"Subaltern Nationalism" and the West Berlin Anti-Authoritarians

Jennifer Ruth Hosek
German, Queen's University

Left-leaning activism of the 1960s has sometimes been understood as part of a global network, especially when governments took such activity seriously.[1] Of late, more 1960s scholarship is going transnational–researchers are attending both to international relations and to cultural and interpersonal connections across national borders.[2] Such new scholarship can better account for the complexity of this phenomenon than that which considers events solely within national frameworks. Moreover, it can make sense of apparently inscrutable notions of activists in the global North. This perspective is long overdue as a way of understanding certain West German groups, such as the self-defined anti-authoritarians organized around the West Berlin-based student leader Rudi Dutschke.

By global North and South, I mean financially and geopolitically more advantaged contrasted with financially and geopolitically less advantaged nations and areas.[3] The terms are linked to hemispheric geography, their borders delineated by the so-called Brandt Line drawn in the 1980s by then Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Willy Brandt.[4] This terminology, however, also maps its own geography, as some increasingly impoverished northern regions have little in common with their geographic neighbors and are more accurately categorized as part of the South. The terms "Third World" and "First World" and "underdeveloped" and "overdeveloped" were used by both the anti-authoritarians and activists of the South, including Cuba, to describe the unequal distribution of wealth and power within a global context of "peaceful co-existence." I employ them descriptively in this article as a local category.

German Politics and Society, Issue 86 Vol. 26, No. 1 Spring 2008
doi:10.3167/gps.2008.260103

For the purposes of this article, the term anti-authoritarians refers to those close to Dutschke who were involved in the radical activist group Subversiver Aktion (Subversive Action) and/or the meeting in Pichelsdorf, as well as those who self-identified and worked closely with these groups, but whose names have not made their way into historiography. As is characteristic of grassroots organizations, participation shifted. Subversiver Aktion, which later formed the basis of the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), was founded by Dieter Kunzelmann, Christof Baldeney, Rudolphe Gasché, and Frank Böckelmann. Both Dutschke and Bernd Rabehl were members.[5] Authoritative sources diverge somewhat on the attendees at the Pichelsdorf meeting, a gathering upon which I expand below. Gretchen Dutschke lists: Rudi Dutschke, Wolfgang Lefèvre, Urs Müller-Plantenberg, Rabehl, Peter Schneider, Christian Semler, Rolf Stanzik, and Peter Wellert.[6] Siegward Lönnendonker lists: Rudi Dutschke, Peter Gäng, Lefèvre, Lothar Pinkall, Müller-Plantenberg, Rabehl, Semler, Stanzick, and Walter Weller.[7] It is probable that those involved with Dutschke in the production of the essay collection *The Long March: Paths of Revolution in Latin America* (*Der Lange Marsch: Wege der Revolution in Lateinamerika*)[8]–T. Käsemann, R. Schöller, Gisela Mandel, and K.S. Karol–also shared the positions that I discuss here.

Most analyses consider Dutschke and these anti-authoritarians within a German or a German-U.S. framework.[9] Their agendas and activism are interpreted as catalysts that matured into reformist change within the Federal Republic, notably the new social movements and the Green Party.[10] This is only part of the narrative. My article contributes to a reassessment of the 1960s beyond the nation-state by articulating an example of a different part of the story: the significance of Southern theories and practices for Northern thinkers and activists. It focuses on perhaps the most well-known student leader in the FRG, about whom German stories are generally told. Even in this case, little scholarship treats links across the South-North axis, a situation that suggests a general dearth of knowledge about such relationships. I make three related arguments: Dutschke and the anti-authoritarians had significant interest in the global South, especially revolutionary Cuba; their vague plan for revolutionizing West Berlin relied on this Southern example; their interest

and agenda were based in the adoption of particular Southern understandings of nationalism that opposed what for Dutschke were tainted Northern models.

Defining Nationalism

Following World War II, the definition and function of FRG nationalism was in dispute. The concept of the Zero Hour (*Stunde Null*) functioned as a *tabula rasa* for the Federal Republic, and the new nation was to be thoroughly bound into Western alliances to assure that it would remain within its postwar borders.[11] FRG national identity was to be based on economic strength and parliamentary, constitutional, socio-governmental structures, not emotive, racialized mythologies that had contributed to the success of Nazi Germany. Many on the Left in the FRG rejected even this Enlightenment-style "constitutional patriotism" and focused on articulating forms of postnational or supranational identification.[12]

These vexed relationships among left-leaning Germans and nationalism may contribute to the relative silence surrounding Dutschke's interest in nationalism. Ulrich Chaussy's well-respected biography, for example, downplays it.[13] Wolfgang Kraushaar has attempted such a project,[14] but, interestingly, his more recent work tends to assess the student leader within a German framework.[15] I assert that in this and related cases, scholars misrecognize the meaning of nationalism. Consider Nick Thomas's note in relation to the group around Dutschke: "It is necessary to acknowledge the Left's contradictory opposition to nationalism while supporting a war of national liberation [Vietnam]."[16] While it may lie beyond the scope of Thomas's worthwhile project to engage this seeming paradox, these positions are not contradictory. What is required in order to make sense of the situation is to interrogate the meaning of nationalism in this context. Analysis of Dutschke's work yields a particular conception of nationalism that suggests a basis for rethinking the anti-authoritarian agenda. Similar reassessment may be useful in order to better understand other left-leaning thinkers and activists as well.

The anti-authoritarians sought to define an identity for themselves based on notions of nationalism professed by Third-World liberation

movements in the global South. By nationalism here, I mean both a shared sentiment of caring about an imagined community and the desire to act in the cause of this community. Yet, an important distinction must be made here. These Germans rejected what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have recently called "bourgeois" nationalism associated with the global North in favor of "subaltern" nationalism associated with the global South. According to Hardt and Negri, the bourgeois nationalism that developed in the Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is imagined and represented as homogeneous and is enabled by the subjugation and elision of the racialized other. This oppression occurs not only outside, but also inside national borders. In such cases: "the construction of national identity guarantees a continually reinforced legitimation, and the right and power of a sacrosanct and irrepressible unity."[17] In contrast, for Negri and Hardt subaltern nationalism is formed defensively against unwelcome dominant forces and is based in communities that exist in the imagination rather than as actual polities. For these theorists, subaltern nationalism is double-edged, for in as far as it succeeds, it risks becoming oppressive itself. Nevertheless, the distinction between bourgeois and subaltern nationalism is significant: "whereas the concept of nation promotes stasis and restoration in the hands of the dominant, it is a weapon for change and revolution in the hands of the subordinated."[18]

The anti-authoritarians legitimated their radical project by identifying it with the subaltern nationalisms of emerging Southern polities and against bourgeois Northern nationalisms. Moreover, by relatively uncritically embracing such emerging nationalisms, they were able to reclaim a positive notion of German national identity in a manner that, for them, opposed the homogeneous, oppressive nationalism of Nazi Germany and of the established FRG and German Democratic Republic (GDR) states. These anti-authoritarians' conception of what can best be understood as subaltern nationalism that was fomented in the highly charged and politically contested space of West Berlin was deeply influenced by Third-World liberation movements and expressed the internationalist agenda of these German youth.

Third Worldism and "Left Fascism"

Although the anti-authoritarians were among the first West Germans to consider the discontented people in the South as ideological partners, they were not alone in their interest in these groups. In his groundbreaking work on Third-World critique in 1960s literature of the Federal Republic, Rüdiger Sareika cites the importance of international development aid programs, media exposure, advertising, and international tourism in creating broad-based awareness. The expansion of television, coupled with public funding for broadcasting, yielded a wide distribution of substantive programming on international themes. Advertising marketed with exotic motifs and travel fantasies, although jet travel remained prohibitively expensive for many.[19] In this environment, left-leaning thinkers began to criticize North-South relations. Some drew parallels between what they saw as wartime imperialist and postwar neocolonialist tendencies. Even policies such as those involving development aid were deemed to be primarily concerned with supporting corporations in more industrialized nations.[20]

By the early 1960s, predecessors of the anti-authoritarians, such as Subversiver Aktion, were deeply involved in such neocolonial critiques.[21] The contributions of these radical activist groups have been largely overlooked in cultural and literary scholarship on Germany and Third-World liberation movements in favor of early work by those who became more accepted and popular public intellectuals. An example of this phenomenon is the scholarly focus on the literary journal *Kursbuch*, founded in 1965 by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, which is often credited as having initiated interest in Third-World themes.[22] Rather than being seen as foundational, *Kursbuch* should be understood as part of a heterogeneous web of critical discourses about Third-World issues. In another example, although *Kursbuch* gave writers of Third-World movements an important forum through which their work could reach a German-language public, publications such as *konkret*, the leftist journal with communist tendencies popular among students, for which Enzensberger wrote before founding *Kursbuch*, have an earlier tradition of this practice.

The nuances of this reception matter, because depending on which South-North connections they foreground, historiographies

shape the way that the South is understood to have influenced the North. The oft-cited, public, and published dispute between Enzensberger and Peter Weiss on what they term First-World/Third-World solidarity illustrates this phenomenon. The debate exemplifies dominant positions among left-leaning thinkers of the FRG in the early and mid 1960s.[23] Read against the grain, however, it also suggests the limits of these dominant opinions, limits that frustrated the anti-authoritarians.

In the texts, Enzensberger asserts that First-World/Third-World solidarity is impossible. Meant as a corrective to what he saw as overzealous and unreflective attitudes, this position risked promoting quiescence and diminishing accountability. Moreover, his stance that revolution must take place in the Third-World in order to benefit Third-World citizenry and the correlate that only they would benefit destabilized efforts to mobilize across national boundaries or to even think seriously about global interdependence as resistance to the status quo. Weiss's First-World solidarity, in turn, was expedient in that its ultimate goal was to atone for German fascism through Third-World aid.[24] Weiss's notion skirted issues that were divisive in the FRG, even when such questions were crucial for Third-World revolutionaries and thus for defining solidarity. Notably, Weiss does not define "oppositional violence" or consider under what circumstances such direct force might legitimately be used against what some left-leaning thinkers saw as "structural violence" in the form of state-sanctioned governmental and societal organization.

To focus on the global perspectives of groups such as Subversiver Aktion or the anti-authoritarians is to articulate a different reception of the South in the North. Both Enzensberger and Weiss largely agreed that revolutionary change in the FRG was impossible, a position that suggested acquiescence to what they agreed were global systems of inequity. In their paradigms, well-established nation-states remain in positions of authority, knowledge and power. Symbolically at least, the anti-authoritarians avoided such intellectual stalemates through their intense identification with Third-World liberation theory and practice.[25]

For the anti-authoritarians, the rebellious South acted as a role model for global change and suggested a domestic blueprint–it was forerunner, not supplicant. Third-World revolutionary theories

offered promising alternatives to existing FRG nationalism that was tainted by history and reinscribed existing power structures. Stated in the terms of Hardt and Negri, for the anti-authoritarians, subaltern nationalism offered an alternative to bourgeois nationalism. For this reason, their desires for domestic national change increased their interest in countries such as 1960s Algeria, Cuba and Vietnam. Their own critical attitudes towards the U.S. were reinforced by their analysis of how U.S. policies impacted such nations.[26] Interestingly, little or no evidence suggests that the anti-authoritarians were inspired by the Palestinian independence movement, whose Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964. It goes beyond my subject to analyze this situation adequately. Yet, it is tempting to speculate that their reserve in identifying with the PLO, political affinities notwithstanding, reveals that the anti-authoritarians' alliance with the South was more about critique of National Socialism than it was about belying this fascist past, as some have argued.[27]

The anti-authoritarians also saw these proto-socialist, emerging nations as alternatives to the increasingly discredited socialist GDR. Dutschke's "From Antisemitism to Anticommunism" (Vom Antisemitismus zum Antikommunismus) expresses this position:

> Precisely the engagement with international questions was the result of our contradictory situation: None of us loved the Wall, only a few considered the GDR and the SED [Socialist Unity Party] to be truly socialistic, but almost all hated the hypocritical [FRG] Adenauer-"Republic" ... Nevertheless, we saw in our own reality no possibilities for a useful political praxis.[28]

Dutschke's text exemplifies this international engagement by articulating the position of emerging Southern nations such as Cuba. For instance, it criticizes U.S. practices as neocolonial and disparages the policy of peaceful co-existence as beneficial only for the U.S. and Soviet bloc countries. In particular, the essay faults the USSR for bettering its own economic position by neglecting Latin American revolutions.[29]

The piece also demonstrates solidarity through identification. In Dutschke's text, the global geopolitical conflict is often shaped by physical geography, but always defined by ideology. Anti-authoritarians mapped what they read as the neocolonialist relationships between the U.S. and Third-World countries onto the U.S.-FRG relationship. For example, the position of the FRG as a U.S. trading part-

ner under the Marshall Plan was criticized as having brought the FRG under the political and cultural sway of the U.S.[30] This identification across lines of privilege may seem surprising and it has often been read as self-serving. Organized along ideology, it downplayed difference. Yet, this identification is worth taking seriously, in part because, as I have shown elsewhere, Southern actors such as the Cuban government and intelligentsia supported it.[31] If the intensity and logic of this felt and theorized solidarity is understood, then an unpublished document by Dutschke that Kraushaar has recently revealed suddenly becomes comprehensible as further evidence for this identification of solidarity. In it, Dutschke aligns the anti-authoritarians with the revolutionaries in Latin America and places the ruling classes across the globe on the other side of the division.[32]

This identification with Third-World liberation also further explains why the anti-authoritarians downplayed the influence of the GDR on their own thinking. These trans-Wall connections were not insignificant. Dutschke and Rabehl had been schooled in the GDR, where the international scope of capitalist influence was studied and articulated as global exploitation.[33] The group also had access to translated printed materials from the Soviet bloc that were not printed in the FRG until the mid 1960s when market demand rose. For example, Che Guevara's influential 1960 text *On Guerilla Warfare* (*La Guerra de guerrillas*) was available to West Berlin anti-authoritarians in 1962 through the GDR's translation, *Der Partisanenkrieg*.[34]

The East German Soviet ally influenced West German leftists in other ways as well, yet this influence remained limited. Kraushaar has demonstrated recently that its government funded the newspaper *konkret*.[35] Journalist and daughter of the *konkret* editors, Bettina Röhl, shows that this support ended in 1964, when the paper repeatedly strayed from the SED's agenda. Although quite critical of this East-West connection, Röhl's work highlights that financing did not mean complete control.[36] In another example, debates between the GDR's Freie Deutsche Jugend and the FRG youth group Die Falken suggest both that the GDR subsidized Die Falken and that the group nevertheless was quite autonomous in determining its political agenda.[37] Scholars variously attribute the elision of trans-Wall political affiliations to Cold War machinations.[38] It would be unsurprising that the Soviets supported the anti-authoritarians as strange

bedfellows–the anti-authoritarians' lack of enthusiasm for such ties accords with their conviction that both superpowers instrumentalized the Third World, as well as with their preference for more radical socialist projects.

Dutschke's interest in the Southern hemisphere involved radically changing the situation both abroad and at home. He considered the Third-World movements important for West Berlin activists for three reasons. First, theories from authors such as Frantz Fanon and Guevara analyzed contemporary international politics in ways that Marx's texts, written earlier, could not.[39] Second, Third-World solidarity opened the possibility of cooperation between GDR and FRG youth, thereby bringing Germans closer together on terms that Dutschke supported. German unification under a socialist organizational system was an aim promoted by the SDS and the SED.[40] Third, the student leader saw the West Berlin demonstrations against contemporary political constellations in countries such as Iran and Congo as the first politically and socially conscious grassroots initiatives in the city. He concluded that these demonstrations were as significant for domestic politics as they were for colonial critique.[41]

The anti-authoritarians' reception of Third-World liberation theory and praxis furthered a shift in their alliances from Western European to Third-World role models. Much work has been done on the relationships between the more established European Left and the student movement. As mentioned above, intellectuals such as Weiss and Enzensberger influenced student reception of that entity theorized as the Third World. The Frankfurt School and the circle of thinkers around it, as well as some intellectuals in the U.S and France such as Herbert Marcuse and Jean-Paul Sartre, were well received. Yet, the younger generation had not lived through WWII, was more impatient for societal change, and believed that the necessary conditions for it were proximate. The students became frustrated by models that seemed to neglect practice for theory.[42] More established left-leaning thinkers and some in the student movement, including the anti-authoritarians around Dutschke, famously disagreed on the use of political violence to promote the conditions necessary for a radical societal shift. For instance, during a series of talks, Marcuse came under attack by student audience members when he was seen as an apologist for categorical nonviolence.[43]

Professorial ally Jürgen Habermas's famous use of the term "left fascism" to criticize student enthusiasm for overt political violence is telling here. The phrase highlights that the older generation judged these young Germans according to a "bourgeois nationalist" paradigm. The well-established state was construed in the Weberian sense as the sole legitimate wielder of force and as the guarantor of national unity and stability under already-existing conditions. On these terms, oppositional violence would amount to sedition. Moreover, the specter haunting Habermas's charge was German fascism, and it was a haunting specter indeed.[44] While the parties disagreed about the suitability of overt violence, they agreed that a voluntaristic attack against a democratic German state was unacceptable because it revisited National Socialist patterns.

Recognition of this context further clarifies that alignment with Third-World national revolution opened a perspective from which the anti-authoritarians around Rudi Dutschke and other activists could entertain ideas about the legitimacy of political violence without inevitably conjuring the fascist past. According to Third-World liberation models, "subaltern nationalism" and its struggles can be justified means of constituting independent new nations. Figures such as Fanon and Guevara argued for violence as popular force–in their models, the existing state was not the only legitimate administrator.[45] The anti-authoritarians' sustained concern, even fascination, with violence in the opposition was more than a vague, romantic notion. Grounded in theories of subaltern nationalisms current across the globe, it expressed and furthered their attempts to reconstitute Berlin and, finally, German identity through these Third-World liberation models of nation-building, amidst and despite the historical baggage of National Socialism.

An Anti-Authoritarian Focus Theory?

Guevara's "Focus Theory" and his international directives were particularly inspirational for the West Berlin anti-authoritarians. Focus Theory hypothesizes that an advance guard acts like the focal point of a magnifying glass, igniting the general populace to revolutionary action. Ingo Juchler has shown some of the ways in which Dutschke's

practices and theories respond to Guevara's demands for an internationalization of Focus Theory.[46] Kraushaar has recently come to similar conclusions.[47] By at least 1967, Dutschke described student group actions in Guevarian terms. Consider his analysis of a clandestine anti-Vietnam War protest involving postering in West Berlin:

> How and under what conditions can the subjective factor write itself into the historical process as an objective factor? Guevara's answer for Latin America was that the revolutionaries are not always to wait for the objective conditions for the revolution, but rather that by means of the Focus, they can create the revolution through subjective activity. This question also stood in the final analysis behind the poster campaign, still stands today behind every campaign.[48]

Dutschke's portrayal of a street demonstration by the SDS also closely echoes Guevara's ideas about praxis creating consciousness.[49] Sometimes read even by sympathizers as fetishizing violence,[50] Guevarism nevertheless spoke forcefully to this group of youth who felt impotent against the status quo.

As the anti-authoritarians sought to translate Focus Theory into West Berlin, they looked to thinkers like Guevara. His texts of the early 1960s suggested that violent protest was inappropriate in the European context. In *On Guerilla Warfare*, the Germans read:

> In places where a government has attained power through more or less democratic means, with or without voting fraud, and where at least the appearance of constitutional law is upheld, no guerilla movement develops, because the possibilities of legal struggle are still not eliminated.[51]

Such statements implied that activists in the Federal Republic should work with established political structures such as the Social Democratic Party and labor unions to create political change.

The local and the global situations seemed to the anti-authoritarians to have changed radically by 1967. In the FRG, the Grand Coalition was established and clashes between police and activists in West Berlin and elsewhere were increasing. Many Western thinkers including the anti-authoritarians believed that in Latin America, "Cuba [had] emerged as a third, independent communist centre, more actively committed to armed revolutionary struggle in the Third World than either the Soviets or the Chinese."[52] The island led in organizing an international group of government and party officials and rebels from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The Janu-

ary 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana ended with its participants calling for a radical, nonaligned platform to counter the superpowers' doctrine of peaceful co-existence and for alliance between Third-World socialists and the proletariat in the First-World metropoles.[53] Were messages from the South to the North changing?

Guevara's Focus Theory formed the official basis of the resultant Havana-based Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (OSPAAL). Although many of the established communist parties of the participating nations disagreed with this strategy, arguing that initiatives for change should be party-led, Cuba pressed its agenda. Guevara's well-known letter to the executive body of OSPAAL, with its call to create two, three, many Vietnams, was published in April 1967 in Cuba and its theoretical counterpart, Régis Debray's *Revolution in the revolution?: Armed struggle and political struggle in Latin America* (*Revolución en la Revolución?*) was published that same year in Cuba as well. Cuba reaffirmed Focus Theory by convening the first Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) Conference, held in early August 1967 in Havana, controlling the guest list, and pushing its official internationalist agenda of nonalignment. Criticizing the Soviet Union and bloc politics, Fidel Castro called for grassroots internationalist revolution and transnational solidarity.[54]

The anti-authoritarians were deeply inspired by such events and sought guidance from their Southern role models. The results of the OLAS conference were considered directly relevant to the European struggle. In the small West Berlin paper in which many anti-authoritarians published, *Oberbaum Blatt,* author G. reports on OLAS:

> A strategy of the urban guerilla for some countries was not treated by the conference, but it was also not fully ruled out. The development of such a strategy seems to be the task of the revolutionaries of the countries whose populations mostly live in the cities.[55]

This account reads like a response to a question formulated prior to the meeting, the question of violent political action in the urban North. It reports that OLAS participants tacitly supported such struggle–its phrasing implying conference debate on the topic. The conclusion that the article draws may or may not have actually been discussed; it responds primarily to questions in West Berlin when it suggests that the Southern delegates had vested the decision-making authority in interested Northern radicals. The report adds that the

participants had unanimously chosen Focus Theory as their method and that, "the best contribution to the continental revolution, the best expression of solidarity is the liberation of one's own nation. 'Imperialism must be beaten at every and any place' (Che)."[56] The OLAS conference focused on Latin America and G.'s article also primarily treats this region. Yet, the report also emphasizes what the anti-authoritarians read as Guevara's new message of ubiquitous struggle shaped by indigenous revolutionaries, including those living in Northern metropoles.

Guevara's letter to OSPAAL seemed to the anti-authoritarians to have opened a new space for their involvement. Dutschke considered the letter so groundbreaking that within days he and fellow West Berlin student leader Gaston Salvadore had finished translating it as "Schaffen wir zwei, drei, viele Vietnam!"[57] In 1967, they published an excerpt in the *Oberbaum Blatt* and shortly afterwards printed the entire letter. The segment in the *Oberbaum Blatt* emphasizes Guevara's call for physical, not simply verbal, solidarity with Vietnam against the U.S.[58] In the complete text, Guevara's words seem to predict some type of revolution in the European metropoles:

> The situation of the world shows a great multiplicity of tasks. Even the nations of old Europe are still waiting for the task of liberation. Although they are developed enough to be able to feel all of the contradictions of capitalism, they are too weak to be able to pursue imperial goals or to begin to take this course now. In the next years the contradictions there will take on an explosive character. Their problems, however, and because of this in the final analysis also their solution, are different from those of our dependent and economically retarded nations.[59]

In 1967, particularly after the killing of the first-time student protestor Benno Ohnesorg, the situation in West Berlin seemed explosive to the anti-authoritarians. Guevara's 1962 missive had expressly forbidden overt political violence within real-existing democracies. Some now saw the end of the "appearance of constitutional law." The governmental and societal structures that to many had regulated primarily through tacit, if ill-informed, public consent seemed to now be exposing their similarity to colonial powers abroad by ruling with the physical force of pistols and cudgels at the heads of protesters. Guevara's 1967 communiqué focused on the role of advance guards as liberators seemed perfectly translatable into the European context and the task of activists in the North.

Taking Guevara's predictions literally, some argued that West Berlin, as the first revolutionized metropolis, would function as another Vietnam in so far as it would be the next focal site of the spreading anti-imperial revolution. In this way, the West Berlin struggle would serve both national and international liberation. In Dutschke's words it would be a "mounting political struggle against 'our' existing order, which distinguishes itself precisely through the open and undercover complicity with the USA, to concretely support the Vietnamese liberation struggle through our own emancipation process."[60] As I have shown elsewhere in more detail, the intended revolution itself was paralleled not with the prolonged and bloody battle in Vietnam, but with the assumedly populist and quickly successful revolution in Cuba. This specific analogy of praxis was critical. Drawing the parallel to an idealized Cuban revolution rather than to the struggles in Vietnam meant that the anti-authoritarians in theory could appropriate concepts of Third-World liberation without appropriating its bloodshed.

Translating Cuba to West Berlin

Two texts that scholars have deemed uncharacteristic of Dutschke's oeuvre show the centrality of subaltern nationalism by styling West Berlin as a revolutionary island modeled on Third-World theory (Guevara and Castro) and praxis (Cuba).[61] One is an essay based on the Pichelsdorf Meeting, which sources as diverse as Rudi's wife, Gretchen Dutschke, and colleague Rabehl describe as a gathering meant to work on plans for taking over West Berlin.[62] A core group of anti-authoritarians around Rudi Dutschke met on 24 and 25 June 1967 shortly after the shooting of Ohnesorg and directly after Dutschke and Salvatore's translation of Guevara's Vietnam letter was published. The essay, *On the Relationship of Organization and the Emancipation Movement–On the Visit of Herbert Marcuse* (*Zum Verhältnis von Organisation und Emanzipationsbewegung–Zum Besuch Herbert Marcuses*), published by Dutschke under a pseudonym on 12 July 1967 in the *Oberbaum Blatt,* summarizes the results of this meeting and was influential among the anti-authoritarians.[63] The October 1967 *Kursbuch* interview with Enzensberger, *A Conversation about the*

Future (*Ein Gespräch über die Zukunft*) focuses on similar issues and reached a larger audience.[64]

Few scholars have attended to these texts, perhaps because they seem to implicate Dutschke in a Soviet-led or rightist unification agenda and a tradition of German nationalism. In his archeology of Dutschke's relationship to the question of unification, Kraushaar–one of the few critics to deal with the issue–generally emphasizes the internationalist ends of Dutschke's national interests.[65] Consider his analysis of the strident call of the student leader to "Crush NATO!" that Kraushaar reads as expressing Dutschke's goal of a neutral course for Germany between the U.S. and Soviet blocs:

> To crush NATO or–in a milder variation–to want to leave it, means, in terms of the politics of the Alliance, to strike a neutral course, and this means, in turn, to win back the lost national sovereignty. It fits this perspective that Dutschke spoke of the "American army of occupation" in his speech at the Vietnam Conference. Probably he thinks complementarily of a Soviet army of occupation and the departure of the GDR from the Warsaw pact. However, to say this openly in 1968 in West-Berlin would have been not only more unrealistic than the explicated demand would have been but also unwise from tactical perspectives.[66]

Kraushaar's analysis engages Dutschke's interest in German nationalism in relation to the power struggles of the Cold War in the North. Rather than exploring the precise meaning of the nation and nationalism for the young German, Kraushaar focuses on demonstrating that his later life was spent working for national liberation through unification as a necessary step towards international socialism. Kraushaar mentions that Dutschke considered the U.S. military an occupying force; that the youth saw structural similarities between the anti-authoritarians' efforts against NATO and Third-World liberation struggles against colonialism; and that he was fascinated by Third-World issues. Kraushaar, however, does not link these concerns.[67]

Yet, for Dutschke, such ideas were deeply interconnected and were legitimated by notions of subaltern nationalism. Southern paradigms informed what he saw as national liberation for Germany, sparked by the liberation of West Berlin. Neither a covert attempt to open the way for Soviet occupation of West Berlin, nor a crypto-fascist agenda, Dutschke's national vision sought its inspiration across what was for him the First World-Third World divide.

Precisely the Dutschke texts that have proven so discomfiting for scholars of leftists in the FRG illuminate his conception of German national liberation through the metropolitan focus of West Berlin. In these two texts in particular, the city is positioned in the South–the West Berlin revolution is to liberate it from the "'false' East-West-perspective."[68] Remember that Castro and Guevara called for a similar goal of tricontinental independence from the West and the East blocs.[69] West Berlin is described as distinct from the FRG, indeed, it is understood as in a neocolonial relationship with West Germany, and, by extension, the U.S. Dutschke writes, "As a consequence of its dependence on the FRG, West Berlin is especially 'endangered'; indeed 75 percent of the commodities produced go to West Germany."[70] For Dutschke, the more oppressive the colonial situation, the higher the probability of a successful subaltern independence movement in West Berlin.

Within this paradigm, Cuba and West Berlin are similarly positioned. Each "island" is sheltered by the policy of peaceful co-existence despite its size and ideology. Cuba's move for sovereignty was seen by many, including the anti-authoritarians, as similarly protected by the tensions between East and West.[71] Dutschke explicitly argues that Cold War tensions will stop the larger powers from taking over a small independent West Berlin.[72] Each polity seeks to lead an international coalition of nonaligned states, Cuba in Latin America and West Berlin in Europe. For the anti-authoritarians, Cuba set the example of nonaligned, grassroots socialism. West Berlin is to be model of the same in the First World.[73] In this situation, the development of the urban Focus into an independent island will provoke the GDR into support of domestic reform and Latin American revolution[74] and may enable German unification.[75] Following the example of Cuba in Latin America, West Berlin will be a revolutionary metropolitan model in Europe. This parallel was enabled by the claiming of subaltern nationalism in the North.

Spreading Subaltern Identification: The Frankfurt SDS and the West Berlin Vietnam Conferences

In their *Organizational Report* (*Organizationsreferat*) on 5 September 1967 at the 22nd Delegate Conference of the SDS in Frankfurt,

Dutschke and Hans-Jürgen Krahl translated Guevara's organizational model for use by the group. "'The propaganda of shots' (Che) in the 'third world' must be completed through a 'propaganda of deeds' in the metropoles, which makes the urbanization of rural guerilla activity historically possible." With the universities as "safety zones," student focus groups were to instigate change and the rest of the populace would be enlightened into socialist consciousness.[76] The anti-authoritarians aligned the roles of student agitator and guerrilla fighter. In his *On the Relationship of Organization and the Emancipation Movement*, Dutschke uses populist rhetoric when addressing his audience: "I don't know how to address you, all forms of address have been occupied by our masters in East and West, unless you accept the term and the title of revolutionaries."[77] Dutschke's request draws in his audience and binds them linguistically with the weapon-carrying attendees of the Tricontinental and the planned OLAS conference. His address allegorizes these West Berliners as advance guard in Europe, much as the Cubans functioned as such in Latin America.

Indeed, some of those in West Berlin did not need Dutschke to identify themselves with the Latin American fighters. A series of letters to Dutschke from the Berlin communist Konrad Born somewhat playfully casts street demonstrations as "street battles," uses some of the terminology of *On Guerilla Warfare*, and calls Dutschke a German Guevara. According to notes from their meetings, members of the Projektgruppe 3. Welt/Metropol, of which Dutschke was a part, considered themselves qualified to judge Third-World guerrilla activities in order to assess the appropriateness of Focus Theory and the effectiveness of Guevara's Bolivian project.[78]

The high-profile 1968 Vietnam Conference in West Berlin was also a significant articulation of subaltern nationalism for the anti-authoritarians. The conference aimed to define solidarity with Vietnam. Could and should the anti-authoritarians' theoretical model be used to foment a West Berlin revolution and what would this revolution look like in practice? The podium backdrop reveals that Southern directives guided these questions. The second line from the enormous banner, "For the victory of the Vietnamese revolution–The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution" (Für den Sieg der Vietnamesischen Revolution–Die Pflicht jedes Revolu-

tionäres ist es die Revolution zu machen), was translated directly from the backdrop of the 31 July to 10 August 1967 OLAS Conference in Havana, "El deber de todo revolucionario es hacer la revolución."[79] Both included images of Guevara.

The uses of this phrase and image reveal both the internationalization and the idealization of the Cuban agenda. The words are Castro's, and Guevara explicitly attributes them to him.[80] Yet, this statement is overwhelmingly ascribed to Guevara in Latin America, within activist movements, and in critical literature. This attribution suggests that the mobile, idealistic, and romanticized fighter Che more readily embodied an international revolution than the governmental leader Castro (or the student leader Dutschke!). At the OLAS Conference, the Cubans had already internationalized the appeal beyond Cuba and the nonaligned nations by omitting the specificity of the Latin American context. The Vietnam Congress organizers welcomed the internationalization of the directive. Their embrace of Che as icon suggests their idealization of the Guevarian "New Man." Their acceptance of a figure that represents self-subordination to group may seem surprising. The Frankfurt School-trained anti-authoritarians were highly skeptical of such discourses in German contexts–their very name articulates the value of difference.[81] This reception of Guevara speaks to their desires for alternative models of identification.

There is also some evidence that during the large conference, smaller meetings between radical European leaders took place. Until recently, the most direct evidence of this conference-within-a-conference stemmed from Rabehl.[82] The purported goal of these leaders was a unified revolt against the prognosticated NATO/U.S. putsch that would occur if the student revolution gained enough momentum. The anti-authoritarians conceived of these actions as countering imperial violence with counter-violence, unseating U.S. dominance in Europe. This understanding placed the West Berlin Vietnam Conference into direct articulation with the OLAS conference, one of whose stated aims was to free Latin America of the U.S. imperialist yoke. It would be a different project to analyze the contested discourses involved in the retelling of these alleged events. Rabehl's assertion that some Vietnam Conference organizers narrated European strife in terms of North-South oppression and resistance supports my contention that the anti-

authoritarians imagined their German nationalism in terms of subalternity.[83] Debates over translation were ongoing, however. Chaussy's assessment that the anti-authoritarians vacillated over the use of overt violence remains salient.

Conclusion

This article invites broader consideration of what is often called the new Left by illuminating how the theories and practices of the West Berlin anti-authoritarians around Rudi Dutschke were shaped by extranational impulses such as notions of subaltern nationalism. Scholarship on this group tends to focus within German or Northern boundaries, elide global connections, and dismiss the internationalist and transnational perspectives of the actors involved–perspectives that these actors understood as attempts to move beyond European traditions of national identification. While the domestic is relevant, to define activist affinities and practices *a priori* as elements of a unified national society is to constrain and misread them.[84] Taking the global perspectives of the anti-authoritarians' local activism seriously reveals the significance of transnational affinities for gaining national leverage and for internationalist attempts at a "third way." This significance cannot be understood solely in terms of the material weightiness of these alliances, but also must be thought in terms of inspirational role models and alternative paths. This perspective suggests new interpretations of the significance of the global South for the North. More extensive consideration of the relationships between Northern and Southern actors can unsettle assumptions about the stability of national identification and highlight the implications of less well-recognized alliances.

Jennifer Ruth Hosek took a Comparative Literature Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley and was a Stanford Fellow in the Humanities until accepting an Assistant Professorship in German at Queen's University in Ontario. Jennifer has published on literature, film, critical theory and neuroscience, and the women's movement. Her manuscript that analyzes the cultural influences of the global South on the North through Cuba and the Germanies has

received support from the Berlin Studienstiftung des Abgeordnetenhauses, the DAAD, the Humboldt and Mellon Foundations, and Berkeley. Professor Hosek's next book project is on urban Heimat. Formerly on the steering committee of Women in German (WiG), she co-produces its bibliography.

Notes

1. George Nicholas Katsiaficas, *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968* (Boston, 1987). I would especially like to thank Belinda Davis, Verónica Garibotto, and anonymous readers for their input on this article. In many ways, this article is for Ulises.
2. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge, 2005); New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness International Conference. Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 13-16 June 2007, conference anthology forthcoming. My definition of transnational is primarily informed by Francoise Lionnet and Shumei Shi, *Minor transnationalism* (Durham, 2005).
3. See Samir Amin and Patrick Camiller, *Obsolescent capitalism: contemporary politics and global disorder* (London, 2003); Neil Larsen, *Reading North by South: On Latin American Literature, Culture and Politics* (Minneapolis, 1995).
4. For the updated version of what is commonly termed "The Brandt Report," go to http://www.stwr.net/ content/view/43/83/, cited December 2007.
5. Richard Diedrich, "Persecution and Self-Persecution: The SPUR Group and Its Texts: The Neo-avant-garde in the Province of Postfascism," *Grey Room* 26 (2007).
6. Gretchen Dutschke, *Wir hatten ein barbarisches, schönes Leben: Rudi Dutschke eine Biographie* (Cologne, 1996), 143.
7. Siegward Lönnendonker, Bernd Rabehl and Jochen Staadt, *Die antiautoritäre Revolte: Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund nach der Trennung von der SPD*, vol. 1 (1960-1967) (Wiesbaden, 2002), footnote 36, 355.
8. Régis Debray, Fidel Castro, Gisela Mandel and K.S. Karol, *Der Lange Marsch. Wege der Revolution in Lateinamerika* (Munich, 1968).
9. Some important exceptions are Ingo Juchler, *Rebellische Subjektivität und Internationalismus: der Einfluß Herbert Marcuse und der nationalen Befreiungsbewegung in der sog. Dritten Welt auf die Studentenbewegung in der BRD* (Marburg, 1989); and Werner Balsen and Karl Rössel, *Hoch die Internationale Solidarität! Zur Geschichte der Dritte Welt-Bewegung in der Bundesrepublik* (Cologne, 1986). Texts sometimes gesture towards the transhemispheric connections, while focusing on Germany, Europe and/or the United States. See Gerd Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt* (Cologne, 2001); Michael A. Schmidtke, "Cultural Revolution or Cultural Shock? Student Radicalism and 1968 in Germany," *South Central Review* 16, no. 4 (1999-2000).

For an overview of the literature, see Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s: West Germany A Social History of Dissent and Democracy* (Oxford, 2003).

10. See for example Sabine Von Dirke, *'All Power to the Imagination!' The West German Counterculture from the Student Movement to the Greens* (Lincoln, 1997).
11. Thomas Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995* (Ann Arbor, 1999).
12. Jürgen Habermas, "Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität," in *Faktizität und Geltung*, ed., Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt/Main, 1992).
13. Ulrich Chaussy, *Die drei Leben des Rudi Dutschke: Eine Biographie* (Berlin, 1993), 347.
14. Wolfgang Kraushaar, "Rudi Dutschke und die Wiedervereinigung: Zur heimlichen Dialektik von Internationalismus und Nationalismus," *Mittelweg 36* 2 (1992).
15. Wolfgang Kraushaar, "Rudi Dutschke und der bewaffnete Kampf," in *Rudi Dutschke, Andreas Baader und die RAF*, eds., Wolfgang Kraushaar, Karin Wieland, and Jan Philipp Reemtsma (Hamburg, 2005).
16. Thomas (see note 9), 163.
17. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, 2001), 105.
18. Hardt and Negri (see note 17), 105-06.
19. Rüdiger Sareika, *Die Dritte Welt in der westdeutschen Literatur der sechziger Jahre* (Frankfurt/Main, 1980), 27-63.
20. Gerhard Fels, *Der Aufruhr der 68er: Zu den geistigen Grundlagen der Studentenbewegung und der RAF* (Bonn, 1998), 21.
21. Willy Albrecht, *Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS): Vom parteikonformen Studentenverband zum Repräsentanten der Neuen Linken* (Bonn, 1994); Ingo Juchler, *Die Studentenbewegungen in den Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland der sechziger Jahre: Eine Untersuchung hinsichtlich ihrer Beeinflussung durch Befreiungsbewegungen und -theorien aus der Dritten Welt* (Berlin, 1994).
22. See for example Von Dirke (see note 10); Sara Lennox, "Enzensberger, Kursbuch, and Third-Worldism," in *"Neue Welt"/"Dritte Welt": Interkuturelle Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Lateinamerika und der Karibik*, ed., Sigrid Bauschinger and Susan Cocalis (Tübingen, 1994); Arlene Teraoka, *East, West, and Others* (Lincoln, 1996). My analysis of the Enzensberger-Weiss debate is particularly indebted to the latter two texts.
23. Peter Weiss and Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "Eine Kontroverse," in *Bewegung in der Republik 1965-1984 Eine Kursbuch Chronik*, eds., Ingrid Karsunke and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 1, (Frankfurt/Main, 1985).
24. Teraoka (see note 22).
25. For more on this interpretation of the debate about global solidarity, see Jennifer Ruth Hosek, "Cuba and the Germans: A Cultural History of an Infatuation," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2004).
26. Such Eurocentric tendencies characterized much interest in the Third World among left-leaning people in the FRG. Lennox (see note 22).
27. Uli Linke, *German Bodies: Race and Representation After Hitler* (New York, 1999).
28. Rudi Dutschke, "Vom Antisemitismus zum Antikommunismus," in *Rebellion der Studenten oder Die neue Opposition*, eds., Uwe Bergmann, et al. (Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1968), 62. "Gerade die Beschäftigung mit internationalen Fragen war Resultat unserer widersprüchlichen Situation: Niemand von uns liebte die Mauer, nur wenige hielten die DDR und die SED für wirklich sozialistisch, aber

fast alle haßten die heuchlerische Adenauer-'Republik' ... Dennoch sahen wir in unserer eigenen Wirklichkeit keine Möglichkeiten für eine sinnvolle politische Praxis." Translations in this article are mine.

29. Ibid., 62, 65.
30. Thomas (see note 9), 72; Fels (see note 20), 26.
31. Hosek, (see note 25)
32. Kraushaar, (see note 15), 33.
33. Dutschke (see note 6), 41, 52; Juchler (see note 9), 15.
34. Statement made by Klaus Wagenbach as guest in seminar on 1968 led by Professor Roland Berbig, Humboldt Universität, Berlin, 2001-02. Ernesto Guevara, *Der Partisanenkrieg* (Berlin, 1962), distributed in the FRG in 1962 under license of the Militärverlag. Most West German editions were published in 1968: *Partisanenkrieg* (Cologne, 1966); *Partisanenkrieg, eine Methode* (Munich, 1968); *Der Partisanenkrieg* (Hamburg, 1968), reprinting of the 1962 GDR edition; Ernesto Guevara, *Guerilla-Theorie und Methode* (Berlin, 1968).
35. Wolfgang Kraushaar, "SED, Stasi und Studentenbewegung," in *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur*, ed., Wolfgang Kraushaar (Hamburg, 2000).
36. Bettina Röhl, *So macht Kommunismus Spaß. Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl und die Akte Konkret* (Hamburg, 2006).
37. SAPMO-BArch DY 24 / 6196.
38. For recent work on trans-Wall ties between authors, see Roland Berbig, ed., *Stille Post: Inoffizielle Schriftstellerkontakte zwischen West und Ost* (Berlin, 2005).
39. Fanon's influential *Les Damnés de la terre* was available in 1961, *The Wretched of the Earth* in 1963, and *Die Verdammten dieser Erde* in 1966 (Frankfurt/Main).
40. For an analysis of the relationship between the SDS and the SED, see Kraushaar (see note 35).
41. Dutschke (see note 28), 62-64.
42. Wolfgang Kraushaar, "Editorial," in *Frankfurter Schule und Studentenbewegung: Von der Flaschenpost zum Molotowcocktail 1946-1995*, ed., Wolfgang Kraushaar (Hamburg, 1998), 13.
43. Herbert Marcuse, "Das Problem der Gewalt in der Opposition," in *Das Ende der Utopie. Vorträge und Diskussionen in Westberlin 1967* (Berlin, 1967).
44. For a differentiated analysis of these events, see Robert Holub, *Jürgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere* (London, 1991).
45. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth, 1973); Che Guevara, *Guerilla- Theorie und Methode*, ed. Klaus Wagenbach (Berlin, 1968).
46. Juchler (see note 9).
47. Kraushaar (see note 15).
48. Dutschke (see note 28), 69-70. "Wie und unter welchen Bedingungen kann sich der subjektive Faktor als objektiver Faktor in den geschichtlichen Prozeß eintragen? Guevaras Antwort für Lateinamerika war, daß die Revolutionäre nicht immer auf die objektiven Bedingungen für die Revolution zu warten haben, sondern daß sie über den Focus, über die Revolution durch subjektive Tätigkeit schaffen können. Diese Frage stand in letzter Konsequenz auch hinter der Plakataktion, steht heute noch hinter jeder Aktion." Christian Semler and others point out that among non-Party leftists there was fluidity in the reception of various theories. Christian Semler, personal discussion. September 2002; Siegward Lönnendonker, personal discussion. July 2002. Thus it is unsurprising that a multiplicity of Southern influences can be found in the oeuvre of the anti-author-

itarians. There was also significant intellectual exchange between thinkers. Guevara, for instance, was intrigued by Mao, particularly his notions of continual revolution and the Cultural Revolution. I hope that this article makes a small contribution to this vast topic.

49. Dutschke, (see note 6), 61; Che Guevara, "Guerrillakrieg: eine Methode," in *Guerilla-Theorie und Methode* (see note 34), 125.
50. Günter Bartsch, "Der Mythos der Che Guevara: Wenn der Mensch zum höchsten Wesen für den Mensch wird," *Neue Politische Literatur* 14, no. 3 (1969): 387-97.
51. Che Guevara, "Der Guerillakrieg," in *Guerilla-Theorie und Methode* (see note 34), 24. "Dort, wo eine Regierung auf mehr oder weniger demokratischem Wege an die Macht gelangt ist, mit oder ohne Wahlfälschungen, und wo wenigstens dem Anschein nach die verfassungsmäßige Gesetzlichkeit gewahrt wird, entsteht keine Guerillabewegung, weil die Möglichkeiten des legalen Kampfes noch nicht beseitigt sind."
52. Albert Szymanski, *Is the red flag flying? The political economy of the Soviet Union* (London, 1979), 191.
53. Juchler (see note 9), 51.
54. For accounts of the OLAS conference see Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the air: sixties radicals turn to Lenin, Mao and Che* (London, 2002); John Gerassi, "Havana: A New International Is Born," in *Latin American radicalism: a documentary report on Left and Nationalist movements*, eds., Irving Louis Horowitz, John Gerassi, and Josué de Castro (New York, 1969); Juchler (see note 9); Szymanski (see note 52). See also Castro's closing speech: Fidel Castro, "Waves of the Future," in *Latin American Radicalism,* ed. Irving Horowitz, Josué de Castro, and John Gerassi (New York, 1967), 543-579.
55. G, "CUBA: Die OLAS und die lateinamerikanische Revolution," *Oberbaum Blatt*, 14 November 1967, 9. "Eine Strategie der Stadtguerilla wurde für einige Länder nicht von der Konference behandelt, aber auch nicht völlig ausgeschlossen. Die Entwicklung einer solchen Strategie scheint die Aufgabe der Revolutionäre der Länder, deren Bevölkerung zum größten Teil in der Stadt lebt, zu sein." The author may be Gisela Mandel or possibly Gaston Salvatore. My research in Germany and Cuba did not reveal whether anti-authoritarians actually attended the OLAS conference. In her letters from Cuba, Gisela Mandel writes that it is to take place nearly a month after the planned end of her visit to Cuba as a State guest, that it is a closed conference, and that she does not know if observers will be permitted. Gisela Mandel, "Briefe aus Kuba," in Debray (see note 8), 260. As a relative of Chilean president Salvador Allende, Gaston Salvatore may have had more access than German visitors.
56. Ibid., 9. "Der beste Beitrag zur kontinentalen Revolution, der beste Ausdruck der Solidarität ist die Befreiung des eigenen Landes. 'Der Imperialismus muß an jedem beliebigen Ort geschlagen werden.' (Che)."
57. Dutschke (see note 6), 147. Quinn Slobodian's dissertation in progress (History, New York University) looks at the influence of Southern students on activism in the Federal Republic.
58. Che Guevara, "Schaffen wir zwei, drei, viele Vietnam," *Oberbaum Blatt* 1967, 1.
59. Ernesto Che Guevara, "Schaffen wir zwei, drei, viele Vietnam," in *Guerilla-Theorie und Methode* (see note 34), 147. "Die Situation der Welt zeigt eine große Vielfalt an Aufgaben. Sogar die Länder des alten Europa warten noch auf die

Aufgabe der Befreiung. Sie sind zwar genügend entwickelt, um alle Widersprüche des Kapitalismus fühlen zu können, aber zu schwach, um imperialistische Ziele verfolgen oder diesen Weg jetzt noch beschreiten zu können. In den nächsten Jahren werden dort die Widersprüche einen explosiven Charakter annehmen. Ihre Probleme aber und darum letzten Endes auch deren Lösung sind verschieden von denen unserer abhängigen und ökonomisch zurückgebliebenen Länder." I thank Christian Semler for his original copy of the essay in pamphlet form, which came out in time for the Vietnam Conference and was reprinted in Wagenbach Verlag's *Rotbuch* series. Different German printings of Guevara's letter have significantly different messages. For instance, the abridged version published on pages 43-53 of the August 1967 issue of *neue kritik* excise this paragraph. Such variances highlight the politics and diversity of the German reception of Cuba, a topic that I consider elsewhere.

60. Rudi Dutschke [R.S. pseud.], "Zum Verhältnis von Organisation und Emanzipationsbewegung–Zum Besuch Herbert Marcuses," *Oberbaum Blatt*, 12 July [labeled June] 1967, 1. "sich steigernden politischen Kampf gegen 'unsere' bestehende Ordnung, die sich gerade durch die offene und verdeckte Komplizenschaft mit den USA auszeichnet, den vietnamesischen Befreiungskampf durch unseren eigenen Emanzipationsprozeß konkret zu unterstützen." Kraushaar has shown that the month printed on the issue, June, is not the month that it was published, July.
61. See for example Chaussy (see note 13), 347.
62. Dutschke (see note 6), 143; Bernd Rabehl, "Die Provokationselite: Aufbruch und Scheitern der subversiven Rebellion in den sechziger Jahren," in *Die antiautoritäre Revolte* (see note 7), 473.
63. Dutschke (see note 6), 143-4.
64. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "Ein Gespräch über die Zukunft mit Rudi Dutschke, Bernd Rabehl und Christian Semler," in *Bewegung in der Republik* (see note 23). This text was not published until after the shooting of Dutschke in 1968.
65. Kraushaar, "Rudi Dutschke und die Wiedervereinigung," 25.
66. Ibid., 26. "Die NATO zerschlagen oder–in einer milderen Variante–aus ihr austreten zu wollen, bedeutet ja wohl in bündnispolitischer Konsequenz, einen Neutralitätskurs einzuschlagen, und dies wiederum, die verlorengegangene nationale Souveränität zurückzugewinnen. Zu dieser Sichtweise paßt es, daß Dutschke in seiner Rede auf dem Vietnamkongreß von der 'amerikanischen Besatzungsarmee' spricht. Vermutlich denkt er komplementär dazu an eine sowjetische Besatzungsarmee und den Austritt der DDR aus dem Warschauer Pakt. Dies jedoch 1968 in West-Berlin offen auszusprechen, wäre nicht nur noch unrealistischer als die explizierte Forderung gewesen, sondern zudem auch noch unter taktischen Gesichtspunkten unklug."
67. Kraushaar (see note 65), 26.
68. Dutschke (see note 60).
69. See for example Fidel Castro, "Zweite Deklaration von Havanna," in *Fanal Kuba: Reden und Schriften. 1960-1962.* (Berlin), 365-98; Castro (see note 54); Che Guevara, *Schaffen wir zwei, drei, viele Vietnam!*, trans. Rudi Dutschke and Gaston Salvatore (Berlin, 1967). Gaston Salvatore and Rudi Dutschke's introduction to the latter also makes clear that they read independence as Guevara's message.

70. Dutschke (see note 60), 4. "West-Berlin ist infolge seiner Abhängigkeit von der BRD besonders, 'gefährdet,' gehen doch 75 Prozent der erzeugten Güter nach Westdeutschland."
71. Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam* (New York, 2000).
72. Enzensberger (see note 64), 173.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 173-4.
75. Dutschke (see note 60), 5.
76. Rudi Dutschke and Hans-Jürgen Krahl, "Organizationsreferat," in *Frankfurter Schule* (see note 42), 290. "die 'Propaganda der Schüsse' (Che) in der 'Dritten Welt' muss durch die 'Propaganda der Tat' in den Metropolen vervollständigt werden, welche eine Urbanisierung ruraler Guerilla-Tätigkeit geschichtlich möglich macht;" and Guevara (See note 51).
77. Dutschke (See note 60), 4. "ich weiß nicht, wie ich Euch nennen soll, alle Anreden sind von unseren Herren in Ost und West schon längst besetzt, es sei denn, Ihr akzeptiert den Begriff und die Anrede des Revolutionärs."
78. Dutschke papers at the Archiv des Hamburger Instituts.
79. Juchler (see note 9), 95.
80. Guevara (see note 51).
81. Guevara, "Der Sozialismus."
82. Bernd Rabehl, personal discussion. June 2002. See also Kraushaar (see note 15).
83. Rabehl makes little of this North-South connection. His aim is a different one. See for instance Bernd Rabehl, *Rudi Dutschke: Revolutionär im geteilten Deutschland* (Dresden, 2004).
84. For an analysis that comes to similar conclusions regarding the reception of U.S. social movements, see Elbaum (see note 54).