House of Savoy. Yet he also reached a certain accommodation with the Fascist regime. From 1923 to 1925 he was ambassador to Brazil. Upon his return to Italy, he was named Army Chief of Staff, a post he held until he fell from Mussolini's favor during the disastrous Greek campaign (December 1940). Those years were filled with almost constant intrigue and jealousy between Fascist hierarchs and the army leadership. Badoglio was promoted to Marshal of Italy in 1926 and appointed governor of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica from 1928 to 1933. His role in the Ethiopian War (1935–36) marked the high point of his military career.

Badoglio obtained his revenge on Mussolini on July 25, 1943, when King Victor Emmanuel III dismissed the Duce and asked the army veteran to join him in a royal-military dictatorship. The two old men bungled the armistice negotiations with the Allies. They were obliged to flee ingloriously from Rome on the night they announced the armistice (September 8/9, 1943), lest they be captured by the Germans. Taking haven with the Allies in the South, Badoglio and the king were propped up by Churchill, who was especially determined to hang on to this Italian government to insure continued fulfillment of the armistice terms. But none of the new political parties in the Committee of National Liberation would join Badoglio's controversial government. The deadlock was not broken until April 1944, when the returning Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, suddenly reversed his party's line and indicated his readiness to join Badoglio and the king for the purpose of strengthening the war effort. Badoglio's new political government was short lived, however. As soon as Rome was liberated, the anti-Fascist leaders managed to unseat him, much to Churchill's dismay. Embittered, Badoglio spent some of the last years of his life writing his controversial memoirs and blaming others for failure to defend Rome against the Germans in September 1943, and defending himself against unfair efforts to punish him for his past links with the Fascist regime.

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GUIDO QUAZZA. *Resistenza e storia d'Italia: Problemi e ipotesi di ricerca.* (Biblioteca di Storia Contemporanea, Testi e saggi, number 9.) Milan: Feltrinelli Editore. 1976. Pp. 468. L. 5,800.

Guido Quazza's book is at once a presentation of recent research from the Turin school of Marxist historiography and an original interpretation of the Resistance as part of the general history of Italy from 1922 to 1946. In Quazza's view, the Resistance should be seen, not as a failed revolution, but rather as a step in the moral and political education of Italy. He feels that in order to understand why the Resistance represented no radical departure the conduct of the three major forces behind the opposition to Mussolini must be examined: the partisan bands of young peasants and workers, who had never accepted the Fascist regime's propaganda (Quazza totally rejects the recent interpretation, put forward by Renzo De Felice, on the extent of Fascist consensus); the political parties, which were represented in the Committee of National Liberation (CLN); and the "Fascist Anti-Fascists" (the Church, army, industrialists), who broke with the regime at the last moment.

In the struggle over post-Fascist Italy, the conservatives, backed by the Anglo-Americans, won almost by default. Quazza analyzes the difficulties in converting the partisan experience into political terms. The partisan movement was too involved in the struggle on the local level against the Germans and their Italian collaborators to offer a revolutionary alternative. The CLN, which aspired momentarily to a Jacobin-style government, found itself caught between two conflicting strategies in 1944. The first, proposed by the Action Party and some socialists, envisaged using the CLN as an instrument to forge new unity among leftist forces. The second, formulated by Palmiro Togliatti, viewed the chances of a radical break with the past pessimistically and opted for the long-range strategy of creating a solid base in the Communist Party. Quazza differs from other interpretations of Togliatti's policies by emphasizing the domestic considerations behind them. The Communist leader's acceptance of the royalist government in April 1944, against the wishes of the other Left parties was viewed not merely as adherence to a policy laid down in Moscow, but as a vital step in the transformation of the Italian Communist Party from a small clandestine force to a mass-based legal organization.

My only objection to Quazza's effort to put the Resistance in the broadest possible context is his dismissal of intellectual dissent within Fascism and the ability of Fascist leaders to create links with free culture as factors in the continuity between the *ventennio* and post-Fascism. While not properly part of the Resistance, the enormous number of people who made their careers under Fascism and could not totally repudiate it offered a powerful constituency against radical change. In all, however, Quazza has written an important work which presents much recent research into little studied areas of Resistance history.

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