



SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

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PREPARED FOR

EDRIVETOKEN



INTRODUCTION

Auditing Firm	InterFi Network
Client Firm	EDriveToken
Methodology	Automated Analysis, Manual Code Review
Language	Solidity
Contract	0x936Dcfc3fF6A8DA20A945d867BDfEA09988Ffa0c
Blockchain	Binance Smart Chain
Centralization	Active ownership
Commit	f2de253e320fd8265d704e9239424b0110978081
Website	https://www.edrivetoken.io/
Telegram	https://t.me/edrivetoken/
X (Twitter)	https://twitter.com/EDriveToken/
Discord	https://discord.gg/cg8dvdJFRF/
Report Date	November 21, 2023


 Verify the authenticity of this report on our website: <https://www.github.com/interfinetwork>



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

InterFi has performed the automated and manual analysis of solidity codes. Solidity codes were reviewed for common contract vulnerabilities and centralized exploits. Here's a quick audit summary:

Status	Critical ●	Major ●	Medium ●	Minor ●	Unknown ●
Open	0	1	0	2	0
Acknowledged	1	0	2	2	1
Resolved	0	0	0	5	0
Important Privileges	Blacklist , Set Daily Limits, Set Pair, Set Fees				

 Please note that smart contracts deployed on blockchains aren't resistant to exploits, vulnerabilities and/or hacks. Blockchain and cryptography assets utilize new and emerging technologies. These technologies present a high level of ongoing risks. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and audit limitations, kindly review the audit report thoroughly.


 Please note that centralization privileges regardless of their inherited risk status - constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.



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SCOPE OF WORK

InterFi was consulted by EDriveToken to conduct the smart contract audit of their solidity source codes.

The audit scope of work is strictly limited to mentioned solidity file(s) only:

- EdriveToken.sol

i If source codes are not deployed on the main net, they can be modified or altered before main-net deployment. Verify the contract's deployment status below:

Public Contract Link	
https://bscscan.com/address/0x936Dcfc3fF6A8DA20A945d867BDfEA09988Ffa0c#code	
Contract Name	EdriveToken
Compiler Version	0.8.14
License	MIT



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Smart contract audits are conducted using a set of standards and procedures. Mutual collaboration is essential to performing an effective smart contract audit. Here's a brief overview of InterFi's auditing process and methodology:

CONNECT

- The onboarding team gathers source codes, and specifications to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.

AUDIT

- Automated analysis is performed to identify common contract vulnerabilities. We may use the following third-party frameworks and dependencies to perform the automated analysis:
 - Remix IDE Developer Tool
 - Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
 - SWC Vulnerabilities Registry
 - DEX Dependencies, e.g., Pancakeswap, Uniswap
- Simulations are performed to identify centralized exploits causing contract and/or trade locks.
- A manual line-by-line analysis is performed to identify contract issues and centralized privileges.

We may inspect below mentioned common contract vulnerabilities, and centralized exploits:

Centralized Exploits	<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Token Supply Manipulation○ Access Control and Authorization○ Assets Manipulation○ Ownership Control○ Liquidity Access○ Stop and Pause Trading○ Ownable Library Verification
----------------------	---



Common Contract Vulnerabilities

- Integer Overflow
- Lack of Arbitrary limits
- Incorrect Inheritance Order
- Typographical Errors
- Requirement Violation
- Gas Optimization
- Coding Style Violations
- Re-entrancy
- Third-Party Dependencies
- Potential Sandwich Attacks
- Irrelevant Codes
- Divide before multiply
- Conformance to Solidity Naming Guides
- Compiler Specific Warnings
- Language Specific Warnings

REPORT

- The auditing team provides a preliminary report specifying all the checks which have been performed and the findings thereof.
- The client's development team reviews the report and makes amendments to solidity codes.
- The auditing team provides the final comprehensive report with open and unresolved issues.

PUBLISH

- The client may use the audit report internally or disclose it publicly.

 It is important to note that there is no pass or fail in the audit, it is recommended to view the audit as an unbiased assessment of the safety of solidity codes.



RISK CATEGORIES

Smart contracts are generally designed to hold, approve, and transfer tokens. This makes them very tempting attack targets. A successful external attack may allow the external attacker to directly exploit. A successful centralization-related exploit may allow the privileged role to directly exploit. All risks which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Risk Type	Definition
Critical 	These risks could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
Major 	These risks are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity.
Medium 	These risks should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. Low-risk re-entrancy-related vulnerabilities should be fixed to deter exploits.
Minor 	These risks do not pose a considerable risk to the contract or those who interact with it. They are code-style violations and deviations from standard practices. They should be highlighted and fixed nonetheless.
Unknown 	These risks pose uncertain severity to the contract or those who interact with it. They should be fixed immediately to mitigate the risk uncertainty.

All statuses which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Status Type	Definition
Open	Risks are open.
Acknowledged	Risks are acknowledged, but not fixed.
Resolved	Risks are acknowledged and fixed.



CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES

Centralization risk is the most common cause of cryptography asset loss. When a smart contract has a privileged role, the risk related to centralization is elevated.

There are some well-intended reasons have privileged roles, such as:

- Privileged roles can be granted the power to pause() the contract in case of an external attack.
- Privileged roles can use functions like, include(), and exclude() to add or remove wallets from fees, swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale and to list on an exchange.

Authorizing privileged roles to externally-owned-account (EOA) is dangerous. Lately, centralization-related losses are increasing in frequency and magnitude.

- The client can lower centralization-related risks by implementing below mentioned practices:
- Privileged role's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.
- Privileged role should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.
- Authorized privilege can be locked in a contract, user voting, or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the privilege.
- Renouncing the contract ownership, and privileged roles.
- Remove functions with elevated centralization risk.

 Understand the project's initial asset distribution. Assets in the liquidity pair should be locked. Assets outside the liquidity pair should be locked with a release schedule.



AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

Symbol	Definition
	Function modifies state
	Function is payable
	Function is internal
	Function is private
	Function is important

```

| **EdriveToken** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public ! |  | ERC20 |
| L | setIsExcludedFromFees | Public ! |  | onlyOwner |
| L | setIsAutomatedMarketMakerPair | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
| L | setIsExcludedFromMaxAmount | Public ! |  | onlyOwner |
| L | setIsExcludedFromNumTx | Public ! |  | onlyOwner |
| L | setIsBlacklisted | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
| L | setIsExcludedFromRewards | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
| L | setNFTFees | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
| L | setSwapTokensAtAmount | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
| L | setDailyLimits | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
| L | _transfer | Internal  |  | |
| L | swapTokensForRewards | Private  |  | |
| L | _setIsBlacklisted | Private  |  | |
| L | getTransferFees | Public ! | | NO ! |
|||||
| **EDT_RewardToken** | Implementation | FDT_ERC20Extension, Ownable |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public ! |  | FDT_ERC20Extension |
| L | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal  |  | onlyOwner |
| L | setBalance | External ! |  | onlyOwner |

```



```
|  L | setIsExcludedFromRewards | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
```

```
|||||
```

```
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context |||
```

```
|  L | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | owner | Public ! | | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | renounceOwnership | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
```

```
|  L | transferOwnership | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
```

```
|  L | _transferOwnership | Internal 🔒 | ● | |
```

```
|||||
```

```
| **IUniswapV2Factory** | Interface | |||
```

```
|  L | feeTo | External ! | | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | feeToSetter | External ! | | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | getPair | External ! | | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | allPairs | External ! | | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | allPairsLength | External ! | | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | createPair | External ! | ● | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | setFeeTo | External ! | ● | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | setFeeToSetter | External ! | ● | NO ! |
```

```
|||||
```

```
| **IUniswapV2Router02** | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 |||
```

```
|  L | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | ● | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | ● | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | ● | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | 📄 | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | ● | NO ! |
```

```
|||||
```

```
| **IERC1155** | Interface | IERC165 |||
```

```
|  L | balanceOf | External ! | | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | balanceOfBatch | External ! | | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | setApprovalForAll | External ! | ● | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | isApprovedForAll | External ! | | NO ! |
```

```
|  L | safeTransferFrom | External ! | ● | NO ! |
```



```
| L | safeBatchTransferFrom | External ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
```

```
|||||
```

```
| **SafeCast** | Library | |||
```

```
| L | toUint224 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toUint128 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toUint96 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toUint64 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toUint32 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toUint16 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toUint8 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toUint256 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toInt128 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toInt64 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toInt32 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toInt16 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toInt8 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
| L | toInt256 | Internal 🔒 | | |
```

```
|||||
```

```
| **SafeERC20** | Library | |||
```

```
| L | safeTransfer | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 | | |
```

```
| L | safeTransferFrom | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 | | |
```

```
| L | safeApprove | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 | | |
```

```
| L | safeIncreaseAllowance | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 | | |
```

```
| L | safeDecreaseAllowance | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 | | |
```

```
| L | _callOptionalReturn | Private 🔒 | 🔴 | | |
```

```
|||||
```

```
| **FDT_ERC20Extension** | Implementation | IFundsDistributionToken, FundsDistributionToken  
|||
```

```
| L | <Constructor> | Public ! | 🔴 | FundsDistributionToken |
```

```
| L | withdrawFunds | External ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
```

```
| L | _updateFundsTokenBalance | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 | | |
```

```
| L | updateFundsReceived | External ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
```



|||||

| ****IERC20**** | Interface | |||

| L | totalSupply | External ! | |NO! |

| L | balanceOf | External ! | |NO! |

| L | transfer | External ! | ● |NO! |

| L | allowance | External ! | |NO! |

| L | approve | External ! | ● |NO! |

| L | transferFrom | External ! | ● |NO! |

|||||

| ****Address**** | Library | |||

| L | isContract | Internal 🔒 | | |

| L | sendValue | Internal 🔒 | ● | |

| L | functionCall | Internal 🔒 | ● | |

| L | functionCall | Internal 🔒 | ● | |

| L | functionCallWithValue | Internal 🔒 | ● | |

| L | functionCallWithValue | Internal 🔒 | ● | |

| L | functionStaticCall | Internal 🔒 | | |

| L | functionStaticCall | Internal 🔒 | | |

| L | functionDelegateCall | Internal 🔒 | ● | |

| L | functionDelegateCall | Internal 🔒 | ● | |

| L | verifyCallResult | Internal 🔒 | | |

|||||

| ****Context**** | Implementation | |||

| L | _msgSender | Internal 🔒 | | |

| L | _msgData | Internal 🔒 | | |

|||||

| ****IFundsDistributionToken**** | Interface | |||

| L | withdrawableFundsOf | External ! | |NO! |

| L | withdrawFunds | External ! | ● |NO! |

|||||

| ****FundsDistributionToken**** | Implementation | IFundsDistributionToken, ERC20 |||

| L | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | ERC20 |



```

| L | _distributeFunds | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
| L | _prepareWithdraw | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
| L | withdrawableFundsOf | Public | ! | |NO! |
| L | withdrawnFundsOf | Public | ! | |NO! |
| L | accumulativeFundsOf | Public | ! | |NO! |
| L | _afterTokenTransfer | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
|||||

```

```

| **ERC20** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata |||

```

```

| L | <Constructor> | Public | ! | 🚫 |NO! |
| L | name | Public | ! | |NO! |
| L | symbol | Public | ! | |NO! |
| L | decimals | Public | ! | |NO! |
| L | totalSupply | Public | ! | |NO! |
| L | balanceOf | Public | ! | |NO! |
| L | transfer | Public | ! | 🚫 |NO! |
| L | allowance | Public | ! | |NO! |
| L | approve | Public | ! | 🚫 |NO! |
| L | transferFrom | Public | ! | 🚫 |NO! |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public | ! | 🚫 |NO! |
| L | decreaseAllowance | Public | ! | 🚫 |NO! |
| L | _transfer | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
| L | _mint | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
| L | _burn | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
| L | _approve | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
| L | _spendAllowance | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
| L | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
| L | _afterTokenTransfer | Internal | 🔒 | 🚫 | |
|||||

```

```

| **IERC20Metadata** | Interface | IERC20 ||| |
| L | name | External | ! | |NO! |
| L | symbol | External | ! | |NO! |

```




```

|  | decimals | External ! | |NO! |
|||||
| **IUniswapV2Router01** | Interface | |||
|  | factory | External ! | |NO! |
|  | WETH | External ! | |NO! |
|  | addLiquidity | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | addLiquidityETH | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | removeLiquidity | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | removeLiquidityETH | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | swapExactTokensForTokens | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | swapTokensForExactTokens | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | swapExactETHForTokens | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | swapTokensForExactETH | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | swapExactTokensForETH | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | swapETHForExactTokens | External ! | 🚫 |NO! |
|  | quote | External ! | |NO! |
|  | getAmountOut | External ! | |NO! |
|  | getAmountIn | External ! | |NO! |
|  | getAmountsOut | External ! | |NO! |
|  | getAmountsIn | External ! | |NO! |
|||||
| **IERC165** | Interface | |||
|  | supportsInterface | External ! | |NO! |

```



INHERITANCE GRAPH



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MANUAL REVIEW

Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-01	Centralized privileges	Critical ●
EDT-01	Privileged role can blacklist EOAs and contracts	
EDT-02	Privileged role can update daily amount and transaction limits	

Important onlyOwner centralized privileges are listed below:

```

setIsExcludedFromFees()
setIsAutomatedMarketMakerPair()
setIsExcludedFromMaxAmount()
setIsExcludedFromNumTx()
setIsBlacklisted()
setIsExcludedFromRewards()
setNFTFees()
setSwapTokensAtAmount()
setDailyLimits()
_beforeTokenTransfer()
setBalance()
setIsExcludedFromRewards()
renounceOwnership()
transferOwnership()

```

RECOMMENDATION

Deployers', owners', administrators', and all other privileged roles' private-keys/access-keys/admin-keys should be secured carefully. These entities can have a single point of failure that compromises the security of the project. It is recommended to:



Implement multi-signature wallets: Require multiple signatures from different parties to execute certain sensitive functions within contracts. This spreads control and reduces the risk of a single party having complete authority.

Use a decentralized governance model: Implement a governance model that enables token holders or other stakeholders to participate in decision-making processes. This can include voting on contract upgrades, parameter changes, or any other critical decisions that impact the contract's functioning.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

EDrive project has confirmed that privileged roles are used as intended. EDrive team argued that blacklist will be used only in cases like a compromised CEX hot wallet or other extreme cases.

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Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-02	Initial asset distribution	Minor 

All of the initially minted assets are sent to the project owner when deploying the contract. This can be an issue as the project owner can distribute tokens without consulting the community.

```
uint128 totSupply = 20 * 10**9 * (10**18);
_mint(msg.sender, totSupply);
```

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RECOMMENDATION

Project must communicate with stakeholders and obtain the community consensus while distributing assets.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

EDrive project will distribute tokens after acquiring broader consensus, as per their pre-determined tokenomics.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-03	Token minting in Reward contract	Minor 

In `setBalance()` function, which is externally callable by the owner, can mint new tokens. If the new balance specified for an account is greater than the current balance, the contract mints the difference and credits it to the specified account.

In `setIsExcludedFromRewards()` function, it contains logic to mint tokens. If an account is included back into the rewards system, it mints tokens equivalent to the ERC20 balance of the owner's account to the new account.


RECOMMENDATION

Remove mint – as it can elevate centralization risk.

RESOLUTION

`setBalance` is only callable by the EDT token, to keep the ratio 1 EDT: 1 EDT_Reward if an address is not excluded from rewards, EDT tokens are in no way mintable. EDT_Reward tokens are capped to the supply of EDT (case in which no tokens are held by addresses excluded from rewards).



Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-05	Token transfer restrictions in Reward contract	Minor 

beforeTokenTransfer function is overridden and restricted to onlyOwner. This may be a design decision, but it sets restrictions to token transfer.

RECOMMENDATION

Remove onlyOwner restriction of beforeTokenTransfer function.

RESOLUTION

beforeTokenTransfer is kept onlyOwner restricted as per design. It sets restrictions to token transfer. It happens only on the EDT_Reward Token, to disallow the transfer of EDT_Reward tokens. EDT_Reward tokens are only transferrable by the EDT contract, that keeps the 1:1 ration EDT:EDT_Reward, EDT token does not have onlyowner restriction on transfer.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
LOG-01	Lack of appropriate arbitrary boundaries	Medium 🟡

Below mentioned functions are set without any arbitrary boundaries.

```
setSwapTokensAtAmount()
```

```
setDailyLimits()
```

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RECOMMENDATION

These functions should be provided appropriate upper and lower boundaries.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

EDrive project has argued that this is set by design, and agreed to keep the code as-is.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
LOG-02	Potential front-running	Minor 

Potential front-running also classified as – sandwich attack happens when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by front-running a transaction to purchase assets and make profits by back-running a transaction to sell assets. Below mentioned function is called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output:

```
swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()
```

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RECOMMENDATION

This function should be provided reasonable minimum output amounts, instead of zero.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
LOG-03	Re-entrancy	Major 🟡

Below mentioned functions are used without re-entrancy guard:

```
withdrawFunds()  
withdrawableFundsOf()  
withdrawnFundsOf()  
accumulativeFundsOf()  
_transfer()
```

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RECOMMENDATION

Use Checks Effects Interactions pattern when handing over the flow to an external entity and/or guard functions against re-entrancy attacks. Re-entrancy guard is used to prevent re-entrant calls. Learn more: <https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/attacks/reentrancy/>



Identifier	Definition	Severity
LOG-04	Inadequate access control	Medium 🟡

Mentioned functions must be provided adequate access control to stop unauthorized use:

`updateFundsReceived()`

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RECOMMENDATION

Add adequate access control such as `onlyOwner` to stop unauthorized use.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

EDrive project team argued that `updateFundsReceived()` on `EDT_Reward` doesn't need access control and can do no harm. It is automatically called by EDT, but in case someone wants to manually gift WBNB to EDT investors he can send WBNB to the `EDT_Reward` contract and then call the `updateFundsReceived()` to update the balances of withdrawable tokens.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-02	Timestamp manipulation via <code>block.timestamp</code> and <code>block.number</code>	Minor ●

Be aware that the timestamp of the block can be manipulated by a miner. When the contract uses the timestamp to seed a random number, the miner can actually post a timestamp within 15 seconds of the block being validated, effectively allowing the miner to precompute an option more favorable to their chances.

RECOMMENDATION

To maintain block integrity, follow 15 seconds rule, and scale time dependent events accordingly.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

EDrive project team argued that block timestamp is not used to generate random number, hence manipulation is minimal.



Identifier	Definition	
COD-08	Lack of fallback function	

Fallback functions are usually executed in one of the following cases: If a function identifier doesn't match any of the available functions in a smart contract. If there was no data supplied along with the function call.

RECOMMENDATION

Use fallback function with empty data, and mark it external, and payable.

RESOLUTION

EDrive project team is aware of the lack of fallback function and they didn't put it since that could have caused locked ether in the contract.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-10	Direct and indirect dependencies	Unknown 🟤

Smart contract is interacting with third party protocols e.g., Market Makers, External Contracts such as Reward Token, Fund Distribution Token, Web 3 Applications, Open Zeppelin tools. The scope of the audit treats these entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, all of them can be compromised, and exploited. Moreover, upgrades in these entities can create severe impacts, e.g., increased transactional fees, deprecation of previous routers, etc.

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RECOMMENDATION

Inspect third party dependencies regularly, and mitigate severe impacts whenever necessary.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

EDrive project team will inspect third party dependencies regularly, and push updates as required.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-12	Lack of event-driven architecture	Minor ●

Smart contract uses function calls to update state, which can make it difficult to track and analyze changes to the contract over time.

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RECOMMENDATION

Use events to track state changes. Events improve transparency and provide a more granular view of contract activity.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
VOL-01	Irrelevant code	Minor ●

Redundant code in:

SafeMath

SafeCast

IERC165

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RECOMMENDATION

Remove redundant and dead code.

RESOLUTION

EDrive project team has reviewed this finding, and kept the code as-is.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
VOL-03	Volatile code	Minor 

`setIsExcludedFromRewards()` function has a complex logic for handling reward redistribution, it does not behave as expected.

`blocksToWait()` anti-snipe logic is complex, and it does not behave as expected.

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RECOMMENDATION

Fix non-conforming logic.

RESOLUTION

EDrive project team is aware of complex logic in mentioned functions, and agreed that functions are behaving as expected.



Identifier	Definition	Severity
COM-01	Floating compiler status	Minor 

Compiler is set to ^0.8.0

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RECOMMENDATION

Pragma should be fixed to the version that you're indenting to deploy your contracts with.

RESOLUTION

EDrive project team has deployed smart contract with stable compiler.



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The smart contract for this particular audit was analyzed for common contract vulnerabilities, and centralization exploits. This audit report makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. This audit report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the smart contract analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the client's business, business model or legal compliance. This audit report does not extend to the compiler layer, any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies, they carry high levels of technical risks and uncertainty. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. This audit report could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results.

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ABOUT INTERFI NETWORK

InterFi Network provides intelligent blockchain solutions. We provide solidity development, testing, and auditing services. We have developed 150+ solidity codes, audited 1000+ smart contracts, and analyzed 500,000+ code lines. We have worked on major public blockchains e.g., Ethereum, Binance, Cronos, Doge, Polygon, Avalanche, Metis, Fantom, Bitcoin Cash, Velas, Oasis, etc.

InterFi Network is built by engineers, developers, UI experts, and blockchain enthusiasts. Our team currently consists of 4 core members, and 6+ casual contributors.

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