

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC

MADE IN GERMANY

Audit

Security Assessment 27. July, 2021

For



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Version	Date	Description
1.0	23. July 2021	Layout project
	24 25. July 2021	Automated- /Manual-Security Testing
	26. July 2021	Summary

Network

Binance Smart Chain (BEP20)

Website

https://www.gameologycrypto.com/

Telegram

https://t.me/GAMEOLOGYV2

Twitter

https://twitter.com/Gameology7

Instagram

https://www.instagram.com/gameology_crypto/

Discord

https://discord.gg/SHydayRJHx

Reddit

https://www.reddit.com/user/Gameology_Official/

Description

Gameology is a decentralized platform for all gamers in the world! Do you love videogames, streams and challenge other players like you? With us all this will be possible! Play, fight in our arenas, earn GMY and spend them on our platform!

GMYX is an utility token based on the Gameology (GMYX) was born from the idea of the two CEOs back in 2019 and finally brought to light.

Project Engagement

During the 23rd of July 2021, **Gameology Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. **Gameology Team** provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo



Contract Link

TBA

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

- OpenZeppelin
 - Address
 - Ownable
 - SafeMatch
- Uniswap
 - UniswapV2Factory
 - UniswapV2Pair
 - UniswapV2Router01
 - UniswapV2Router02

Tested Contract Files


This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/gameology.sol	52e36adbc85de7753b4e07c3b1e4c1714448dae4

Metrics

Source Lines



Capabilities

Components

Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
4	4	7	2

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Public	Payable
155	8

External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
111	141	7	29	58

State Variables

Total		Public	
	71		48

Capabilities

Solidity Versions observed	Experiment al Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembly	Has Destroyable Contracts
^0.7.0 >=0.6.0 <0.8.0 >=0.6.2 >=0.5.0 ^0.7.6		Yes	**** (0 asm blocks)	

Transfers ETH	Low- Level Calls	Delegate Call	Uses Hash Function s	ECRecov er	New/ Create/ Create2
yes					yes → NewCo ntract: GAMEOLO GYv2Div idendTr acker

Scope of Work

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 2. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 3. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 5. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Inheritance Graph



Verify Claims

Correct implementation of Token standard



Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
Total Supply	provides information about the total token supply	√	√	√
BalanceOf	provides account balance of the owner's account	\checkmark	√	√
Transfer	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	√	√	√
TransferFrom	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	√	√	√
Approve	allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	√	√	✓
Allowance	returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	√	√	√

Optional implementations

Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
renounceOwnership	Owner renounce ownership for more trust	\checkmark	√	

Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Tested	Verified	File	Comment
√	√	Main	Line: -

Max / Total Supply: 50000000000

```
constructor() public ERC20("GAMEOLOGYv2", "GMYX") {
   // LP burn address
   burnAddress = address(0x54934474463e4A31923c8F2f4D0f2e0A45f01b69);
   uint256 _processDividendTime = block.timestamp;
 processDividendTime = _processDividendTime;
dividendTracker = new GAMEOLOGYv2DividendTracker();
 IUniswapV2Router02 _uniswapV2Router = IUniswapV2Router02(0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E);
   // Create a uniswap pair for this new token
   address _uniswapV2Pair = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory())
 .createPair(address(this), _uniswapV2Router.WETH());
 uniswapV2Router = _uniswapV2Router;
uniswapV2Pair = _uniswapV2Pair;
_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(_uniswapV2Pair, true);
 // exclude from receiving dividends
   dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(address(dividendTracker));
   dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(address(this));
   dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(address(_uniswapV2Router));
 dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(owner());
  // exclude from paying fees or having max transaction amount
  excludeFromFees(burnAddress, true);
   excludeFromFees(address(this), true);
 excludeFromFees(owner(), true);
  // enable owner and fixed-sale wallet to send tokens before presales are over
   canTransferBeforeTradingIsEnabled[owner()] = true;
       _mint is an internal function in ERC20.sol that is only called here,
       and CANNOT be called ever again
   _mint(owner(), 50000000000 * (10**9));
function mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal virtual {
  require(account != address(0), "ERC20: mint to the zero address");
     _beforeTokenTransfer(address(0), account, amount);
     _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(amount);
     _balances[account] = _balances[account].add(amount);
      emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);
}
```

Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Tested	Exist	Verified
No Lock function	\checkmark	√	\checkmark
No Burn function	√	√	√



Deployer cannot pause the contract

Tested	Verified	No pause function
\checkmark	√	✓




Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	\checkmark
Partly Verified	
Unverified / Not checked	X

CallGraph



Source Units in Scope

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
 	contracts/gameology.sol	10	7	2291	1932	1040	652	977	<u>\$</u> 40*
∌ ≧ ૣ	Totals	10	7	2291	1932	1040	652	977	<u>\$</u> ♣6☆

Legend

Attribute	Description	
Lines	total lines of the source unit	
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)	
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)	
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments	
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)	

Audit Results

AUDIT PASSED

Critical issues

- no critical issues found -

High issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	DividendP ayingToke n	Reentrancy vulnerabilities	1204	Reentrancy in DividendPayingTokenwithdrawDividendOfUser(address)

Medium issues

- no medium issues found -

Low issues

Issue	File	Туре	Line	Description
#1	Main	A floating pragma is set	2	The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.7.0"".
#2	Main	Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization control.	1725, 1873	Using "tx.origin" as a security control can lead to authorization bypass vulnerabilities.
#3	Main	Unused local variable "data".	1921, 1936, 1952, 2058	The local variable "data" is declared within the functions of contract "GAMEOLOGYv2" but its value does not seem to be used anywhere in the functions.

Informational issues

- no informational issues found -

Commented Code exist

There are some instances of code being commented out in the following files that should be removed:

Line	Comment			
1402	<i>//</i>			
1496	/* function updateBurnAddress(address _burnAddress) external onlyOwner { burnAddress = _burnAddress; }*/			
1529	//dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(marketAddress);			
1535	//dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(charityAddress);			
1541	//dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(buyBackAddress);			
1616-1619	 - //require(_isExcludedFromFees[account] != excluded, "GAMEOLOGYv2: Account is already the value of 'excluded'"); - //dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(account); - //emit ExcludeFromFees(account, excluded); 			
1623	//require(_isExcludedFromFees[account] != excluded, "GAMEOLOGYv2: Account is already the value of 'excluded'");			
1626	//emit ExcludeFromFees(account, excluded);			
1636	//require(_isExcludedFromFees[account] != excluded, "GAMEOLOGYv2: Account is already the value of 'excluded'");			
1638	//emit ExcludeFromFees(account, excluded);			
1918-1919	//_transfer(address(this), burnAddress, marketFeePortion); //emit Transfer(address(this), burnAddress, marketFeePortion);			
1933-1934	//_transfer(address(this), burnAddress, charityFeePortion); //emit Transfer(address(this), burnAddress, charityFeePortion);			

Recommendation

Remove the commented code, or address them properly.

There are many more comments in the contract (line: 1938, 1939, 1947, 1949, 1950, 1954, 1955, 1960, 2112, 2118, 2122, 2124).

Audit Comments

- · Owner can update Trading enabled time
- · Owner can update dividend time
- · Owner can update minimum balance for dividend



SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>6</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>5</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>4</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>3</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>2</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>1</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	NOT PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>0</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>9</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>8</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>7</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>5</u>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>4</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>3</u>	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>2</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
SW C-12	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>0</u>	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>7</u>	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	NOT PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-111</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>9</u>	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>8</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>7</u>	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>6</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>5</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>4</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>3</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	NOT PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>2</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>1</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>0</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED



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