

Private Notification Industry Notification

TLP:WHITE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CYBER DIVISION

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Please contact the FBI with any questions related to this Private Industry Notification at either your local **Cyber Task Force** or **FBI CyWatch**.

Local Field Offices: www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field

E-mail:

cywatch@fbi.gov

Phone:

1-855-292-3937

The following information is being provided by the FBI, with no guarantees or warranties, for potential use at the sole discretion of recipients to protect against cyber threats. This data is provided to help cyber security professionals and system administrators guard against the persistent malicious actions of cyber actors. This product was coordinated with DHS-CISA.

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IRGC-Associated Cyber Operations Against US Company Networks

Summary

The FBI is sharing information about a group of Iran-based cyber actors recently indicted for conducting malicious cyber operations to obtain access to US-based networks and steal information. The Iranian nationals indicted are Said Pourkarim Arabi, a member of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammad Reza Espargham, and Mohammad Bayati, both associates of Arabi. Since at least 2015, the actors conducted malicious cyber activity against US-based and foreign organizations and companies involved in aerospace or satellite technology and international government organizations in the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Australia, and Israel.

The FBI is providing an overview of the group's tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as indicators of compromise, to aid potential targets in the identification of malicious activity.





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Details

The FBI has observed Iran-based cyber actors conducting multi-phased cyber operations targeted against companies in the United States. The FBI advises these cyber actors can achieve substantial unauthorized access to US company networks through harvesting of personally identifying information, use of fraudulent identities, social engineering, and off-the-shelf malicious tools. These operations have led to significant financial losses, with the actors accessing sensitive business information, intellectual property, and vendor information.

The FBI has observed these actors beginning their operations by identifying employees connected to the US aerospace and satellite industry. The FBI judges the malicious cyber actors obtained personal details needed to impersonate employees via openly available sources, such as professional development and networking Web sites. The actors create fraudulent social media accounts impersonating those individuals. The actors then use information about those employees for other purposes related to their operations, such as registering email and PayPal accounts and fraudulently purchasing domains and hacking tools.

The FBI has observed the actors create and send customized spear-phishing emails purporting to be from the individuals whose identities they had stolen. The emails would entice recipients to take action — usually clicking on a malicious link, which would download malware being downloaded onto the victim's computer and enable unauthorized access to victim networks. In one instance, the actors were observed hosting malicious code on a file-sharing service registered in the name of a US company employee, and including links to that malicious code in spear-phishing emails. One of the actors was observed using a fraudulent domain to host malware, then sending a link to the malware via spear phishing.

The FBI observed these actors conducting follow-on activities to expand and maintain their unauthorized access, such as creating additional backdoors and escalating privileges. The actors were observed using the below tools to exploit victims.





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Tool	Description
Metasploit Framework	An open source pen-testing framework
	sometimes used by attackers to exploit
	vulnerable systems and gain remote access.
	Metasploit contains a catalog of prewritten
	modules and payloads that make its usage by
	attackers very simple.
Mimikatz	A post-exploitation tool that dumps
	passwords from memory, as well as hashes,
	PINS, and Kerberos tickets.
NanoCore RAT	Remote Access Trojan that allows a user to
	remotely access and control computers. Also
	used to record user credentials and conduct
	surveillance using infected computers.
OCRA shell-code stagers	Used to execute intrusions once malicious
	code is active on a running system.
Python Backdoor	Open source backdoor written in the Python
	programming language. Additional way to
	control a victim's computer.

The FBI advises that the below indicators of compromise are historical in nature, but may be used to identify historical targeting efforts.

Indicator	Context	
tleanalyser[.]com	May be included in spear-phishing messages as a provided link	
theanalyser@gmail[.]com	May be included in spear-phishing messages as contact email	
reseller.apples@gmail[.]com	Sending account for spear-phishing emails	
noreply@theanalyser[.]com	From: line on spear-phishing messages	
idc-team[.]net	May be identified in malware	
109.236.81[.]86	Used in 2017 intrusion activity	
91.210.107[.]120	Used in 2017 intrusion activity	

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Example spear-phishing email using a link to a file-sharing service account hosting malware:

From:		
Sent: Saturday, September 17	, 2016 10:35 AM	30
	D CONTRACTOR	
Subject: parallel image	processing project	
Hello,		
I'm Dr.		
I am currently a	at the	specializing in geomorphology,
glaciology, and geographic	information technologies.In	working on a project about remote sensing
	그렇게 되어 있다면 살이 살아보면 살아보다 그 사람들이 없는데 얼마나 나는데 얼마나 나는데 그렇게 되었다면 살아 없는데 얼마나 없다면 살아 싶다면 살아 없다면 살아 싶다면 살아 없다면 살아 싶다면 살아 없다면 살아 싶다면 살아요니다면 살아요니	ng for that reason I need a huge satelite imag
		u to Prepare it for me or test my attached
application and send me fe	edback.	
external application link		
link to download		
cheers.		
Dr.		
Associate Professor		

Example spear-phishing email using an actor-registered and controlled domain hosting malware:

From: noreply@tleanalyser.com

To: @____com>,
Sent: Monday, 12 June, 2017 15:40:55

Subject: Satellite Tracking Software

Hello dear

After months of hard work, we are delighted to officially announce the launch of our new and ultimate software for tracking satellite

Our goal with this new software is to provide our visitors an easier way to track their desired satellite and also to allow the visitor the ability to conduct not only neighborhood searches but new developments and building specific searches. The new software is interactive and gives better access to conduct TLE and Map searches. Our current and prospective clients will find useful information about our services and recent production numbers on the homepage.

You can download our ultimate software from the link below:

http://www.tleanalyser.com/download.php

Kind regards

Software Department

Contact Email: tleanalyser@gmail.com



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Recommendations

- Ensure anti-virus and anti-malware software is enabled and signature definitions are updated regularly in a timely manner. Well-maintained anti-virus software may prevent use of commonly deployed attacker tools that are delivered via spear phishing.
- Adopt threat reputation services at the network device, operating system, application, and email service levels. Reputation services can be used to detect or prevent lowreputation email addresses, files, URLs, and IP addresses used in spear-phishing attacks.
- Deploy application control software to limit which applications and executable code can be run by users. Email attachments, and files downloaded via links in emails, often contain executable code. Application control software limits users so they can only execute applications and code allowed by the organization, rendering malicious executables delivered via spear phishing unable to execute.
- Limit the use of administrator privileges. Users who browse the internet, use email, and
 execute code with administrator privileges make spear phishing much more effective by
 enabling attackers to move laterally across a network, gain additional accesses, and
 access highly sensitive information.
- Be suspicious of unsolicited contact via email or social media from any individual you do not know personally.
- Be suspicious of unsolicited or unexpected email or social media messages enticing recipients to open an attached or hosted file.



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Reporting Notice

The FBI encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI field office or the FBI's 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch). Field office contacts can be identified at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices. CyWatch can be contacted by phone at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. Press inquiries should be directed to the FBI's National Press Office at mpo@ic.fbi.gov or (202) 324-3691.

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