From Holocaust Trauma to the Dirty War

Federico Finchelstein

Professor of History, New School for Social Research, New York City

Abstract • Violence defines the global experience of fascism as an ideology, movement, and regime, as well as its subsequent reception after 1945. This article is part of this a transnational trend in the study of fascism examining such violence, but it also proposes to expand it by way of studying its transatlantic repercussions in the postwar period, especially in terms of what I call a "transcontextual history" of trauma and especially for the case of the so-called Argentine Dirty War. I argue there is a need for understanding these transnational dimensions of fascist violence for victims and perpetrators in light of an equally significant transcontextual emphasis on the traumatic fascist genealogies of the Cold War.

Keywords • antisemitism, Argentina, Cold War, Dirty War, fascism, Holocaust, Nazism, political violence

The legacy of fascist violence is central to the ideological origins of political violence and victimization in Argentina. Fascist violence was a key factor in the ideology that ruled the Argentine network of concentration camps and the Dirty War in the 1970s. The military juntas systematically kidnapped, tortured, and killed between ten thousand and thirty thousand Argentine citizens, as well as people of other European and Latin American nationalities. These killings were not random but were instead carefully planned at the upper levels of the military government. Moreover, in many cases the Argentine military cooperated with other Latin American dictatorships in a transnational plot for kidnapping and murder called Plan Condor. Plan Condor operated throughout the Southern Cone, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The words "*desaparecer*" and "*desaparecidos*" (to disappear and the disappeared) became euphemisms for state-sanctioned assassinations of actual and imagined enemies of the dictatorship. In most cases, the victims were confined in concentration camps, tortured, executed, and thrown into the Atlantic Ocean from military airplanes. The genealogy of these practices is rooted in the transcontextual legacy of fascism.

The camps were the sites of one of the most radical realizations of fascism, racism, and political violence during the Cold War period in Latin America and beyond, but they also transcended their own context, establishing links with previous genocidal experiences of camps and political repression—

especially the Holocaust and the Italian and Spanish fascist campaigns of violence and repression. In the camps neofascism took the form of a fascist spectacle of traumatic reenactment by victims for the benefit of perpetrators. Fascist ideology was thus made tangible for perpetrators through a ritualized practice of torture and extermination that was rooted in the transcontextual memory of fascist violence. Argentine perpetrators constantly reminded their victims that torturing and killing them continued the global war of fascism.

The members of the military junta created an extreme ideological laboratory, one clearly inspired by the legacy of fascist violence. Most notably, this situation engendered the acting out of transgenerational trauma by leftist and, especially, Jewish victims. Proportionally, the last military dictatorship punished Argentine Jews more than other sectors of the population. Jews represented less than 1 percent of the population but between 10 percent and 15 percent of the victims of the military dictatorship.[1]

The legacy of fascism was a source of inspiration for the perpetrators. Delia María Barreda y Ferrando remembers, "One of the military personnel who called himself the Great Fuhrer made the prisoners shout Heil Hitler! and at night they could frequently hear recordings of his speeches."[2] In addition, the perpetrators painted the faces of Jewish prisoners with "Hitler moustaches." Prisoners also had swastikas sprayed on their backs in order to be identified as and punished for being Jewish. In several camps Jewish prisoners had to kneel when facing portraits of Hitler and Mussolini. They also were obliged to insult themselves as Jews. In other camps, they were ordered to say, "I love Hitler."[3]

In this context, transcontextual memories of violence, remembered and performed by Argentine perpetrators, explicitly elicited the repetition of trauma for the victims: the traumatic memories of the Holocaust were vehicles for the enactment of a new violent present. This return of a formerly repressed and now renewed fascist ideology in Argentina was not so much the result of a mechanical ideological transfer or the adoption of a putative Fascist/Nazi protocol but the outcome of a fascist politics of memory across generations of perpetrators, acting it out on both sides of the Atlantic. And against some Eurocentric and North American stereotypes currently prevalent in Cold War studies, the *desapariciones* were not the result of American or French Cold War theories of repression, but the result of Argentine decisions, ideologies, and practices. To be sure, all these influences were important for the Argentine perpetrators but as most sources indicate, the trauma of the Argentine concentration camps was related to the longstanding tradition of Argentine fascism as it has been appropriated in Argentina.

This violence was the transcontextual outcome of national and transnational histories of fascist theory and practice. It belongs to a long history of interactions across the Atlantic. Fascist violence had similar functions both in the Holocaust and in Argentina. With its long history of fascist reformulations, Argentina presented a unique and fruitful ground for the acting out of

traumatic memories for the perpetrators. If for them the enactment of fascist violence was a regenerative source of ideological renewal, for the victims it was simply kidnappings, torture, disappearances, and death.[4] But what is fascist violence? And why has it been it so central to fascism?

Violence in Fascist Ideology

Violence is a defining element of fascism. Most notably, fascist violence involves violations of political and social rights and also genocidal forms of repression and civil war. As I have argued elsewhere, fascist violence is not only instrumental. Fascist totalitarianism, unlike Soviet Russia, does not spread fear, violence, and death with the sole objective of silencing real and imagined dissent. Unrestricted, bare violence is a defining aspect of both fascist practice and fascist theory.[5] Violence defines power and it is presented in fascist ideology as the best expression of inner authenticity. It is also regarded as an organic source of knowledge. This structural violence was a defining element of transnational fascism. It found its best expression in the messianic nature of the war ideal and the literal fascism of the concentration camps.[6] Most historians of fascism agree on this centrality of violence.

In the first major works in the historiography of fascism, violence, like fascism at large, was considered in exclusively national terms. Every country where fascism emerged had a *Sonderweg* of sorts.[7] Thus, for historians like Renzo De Felice or Karl Bracher, Nazism and fascism were utterly different insofar as they displayed distinctive forms of violence. In their view, fascism had nothing to do with Nazi genocidal practices. Other historians looking at the past from the perspective of the later twentieth century have formed conclusions that differ from these earlier works.[8] For historians like George Mosse or Zeev Sternhell, violence was an outcome of fascist intellectual pursuits and/or cultural notions and practices.[9] For historians interested in taxonomies, violence was an inherent feature of fascism and played a key role in their classifying of different forms of totalitarianism. National distinctions and considerations were often left behind.[10] More recent studies often integrate the two different trends from the earlier histories of fascism and Nazism and the later reassessments of those studies. These new studies emphasize the transnational and comparative dimensions of fascist violence, highlighting how fascist violence eventually transcended national borders through imperialistic invasion, international collaboration, or, more symbolically, through emulation and/or reformulation in different contexts.[11] Violence defines the global experience of fascism as an ideology, movement, and regime as well as its subsequent reception after 1945.

I count myself as part of this new transnational trend in the study of fascism, but in this article I propose to illustrate it by way of studying its transatlantic repercussions in the postwar period, especially in terms of what I call

a "transcontextual history" of trauma. I maintain there is a need for understanding these transnational dimensions of fascist violence for victims and perpetrators in light of an equally significant transcontextual emphasis on the traumatic fascist genealogies of the Cold War. In short, I argue that the study of the legacies of fascist violence also allow us to better grasp fascism's historical global implications as well as its effects after 1945. In this sense, I want to overcome the opposition between anti-theoretical approaches to fascism and the ones that are focused on the quasi-transcendental dimensions of fascist phenomena. The emphasis on fascist violence on a comparative and cross-national scale presents a way to overcome this dichotomy.

The approach that I introduce emphasizes the need to combine the transnational—understood as a series of synchronic encounters, transfers, and reformulations around the globe that changed over time—and the transcontextual, which in this case implies the study of the ideological, political, and practical effects of the traumatic legacies of fascist violence in the different contexts that emerged after 1945. My main point is that fascism's emphasis on political violence, repression, and genocide has remained the most significant dimension of its memory for both perpetrators and victims after 1945. This traumatic memory of violence has engendered both neofascist movements and postfascist forms of populism.

First, I touch briefly on the current state of fascism studies and the new emphasis on transnational fascist violence through radical repression, empire, and war. Then I briefly analyze the Argentine case of the legacy of fascism and the Holocaust. Fascism played a significant role in the Argentine twentieth century. It was a central element in the most influential form of Latin American populism (Peronism) and it was the intellectual source of the concentration camps and extermination practices of the Argentine Dirty War in the 1970s. In addition, Argentina, as an actual haven for famous Nazis and other fascists on the run, was seen by proponents of global fascism as a potential site for its resurrection. Very different transcontextual memories of the traumatic violence unleashed in the Holocaust, and by fascism in general, functioned as a sort of foundational trauma for both perpetrators and victims of the Argentine Dirty War.

Fascism and Violence in Recent Historiography

The historiography of fascism differs on the issue of the relationship between the theory and practice of violence in both its national and transnational implications. For example many historians of fascism share the view that fascism is a phantasmatic inassimilable object of study that, while it cannot be fully assimilated, paradoxically, is easy to define with a few words: modernity, national regeneration, extermination. These works generally present fascism as prompting the elimination of a fully articulated and uncomplicated democratic self. In this view, fascism is a radical "other" in the history

and theory of politics. To be sure, there are significant elements of truth in this view of fascism, but its rendering as totally unconnected to other normative versions of the political occludes the highly problematic relations between fascist and liberal practices of violence. Explaining the notion of fascism as belonging to a different planet enacts an uncritical liberal nostalgia, full of utopian transcendental implications. Needless to say, the fascists themselves equally embedded their movement and ideology in the world of the mythical and the transcendental. This convergence, however, which led to violent enactments of the mythical, is precisely one of the problems that many historians neglect to engage.

For these historians, fascism becomes the object of projection: it is often what they want it to be. Fascism is thus ossified, expunged of any contradicting elements that would move it further away from generic definitions. In short, fascism is researched as an illustration of theory. Nevertheless, most historians of fascism, including Roger Griffin or Roger Eatwell, consider violence to be a practical outcome of fascist ideas of national regeneration and modernity.[12] For many historians of transnational fascism, however, their subject of study is not a homogenous absence, an object fully distant and highly differentiated from our present, but one of fragmented realities involving national and transnational histories of ideology, repression, and extreme victimization.

If traditional historians of fascism generally fail to see the deep connections between fascism, empire, war, and genocide, historians of genocide and the Holocaust often downplay the connections between Nazism and other genocidal regimes and transnational fascism. More recently, however, historians of fascism have analyzed the affinities between fascism and imperial and genocidal violence.[13] In this context, the Holocaust presents itself as the most extreme example of fascist practice. This view was shared outside and inside the concentration camps. In Germany, Italy, Argentina, and many other places, intellectuals like Primo Levi, Chaim Kaplan, Hannah Arendt, Jean Amery, and Jorge Luis Borges saw Nazi genocidal practices as an expression of its constitutive ideological dimensions. German and Italian fascists saw war and extreme violence as fundamental to fascist ideology, and they ascribed to it a value of metahistorical proportions, as evidenced by Himmler's famous speech at Posen or Mussolini's idea of the foundational messianic nature of World War II.

Despite the prevalence of sources, transnational approaches that integrate fascism with the Holocaust experience are not easily found in Holocaust and fascist historiography. As I have suggested elsewhere, Eurocentrism plays an important role in pleas for uniqueness in Holocaust historiography. Whereas Africans and Arabs experienced an equally unique brand of Italian fascist racism in the form of mustard gas and other chemical weapon attacks, summary executions, and the killing of civilians, the Nazis executed one of the most extreme events in history. In short, it was a radical departure, a turning point in history. But empire, fascism, and racism link the Holocaust

with the world outside Europe. If Nazi violence reached an extreme and even transcended key dimensions of the constellation of fascist ideologies, other fascisms executed gruesome genocidal and political massacres of their own and did so on a global scale, from Romania to Spain, and from North Africa to Ethiopia. These should not be downplayed in light of the unique nature of the Nazi brand of fascism. Even in the case of the Holocaust, the Nazis relied on the transnational collaboration of their fascist brethren in concentration camps, killing sites, and deportation centers. Nazism is not a generic "ideal type" of fascism but its most radical possibility.[14]

Violence was not only central to the theory and self-understanding of global fascism. It was also a defining element of fascism's legacy. In sum, fascist ideologues and perpetrators, a variety of bystanders, and, most certainly, its victims shared this appreciation of violence as a central element of fascism. Radical connections between these fascist theories of violence essentially shaped its transnational practice, from the Holocaust to the Spanish Civil War and beyond. These shared experiences and understandings of fascism were projected as a legacy for subsequent generations of witnesses, fascists, and their victims.

Transcontextual Connections

These notes on fascist violence are situated at the crossroads of my interest in transnational fascism before 1945 and the idiosyncratic practices of neofascism, postfascism, and populism in the Cold War. In my work, I first analyzed how fascism had universal and transatlantic implications and then explored how it changed over time and over the Atlantic, affecting a new generation of perpetrators and victims.[15]

If the new bibliography on fascism and its genocidal dimensions (especially the Holocaust but also empires) are rightly emphasizing its colonial genocidal connections, I propose to expand this view to include the postcolonial Cold War experience of fascism, when violence of the fascist kind was at the center of all these experiences, and especially so in Latin America.

Despite the emergence of new pathbreaking studies of transnational fascism in Europe both before and after 1945, more work is needed to document its effects in the rest of the world. It is especially important in this context to mention Andrea Mammone's research on the connections between neofascists in Italy and France and Federica Bertagna's work on the emigration of Italian fascists to Switzerland and Argentina.[16] More transnational studies are needed, however, regarding the Cold War history of fascist ideology and practice. In particular, analysis is needed of the actual connections and reconfigurations of fascism and the Cold War, and especially on the study of the reception of, and connections between, the experience of fascism, populism, and extreme genocidal military dictatorship. These connections and legacies define the history of the Cold War in many contexts

outside Europe and the United States. I would argue that Argentina, as a case study of transatlantic fascism, actually illuminates all these issues.

Violence, or more precisely the memories and experiences of global fascist violence, seemed to be the connector for fascists worldwide during the Cold War, and Argentina played a special role in transnational fascism, and for a variety of reasons. After 1945, most anti-fascists saw Argentina as one of the two remaining countries (Franco's Spain was the other one) where fascism still ruled. But if Spain was a fascist regime that had been established after a military coup d'état and civil war, Argentina was by 1946 a democracy that succeeded a military coup and a junta dictatorship. This was the context of Peronism. But Perón saw fascist violence, and the traumatic memories that it unleashed, in a refractory way. He regarded this violence as a main legacy of fascism and for this reason he thought that it could not be applied in the postwar era. Fascism could not work in the new context; it was a remnant of the past that needed to be reformulated. Peronism could be successful only as postfascism, and only if it left extreme violence and dictatorship behind. The transcontextual legacy of fascist violence acted as a dialectical force in its interaction with Peronism, defining it as a sui generis experiment in what fascism could actually become after its global defeat. The neofascist movements that followed Juan Perón's deposition in 1955 would exceed classic Peronism in their use of executions and anti-democratic proscriptions.

After the anti-Peronist coup of 1955 and the demise of classic Peronism, the paramilitary Peronist neofascist organizations (Tacuara but especially the Triple A) and the military junta's dictatorship of the 1970s unmade the central distinctions between European fascism and the experience of Peronism. Violence regained its primary role as the main ideological source for the understanding of politics. After 1955, the Argentine extreme right returned to violence, going from postfascism to neofascism. Paradoxically, Argentina presented a primary case for the return of the repressed memories of fascist violence. In the concentration camps of the last dictatorship, fascist ideology was literally imposed on the bodies of its victims. Thus, after 1955, the country became more connected to classic fascism than Peronism itself had been.

Neofascism and the Dirty War

In Argentina, a central dimension of the perpetrators' attempt to re-inscribe the ideological identity of its victims was the idea that the victims had to renounce their subject position and embrace that of the perpetrators. The Nazi idea that victims could exist only as an example of the temporal will of the perpetrators thus became a central aspect of the Argentine dictatorship.

Argentine Jewish victims especially were confronted with the legacy of anti-Semitic violence. Erasing the identity of the victims—presenting them only as symbols of their famous German and Italian transcontextual oppres-

sors (Hitler and Mussolini)—became a source of ideological satisfaction for Argentine emulators. This carnivalistic act represented the callous humor prevalent in the Argentine concentration camps. The "joke," of course, was funny only to perpetrators, as it presented the bodies of Jewish victims as physical manifestations of the ideological wish to exterminate them. Inscribing Jewish self-hatred onto the bodies of the victims became an example of their fantasy of the total submission of the victim. Exemplifying these ideological practices are the atrocities of Julian the Turk (pseudonym of police sergeant Julio Simón): every time he killed a Jewish victim, he argued with supposed irony that he was working for AMIA (The Argentine Jewish Mutual Association that cares for Jewish cemeteries).[17]

Jacobo Timerman points out that other neofascist "jokes" made reference to the Nazi gas chambers as the place to which the Jewish victims were being sent. The Argentine perpetrators established a transcontextual dialogue of sorts, telling their Jewish victims that, "We'll show the Nazis how to do things" (*Les mostraremos a los nazis cómo se hacen las cosas*).[18]

The few surviving Jewish prisoners also stressed the link between the Holocaust, fascist ideology, and the Argentine genocidal campaign. To be sure this is not an original view: survivors from other genocides also refer to the Holocaust—it is for them a frame of reference. Rather than emphasizing structural issues, however, such as historical similarities between the two regimes and their campaigns of extermination, Argentine survivors stressed the most original continuity between the Holocaust, classic fascism, and the Argentine massacre—the experiential dimension. In Argentina, the perpetrators explicitly made reference to the Holocaust and fascism as both an aim and as an ideological model that should be constantly emulated, even surpassed.

As Alicia Portnoy remembers, while she was being tortured, the military perpetrators threatened her "with converting me into soap (for I was Jewish)."[19] In similar terms, the Argentine Jewish citizen Pedro Krepplak (born in Poland in 1924) recalls: "When they were putting pressure on me they would call me 'damned Jew', swine, and they would also say 'we are taking you to the gas chambers'." Krepplak continues, "they [said they] were going to take me to [an] unknown place and they were going to make soap out of me, in the same way it was done to my brethren in Germany."[20] Nora Strejlejvich was also told the same: "They threatened me for having uttered Jewish words in the street (my surname) and for being a piece of shit Jew, whom they would make soap out of me."[21] The objectifying metaphors about soap and gas chambers were used on a majority of Jewish prisoners. Timerman was also told that he was going to be sent to the gas chambers.

It is not a surprise that many Jewish victims of Argentine fascism related their own experience to that of the Holocaust.[22] The references to the Holocaust (by victims and perpetrators both) were exemplary of what could be defined as the transgenerational presence of trauma. The perpetrators exacerbated this trauma insofar as they subjected the victims to a forced

reenactment of the suffering and losses of their forefathers. At the same time, perpetrators repeated the "actions" of their ideological siblings. Their ideological will to present themselves as "continuing" the Holocaust, and more generally transcontextual fascist violence, presents a unique type of transcontextual fascist constellation where trauma and ideology complement each other while achieving a state of fractured reality, even a kind of temporal schizophrenia, in their victims. The victims could not tell whether they were in the concentration camps of the Nazis or Argentines. They could not tell the difference between past and present.

Here lies one of the most singular aspects of the Argentine camps, namely that perpetrators wanted them to produce the ultimate form of fascist violence in the post-Holocaust world. Although several genocides have repeated certain elements of the Holocaust, only in Argentina did perpetrators present their actions of abduction and extermination as an active performance of remembrance and reenactment of the Holocaust. The extreme fascist violence as remembered by the perpetrators also found in Argentine Jews useful subjects with which to "reproduce" Auschwitz. Although an impossible goal, it nevertheless led perpetrators to historical hyperbole and messianic neofascist notions of redemption through violence and torture. It was their (positive) memory of Auschwitz that led them to justify killing Argentine Jews. Timerman was told by one of his captors: "Hitler lost the war. We will win."[23]

In the Argentine concentration camps, the Auschwitz universe was presented as the consecration of a patriotic fascist ideal. If under the Nazis, Jews' alleged actions against the Aryan race meant that they had to cease to exist, in Argentina the killings were justified by the brand of Argentine fascism, which combined the Nazi type of anti-Semitism with a more traditional form of religious anti-Semitism.[24] This combination was not so much the result of a specific theory of the enemy.[25] It was, above all a transnational ideological experience reformulated in light of Argentine political traditions. Argentine perpetrators instead performed their ideology through the physical reality of the camps.

To conclude, it was in the Argentine concentration camps of the 1970s where the ideological phenomenon of transnational fascism was finally objectified. In the camps, the Argentine fascist "Christianized" ideology created in the 1920s and 1930s was once more integrated into other European strains of fascism, and fascism became a matter of everyday life for both prisoners and perpetrators. In the camps, the long Argentine century of political violence and dictatorship finally created a reality that was entirely ideological. Here the acts of emulation of past traumas produced entirely new traumas. History and these fascist memories were conflated, producing new forms of fascist violence. If the Argentine fascists had promised to exterminate their enemies in the 1930s and 1940s, the last Argentine military dictatorship delivered death with an ideological impetus that stemmed from the national and transnational legacies of fascist violence. The Argentine

perpetrators presented to their victims a new staging of past traumas. They performed them as a repetition of Holocaust trauma. This transcontextual form of violence tried to eliminate distinctions between subjects and objects, obliterating key differences between ideology and lived experience. This was an artificial reality created by the fascist theory of violence as the perpetrators reinterpreted it at the time of the Cold War. Although this "repetition" of trauma was experienced as such by many of its victims, especially for the Argentine Jewish victims, historically, there was no actual repetition at all. The killers' transcontextual representations of trauma conflated the past with the present creating new gruesome realities.

Notes

1. Comisión de Solidaridad con Familiares de Presos y Desaparecidos en la Argentina (COSOFAM), *La violación de los derechos humanos de argentinos judíos bajo el régimen militar (1976–1983)* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Milá, 2006), 79–80, 93–135. The COSOFAM report provides a detailed enumeration of the Jewish victims including 1,117 disappeared (12.47 percent), 15 dead (15.62 percent), 116 liberated (12.96 percent), and 48 with unclear status (10.10 percent). The total number of Jewish victims in the *Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas* (CONADEP) Truth Commission Report is 1,296 (12.43%); CONADEP, *Nunca Más* (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1984).
2. CONADEP, *Nunca Más*, 71.
3. COSOFAM, 53.
4. I have extensively explored this theme in my book *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
5. On the role of bare violence in fascism see Enzo Traverso, *The Origins of Nazi Violence* (New York: The New Press, 2003). See also Angelo Ventrone, *La seduzione totalitaria: Guerra, modernità, violenza politica (1914–1918)* (Rome: Donzelli, 2003); Francisco Sevillano Calero, *Exterminar. El terror con Franco* (Madrid: Oberon, 2004); Philippe Burrin, *Nazi Antisemitism* (New York: New Press, 2005); Giulia Albanese, "Political Violence and Political Crisis in Interwar Europe," in *Rethinking the Nature of Fascism: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Antonio Costa Pinto *(New York: Palgrave, 2011), 186–196.*
6. See Federico Finchelstein, "On Fascist Ideology," *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory* 15, no. 3 (2008): 320–331.
7. For the critique of the *Sonderweg* thesis, see David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). More recently, the *Sonderweg* thesis has resurfaced via the link with specific forms of imperial genocide. These discussions generally avoid the issue of comparative fascist violence. See for example Joël Kotek, "Sonderweg: Le génocide des Herero, symptôme d'un Sonderweg allemand?" *La Revue d'histoire de la Shoah* 189 (2008): 177–197.
8. Renzo De Felice, *El Fascismo. Sus interpretaciones* (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1976), 341. On De Felice and comparative fascism, see my article "Rileggendo il canone: Renzo de Felice fra storia e teoria," *I Viaggi di Erodoto. Trimestrale di Cultura Storica* 43, no. 44 (2001): 52–67.

9. See for example Zeev Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology" in *Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography,* ed. Walter Laqueur (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 315–376; George Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1998). On Mosse and Sternhell, see Enzo Traverso, "Interpreting Fascism: Mosse, Sternhell and Gentile in Comparative Perspective," *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory* 15, no. 3 (2008): 303–319.
10. The main features of this generic historiography are represented by its self-canonizing dimensions, its emphasis on consensus over historiographical exchanges, its self-referential claim to be foundational, and its desire to reach a sense of closure in the study of fascism. See for example, Roger Griffin, "The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus within Fascist Studies," *Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 1 (2002): 21–43; Stanley G. Payne, "Historical Fascism and the Radical Right," *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 1 (2000): 111; Roger Griffin, ed., *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1998); Roger Eatwell, "Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4, no. 2 (1992): 161–194; Aristotle Kallis, "Studying Inter-War Fascism in Epochal and Diachronic Terms: Ideological Production, Political Experience and the Quest for 'Consensus,'" *European History Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (2004): 9–42.
11. See among others, Sandra McGee Deutsch, *Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile 1890–1939* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Enzo Collotti, *Fascismo, fascismi* (Florence: Sansoni, 1997); João Fábio Bertonha, *Fascismo, nazismo, integralismo* (São Paulo: Ática, 2000); Hélgio Trindade, *O Nazi-fascismo na América Latina: mito e realidade* (Porto Alegre: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2004); Dylan Riley, *The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe: Italy, Spain, and Romania 1870–1945* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2010); Giulia Albanese, "Comparare i fascismi. Una riflessione storiografica," *Storica* nos. 43–45 (2009): 313–343.
12. Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: Routledge, 1991); Griffin, *A Fascist Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). See also Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism 1914–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995); Robert Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004); Roger Eatwell, "Ideology, Propaganda, Violence and the Rise of Fascism," in *Rethinking the Nature of Fascism, ed. Antonio Costa Pinto* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Aristotle Kallis, *Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expansion in Italy and Germany (1919–1945)* (London: Routledge, 2000), 165–185.
13. For example see among others, Traverso, *Origins of Nazi Violence;* Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, eds., *Italian Colonialism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005); Dylan Riley, "The Enigmas of Fascism," *New Left Review* 30 (2003): 146; Davide Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire: Italian Occupation during the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Roberta Pergher, "Impero immaginario, impero vissuto. Recenti sviluppi nella storiografia del colonialismo italiano," *Ricerche di Storia Politica* 10, no. 1 (2007): 53–66.
14. Federico Finchelstein, "Fascism and the Holocaust," in *The Holocaust and Historical Methodology,* ed. Dan Stone (New York: Berghahn, 2012), 255–271. For a converging critique of the Eurocentric tendencies in Fascist studies see also

Rikki Kersten, "Japan," in *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism,* ed. R. J. B. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 526–544.

15. See Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919–1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), and *Ideological Origins of the Dirty War.*
16. See Andrea Mammone, "Revitalizing and De-Territorializing Fascism in the 1950s: The Extreme Right in France and Italy, and the Pan-National ('European') Imaginary," *Patterns of Prejudice* 45, no. 4 (2011): 295–318; Federica Bertagna, *La inmigración fascista en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Ediciones, 2007).
17. CONADEP, *Nunca Más,* 74; Diego Martínez, "El turco primero," *Página 12,* 30 July 2006.
18. Jacobo Timerman, *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number,* trans. Tony Talbot (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 159.
19. COSOFAM, 53, 164.
20. COSOFAM, 53, 154, 155.
21. CONADEP, *Nunca Más* 72.
22. On trauma in history see Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), and Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, *The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
23. Timerman, *Prisoner without a Name,* 50.
24. Finchelstein, *Ideological Origins of the Dirty War,* 52–64.
25. On the enemy in fascism, see Enzo Traverso, *À feu et à sang. De la guerre civile européenne (1914–1915)* (Paris: Stock, 2007); and Angelo Ventrone, *Il Nemico Interno. Immagini, parole e simboli della lotta politica nell'Italia del Novecento* (Rome: Donzelli Editore, 2005).