

**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC** 

MADE IN GERMANY

# Audit

Security Assessment 02. November, 2021

For



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### **Disclaimer**

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Version	Date	Description
1.0	02. November 2021	<ul><li>Layout project</li><li>Automated- /Manual-Security Testing</li><li>Summary</li></ul>

#### Network

Binance Smart Chain (BEP20)

#### Website

https://mahhealthcare.com/

#### **Twitter**

https://twitter.com/mahhealthcare

#### **Facebook**

https://www.facebook.com/MAH-Healthcare-Estonia-102940742147177

#### **Github**

https://github.com/HTRAX/htrax-token

#### Instagram

https://www.instagram.com/mah.healthcare/

#### LinkedIn

https://www.linkedin.com/company/mah-healthcare-estonia/

## **Description**

MAH Healthcare OU is Estonia Based rapidly growing Healthcare IT company with the Vision of Creating Brand Value in Short span of 2 years. MAH Want to Expand its service offerings across Healthcare IT industry sectors, number of customers, number of operating locations and capability for value creation. A strong leadership, investment in infrastructure and people, confidence of our People and our unwavering passion for excellence has significantly contributed to this momentum. MAH is constantly investing in state-of-the-art infrastructure, building people competence, adopting leading edge technology, and adding business value for its customer as well as in Community and everything else that is essential to achieve customer delight and employee jubilation. MAH Healthcare uses blockchain technology to securely manage health records for a collaborative, smart approach to healthcare

## **Project Engagement**

During the 30th of October 2021, **HTRAX Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.



Contract Link v1.0 TBA

## **Vulnerability & Risk Level**

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

## Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

# **Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)**

#### Imported packages:

- HTRAXTokenSale:
  - AccessControl
- HTRAXToken:
  - Ownable
  - Pausable
  - AccessControl
  - ERC20
  - ERC20Snapshot

## **Tested Contract Files**

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

#### **v1.0**

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/utils/Context.sol	5ece05a1a975617e5663847ad3a522966e3c5904
contracts/utils/Strings.sol	ccb4d394fcf0694b7dc1fed9ec2f0b292998b4be
contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sol	c274749941851ddff3c478cb475b65da616697c7
contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165.sol	160047f3e0c5221369ba3558f0a56ea2a7d7ca3f
contracts/utils/math/Math.sol	f04e52286764b68060e0619462f172c441b5bec4
contracts/utils/Arrays.sol	fcc6f29ca11d48ca9e2642ce8235c66604d53a3c
contracts/utils/Counters.sol	1152ad436016e04e2299d8cae70f68f3880f9de3
contracts/HTRAXToken.sol	791d710db982271e971ca1669b0ef176dfa403e1
contracts/HTRAXTokenSale.sol	8d56dbb841c00059bea0c79f3b17914893b4dafb
contracts/security/Pausable.sol	91d67f0ca43d851c1a43ec98ecf160ee14d0f504
contracts/access/Ownable.sol	b1b5d13cd2134a90082b2bad46542a323955d2eb
contracts/access/AccessControl.sol	a94eb77ca64f47afe96401336cf79174aba324ea
contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol	3b01806757407473fe8110a75856f0c214ec1762
contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	d0dd54d5a489c52b30f941ac1d4a88aecbd0f2e4
contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Snapshot.sol	993fbebe49e198ac31f45a7421a3c9f47b9f1e04
contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol	6e1b1b40d095a0a5611d6500052b87ac8f04b83f

## **Metrics**

# Source Lines v1.0



## **Capabilities**

## Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	2	4	4	7

## **Exposed Functions**

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Vers	ion	Public	Payable
1.0		67	0

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	16	85	7	6	41

### **State Variables**

Version	Total	Public
1.0	30	6

## **Capabilities**

Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experim ental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembl Y	Has Destroya ble Contract s
1.0	0.8.9			**** (0 asm blocks)	

Version	Transf ers ETH	Low- Level Calls	Delega teCall	Uses Hash Functi ons	ECRec over	New/ Create/ Create 2
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	1.0	yes			yes		
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
## **Scope of Work**

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 2. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 3. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 5. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

## Inheritance Graph v1.0



## **Verify Claims**


## **Correct implementation of Token standard**

Tested	Verified
<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>

Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
TotalSupply	provides information about the total token supply	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	$\checkmark$
BalanceOf	provides account balance of the owner's account	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	$\checkmark$
Transfer	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
TransferFrom	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
Approve	allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
Allowance	returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	<b>√</b>	1	✓

### Write functions of contract

#### HTRAXToken:



### Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Verified	File
Deployer cannot mint	✓	✓	X	Main
Comment	Line: -			

Max / Total Supply (Release): 93.750.000

#### Comments:

#### **v1.0**

- Addresses with MINTER\_ROLE can mint tokens
  - Maximum \_release tokens
  - totalSupply + totalBurned tokens + minting amount cannot be higher than \_cap

```
function mint(address account1, uint256 amount1) public onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) {
    require(amount1 <= release, "Token for mint can't be more then allocated for each release");
    require((totalSupply() + totalBurned() + amount1) <= cap, "cap exceeded");
    super._mint(account1, amount1);
}</pre>
```

Addresses are not allowed to use mint function when pause is enabled

## Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Verified
Deployer cannot lock	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	X
Deployer cannot burn	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	×

#### Comments:

#### **v1.0**

- Addresses with BURNER\_ROLE can burn tokens
- Deployer with RISK\_MANAGER\_ROLE can
  - · Set address to blackListed and can lock user funds
  - Lock user funds when pause is enabled
  - · Can set pause/unpause
  - Add/remove blacklist addresses
- Addresses are not allowed to use burn function when pause is enabled
- Deployer with EXECUTOR\_ROLE can
  - Transfer discounted/locked tokens
  - · Withdraw token from smart contract to own address

## Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Verified
Deployer cannot pause	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	X

#### Comments:

#### **v1.0**

 See comments above in "Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds" section



## **Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)**

Tested	Verified
$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$

#### Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	$\checkmark$
Partly Verified	
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

## OnlyRole functions HTRAXToken

- MINTER\_ROLE
  - mint
- BURNER\_ROLE
  - burn
  - burnFrom
- · RISK\_MANAGER\_ROLE
  - snapshot
  - pause
  - unpause
  - addBlackList
  - removeBlackList
- EXECUTOR\_ROLE
  - transferDiscountedTokens
  - withdrawBalance


#### **HTRAXTokenSale**

- · PRESALES\_MANAGER\_ROLE
  - setSaleStartDate
  - setSaleEndDate
  - setLevel1Value
  - setLevel2Value
  - setLevel3Value

### **AdminRole functions**

- grantRole
- revokeRole

## **CallGraph**



## **Source Units in Scope**

## v1.0

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
<b>\$</b>	contracts/utils/Context.sol	1		27	27	10	13	1	
<b>E</b>	contracts/utils/Strings.sol	1		67	67	45	15	41	*
Q	contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sol		1	24	23	3	18	3	*
<b>%</b>	contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165.sol	1		28	28	7	18	6	
<b>\equiv </b>	contracts/utils/math/Math.sol	1		31	31	12	15	3	*
<b>\equiv </b>	contracts/utils/Arrays.sol	1		47	47	24	16	6	*
<b>\equiv </b>	contracts/utils/Counters.sol	1		38	38	21	13	2	*
<b>&gt;</b>	contracts/HTRAXToken.sol	1		185	181	96	59	139	<b>.≟.</b> ⊞
<b>%</b>	contracts/HTRAXTokenSale.sol	1		192	192	90	77	75	ATA
<b>%</b>	contracts/security/Pausable.sol	1		90	90	29	50	16	
<b>*</b>	contracts/access/Ownable.sol	1		56	56	23	26	18	
Q.	contracts/access/AccessControl.sol	1	1	243	231	102	146	65	*
<b>&gt;</b>	contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol	1		364	344	108	196	83	
Q	contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol		1	86	26	17	60	15	
<b>%</b>	contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Snapshot.sol	1		179	177	73	79	45	
Q	contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol		1	27	16	4	15	9	*
<b></b> ≥≥ <b></b> (%)	Totals	13	4	1684	1574	664	816	527	<b>♣≣</b> ※

## Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)

## **Audit Results**

## **AUDIT PASSED**

### **Critical issues**

- no critical issues found -

## **High issues**

- no high issues found -

## **Medium issues**

- no medium issues found -

#### Low issues

Issue	File	Туре	Line	Description
#1	Main	Contract doesn't import npm packages from source (like OpenZeppelin etc.)		We recommend to import all packages from npm directly without flatten the contract. Functions could be modified or can be susceptible to vulnerabilities

## Informational issues

Issue	File	Туре	Line	Description
#1	HTRAXT oken	State variables that could be declared constant (constable-states)	21, 20	Add the `constant` attributes to state variables that never change

## **Audit Comments**

#### 02. November 2021:

- · Addresses with MINTER\_ROLE can mint tokens
  - For more information read "Deployer cannot mint any new tokens" section on page 16
- · Addresses with BURNER\_ROLE can burn tokens
  - For more information read "Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds" section on page 17
- Addresses with RISK\_MANAGER\_ROLE can lock user funds
  - For more information read "Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds" section on page 17

## **SWC Attacks**

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>6</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>5</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>4</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>3</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>2</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>1</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-13</u> <u>0</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>9</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>8</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>7</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>5</u>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>4</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>3</u>	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>2</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>1</u>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-12</u> <u>0</u>	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>7</u>	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-111</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>9</u>	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>8</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>7</u>	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>6</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>5</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>4</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>3</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>2</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> 1	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-10</u> <u>0</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED



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