The Reawakening of European Nationalisms

BY JACQUES RUPNIK

> In all a great array of elaborate, statistically supported serious futurology mingled with free fantasy, there took place one movement which dominated much of the nineteenth century, for which no significant future was predicted, a movement so familiar to us now, that it is only by some effort of imagination that one can conceive of the world in which it played no part. . . . The movement is nationalism.
>
> Isaiah Berlin

The end of the twentieth century is marked by the return of the nation and nationalisms. With force and often violence in the East and South, or softly in the West, it is the major ingredient of the post Cold War period. For the fall of communism and the last colonial empire incarnated by the Soviet Union opens not only the possibility of European reunions in democracy, but also that of a vengeful nationalism. Some across the Atlantic have announced the "end of history." Instead, we are discovering its return.

A "progressive" product of the European nineteenth century, after 1945 nationalism was held responsible for the two world wars and considered doomed to be overtaken either by Marxism or by liberalism, in the name of socio-economic logics stressing either international socialism or the market and the construction of Europe. Only the decolonization of the sixties seemed to confer a legitimacy in the Third World on the European model of the nation-state.

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Spring 1996)

Today, in the East, with the plan of communist integration in ruins, a space has opened up where the vitality of the "captive" nations is affirmed, along with conflicts which were thought to be a thing of the past. The lyrical illusion and unanimity of liberty was followed by ethnic fragmentation. In the West, the model of European integration embodying rationalism and modernity, which was supposed to culminate in Maastricht, appeared to run out of breath: the nation-states are reluctant to give up more of their sovereignty and several of them (Belgium, Italy, Spain) are being pulled by centrifugal forces. Thus, with the fall of communism, it was not only the Marxist utopia which became exhausted, but also a teleological reading of history, inherited from the Age of Enlightenment, of which the European integration was also a product.

"Everywhere in the world today, men and women are reaffirming their local particularities, their national, ethnic or religious identity . . . " writes Michael Walzer (1992, p. 44) in an essay devoted to the "new tribalism." We are witnessing the general affirmation of particular identities. Everywhere, in extremely different contexts, one finds a doubt, even an anxiety concerning identity, and it is tempting to seek common denominators for phenomena as diverse as the violent conflicts among the Serb, Croat, and Muslim communities in Bosnia, between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, between Hindus and Muslims in India; the divorce in Czechoslovakia and that in progress in Belgium or Quebec; the upsurge of a populism à la Zhirinovski in Russia or à la Le Pen in France; the increase in xenophobia, racism, antisemitism, and, more generally, intolerance of minorities in the East or immigrant communities in the West; the same fault line running as far as the ghettoization of Los Angeles, Beirut, and Sarajevo; the debate between the civic and ethnic definitions of the nation in South Africa after apartheid, in Eastern Europe after communism, or in Germany after the reunification.

Despite the many parallels or phenomena of contagion, one, therefore, should proceed with caution before using the same

label of reawakening of nationalisms or "tearing apart of nations" for such varied and sometimes contradictory manifestations. Simultaneity is not similitude.

First, because at the end of an imperial dictatorship the return of politics is hard to separate from the return of the nation—the nation, not necessarily nationalism. Poland, like Spain, its Catholic and traditionalist counterpart at the other end of Europe, has experienced a return to the concert of European nations after a long eclipse. This testifies to the "vitality" of the nation, at the precise moment when the forces of "clerico-nationalism," often summarily identified with the Polish political culture, underwent a stinging defeat in the elections won by former communists claiming to be skilled in the market and "social democracy." Going a little further, one could say that post-communism in Poland, in Hungary, or in the Czech Republic is not marked by the rise of threatening nationalism, but in the impossibility (disquieting in certain respects) of enforcing any collective project.

Second, because alongside the many ethnic conflicts and separatisms which receive the attention of the media or the political pundits there are countries and regions where nationalism is not "stirring," and even where old national wounds seem to be healing. Both in Southeast Asia (Burma, Thailand) and in Latin America (Chile), the nation-state is not in crisis, but growing stronger despite the destabilizing repercussions from the collapse of communism or the liberal economy in recession in other parts of the world.

Finally, there are the objections of those (Marxists or liberals) who point to the economy and the "long run" and caution against overestimating a transitory phenomenon or optical illusion. The nationalist "reawakening" is nothing more than a bout of fever connected to the fall of the Soviet bloc. Its "visibility" at present is masking, according to Eric Hobsbawm (1992, p. 191), its inevitable downfall. Nationalism is "historically less important" as a political project of planetary dimensions than it was in the nineteenth century or in the first

half of the twentieth. The globalization of economic exchanges is sounding the knell of the nation-state. The future will belong to the supranational or infranational dimension.

Starting with different premises, Jean-Marie Guéhenno (1993) arrives at a similar diagnosis: the end of the Cold War marks the end of the era of the nation-states and ushers in a new imperial age but without an emperor, since the United States is refusing this role, despite what Charles Krauthammer called the "unipolar moment."

The reawakening of nationalisms is connected to the interaction of three main causes: the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the international system; the ideological vacuum after communism; the economy, caught between globalism and the decomposition/recomposition of systems.

The New International Disorder

The collapse of the Soviet empire marks the end of an unjust order, yet one which was stable and predictable. The changes are comparable in their sweep to those of 1919 or 1945, that is, those which followed the two world wars, when the victors formulated the rules and the new outline of the international system. This time, the implosion of the communist system having come from within, the international order is collapsing without the "victors" of the Cold War being able to impose a "new world order." The destruction of the international system (bipolarity, "neither war nor peace") creates an opportunity for new actors but also for new conflicts concerning boundaries and national minorities.

For the order which is disappearing is not only that of Yalta, but also that of Versailles. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were its creations, on the ruins of the conquered empires, in the name of the right of nations to self-determination. These are disappearing in the name of the same principle, invoked by the very peoples which had formed them.

What are the limits on this logic of self-determination and fragmentation? Hans Morgenthau, in 1957, defined the paradox of nationalism thus: Nation B invokes it to defend its rights against Nation A but refuses these same rights to Nation C, each time, to be sure, in the name of an imperative of survival. Wilsonian idealism identified the principle of nationalities with justice. Hans Morgenthau (thinking about the fate of the minorities resulting from the old imperial nations within the newly created United Nations) sees this simply as a reversal of the roles of oppressor and oppressed.

> There are no inherent limits to the application of the principles of nationalism. If the peoples of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia could invoke these principles against Turkey, why could not the people of Macedonia invoke them against Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia? . . . Thus yesterday's oppressed cannot help becoming the oppressors of today because they are afraid lest they be again oppressed tomorrow. Hence, the process of national liberation must stop at some point, and that point is determined not by the logic of nationalism, but by the configuration of interest and power between the rulers and the ruled and between competing nations (Morgenthau, 1957, p. 481).

In a lecture given at Oxford in 1920, Elie Halévy pointed out the danger of applying the principle of nationalities without the correction or counterpoise of the principle of natural borders and European equilibrium. "The simple ideas are the revolutionary and warlike ones, because they can only become adopted by the exclusion and the destruction of all other ideas" (Halévy, [1937]1992, p. 126).

These limits on the logic of the third wave of nationalism not being established (or not yet), the process of fragmentation can continue in the uncertainty and the chaos (multiplicity of actors, absence of superior authority) whose most violent manifestations are found in the "crisis arc" between the Adriatic Sea and the Sea of Azov. Croatia separates from Yugoslavia, and the Serbs of Croatia proclaim their "republic"

in the Krajina; Moldavia (the former Romanian Bessarabia) has hardly declared its independence when the Russians of Transdniestria and the *gagaouze* minority (Turkish Christians) do the same with respect to the government of Kishinev. The latter does not ask to rejoin Romania for fear of the reaction of the Russian XIV Army, to say nothing of the precedent which this might establish for the Hungarians of Transylvania. Georgia proclaims its independence, which triggers the separatist insurrection among the Abkhasian and Ossetian minorities, encouraged by the Russian Army until Shevarnadze, on bended knee, asked Moscow to enter the CIS. Thus, from the Balkans to Central Asia, there extends a seismic zone of new conflicts involving borders and national minorities.

The multiplication of the nation-states is occurring in a context where they hold neither a monopoly on "meaning" nor on violence, where the decomposition of their freshly acquired authority keeps pace with that of the economy, favoring the proliferation of parallel economic, financial, and communication circuits. Pierre Hassner speaks in this regard of the "mafiaization" of politics, of the economy, and of war: "The war in Bosnia Hercegovina, as in Nagorno-Karabakh, is less between states and regular armies than between rival bands, and the confrontations do not seem to differ fundamentally from the North American gang wars or the wars of African clans" (1993, p. 15).

The Ideological Vacuum: Nation, Religion, Civilization

The second reason for the return of nationalism is the ideological vacuum after communism. Not simply because in the departure from communism the recourse to nationalism is proving to be the most easily mobilized substitute legitimation, but more generally because, with the vanishing of communism, an ideological model on which Europe has lived for two

centuries is worn out: the certainty of progress, shared in the East and in the West. It is the end of an era inaugurated by the French Revolution, where European history was thought of in bipolar terms: enlightenment/obscurantism, ancient/modern, progress/reaction. If the future horizon disappears, if the present is uncertain and worrisome, one has a tendency to turn toward the "certainties" of ethnic, national, or religious origin.

The advent of "postmodernism" announces the return of what Dominique Wolton (1993) calls "the gang of four": nation, history, religion, identity. Omnipresent in post-communist Europe, it also implicitly questions the model of European construction invented by modernist and technocratic elites.

While in Europe the post-ideological era or the "desecularization of the world," in the phrase of George Weigel, favors the "revenge of nations," to Samuel Huntington (1993) it involves "a clash of civilizations" which risk becoming the new front lines. The innermost identity depends more on this criterion than on that of the nation. Hence the concern about "the asiatization" of Japan, "the hinduization" of India at the expense of the encompassing nationalism inherited from Nehru, the "re-islamization" of the Middle East, which is taking over from pan-arabism. In Europe, the cleavage between western and eastern Christianity is again important with respect to Russia or the Balkans. In the coming years, says Huntington, "the local conflicts which risk becoming larger are those—like the war in Bosnia or the Caucasus—which occur along the fault lines between civilizations." And he adds, apocalyptically: "The next world war, if it occurs, will be a war between civilizations."

Without denying the importance of "deep structures," whether cultural or religious, most of the specialists on the Balkans refuse to interpret the conflict in Bosnia as a "religious war (Banac, 1993; Pavlowitch, 1992; Garde, 1992–93). Bosnia was the most secularized republic of Yugoslavia and the one

with the largest percentage of marriages between communities. Nevertheless, religion represents an important element in the community or national identification among Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croatians, and Muslims, whom Tito formed into a nationality in the '60s. But here as well, the peculiar Manicheism of the protagonists of the present conflict only stands out when certain paradoxes or contradictions of their common history are ignored. Thus, the Croatians, like the Hungarians or the Poles, consider themselves historically to be a rampart against the Turkish and Islamic expansion, whereas in reality it was the Serbs of the Krajina (the object of the present conflict) who fought against the Ottomans. Moreover, it is enough to read the novels of Ivo Andric (*The Chronicle of Travnik*, *A Bridge on the Drina*) to see the importance of the religious cleavages but also how much the Ottoman oppression brought together the Serbs and Croatians of Central Bosnia (today fleeing from the Muslims): the Franciscans, symbol *par excellence* of the Croatian presence in Bosnia, used the Cyrillic alphabet.

The Muslims of Bosnia are the descendants of the Bogomil heretics (the "Cathars of the Balkans") converted under the Ottoman Empire. The Serbs consider them to be Serbs who do not know they are Serbs (which is intolerable); the Croatians, as the descendants of a schism involving the flower of Croatian (that is, Catholic) society of Bosnia. It was Ante Pavelic, the "Führer" of the Croatian Ustasha state during the last war, who had the largest mosque in the Balkans built—at Zagreb!

Before the disappearance of Bosnia, carved up between Serbia and Croatia along "ethnic" lines, the Bosnian Muslims were the most secularized and the most committed to the common state of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia; today, they are evolving toward the only heartfelt identity which remains to them: the religious identity. Milosevic will have created what he claimed to be fighting.

This relationship between religion and nationalism in Europe deserves two remarks. While historically the modern

nationalism emerges along with the secularization of politics, it retains a close connection with religion in the multinational empires: Protestantism in Central Europe (and also for the German nation) against the Catholicism of the Habsburgs and especially Orthodoxy in the Balkans (Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece in particular) against the Ottomans. After the division of Poland, at the end of the eighteenth century, between Orthodox Russia and Protestant Prussia, the Catholic Church became the repository of the national idea. It resumed this role under communism, both in Lithuania and in Slovakia, or Croatia. This, today, is also one of the differences between the Catholicism of the east and that of the west of the continent. In the east, it remains very connected to the national identity or even the nationalist movement. In the west, the Christian-Democrats remain the pillars of the European idea, of which they were the first inspirers after the war. In France, it was the Catholic vote in Brittany and in Alsace which "saved" Maastricht!

Economic Globalization and Political Fragmentation

The global economy and the technological resolutions work against a will to power that is confined to the territory of a nation (the recent monetary crises have shown that national sovereignty was a fiction in this regard). The thesis advanced by Jean-Marie Guéhenno is not new, yet it contains serious implications for our subject: the relevant areas of economic action, of deliberation, or of political identification are in discord.

But contrary to the Marxist or liberal prophesies, this does not automatically signal the waning of nationalisms, not even in the economic domain. As Elie Cohen notes, the more the world economy becomes integrated, the more businesses will break free from their original territory and "the more one will witness awakenings of sovereignty, along with flare-ups of

localism (Cohen, 1993). The debate about GATT was one illustration of this.

But, most of all, the bypassing of the nation by the globalization of the economy and of communication is supposed to announce the death of politics (Guéhenno, 1993). While the logic of economics tends toward globalization, interdependence, and regional integration, that of politics moves toward national fragmentation.

Further, the idea that the global market and the universal *Homo economicus* are dissolving ethnic particularities is not true. On the contrary, a recent study by Joel Kotkin (1993) suggests that the world economy of the twenty-first century will be dominated by "global cosmopolitan tribes." The international ethnic networks (diasporas) will be one of the factors of success. This phenomenon should be compared to the connection studied by sociologists between ethnicity and economic success in American society. "The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism" will shift to the Japanese, Chinese, Jews, or Armenians. Their rapid ascending mobility contrasts with the relative stagnation of the black population and may be one of the factors underlying inter-ethnic tensions.

How much do economic factors weigh in the dynamic of the post-communist nationalisms?

The nations leaving Sovietism simultaneously rediscover political sovereignty and a new form of economic dependency. The dependency in itself, as shown by the case of Spain, is not a problem: it has not prevented either the formidable economic expansion of the past twenty years or the transition to democracy. But it was acceptable to the society precisely because it found its counterpart in the process of integration in the democratic and prosperous club which is the European Community. The present situation of Central and Eastern Europe is that of a dependency without the counterpart of integration. If it continues for long, one should fear already noticeable reactions of economic nationalism.

The collapse of the economic system has accelerated the

breakup of the multinational federal nations. The Slovenians and Croatians were persuaded that the statism and the redistribution of the Yugoslavian federation was costing them a lot and that independence would favor their integration in the European market. In a generalized context of every man for himself in the USSR, the Baltic peoples followed a similar reasoning. The "nationalisms" of the Slovenians, the Baltic peoples, or the Czechs are first and foremost economic "egoisms" comparable to those of the Catalans, the Flemish, or the Lombard League.

The case of Slovakia proves, on the contrary, that nationalism is not a rational ideology. The Slovaks voted in June 1992 for the nationalist parties, not skimping on social demagogy, only to find after the divorce that they were, economically speaking, the big losers (budget subsidies, foreign investments). On the other hand, the Czech liberal right wing (Vaclav Klaus) implicitly used the economic argument of the Slovak "burden" to induce the Czechs to say "goodbye" to a State with which they had identified since 1918. Finally, the opposing attitudes of the Czech and Slovak societies with respect to the transition toward market economy (Czech liberalism, Slovak national-populism) helped bring out the division between two nations, two societies, and two divergent political dynamics.

Whereas the economic factor has initially favored separatism, the economic limits of independence emerge later. Most of the states originating in the former USSR are finding that their new currency (the most prized symbol of independence after the flag) is not convertible and that their energy supply or the market for their products are located in Russia. We are even witnessing the use of the economic weapon by Russia against Ukraine or the Baltic countries, by Serbia against Croatia (tourism was its principal source of foreign exchange), but also by the international community against the nationalism of the Milosevic regime.

In other words, economics first worked toward separation,

then toward the return to cooperation, if not unification. There is one exception, Germany, where economics instead first favored unification, then became the principal obstacle or challenge to integration. When the Wall came down and Chancellor Kohl proposed exchanging one Eastern Mark for one Western Mark (an economic absurdity but an effective political symbol), Jürgen Habermas spoke, not without a certain condescension, of a "nationalism of the Deutsche Mark" among his new fellow citizens of the East. As if, with regard to history, it was not preferable to all others . . .

Modernity or "Return of History"

The social sciences neither predicted the reawakening of nationalisms, nor saw the coming fall of communism. And Robert Solow, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics (a discipline well placed to speak of failure of predictions), asks: "Why one who predicted so poorly should have relevant opinions on other subjects?" One, therefore, should consider with modesty the contribution of the theoreticians of nationalism. The sole (meager) consolation is that the intellectual and political elites have found themselves even more disarmed.

Two main interpretations have been proposed for the "reawakening of nationalisms." The first, more widespread among the political elites and public opinion, sharing a culturalist or primordialist vision of the nation, sees nothing but archaism, return of history, or return of the repressed. The second, more widespread within the social sciences, considers instead that nationalism and the tardy and disorderly construction of new nation-states on the rubble of the Soviet empire is a stage (not very attractive, to be sure) in the admittance of these societies to the modern world.[1]

The first thesis starts with a reading of post-communist nationalism summarized by the metaphors of the "refrigerator" or the "cauldron." Communism acted as a freezer, chilling

certain problems, aspirations, controversies which one finds intact or (where the refrigerator broke down) in a nauseating condition half a century later. The metaphor of the cauldron suggests that imperial Soviet power kept the "captive nations" under the lid, with their conflicts and hatreds fully cooked and now released.

One finds this thesis implicitly in the inaugural speech of President Clinton in January 1993, where he evokes "a world warmed by the sun of liberty, but menaced by ancestral hatreds." The same term of "ancestral hatred" was used by President Mitterand on the subject of the former Yugoslavia in February 1992 during a colloquy with the provocative title "Europe and the Tribes." On one side, Europe, our Europe, marching confidently toward the radiant and supranational future of Maastricht; on the other, the barbarous "tribes" of the East, regressing toward the ideologies and behaviors of a bygone age.

This interpretation, the most widespread in the West both among the political elites and in the media and public opinion, presents several conveniences. First of all, simplicity. The nationalism problems of today are merely a reproduction of those of the past. Secondly, nationalism involves the "affective" dimension of politics. If one is dealing with passions or irrational impulses, there is no need to analyze their political nature. Finally, it involves "tribes" ("*Far away countries of which we know nothing*," said Chamberlain at the time of Munich), which excuses one from making a connection with manifestations of the national life in Western Europe and thus becoming involved. For the "tribes" of the East do not belong to our history (that of the supranational Europe which is being built) or even to our geography (*tribe*: cf. *Third World*).

This interpretation relies on culturalist, historicist, primordialist postulates in the sense that Clifford Geertz defined the "primordial ties" of blood (*kinship*), language, religion or custom, the outcome of "centuries of progressive crystallization (Geertz, 1963). Applied to the post-communist realm, it

obscures the political nature of the national problem, starting with its connection to the collapse of communism and the breakthrough of democracy.

The revolution of 1989, as well as the "Springtime of the Peoples" of 1848, simultaneously pose the problem of the nation and of democracy, of popular sovereignty and national sovereignty. The East German protesters in October 1989 chanted "*Wir sind das Volk* (We are the people)"; after the fall of the Wall, the chant was "*Wir sind ein Volk* (We are one people)." A semantic glide from democratization to reunification, two components (or two phases?) of the departure from communism. The first modification of frontiers, the first application of the principle of national self determination of the post-Soviet period, was the reunification of Germany, with its past as a nation-state (1871–1945), as short as it was intense. But here, at least, there was no talk of a tribe.

In other words, the question is not whether self-determination is good or bad in itself, but whether it is compatible with democracy, an "open society," European integration. The argument of size is not decisive either for democracy or for economic viability, despite the statement of the Luxembourgian Minister, Jacques Poos, who explained with unintentional humor at Ljubljana in June 1991 that Slovenia did not have the requisite size to be viable. The separation of Norway and Finland from Sweden or of Belgium from the Netherlands in other times, and that of Slovenia or the Baltic countries today, is the consequence and the condition for the development of democracy. For the "small nations," according to Michael Walzer or Milan Kundera, independence, or the "deconstruction" of the imperial or multinational structures, can be a condition for democracy and European integration. This is also the argument developed by the Slovenia philosopher, Valentin Hribar:

> Only a sovereign nation can sovereignly abandon a portion of its sovereignty and transfer it to the international community. . . .

> But the peoples living at an infranational level, and not within their own state, remain more or less objects. . . . If they do not obtain independence, that is, a position of a completely separate subject in the new Europe, not only will they remain what they have been up to now—an object—but they will also become the scraps of History, an ethnic vestige, a folkloric curiosity, without any power to control their own identity (1991, p. 27).[2]

The cause of the explosion of Yugoslavia or the USSR was not hatred but the interaction between the decomposition of the communist system and that of a federal state. The decisive element for the survival of a multinational state emerging from a dictatorship is the electoral sequence, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1992) have shown in the case of Spain. The new democracy must first legitimize the state framework in which it has to operate. If, contrary to what was organized after Franco, the first free elections did not take place simultaneously throughout the territory of the state, its future cohesion would have been compromised. That is what happened in the former Yugoslavia, where the first free elections did not take place on the level of the federation, but in Slovenia and Croatia. From the moment a new power, provided with a democratic legitimacy, exists on the level of the republics, the federal state inherited from communism is instantly delegitimized. The same argument holds for the explosion of the USSR in terms of the conflict between the center and the periphery, with the central power symbolized by Gorbachev, head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the power of Yeltsin, president-elect of Russia.

If popular sovereignty and national sovereignty are combined in the first phase of the disaggregation of a system and an empire, it remains to be seen how durable this symbiosis is, provided it is not a first phase that is followed by another combination of nationalism and authoritarian temptation. Are we not already seeing in most of the countries of Eastern Europe a cleavage developing between the democratic and liberal currents and those of national-populism? In his work,

Misery of the Small States of Eastern Europe, written at the end of the last war and remaining one of the best guides to the subject, Istvan Bibo formulated this dilemma as follows: "Fascism exists in rudimentary form wherever, after a cataclysm or an illusion, the cause of the nation is separated from that of liberty, where a historical shock engenders convulsive fear in seeing liberty menace the cause of the nation" (1986, p. 115).

"Return" of History or Its Detouring?

Forgetting is just as essential as memory to the building of a nation. Ernest Renan, in *What is a Nation?* (1882), wrote: "The essence of a nation is that all individuals have much in common and also they have forgotten many things." For Renan, "every French citizen *should have forgotten about* St. Bartholemew's."

Most of the protagonists of the recent nationalist conflicts invoke history. Nowhere in the world does one commemorate with such assiduity and pride their historical defeats and their "St. Bartholemew's" as in post-communist Eastern Europe, the collective memory as an illustration of what D. H. Lawrence called "*thinking with the blood.*"

When one evokes the argument of "ancestral hatred" to explain the recent conflicts, especially in the former Yugoslavia (but also in Northern Ireland or in India), it should be kept in mind that this is fabricated or "reproduced." In the case of the Serbs and Croatians, it goes back to the period between the wars and especially the traumatism of 1940–45, which from the standpoint of the historian is still quite recent. A similar animosity was totally absent from the Czech/Slovak divorce. Consequently, one must distinguish the actual weight of history from how it is used or abused in political discourse, in particular, for purposes of legitimation of a new power or its recourse to violence. In the ideological marketplace of post-communism, community identity (national or religious) is

invoked by the political elites to fill a void. Their success is not determined by ancestral atavisms, but by political strategies of conquest (or preservation) or power, legitimated by the recourse to "national values" or to history. It is not "ancestral" hatred which is the cause of the war in Bosnia. It is the war which created the hatred.

No one in the post-communist realm is sure of emerging unscathed from the manipulation of the historical discourse. And there is but a short step from the war of memories to real war in the Balkans. The cases of Kosovo, Transylvania, or Macedonia (like Nagorno-Karabakh) are examples of the syndrome "one territory for two dreams." Thus, Greece claims the "copyright" to the name Macedonia, invoking Philip of Macedon (who was not Greek, but that was so long ago . . .). The parliaments of Athens and Skopje claim the same emblem found on the tomb of Philip. Symbolically, the conflict has already started.[3]

In Croatia, there is a tendency to forget that the Yugoslav idea was invented in the last century by the Croatian bishop Strossmayer as an alternative to Austria-Hungary; the Croatian minister of defense declared at the time of independence, "We have been waiting for this moment for eight centuries!" President Tudzman, the general and historian of his state, caused the "Square of the Victims of Fascism" in Zagreb to be rebaptized the "Square of the Croatian Heroes," while a school adopted the name of Mile Budak, Ustashi "theoretician" of anti-Serb "ethnic cleansing," to whom the formula is attributed "exterminate a third, expel a third, assimilate a third."

But it is without doubt that in Serbia this misuse of history for political purposes has been taken the furthest; for historians and intellectuals have lent themselves gladly to this exercise. The *Memorandum* of 1986 of the Academy of Sciences of Serbia furnished the ideological foundation for the project of Greater Serbia, adopted by Milosevic: starting with the defense of the Serbs (10 percent of the population) in Kosovo,

one arrives at the idea that Serbia is wherever Serbs are found. The Belgrade historian, Veselin Djuretic, formulates it thus: "The frontiers imposed by Europe, then inherited from communism, are profoundly unjust. What we desire is the union of all the Serbian countries: Serbia, Montenegro, Srbska Krajina, the Serb Republic of Bosnia, and Northern Macedonia" (1992). In other words, the Serbian nationalists simultaneously invoke the *ethnic principle* on behalf of their minorities in Croatia and Bosnia and the *historical principle* on behalf of Kosovo, where nearly nine-tenths of the population are Albanians.

The person who has formulated the Serbian theses in the most explicit and most outrageous manner is beyond doubt the leader (now deceased) of the Serbs of the Krajina, the psychiatrist Jovan Raskovic, the counterpart of Karadzic (also a psychiatrist) in Bosnia, in a book entitled *The Crazy Country*, published in Belgrade in 1990 with a preface by Dobrica Cosić (novelist and briefly President of Yugoslavia in 1992): "Where the Serbs are living are Serbian territories of the Croatian state . . . This question: who does this land belong to, remains quite open. The strongest can say it belongs to him. But that is precisely the question: *who is the strongest*?" (Raskovic, 1990, pp. 246–47). And again, which Zhirinovski would not disavow: "The small peoples have a constant fear of the larger nations. . . . Thus, we have allowed a complex of guilt to be imposed on us." The Serbs, therefore, should free themselves of this complex by affirming their will to power. The conflict is inevitable: "It is not surprising that a situation of total hatred and paranoia is developing in this country," hatred which the Serbian politicians and intellectuals have deliberately stirred up. Raskovic, head of the Democratic Party of Serbia, does not deny this and even claimed in a televised interview: "I feel responsible, because I prepared this war, although not with military preparations. Had I not provoked this emotional tension within the Serbian people, nothing would have happened. My party and I myself have set fire to the fuse of

Serbian nationalism, not only in Croatia, but everywhere else, particularly in Bosnia-Hercegovina" (quoted in Grmek, Gjidara, and Simac, 1993, p. 313).

The Serbian intellectuals, historians, writers, even reconverted psychiatrists have played an essential role in the legitimization of the theses of "ethnic cleansing." In the '20s, Julien Benda pondered the role of the intellectuals who abandoned the universal humanist values in a work entitled *The Treason of the Clerics*. The formula was later used to describe the compromising of European intellectuals with communism. Today, it can be applied to the role of certain intellectual circles in the "reawakening" of nationalisms.

The case of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is mentioned here only as an example of a more general phenomenon. A recent article by political scientists, Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph (1992), specializing in India studies (in a context where the Hindu middle classes and their intellectual elites are seeing their status decline in the face of the Muslim "nouveaux riches") how the conflict between Hindus and Muslims uses references to history or religious symbols for political ends. Much of their analysis can be transposed to the Serbo-Croatian conflict or to Bosnia:

> 'Ancient hatreds' are thus fabricated at least as much as inherited. To call them 'ancient' is to claim that they are primordial forces, beyond history and human action, whereas quite often they are only synthetic junk. The intellectuals, writers, artists and politicians 'manufacture' hatreds (. . .). It is not the ancient or primordial nature that establishes which identities will be determining. These identities are manufactured, innocently or maliciously, in the print or audiovisual media, in school books and advertising, in the gigantic televised series in India and the American *talk-shows*, in the electoral strategies, wherever the self and the other, them and us, are represented in an ever-widening public culture.

"Ancestral hatred" and ethno-nationalism are creations of the modern world.

Since the nineteenth century, nationalism has been mainly

an invention of intellectuals. The search for the *Volksgeist*, the peculiar genius of each people, the reconstitution of a historical continuity are so many aspects of what Eric Hobsbawm calls "the invention of a tradition" (1984). It is also the post-modern thesis of Benedict Anderson, who considers nations to be "imagined communities" (1983), "invented," "imagined," but no less real than others. As Michael Walzer writes, "The constructed communities are the only ones that exist" (1992, p. 47).

Nation-State and Modernity

John Plamenatz (1973) draws a distinction between the "two types of nationalism": the Western, where the State precedes the nation, and the Oriental (which encompasses Eastern Europe but also the Third World), where the nation is in search of the State, wavering between imitation and rejection of the Western model. The relationship between these two models also governs the outcome of the debate, both classical and also quite current, between the citizen nation and the ethnic nation, of which the "other Europe" has been the prime location since the nineteenth century.

In the Western model (France, Great Britain), the nation corresponds to the State and thus can be identified with a political community. In the "Eastern" model, the nation, or rather the people (*das Volk*), is defined by language, culture, ethnicity. Since the French Revolution and certainly since 1848, the epoch of exportation of the democratic nation-state model to the nations belonging to multinational empires, the primary ambition of all the nationalisms was to bring together the *Volk* and the political nation. Nationalism, to Ernest Gellner, is "essentially a political principle, which affirms that the political unity and the national unity should be congruent."

According to the model proposed by Gellner, nationalism is the child of industrialization and of the dislocation of

traditional communities. The nation-state is the product of industrial society, which needs to homogenize, culturally and linguistically, the society by means of a "national" system of education and communication (one comes back to the idea of Karl Deutsch (1969): the nation as a new "community of communication"). "Nationalism is not the reawakening of an ancient, latent, slumbering force, although it has been presented as such. In reality, it is the consequence of a new form of social organization, founded on high cultures dependent on education and profoundly interiorized, each of which receives protection from its State. Nationalism avails itself of preexisting cultures, which it transforms . . . " (Gellner, 1989).[4]

Gellner discerns five stages toward modernity and the nation-state in the East: 1) the multinational empires (from the Treaty of Westphalia to the French Revolution); 2) the process of industrialization and modernization, requiring the use of the same language by the people and the state apparatus; 3) the pyrrhic victory of the nation-state (1918) ("Misery of the Small States of Eastern Europe," wrote I. Bibo); 4) "*Nacht und Nebel*": Hitler and Stalin "simplify" the national puzzle by murder, forced migrations, assimilation; 5) the emergence of an advanced industrial society enabling both local autonomy and supranational integration.

This scheme of the joint march of industrial modernity and the nation-state deserves several remarks. First of all, the end of the Soviet Empire completes the history initiated with the fall of the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire. History (that of the building of the nation) resumes its course, which is not the same thing as regression. Secondly, not all of the states of the post-communist realm are in the same situation with respect to the phases of the proposed model. The Poles, the Hungarians, or the Czechs had a State in the Middle Ages, subsequently lost (in the seventeenth century for the Czechs, at the end of the eighteenth for the Poles) then regained in 1918. Their situation is different from that of the new states being

born. In the case of Slovenia or Ukraine, they are nations which never had a State (Croatia had one until the twelfth century, Slovakia experienced its first State between 1939 and 1945 under the high patronage of Nazi Germany). For them, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, or the USSR will have formed a stage in the construction of a nation-state. Finally, in the case of Byelorussia or the republics of Central Asia, these are pure creations of sovietism. The Soviet system was the context of the emergence of these nations, which are today trying to give themselves an ethnic legitimation (against the Russians and other minorities). In Gellner's scheme, they oscillate between Phase 2 (start of industrialization) and Phase 4.

But it is the linear scheme implied by the theory of modernization that causes the problem. It suggests that from the nineteenth century until 1945, the constitution of nation-states was done by virtue of "ethnic cleansing," more or less violent (the negotiation between Greeks and Turks completing what the socio-economic dynamic or the war had started). From this standpoint, the carving up of Bosnia would not be a threat to Europe, but only the last tremor in the building of nation-states in the Balkans.

Thus, both the thesis of archaism ("ancestral hatred") and that of modernization imply passivity, at best containment, in view of the violent emergence of ethnic nationalism. Now, as we know, history (including that of nationalism) is not linear and does not necessarily have more opportunity to advance toward the *happy ending* of the satisfied nations (no more than post-Bismarckian Germany, presumed to be "satiated"). The success of ethnic nationalism over the civic conception of the nation, the modification of frontiers by force from the Balkans to Transcaucasia would constitute a precedent full of consequences in a territory where the frontiers are more recent (and considered to be less legitimate) than the frontiers of Africa. Commencing with Russia, in quest of a post-imperial identity.

Russia, between empire and liberty, is confronted today, as

in the time of Pushkin, by the central dilemma of its national identity, as analyzed by Georges Nivat in the light of history. Decolonization is a trauma to Russia, as it is to any imperial power, but with this specific feature: it is an empire which was built by progressive extension of its territory. Russia is "a country which colonized itself," said the historian Kluchevsky. The result? While Great Britain was still Great Britain without the Indies, while France remained France without Algeria, what is Russia without empire? And what should its borders be, since 25 million Russians are living outside of those inherited from the explosion of the Soviet Union? No one has given a satisfactory answer to these questions. The retaking of the "near abroad" is one answer for the wounded post-imperial ego, but it arouses (or reinforces) the nationalist fears, the "ethnoparanoia" (using the term of the political scientist, Andrei Zubov) of the newly independent nations.

The simultaneous fall of communism and the empire was experienced by the Russians as a liberation but also as a humiliation. For the nations of the old Soviet bloc, there is one main culprit (outside the nation) for the communist disaster: Russia. There is a return to the national past in search of a "pure" identity not sullied by the communist experience (and this is done with more zeal as the continuity with the old regime is more obvious, from Serbia to Ukraine). It is difficult for the Russians to resort to such a subterfuge; they cannot avoid the old question, already formulated by Berdyayev, of the link between Bolshevism and their history, their culture, their religion.

The situation of Russia today is not unlike that of Weimar Germany. Between 1989 and 1991, Russia lost its conquests of 1945, as well as those of the tsarist empire: the equivalent of a defeat without having fought. The external humiliation is combined with the economic disaster and hyperinflation at home, the collapse of the old regime, and the extreme vulnerability of the democratic institutions, as demonstrated by the events of autumn 1993 and the legislative elections carried

away by the ultranationalist right of Zhirinovski. One should not push the similarities too far: Zhirinovski is not Hitler, nor is Yeltsin Hindenburg, and the Russian population can have nostalgia for the empire without having that for totalitarianism. Even so, while all the extreme right nationalists in Europe are today focusing on the rancors and frustrations at home, those of Russia are explicitly playing the card of external expansion. In the immediate future, Zhirinovski (like Le Pen) represents a danger not so much because he might assume power as because he is pushing the political class to recover its themes. Will Russia be able to forge a national identity without empire? With an empire, could it become a democracy?

The Return of the Nation in the West

The contrast between the integration in Western Europe (and North America) and the fragmentation in the East (and in the Third World) proves to be reductive. The examples of Belgium, Italy, or Canada, to mention only these, show that the problem of nationalism is not a by-product of post-communism; it concerns the Western democracies and the developed industrial societies of today.

While the causes of this return of the national question are strong (exhaustion of the traditional ideologies and political cleavages, crisis of the State, ethnification of politics, economic crisis), the liberal institutional and legal remedies are proving to be weak. All of the antidotes to nationalism (multiculturalism, regionalism, federalism, European integration) produced by the Western democracies for a half century are today running out of steam.

Cosmopolitanism and Multiculturalism

The liberals have long considered the market and democracy as a formidable means of integration and homogeniza-

tion. The cosmopolitanism of the large Western metropolitan areas was the illustration of this fact. Yet, as Michael Ignatieff rightly observes, this cosmopolitanism is the privilege of societies enjoying a strong nation-state (1993, p. 9). When the authority of the State breaks down, the logic of the conflicts in our multiethnic neighborhoods is not so distant from that of the interethnic conflicts in the post-communist realm or in the Third World. The cosmopolitanism of Sarajevo did not survive the disappearance of a supranational umpire State.

The paradox of the modern democratic world, with the development of the consumer society and planetary television entertainment, is that it produces homogenization and uniformity but also the exacerbated quest for distinction and recognition. The more individuals (and peoples) resemble each other, the more they long to affirm their differences. It is what Freud called "the narcissism of the minor difference": the smaller the actual difference, the more important it is perceived to be. Enemies, says Ignatieff, need each other to remind themselves what they are.

How to organize diversity? How to reconcile the principle of democratic equality and the right to be different? The two most formidable machines of assimilation in the name of a civic concept of the nation, the United States and France, are at issue today. The *melting pot*, symbol of the American identity which integrated the subcultures of the various ethnic groups, has been replaced by the "multicultural" movement, emphasizing separate ethnic identities. From the recognition of diversity, we have moved on to particularist identity demands, to the institutionalized fragmentation which, for Arthur Schlesinger, threatens the very foundations of the American nation. The American nation was a people before being a culture; today, the priorities are reversed, at the risk of creating an increasingly more compartmentalized "nation of minorities" (Schlesinger, 1993).

In the countries of the European Union, one finds (in a different context) certain of these questions in view of the

mobilizations around religious or ethnic identities of immigrant populations. Beyond the different models of integration proposed by France, Germany, or Great Britain lies the coming definition of a European citizenship able to reconcile the multiple allegiances of these populations.

Regionalism and Federalism

Regionalism, decentralization, and federalism have long been looked upon as the antidote to Jacobinism and its alterego, separatism. Today, one may ask whether they are not more similar to transition phases, or vectors of separation, instead of remedies to the centrifugal forces; they are as much a part of the problem as of its solution.

Denis de Rougemont, founder of the European Culture Center in Geneva, contrasted the coldness of the Jacobin nation-state with the warmth of regional communities, defined as "spaces of civic participation": "Against the nation-state, implacable and truly catastrophic expression of the technocratic utopia, one single reply: the reawakening of the regions, the return of basic communities, the only real ones, the only inoffensive ones" (de Rougemont, 1980, p. 127).

"Only real?" Inoffensive? Unlike a nation, "a region is not delimited, it is recognized," said geographer, Vidal de la Blache, at the end of the last century. But what to make of a region which has been wracked by linguistic cleavage? The separation of the canton of Jura from that of Berne was one model of solution by law and democratic procedures (referendum), yet it remains a defeat as to the possibility of overcoming the primacy of the ethno-linguistic frontier.

With Switzerland, Spain represents the other model where regionalism serves as an antidote to separatism. The Spanish Constitution, in fact, presents great originality and great pragmatism in granting degrees of autonomy of variable geometry to the different regions (Catalonia, Basque prov-

inces, Andalusia, and so forth). This has certainly made it possible to safeguard the coherence of the Spanish state in emerging from the Franco dictatorship. Today, this solution appears to be attacked on two sides. First, the Catalans are no longer satisfied with the status quo. On 3 September 1991, the president of the regional executive, Jordi Pujol, in Barcelona issued a warning to the government of Madrid: "Catalonia is a nation. It does not deserve the treatment it has received. Centralism is falling apart in Europe. The nationalist forces are the emerging ones . . . We have the same rights as the Lithuanians" (quoted in Kourliandsky, 1991, p. 44). On the other hand, one witnesses a "spiral of protest" on the part of other regions demanding the same status of autonomy as that granted to Catalonia.

The idea of "the Europe of regions" has long been perceived as an effective counterweight to the emergence of nationalisms in the western part of the continent. This was the purpose behind the first conference in Munich 1989, bringing together representatives of the regionalist movements throughout Europe. The minister-president of Bavaria, Max Streibl (CSU), straightaway affirmed the philosophy of the movement: the regions are the old stones making up Europe; one is a Catalan or a Walloon before being a Spaniard or a Belgian.

Three questions arise with respect to the regionalist currents. First, the discourse about identity and rootedness in a region as *Heimat* (homeland) might be mistaken for the most traditionalist nationalism. Second, the idea of a Europe from the bottom up, a Europe of regions, is often combined with a virulent criticism of the Brussels bureaucracy, which goes as far as that of the most anti-European nationalists. Finally, the "Euroregions" as transborder communities implying a German opening toward Central and Eastern Europe (Silesia, Pomerania, Eastern Prussia, the "Sudetenland") concern all the territories lost by Germany in 1945. Is there not, in those seeking a new role for the reunified Germany in Europe, "a danger of instrumentalization of Euroregionalism by pressure

groups in the sense of a reconquest, peaceful of course" (Korinman, 1993, p. 66)?

While the violent explosion of Yugoslavia represents a foil to the independentist temptation, the friendly Czech/Slovak separation is already serving as a reference (we dare not say "model") for the Flemish in Belgium and the independentist Québécois in Canada. The nonviolent nature of the divorce is only part of the explanation. Three other elements should be taken into account. The first is the asymmetry of loyalties to the common State as the central problem of the political system. For the Czechs, the Walloons, or the English-speaking Canadians, there was a symbiosis between the national identification and the identification with the State. Not so for the Slovaks, the Flemish, or the Québécois, especially after the '60s. Federalism was expected to offset this imbalance; it now appears to be a stage along the road to separation. For federalism of two parties (the English-speaking/French-speaking cleavage makes it so relevant for Canada) is a federalism of confrontation where the political conflict is perceived as a zero-sum game: what one party acquires must come at the expense of the other. Unlike the federalism by association (Switzerland), where distinct entities decide in common the terms of their cooperation, there is in the case of Czechoslovakia, Belgium, or Canada what France's Delpérée calls a federalism of dissociation which leads a State "to divest itself of some of its activities and to delegate part of its responsibilities, and thus of its political choices, to new entities."

These new entities eventually become States within the State, to the point of transforming what remains of the federal State into an empty and, thus, extremely vulnerable shell. Apart from the economic stakes (who "subsidizes" whom) or the political polarization (Klaus versus Meciar), the dynamic which prevails is that of the insatiability of the autonomist claim. The rapidity of the Czech/Slovak divorce after the elections of June 1992 can only be understood in light of mutual disappoint-

ments since 1918 and, especially, the impasse of the constitutional debate which completely dominated the Czechoslovakian political life after the fall of communism. In simple terms, the Czechs, assuming an attachment to the common State, advocated a federation from the top down; the Slovaks preferred the prior recognition of two entities, a confederation from the bottom up. In the space of two years, President Havel organized a dozen Czechoslovak "summits," not counting those which took place directly between the prime ministers (Pithart and Meciar, later Carnogursky). Whenever a constitutional compromise was found, it would be attacked the next day by the government or the Slovak parliament. The winner of the elections in Slovakia had the following agenda: 1) a declaration of sovereignty (voted by the parliament of Bratislava in July 1992); 2) a Slovak constitution (adopted in August 1992 by the same people who refused a Czechoslovak constitution); 3) the election of a president of Slovakia (fairwell to Havel, symbol of the common State). Slovakia would become a "subject of international law" with its own foreign policy, its own diplomatic representation, a seat at the United Nations, and so on. In other words, an independent State in a common State. The same logic of insatiable autonomy as the moving force of the game of politics is at work (in different economic contexts, to be sure) in the Québécois and Flemish cases analyzed by Michael Ignatieff and Francis Delpérée.

Finally, the last common characteristic of the ethno-linguistic independentist nationalisms: to refuse others (the minorities) what one demands for oneself. After having long fought to affirm their cultural and linguistic identity, Slovaks, Flemish, and French-speaking Québécois hasten to repudiate bilingualism for the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, French-speakers in Flanders, or English-speakers in Quebec (the argument applies to the Russian minority in the Baltic countries). In the name of a threatened identity, the collective rights of the "independent" nation are imposed to the detriment of the individual or collective rights of minorities. The logic of the

independentist majority democracy at work in the West does not differ fundamentally from that of the newly independent States in the East, whether Slovakia or the Baltic countries.

Europe

The idea of the construction of Europe began for its founding fathers with a rejection of the nationalisms responsible for two world wars which, in their eyes, were also European civil wars. Today, it furnishes a framework which neutralizes or lessens the effects of nationalist or separatist temptations: rendering them superfluous in the Europe without borders of the single market; or, if separation nevertheless has occurred, it has no major consequence, since it is not a threat to the peace.

If the European Union has become a guardrail, it also reveals today in the majority of the member countries the national identity crisis of the nation-state. This appears nowhere more clearly than in France, from the Toubon law, protecting the purity of the language, to the protectionist tendencies revealed by the debate on GATT, and the European elections of June 1994, where a quarter of the electorate opted for an extreme rightwing nationalist and an anti-European (Le Pen, de Villiers).

In his essay, *The Reawakening of French Nationalisms* (1994), Gilles Martinet points out how the three components of French nationalism, taking their inspiration from different traditions (Barresian, de Gaullian, and Jacobin) are confronting the same dilemma: they wish to dissolve the community ties in the name of national sovereignty, while invoking a European shield against the American or Japanese power. In England, the anti-European discourse of the conservatives is resolutely free trade. In France, it is protectionist: "In the past, nationalism claimed to embody the rejection of decline. Today, it has become one of the principal causes" (Martinet, 1994, p. 139).

Yet it is the question of the nation-state as the exclusive (or

privileged) context of sovereignty and democracy which is the essential point of the argument of the anti-European neonationalists, from Philippe Séguin to Jean-Pierre Chevènement. The European Community is built on the market and law to the detriment of politics; one cannot separate sovereignty from the people; now, there is no European people, and so there cannot be a European "sovereign." But Europe, to this way of thinking, is primarily "the end of the French exception," to borrow the formula of François Furet, Pierre Rosanvallon, and Jacques Julliard (1989). It relied on the citizen of the republic, the collective interest represented by the State, secularism, and the universalist vocation of France. It will be replaced, in the liberal European new deal, by the individual, the market, community multiculturalism, and the European Union.

Europe has long been built in prosperity and adversity. Today, these two elements have disappeared and with them the federalist project. "The European federalists," writes Jean Marie Guéhenno, "have reason to denounce the archaism of the old nationalisms, but they are wrong to construct a project which in fact assumes a European nationalism" (1993). This lacks "the struggles in which the old nations of Europe were exhausted, but also formed. In order to become a nation in its turn, it will require a great common evil." The threat of communism is no longer there for solidarity, and that of the ethnic nationalism in Bosnia has not been perceived as such by the European Community.

Since the war, Europe has been built on a liberal project, civil society at the expense of the nation. This project is today out of breath, and the nationalist passions, with their infinitely more powerful capabilities of mobilization, are again at work.

It would surely be an exaggeration to speak of nationalist dominoes, but the repercussions in the West of the reawakening of

the nations of the East are clearly perceptible. One observes phenomena of transeuropean osmosis or imitation both in the discourse and in the independentist claims: the Catalan or Scottish nationalists refer explicitly to the independence of the Baltic countries, while the Flemish and Québécois invoke the Czech/Slovak divorce; Greece, at a time when it held the presidency of the European Union, succumbed to the Balkan syndrome while keeping the mention of religious affiliation on the identity cards in the name of the "indissoluble bond between Hellenism and Orthodoxy"; Italy, with its populist revolt against the "single party" in power since the war, combining the neonationalism of Forza Italia with regionalism and "post-fascism," is an intermediate case between the East and the West in the transition after the Cold War.

The kickoff of this new period was the collapse of the Wall, the "leaving of Yalta," which began with the reunification of Germany in the name of the self-determination of nations. It provoked and legitimated, in turn, a chain reaction which has by no means run its course. But it would be illusory to wish to rebuild a wall of indifference or of fear against the processes of recomposition in the East. The Europe of today is one of communicating vessels.

Notes

[1] Among the abundant literature on the subject we mention Greenfeld, 1992; Teich and Porter, 1993, and the classical works of Kedourie (1993, with a new Introduction) and Seton-Watson (1977).

[2] See also Kundera, 1991.

[3] See Karakasidou (1993) and Dimitras (1993) as well as "The upsurge of ethnic nationalism in Greece focuses on the question of Macedonia and unites around the Orthodox Church the political forces of the extreme right" in PASOK.

[4] The following typology was presented by E. Gellner during the conference "Transitions to Democracy," Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, 30 June 1990.

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