InterFi NETWORK

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

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PREPARED FOR

HARVESTFI

INTRODUCTION

Auditing Firm	InterFi Network
Client Firm	HarvestFi
Methodology	Automated Analysis, Manual Code Review
Language	Solidity
Incinerator Contract	0x55Db03C70581d87168543D029ed0Ac5163FfBd4c
Token Contract	0xfb3c56B504793E853d94847E2Aa69A993c5e90F5
Blockchain	Arbitrum
Centralization	Active ownership
Commit	868ef7807d5fda28468ade0a8859b352e3dab802
Website	https://harvestfi.co/
Twitter	https://twitter.com/HarvestProtocol/
Discord	https://discord.com/invite/tazFqrKapJ/
Report Date	June 15, 2023

ℹ Verify the authenticity of this report on our website: https://www.github.com/interfinetwork

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

InterFi has performed the automated and manual analysis of solidity codes. Solidity codes were reviewed for common contract vulnerabilities and centralized exploits. Here's a quick audit summary:

Status	Critical 🔴	Major 🟠	Medium 🟡	Minor 🟢	Unknown 🟤
Open	0	0	1	4	0
Acknowledged	0	1	0	1	1*
Resolved	0	0	0	1	0
Noteworthy Privileges	Review PAGE 16 for centralized and controlled privileges				

ℹ️ Please note that smart contracts deployed on blockchains aren't resistant to exploits, vulnerabilities and/or hacks. Blockchain and cryptography assets utilize new and emerging technologies. These technologies present a high level of ongoing risks. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and audit limitations, kindly review the audit report thoroughly.

ℹ️ Please note that centralization privileges regardless of their inherited risk status - constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.

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SCOPE OF WORK

InterFi was consulted by HarvestFi to conduct the smart contract audit of their solidity source codes.

The audit scope of work is strictly limited to mentioned solidity file(s) only:

- HarvestFarm.sol**
- HarvestIncinerator.sol
- HarvestToken.sol

ℹ️ If source codes are not deployed on the main net, they can be modified or altered before main-net deployment. Verify the contract's deployment status below:

Public Contract Links
https://arbiscan.io/address/0x55Db03C70581d87168543D029ed0Ac5163FfBd4c#code
https://arbiscan.io/address/0xfb3c56B504793E853d94847E2Aa69A993c5e90F5#code

**`HarvestPresale` and `HarvestWhitelistData` dependencies in `HarvestFarm` are not checked, tested, verified, and/or audited due to being out-of-scope.

AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Smart contract audits are conducted using a set of standards and procedures. Mutual collaboration is essential to performing an effective smart contract audit. Here's a brief overview of InterFi's auditing process and methodology:

CONNECT

- The onboarding team gathers source codes, and specifications to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.

AUDIT

- Automated analysis is performed to identify common contract vulnerabilities. We may use the following third-party frameworks and dependencies to perform the automated analysis:
  - Remix IDE Developer Tool
  - Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
  - SWC Vulnerabilities Registry
  - DEX Dependencies, e.g., Pancakeswap, Uniswap
- Simulations are performed to identify centralized exploits causing contract and/or trade locks.
- A manual line-by-line analysis is performed to identify contract issues and centralized privileges. We may inspect below mentioned common contract vulnerabilities, and centralized exploits:

Centralized Exploits	○ Token Supply Manipulation ○ Access Control and Authorization ○ Assets Manipulation ○ Ownership Control ○ Liquidity Access ○ Stop and Pause Trading ○ Ownable Library Verification

Common Contract Vulnerabilities	○ Integer Overflow ○ Lack of Arbitrary limits ○ Incorrect Inheritance Order ○ Typographical Errors ○ Requirement Violation ○ Gas Optimization ○ Coding Style Violations ○ Re-entrancy ○ Third-Party Dependencies ○ Potential Sandwich Attacks ○ Irrelevant Codes ○ Divide before multiply ○ Conformance to Solidity Naming Guides ○ Compiler Specific Warnings ○ Language Specific Warnings

REPORT

- The auditing team provides a preliminary report specifying all the checks which have been performed and the findings thereof.
- The client's development team reviews the report and makes amendments to solidity codes.
- The auditing team provides the final comprehensive report with open and unresolved issues.

PUBLISH

- The client may use the audit report internally or disclose it publicly.

ℹ️ It is important to note that there is no pass or fail in the audit, it is recommended to view the audit as an unbiased assessment of the safety of solidity codes.

RISK CATEGORIES

Smart contracts are generally designed to hold, approve, and transfer tokens. This makes them very tempting attack targets. A successful external attack may allow the external attacker to directly exploit. A successful centralization-related exploit may allow the privileged role to directly exploit. All risks which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Risk Type	Definition
Critical 🔴	These risks could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
Major 🟠	These risks are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity.
Medium 🟡	These risks should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. Low-risk re-entrancy-related vulnerabilities should be fixed to deter exploits.
Minor 🟢	These risks do not pose a considerable risk to the contract or those who interact with it. They are code-style violations and deviations from standard practices. They should be highlighted and fixed nonetheless.
Unknown 🟤	These risks pose uncertain severity to the contract or those who interact with it. They should be fixed immediately to mitigate the risk uncertainty.

All statuses which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Status Type	Definition
Open	Risks are open.
Acknowledged	Risks are acknowledged, but not fixed.
Resolved	Risks are acknowledged and fixed.

CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES

Centralization risk is the most common cause of cryptography asset loss. When a smart contract has a privileged role, the risk related to centralization is elevated.

There are some well-intended reasons have privileged roles, such as:

- Privileged roles can be granted the power to `pause()` the contract in case of an external attack.
- Privileged roles can use functions like, `include()`, and `exclude()` to add or remove wallets from fees, swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale and to list on an exchange.

Authorizing privileged roles to externally-owned-account (EOA) is dangerous. Lately, centralization-related losses are increasing in frequency and magnitude.

- The client can lower centralization-related risks by implementing below mentioned practices:
- Privileged role's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.
- Privileged role should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.
- Authorized privilege can be locked in a contract, user voting, or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the privilege.
- Renouncing the contract ownership, and privileged roles.
- Remove functions with elevated centralization risk.

ℹ️ Understand the project's initial asset distribution. Assets in the liquidity pair should be locked. Assets outside the liquidity pair should be locked with a release schedule.

AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

Symbol	Definition
🛑	Function modifies state
💸	Function is payable
🔒	Function is internal
🔐	Function is private
!	Function is important

HarvestFarm

IERC20	Interface			
└	totalSupply	External !		NO!
└	balanceOf	External !		NO!
└	transfer	External !	🛑	NO!
└	allowance	External !		NO!
└	approve	External !	🛑	NO!
└	transferFrom	External !	🛑	NO!
SafeERC20	Library			
└	safeTransfer	Internal 🔒	🛑	
└	safeTransferFrom	Internal 🔒	🛑	
└	safeIncreaseAllowance	Internal 🔒	🛑	
└	safeDecreaseAllowance	Internal 🔒	🛑	
└	forceApprove	Internal 🔒	🛑	
└	safePermit	Internal 🔒	🛑	
└	_callOptionalReturn	Private 🔐	🛑	
└	_callOptionalReturnBool	Private 🔐	🛑	

|||||||

| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context |||

| └ | <Constructor> | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | owner | Public ❗ | |NO❗ |

| └ | _checkOwner | Internal 🔒 | | |

| └ | renounceOwnership | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | transferOwnership | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | _transferOwnership | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

|||||||

| **HarvestFarm** | Implementation | Ownable |||

| └ | <Constructor> | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | checkPoolDuplicate | Internal 🔒 | | |

| └ | add | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwnerOrOfficer |

| └ | set | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwnerOrOfficer |

| └ | getGeneratedReward | Public ❗ | |NO❗ |

| └ | pendingRewardTokens | External ❗ | |NO❗ |

| └ | massUpdatePools | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | updatePool | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | deposit | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | withdraw | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | emergencyWithdraw | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | safeTokenTransfer | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | setFeeCollector | External ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | clearReward | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwnerOrOfficer |

| └ | remove | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwnerOrOfficer |

| └ | updateEmissionRate | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwnerOrOfficer |

| └ | governanceRecoverUnsupported | External ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwnerOrOfficer |

| └ | isExcludedFromFee | Public ❗ | |NO❗ |

| └ | isPresaleExcludedFromFees | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | setIsExcludedFromFees | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwnerOrOfficer |

| └ | <Receive Ether> | External ❗ | 💵 | NO❗ |

| └ | setPoolOfficer | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

HarvestIncinerator

| **ERC20** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata, IERC20Errors |||

| └ | <Constructor> | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | name | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | symbol | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | decimals | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | totalSupply | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | balanceOf | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | transfer | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | allowance | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | approve | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | transferFrom | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | increaseAllowance | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | decreaseAllowance | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | _transfer | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _update | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _mint | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _burn | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _approve | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _approve | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _spendAllowance | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

||||||

| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context |||

| └ | <Constructor> | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | owner | Public ❗ | |NO❗ |

| └ | _checkOwner | Internal 🔒 | | |

| └ | renounceOwnership | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | transferOwnership | Public ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | _transferOwnership | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

||||||

| **Pausable** | Implementation | Context |||

| └ | <Constructor> | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | paused | Public ❗ | |NO❗ |

| └ | _requireNotPaused | Internal 🔒 | | |

| └ | _requirePaused | Internal 🔒 | | |

| └ | _pause | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | whenNotPaused |

| └ | _unpause | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | whenPaused |

||||||

| **HarvestIncinerator** | Implementation | Ownable, Pausable |||

| └ | <Constructor> | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | paidBurn | External ❗ | 🛑 | whenNotPaused |

| └ | setPricePerHrvst | External ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | togglePause | External ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | withdraw | External ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | withdrawTokens | External ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | setTokenAddress | External ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | <Receive Ether> | External ❗ | 💵 |NO❗ |

HarvestToken

| **ERC20** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata, IERC20Errors |||

| └ | <Constructor> | Public ❗ | 🛑 |NO❗ |

| └ | name | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | symbol | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | decimals | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | totalSupply | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | balanceOf | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | transfer | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | allowance | Public ❗ | | NO❗ |

| └ | approve | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | transferFrom | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | increaseAllowance | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | decreaseAllowance | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | _transfer | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _update | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _mint | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _burn | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _approve | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _approve | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | _spendAllowance | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |

||||||

| **HarvestToken** | Implementation | ERC20 |||

| └ | <Constructor> | Public ❗ | 🛑 | ERC20 |

| └ | burn | Public ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

INHERITANCE GRAPH

`HarvestFarm`



`HarvestIncinerator`



`HarvestToken`



MANUAL REVIEW

Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-01	Centralized privileges	Major 🟠
HAR-01	Privileged role can withdraw contract balance in **`HarvestIncinerator`**	
CEN-05	Privileged role can pause `paidBurn()` in **`HarvestIncinerator`**	
CEN-07	Authorizations and access controls	
HAR-02	Privileged role can clear reward to any EOA in **`HarvestFarm`**	

`HarvestFarm`

`onlyOwnerOrOfficer` privileges are listed below:

```
add()
set()
setFeeCollector()
clearReward()
remove()
updateEmissionRate()
governanceRecoverUnsupported()
setIsExcludedFromFees()
setPoolOfficer()
```

`HarvestIncinerator`

`onlyOwner` centralized privileges are listed below:

```
setPricePerHrvst()
togglePause()
withdraw()
withdrawTokens()
setTokenAddress()
```

RECOMMENDATION

Deployers, contract owners, administrators, access controlled, and all other privileged roles' private-keys/access-keys/admin-keys should be secured carefully. These entities can have a single point of failure that compromises the security of the project. Manage centralized and privileged roles carefully, review PAGE 09 for more information.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

HarvestFi team has confirmed that privileged roles are used as intended. It is recommended to:

Implement multi-signature wallets: Require multiple signatures from different parties to execute certain sensitive functions within contracts. This spreads control and reduces the risk of a single party having complete authority.

Use a decentralized governance model: Implement a governance model that enables token holders or other stakeholders to participate in decision-making processes. This can include voting on contract upgrades, parameter changes, or any other critical decisions that impact the contract's functioning.

Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-02	Initial asset distribution in **`HarvestToken`**	Minor 🟢

All of the initially minted assets are sent to the project owner when deploying the contract. This can be an issue as the project owner can distribute tokens without consulting the community.

```
_mint(msg.sender, 10_000_000 * 10 ** decimals());
```


RECOMMENDATION

Project must communicate with stakeholders and obtain the community consensus while distributing assets.

RESOLUTION

HarvestFi team will distribute tokens after acquiring broader consensus, as per their pre-determined tokenomics.

Identifier	Definition	Severity
LOG-01	Lack of appropriate arbitrary boundaries	Minor

Below mentioned functions are set without any arbitrary boundaries.

HarvestFarm

`add()`
`updateEmissionRate()`

HarvestIncinerator

`setPricePerHrvst()`

RECOMMENDATION

These functions should be provided appropriate upper and/or lower boundaries.

Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-02	Miner manipulation via `block.timestamp`	Minor 🟢
LOG-02	Potential front-running	

Be aware that the timestamp of the block can be manipulated by a miner. Front-running attack potential exists in all contracts, since miners or other users can see transactions before they're confirmed and act on them accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION

Use commit-reveal or similar scheme to hide transactions until validated.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

HarvestFi team acknowledged that this is a problem inherent in most EVM based blockchains. Front-running, and somewhat miner manipulation is impossible to deter.

Identifier	Definition	Severity
LOG-04	Unwanted state changes	Minor

`massUpdatePools()` can be called by anyone, which allows any caller to make state changes. This may be a required design implementation.

RECOMMENDATION

If only contract needs to call `massUpdatePools()`, make it `internal` or `private` to prevent any potential abuse.

Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-08	Inadequate checks	Medium 🟡

`HarvestIncinerator`

In `paidBurn()` function, contract assumes that it has enough `ETH` to pay for tokens. If it does not have enough `ETH`, contract may get stuck. Add a check to validate if contract has enough `ETH` to pay for tokens.

`HarvestToken`

In `burn()` function, make sure to check `_burn` and approve token allowance before initiating `public` burn. Import appropriate `ERC20` contract.

Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-10	Direct and indirect dependencies in all contracts	Unknown

Smart contracts and addresses are interacting with market makers, presale contracts, whitelist data contract, decentralized applications, *OpenZeppelin* tools, Math libraries, etc. The scope of the audit treats these entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, these entities can be compromised, and exploited. Moreover, upgrades in these entities can create severe impacts, e.g., increased transactional fees, deprecation of previous routers, logical and functional flaws, introduction of bugs, etc.

All unknown and/or out-of-scope instances, calls, interactions and dependencies are presumed correct for this assessment.

RECOMMENDATION

Inspect third party dependencies regularly, and mitigate severe impacts whenever necessary. Get presale contracts audited by a reputed third-party audit provider.

PARTIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT*

HarvestFi team will inspect dependencies periodically, and provide amendments when possible.

Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-11	Code optimization	Minor 🟢

HarvestIncinerator

`SafeMath` is not used in the calculation `_hrvstAmount * pricePerHrvst) / 1 ether`. Use `mul` and `div` from standard `SafeMath` library.

`Constructor` is not provided visibility identifier, such as `internal`.

Since `paidBurn()` is complex, `.call{value: x}` may be a better choice to send `Ethers` than `.transfer`.

`paidBurn()` is transferring tokens from user and burning them before sending `ETH` to user. If for `ETH` transfer fails, user's tokens would be burnt, and they wouldn't receive any funds.

HarvestFarm

Withdrawal fee logic is implemented in `withdraw()` function but not in `emergencyWithdraw()` function.

In `withdraw()` token transfer is happening before the interaction, e.g., updating user's info.

RECOMMENDATION

Implement recommended updates.

Identifier	Definition	Severity
COM-01	Multiple pragma directives	

Various compilers and floating pragma are used across all contracts.

RECOMMENDATION

Pragma should be fixed to the version that you're indenting to deploy your contracts with.

Identifier	Definition	Severity
COM-04	Potential resource exhaustion errors	Minor

Below mentioned functions may throw out of gas errors upon executing:

`updatePool()`
`massUpdatePools()`

RECOMMENDATION

Set upper bounds for multi-address calls.

DISCLAIMERS

InterFi Network provides the easy-to-understand audit of solidity source codes (commonly known as smart contracts).

The smart contract for this particular audit was analyzed for common contract vulnerabilities, and centralization exploits. This audit report makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. This audit report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the smart contract analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the client's business, business model or legal compliance. This audit report does not extend to the compiler layer, any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies, they carry high levels of technical risks and uncertainty. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. This audit report could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results.

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InterFi Network provides intelligent blockchain solutions. We provide solidity development, testing, and auditing services. We have developed 150+ solidity codes, audited 1000+ smart contracts, and analyzed 500,000+ code lines. We have worked on major public blockchains e.g., Ethereum, Binance, Cronos, Doge, Polygon, Avalanche, Metis, Fantom, Bitcoin Cash, Velas, Oasis, etc.

InterFi Network is built by engineers, developers, UI experts, and blockchain enthusiasts. Our team currently consists of 4 core members, and 6+ casual contributors.

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SMART CONTRACT AUDITS | SOLIDITY DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING

RELENTLESSLY SECURING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BLOCKCHAINS