SOLIDProof

Bring trust into your projects

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC

MADE IN GERMANY

Audit

Security Assessment

24. September, 2021

For

PET WORLD

Disclaimer

SolidProof.io reports are not, nor should be considered, an “endorsement” or “disapproval” of any particular project or team. These reports are not, nor should be considered, an indication of the economics or value of any “product” or “asset” created by any team. SolidProof.io do not cover testing or auditing the integration with external contract or services (such as Unicrypt, Uniswap, PancakeSwap etc’...)

SolidProof.io Audits do not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug- free nature of the technology analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the technology proprietors. SolidProof Audits should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. These reports in no way provide investment advice, nor should be leveraged as investment advice of any sort.

SolidProof.io Reports represent an extensive auditing process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology. Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. SolidProof’s position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. SolidProof in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze.

Version	Date	Description
1.0	24. September 2021	• Layout project • Automated- /Manual-Security Testing • Summary

Network
Binance Smart Chain (BEP20)

Website
http://www.petworldgame.com/

Telegram
https://t.me/PETWORLD_GAMEFI

Twitter
https://twitter.com/PetWorld_GAMEFI

Description

In the last two years, blind box games have become the "new darling" of users. The same box, with a completely unknown item inside, is purchased by users based on luck. This seemingly simple game has seen nearly 200,000 "hardcore users" spend over $20,000 in the last year alone. Many businesses have also taken the blind box model online, creating a variety of popular mystery box opening and card selection games.
Blind box games bring both material and spiritual stimulation to users, but the opaque rules have led to various "backroom operations" by merchants, reducing user trust and causing a gradual loss of users. If this problem can be solved through technological means, then blind box games will gain tremendous development, attracting countless users and triggering a new round of wealth explosion.

With the support of blockchain technology, Pet World can be highly "decentralized" and avoid excessive control of the game by the operator. At the same time, through the rules on the chain, the rules of the game are written into the blockchain's smart contract, ensuring that the "mechanism" replaces the "rule of man" in the process of the game, eliminating underhand

operations and false operations, ensuring that users can play in a truly fair and just environment, enjoying the The game is fun and surprising with a small amount of money.

Project Engagement

During the 19th September, **PetWorld Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo

Contract Link

v1.0

https://bscscan.com/address/0xff00da868f1ca57a3c13ec8a77f6c3cdf06139c3#code

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
    i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
    ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
    iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.

2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
    i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
    ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.

3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.

4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

- OpenZeppelin
  - Ownable
  - SafeMath
  - Context
  - ERC20
  - ERCBurnable
  - IERC20
  - IERC20Metadata
- Uniswap
  - UniswapV2Factory
  - UniswapV2Pair
  - UniswapV2Router01
  - UniswapV2Router02

Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.0

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/petworld.sol	fa3bdbea2c10c8bb89be343a5faa675ca313bbd3

Metrics

Source Lines
v1.0



Risk Level
v1.0



Capabilities

Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	2	1	5	3

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Version	Public	Payable
1.0	65	5

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	46	67	1	18	23

State Variables

Version	Total	Public
1.0	21	11

Capabilities

Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experimental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembly	Has Destroyable Contracts
1.0	`^0.8.2`		`yes`	**** (0 asm blocks)	

Scope of Work

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

1. Correct implementation of Token standard
2. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
3. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
5. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Inheritance Graph

v1.0



Verify Claims

Correct implementation of Token standard

Tested	Verified
✓	✓

Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
TotalSupply	provides information about the total token supply	✓	✓	✓
BalanceOf	provides account balance of the owner's account	✓	✓	✓
Transfer	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	✓	✓	✓
TransferFrom	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	✓	✓	✓
Approve	allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	✓	✓	✓
Allowance	returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	✓	✓	✓

Optional implementations

Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
renounceOwnership	Owner renounce ownership for more trust	✓	✓	✗

Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Verified	File
Deployer cannot mint	✓	✓	✓	Main
Comment	Line: -			

Max / Total Supply: 100.000.000

Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Verified
Deployer cannot lock	✓	✓	⚑
Deployer cannot burn	✓	✓	✗

Comments:

v1.0

- Deployer can only lock for 10 minutes

```
/**
 * To prevent bot trading, limit the number of tokens that can be transferred.
 */
ftrace | funcSig
function antiBot(uint256 amount↑) external onlyOwner {
    require(amount↑ > 0, "not accept 0 value");
    require(!antiBotEnabled);

    antiBotAmount = amount↑;
    antiBotTime = block.timestamp + antiBotDuration;
    antiBotEnabled = true;
}
```

1. SetMintContract →
2. addBotAddress →
3. antiBot →
4. approve →
5. burn →
6. burnFrom →
7. decreaseAllowance →
8. excludeFromFee →
9. includeInFee →
10. increaseAllowance →
11. renounceOwnership →
12. setBotAddresses →
13. transfer →
14. transferFrom →
15. transferOwnership →

Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Verified
Deployer cannot pause	✓	✓	✓

1. SetMintContract →
2. addBotAddress →
3. antiBot →
4. approve →
5. burn →
6. burnFrom →
7. decreaseAllowance →
8. excludeFromFee →
9. includeInFee →
10. increaseAllowance →
11. renounceOwnership →
12. setBotAddresses →
13. transfer →
14. transferFrom →
15. transferOwnership →

Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Tested	Verified
✓	✓

Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	✓
Partly Verified	⚑
Unverified / Not checked	✗
Not available	–

CallGraph



Source Units in Scope
v1.0

Type	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
📝📚🔍🎨	contracts/petworld.sol	6	5	1090	834	356	456	340	💰🔆
📝📚🔍🎨	**Totals**	**6**	**5**	**1090**	**834**	**356**	**456**	**340**	💰🔆

Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)

Audit Results

AUDIT PASSED

Critical issues

- no critical issues found -

High issues

- no high issues found -

Medium issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Main	Contracts that lock ether (locked-ether)	-	Remove the payable attribute or add a withdraw function. When contract receives eth from uniswap, the owner is not able to withdraw the balance

Low issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Main	Contract doesn't import npm packages from source (like OpenZeppelin etc.)	-	We recommend to import all packages from npm directly without flatten the contract. Functions could be modified or can be susceptible to vulnerabilities
#2	Main	A floating pragma is set	5	The current pragma Solidity directive is „“^0.8.2““.
#3	Main	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check)	1039	Check that the address is not zero
#4	Main	State variable visibility is not set	951, 952, 958	It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly

Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Main	State variables that could be declared constant (constable-states)	955, 952, 951, 970, 976, 975	Add the `constant` attributes to state variables that never change

Audit Comments

24. September 2021:

- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Developer can lock the contract once for 10 minutes
    - Following conditions should be true for locking
        - antiBotTime should be higher than block timestamp
        - Amount should be higher than antiBotAmount
        - Sender should be marked as bot in botAddresses mapping as true with addBotAddress function
- Medium issue is important for Owner, not for address who wants to invest in this contract

SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
SWC-129	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

SWC-116	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
SWC-110	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	NOT PASSED
SWC-107	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	NOT PASSED
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC

MADE IN GERMANY