

## **Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC**

MADE IN GERMANY

v1.0: 19. January, 2022

# Audit

Security Assessment 22. January, 2022

For



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Version	Date	Description
1.0	18. January 2022	<ul><li>Layout project</li><li>Automated-/Manual-Security Testing</li><li>Summary</li></ul>
	19. January	Finished
1.1	22. January 2022	Reaudit

#### **Network**

Binance Smart Chain (BEP20)

#### Website

https://talkaboat.online/

## **Telegram**

https://t.me/talkaboat

#### **Twitter**

https://twitter.com/talkaboat

## **Description**

The Aboat ecosystem maps a metaverse in which content creators and the community are enabled to interact with each other in completely new ways. The focus is on online entertainment such as podcasts, - and video streaming, as well as gaming. The latter will be the bridge to the metaverse and will allow for a whole new sense of play and belonging.

## **Project Engagement**

During the 13th of January 2022, **Talkaboat Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.





## Contract Link v1.0

- Github
  - https://github.com/Talkaboat/smart-contracts/tree/master/ contracts
  - Commit: 3be279a37d6b5d208c33ac7ffad9fd48b9fafdf0

#### **v1.1**

- · Github
  - https://github.com/Talkaboat/smart-contracts/tree/master/ contracts
  - · Commit: d9237e51c9a99059c1182ee3b05f257a673616ad

## **Vulnerability & Risk Level**

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

## Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

## **Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)**

#### Imported packages:

Dependency / Import Path	Count
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol	7
@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol	3
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol	6
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	8
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol	3
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol	7
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol	7
@uniswap/v2-core/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Factory.sol	2
@uniswap/v2-core/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Pair.sol	5
@uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol	5

## **Tested Contract Files**

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

#### **v1.0**

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/interfaces/IMasterEntertainer.sol	b4f3986724c2810312b5b29ba06cd39ef63a35c0
contracts/interfaces/IMasterChefContractor.sol	fb6e67879121f0f3206fa5f3cd7cda220e86bebe
contracts/flip_interfaces/IPancakeSwapMasterChef.sol	7f39b30ef9256490350d72de95e03f60948d2e25
contracts/BaseFlipPool.sol	ab2bc497a2e75527fc34bcdba41a3db714b0f2b4
contracts/PreSale.sol	821164dcbd6eaa91b95850ee1ce4ff9bdd1f8f68
contracts/libraries/Liquify.sol	ee57cd546085f3badbfbd31868cf26b3908257b9
contracts/libraries/TransferHelper.sol	0f3f37a3a4fce3b7f9b75a37959bb4907030b7e5
contracts/libraries/TimeLock.sol	0620320a980162d15a4f9ff4aa257608a69dac3c
contracts/libraries/PriceTicker.sol	5bf869bf1de11d6f6ba7f44c4965bc3c6f173b56
contracts/MasterEntertainer.sol	2b9bd412392045245844e2b2d0880205558747e9
contracts/AboatToken.sol	973561b6770643e873e44ba8f9d78439b37527aa

## **Metrics**

## Source Lines v1.0



## **Capabilities**

## Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	4	1	3	3

## **Exposed Functions**

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Ve	rsion	Public	Payable
1.0		113	4

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	30	128	5	1	32


## **State Variables**

Version	Total Public	
1.0	78	71

## **Capabilities**


Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experim ental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembl Y	Has Destroya ble Contract s
1.0	^0.8.7		yes		

## Inheritance Graph



## **Call Graph**

#### **v1.0**



## **Scope of Work/Verify Claims**

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

#### We will verify the following claims:


- 1. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 2. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 3. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 5. External Approve function is restricted
- 6. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

### **Correct implementation of Token standard**


Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
TotalSupply	provides information about the total token supply	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
BalanceOf	provides account balance of the owner's account	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	$\checkmark$
Transfer	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
TransferFrom	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
Approve	allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
Allowance	returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	<b>√</b>	1	<b>√</b>

## Write functions of contract v1.0









## **Deployer cannot mint any new tokens**

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot mint	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	X
Max / Total Supply	600.000.000.000		000.000

#### Comments:

#### **v1.0**

- Deployer can mint new tokens
  - As long as total supply + minting amount is lower equal than maxDistributor
    - · maxDistributor can be set without any limitations
- MasterEntertainer can mint new tokens

```
if(canClaimRewards(coinReward + coinReward.div(10))) {
    coin.mint(devAddress, coinReward.div(10));
    coin.mint(address(this), coinReward);
}
```

## Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot lock	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	X
Deployer cannot burn	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	X

#### Comments:

#### **v1.0**

- OnlyMaintainerOrOwner can burn tokens
- OnlyMaintainerOrOwner can lock user funds by
  - · Blacklist address with blacklist function
  - Setting maxAccBalance to 0
  - Setting maxTxQuantity to 0

## **Deployer cannot pause the contract**

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot pause	-	_	-



## **External approve function is restricted**

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
External Approve cannot be called without restriction	-	-	_



## **Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)**



#### Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	$\checkmark$
Partly Verified	P
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

## **Modifiers and public functions**

#### Liquify

#### AboatToken

- setMasterEntertainer
- ⊗ onlyOwner
- setMaxDistribution
- onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- ❷ locked
- setMaxAccBalance
- ❷ onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- setMaxTransactionQuantity
- onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- setGasCost
- activateHighFee
- deactivateHighFee
- activateContract
- onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- blacklist
- whitelist
- 🖢 requestWhitelist 👸
- claimExceedingETH
- mint
- ⊗ onlyOwner
- burn
- checkPriceUpdate

- setLiquidityPair
- onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- ⊗ locked
- setDevWallet
- setDonationWallet
- onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- setRewardWallet
- setMinAmountToLiquify
- onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- excludeFromAll
- excludeTransferFeeAsSender
- excludeFromFeesAsReciever
- ❷ onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- includeForAll
- includeTransferFeeAsSender
- includeForFeesAsReciever
- onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- updateMinimumTransferTaxRate
- ⊗ locked
- updateMaximumTransferTaxRate

- updateTax
- onlyMaintainerOrOwner
- ❷ locked
- updateRouter

- swapAndLiquify
- ⊗ taxFree

#### MasterEntertainer

- setDevAddress

- massUpdatePools
- setPoolVariables
- ❷ locked
- updateEmissionRate
- ⊗ locked
- 🗣 setMaxEmissionIncrease
- ⊗ onlyOwner
- whitelist
- 🌲 add
- ⊗ onlyOwner
- updatePool
- depositForUser
- deposit
- withdraw
- ⊗ nonReentrant
- diaim 🝦 claim
- withdrawWithoutRewards
- updatePrice
- checkPriceUpdate

#### BaseFlipPool

- setRewardSystem
- setRouter
- ⊗ onlyOwner
- setMasterEntertainer
- ⊗ onlyOwner
- setMinAmountToSwap
- ❷ onlyOwner
- deposit
- onlyMasterEntertainer
- withdraw
- emergencyWithdraw

#### TimeLock

- setMaintainer
- ⊗ locked
- setTimelockEnabled
  - OnlyMaintainerOrOwner
- unlockFunction
- lockFunction
- ❷ onlyMaintainerOrOwner

#### Ownable

checkPriceUpdate

PriceTicker

setCoin


locked

⊗ onlyOwner

getTokenPrice

- renounceOwnership
- ⊗ onlyOwner
- transferOwnership
- ⊗ onlyOwner

#### Presale



#### **Comments**

- Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations
  - AboatToken
    - maxAccBalance
    - maxTxQuantity
    - gasCost
  - Liquify
    - \_minAmountToLiquify
  - MasterEntertainer
    - maxEmissionIncrease
  - BaseFlipPool
    - minAmountToSwap
  - Presale
    - afterDays
- Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
  - AboatToken
    - isHighFeeActive
    - blacklisted
  - Liquify
    - \_excludedFromFeesAsSender
    - \_excludedFromFeesAsReciever
  - MasterEntertainer
    - whitelisted
  - TimeLock
    - isLockEnabled
  - Presale
    - whitelisted
- depositUser can only be called from whitelisted addresses in MasterEntertainer
- Everybody can call updatePrice function in MasterEntertainer

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

#### **External Calls from functions**

#### AboatToken

- getBalanceOf
- --- \_masterEntertainer.getBalanceOf (IMasterEntertainer)
- getLiquidityTokenAddress
  - → pair.token0 (IUniswapV2Pair)
- pair.token1 (IUniswapV2Pair)
- liquidityTokenBalance
- → IERC20.balanceOf (IERC20)
- checkPriceUpdate
- --- \_masterEntertainer.updatePrice (IMasterEntertainer)

#### PriceTicker

- setCoin
- --- coin.liquidityPair (AboatToken)
- getCoinAmount
- → pair.token0 (IUniswapV2Pair)
- → pair.token1 (IUniswapV2Pair)
- --> pair.getReserves (IUniswapV2Pair)
- → pair.totalSupply (IUniswapV2Pair)
- getTokenPrice
- → coin.liquidityPair (AboatToken)
- --- pair.getReserves (IUniswapV2Pair)
- → pair.token0 (IUniswapV2Pair)
- → pair.token1 (IUniswapV2Pair)
- → pair.token1 (IUniswapV2Pair)
- --- pair.token0 (IUniswapV2Pair)
- → tokenB.decimals (ERC20)

#### MasterEntertainer

- canClaimRewards
- --- coin.canMintNewCoins (AboatToken)
- updatePool
- → coin.mint (AboatToken)
- → coin.mint (AboatToken)
- safeCoinTransfer
- --- coin.balanceOf (AboatToken)
- → IERC20.safeTransfer (IERC20)
- → IERC20.safeTransfer (IERC20)
- checkPriceUpdate
- → coin.liquidityPair (AboatToken)

#### BaseFlipPool

getLiquidity --- masterChef.userInfo (IPancakeSwapMasterChef) \_deposit → stakeToken.safeTransferFrom (IERC20) → stakeToken.approve (IERC20) --- masterChef.deposit (IPancakeSwapMasterChef) withdraw masterChef.withdraw (IPancakeSwapMasterChef) → stakeToken.safeTransfer (IERC20) emergencyWithdraw masterChef.withdrawWithoutRewards (IPancakeSwapMasterChef) → stakeToken.balanceOf (IERC20) 🖢 enterStake ---> masterChef.deposit (IPancakeSwapMasterChef) leaveStake --- masterChef.withdraw (IPancakeSwapMasterChef) swapToken → rewardToken.balanceOf (IERC20) swapTokensForEth ··· router.WETH (IUniswapV2Router02) → token.approve (IERC20) → router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens (IUniswapV2Router02) swapEthForTokens → router.WETH (IUniswapV2Router02) .swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens () safeTokenTransfer → token.balanceOf (IERC20) → token.transfer (IERC20) → token.transfer (IERC20)

#### Presale

claimAndEndSale

paymentToken.balanceOf (IERC20)

rewardToken.balanceOf (IERC20)

updateRewardToken

paymentToken.balanceOf (IERC20)

rewardToken.balanceOf (IERC20)

getRemainingBalance

rewardToken.balanceOf (IERC20)

buy 


buy 

paymentToken.safeTransferFrom (IERC20)

#### Liquify

setLiquidityPair IUniswapV2Factory.getPair (IUniswapV2Factory) --> \_router.factory (IUniswapV2Router02) --> IUniswapV2Factory.createPair (IUniswapV2Factory) --> \_router.factory (IUniswapV2Router02) updateRouter --- \_router.WETH (IUniswapV2Router02) swapAndLiquify --- pair.token0 (IUniswapV2Pair) --- pair.token1 (IUniswapV2Pair) → \_router.WETH (IUniswapV2Router02) --- \_router.WETH (IUniswapV2Router02) swapAndLiquifyTokens → tokenBContract.balanceOf (IERC20) → tokenBContract.balanceOf (IERC20) swapEthForTokens → \_router.WETH (IUniswapV2Router02) --- .swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens () swapTokensForEth → \_router.WETH (IUniswapV2Router02) --- \_router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens (IUniswapV2Router02) addLiquidity → IERC20.approve (IERC20) --- \_router.addLiquidity (IUniswapV2Router02) addLiquidityETH ·- .addLiquidityETH ()

#### TransferHelper



## **Source Units in Scope**

## v1.0

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
Q	contracts/interfaces/IMasterEntertainer.sol		1	8	5	3	1	7	
Q	contracts/interfaces/IMasterChefContractor.sol		1	12	6	4		13	
Q	contracts/flip_interfaces/IPancakeSwapMasterChef.sol		1	12	4	3		17	
2	contracts/BaseFlipPool.sol	1		213	213	157	27	130	. <u>Š</u> .
9	contracts/PreSale.sol	1		204	204	161	42	169	. <u>Š</u> .
<b>%</b>	contracts/libraries/Liquify.sol	1		300	300	220	41	210	
<b>E</b>	contracts/libraries/TransferHelper.sol	1		57	44	34	5	26	
<b>%</b>	contracts/libraries/TimeLock.sol	1		84	84	48	23	31	
<b>%</b>	contracts/libraries/PriceTicker.sol	1		135	135	102	17	80	
2	contracts/MasterEntertainer.sol	1		424	423	359	24	303	
9	contracts/AboatToken.sol	1		275	275	207	30	213	. <u>Š</u>
<b>≥</b> €	Totals	8	3	1724	1693	1298	210	1199	. <u>Š</u> .

## Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)

## **Audit Results**

## **AUDIT PASSED**

#### **Critical issues**

#### No critical issues

## **High issues**

## No high issues

## **Medium issues**

#### No medium issues

#### Low issues

Issue	File	Туре	Line	Description
#1	Presale	Missing Events Arithmetic	102	Emit an event for critical parameter changes
#2	Presale	Out of gas	108, 114	Loop is used without any limitation. If there is no limitation and a long list of addresses, the function will be aborted

## Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	AboatTo ken	State variables that could be declared constant (constable-states)	40	Add the `constant` attributes to state variables that never change

#2	Liquify	Misspelling issues	See lines in description	Change following variables  - Liqudity to liquidity line: 193  Make sure to change variables, functions etc. everywhere else if you want to change them
#3	MasterE ntertain er	Wrong visibility order	159, 237, 333	Visbility modifier "external/ public" should come before other modifiers
				For Example: From
				function getBalanceOf(address _user, uint256 _vesting) override external view returns (uint256) {
				То
				function getBalanceOf(address _user, uint256 _vesting) external view override returns (uint256) {
				Have a look at the position of override

#### **Audit Comments**

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <a href="https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html">https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html</a>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

### 19. January 2022:

· Read whole report for more information

#### 22. January 2022:

· Several bugs were fixed

## **SWC Attacks**

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI)  Misrepresentation of Critical  Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>25</u>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>24</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>23</u>	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
SW C-1 21	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SW C-1 20	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>7</u>	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>03</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>02</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED



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