable.

4. Consequences for economic growth

4.1 The production factor labour

The sudden increase of the labour supply, made possible by the decreased need for 'security', makes an acceleration of the economic growth rate possible. This is due to the fact that in a strongly industrialized economy, such as the Dutch economy, labour is one of the bottlenecks for growth.

4.2 The factor land

Because the military need will cease to exist, more than 5,000 acres of land will become available, which are particularly suitable for recreation. They would presumably be set aside for this purpose. The influence this would have on economic growth cannot be evaluated; at least it can be characterized as non-negative.

4.3 The factor capital

The possibilities for the private formation of capital will become greater; this is, however, entirely dependent on the use to which the amount previously spent on defence will be put. The effects on the growth of the changed uses to which capital is put, are dependent on the capital-output ratios in defence-related and non-defence industries. In this respect no concrete conclusions can be drawn owing to lack of data.

4.4 Technology

The Dutch defence sector, unlike, for instance, that of the U.S.A. or the United Kingdom, is not a stimulator of fundamental scientific research. In 1959 military research accounted for only 1.7 per cent of the total amount spent on research. For the U.S.A. the corresponding percentage is 50 to 60 per cent! The discontinuance of defence expenditure would, therefore, exercise hardly any direct influence on the development of technology. Most of the research is done by the metal and chemical industries, those sectors which stand to suffer most from disarmament. It cannot, however, be predicted whether this would be a stimulus to more intensive research for this branch of industry, or a check.

4.5 The influence on economic growth

The easier supply of production factors for civilian products makes an accelerated economic growth *possible*; whether this possibility will be utilized will largely depend on an adequate economic policy

in terms of the prevention of a recession, which would cause an interruption in the present growth. The adequacy of such a policy may be considered more probable for the Netherlands than for many other countries; this is due to the fact that in the Netherlands the bottleneck for growth is not formed by the lack of an adequate infra-structure, in the widest sense of the term. This is, of course, not true for areas which are underdeveloped, even without disarmament.

5. *The consequences for the territories in the Western Hemisphere*

5.1 *Preliminary remarks*

We shall confine ourselves to the economically most important territories, Surinam and the islands of Curaçoa and Aruba. Both areas exhibit a very one-sided economic structure.

5.2 *Surinam*

The prosperity of Surinam mainly depends on bauxite mining.⁴ The country produces *c.* 14 per cent of the world production of bauxite. The export of bauxite accounts for a good 84 per cent of the total Surinam exports. The bauxite mainly goes to the U.S.A.; the exploitation is in American hands.

5.3 *The Antilles*

Curaçoa and Aruba are dependent for their prosperity on the refining of crude petroleum got elsewhere (Venezuela). The import of crude petroleum accounts for *c.* 85 per cent of total imports; the export of petroleum products for *c.* 99 per cent of total exports. In 1959 nearly 77 per cent of the imports came from Venezuela; 36 per cent of the exports went to the U.S.A.

The oil companies tend to establish their processing plants near the marketing areas. Venezuela exerts pressure to have the processing done at the source.

5.4 *The consequences of disarmament*

The consequences of disarmament will make themselves felt through the diminished demand for bauxite and petroleum products. The consumption of crude oil and bauxite for defence purposes is estimated at *c.* 8 and *c.* 7 per cent respectively.⁵

Assuming that all governments would meet the effects of disarmament by not reducing the total government expenditures, we find a decrease of *c.* 0.17 per cent in the demand for oil, and of *c.* 1 per cent in the demand for bauxite.⁶ It is expected that these low percentages, together with the expected stimulus for the economic growth and the increase in international trade, will not frustrate the development of the underdeveloped countries, i.e. the countries producing primary raw materials.⁷ Some reservations should, however, be made here.

1. The assumption that the total government expenditures will not be reduced cannot be considered relevant, especially for the large buyers of raw materials — the industrialized countries. However this may be for Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, the compensating measures, the non-reduction of the demand for bauxite and petroleum, will all have to be taken by foreign governments.
2. Raw materials are highly price-elastic. Apart from the quantity effect, specified in the U. N. report, price-falls, also mentioned but not specified in the report, will have to be taken into account, in our case for petroleum and bauxite. Even in the case of a slight decline in the demand, price-falls will not fail to produce their effect on the value of exports and consequently on the income of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.
3. The considerations in 2 also hold for Venezuela. If the compensating measures of the government of this country take the form of increased pressure to

get the Antilles' refineries removed to Venezuela, the outlook for the Antilles is rather gloomy. Also, if there exists a diminishing demand for the products of Surinam and the Antilles, it seems likely that their principal customer, the U.S.A., will consider Surinam and the Antilles marginal sellers; not as a result of price-comparisons but as the result of 'territorial preferences' for domestic products. To sum up, the U. N. report, too, makes reservations for unspecified special cases. The possibility should be considered of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam coming to belong to this not very enviable category.

6. *Disarmament and the individual firm*

In order to know to what extent the individual firm in the Netherlands was involved and felt involved in disarmament problems, we held an inquiry among the Dutch defence-contractors. This inquiry was inspired by, and the results are comparable with, a similar English inquiry.⁸ Although the inquiry is not yet complete, a provisional summary of the most important results is given below. Our inquiry contains one serious bias: up to now we have not received answers from the six or

seven presumably most important defence contractors.

The questionnaire was sent to 203 companies. The degree of response was as follows:

	Percentage of total	
	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Replies received ...	60.6	55.2
of which:		
carried out defence work	43.3	31.2
did not carry out defence work	10.3	19.1
refused to give, or did not give, a definite answer ...	6.9	4.8
Did not reply	39.4	44.8
Total	100	100

Evidently our response was better than in the English case, but the results are less reliable because of the bias mentioned above.

In what follows we refer to the 43.3 per cent, or 88 companies, which gave definite answers and carried out defence work. Their distribution over some classes of industry is given in Table 5.

Table 5. *Employment and distribution of 88 defence contractors*

Industry ⁹	Number of received answers	Total employment	Defence-related employment as a percentage of total employment
Construction	47	6,120	22
Textiles	13	13,000	2
Electro-technical industry	3	450	33
Chemicals	1	250	8
Ammunition and explosives	3	900	89
Metal industry	10	6,500	3
Transport	4	4,000	2
Manufacture of rubber products	1	70	14
Other industries	6	10,500	1
Total	88	41,790	7

From the last column it will be clear that the Netherlands do not have a highly specialized defence-industry — with the exception of a few ammunition and explosives manufacturing companies. The first industry, construction, shows a high percentage of defence-related employment, but this class consists of a great number of small firms, with a production apparatus that is completely adaptable to civilian ends. To a smaller degree the same is true for the electro-technical industry, but here the sample is too small to draw more definite conclusions. Our total of 7 per cent defence-related employment is small in comparison with the 23 per cent mentioned in the English study.

Almost 80 per cent answered that they never paid serious attention to the disarmament problem.

More than 80 per cent considered complete conversion of their production factors to civilian ends possible. Only one firm thought this conversion would take more than one year. More than 80 per cent of the companies did not need any time for conversion.

Generally speaking, most of the companies inquired into saw no serious problems in connection with disarmament. The majority explicitly expressed confidence in the Dutch Government's taking

responsibility for sufficient and adequate civilian orders. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

7. *Postscript*

The conclusions to which these considerations lead are the following:

1. The harmful effects of disarmament can generally be met by special government measures; under the assumption that industrial firms prepare themselves for the event of discontinuation of defence-orders.¹⁰
2. Disarmament may, if accompanied by adequate government measures, stimulate economic growth.
3. There are certainly also areas where GCD may lead to economic recession (as for instance in Surinam). Very intensive action will be needed there to make these special economic burdens — caused by measures which are of vital importance for all mankind — as light as possible.
4. Generally speaking, a knowledge of what disarmament implies for the economic situation need not be a negative factor, but may rather be a positive one in forming a public opinion in favour of disarmament.

NOTES

* This report is the nucleus of one chapter of a treatise on the economic consequences of disarmament, which is due to appear this year as a publication of the Polemological Institute of the University of Groningen, and which was written in the collaboration of this institute with the Economic Institute at Groningen. An earlier version of this report was presented at the VIIIth Pugwash Conference, Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, 13–19 September 1964.

The authors wish to thank Mr. J. K. T. Postma, Groningen, for his help as a collector of data for this article and Professor Leif Johansen, University of Oslo, for his critical remarks on the Pugwash paper — one of the reasons why this article is an amended version of that paper.

¹ Unless specified to the contrary in this report we mean by 'disarmament' an immediate and complete discontinuance of all defensive measures. Only if it should appear that this starting-point would lead to disastrous economic difficulties is there any point in modifying this assumption and assuming a more gradual method of disarmament.

² The authors wish to express their thanks for the co-operation of the Central Planning Bureau, especially to Dr. A. Russchen.

³ This is only one of a potentially infinite series of possibilities; the following analysis is consequently to be taken as only an example of a possible economic policy. In our example the Government budget is not disturbed. This is, however, not at all necessary nor likely, because the Gov-

ernment will probably give higher priority to another macro-economic goal, e.g. maintaining full employment, or balance-of-payments equilibrium, etc.

⁴ Figures for the magnitude of the national product or the national income are not available; the same is true of the Antilles.

⁵ United Nations, 'Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament', (E/3593/Rev. 1), New York 1962, Table 3-3, p. 65.

⁶ United Nations, op. cit. Table 3-4, p. 66.

⁷ United Nations, op. cit. pp. 36-37.

⁸ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *The Economic Effects of Disarmament*, London 1963, pp. 18-25.

⁹ The shipbuilding industry is not included. The combined Dutch shipbuilders are preparing a joint answer.

¹⁰ From our inquiry it appears that this is not at all the case in the Netherlands.

S U M M A R Y

General and complete disarmament in the Netherlands would result, as might be expected, in a decreasing national product and an increasing unemployment. However, these unfavourable consequences can be met successfully by rather simple counter-measures, consisting of the maintenance or even the increase of total effective demand, provided these measures are prepared and taken in time. To make the likelihood of a smooth conversion as great as possible this preparation should be done by the Government as well as by the individual firms. This last condition is not fulfilled in reality. Detailed governmental counter-measures, meaning intervention in individual firms or industries, do not seem necessary on a large scale. Supply of labour being a bottleneck for growth in the Netherlands, the resources freed by disarmament may give new possibilities for economic growth.

The effects of disarmament for Surinam and the Antillian Islands run via the markets for primary products, especially bauxite and oil. Since demand on these markets is probably determined not only by such factors as price, quality and distance, but also by national-political influences, the ultimate result cannot be predicted but can be described as non-positive for the development of these areas.

Краткое содержание.

Всеобщее и полное разоружение в Голландии привело бы, как этого можно ожидать, к уменьшению национального продукта и к повышению безработицы. Однако, такие неблагоприятные последствия можно с успехом предотвратить, если принять сравнительно простые меры, заключающиеся в поддержании или даже повышении общего действительного спроса. Это возможно, конечно, при условии, если эти меры будут подготовлены и приняты своевременно.

Для того, чтобы повысить вероятность безболезненности перехода, эти меры должны быть приняты как правительством, так и частными предприятиями. Это последнее условие, в действительности, не выполнено. Детально разработанные правительственные меры, означающие вмешательство в дела частных предприятий или отраслей промышленности, не кажутся необходимыми в широких масштабах. Так как недостаток рабочей силы препятствует экономическому росту Голландии, средства сэкономленные при разоружении, могут дать новые возможности для экономического развития страны. Последствия разоружения для Сюринама, Южная Америка, и для Антильских островов находятся в зависимости от рынков сбыта основного сырья, особенно бокситов и нефти.

Так как спрос на это сырье определяется не только такими факторами как цена, качество и расстояние от рынков, но и факторами национально—политического характера, трудно для них предсказать последствия разоружения. Тем не менее, эти последствия можно определить как отрицательные для экономического роста этих районов.