

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1972

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K. Marx: "The label of a system differs from labels of other goods in that, among other things, it fools not only the buyer, but often the seller as well."

March 5, 1972 (Sunday)

[Georgiy Emmanuilovich] Tsukanov (Brezhnev's top adviser) called yesterday and notified me that I am included in a group that will prepare the General Secretary's speech for the XV Congress of Trade Unions (March 20). Naturally, Kulakov is out of the picture. Moreover, [Georgiy Arkadievich] Arbatov conveyed to me the conversation between Tsukanov and Brezhnev: Tsukanov told Brezhnev that "the main group is being pulled apart." To which the latter apparently replied, "Why don't you figure this one out yourself."

March 9, 1972

In the morning I was summoned to Brezhnev's. Tsukanov, Arbatov, and I. He already read the text yesterday and was thinking out loud, which meant he was "making comments".... He read out the beginning...

"My main idea is to rise above the trade union themes. I am not supposed to stoop down to their problems on behalf of the Party, but to get them to adjust to the policies of the Party"...

The selector buzzed, we recognized [Aleksey Nikolaevich] Kosygin's voice. Brezhnev responded without turning around to face the device; it was like two people having a conversation in the same room.

Tsukanov made a sign for the three of us to leave (including him). But Brezhnev stopped us. So we heard [the following]:

K[Kosygin]: "How did you spend the holiday?"¹

B[Brezhnev]: "So-so. We were at the dacha with Viktoriya Petrovna (wife). Nobody visited us. During the day she went to the hospital, our daughter (20 years old) got a duodenal ulcer. Who would have thought... But it looks like she is going to be ok."

K: "I also visited my daughter at the hospital in Barvikha. We went for a walk. In the evening I saw a movie, don't remember what it was called. Made by the Odessa motion pictures, about our intelligence men. It was alright. Of course, there were all kinds of heroic deeds which are only ever so easy in a movie studio."

B: "I saw a movie last night with V.P... what was it called... Maybe "Shield and Sword"? It's old, but I haven't seen it before. It was good. During the day I called Stavropol. The Obkom [oblast committee] secretary² told me they have a scientist (don't recall his last

¹ March 8 - International Women's Day – ed.

² Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the time – ed.

name) who completed an experiment. He sustained wheat sprouts at -20 degrees [Celsius]. It is a great achievement!

“I worked a little bit. I’m preparing for the XV Congress of Trade Unions. Some comrades are helping me right now...”

K: “Oh yes... here is what I wanted to tell you. Remember we sent [Vladimir Vladimirovich] Matskevich to accompany [Sheikh Mujibur] Rahman to Tashkent. He said that on the plane, the ministers came down on him, Rahman, for giving us too many promises. He was very agitated. Later, in private he swore to Matskevich that he will fulfill everything he promised to Brezhnev and that he liked the Soviet Union so much that he did not want to leave.

“Next week we are receiving [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto and the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. With the Afghan it is simple: they want to pick at Pakistan from their side and to take away the Pashtuns. We will tell him that they shouldn’t (do this).

“It is more serious with Bhutto. After all he... those generals, who executed the Bengalis, he took them into his government. Maybe we should not receive him right now?”

B: “Actually, we are pretty busy right now, what do you think?”

K: “We could write him a letter or convey a verbal message through the ambassador, saying that he should put his generals behind bars, otherwise we will not receive him.”

B: “Oh, he is not going to agree to that...”

K: “Yes, you are right... And if we do not receive him, he will run over to the Americans or the Chinese.”

B: “He is already with them... Maybe we should write him a polite letter that we are not prepared right now to discuss the complex issues that have arisen from the armed conflict. Let them, say, discuss it among themselves (with India and Bangladesh) and try to settle it, it is not our job to be the middlemen. For how long should we postpone it? Until May? No... Nixon is coming in May, damn it. Then let’s do June.”

K: “All right. I will talk with Gromyko.”

B: “No, I’ll talk with him myself.”

K: “Look at how insolent Nixon has gotten. He keeps bombing Vietnam, more and more. Bastard. Listen, Len’,³ maybe we should postpone his visit as well?”

B: “Are you kidding?”

³Shortened familiar version of the name Leonid – translator.

K: "Why not? What a bombshell that would be! That's not like postponing Bhutto's visit for you!"

B: "It would be a bombshell alright, but who is it going to affect more!?"

K: "Yes, you are probably right. But we should write to him, at least..."

B: "Yes. I think I have a letter from Nixon somewhere. I haven't replied to it. I should use this opportunity. I want to spend this Saturday and Sunday to work on it. I'll go through all the correspondence again, read up on some materials."

K: "Sounds good. I am going to receive the Yugoslav ambassador right now. He's been asking for a long time. He needs to convey something from their Premier (or what do they call him there)."

The selector turns off. Brezhnev switches it to Gromyko.

B[reznayev]: "Hello."

G[romyko]: "Hello. How are you (!)⁴ feeling?"

B: "Alright. You know, Aleksey Nikolaevich [Kosygin] just called me and suggested to postpone Bhutto's visit. I thought – I am very busy right now, and I'm tired, plus the situation there is very uncertain, their problems aren't settled. It is too early for us to come in as intermediaries."

G: "Nobody is asking us to be the intermediary. And we don't need that right now."

B: "OK, I was speaking hypothetically. But you know what I mean. Plus, you know how Aleksey Nikolaevich is – he considers both options possible."

G: "Are you alone right now?"

B: "I'm alone." (He gave each one of us a look.)

G: "This Kosygin changes his mind twenty times a day. My opinion is this: we should not postpone Bhutto's visit for any reason. If he is turning to us in such a desperate situation, it means he realized that had Yahya Khan listened to us before the start of the armed conflict, he would not have lost such an important piece as Bangladesh. It means he understood that it is better to listen to us."

"Right now we have very strong positions in that whole region. If we push away Bhutto, we will lose an opportunity to quickly expand and enhance them."

⁴ Gromyko uses the familiar form of address when speaking to Brezhnev, which Chernyaev notes with (!) – translator.

“To demand that he jail the generals is just dumb. He will have enough time to do that. There is no need to exaggerate their role. It is not true that he is no longer in control of the situation and that everything is in the hands of the military junta.

“We should strike while the iron is hot.”

B: “Alright. I will raise this question at the Politburo today. You are probably right. I wavered for a minute because there is absolutely no time. Among foreign affairs, there are two things on my mind: Germany and Nixon. We need to help Brandt. I’m thinking to include a couple paragraphs in support of him and against the opposition’s arguments in my speech at the Congress of Trade Unions.”

G: “That would be very important. We presented our suggestions per your request. By the way, we should mention the Common Market. It is time to decide on this issue. The opposition is pushing the idea that the USSR wants to normalize relations with the FRG in order to separate it from the Common Market. And, they say, it is impossible to deal with the Soviet Union because it set a goal of waging an irreconcilable struggle against the Common Market.”

B: “Yes, I am planning to say something about this. You know, Kosygin suggested to postpone Nixon’s visit, too. He said it would be a bombshell.”

There was an extended silence over the selector. It seems it took Gromyko several seconds to get over the shock.

G: “What’s wrong with him...”

B: “Yeah, well... This Bhutto and the Afghan will probably ask to meet with me.”

G: “Of course. You don’t have to give them a lot of time, but you should see them. This is important.”

B: “I am tired. We will discuss everything today at the Politburo.”

He turned off the selector.

For about 15 minutes we continued to discuss the text. Then a call came in on the government communications line.

Brezhnev, picking up the receiver: “Ah, Nikolai (it was [Nikolai Viktorovich] Podgorny calling from Gagra, where he is on vacation).” This time we could only hear Brezhnev’s side of the conversation. He briefly talked about his daughter’s illness and about some routine affairs. Then he said:

“You know, Kolya,⁵ my nerves are on the edge. Yesterday I had some harsh talk with [Dmitriy Fedorovich] Ustinov. He was saying how he was resolute and would insist on his point.

⁵ Familiar version of the name Nikolai – translator.

You know this habit of his. I got wound up. Only later I came to my senses. All day I couldn't get over it. At night, around 2 a.m., I called him. It seems we made up. In the morning he called me at work. I guess these things happen. But he and I were always so friendly. It's my nerves...⁶"

"You run around doing this and that. I tell you, Kolya, unlike my predecessors, I am not just lord over others here. I'm knee-deep in work."

In the evening Tsukanov told us that at the PB everything went "well" and quickly. What "well" means he did not have the time or the inclination to explain.

One thing is clear – if matters were in Kosygin's hands, everything would go to hell. And this easily could have happened, had Brezhnev indeed only reigned in his post, instead of working.

In the beginning, when we just came into his office, he complained about the disorder and the vastness of the information. He was sifting through a folder with ciphered telegrams, articles from American newspapers, and TASS reports. He seemed to be asking: "Could I just read the headlines? Look here – the leadership in Poland is in discord, trade unions are scheming against the Party... Can I just fix it in my memory, without looking into the heart of the matter?" Etc.

March 10, 1972

Yesterday at the Politburo Bhutto's visit was approved for March 16-18; i.e. Kosygin was swiped.

The "arguments" have been approved for Brandt's struggle with the opposition to the agreement. The ambassador is supposed to give them for "the chancellor's consideration."

March 18, 1972 (Saturday)

I haven't written in a while. On Wednesday evening I visited B.N. at the hospital. He's old and sickly. He told me at length about his illness and treatment.

On Wednesday evening we "considered" Politburo members' and Secretaries' comments on L[eonid] I[lyich Brezhnev]'s text. It's funny: we mostly corrected for "style" and smoothed out the edges, verbally concealing the deficiencies that were marked by "folksy" sayings like "if we dig deeper..."

There was probably just one substantive change: [Mikhail Andreyevich] Suslov crossed out everything about the Common Market. It is a sensational part, where in order to support

⁶ As we later learned from Tsukanov, Ustinov demanded from Brezhnev greater influence over the military-industrial complex. Brezhnev hesitated, since he took a course for détente and was forced to consider other aspects of the economy and "the people's needs." But pressure from his friend – who admonished, as always, about the priority of defense – took the upper hand.

Brandt, we say for the first time that we will not be mortal enemies to the Common Market forever... Brezhnev rejected Suslov's fears.

B.N. is concerned about the position of Academician-Secretary of the History Department that opened up after [Vladimir Mikhailovich] Khvostov's death. He is afraid that [Pyotr Nikolaevich] Pospelov⁷ will show up again. Asked me to think about it. The next day I sent him a note suggesting [Vladimir Grigoryevich] Trukhanovsky (Editor in chief of the *Voprosy Istorii* [Questions of History] journal) for the position.

I told B.N. about the conversation with Kosygin and Gromyko I heard in L.I.'s office. He was surprised at Kosygin. But he also called Gromyko impudent for speaking informally to Brezhnev while kissing up to [Dzhermen Mikhailovich] Gvishiani's. He recalled that Gromyko was till the last moment against the India-Pakistan war, he thought they were one and the same thing for us. "And why shouldn't they have a war? Results have shown that it was quite alright," commented Ponomarev.

March 19, 1972 (Sunday, 23:00)

[Enrico] Berlinguer was elected Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party [PCI]. (Brezhnev's greetings in *Pravda* were more reserved than even the greetings printed right above it on the occasion of [Luigi] Longo's appointment as Chairman of the PCI.)

I remembered B.N.'s poisonous remarks in the hospital about the "government of the democratic shift": "They don't know what else to think up!"

Well, what would he, B.N., advise them to think up?!

March 20, 1972 (Monday)

Brezhnev's speech at the XV Congress [of Trade Unions]. Tsukanov later told me that Brezhnev was editing the speech on Saturday night. (It was noticeable when I listened to the speech on the radio). Some international aspects, like the phrase that negotiations in Peking took place under the thunder of bombs in Vietnam, were the result of Arbatov's intervention.

[Andrey Mikhailovich] Aleksandrov-Agentov found out about the changes at the last minute, half an hour before the speech. He was fuming at Tsukanov, yelling that he recognizes Arbatov's work by the handwriting.

March 22, 1972

In the morning Tsukanov again: the speech at the presentation of the order to the Trade Unions. Present: Arbatov, [Georgy Lukich] Smirnov, and I, in Tsukanov's office. Went over it. Snot.

⁷ Pyotr Nikolaevich Pospelov – a long-time party apparatus worker from the Stalin era, a historian of the Party; he participated in the compilation of *A Brief History of the CPSU(b)*; during the war he was an editor of *Pravda*. An inveterate dogmatist and political chameleon, an academician.

In the evening Tsukanov told me that he will try to convince L.I. not to diminish his position by presenting this award. It is not his job. Truly, this is ridiculous.

I read the transcript of the conversation between Brezhnev and Bhutto. Brezhnev handled the matter brilliantly. He brainwashed Bhutto, who walked away as our true friend. Brezhnev almost persuaded him to work with India toward an agreement on non-aggression , non-use of force, and non-interference. If that were to happen, he said, then all the remaining problems will resolve themselves, like the issue with prisoners of war Kashmir, etc. If you agree, he said, then we will “work with India” toward this. It was difficult for him [Bhutto] to take this step. But personally, he already agreed. “I will do everything I can. If I fail, at least send a wreath for my grave.”

March 23, 1972 (Thursday).

All day I can't shake the feeling of self-satisfaction at how cleverly I reworked the note to the CC about responding to the Communist Party of Australia [CPA].

The gist of the matter: the Aaronses⁸ (“revisionists and anti-Soviets”) are proposing a meeting of CPSU and CPA delegations, and they are asking us to send greetings for their Congress (March 31st).

The note: We'll respond after your congress, depending on its results. [If we don't like it], we will formally sever our connections with the CPA.

Vadim Zagladin returned from Italy, and it seems he secured a breakthrough in our relations with the ICP.

Our ambassador in Paris met with [André] Malraux (in connection with the latter's visit to Nixon). He assures us that all of Nixon's actions are dominated by the upcoming meeting with Brezhnev. He does not think that anything significant has happened.

Unlike the rest of the world, he has a low opinion of Zhou,⁹ says he is primitive and knows a couple words in French.

It turns out Zhou went to Hanoi at Nixon's request. The latter promised to withdraw all troops and to cease hostilities as soon as the Vietnamese release the pilots. The Chinese want the role of peacemakers and are in a hurry, they are afraid that Nixon will turn to Moscow with the same request for mediation. The prisoners of war are his main trump card in the presidential elections.

[Stanislav Mikhailovich] Menshikov (consultant of the International Department) spent a month in the United States. He was surprised that in comparison to 1970, when he was there last, the most urgent issue on college campuses was “freedom for homosexuals!” Whereas in 1970 students were jumping on guns because of Vietnam. Total political apathy among the youth.

⁸ Laurence and Eric Aarons – leaders of the Communist Party of Australia, brothers.

⁹ Zhou Enlai – one of the main “historical leaders” of China.

March 25, 1972 (Saturday, morning, at home).

I'm reading the TASS reports. [Carlos] Altamirano (General Secretary of the Socialist Party of Chile, whom I met when he was in Moscow a year ago, and then saw again when I was in Chile in October of 1971) went to the PRC.

He spent five hours with Zhou. Enthusiasm – “unfinished revolution,” “great nation,” “the fate of mankind” (in the spirit of Nixon), “750 million Chinese + 600 million Latin Americans,” “a recognized leader of the Third World”...

Either they have despaired of the reality of Soviet aid, or it is the effect of the “revolutionary” nature of being anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, since the USSR is now a completed society, similar to a Western consumer society, and an ordinary superpower...

April 1, 1972 Saturday, at home.

Saw “Brother Alyosha” in the theater on Malaya Bronnaya, directed by Efros. Vomit-inducing slush. Sentimental wimpishness. I am furious about the wasted evening. Our intelligentsia (who applauded and called the author on stage) has completely lost its bearings. They are so consumed by their escapism from reality, that in their “protest” they turn to whatever may come their way. Disgusting!

Two dreams of Lyudka Malova: to give herself to a man she loves on a carpet of Parma violets (from Anatole France’s “Sylvestre Bonnard”), and to walk into the Milan Opera in a gorgeous long dress, in diamonds, and with the best hairstyle in the world – so the whole evening all eyes would be only on her (even if the diamonds are only leased!). Only one evening, and a whole life!¹⁰

Saw Stalin’s grandson in the “Feeder” [cafeteria] of the “Udarnik” theater.

I’m reading Alvin Toffler’s “Facing the Future: the 800-th Generation” in *Inostrannaya Literatura* No. 3: the end of constancy, the escalation of acceleration, rhythm of life, a society of “discarders,” a new tribe of nomads, easily replaceable people, the overabundance of choice... etc.¹¹

¹⁰ Who is Lyudmila Malova? She is one of four 19-20 year-old girls who were sent by the CC to Prague in 1959 to work for the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* journal as stenographers and typists; each of them spoke some foreign language. One of them – Valya – married a famous leader of the French Communist Party, Jean Kanapa. Another – Olya – married a consultant of the International Department [Yuriy] Zhilin. The third – Nadya – later worked for a long time in the CC International Department. The fourth is that very “Lyudka” – when she returned to Moscow she got lost in the various Ministries. In their personal lives, all these four girls ended up unhappy. In Prague they were at the center of merry companies, which transgressed all norms of CC-morality. They were smart, educated girls. I decided to include them in this political text as examples of political characters that destroyed the notions about “apparatchiks of that time.”

¹¹ Now we know that this is a modern Nostradamus. Back then it was perceived as something foreign to us, in the sense of “we wish we had those kinds of problems.”

April 3, 1972 (Monday)

Yesterday I was at an exhibition called “Artists of Moscow. Spring 1972” on Kuznetskyi Most. The same social impression as from “Brother Alyosha.” But this case is more complex. As the result of an easing up of restrictions, artistic development has turned back [to the period] 40-50 years ago, to a time when its “natural course was interrupted by force.” Artists are repeating Steinberg, Altman, Larionov, Petrov-Vodkin, even Chagall and Tischler. But all of this looks like feeble imitation, especially after my visit to the vaults of the Russian Museum in Leningrad, where I was in December on vacation.

There are also some cheap modernist show-offs. A bunch of natural landscapes, which seem to be 100 years old, a huge number of churches (in village and city settings), Russian huts, palisades and porches, chamber portraits, etc.

It is the element of political indifference and thoughtlessness. It seems people are sick of the official theme of “Social Heroism” and the like. But there is no new idea, no new form that would inspire people to look for new content. Terrifying escapism from reality. And the technique is very weak, too.

Today I learned that on March 15th and 21st in several cities in Hungary there were student disturbances “with nationalist and anti-Soviet slogans.” It is not the first time that I read in TASS and the cables that economic reform led to a major shift of income to the “private-cooperative” sector. There are high incomes for academics, professors, doctors, and other intelligentsia. There are murmurs from the working class. The student groups were broken up with batons. Sixteen arrests. The “instigators” have not been found yet.

Meanwhile, in recent years Hungary seemed to be the most prosperous country from “our camp.” Everybody expected an explosion in Bulgaria (after Poland in 1970). But here you go!

Shumeiko’s materials for Brezhnev’s meeting with the World Council of the Peace Movement, which is on its last dying breath.

April 6, 1972 (Thursday)

Today I attended the Politburo [session] for the first time in my life. There was a discussion of materials for Nixon’s visit.

It meets in the Kremlin, not far from Lenin’s cabinet. The windows overlook the Hall of Facets, where Sverdlovsky Hall is located. The guards took a long look at me, and compared my face to the photo on my ID. The small room is the lobby. Gromyko, [Andrey Antonovich] Grechko (and two colonel-generals and a vice admiral with him, later it turned out they were summoned to confirm their promotions to higher posts), [Nikolai Konstantinovich] Baibakov and other ministers, and some deputy department heads – a total of 10-12 people – gathered in this lobby 15-20 minutes before the start of the Politburo session.

Some CC Secretaries stopped by, too. On the spot, [Konstantin Fyodorovich] Katushev assigned me [to write] an article for *Pravda*: he said he read a ciphered telegram that Brandt is

asking for support from the Socialist International, which we are ready to give him... So we should praise the Social Democrats. (He doesn't understand that this kind of praise from us is like a sickle to the balls for Brandt!)

We were invited into the main hall for the "first question [on the agenda]."

Brezhnev approved the submitted materials (praised the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], and "our Department," as he said, i.e. precisely our Department, and... someone reminded him – [Yuri Vladimirovich] Andropov).

He said that right now it is important to note only the fundamentals: the materials lay the foundation, but you can't use them to talk to Nixon. They need to be converted into "working material." Let every PB member provide in writing comments and suggestions on the materials. We will form a commission, which will work on this day and night.

The order of last names in the committee is indicative: Suslov (member of the PB), Andropov (candidate member of the PB), Ponomarev (just a Secretary), Ustinov (candidate member of the PB), [Pyotr Nilovich] Demichev (candidate member of the PB), Gromyko, Grechko (Minister of Defense).

[Brezhnev] asked to pay attention to some unacceptable approaches in the materials, including in the draft communiqué. For example, there is mention of the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism. "How is this possible? We are teaming up with them on an issue in which we can have nothing in common?! At the Conference in 1969 we pledged to fight against the United States precisely on this issue. Nobody will understand us, first and foremost the ICM [International Communist Movement]. Or – about upholding sovereignty. Why would we write this when Nixon is fighting in Vietnam. He may agree to all of this and put it in writing. But he will not and cannot carry it out. So the communists will say to us: 'It is all nonsense, you are naïve people.'

"We have to note down all our fundamental disagreements. But we should not use the Chinese method: our positions on one side, theirs on the other.

"Of course, on many issues I will be speaking with Nixon without notes. But on paper every phrase has to be carefully weighed."¹²

April 8, 1972

There was an interesting discussion at the Politburo regarding the protocol for Nixon's visit.

Brezhnev: "In China, Nixon walked on the Wall (Great Wall of China) with his Madam. Here, she is going to be going everywhere alone. He is only going to 'Swan Lake.' Is this appropriate?

¹² As we can see, at the time Brezhnev's mental capacity was still quite normal for his position.

“We do not have speeches prepared for the luncheon, or toasts for the reception (from our side). What if he wants to make them (and he will probably want to, he needs it)?...”

“We should not put the accompanying party at the hotel. Andropov won’t be able to keep an eye on them there. We should put all of them at the Lenin Hills (government mansions built under Khrushchev). They will have fewer contacts that way, too.

“The crowd at the airport. Usually we have them waving flags and shouting ‘Friendship!’ It won’t do this time. But they shouldn’t be completely silent, either. We should prepare 5-6 guys to say something to the President, maybe to wish him success in the negotiations or something...”

Podgorny started to insist on showing Nixon the Osipov and Aleksandrov ensembles (Soviet Army).

Brezhnev: “This is not what we should show off.”

Brezhnev then separately raised the question presented by Baibakov and [Nikolai Semenovich] Patolichev¹³--a draft trade and economic agreement with the USA.

Pogorny took the floor first: “It is inappropriate for us to get involved in these deals, with gas and oil pipelines. As if we are planning to sell off the whole of Siberia; plus, it makes us look technologically helpless. Can’t we do the same things ourselves, without foreign capital?!”

Brezhnev invited Baibakov to explain. The latter calmly approached the microphone, barely suppressing an ironic smile. And he began to speak, providing from memory dozens of numbers, calculations, and comparisons. Clearly and professionally.

1. We have nothing to sell for hard currency. Only timber and pulp. This is not enough, plus we are selling it at a large loss for us. We also cannot ride forward only on the sale of gold. And it would be dangerous in the current world monetary situation, there is little prospect for success this way.
2. The Americans, the Japanese, and others are interested in our oil, or even better – gas. The fuel balance in the U.S. will become increasingly strained. Their imports will grow, and they prefer to receive liquefied natural gas. They are offering:
 - a. To build a gas pipeline from Tyumen to Murmansk, and there a gas liquefying plant, and from there – on the ships;
 - b. Construct a pipeline from Vilyuysk through Yakutsk to Magadan.

The latter option is better for us. It will pay off in seven years. All equipment for construction and operation will be theirs.

¹³ Nikolai Semenovich Patolichev – USSR Minister of Foreign Trade.

If we refuse, we will not be able to even approach the Vilyuysk reserves for at least 30 years. Technologically we could lay down the pipeline ourselves. But we have no metal for pipes, nor for machines or other equipment.

3. Sakhalin. The Japanese are offering to set up oil extraction from the bottom of the ocean. But we do not have the equipment for this. There is one machine, a Dutch one, that is operating in the Caspian Sea.

Podgorny: "There are strong winds in Sakhalin, they will topple all the constructions."

Baibakov barely suppresses a smirk: "Nikolai Viktorovich, Sakhalin is big, these are strong winds in the north, and no strong winds in the south. And then, let the Japanese worry about these winds, but for some reason they don't seem to mind."

In the evening I visited B.N. at the hospital. We again were talking about his report in Sofia for Dimitrov's 90th anniversary. He started to push the idea of a direct connection between the Popular Front and people's democracies. It's a stupid idea. He keeps wanting to teach [foreign] communist parties, which reject this connection as such, and in essence condemn "people's democracy" as a form of government. Sometimes I am amazed by the bureaucratic limitations of B.N.'s thinking. He is ignorant about issues that he deals with every day, but he possesses precise knowledge of the kitchen gossip of communist fraternal parties and their "scandalous" statements about us. It is mainly based on these statements that he formulated his policies.

He again scolded the Italians. It is as if there was no XIII Congress of the ICP, no Grishin-Zagladin reports from Rome, no Politburo session discussing the results of [our delegation's] visit to the Congress of the CPI, which gave a lot of support to the Italians. They are the only real force in the communist movement of the capitalist world! He even said, "If a war started now, I am not sure that they wouldn't take a position of neutrality against us." I protested. He pretended that he was joking.

In the morning we were meeting Gus Hall¹⁴ at Sheremetyevo airport. The Vietnamese ambassador was there. Demichev's talk about, "Vietnam has already secured the election of the American president." This is in connection to their powerful offensive, which after a long period of inactivity has now lasted for nine days and is upsetting the "Vietnamization" of the U.S. presidential campaign.

April 16, 1972 (Sunday)

Yesterday we had a subbotnik.¹⁵ We were again working in Kuntsevo on the construction of some beautiful houses of the Central Committee complex, which the people have already dubbed "Ilyich's Testaments."

¹⁴ General Secretary of the Communist Party of the U.S.

¹⁵ Saturday volunteer work day – translator.

We worked cheerfully. Our construction worker Yura was very proud of us. He repeatedly said to the foreman: “you write it down – [my team] finished first and was the first one to be transferred to another section!. During the break, our team drank three bottles of vodka and Teosyan brought good Armenian cognac from home (he lives nearby). We felt really good after that and people decided to walk home. I tried to walk with Nadya (one of the girls who was in Prague) but she told me, “Everybody is at home.” It is 21 degrees Celsius in Moscow, it hasn’t been so warm at this time of the year in a 100 years.

On Wednesday I was at Boris Slutsky’s. He recently came back from Hungary. He and his sweet wife, Tanya. We drank wine. He told curious stories (he is a wonderful storyteller) about [Anna] Akhmatova (her feelings about Pushkin, Tolstoy, Blok and Bryusov – with the latter two she slept on occasion – and Esenin, who happened upon her in 1921 as she was washing the floors and was unable to hide a mocking grin on his “Ryazan mug.” From that moment he ceased to be a poet in Akhmatova’s eyes. She crossed him out of literature, as she later did with Zabolotsky, when he refused to drink vodka in toast to her, since he never took the stuff in his mouth and did not make an exception for Akhmatova.

She called the last session of the Presidium of the Congress of the RSFSR Writers Union before her death – “a challenge to the king!” In the end, she won!

Boris also told us about Konenkov and Shostakovich, who in the last fifteen years not only did not write their articles, but also did not read them.

On Thursday I made an impromptu speech at the Party meeting of our Department. And once again I felt that people perceive me as a deputy department head differently from the others. Some with more sympathy, others with contempt, and probably all with some surprise and lack of understanding. They are trying to find some kind of pattern that would allow such a deputy department head to appear in the CC apparatus. They are waiting for me to fail, so the familiar situation could be restored.

April 21, 1972 (Friday)

The director of “Renault” said during his conversation with Kosygin: “Excuse me, but the cars manufactured by “Moskvich” and in Izhevsk are at the level of cars that we produced 15 years ago.”

Brezhnev asked [Earl L.] Butz (U.S. Secretary of Agriculture) to tell Nixon that he should stop the bombing in Vietnam. Our people, Brezhnev said, will never understand or accept it. They remember the war, and you, Americans, never had such a war.

[John] Gollan’s words to [Ivan Vasilievich] Kapitonov (CPSU delegation in Great Britain). “I will never agree with your ideological policies,” Gollan said, “nobody knew Daniel and Sinyavsky. You jailed them and turned their books into bestsellers. A whole ‘industry’ has been created around their names in the West. And for what? They served their terms, and the first thing they did when they got out of prison was write books about their experience in the

camps and the like. Are you going to imprison them again? But what is the point of imprisoning people who are not afraid of it?

“Or, take Solzhenitsyn. You made him into a Nobel laureate. By your policies you turned him into a modern Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky. If you imprison him, you’ll make him the second Christ!” And so on in this vein.

In Czechoslovakia the trials of 46 former opposition activists will begin soon. These activists led some underground work. [Gustav] Husak ordered the process to be closed, as he said, “So as not to breed new Dimitrovs.”

April 22, 1972

When I was visiting B.N. at the hospital last time, he told me some things about the famous Politburo that was in session from morning till night on the nationalities question.

They were discussing Andropov’s report about the document discovered in Ukraine. It was written in 1966 by a group of nationalists. The gist of it is anti-“russification” and pro-separation.

In the meantime, as Ponomarev reported at the PB, never in the history of Soviet power was there such an “Ukrainization” of Ukraine. “I,” he said, “provided this fact – from the days of [Dmitriy Zakharovich] Manuilsky and [Georgiy Leonidovich] Pyatakov before him, the First Secretaries of Ukraine were not Ukrainians: [Lazar Moiseyevich] Kaganovich served several times, [Pavel Petrovich] Postyshev, [Nikita Sergeyevich] Khrushchev, and others. This lasted until Podgorny.”

And now, the only “practical” and “political” quality considered when picking candidates is whether he is Ukrainian. If yes, then he is automatically a good candidate. [Vladimir Vasilievich] Shcherbitsky said this, and his speech at the PB was much sharper and more self-critical than [Pyotr Yefimovich] Shelest’s.

Brezhnev: “I am in touch with Pyotr Yefimovich (Shelest) on the phone every day. We talk about sausage, wheat, land reclamation, and the like. All the while, he and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine knew about this document since 1966, they knew about the activity of the nationalists, and never said a word about it to me. He did not see a problem here. Or another example: when it became known, I called Pyotr Nilych (Demichev) and asked what he thinks of this. He started assuring me that it is not a big deal, that they took care of it, and so on. This is the position of our chief ideologist.”

There is it. But really, we must look at the root of the problem. Some Armenian and Azerbaijani threads are connected to [Karen Nersesovich] Brutents. They tell him that the dislike and even hatred of Russians is growing on the basis of a spreading belief (which is, by the way, widely introduced by the local Party and government apparatus – as an alibi for themselves) that everything is going badly because the Russians are holding everything at the top, and they are incompetent and stupid.

The difference of today's nationalism is that its main repository is the local political apparatus. And it stems from the fact that the "former colonial outposts" now live much better than the Russian "mother country." They are wealthier and they feel their "capabilities." Gratitude, on the other hand, is not a political concept.

April 23, 1972

When the week starts, I wait for Saturday and Sunday as a promise of freedom and rest. This happens every time. But they are always the days of uneasiness. You read something that you left unfinished, you look through something, sort something. And you always want to go somewhere, meet with someone, see something – a museum, an exhibition (for a while now, [Boris Abramovich] Slutskyi has been calling me to go see the underground artists), visit Dez'ka (the famous poet David Samoilov), go to Opalikha, visit Karyakin, Vad'ka...

These are all attempts to run away from myself, to hide behind the appearance of activity. It is because I do not have my own work in life, something outside of my job. And my job, most of the time, is a profanation of real aspirations. I write articles and reports for Ponomarev, texts for Brezhnev and others. Though sometimes it is possible to play an advisory role in the determination of real political positions (in respect to this or that party, communist movement, some matters of foreign policy, some actions in the sphere of political propaganda).

I will be 51 soon. What have I done in my life? Nothing really that would be worthwhile for my successors. But I lived an honest life: I did not hide from responsibility, did not trample on anyone, I defended convictions when it wasn't hopeless, I did not dance to the tune of any authorities, I certainly did not aid dishonesty and social stupidity, I held ideological scoundrels in contempt and did everything in my power to trip them up.

And still, I do not have my own work, my master work. I do not even have a course for a dissertation. This is not so much because I lack confidence in my abilities, but mostly because my own experience (and that of everyone around me) shows the pointlessness of this so-called social science, the futility of its existence and the wasted paper. This is why life in research institutes is either full of vanity and sexual exchanges, or vulgar fussing of ambitions and careers under the pretense of ideological struggle. It's sickening.

I don't want to write anything (for publication), not just my dissertation. I know too much, therefore any composition (and it can only be on the subject of science or politics) seems to be lying to myself and others.

Of course, the habit of a graphomaniac to always be writing something must produce a sense of being a craftsman (no matter what you do, just as long as you have something to do – fill pages and be satisfied with your words and paragraphs). But I don't have this journalistic habit. Although indirectly, it is there somewhere: I notice that at work, a well-written paper gives me a feeling of satisfaction regardless of its actual significance.

Oh yes, by the way, Brezhnev met with the Vietnamese ambassador last week. The press afterwards was full of expressions of solidarity and the like. But in the conversation there was a

counterpoint of demanding and emphatic concerns (and requests to convey it to Hanoi) about the fact that “we did not know anything about the plans for the offensive, nor its goals, not its real progress.” We find out about it only through the published reports of “our common enemy.”

April 25, 1972

Yesterday in the evening Shaposhnikov and I visited B.N. in the hospital. We talked about the upcoming trip to Sweden, about [Aleksandr Yevgenievich] Bovin.

I received Frida Brown (wife of one of the leaders of the “healthy forces” in Australia, a member of the CC of the new Socialist Party). She declared that this is an “historical meeting” because for the first time a representative of the Socialist Party of Australia [SPA] is received in the CC CPSU. I expressed support and approval for the SPA rather bravely (without having the proper authority for it) and encouraged her to keep it up against the Aarons brothers & Co.

It was announced that Kissinger was in Moscow from April 20-24th, and Brezhnev and Gromyko received him.

In the meantime, our Department is receiving letters from everywhere (including the scientists of Byelorussia) with demands to reject Nixon’s visit because he is bombing Vietnam. We are reaping the fruits of our own propaganda during Nixon’s visit to Peking!

April 27, 1972

All day today we were in suspense: the Bundestag was deciding the fate of Brandt’s government. [Rainer] Barzel moved for a “constructive vote of no confidence.” Everything depended on two-three votes. And before that, a couple of Social Democrats and ‘Free Democrats’ were bought up by the CDU. Fortunately, Brandt “won,” even by two votes!

May 1, 1972

I was on Red Square. I walked there slowly. All kinds of thoughts. The main one: “order!” The central streets are cleared of people. There was a cordon of police and people’s guards at Kropotinskie Vorota, and at every turn after that. My god, how much police we have! And hoards of people’s guards, too. This is also “order.” The cordons making way for cars with special passes on the windshields is also “order.” The fact that the passengers in these cars ride to work despite the fact that they live a 15-20 minute walk away, this is “order” too. And the chains of soldiers and “volunteers” that make up the columns that are already on Manezhnaya Ploshchad’... These are all elements of “order.”

Podgorny’s speech, which consisted of the necessary phrases, old tired formulas and banalities – this is also a symbol of “order,” of stability, of the “establishment”! Moreover, when the speech ended and the “Internationale” thundered (through loudspeakers, of course) over the Square – with its archaic text and almost incongruously moving rhythm and music – this was also a component of “order,” because there exists a decision to play the “Internationale” because we need official revolutionary enthusiasm for our “order.” Try to express that!

What took place on Red Square is a grand abstraction, of course (this became especially evident when I walked down Kremlyovsky Proezd half an hour before the parade ended and saw up close the remains of columns walking toward me...).

But even knowing that it is an abstraction, you still get emotional. Very. For many reasons. First of all – the “physical parade.” Girls – healthy, beautiful in their colorful pantsuits, all pretty, showing off their tits, their gait, their hair. Of course they have nothing of the ideology and romanticism of the 1930s. But they exude health, the strength of the people... and prosperity. Yes, there are very many nicely and fashionably dressed young women at this demonstration (it’s stunning how many beautiful women can be gathered in one place) – which shows that there is a considerable level of prosperity already. And this makes one emotional. The melodies are pleasant too, the old ones and the new ones.

May 7, 1972

After the reception at the GDR Embassy [Yuri Aleksandrovich] Zhilin and I went for a walk. He was philosophizing about our work at the International Department, saying that we’re not doing what we should be. He said that if we weren’t so busy servicing B.N. with reports, articles, etc. – on which we spend our best creative powers, our time, and our energy – we could be producing analytical materials about the Communist Movement, preparing initiatives, considering the strategy of our policies in the International Communist Movement. I objected: if it wasn’t for B.N. and his aspirations to be a theorist, what would we be doing at all? We would be working on routine stuff, like our sister department (socialist countries). I reminded Zhilin that since 1966 there have been numerous attempts to seriously analyze the state of the International Communist Movement and our strategy as a whole. Once there were even plans for a special CC Plenum on the subject. Where did all of this work go? It is in my safe, a dead weight, work for the wastebasket.

Our “bosses” don’t need this. The Communist Movement right now is nothing more than an ideological addendum to our foreign policy, and archaic “argument” that we are still an “ideological authority,” and not just a superpower. The Communist Movement as an independent force with its own laws and objectives is nothing but a disadvantage to us right now. It is best to ignore it as such, although some parties, as sovereign authorities, sometimes cannot be ignored. That is why it is totally idealistic to offer objective analyses of the movement and to attempt to develop a strategy for the International Communist Movement.

I told Zhilin: if B.N. leaves, they will give us the Candidate of Science [Stepan Vasilievich] Chervonenko (former ambassador to Czechoslovakia), then are you going to spend much time working on “problems”? It was enough to put the question that way, and all arguments disappeared.

I’m reading Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “Between Two Ages”!

May 8, 1972

Yesterday Ella and I stopped by a movie theater that plays reruns, the Nikitsky one. We saw *Bumbarash* with Zolotukhin. It's based on the story by [Arkady] Gaidar. The same spirit as in *Vogne broad net* [No Path through Fire], *Belye solntse pustyni* [White Sun of the Desert], and some others. Though done in a conventional manner and with some exaggeration, this film expresses with great skill our original revolutionary idealism. It is clearly the reaction of the young generation to the conformism of our establishment, our stable and orderly life. It is also a reaction to the cynicism of the people who officially profess Leninism, but in regular life have long been guided by quite different motives. Here you see the "generation gap," in which you can clearly discern the social and ideological tensions of our society.

It is no wonder that all such pictures come out with difficulty, bowdlerized, and have limited runs mainly in peripheral theaters. Lapin, Romanov, Kat'ka,¹⁶ and others are too smart to not figure out what's going on.

This echoes what Gen'ka told me yesterday. She was giving a tour to a class of fifth graders from some Moscow school. One boy, very intelligent, serious, and meticulous, told her, "We have two buildings near my school, they are from the XVII century. There's a sign on them that they are historical monuments and are maintained by the State. What kind of maintenance is it, if they are completely run down, debilitated, and neglected?" Later, when they were walking from one exhibit to another, she asked him, "Do you study antiquities?" "No," he said, "I study the year 1937!"

Gen'ka was shocked, and at first pretended that she did not understand. He asked her, "Don't you know what 1937 is?" "How do you study it, where do you get materials and so on?" "Yes, it's hard to get any materials. But I will not give up. I have to find out how it became possible for so many innocent people, revolutionaries, and Leninists to be killed!" This is a fifth grader.

May 9, 1972

Victory Day. A terrible day. It seems to contain all your youth, all the most important things in life, all your real importance and self-respect. And you want to escape somewhere, do something, to be with people... With which people? With whom?

Yesterday I spent the whole day with Kol'ka Varlamov.¹⁷ We walked around the streets together. I told him about all my goings-on. Then we started drinking, and when we were drunk I walked him to his house. Today we did not meet up or even call each other: either he is busy, or maybe it's me – there is a sense that we should not spoil the effect of our meeting yesterday, because we have nothing left to do together.

I'm in a state of complete despair – from the relentless loneliness, from which it is impossible to escape. An'ka (my daughter) did not even congratulate me on the holiday. Gen'ka too. I destroy in the most vulgar way all of my so-called "free time" out of pity for her, out of my

¹⁶ Sergey Georgievich Lapin – Chairman of State Radio and Television; Grigoriy Vasilievich Romanov – Head of the CC CPSU Department of Culture; Yekaterina Alekseyevna ("Kat'ka") Furtseva – USSR Minister of Culture.

¹⁷ My friend from the front. An employee of the General Department of the CC CPSU.

innate sense of duty, out of my attachment to her helplessness. I have so many opportunities to meet with interesting people, to be in very meaningful society... And in recent years I've felt a sharp increase in my yearning for intellectual stimulation (particularly through paintings – when I was in Leningrad last December, I got the greatest pleasure and the strongest impressions from the Russian Museum, where I've been about a dozen times. The vault left me completely stunned). And despite all this, I spend my Saturdays and Sundays (when they are free) in my room (while she lays in hers) only in order not to hurt her feelings, so she can be calm, and... so I don't feel guilty. Idiotic.

Today – on such a day – [Yuri Petrovich] Lyubimov invited me to a commemorative screening of *A zori zdes' tikhie* [At Dawn it's Quiet Here] and then to a party at Taganka. Oh, how I wanted to be among those people, who for some reason like me, or at least they are always happy to see me. And they themselves are talented and cheerful.

But I stayed home and read Brzezinski, and from time to time walked over to the TV, where Gen'ka was watching a banal concert broadcast from the theater of the Soviet Army.

Two-hour walk around Moscow with Brutents. This time the city is quite empty. He told me about his trip to Hungary with Kuskov (for the anti-imperialist Congress).

Impressions: vigorous economic activity, the store shelves are full of goods, the prosperity is evident and obvious. But the “middle class” and intelligentsia profit from it mostly, the workers much less so. The gap is growing, as are internal tensions. Ideological “debauchery,” though they clamped down on the striptease joints. The apparatus and in the higher echelons of the party are already dividing into “we” (the healthy forces) and “they,” for whom “Moskvich” and “Volga” cars are no longer enough, they want Mercedeses. There are forecasts that “quite something” will happen if this continues for another year-year and a half.

After you have your fill of Brzezinski’s “Between Two Ages” (he sees everything, understands everything, and is very deep and merciless) it becomes impossible to write anything serious for publication. Everything will be unbelievably hackneyed, with demagoguery and lies. The only way to refute him is through logic, i.e. to try to show the shortfalls of his analysis and method. But to refute him factually... There are no such facts, only the passionate desire to disagree with his conclusions and predictions.

May 21, 1972

Last night I returned from Sweden. Official delegation of the Central Committee ([Mikhail Vasilievich] Zimyanin, [Aleksandr Arvidovich] Drizulis from Latvia, and I). There hasn't been anything like it since 1964. When [Carl-Hendrik] Hermansson became chairman of LPC (Left Party-Communists of Sweden), without a backward glance they harshly criticized us for “Stalinism;” went between us and the Chinese, with more sympathy toward the Chinese; and refused to have relations with other parties, first and foremost with us. Then there was Czechoslovakia and Hermansson's public demand to break all ties with the USSR. This was followed by TV personality [Viktor Osipovich] Shragin “unmasking” Hermansson as the husband of a Jewish millionaire wife (by the way, I saw her there, a beautiful woman; and

[Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich] Vorozheikin¹⁸ says that if it wasn't for her, Hermansson would have never become a communist. She always treated us with sincere affection). They say that when journalists asked Hermansson what he thought about this attack by Shragin, he said, "I knew that they will condemn me over there, but I never imagined that they would stoop so low."

So, now that there has been a mutual change in sentiments, they invited us. From May 14-20th. I would need a whole notebook to describe everything.

Point by point.

The Arlanda airport: the embassy staff, the last time we saw the handsome and all knowing M.N. Streltsov (embassy adviser, he is being transferred to Finland), Vice Chairman of the LPC [Lars] Werner, Urban Carlson (Secretary of the CC), Marklund with two young girls (possibly Werner's daughters).

Then the hosts left us to rest for that day – Sunday. A tour of the city with the ambassador: villas, park, riding, television tower. In the evening in "Lido" (Zimyanin, Vorozheikin, me, Yakhontov (*Pravda* correspondent)): porno films alternating with live performances.

Monday the 15th. First meeting with leadership of the LPC: Hermansson, Werner, Forsberg, Carlson, Johansson. To Zimyanin's surprise (he prepared "the history of the CPSU's work after the XXIV Congress"), Hermansson simply started asking questions, the first one being: "Nixon is going to Moscow, and at the same time he lays minefields in Haiphong; the Vietnam War is growing... We are pressured from all sides for explanations." (The Vietnam War movement in Sweden is one of the strongest in the world. This reflects both the level of real democracy and democratic awareness in the country, as well as the skillfulness of the politicians who managed to mobilize and use this factor.)

Zimyanin started saying something incoherent, and he got louder and louder, too. Ironic smiles soon gave way to outright boredom. Since I had the opportunity to think a bit while Zimyanin was talking, I asked for a turn to speak. Zimyanin was completely confused and rushed after his speech, so he agreed, and in 5-7 minutes I tried to ease the situation a little.

Breakfast. Vorozheikin-[Olof] Palme (Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden, Prime Minister).

In the evening at the Carlton Hotel – a meeting with the Stockholm Party organization: Johansson with the face of a turtle, the "organized opposition" to smoking and wine, he refused to serve in the army 10 years ago and was sentenced to a month in jail. Now he is choosing which jail to serve his sentence in, and when to do it: during vacation or while working. All of this is allowed, together with two "holidays" per month for all prisoners.

His deputy is a doctor with long hair and unkempt looks. They say he is a great orator, but his appearance is of a slobbering, mumbling amateur – it does not inspire confidence. Levan

¹⁸ Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Vorozheikin – Assistant of the CC International Department, specialist on Sweden.

(member of the Secretariat). Both of them are “academics,” i.e. intellectuals. The other 10 are workers, including members of the Riksdag. One of them is a young man of about 27, an “ideologist” of proletarian beginnings, who hates the “academics.” He couldn’t care less about all of their ideas. He is a construction worker and earns on par with a doctor, that very one. He has a house, a car; he is “at home” in the trade union, which is a real force. He is a deputy and has a strong voice in the municipality. He believes that everyone should be like him.

There was also a former member of the Spanish International Brigades (62, retired) in the group. For a while he was serving time supposedly for spying for us. In recent years he was the loudest anti-Soviet. Now he warmed up.

Zimyanin was more confident in this conversation than in the morning. However, another tendency of his came through: the patronizing tone, familiarity, authoritative (stupid) jokes.

The topics: again Nixon and Vietnam, then – youth. Zimyanin and then Drizul went on at length about how tough it is for young people in the U.S., and how drugs are the bane of their existence.

Tuesday the 16th. Prepared the communiqué with Carlson.

A meeting with the Communist faction in the Riksdag. Zimyanin laid out the framework of the CPSU pretty coherently.

His manner of speaking ruins his own speeches and statements: once he says something, often effectively and on-point, he gets carried away with his success and starts to comment on his own words. It turns ridiculous and boring, and then quite uncomfortable, especially when a didactic note seeps in (which happens almost without exception), and he starts explaining platitudes from the top down. In a word, he starts on a “campaign against illiteracy.”

After breakfast – the Social Democrats: Secretary General Anderson, Secretaries Carlson and Tunnel. The atmosphere was completely different than with the Communists. With them, there was strained seriousness, which concealed a feeling of inferiority, differences among themselves that they wanted to hide, mistrust and wariness towards us. With the Social Democrats, there was confidence in their strength, and not the slightest fear that interacting with us would harm the “independence” of their party, which resulted in an open and friendly tone, jokes, irony, and plenty of “laughing at ourselves.” (After running three times in the course of our conversation to the hall where parliamentary voting was taking place, Stan Anderson said “severely” – he is sick of this button war, he is now against the parliamentary democracy, which prevents him from having a peaceful conversation with his friends). They willingly told us about their affairs and inter-party struggles, and gave characteristics of various figures and so on.

I think Zimyanin was a little overwhelmed. It’s not the first time for Vorozheikin and me, we really are already “friends” and that’s why our hosts took that tone. But for Zimyanin, it seems, it was the first time seeing firsthand Social Democrats of that rank in such a good mood. Even in Moscow he was anxiously asking me what we will tell them if they ask why we consider them “ betrayers of the working class.”

In the evening we flew to Gothenburg. It was cold, but I didn't bring my raincoat.

May 22, 1972

Nixon arrived today. But I'll finish describing Sweden.

At the hotel we had some beers and our first "discussion." Hagel is the chairman of the district party organization. I discharged a long tirade about the Soviet people's sacrifices at the altar of internationalism.

Morning of May 17th – a drive through the city, blocks that are going to be demolished; view of the city from the hill with the stylized Viking church (built in 1912), which is beautiful. The flying bridge across the Göta Elve River; port, shipyards, new city blocks, a satellite town with a shopping center in the middle. Too bad there is no theater, cinema, etc. The communists criticized the municipality for this, though they noted that everybody has a car and it's a 10-minute drive to the city center.

The public library is a wonder of modern culture, and, as we would say, "cultural services." It was created with electronic technology, the great imagination and ingenuity of the staff, and their sincere and, I would add, ideological commitment to public education. All of this was funded by the municipality. The state – not a single krona.

Breakfast at a restaurant with Mayor Hansen (former sailor). A big and merry man from a large bourgeois party, friend of the USSR. He told a story of how some students, imitating the Parisians, seized a brewery in 1968 and demanded that "beer pipe" be extended into the workers' quarters and student dormitories. The director of the brewery gave an interview during the period of "ferment."

The Volvo factory! Sixty percent of the workers are foreigners.

Lunch at the "red restaurant" with Hagel and others. An interesting conversation – the beginning of a discussion.

An official meeting with the board of the district communist organization. Zimyanin was very loud, impulsive, verbose. My interventions on Nixon and Vietnam, on Solzhenitsyn, Chile and "revolutionary expediency," and on "freedom of expression."

It was already late when we met with the local dock workers' organization. Proletarians, fighters for communism at a time when everyone has a decent living. Dedicated ordinary people. They are the descendants of "Party Cell No. 1," the Communist Party of Sweden, which emerged in 1917 – the oldest one after Bolsheviks.

Zimyanin's speech was long and cocky. I made comments on the crisis of capitalism, economic relations between the USSR and capitalist countries, which supposedly hinders the revolutionary process in those countries; on Nixon and Vietnam.

A tall and skinny girl looked at me with big, wondering eyes. There were around 150 people total.

In the morning of May 18th we flew to Stockholm. Work on a ciphered telegram to Moscow. Meeting with Palme at the Riksdag: we entered the building and nobody even asked who we were and where we were going.

The embassy staff tells amazing (to us, not to Swedes) stories about Palme. About how he and his daughters were pushed into the crowd at a stadium; how he was dragged through the courts because he ran a red light, and was given a large fine at the commissariat; how he drives himself every week to meet the voters, etc.

He is a smart, sharp, competent man of 42.

Zimyanin handled all the conversations well. Only one time he could not resist and schooled Palme in internationalism.

Then we had the final meeting with the party leadership. Though before that we sat at the hotel with Carlson (the Social-Democrat one, they have so many Carlsons!) working on the communiqué; he asked us to take out the part about the “joint struggle against anti-Sovietism.” We finished everything up quite amicably. Had breakfast together in the Riksdag’s self-serve cafeteria.

Zimyanin went home.

Evening reception at the embassy. A stupid event.

At the Town Hall. Breakfast. Conversation with the head of the municipality – a communist (forgot his name). Sincerely and about everything. Then a sex shop, bought some dildos. Very expensive – half of my cash is gone.

At [Krister] Wickman’s (Minister of Foreign Affairs). Mostly I spoke. Very interesting conversation: about ecology, the fate of Europe, social-democracy, uniting with Communists, Brandt, relations between the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, about the fact that Wickman and Palme are very pleased that we explained everything to “their communists.” About the danger of fascism and who was responsible for letting it happen.

Wickman’s secretary took notes in a big notebook.

Trip to a big shopping center outside the city with Yakhontov (Yuliy Alekseyevich) and his Irina. Very nice.

Morning of the 20th – shopping.

The plane was late (broke down in Oslo), so I had an extra three hours. A sincere conversation with U. Carlson, accompanied by some cognac and nuts. About the Centre Party

and the danger of fascism, about the sharp disagreements in the Party, about the danger of a conspiracy by Werner-Frosberg against Hermansson, etc. He turned out to be much smarter, better educated, and a deeper thinker than I initially thought.

Departure.

June 3, 1972

For two weeks I didn't have time to even open this notebook.

The Nixon visit. It is inconceivable to convey even in the most suppressed form the flow of ideas that emerged in the world press about this event. I will quote here the concluding paragraph from the speech Nixon's gave before Congress an hour after he came back to the U.S.

An unparalleled opportunity has been placed in America's hands. Never has there been a time when hope was more justified or when complacency was more dangerous. We have made a good beginning. And because we have begun, history now lays upon us a special obligation to see it through. We can seize this moment or we can lose it; we can make good this opportunity to build a new structure of peace in the world or we can let it slip away. Together, therefore, let us seize the moment so that our children and the world's children can live free of the fears and free of the hatreds that have been the lot of mankind through the centuries.

Then the historians of some future age will write of the year 1972, not that this was the year America went up to the summit and then down to the depths of the valley again, but that this was the year when America helped to lead the world up out of the lowlands of constant war, and onto the high plateau of lasting peace.

Needless to say, this was not published here. But I think the essence of our assessments of the events boil down to ultimately the same thing. Except we express ourselves in ideological language.

However, this language is not accidental. Firstly, because our view of ourselves as an ideological power (=part of the International Communist Movement) still remains a part of our real force (after all, mythology was also a force in its time). Secondly, because a huge, multi-million army of people feeds off this ideology. These people comprise a very influential part of our social and Party mechanism and have to be taken into consideration. The same as the Church was back in the day. Thirdly, over the years and decades we learned to see and present political phenomena only through the familiar ideological terminology.

In this regard – a characteristic episode. On May 28th [Felix Yurievich] Ziegel invited me and Gen'ka to his celebration (!) of the 300th anniversary of the birth of Peter I. The event itself was great; Felix thought up this whole creative and witty affair, he spoke only Old Slavonic for the entire evening, etc. But that is not the point.

There were two couples among the guests: a geologist with his wife, and a fairly well known science fiction writer Kazantsev. Both of them are bearded men. Nixon's speech came on the TV just as we were all having a great time at the party. Everybody listened to it, and... The reaction of these two beards: Nixon is a hypocrite, listen to him talk, he is talking about peace while killing Vietnamese children, a politician has a tongue just so he can conceal what he really thinks," etc. These are typical conclusions of a regular guy on the street. And, I must say, this was the mass perception of Nixon.

Be that as it may, still, we've crossed the Rubicon. The great Rubicon of world history. These weeks of May 1972 will go down in history as the beginning of an era of convergence – not in the trite sense of this word as it is presented by our ideologues like Fedoseyev, but in its revolutionary sense that will be the salvation of humanity.

Our press stopped making noise about the struggle against imperialism and such. Right now it is a diplomatic situation, but one day it will become reality. Yes! Thanks to our present strength.

Here are some confidential illustrations for this conclusion. On May 29th I was summoned (together with [Nikolai Vladimirovich] Shishlin from our sister department) to the Secretariat (Ponomarev, Demichev, Kapitonov, Katushev) and received an assignment to prepare Brezhnev's May 31st speech for the Politburo on the results of Soviet-American relations. In addition, I'd already read some Brezhnev-Nixon conversation transcripts. I will mention only the most important things I learned during these two days of working "at the top" and "for the top."

So, about Nixon, what I remember. One on one, Nixon told Brezhnev (in relation to the People's Republic of China): "Believe me and remember that I will never do anything that would hurt the Soviet Union."

Already on the airplane (on the way to Kiev), Kissinger told [Anatoly Fyodorovich] Dobrynin (to be passed on, of course): "The President is disappointed by the outcome of the economic negotiations. As you understand, our options are limited if the companies are not interested, it is not profitable for them. But we will do everything to conclude a trade agreement this year. And it will be very favorable for you. I assure you."

Perhaps Kissinger and Nixon really adhere to the concept so widely promoted by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, who believe that the best way to establish universal peace on earth, or at least prevent nuclear war, is to raise the Soviet people's standard of living to American levels, with all the ensuing consequences.

Kissinger also told Dobrynin that in the fall, the President will make an offer (in the sphere of disarmament) that "you will like very much."

In the meantime, in the CC letter to the Party members on the outcomes of the Nixon visit, alongside the relevant information and the "balanced," perhaps objective assessments (taken from the CC letter to fraternal parties) there is an overview of "letters from the workers"

about Nixon's televised appearance. He's a hypocrite, we can't trust him, he talks about peace while at the same time killing women and children in Vietnam.

Perhaps this is partially an element of our semiconscious desire to preserve the status of ideological superpower (our distinction and for now a real factor of our strength). However, it is being done "Demichev-style," so to speak, i.e. stupidly and crudely, with no thought for the future, calculating not two, but barely half a step ahead.

[Josip Broz] Tito. He was in Moscow with his Jovanka (who's gotten somewhat heavy, but still quite appetizing at her 60-something, and dressed in diamonds and furs, to boot).

The German ratification and Tito's arrival took place in the Nixon context. Demonstrative geniality, friendship, respect, even some kind of reverence towards him – it is a notable event. Some newspaper, I think the *Observer*, wrote that the visit signifies that in the new context, when the "greats" agreed on a status quo, Tito will no longer be able to balance so cleverly between the "two," as he did for 20-plus years. So he made a choice (taking into account his internal difficulties). Perhaps, perhaps...

However, I see another aspect of it. From now on, "Yugoslavian revisionism" ceases to be a factor in our internal ideological politics. If someone wants to threaten with it, it'll have to be done quietly! And Tito did not go to Canossa. In his public speech at "Ballbearings," which was published in *Pravda*, he mentioned self-governance three times and talked a great deal about noninterference and everyone's sovereign rights. He mentioned only once, but authoritatively, the various forms of socialism, and said that socialism is a global phenomenon that transcends boundaries and not just a system of government. He did not say a word about the Soviet Union's achievements in world affairs, or the shift in Soviet-American relations.

June 11, 1972

It sounds like Bulat Okudzhava was expelled from the Party because the emigrant journal *Grani* published something by him, and he refused to condemn them for it in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. Moreover, people say he sent a Thank You letter to *Grani*. It is strange. Hard to believe.

June 19, 1972

On Monday I saw the play "Under the Skin of the Statue of Liberty," based on [Yevgeny Aleksandrovich] Yevtushenko's poems, at the Taganka Theater (the play isn't permitted yet, this was a review performance). Lyubimov was dazzling in the full originality of his talent. After the play I kissed him in front of Yevtushenko, [Sergey Sergeyevich] Narovchatov and someone else. It was truly talented, unlike anything else. The whole play is permeated with a clever message to circumvent the censors: America is being exposed, but almost every line is full of "associativity," sometimes almost to the point of hooliganism (Lyubimov-style). I said some things to him afterwards (about Kennedy, about "I ain't no anti,"¹⁹ about Christ, etc.). In the evening I portrayed for Ella a moron Doctor of Philosophy from the cultural administration – how he would report to his superiors about this thoroughly anti-Soviet piece. Even with my

¹⁹ Quote from Yevtushenko's poem "Under the Skin of the Statue of Liberty" – translator.

“gift” for mimicry, it was easy to depict. She couldn’t stop laughing. And there was nothing she could say to argue with me. I got more and more wound up. Finally I told her: I am very afraid for your show and for you all... I am afraid because this kind of moron, or not even necessarily a moron, but someone like Aleksandrov-Agentov, for example (with all his culture and intelligence) – a super principled supporter of “order” – could see the play and say, “It is astonishing that in 1972, in the center of Moscow, this anti-Soviet thing is being openly shown, and everyone acts as if nothing is happening.” And it would be game over for you!

But nobody at the cultural administration or the Ministry of Culture is saying anything of the sort. The people who allowed this play to be shown to the public (but have not yet given an official permission for the première) are vacillating and hinting, but they do not dare to openly say what they think. So we are left with a vicious circle of self-deception:

- Lyubimov (together with Yevtushenko) portrays America, but consciously wants to tell the audience and the public what he thinks about our order, our moral system, and our authorities. When someone tries to delicately correct him, he goes on the attack: “How could you think this! We state very clearly exactly what we mean!”

- The authorities (“cultural representatives”) are deliberately pretending that they don’t notice the essence of Lyubimov’s plan. They do not dare to say it and sack the play, because it really does sound wild to publicly announce that they saw themselves and their environment in a play that attacks America!

- But at the same time, they understand that someone like Aleksandrov could cynically expose it on his level. And they’re going to get hell for it. So they are afraid to fully allow the play.

This hypocrisy is the sad result when society is not allowed to look at itself in the mirror, even though everyone knows what it really looks like.

The Taganka Theater went to Leningrad (where the play was not allowed).

July 15, 1972

Last Sunday, Anwar Sadat demanded immediate withdrawal of Soviet specialists and all Soviet military from Egypt—to protest the fact that he wasn’t given what was promised to him during his last meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow. Namely, offensive weapons, and Su-17 fighter-bombers. There was a commotion. We persuaded [Aziz] Sedki, the Prime Minister of Egypt, to come to Moscow. I think we settled it, in the sense that we gave them quite a bit of what they were asking. A week ago [Hafez] al-Assad, the President of Syria, was here. This guy is moderate and still he was able to get our guys to practically approve a “military solution” and got a great deal.

Sedki, 200 people from the regional committee to show enthusiasm during his departure. [Leonid Ivanovich] Grekov (Secretary of the Moscow City Committee), [Boris Leonidovich]

Kolokolov (MFA Chief of Protocol). The negotiations ran behind schedule and the guest was delayed for his flight.

I allowed the people to go, because it was hot, they were sitting for four hours without lunch, and it was Friday... As a result, "the people" were not there to see Sedqi off. There could be some "serious consequences" for me.

July 22, 1972

It is hot all the time, near 30 degrees. The weather forecasters on TV are reporting that this is unprecedented in the whole history of the weather service in Russia.

The crops perished in Astrakhan, Saratov, Volgograd, and Stavropol regions. The world press has been buzzing about this week's two sensational events: 1) The Soviet Union purchased feed grain from the United States for \$750 million ("to fulfill its promise to feed the Soviet people meat"). Naturally, there is no mention of it in our press, even though this deal, which is comparable in scope to Lend-Lease, is unprecedented in the history of the Soviet Union. 2) Sadat ordered our military personnel out of Egypt after all. It may be for the best – we will not be liable when he tries to wage war against Israel and gets smacked once again. As for our "superpower prestige"... in our time, it is not so precious in that sense. Quite the contrary. After all, the Swede Palme keeps saying, "If the U.S. wins the Vietnam War, it will be the greatest disgrace for America!"

I am covering Latin America for Kuskov (he is on vacation). Arrival and departure of the Secretary of the Communist Party of Argentina [Alvarez Geronimo] Alvedo, as well as [Americo] Ghioldi, who was here to receive a decoration. The farewell reception was on Plotnikov Street. Speeches, toasts. They are both 74 years old. One has a wife named Carmen, the other – Lida.

Today I was at Ernst Neizvestny's studio on Gilyarovsky Street. Again I am stunned – he is amazingly talented. But also resourceful... otherwise he could not survive. We went to the "Electro-72" exhibition in Sokolniki, where his 13-meter sculpture stands in the main hall. He told me how [Vladimir Nikolaevich] Yagodkin threw a fit about it – why was it installed without his knowledge. They almost had to remove the sculpture on the eve of the exhibition's opening. Luckily, the supervisor from the regional committee turned out to be an experienced and decent woman, she had all the paperwork prepared to prove that everything was done "by the books" – had gone through the right number of inspections and commissions, etc. But still... there are no signs anywhere about the sculpture, not in any of the brochures or the program, not by the entrance. Nowhere does it say that the central artistic symbol of the exhibition is a work by Neizvestny. But almost all of the mediocre stuff is presented as signature pieces.

So this truly great sculptor and artist of our time has to find all kinds of "influential acquaintances" like me, has to run around, be clever, "get around" the people who cannot be overcome – all of this only so he can have an opportunity to show his art to the people. He asked me to get Zimyanin (*Pravda*) to print a photo of his sculpture in the paper on the occasion of the exhibition's closing.

Yesterday I read George Kennan's essay on the 25th anniversary of his own "X Article" about the fate of the world after the war. A lot of important stuff about us. I should write out some excerpts...

July 29, 1972

It's hot. Something in me is starting to break. Sometimes you get home at night and don't want to and can't do anything, not even watch TV. You stretch out on your bed, and lie there thoughtlessly. I don't even want to sleep.

The soul is getting worn out and the body is giving out – it hasn't been getting its normal exercise: I haven't been swimming, running, or even playing tennis. And I haven't been to the dacha.

Tuesday (the 25th) – trip to the airborne division near Tula. Performances of "combat operations." The commander – and Army General – is a beggar. The division commander is a young Ossetian type. The soldiers are wonderful material. They train them like "James Bonds" – unarmed combat, summersaults, centrifuges, swings... they are tried under fire, under tanks...

When I got home in the evening and told Anya (daughter) where I was and what I saw, she innocently remarked, "Is that how well they train them to kill?!"

Saw Ponomarev off to Paris.

Met [Luigi] Longo and [Agostino] Novella (leaders of the Italian Communist Party) in Sheremetyevo airport. They came for vacation.

Met [Jacques] Duclos.

Bianca is in Moscow. We met Wednesday evening (she came with an Italian company to take the "Electro-72" exhibits back to Italy).

I am almost the only deputy left in the Department right now, so all work is on me – papers, meetings, talks.

On Thursday I had an interesting 3-hour conversation with Germans from the FRG (mid-level party workers). Could I imagine 30 years ago at the Rede (North-Western Front) that I would be sitting at the CC like this, and talking with Germans about internationalism! It's amazing. A different life. A different person.

Conversation with the CC Secretary [Jakob] Lechleiter of the Communist Party of Switzerland. I first met him in 1964, when Shelepin and I were in Switzerland with a delegation.

For my birthday I got the first 9 volumes of Lenin's collected works. It is a new edition, and I didn't have them before. I am going through the volumes, leafing through them again. I see things I remember and things I've forgotten, and I feel excited. Partially it is because almost all of my conscious existence is connected with reading Lenin, and partially because I never cease

to be amazed at his genius and the power of expression of this genius (55 volumes with practically nothing that is hackneyed or routine, as almost any political writer has in abundance, even Marx and Engels!). There is also the fact that Lenin has that magical power of "the gospel" for our society. He brings together people who've never read him before; people who read something from him a long time ago and maybe even studied him, but forgot completely; people who don't know Lenin but consider themselves his representatives and faithful disciples; people who know him dogmatically and every time pick passages that are advantageous to them or fit their intellectual or career schemes; and finally, people who truly know and understand Lenin deeply.

However, here, as always, there is the problem of Dostoyevsky's "Grand Inquisitor." Perhaps it is necessary for the basic viability of society. Still, it's too bad that only a few intellectuals (and some diligent students) study Lenin, while politicians haven't read or studied him in a long time, and Demichev might even think it harmful to delve too deeply into Lenin: "all kinds" of thoughts might come to mind.

August 8, 1972

Again we have 35-36 degree weather day after day. Plus, peat is burning somewhere near Shatura and all of Moscow (and Podmoskovye) is covered in a blue veil of smoke. The sun cannot get through the smoke... though this may be for the best.

Yesterday Shishlin told Bovin and me about a letter from the Secretary of the Astrakhan regional committee to the CC CPSU: 100% of the winter crops in the area are burned out and reseeding cost this much; 100% of the spring crops are burned out; this much cattle died of starvation in the spring, and this much dies per day currently; meadows and pastures are all burned, there will be nothing to feed the cattle in the fall. There is practically no drinking water (that meets sanitary-hygienic standards) in Astrakhan. The sewage system is breaking down. Cholera is spreading. And so on.

Shishlin was in the Crimea and attended Brezhnev's meeting with leaders of socialist countries. He heard some things there, too: Brezhnev ordered 50,000 military vehicles to be sent to help with agricultural needs, as well as 25,000 vehicles to be taken from industries (no matter what) and also sent to help with the harvest, so in the areas where the harvest survived, every last bit would be collected. (By the way, the street cleaning machines vanished from Moscow – they were sent there as well).

At the same time, at Brezhnev's dacha in the Crimea (Shishlin told us) there is a pool with sliding walls and a transparent dome that can protect from the wind or turn into a full ceiling. Other dachas were recently built in the vicinity of this "dacha No. 1," for big-shot ministers and individual deputies and heads of the CC – four-storey mansions with Japanese wallpaper, bars, conditioners, special Hungarian furniture, and balconies overlooking the sea. Each one cost this much.

Before that Shishlin was in Zvyozdnyi Gorodok [Star City] when Castro was there. Beregovoi, their senior general, told him privately, "You see that fresh asphalt? They put it down

yesterday. I asked my soldiers to walk on it so it doesn't seem to new. And still... We, astronauts, are costing the people so much..."

Bovin came back from Baikal yesterday and gave me a dressing down for "trampling on him" by re-writing his article about the Socialist International Congress in Vienna. He was seriously upset. I had to get the page proofs and point to the complete bullshit (and dangerous for him, too) that he wrote there. I think he calmed down.

In the evening we were drinking whiskey at his place (on B. Pirogovskaya) together with Shishlin. That's when he described all those things about the Crimea.

By the way, I read the transcript of the Crimean meeting almost in full. It is much duller than last year. The reasons? I think there are two: a) [Nicolae] Ceausescu's presence, b) written texts instead of free conversations.

August 11, 1972

I'm sick. Haven't been to work in three days. I'm spending my time meaninglessly. The heat is not subsiding. It is over 30 degrees all the time. Moscow is covered in smoke. The forests are burning. Firefighters, the army, the locals and Muscovites are all there... but they say there are no results yet (and you can tell as much by how dense the smoke is). Potatoes are burning up. People are trying to rescue their fields by the "local watering" method. The newspapers are promoting this technique, but it's akin to throwing a bottle with lighter fluid at a tank in 1941. Really, it is devastating.

All of this contrasts greatly with the "step" of our Peace program. Complainers even contrast the two events; but then again, in such cases as these, the so-called "people" are always looking for a scapegoat.

But be that as it may, the coming year will be a very difficult one in terms of supplies, which in turn means it will be politically difficult. (By the way, it's a good thing that we freed ourselves politically from the Middle East, which was dangerous for us!) God forbid, though, that Demichev should use the drought to make conclusions in terms of further tightening the ideological grip!

I'm in a strange state of meaninglessness, lack of specific desires, a general "inexpediency" of existence. That's why I want to get back to work as soon as possible, where you get caught up in the rhythm of the bustle, in which the important things are intertwined with trifles and pointless stress, and you forget that the general meaning of life was lost long ago.

In issue No. 7 of "Novyi Mir" [New World] – second article by Al. Yanov about the literary hero of the 1960s. First of all, he restores the "Novomirsky" method of sociological literary criticism, strengthening the Belinsky - Dobrolyubov - Pisarev bridge built under Tvardovsky. Secondly, he solidly follows Tvardovsky's line of looking at society realistically and writing about it without demagoguery.

He talks about, as do all the serious articles in the journal, the rational development of society in accordance with its historical and “national” (in the broad sense) possibilities and conditions, not about building communism. The way he references Party document corresponds to this: he takes only the practical and realistic ideas and recommendations, even if they are critical. These documents are considered as a manifestation of our public life, not as decrees on how it should develop.

October 17, 1972

Pushkin is like longing for your irretrievable youth.

[Vasiliy Ivanovich] Belov’s novel *Kanuny* [Eves] in the journal *Sever* [North], about collectivization. Smacks of literature from the 20s-30s.

Last night I was at the premier of “Under the Skin of the Statue of Liberty.” Beau Monde: Arbatovs, Samoteikins, Efremov with his wife – a famous actress of the Sovremennik Theater. Yevtushenko with a bandaged-up hand (he cut it while whittling a frame for a picture he got as a gift). He either honestly did not notice me, or he despises me as an official who did not help him go to America. (He succeeded without me, but God knows, I tried.) I wonder at what letter will he stand in Soviet literature according to Mayakovsky’s “Yubileinoe” [Jubilee] poem – at “Nadson” or at “Lermontov”?

I was not impressed by the play. Of course, it is a slap in the face of authorities. It seems that associativity multiplied by Lyubimov’s signature style (technical and directorial inventiveness) is already nothing new. If the cultural authorities from the various ministries could think even a little beyond keeping their positions and gave some thought at least to “local politics,” the best thing they could have done was not to notice it, to adapt it and present the play’s hidden protest against the Soviet system as tangential antics.

On Sunday – exhibition at the Museum of Fine Arts, “Portraits from the XVI-XX centuries.” The faces looking back at you are the same as today. “Lady with an Ermine” by Leonardo, Van Dyke’s “Self-Portrait,” a young man in a colorful shirt by [Ilya] Mashkov, [Ivan] Kramskoy’s “Tolstoy” (at 45 years old), boy in the arms of Princess Muravyova, etc.

The lines to the museum (same as to Manege for the “Faces of France – 100 years in photographs”) are miles-long every day – weekdays, Saturdays, Sundays, and under pouring rain. I wonder, does Demichev approve of this, or does he see some danger here?

I remembered the Biennale retrospective at the Piazza San Marco in Venice. Empty rooms.

On October 1st, an Il-18 airplane fell into the Black Sea a few minutes after taking off from Adler airport. One hundred and two people suffocated in the depressurized cabin. On the 13th, an Il-62 crashed while approaching Sheremetyevo airport (flying from Paris through Leningrad). One hundred seventy three people. The latter was reported in “Pravda,” there were 38 Chileans, 5 Algerians, 6 Peruvians, and Frenchman, a German, and an Englishman among the

victims. Our ambassadors in Chile and Algeria were instructed to express their condolences (since these are friendly governments).

There was nothing about the Adler crash in the newspapers, only “Moskovskaya Pravda” and “Vechyorka” for a week printed little notices of mourning about the tragic death (where and how?) of this or that person, sometimes married couples.

I am getting ready for a trip to Belgium. The PB released a new resolution on China. Again, we will have to write letters with explanations to our party and the fraternal parties. Again we have to unmask them. What, how?

Until we renounce the self-imposed mindset that “we are a socialist country and they are a socialist country, so how is it possible that they criticize the CPSU-Lenin’s Party,” we will close the way to understanding what is happening and following a consistent policy that is realistic and clear to all. Nobody believes us anymore, no matter how we portray the Chinese and try to explain our Marxist-Leninist purity.

[Georges] Marchais is asking to talk to Brezhnev “as equals.” But Brezhnev prefers [Georges] Pompidou, to whom we’ve already given consent for his visit to Moscow in January. Even on his return from Paris, Brezhnev said in his circle, (about Marchais) “He talks about democracy, but I’d like to see what he will do if he comes to power;” (about Pompidou) “He thinks like a statesman, he is the boss and sees all the problems, he perceives the bigger picture.”

Pompidou, in turn (like Nixon and Brandt) understood perfectly well that our ideology is for internal consumption only, i.e. where it can be practically applied by the government. And we are not such fools as to engage in ideological exercises in serious relations with people who can easily tell us to go to hell.

December 7, 1972

All of Western thought goes back to Tocqueville. So do I. I remembered that in 1947-48 I wrote down excerpts of his most important ideas from *The Old Regime and Revolution*, the same ideas that are now popular with Raymond Aron and others. Also on Tocqueville: “The revolution broke the historical reality for the sake of abstract theories, but the power of abstract theories (others?) formed long before the revolution, in an era when society forgot any participation in political activity.”

December 9, 1972

Yesterday in Sovremennik Theater – Ins Raid in a production by the Pole [Andzej] Wajda of “Kak brat bratu” [Brother to Brother].²⁰ The situation in American with regard to Vietnam. [The actors] Gaft, E. Vasilieva, Kvasha, Tabakov were spectacular.

The essence: the meaninglessness of life has become its content, and because life is good – the attachment to its inanimate, non-human content is so strong, that even shock (a blind son

²⁰ David Rabe’s play *Sticks and Bones* – translator.

returning from Vietnam and distressing everyone with stories of the horrors he experienced) stirs only the very depths of consciousness and longing for meaningful life. In the end, this shock only increases (to the point of a hysterical frenzy) the desire to keep things as they are (Gaft, lying on the floor and clutching his head, endlessly repeats "I want to watch TV!"). The family – father, mother, and brother – resolves the situation by suggesting that the blind brother slit his wrists. Blood pours into two buckets, forms puddles, which the mother immediately cleans up, while the brother asks the victim how he is feeling, etc.

They say that Furtseva really did not like it (especially since she had attempted the same after the XXII Congress, when she was expelled from the Presidium of the CC).

The public, which is always ready to approve and support Sovremennik Theater, was confused and applauded timidly.

Galya Volchek after the show (as always wearing an extravagant outfit that accentuates her already enormous tits). [Yuri Fyodorovich] Karyakin and I said a bunch of unpleasant things to her about the play and Tabakov: "why waste your time and talent on something that has no social relevance for us?"... "Mediocre play... why did you pick it?" "It does not grab you, it does not leave you with anything, it is too rooted in American specifics to allow the viewer to see the universal human value of the play and the production."

Galya pretended to be grateful for our frankness, but in her heart she got very offended. Naturally. Then she portrayed a couple scenes from her work with [Chingiz] Aitmatov and another Kazakh (she did it in the "Russian" language that this Kazakh screenwriter speaks). We were laughing. This luxurious busty woman is damned smart and talented!

From the events that were not mentioned because I've neglected my diary.

- Trip to Belgium (October 21-31) with a stopover Holland (Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam) on the 29th, a Sunday. Someday I might describe this trip.²¹

- Elections to the Academy of Sciences: how with the help of Karyakin and [Boris Mikhailovich] Pyshkov we found the academicians [Georgy Nikolaevich] Flerov, [Pyotr Lenidovich] Kapitsa, and [Mikhail Aleksandrovich] Leontovich, and flunked [Mikhail Trifonovich] Yovchuk.

- B.N.'s report at the general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences – his fears of getting reprimanded for butting in with the "50th anniversary of the USSR" right before the General Secretary's report on December 21st! "You keep trying to work for the cause..." he told me grievously and pathetically. Then he waved his hand hopelessly, though recalling that in Stalin's days, Kalinin, Kuibyshev, Ordzhonikidze, and others "from the leadership" made speeches and were recognized by the people.

December 16, 1972

²¹ On this trip I met Gorbachev, who headed the delegation. Now I am astonished that I did not record this in the diary at the time.

Every day we make multiple trips to Sheremetyevo airport: guests are arriving for the 50th anniversary of the USSR. Then there are “conversations” at dinners or lunches, at Plotnikov Street or on “Sovetskaya.”

The day before yesterday I had a good conversation with Kusselman (member of the Belgian Communist Party). He is intelligent and sincere. He told me how [Marc] Drumaux died. They were surprised at the funeral; they saw that in his four years as chairman of the CP, Drumaux had become a national figure. I knew him well.

Yesterday Graham from Ireland. He is primitive and doltish, though maybe he does this on purpose. I asked him how his trade unionists (he is a union boss) will vote in the referendum to unite the two Irelands. He tells me that they want to unite the economic demands of the workers with the struggle for “socialism in the future.”

Eddisford from Manchester was interesting. He is an intellectual, the head of a regional committee in Central England. Either people like him want to deceive us (so we don’t communicate with their government too much), or they are deceived themselves. He told me that British capitalism was completely gutted and had no potential left, and it is no longer a real power. But if that is the case, why are its partners in the Common Market so afraid of it, and why don’t the communists (or even the Labour Party) take it with their “bare hands”?

[Yakov Semyonovich] Khavinson asked me to write an article on the 125th anniversary of the Communist Manifesto (in common parlance – the “ghost”). I almost agreed. But first of all, I have absolutely no free time. Secondly, and most importantly, I re-read the Manifesto. I got a strange feeling. Marx and Engels were claiming things about capitalism of their day that it hasn’t completely reached even now. As for the development of the forces opposing it, it seems the Western interpreters of Marxism are right when they say it is an outdated gospel. I need to do some brainstorming. After all, it was a brilliant insight and working hypothesis, which was correct even for the sole reason that its development (in theory and practice) had such a powerful impact on the course of history. But I could not write this publicly about the “Communist manifesto”...

December 30, 1972

This day has been declared a holiday instead of December 5th, which was the day of the “Stalin Constitution.” This initiative had a curious origin. Ponomarev gave me the text of Brezhnev’s report that was sent around the Politburo a couple days before the USSR’s 50th anniversary celebrations. (By the way, I offered him a good number of comments, but he either did not accept them himself, or Aleksandrov-Agentov cut them, I’m not sure. But in the final text I did not see a lot of my revisions.)

“Here,” B.N. said, giving me the text, “this is a proposal for a new holiday. And you know who wrote it? [Viktor Andreyevich] Golikov (Brezhnev’s adviser on ideology, [Sergey Pavlovich] Trapeznikov’s best friend, Black Hundredist and Stalinist). Amazing. So much for the Stalinist... And we had no clue.”

These two weeks were busy with “parades” for the USSR’s 50th anniversary. In the International Department, we were busy meeting foreign guests and having discussions with them. The main work for my group of consultants was fixing up their speeches at the various workers’ meetings. At times this was something quite inconceivable that could not easily be transferred on paper. The authors themselves told our assistants, “Could you finish this up... I agree in advance to any changes you make”... And we did it, even managed to adapt the texts to the specific situation in the speaker’s country.

In general, the squalor of “our” communist movement struck me particularly strongly this time. On the one hand there is O’Riordan, who was put in the Presidium here, and in Lithuania, where he spoke at the celebrations, they practically worshipped the ground he walked on. [Antanas] Sniečkus²² quoted him extensively from the podium of the Kremlin Palace. But in Ireland, nobody knows him – not the left, nor the right, nor the people who are throwing bombs, nor the English. Nobody takes him seriously, if they know anything of his party that consists of several dozen people. And next to him is his friend Graham, a member of the party’s executive committee and a union boss in Belfast. I tried to have a political conversation with him and was shocked by his primeval, philistine “tradeunionism.” He couldn’t care less about the explosions and the fighting. All he cares about and is interested in is that the members of his union get a raise and don’t lose their jobs.

Or – [John] Sendy, the chairman of the CP of Australia, which has been sticking its nose in the air at the CPSU for many years. They can’t adapt to what is going on in the world, where three cumbersome and powerful wheels (U.S., USSR, PRC) are turning, and which are so connected to each other in their momentum that no grains of sand like the Communist Party of Australia can stop them. One wouldn’t even hear a squeak if it carelessly got caught between these wheels. The best thing to do for such CPs as the Australian one is to quietly cling to the safe side of the Soviet (or the Chinese, if they like) wheel.

On the other hand we have Georges Marchais, who is now the General Secretary of the French CP. He knows the rules of the game very well. But he still wants to become one of the gears in the system by taking Pompidou’s place. He is trying to use us to topple Pompidou in his favor. We are slapping him for it. But since he still represents a certain power (and you never know), we play his game too. Pompidou asked for an “informal” meeting with Brezhnev somewhere in the Soviet Union, and Marchais wants the same. As [Jean] Kanapa (his grey majesty) said to our guys: “Why can’t Marchais and Leonid (!) meet somewhere near Moscow in an informal setting, take a stroll in the park, and have a talk? Then we could publish a (‘casual’) photograph of them in the papers...”

Everyone understands that we are engaging with Georges not because he is a communist, but because he can (?) become a national figure.

In the meantime, the French CP is quickly “progressing,” and turning into what the big social-democratic parties in other countries have become a long time ago. Otherwise it would not have a chance to turn into a “state power.”

²² First Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania.

So the historical communist movement as it was envisioned 30 years ago is being eliminated from both ends (not to mention the China phenomenon in all of this). Moreover, the communist parties themselves are disappearing as an independent ideological-political category. Although, there is still the Italian Communist Party. An original phenomenon. Perhaps it will be able to revive the communist movement on some new basis.

December 31, 1972

There was a CC Plenum before the 50th anniversary. Baibakov (Gosplan [State Planning Committee]) reported that we are seriously behind the projected plan for 1972, the plan for 1973 will also not be met, and it is unclear how to get out of this situation at all. After this, Brezhnev made a big speech. Here is a short summary:

“We are not meeting the Five Year Plan in almost every aspect, with some exceptions.

“People refer to last year’s weather as the reason why this is so. But this is applicable only for agriculture. Even there, we mostly overcame the difficulties. And we shouldn’t have raised panic with buying grain abroad. We would have made it. For example, there was an article in *Pravda* where a kolkhoz chairman in Kirovogradsk region was able to collect 2.5 tons even though his harvest burned out, while his neighbors ‘across the street’ collected only around 1 ton each.

“As for excuses about the weather in the industries... Shame on you, Comrade [Ivan Pavlovich] Kazanets, for boasting that you smelt more metal than the U.S. What about the quality of the metal? Or the fact that only 40% of every ton goes to production, compared to the American standard, and the rest is slag and chips?!

“Capital construction. Unfinished projects. An old problem. We calculated that for each one of the 270,000 projects there are about... 12 workers. So if there are 70,000 workers at the Kamaz project, it means that hundreds, if not thousands, of projects have no workers at all! I propose that we freeze all projects except for the ones that were supposed to be completed in 1972-73. But we finish those!

“We still get about 90 kopeks per every ruble of investment, while the Americans get the reverse (90 dollars for every dollar of investment).

“They blame the suppliers. But look at the facts. Comrade [Nikolai Nikiforovich] Tarasov (Light Industry), you have a million pairs of shoes in your warehouses. Nobody will ever buy them because they are styled like galoshes. But it took raw materials to make them, which you say are in short supply. This way you could buy all the raw materials abroad and put them under the knife!

“Baibakov’s group decides the plan. Because people don’t need money, they need goods. Only if we have goods, saleable (!) goods, can we get the money from the people to build blast furnaces, etc.

“How do we work? In August I was at a new tire factory in Barnaul. I asked the workers, ‘You have all the new equipment, both domestic and foreign, and you have the capacity to produce 9,000 tires per day, yet you produce 5,000. Why is that?’ They replied that Minister [Viktor Stepanovich] Fedorov gave them 30 months to reach full capacity. Alright. Recently I got a note that the Barnaul factory produced 9,000 tires per day already in November – the projected capacity. In other words, they took some measures after my talk. So: 30 months and 3 months! What is going on? Laziness, irresponsibility, stupidity, or a crime?!

“We are not fulfilling the main resolution of the XXIV Congress – to raise productivity and efficiency. The entire Congress and the people present here today were applauding when we spoke about the new goal of simultaneous movement along the main directions of economic development (to raise the quality of life, productivity, and defense). What do we have instead? We have not made this shift and two years have passed since the Congress, that’s half the Five Year Plan! Now Comrade Baibakov reports to us that the plan for 1972 was not met, and we won’t meet the 1973 plan either, and after that who knows what will happen.

“Gosplan is being liberal, while the organizations behind it are being irresponsible. We no longer have a Gosplan in the sense of an organization that would define our strategic perspective and tightly control the course of our economy!”

The reaction to this speech was telling. Brutents told me about it, he heard it from Arbatov, one of the authors of the speech. “Our group was exiting the Sverdlovsk hall,” he said, “and we happened to be next to [Pavel Dmitrievich] Borodin (director of ZIL), one of the bosses of our industry. I ask him, ‘So, what did you think?’ ‘It was a beautiful speech. You were probably the ones who made it pretty and convincing, you are good writers. Except we’ve heard it all before more than once. The speeches get nicer and nicer, while things get worse and worse.’”

He said all of this out loud, in the crowd of CC members, but it didn’t turn a single head. The others must have been occupied with similar thoughts.

Also, Arbatov said that they (i.e. Tsukanov, Aleksandrov-Agentov, Zagladin – all of them participated in the creation of the speech) did their best to soften the sharp tone that the speaker insisted on. Most of the sharpness was clearly directed at Kosygin.

Why should did they need to soften it? Of course, Kosygin can’t really do anything anymore. But “we really don’t need confusion at the top right now,” especially since there is a whole company waiting in the wings: [Aleksandr Nikolaevich] Shura Shelepin, [Dmitriy Stepanovich] Polyansky, Demichev, [Gennadiy Ivanovich] Voronov, and now they are joined by disgruntled Shelest, who was removed from his post. Plus, removing Kosygin would mean getting rid of his entire team. What would be the point? Apparently Baibakov does not “provide” the proper role for Gosplan. But he is intelligent, brave, and knowledgeable. At least he is not afraid to speak the truth. You couldn’t find a better man right now. Especially considering that no matter whom you put in that seat right now, it won’t fix the problem, since the root of it is elsewhere.

There are already legends about this: people say Kosygin stayed at the reception (USSR 50th anniversary) until the very end, always alone and he drank and drank. Shelepin left the half-empty hall in the company of his “clique.” The forces against Kosygin are focusing. Of course, he doesn’t know anymore what to do or how to do it. But he “himself” does not understand economics. He got skilled in international affairs and now that’s his favorite thing. In economics he “cannot imagine how to secure the shift that was announced at the Congress.”

And one more “musical moment,” as Bovin likes to say. Arbatov said, “We keep advising Brezhnev to stop making all these TV appearances. And he’s not the only one who should restrain himself. His decrepitude is really becoming quite noticeable.”

Afterword to 1972

What is the outcome of 1972?

What did we have thirteen years before *perestroika*?

The absolute authority (and power) of the General Secretary of the CC CPSU was restored after being shaken under Khrushchev, although it was not formalized in the party until the next year. The first signs of the “cult” appeared, even if it was a secondary, farcical one.

The same intellectual and cultural mediocrity remained in the highest echelons of power – the Politburo and the Secretariat: Podgorny, Polyansky, Kirilenko, Voronov, Shelest (then Shcherbitsky), Shelepin, Kunaev, Demichev, Kapitonov.

Suslov, Ponomarev, and Kosygin were people of a somewhat different order. The latter was a professional, but precisely during this year he started to be pushed to the sidelines. The first two remained as carriers of the Bolshevik tradition, which was still characterized by a certain level of education.

The economy, after an unexpected rise during the 8th Five Year Plan, again began to deteriorate. The smart and cynical executives like Baibakov already understood that no resolutions, appeals, or penalties for unfulfilled plans could change anything at the core. The “roots” where elsewhere, they were deeper.

The standard of living for the majority of city dwellers was still acceptable, though people remembered that this was the year when Nikita [Khrushchev] promised we would complete the “first phase of communism.”

Brezhnev slightly recovered after the intervention in Czechoslovakia, solidified his power, and found his common sense. On Andropov and Tsukanov’s advice, he surrounded himself with intellectuals of the “highest Soviet standard” – Inozemtsev, Bovin, Arbatov, Zagladin, Shishlin. These highly educated people gained access to the most sensitive information, and being realists and having mastery of the pen, they were able to use the “reasonable and good” in the General Secretary’s nature to correct our policies where it was possible within the system.

Their regular informal communication with Brezhnev, their advice, personal opinions and objections (which they did not hesitate to share with him), and most importantly the “style” in which policies were presented (they had 90% control over this factor) had an impact first and foremost on international relations. Namely – the turn toward reduced tensions, the dialogue with America, with West Germany, the change of attitude towards the “third world” – a departure from the reckless support of the “national liberation movements,” a dangerous and in principle short-sighted and harmful policy for the interests of the USSR.

The “form” of announcing policies, which became entrusted to Brezhnev’s close advisers, took the ideological edge off international relations, which inevitably reflected on the content of our foreign policy in the nuclear age. It became more “civilized.”

Ideology had long ago and irreversibly lost its revolutionary, inspirational, and mobilizing potential, and completely merged with the false “propaganda of success.” It was so removed from internal and external realities that it lost any effectives and had long ceased to be used in practical politics. But it was still necessary to maintain the image of an alternative to the “imperialist West.” And, of course, it served as a demagogic cover for the party-state control over the spiritual life of society.

In this spiritual life there was a clear turn from the apologetics of the Soviet system – a prerequisite of “socialist realism” – to the original purpose of literature, theater, cinema, and art. The topics of man-woman, happiness-grief, human relations, the vicissitudes of everyday life, the meaning of life, etc. – these subjects now determined the interest of both the consumers and producers of spiritual products. At the same time, people began to break the restrictions on the Silver Age and the Avant-garde of the 1920s. Both of these actions were essentially acts of protest because people were sick of the “official” culture. There was also active protest in the form of juxtaposing the existing order to the idealized norms and principles of Lenin’s time through Aesopian satire.

All of this testified to growing confusion in society, and people’s dissatisfaction with the familiar imposed way of life.

In reaction to this, officials in the ideological and cultural spheres became harsher, including the conformists of official science. It was no longer a struggle for ideas, but for the preservation of social privileges and ideological power. The “quality” of the means used corresponded with this goal – blatant demagoguery, intimidation, chauvinism, Black Hundredism, anti-Semitism. This was not an official policy that was “approved by the rules.” But it reflected the mood and level of “culture” of many Politburo members, CC Secretaries, apparatus bosses, regional committee and ministerial heads. They supported it.

The International Communist Movement was disappearing right before our eyes, until it finally lost its political and ideological potential. The Moscow celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the USSR, three years after the World Meeting of Communist Parties, showed the collapse of the ICM, the pettiness of its component parts that were dependent on the CPSU. The exceptions to this rule did not change the overall picture. Some communist parties tried to build political capital in their countries by criticizing the Soviet antidemocratic order, which completely undermined the very basis of the Communist Movement’s existence as a world-wide phenomenon.

These are the “starting” positions of the period to which this project is dedicated.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1973

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

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January 6, 1973

Even though it's Saturday, I spent the whole day at work. We're preparing yet another report on the International Communist Movement [ICM] for Ponomarev. The only satisfaction I get out of it is seeing how much better I can do the work than the "guys" (consultants), and naturally, they willingly submit to my skill. But you can't respect a person who hasn't learned anything after ten years on the job.

We've got a circus going on with the dual management of the Department by Kuskov and Zagladin. Kuskov is tongue-tied and nonsensical, which is probably a reflection of his dulled intellect and tired brain that was subject to too much alcohol in its day. Plus, Kuskov did not have proper training or develop a good work ethic when he was young. Zagladin is not exactly using him because of this, but he finds his helplessness annoying, because it steals time from his subordinates, not to mention the incomprehensible tasks he gives them.

I am reading Bykovsky.

January 8, 1973

There is a flu epidemic in Moscow, they say that 70,000 people get sick every day (citing statistics from the city committee). It's probably a lie. But there are many sick people around.

The day before yesterday I met with a delegation from the Austrian Communist Party. [Franz] Muhi (chairman) and [Erwin] Scharf (former social-democrat, a member of the Resistance). We had a big discussion about social democrats. Their subtext: you are doing business with them like you would with government officials. This is detrimental to us, because they are not only an integrated part of the State monopolistic capital, they are also its smartest part, capable of controlling and directing it better than today's bourgeois parties.

Reception for [Pat] Clancy (from the new pro-Soviet Communist Party of Australia) at B.N.'s this week. Their undertaking is really a lost cause.

We summarized (on orders from the Central Committee [CC]) the requests made by our fraternal parties during the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations. Mostly it's all about money: to publish newspapers, set up small firms, give pensions to veterans. But also it's to send someone's niece to a Moscow conservatory, to provide a scholarship for a son who is studying in a university in Ukraine, to "help" write a book (i.e. it will be written for the party leader, and he will sign it), etc. In a word, it is a depressing picture.

Kapitonov gathered all the heads of the CC Departments. They are discussing the Secretariat's plan for the first half of the year. The people present are bosses, and act accordingly. Dolgikh, the new Secretary, seems to have grown into his role already. He clearly is smarter than Kapitonov, which, however, is not very difficult.

Then Shauro dragged me into his office. We talked for two hours. He seems to have a complex of being "misunderstood and disregarded by everyone." He, like many other people, sees a hidden and mysterious power in the workers of the International Department, because they

communicate closely with the very top. This explains his apologetic tone, particularly with me. He talked a great deal, mainly about the changing “atmosphere” among cultural figures, writers, and about their attitude towards him and the CC in general. However, there was not a penny’s worth of independent thought or personal conviction in his speech, not to mention policy. But he seems to understand the situation, and mostly takes it into account so as “not to get tripped up.”

Astonishing situation. Brezhnev pampers Pompidou in Byelorussia, while at a press conference in Paris last week Pompidou said the following about us and our whole “cause”:

Question (Pierre Charles, “France-Soir”): “Without overestimating the joint program (socialists and communists), I must say that in addition to the main policy directions it contains a certain plan for society. The Prime Minister has stated the main policy lines that the current majority plans to defend. Could you tell us about your plan for society?”

Pompidou’s response: “What is my plan for society? In fact, the joint program provides at least a general outline of the so-called ‘socialist’ society, i.e. communist, that is, in my view, a totalitarian society in the fullest sense of the word. What I mean is that everything is in the hands of the state, everything depends on the state and the state itself is in the hands of the Party, and this Party commands people’s lives in all aspects.

“On the other hand, there is – it’s true – the classical capitalist society, which no longer fully exists anywhere, but is still preserved to a great extent in the United States and Japan (although this has yet to be proven). But in France today, the capitalist society is a thing of the past after a number of reform measures adopted by previous governments – in 1936, and during the Liberation, and after 1958.”

February 3, 1973

Story with Ulyanovsky (one of B.N.’s deputies specializing in the Middle East). Gafurov (academician, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies) wrote a letter to Brezhnev about him – that he used materials produced for the International Department in his own articles and brochures; that he monopolizes the editorial process of various anthologies and books on the international liberation movement; that he creates a mess when he publishes several articles in various places almost simultaneously, and each of the articles contains strong, prescriptive opinions that contradict each other from one article to the next; that he re-prints the same articles in various sources; that he receives huge honoraria. .

B.N. was very upset. He paced around his office for a long time. First there was the drinking party organized by his deputies for the November 7th holiday in Zagladin’s office, which Pelshe himself investigated, and now this new reminder that his deputies are “not well in the head”!

Clash with B.N. over a report on the ICM, which we prepared for him (for the “congregation” of the republics’ ideological secretaries). He called me a pacifist and said that we cannot see beyond the success of the Peace Program, that the arms race continues, military budgets are growing (U.S. – 83 billion), NATO continues its maneuvers to perfect the military

machine, and Pompidou smiles at us while scheming with Americans and encouraging anti-communism.

I told him: ‘How will this make you look? If at a closed meeting, in front of the leadership elite, you essentially suggest that there is no point to the Peace Program, that our ‘peace offensive’ is getting nowhere, that nothing has changed in the world and that 90 percent of Brezhnev’s and others’ time devoted to foreign policy (and only 10 percent to the economy) is time wasted.

“Plus, our listeners judge Pompidou based on the TV broadcasts where they see the ‘embraces,’ smiles, reciprocal gifts and so on, at the highest level. And at this very moment you will tell the ideologues that all of this is nothing but a façade, that in reality Pompidou is our bitter enemy, and so on?”

He lost some steam... Naturally, the report remained unchanged, except for a small addition about the U.S. military budget.

However, in the tactical sense B.N. may be right. Especially when he gave me a speech about European security: “There is a buzz in the press about it, and you also wrote in my report: European security, new system of relations, cooperation, mutual benefit, exchange of people and ideas, good neighborliness... Hell, Anatoly Sergeyevich, none of this will happen! I assure you. God willing, we will reach a decent joint document, so propaganda can’t use it against us later. Other than that, everything will remain the same. After all, what we wanted from Helsinki we already got (borders and recognition of the GDR). Now it is turning against us, and we just want to find a suitable way out of this idea of ours.”

In this he is right, of course. He knows and reflects the *mentalite* of our entire leadership (although, perhaps, with the exception of Brezhnev himself).

At the same time, this candor contains an admission of something we do not want to admit: world development, the “revolutionary process” took a different route from what we expected for 50 years. We won with our “realpolitik,” based on strength and bullying, but not with our ideology. The more successful our policies, the greater the damage to our ideology (Demichev and Trapeznikov are a classic example of this, and now we can confidently say that it is no coincidence that they represent our ideology).

So in a global-strategic sense, B.N. is archaic. He cannot see even the deep contradictions in his own work. He shrugs off the problems to keep his head above water.

We have a guy named Boris Ilyichev in our Department; he is the head of the Southeast Asia sector. He’s intelligent, educated, sharp, sarcastic, cynical, and cracks jokes. He traveled all over his region, worked in Indonesia for many years. We’ve had some mutual interests for a while; in particular we exchange “Marxist-Leninist” literature on sexual matters. He is a big expert in this field.

The other day he came to my office, sat down in an armchair, and quickly, in his slightly mischievous style, began to expound his vision.

February 4, 1973

So, B. Ilyichev. "I am sick of these endless resolutions to 'counter' and 'rebuff' the Chinese," he said. "My hand is tired of signing these papers. Our leaders are under some kind of spell – they think that once they pass a resolution everything will happen on its own exactly like they said. And even if it did, they're missing the point... Consider this: they put together a group of specialists 'under the CC Secretariat.' For three months the specialists worked on a strategic plan for 'what to do with the Chinese.' The mountain brought forth a mouse, which is now approved by the Politburo. Their analysis is correct to a large extent; it confirms that there will be no changes for the better; that we should not wait for these changes even if Mao or Zhoе, or both of them, should die. For China, friendship with us is unnecessary and objectively not beneficial.

"So what was the conclusion our experts came to? 'The policy of the XXIV Congress regarding the PRC was correct.' Yes, it was the right thing to announce to the world. But we should also have a realistic policy as such, which should stem from the fact that war is inevitably coming from China. If not in 5 years, then in 10, and if not 10 then 15.

"I always thought that after 1945 there could never be another war in Europe. I was sure of this, despite the various crises, West Berlin, and others. Now it is clear to everyone that there will never be another war.

"I understand, of course, that '20 million killed'... it was a psychological problem that we could not simply dismiss. But now there has been a psychological change, too. And yet, we were still spending our primary energy on Pompidou, Brandt, etc.

"In the meantime, the axis of world politics has long moved to Southeast Asia. Right now, after the end of the war in Vietnam, we should be creating a 'Great Vietnam,' combining all these Laoses and Cambodias and Philippines into a 'Great Vietnam' with 100 million people, plus Indonesia with another 125 million. Suharto is a scumbag and an enemy, but we need to get him on our side as quickly as possible. We need to create a serious hostile front for China. If we miss the opportunity and China gets influence over Southeast Asia with the help of the Japanese, it's over for us. A billion Chinese people! No nuclear power of ours can stop this force."

While he was talking I threw out little questions here and there, tried to make fun of his extremism, laughed at his vulgar expressions. But somewhere at the core he is right: we are very inflexible in our policies, very archaic in the ways we implement them... Even though Boris exaggerates and closes his eyes to the "demands of historicism" – "Everything in its own good time."

During these two weeks I've been at the Politburo twice and once at the CC Secretariat. The first time it was chaired by Suslov. Among other things, it was interesting to note the

haphazard nature of opinions on this or that issue, and the majority's (except for the core Politburo members) fear to defend their positions or proposals.

February 6, 1973

At the Politburo meeting there was a discussion of Kirilenko's note on "streamlining" external economic links of the ministries and departments. The point was that ministers and their deputies are more interested in trips abroad than they are in their own work.

Demichev spoke: "We really have to bring some order to this. It has come to the point that departments contact each other across the border, and we don't even know what ministries there are and so on... even people from factories and institutes are traveling abroad, setting up their own contacts. We need to put a stop to this, to bring it under the center's control."

Andropov: "There are violations of the requirement to submit records of conversations held abroad."

Kosygin must have not been paying attention to who said what, and came down on Andropov while responding to Demichev's statements (saying that we are moving toward integration and it's fine if factories, institutes, and others communicate with our permission but directly, because we would sink if everything was narrowed down to the center, plus – it's absurd).

Andropov listened to this for a while, then stood up and said with his high-pitched Komsomol voice that he did not suggest anything of the kind, and that it was "him," and pointed his finger at Demichev. The latter jumped up and started mumbling that it's not what he meant.

At the CC Secretariat there was a discussion about the "pushers," people sent from companies and agencies to obtain necessary materials. Kirilenko's note. Committee reports provided all kinds of "outrageous" and funny facts about how these trips are used to celebrate anniversaries of superiors in Moscow, to set up fraudulent deals, for tourism purposes, etc.

But then the deputy chairman of the State Logistics Committee spoke and also provided facts to show that abuses do take place, but they are not the reason why "pushers" exist. "The reason lies elsewhere. If, for example, the director of a metallurgical plant responds to the pleas of the people whom he supplies with piping by saying that he may fulfill the supply plan for the first quarter, but he will supply only 13 percent of the order in January, 27 percent in February, and the rest in March. What would you do? How is the plant supposed to work when it has such a supplier? What is it going to pay its workers? How is it going to fulfill its plan?

"Or: a construction site needs a certain type of metal, but the wrong material was delivered to it, and this wrong material lies around and goes to waste, because it cannot be used for this particular project. But the supplier fulfilled his quota in terms of the tons of metal delivered, and already received a bonus for his work. And so forth."

I was surprised when Solomentsev, Ustinov, Dolgikh – CC Secretaries – spoke quite sharply in support of the State Logistics Committee's analysis. They said that we have to look

beneath the surface to reveal the true reasons for pushers. In other words, they see all of this and understand very well that the root of the problem lies in the general and universal non-compliance with the Plans.

At the last Politburo (February 2) there was a “summary and review” of the conclusion of the Vietnam War, or to be more precise – the outcomes of Brezhnev’s meetings with Le Duc Tho, and Suslov’s meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Duy Trinh.

Brezhnev reviewed the responses to his speech at the reception of Vietnamese officials in Moscow (traveling from Paris, from negotiations). “The most important thing is that the West is emphasizing ‘Brezhnev’s firmness in the struggle for détente.’ And they believe that the line of the XXIV’s Congress is not just a conjuncture, but a matter of principle. Not to bring military vehicles into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam like before. I gave ‘no reaction’ to Tho’s questions about economic assistance.”

Grechko: “The Vietnamese still are not giving us the downed U.S. aircraft; they won’t let us near the B-52 or the American sea mines.”

Brezhnev: “Let Sadat think about what the end of the war in Vietnam means for him. Andropov and Gromyko are assigned to look for new ways to establish contact with Israel. Past attempts were unsuccessful. To just sit there with severed relations – that is not a policy.”

At the same PB session Polyansky was appointed Minister of Agriculture and relieved of the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. When this was published in *Pravda* on Saturday, no one could understand what happened. I couldn’t either (I was only present at the discussion of the Vietnam question). Today I heard a rumor that it happened despite Podgorny’s objections. Brezhnev suddenly agreed with Kosygin, who had had a long-running feud with Polyansky, after Kirilenko had “prepared” Brezhnev for it.

Thus, now there is a fairly large group of disgruntled, resentful people at the Politburo: Shelepin, Shelest, Voronov, Polyansky. Plus, the Premier and the General Secretary aren’t friends, and the relations between the President and the Premier are even worse.

People in Georgia are very upset because [Vasil] Mzhavanadze, the ousted First Secretary, is shielded from criticism and denunciations. He and the General Secretary were friends during the war.

In Armenia, the CC Bureau of the Communist Party of Armenia made a unanimous decision to relieve First Secretary [Anton] Kochinyan of his duties. But they received urgent instructions from Moscow to cancel their decision. There was a meeting of the CC Plenum, whose members pretended not to know about Moscow’s opinion and berated the PB members, who naturally cancelled their decision, for lacking principle and for spineless liberalism. Kochinyan is also General Secretary’s wartime friend.

Back in early January the plan was approved for the CC leadership's foreign policy activity in 1973, including the main events: Brezhnev's trips to India, the FRG, the U.S., Poland, Czechoslovakia, possibly Finland, and some socialist countries.

I remember how in May of last year, when we were preparing Brezhnev's speech for the XV Congress of Trade Unions, Arbatov got upset with me for insisting that Tsukanov should throw out the passage promising to devote the next CC Plenum to the Scientific-Technical Revolution. I told him at the time: "You're not going to get your Plenum in 1972." Now it looks like it won't happen in 1973, either.

There is a lot of noise in the newspapers, on the TV and radio about restructuring socialist competition to a more "competitive" mode. But the CC Propaganda groups, who toured the country with the "outcomes" of Brezhnev's report for the 50th anniversary of the USSR, got the sense that nothing is really being done on this issue. Nothing is being done in general. It's as if there was no December Plenum.

Is this a repeat of the situation in the fall of 1964?

[Rodney] Arismendi (First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uruguay) visited Suslov. I spoke with him about his trip to Korea. His impressions of Kim Il Sung. The splendor of the reception there. Dinner at Plotnikov Street. My toast. Seeing him off from Sheremetyevo-2.

Conversation with Galya Volchek about her new production of "Ascent of Mount Fuji" (by [Chinghiz] Aitmatov), which I saw two days before. It is the forefront of theater, a profound and sharp work. Once again, it is a challenge to our "cultural powers that be." The culmination of the play is the protagonist's (who is an institute director) exclamation: "That came later (rehabilitation), but then was not later!" This is a discovery at the level of Pushkin's "the people are speechless."¹

[Vladimir] Vysotsky's new songs. One of them is about two working class guys, lowlife drinking buddies, who decide to go to Israel (a Russian and a Jew). The Russian one was allowed, but the Jew did not pass under the fifth paragraph [nationality]. Marina Vlad. We talked. She is sweet.

February 8, 1973

Was at the Politburo again, for the discussion of the USSR joining the international convention on copyright protection. Yesterday, on B.N.'s orders, I spent the whole day preparing a draft resolution on the new Constitution for this Politburo. B.N. clearly wants to take the lead on preparing this document. However, my draft, which was sent to the Politburo with Ponomarev's signature forged by Balmashnikov (Ponomarev's assistant) (Ponomarev is on vacation in Gagra), was not discussed today. The CC Secretariat was assigned to "prepare and submit the question..."

¹ The last line of Alexander Pushkin's play *Boris Godunov*. [Trans.]

The other day Borya Pankin visited me, he is the editor in chief of *Komsomolka* [Komsomolskaya Pravda]. He said, "Our common (and individual, for people like us) problem is that the people occupying key positions are scum, especially in the information apparatus (or, for us, in ideology). And there is nothing you or Yakovlev can do about it. For example, you made your statement in *Kommunist*, and everyone seemed to agree. But now they are slowly pecking away at you in the 'discussions' and 'scholarly councils,' and indirectly in the press (see issue No. 12 of "History of the CPSU"). And there is nothing you can do. They are creating a 'public opinion' in a certain layer of society, and the 'masses' of cult wardens (as we used to call them a little while ago, and now I would simply call them ideological priests) are willing to do anything to keep their feeders."

I saw Shauro in the PB vestibule today. He told me, "You know, Safronov published the first volume of his collection and got 75,000 rubles for it! What's going on!!" He tells me this!

February 9, 1973

I jumped out of bed at 6 a.m. Went to tennis, lost a match, got energized.

Read a couple dozen ciphered telegrams, gave various orders... Asked for the proofs of Arismendi's article in *Pravda* on the revolutionary process in Latin America. Proofread a set of articles for *Izvestiya* about Chinese chauvinism.

Talked to Katushev about next week's arrival of [Hermann] Axen with a large group from the SED to review information [*na vzaimoinformatsiu*] on the International Communist Movement. I assigned the sector to prepare materials.

I wrote two notes to send to Ponomarev in the south – about the Australian CP and about the forthcoming conference of forty-two Communist Parties on the 125th anniversary of the Communist Manifesto, to take place in Berlin in March.

I read the information from TASS. Spoke with Shaposhnikov and Pukhlov about a letter the father of one of our junior assistants wrote to us, essentially a denunciation of his son. The son may be a piece of shit, but it is clear that the father is a real scumbag. I asked them to get to the bottom of it, particularly why he wrote such a thing about his son.

I spoke with the Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov about some materials for Brezhnev's visit to India, and with the head of the sector on how they will be prepared in our department.

Rewrote and signed several ciphered telegrams to different parts of the world.

Had several talks with Balmashnov regarding various projects and decisions adopted by the Politburo and the Secretariat.

Almost started reading the manuscripts for the *Questions of History* editorial board meeting that will take place on Monday, but didn't get the chance.

Prepared drafts for the note and telegram to Berlinguer, who will come in mid-March for a meeting with Brezhnev.

There was something else, I don't remember.

I'm reading [Pyotr] Proskurin's *Destiny*. It's about collectivization, a new resuscitation of Stalin. There is a waiting list for this book in the CC library.

February 13, 1973

There's been a string of festivities. On Saturday at Gililov's (a colleague from the days at the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* [PPS] journal). Arbatov, Kovalyov (editor of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia) with his now quite bloated and aged Sonya. Toasts. Everyone told me how young and unchanged I look. It was nice overall: Gililov was with Olga (his new and relatively young wife), as if this is how things always were.

On Sunday Ziegel (my school friend) had a party for his wife Galya's 50th anniversary. Again a strange collection of very different people: from the sci-fi writer Kazantsev, who is advertised in a West German film "Remembering the Future," to a Colonel of the tank troops, who got drunk and said, "What's keeping Soviet power propped up? Its authority, you think? That evaporated long ago! We are keeping it up, that's who! That's why we will always be in good shape."

Their eldest daughter Tanya is charming. Poems about her mother, lanterns made out of tree bark and metal, caricatures of Ziegel as Peter the Great and Galya as Catherine II – their photos are pasted onto the picture, it turned out great. The girl is stately and quite ripe, willingly brushed against me with her hips.

Ziegel said a number of toasts in honor of his wife and gave her a manuscript (hobby) about Catherine II, who was "Galya's prototype" ... as if in the last seven years there was no Klava, no waitresses from various Moscow cafes every year, etc.

In a word, they are an attractive, organized, disciplined Russian-German intellectual family, which were probably typical in "Moscow society" in the beginning of the 20th century, with vestiges of such families surviving into the 1920s.

As for the guests (the relatives and "those" friends), it was a pretty tasteless bunch: Soviet bureaucrats with pretensions to importance.

On Monday at Mitta's house there was a completely different "society," though no less unpleasant. Sasha Mitta himself is a director of excellent children's films, he is kind, charming, down to earth, smart, and without a hint of showing off or being a modern bohemian. His wife's name is Lilichka (by the way, she is Dezka's cousin). She is lovely, and also is an incredibly talented woman. She is a puppeteer and illustrator of children's fairy tales. Their nine year old son is a simply brilliant Jewish child. The things that he draws in the spirit of expressionism and primitivism (not childish drawings, but done specifically in that style) could outshine exhibits by

popular European artists. The caricature portraits he made when he was three years old are remarkable in the depth and accuracy of the captured image.

I am always amazed at the mystery of talent that can capture and express things that are unattainable even to encyclopedic learning. In this case one is simply dumbfounded. The kid is nine years old, he is a regular schoolboy.

But to come back to the “company.” Actresses, diplomats, scientists, writers. Medium-small-fry, of course (with the exception of Galya Volchek). But what pantsuits they had, what heels, what blouses and costume jewelry! How the cigarettes and glasses of gin rested in their fingers! What arrogance and “ease” in their manners. And at the same time, the women had a constant carnivorous searching gaze in their eyes – might this new, unfamiliar man take the bait, especially since people say he works at the CC!

A few years ago I would have wanted to blend into the wall from shyness in such company. Now for some reason I feel good and completely relaxed. I don’t need anything from them. The airs they put on are amusing. Nevertheless, there were maybe five people out of these two dozen who were genuinely interesting and nice.

Ostrovityanov said about the funeral of Shavrov from MGIMO: “It turns out that dying is even worse than living.”

Zagladin finally came back to work after over a month-long illness. He told me what he kept busy with: studying the “collective laborer.” He revealed Marx’, Engels’, and Lenin’s system of ideas regarding the concept of the “working class.” He enthusiastically described the diagram he came up with, but then grew quite bored when I started telling him about the work I had been doing for him this whole time... He brushed off the suggestions of things that he should pick up himself now...

Also, I was looking at his huge, soft body, which is now sick, too, and at heart I was terrified: this body cannot fly up a flight of stairs; it cannot embrace a woman without causing disgust; it does not know the pleasure of a ski trail; it cannot enjoy tennis; it basically does not know the general sensations of agility, strength, and health. This is scary. It is good that he doesn’t know it. And he is seven years younger than me.

February 20, 1973

We prepared a speech for Ponomarev for an international conference in Berlin on the 125th anniversary of the “ghost” that was “wandering through Europe” in those days. Additionally, he will be opening the conference in the Hall of Columns.

But when I was offered to go to Bonn for an analytical conference on State Cadre Policies, Ponomarev set the invitation aside. We were talking and he accidentally revealed the reason, “It would mean that you would have to prepare for your own presentation...” He doesn’t want me to spend time on myself when he needs a “fresh, interesting, and informative text” for himself.

A large delegation from England arrived. We are meeting with them. They are meticulous, everywhere they go – the raikom [regional committee], the CC Department of Organizational Party Work, the Writers [Union] – they ask why everyone here votes unanimously “in favor” of everything. Is it possible that there is so much agreement on all issues? Because consider, before Khrushchev was removed, if you had asked the people what they thought of his policies, they would have unanimously voted “in favor” of them. But a week later they voted “in favor” of removing him!

We tell them: would you like us to have parliamentary theatricals? Have a referendum on every question?

The closed conference of European Communist Parties on youth issues begins tomorrow. Even though I was involved in its preparation, I do not understand what merits it being closed... We do not raise any youth issues either “with us,” or “with them.” In fact, it’s not really clear what the purpose of this meeting is; we just have to show to ourselves and the parties that the ICM is internationally active.

Yesterday I met an Irish woman who came here for the youth conference (Edwin Stewart). She told me in the car that three Catholics were killed in their building three days ago. She is afraid for her daughters (10 and 18 years old). On Sundays they send them from Belfast to other cities to visit relatives. The Protestants are particularly vicious on Sundays. She also worries in the evenings, because she and Jimmy (husband) are often at meetings or on the road. The girls are usually at home. She is around 40 years old.

On Sunday I went skiing at Uspenka. This is the first real ski day of the winter. I raced all around the paths I found last year. Three hours – to the point of total exhaustion. Then in the evening I ended up having to go meet the British delegation (with Kapitonov!) and had dinner with them.

Today I was signing forms to issue pocket money to the people arriving for the youth conference (100 rubles per person, and that’s for two days! Considering that their living arrangements and other services are taken care of). I thought to myself, all of this is “at the expense of the Tambov peasant.” I think no other country could have borne the duty of internationalism for so long. And internationalism would have been long gone had the revolution (the main one) occurred not in Russia, but, say, in Germany or France.

February 24, 1973

February 21st at Plotnikov Street – the Moscow correspondent of the *Morning Star* Colin Williams together with his wife Jane and a delegation from the Communist Party of Great Britain. My toast. Presented him with a watch “from the CC CPSU.” The toast of the head of the delegation (Gordon McLennan) and its subtexts.

The youth conference of the European CPs has concluded. I participated in it indirectly.

The next day two Swedes (conference participants) said it was alright, of course. But it's not clear why this conference was necessary. And the geezers working on youth issues are just too old.

Reception at Plotnikov on occasion of the completion of the conference. My neighbors at the table were a young Italian and a Frenchman.

B.N. has another report to the CC apparatus coming up on the 28th. My God! Besides the trip to Berlin with "the ghost," he will also be opening the festivities in honor of this occasion in the Hall of Columns.

March 4, 1973

It was a difficult week. The British delegation returned to Moscow (Leningrad, Kiev, Vilnius, Lvov). They were a lot of work, but in the end it was interesting. They started asking (back when they first got to Moscow, at the automobile plant) – "What is the average salary at your plant? 150 rubles, ok..." Then he quickly calculated something on a piece of paper, "So one would need to work for three years, no food or drink, no going to the movies, to be able to buy a car."

This started a rowdy altercation with mixed results. In the evening, the bearded guy, Ralph Pindor – a young, red-haired shop-steward from Scotland – asked the head of the delegation to gather the members together. "What did you come here for? To pick fights, like provincials? To spoil relations between the parties? Are you at a bar around the corner, or are you carrying out a political assignment?"

In the morning everyone was apologetic.

With each passing day their critical enthusiasm waned. They ended up not raising even the questions they had asked everywhere and wanted to convey to the CPSU Central Committee. These were about the Jews (their theorists came to the conclusion that if we cease considering the Jews a nationality and recoding that in documents, the problems would suddenly disappear); about social-democrats; about the Common Market. They want us to continue fighting against it.

Matkovsky and Lagutin traveled with them and said that after numerous meetings at all levels, the Brits admitted to being in a strange state. They couldn't come up with any objections or arguments, but a sense of dissatisfaction remained.

Apparently, this stems from the fact that they, like most of the West, want to measure us with an incommensurable scale. Mainly, they are stunned by our size, by our strength (which is dilapidated, but then again, only we notice this), and by the fact that they are somehow a part of this... In the end, nitpicking an entity with which you really can't argue seems ridiculous and petty. So they quiet down.

Nevertheless, I had a serious conversation with Gordon McLennan when we were working out the communiqué. We discussed why we needed them to say that they "appreciate

the building of communism;” we talked about the Common Market, about our foreign policy, about why we needed the formula of “joint struggle for unity of the ICM.”

On March 1st there was an official reception of the delegation by the CC CPSU. The delegation (its head) no longer made any claims and praised everything profusely. Gordon timidly noted that all questions have essentially been answered and left it up to B.N. to decide whether to go over the questions. But B.N. did not think it necessary and rattled off some kind of stock paragraphs from his last report for propaganda. It was embarrassing to listen to. But the Brits kept listening and nodding. Even in response to Gordon’s question about agriculture, B.N. brazenly declared that “the West is lying” that we have difficulties. There was no 1972, there were no problems at all and everything is just fine.

I sat there and thought: why is he doing this? Everyone knows that it’s not the case. But maybe there is some kind of wisdom in this? Maybe they need to hear a stream of optimism from an official source, so they can officially fend off the anti-Soviets in England?

Then Kapitonov spoke “about the Party.” Reading off a paper, he was expounding some total absurdity from the point of view of the British people’s needs. He talked excitedly about how today Leonid Ilyich signed Party ticket No. 1 – to Lenin. The Brits stared and could barely restrain the smirks on their faces. Then he stopped reading from the paper and made some more comments, which were totally incomprehensible and tongue-tied. Dzhavad, the interpreter, did the best he could to find something to translate into English from the nonsensical stream of words.

At first I felt very ashamed, and then grew downright scared. After all, this person is in charge of all the executive cadres in the Soviet Union! It’s lucky that he happens not to be a malicious person. But his intellectual potential, his understanding of human values and the needs of the Soviet people – they are impossible to define because they are like clay, capable of taking any form and squeezing in any direction.

In an unprecedented move, B.N. and Kapitonov joined the farewell dinner at the hotel in the evening. Overall it was pretty good. And sincerely friendly. B.N. is good at these kinds of events. After they left, McLennan pulled me back into the banquet hall and the real heartfelt toasts began. I gave a long one, about my love for England and the future of this “after all great country.”

The aforementioned “bestowing” [vruchenie] (as Parshin called it at our Party meeting) of Party ticket No. 1 contained its own “musical moment”: Podgorny, Kosygin, and Suslov were not in Moscow that day, but they wanted to be depicted as taking part in the event. Therefore, Zamyatin (from TASS) was assigned to edit the photograph in *Pravda* and include them in their proper places next to Leonid Ilyich. However, he did not bother to include Shelest and Shelepin in the photo, who were also absent from the ceremony but included in *Pravda*’s official list of attendees.

Party ticket No. 1 was not the end of it. The next day *Pravda* ran an announcement that Party ticket No. 2 was presented to L.I. Brezhnev!.. It’s not enough for him that prior to this the

whole of Moscow was buzzing for a week that “Brezhnev embraced Podgorny on paper” (on the occasion of awarding Podgorny a second gold medal of the Hero of Socialist Labor on his 70th anniversary).

I am amazed by all of this, despite the fact that I know Brezhnev and many of the rest of them personally. Do they not see that this goes beyond the banality of these “events” (though just banality would be alright, it could be passed off as “let the intellectuals squirm a little bit”); do they not see that this directly damages their prestige? Because the people are laughing, and not good-naturedly. They are laughing with contempt.

On March 8th I have to go to the FRG for a conference on the State Cadre Policies. I was writing my report all day yesterday, came up with twenty pages.

On the 9th and 14th Ponomarev is giving speeches on “the ghost” in the Hall of Columns and in Berlin. He really watches carefully that I work on his reports and not my own. Indeed, I haven’t had a single day to work on my text.

Today I spent three and a half hours skiing. I must have covered around 40 kilometers, if not more. The dacha is a fairy tale. This is probably the last good skiing day this year. And I can still do it as a skier! At least to others, I don’t look like someone who’s just out on a stroll, or skiing for exercise. I look like a racer, though an aging one.

March 5, 1973

Tonight Iskra and I went for a walk. I wanted to arrange a trip to Italy for her through one of the Italian Communist Party organizations, to give lectures. We do this every year. B.N. suggested that I look for some new, good people to send. I immediately thought of her and recommended her. After all, she is a great public speaker, has excellent command of the audience, is broadly educated, smart, charming. What better candidate could they want?!

But the KGB took a very long time running a background check on her. That struck me as odd. Then they sent a brief note: “was in close contact with Burkhard.” Who is Burkhard? Verbally, they added that her husband (Gulyga) has so much baggage that it’s best not even to go into it (though they called the Department Secretariat, not me personally). And they said in general they are pretty suspicious. “But for Andreyeva (Iskra) herself, there is nothing besides Burkhard.”

I decided to ignore it and presented her to the committee for foreign travel. They called her in and the instructor casually asked her if she knew Burkhard. Iskra later told me that she did not understand at first and based on the context of the question thought that it was one of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party, and that she was being tested on her knowledge of that Party. She sheepishly said that she does not know this man (!) (she did not understand that it was a woman).

The instructor explained that he is talking about a woman convicted for anti-Soviet activities. Still, Iskra could not recall this Burkhard. But she said that she had known some

acquaintance of a relative of Solzhenitsyn. As we later learned, the instructor noted down that she was lying and deliberately confusing the matter.

The other day N.N. [Nikolai Nikolaevich] Organov, the chairman of the committee for foreign travel, called me and started indignantly telling me that Andreyeva is an anti-Soviet [person], that she helped to smuggle Daniel's manuscripts abroad, that Burkhard is Daniel's wife and she was also sentenced for anti-Sovietism in 1968, etc. In a word, they cannot let her out of the country and intend to report everything to the raikom.

I raised my voice, even though Organov is older and a high-ranking official. I told him that I don't believe a single word of this so-called "investigation," and that if this was the case she would have been expelled from the party a long time ago (she has been a member for 20 years) like the others, and she would have been fired from her job. I said that I've known Andreyeva for a quarter of a century, "I know the real person, not a piece of paper," and will not listen to such accusations for a minute longer. All of this is complete nonsense.

Of course I did not tell any of this to Iskra. I found out that she had been questioned about this Burkhard (by the way, Daniel's wife is Bogoraz, not Burkhard at all, who is someone else. But Iskra did not know either of them) not from Iskra but from the committee. I advised Iskra to call the instructor and "responsibly declare" that she does not know Burkhard or Daniel's wife, and that they should not smear her with this.

Iskra is terribly upset. Now her official biography has such (!) a "blemish." On my part, I am afraid that they may report this to the raikom after all. If that happens, my initiative to send her to Italy will result in her not getting her party card renewed. Holy shit!..

Ponomarev told me today that he is thinking of recommending me for the position of director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism [IML]. But, he says, he doesn't want to let me go. Still, Fedoseyev needs to be relieved of one of his positions (vice president or director of IML). I suggested Zagladin, who told me numerous times that he wouldn't mind going there. But B.N. erupted against Vadim, calling him scatterbrained. And he made all kinds of contemptuous faces while talking about him. He said that the real reason behind the order he gave "back then" regarding publications by his deputies and the workers of the International Department in general was not Ulyanovsky, but Zagladin. Suslov had shown B.N. a whole stack of brochures and collections "edited" by Zagladin, and demanded that B.N. stop this "laxity." And in general, B.N. concluded, Zagladin is not at all well-liked up there (!)... (he accompanied this with an upward thrust of his head).

Personally, I think B.N. got wind of some of the "statements" Zagladin made about him on the side, or maybe even in the circle of Aleksandrov-Agentov... Which is quite likely. Zagladin really has picked up a Belyakovian² tone regarding Ponomarev.

March 19, 1973

² In the 1960s A. Belyakov was the first deputy of the International Department. He was a talented but boisterous guy, who was later sent as ambassador to Finland. He clearly intended to take B.N.'s place.

From March 8-15th I was in the FRG for the first time. All kinds of major impressions; this was probably the most interesting of my business trips.

March 8th – East Berlin. Meeting with Gary Ott (Deputy Head of the SED International Department). Lunch at the Party hotel. A chance meeting with Sasha Kheinin, the Second Secretary of the CP of Israel, who is vacationing in the GDR with his daughter. His daughter is a genuine Jewish goddess. My jaw literally dropped when Markovsky introduced us and I turned around to shake her hand. I think I've never seen such a beautiful woman – not in art, or in the movies, or in real life.

Lunch. Ride through the “Wall” to West Berlin. In an hour we were in Cologne. In the evening – dinner at a restaurant with Trambovsky (Secretary of the Rhine-Westphalia regional committee), member of the PB Gerd Daumlich, and someone else. Boring. First conversation – first intelligence-gathering mission.

March 9th – conversation in the Rhine-Westphalia regional committee. Speech, discussion. After lunch, [visit to] Wuppertal, the homeland of Engels. The *partprosvet* [party education committee] house, which was burnt by the Nazis in January. The house where Engels was born, or rather the place where his house once stood; it was destroyed by a bomb. Wreath by the stone. The house-museum of Engels' family. Created by the municipality. Very decent, but the communists are grumbling, they are upset that it's not theirs.

March 10-11th – conference in Cologne devoted to “the ghost.” But it was a political action rather than a scholarly symposium. I was in the presidium, next to Bachmann (Chairman of the German Communist Party [Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, DKP]). Bachmann's report, my report, Diehl's report (the director of some institute in East Berlin), the report of the Head of the SED Central Committee. Regarding Diehl, twelve times conference participants approached Rykin and me to express their contempt for the nonsense he was saying, which “embarrassed him and our Party.” It is telling that they wanted to bring this to our attention without particularly trying to be discreet.

Visit to downtown Cologne. The cathedral! House No. 4711, where *Eau de Cologne* was invented. The building where the “League of Communists” process took place. The building where Marx made speeches.

March 12th – Monday. In Bonn. Conversation with Ambassador Falin. He was pointedly easygoing, but kept his distance, as if to say “You should know who appointed me here and to whom I am accountable” (he is from Brezhnev's Zavidovo team. Friends with Tolya Kovalyov). He is a clear and efficient thinker with an aversion for idle talk and common phrases; he is somewhat artificially critical, which implies that everyone else is a fool.

His main ideas:

The national problem was handed over to Brandt. He is a national hero. The “beard” (Ulbricht) had a vision for a future Germany, even if it is utopian for now: when all of Germany becomes socialist, then the unity of the nation will be restored. Honecker has no vision. He goes

with the flow and is manipulated by his close associates, who know what they are doing. On the one hand, they offer the Soviet Union integration, fully understanding that it will not be accepted but will appear as a gesture of utmost loyalty. On the other hand, they organize small provocations against Brandt's policies – with the status of journalists, with reunification of families (especially children), thereby arousing hatred first and foremost in the population of the GDR. That said, they are not risking anything personally. Because they are practically acting on instructions from the West German intelligence service.

Take into consideration, Falin continued, that in addition to very active economic ties between the GDR and the FRG, about which we know "almost nothing," the two sides share general, invisible but powerful, ties. You know, these are the undercurrents that ultimately determine the life of the ocean. They take place on all fronts: trade unions, scientific, technical, cultural, but especially personal and family ties, and (!) the top secret inter-party and political ties.

Dozens, hundreds of emissaries with various well-concealed assignments travel back and forth daily. First and foremost, they hide this from us. Recently the following episode took place: one such unsophisticated emissary was supposed to transfer something urgent to Berlin, but of course there are no coded communication lines. He hurried to our embassy and asked to do it through our services. We did it. Later we found out that by the time he returned to the GDR he was expelled from the party and disappeared somewhere.

They (the GDR) really display the most loyal friendship to us (the USSR). To this end, if you remember, they proposed projects of complete industrial product integration. We could not praise them enough; we were wide-eyed listening to them. In the meantime, they were well aware that we were not able to accept their "bold internationalist projects." And notice that despite all our proposals, the East Germans persistently refuse to accept our All-Union State Standard system and use the West German, Common Market system of standards. So much for integration.

And what could you expect! To theorize about the division of a great nation, at the end of the XX century! Is this not absurd! We need to seriously think about "the concept of Germany." Otherwise, in five years or so we could have such a situation in the GDR that the occupation forces may not be enough.

Falin talked a great deal about the incident that happened a month ago. A member of the DKP Politburo "lost" his briefcase with the complete party personnel files and information on the party's financial relations. The briefcase turned up at a police station... Now everything is in the hands of Genscher – Minister of the Interior of the FRG.

Somewhat contradicting himself, Falin believes that the DKP will not become a serious force unless it refuses to "worship" the SED and repeat all its "positions" on fundamental issues... At least until the DKP gets its own independent line in such matters as the common market and the national question. A fine thing! – I replied. You are suggesting this when the DKP practically belongs to the SED and exists through its means!

He talked about [Herbert] Wehner, deputy chairman of the SPD, chairman of the SPD faction in the Bundestag, former member of the Communist International, and now a “patriarch” of the SPD.

I ended up having to give a report to the diplomatic staff of the embassy, after which Marta (Kapluk’s wife) drove Rykin and me from Bonn to Essen (120 km) in 30 minutes. She is a real ace behind the wheel, and to top it off she plays around by passing cars at 200 km per hour. She was a “liaison” for the Party at some point in the underground. She transported prohibited literature, people’s documents. In ten years she was never caught and always evaded pursuit if someone “got on her tail.”

That evening in Essen there was an extended plenum of the regional committee, taking stock of the strike at “Mannesmann.” Huge impressions. The communist workers, the ones who made the strike despite the trade unions and social democrats, they assured its success. Their stories about what happened, day by day and hour by hour. For the whole week. Their summaries and conclusions. And all of them such good speakers! And this fighting proletarian spirit! After all, there are only 12 communists at the factory, and 3200 social-democrats.

We had two meetings with the party administration. One on Sunday, right after the conference, and the second on Wednesday – Angenfort, Mueller and others. Farewell to Bachmann, Mies. Intellectual and political potential of almost all leaders. Their seriousness and authority is based on capability, knowledge, the force of their dedication, their high ideals and openness to any debate, any action, to anyone who wants to test their qualifications and dedication. But where is this potential going? It is serving a hopeless cause.

The roads, bridge over the Ruhr Valley: 2 km on thin supports, 125 meters high. It’s a marvel. Germany’s industrial might is evident on the sides of the autobahns when you travel through the Ruhr. At night you see lights, during the day – the massive factories. The cities of Ruhr – Dusseldorf, Duisburg, Dortmund, Essen – are now a single metropolis with a population of over nine million. You don’t notice when you leave one city and enter another.

German women are beautiful, well bred, clean, busty, and richly and tastefully dressed. The strength of the nation. In no other country have I seen so many beautiful women – they are everywhere, throngs of them.

March 21, 1973

It has only been a week since I was in Germany. Even those impressions have passed by.

Today we had some “ominous events.” Unexpectedly, Zagladin and Shaposhnikov were summoned to the CC Secretariat and told to make a “public, stern reprimand” for the events of the night before November 7th, i.e. events that took place almost 5 months ago (referring to the small party, with alcohol, in Zagladin’s office. I was among the participants, as well as Kuskov, Zhilin, Pushkov, and Brutents. But most of the people left early, the ones who were “caught” were there until about 11 p.m.).

Why has this surfaced again? We all discussed this for a long time, tried to get to the bottom of it. Is it a swipe at Ponomarev? For what? It seems the points of power at the top are still shifting, there is a rebalancing of forces, and the first clear sign of this is Polyansky's demotion. The thing is that after the critique of Zagladin and Shaposhnikov, the Secretariat immediately removed Yakovlev from the position of first deputy of Agitprop ("to send him to diplomatic services"). The excuse is his article in *Literaturka*, which blasted the Pochvenniki and modern Slavophiles. Actually, it was not so much the article itself as the fact that it was published "without permission." (Note: any person with an understanding of the apparatus knows that it could not have been published without permission). When it was published and Golikov & Co. started raising a stink about it, Yakovlev leaked some information – namely, that Demichev approved and allowed the article.)

However, when Suslov raised the issue at the PB, Demichev said that he never read the article. Nobody so much as batted an eye at this blatant lie, and all conclusions were made against Yakovlev. It was "suggested" to Demichev to present Yakovlev for expulsion. Despite Demichev's statement at the PB, people say that there is a note that he "signed off" on the article, adding that he does not object to the content even though it has some ideological-political shortcomings. The main thing that Yakovlev is being accused of – that he proceeded without permission – is an obvious lie. The social implications of this act are clear: the article appears to be a mistake, and of such magnitude that its author, a member of the Oversight committee [*revizionnaya komissiya*] and practically the head of a CC department, is being removed from his position. All our Black Hundredists will be quite happy.

... Recently, B.N. mentioned several times that Suslov has whole binders of our work (i.e. the International Department staff) on his desk. Mikhail Andreyevich [Suslov] rubbed Ponomarev's nose in it, saying that it is bad, because these "authors" are perceived as representatives of the CC.

Ponomarev himself is under great suspicion on this subject. After all, he appears in print more often than all the other Politburo members, candidate members, and CC Secretaries put together. With the exception, of course, of the General Secretary.

The assistants (a special clan that occupies Usovo and Uspenka) openly grumble about Ponomarev's "theoretical" activity. He has a whole pack of writers-consultants at his beck and call.

But all of this has clearly already "settled" at the top. This creates (or rather gives off) the atmosphere of some great collective immorality. The so-called "interests of the cause" have nothing to do with this life.

B.N. gathered the entire department today. He talked about vigilance when dealing with foreigners. The meaning of his speech: do not say anything that has not been published here. Record everything you and your interlocutor say into a numbered notebook. And so on. All of this is completely absurd. You cannot engage in politics if you turn its agents into dummies that mindlessly repeat newspaper phrases.

March 23, 1973

I got up early. Reading *Literaturka*, the last issues that I missed because of my trip to the FRG. There are many articles about the modern worker, the modern intellectual, the modern literary hero. What is he like? What should he be like? At the center is the image of a manager. The object of discussion is Peshkov from *A Man from the Side* by Dvoretsky (I saw it in "Sovremennik"): "Social activity, awareness, civic integrity and personal courage of the modern hero. Professional skills, exceptional competence, and absolute rationality as conditions for a moral approach to modern problems." The discussion of this aesthetic search for a modern Soviet literature is passionate and intelligent. But considering what was said earlier, are they doing this without the boss? Or perhaps the boss is out of the loop?

Yesterday I went to the Tretyakov Gallery to see Boris Musatov. Only, perhaps, the "Requiem." The rest – an anemic world of a sickly, "wretched," as people used to say, person of refined tastes. A world that makes you think about the infinity of variations and possibilities of the human spirit, about the secret mysteries of this spirit, which is attractive and thrilling. But the artist himself is not exciting at all.

April 1, 1973

The *Voprosy literatury* [Problems of Literature] journal printed Akhmatova's previously unpublished manuscript about Pushkin's death. About Pushkin in general. Lyubimov's Pushkin ("My friend, believe...") at the Taganka Theater. I got to see the transcript of the numerous discussions of the "runs-through" of the show before the decision was made to allow or not allow it. Among the comments were the terrible statements of our head of culture Pokarzhevsky, as well as the brave comments of the writers, who said that they also have a responsibility before the people for their cultural and spiritual development, and that the various departments' claims to a monopoly on culture are intolerable, etc. So, about Pushkin. Why do people keep coming back to him? He is universal like any genius, and like all the greats – he is "eternal." But Pushkin is universal and eternal in the genius of each one of his specific, inimitable manifestations. And then – the word! I am reading him right now and realizing that previously I perceived a lot of it simply as music, without particularly thinking about the meaning of the phrases. And sometimes, it turns out, I did not even understand the meaning of his poems. Right now my feeling for the words is very acute, right now I see the poem in its entirety, its balance, as well as each stanza and each syllable. The music has fused with the delight of penetrating into every nuance of the idea. There is a great labor behind this, too. Some poems appear in quite a different light than in the past. For example, "To the nobleman" (to Yusupov, the owner of Arkhangelskoye Palace).

At the same time I am reading a book I brought from the FRG, Jack Pine's *The Love Sucker*. It's a sex-bomb book, with a rare collection of lusty techniques. It would seem I am a well-informed person in this sphere... But there were quite a few surprises. Truly, the sexual revolution, like every revolution, opens up extraordinary creativity!

"Che Guevara died, but 'for boys, Poses do not die' and his ghost wanders the countries of America and Europe like a stern warning to all who are over-fed, too relaxed, presumptuous, bowing and scraping, kowtowing, everyone who forgot about the human values of dignity, truth,

and justice.” That is from V. Guseyev’s [sic] from “Yunost” [Youth] No. 3. This is when the apogee of power over our spiritual life is in the hands of people like Demichev, Trapeznikov, and, as Lenin used to say, *tutti quanti*.

I saw Trapeznikov – that freak in a large cap – today, from a distance, in Uspenka. Once again I was consumed with rage and wanted to walk up to him and mug him in the face, lift him up by the collar and hit him in the face again, saying “This is so you would stop abusing Soviet system, stop defiling our ideals!”

April 2, 1973

Yesterday I read Roger Garaudy’s *Alternative*. I put it off for a long time. At first it seemed like it was all the same. After all, he publishes a new book every year. And actually, it’s more or less true this time as well. But still it gives you something to think about (in your spare time).

Since he is a renegade who burned all the bridges, he enjoys his freedom of thought. He is literally swimming in it; he frolics like a stallion that’s been locked up too long in the pen of Marxist dogmatism. By the way, Garaudy played a very active part in the construction of this Marxist pen, not only abroad but also here in the 1950s and early 1960s.

But such uncontrollable “freedom of thought” is bad for real scholarly analysis. The flaws of dogmatic Marxism are obvious. They have long been on the surface. All one needs is some writing experience to build a “system for the future” based off these flaws. This is even easier for a person who was raised on Fedoseyev-style Marxism (they say that Fedoseyev was even an official reviewer for Garaudy’s dissertation at the Academy of Social Sciences). But such work has little potential. Entire battalions of various types of anti-Soviets are engaged in this kind of work. This is the first point.

Second. Since he is, as we used to call him, an “educated Marxist,” i.e. a person who is well-read in Marxist-Leninist literature and history, and in addition a person who is aware of the huge flow of public opinion in the West³, he grasped practically all the fundamental problems of the modern revolution. Many of them he presented interestingly and innovatively, maybe even correctly. For example, starting at a certain moment, namely when production begins to “determine” the market, to dictate and invent needs, to impose demand and thereby expand it by renewing the stock of goods – at this point the position of A and B radically changes in the method of production. (B) begins to consume the bulk of investments, which deprives the production of means production (A) of its defining role: 1) in the development of the cycle; 2) in the creation of a trend to lower the rate of profit, which, according to the facts, is no longer valid today. (Also, thanks to the transformation of scientific labor into “living labor,” directly create a profitable price, and not just immobilized in the past in vehicles, etc.)

³ The majority of our “scholars” have a misconception about Western public opinion based on the loud criticism in our newspapers and magazines; some privileged Muscovites have a better idea from literature reviews; and only a handful of people who know foreign languages and have access to the original publications and have some real understanding.

Things of a similar nature and many others require very serious attention and analysis, of course. But the problem is that everything that Garaudy touches becomes revisionism – not only for us, but in our entire Communist movement. I felt it vaguely in the FRG: at the conference we were discussing the same questions that Garaudy writes about in his books, but nobody wanted to rebuke him, his name was not spoken once in two days. But (and more importantly!) nobody dared to put questions the way Garaudy puts them (or even in a different form), though perhaps it is impossible to put this question in any other way. This is the obvious damage of his defection.

But any public reflection on this subject in the Soviet Union and in our Communist movement is now taboo, revisionism. Because here Garaudy walked arm in arm with the Spanish [Santiago] Carrillo.

As for the Fedoseyev-style Marxism, it turned out to be so timid and (really) so impotent in terms of creativity, and ignorant to top it off, that it does not dare to raise the problem and solve it better than Garaudy attempts to do. Besides, Fedoseyev's goals are different – to stigmatize foreign and catch domestic revisionists, instead of delving into the essence of things.

Third. Garaudy's anti-Sovietism is fierce and blinding, like every renegade's. It has led him not only beyond the limits of the Communist Party of France [Parti communiste français, PCF]⁴, but outside the limits of common sense. He has many interesting ideas about, for example, overcoming capitalism. In particular, about the “national strike,” an idea he borrowed from Carrillo. What is interesting about that idea is that the decisive struggle will take place “in the workplace,” not on the street or in Parliament. (By the way, unbeknown to himself, Ponomarev insists on this idea before every report he makes). However, all details are devalued if they are not organized in the context of the core balance of forces in the world. After writing us off ideologically (techno-bureaucratic socialism), he also ignores us politically, not understanding that by now we are an organic component of the entire process of modern development, at least on the course that has or will have historical meaning. And vice versa, by believing Mao and supporting him ideologically (philosophy of the Cultural Revolution) he politically accepts Maoism only with a plus sign. In the meanwhile, it is a reactionary force, and more and more so. If it ever does form a new advanced civilization, it will only be through the suppression of existing civilizations. Garaudy should understand this, as he is no stranger to understanding the essence and possibilities of religious ideology in human history (and here we also have the racial psychology of the masses). However, his eyes are obscured by that same anti-Sovietism.

April 3, 1973

Yesterday I also read the new novel by [Vladimir] Voinovich about Vera Figner. It is a stylistically talented work, done to resemble prose from the 1880's. It introduces the atmosphere of the era very well. However, its chief merit is the hidden philosophy. The complex modern fate of our Revolution (October) is extrapolated from the revolutionary events of the time: the pure

⁴ Certainly, if Garaudy's position was not so anti-Soviet and did not infringe on “democratic centralism,” i.e. [George] Marchais' position, he would have remained in the party and all his theories would be in a different “system of relations.”

ideals embodied in Vera and her friends coming in contact with crude reality from top to bottom. But the author and the narrator, who tells the story, is deeply ironic (not only in the literary sense, but, significantly, also in the philosophical sense). This makes his interpretation of this contradiction not trivial. With sympathy and bitterness, he seems to be constantly mocking and ridiculing the helplessness, innocence, and the general pointlessness of their heroism and sacrifice. At the same time, he leaves the reader with a deep belief in the historical inevitability and... the necessity of such actions, such ideology.

April 4, 1973

Coming back to *Vera Figner*. In recent years, the theme of Narodnaya Volya [People's Will] and "that era" in general is very popular, both in historical literature, in art, and in journals and publishing houses. Just the things that have crossed the radar of my attention: about Perovskaya, about Bakunin, about Kropotkin in the *Lives of Outstanding People* series and in the popular series *Nauka*. Strepnyak Kravchinsky has been re-issued. There is something in every issue of *Prometheus*; in the latest issue – about Kletochkin (an agent of the III branch of Narodnaya Volya). From time to time there is something in *Questions of History*, where I am a member of the editorial board. Now Voinovich, who appeared on the literary horizon 7-8 years ago with his far-from-orthodox short stories, released a book about Vera. And [Aleksandr] Lebedev (author of the famous *Chaadaev*) is finishing a book about [Andrey] Zhelyabov.

What could it all mean?

It clearly resonates with things like the quote from *Yunost'* about Che Guevara. There is a void in spiritual life. Young people (the best part of them) are pragmatic, businesslike, learning professionals, getting married early. A relatively small part of the children of the "elite" are freeloading off their parents. The rest are simply working and living, not thinking about anything. There is a rather large group of Komsomol loudmouths and careerists on the sly. Among these Komsomol activists, very few are truly ideological and dedicated, or business-minded and positive people but "without all these fantasies" (for example leaders of student groups). A cross section of our youth reflects the state of our society.

And, perhaps, right now it's not the youth who have a "need for ideas." More likely it is the "combat generation," the people who lived through the war and are eager to do everything they can to prevent the dangerous (in its irreversibility) leakage of spirituality from public consciousness and life.

April 5, 1973

The thirst for spirituality arises not so much from the day to day life; it is fed by the subterranean current of the "national tradition." Right now Tocqueville is in vogue (among refined intellectuals). The pressure of the "old order" (almost synonymous with "human nature") manifests itself not only in the structure and habits of state practices, but in ideological life as well. It finds various expressions. One is well known – neo-Slavophiles, Pochvenniks from [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn to [Vladimir] Soloukhin and beyond – neo-Stalinist *Molodaya Gvardiya* [Young Guard]. The other is neo-Westernism, which started with *Novy Mir* [New

World] (especially Lakshin with his brilliant journalism). The interest in Populism, and even Narodnaya Volya, joined with this course. This is not just the desire for ideological purity and selflessness. There is some kind of vague suggestion here. No wonder this trend intensified in connection with the shooting at Borovitsky Gates three years ago.⁵ Back then people said that if the country is destined to go through another revolutionary cycle of historic proportions, right now it is in a state equivalent to the '60s of the XIX century (by analogy).

The search for spirituality is based on Soviet tradition. The increasingly frequent (and increasingly stylized – for the convenience of contemporaries) references to the civil war era are indicative. But even more remarkable is the deep-seated and passionate, indestructible like a guilty conscience, interest in the "Great 1941." No matter how much Demichev's minions try to hush it up, falsify it, or conveniently channel it, the roots of this interest are deep and will thrive for a long time. The year 1941 was the culmination in the development of Soviet social consciousness. Sometime in 1942 you can date the beginning of the "post-revolutionary" period of our state and society.

April 7, 1973

My first day at work after being out sick. There is a feeling that things would get done even if I was not here. And the quality of the work wouldn't even suffer that much without me. In only one sector – England, Ireland, and Australia – would things not be done as they should. The main impression I get after every break from my job is that I need the work more than it needs me.

At my 52 years, I am so integrated in this activity that I cannot imagine myself in any other life situation.

It turns out that intense preparation has begun for the CC Plenum. People have been waiting for two years, if not more, for a plenum on scientific-technical progress. But it has been postponed again, same as the plenum on international issues. It seems the generals and colonels from agriculture, obkom leaders and others, are filling with a quiet rage. Indeed, what's the logic? The areas that are getting worse are left untouched, nobody wants to raise these issues (maybe because nobody knows how to solve them; or because the key decision has not been made – weapons or economy, there is no money to solve them; or because the General Secretary himself is not preparing the Plenum, it is in the hands of other people, namely – Kirilenko). The areas that are successful and straightforward will continue in that direction anyway. In these spheres there are numerous lavish discussions of "findings and conclusions," of which 99.99 percent have no direct correlation with the Plenum.

However, it is tempting [to concentrate on the successful aspects]: the entire world's media are working here for our prestige and authority. Everything is in the open: beautiful and pleasant. And you can see the work...

⁵ Attempted assassination of Brezhnev.

Ponomarev, Aleksandrov-Agentov, Zagladin & Co. have bunkered down in Novo Ogarevo. They are preparing the main report and alongside that materials for Brezhnev's trip to the FRG. This connection is not coincidental. Zagladin "leaked" the following conversation with the speaker [Brezhnev]: "I do not want it to look like my trip; I want it to be our mutual undertaking, collective..." That is why, contrary to the practice established after the XXIII Congress, other members of the leadership will be speaking at the Plenum, including Ponomarev. The consultants headed by Zhilin are very busy because of this. Yurka [Zhilin] told me about the central issue, which is how to present the General Secretary's achievements in B.N.'s speech. By the way, he, Zhilin, recalled an incident that occurred in Berlin, where B.N. gave a report on the 125th anniversary of the "ghost." He had to make a toast at the final banquet. He did it off the cuff, and later, when Yurka presented him with the written text for the press, B.N. started to anxiously lecture him, "It should be just as I said it, namely: not 'headed by,' but 'Politburo,' comma, 'personally Comrade Brezhnev,'" etc. He repeated it several times. Then he caught Zhilin as he was leaving the room and "explained" it to him one more time.

They say Yakovlev is already appointed as ambassador to Canada. Moscow does not know yet. He is in the hospital. Frail folk we have nowadays!

April 10, 1973

More on Yakovlev. They say that the article in *Literaturka* was not the real reason, only an excuse. The main problem is that he did not provide the correct presentation of the leadership in our propaganda. He did not develop this theme enough, he even held it back!

One momentous episode corresponds to this. At the last CC Secretariat there was a discussion of the second book of Volume V of the "History of the Communist Party." It was a closed session. Everyone was asked to [leave]... The people who stayed were Pospelov (editor in chief of the whole publication), Fedoseyev (director of the IML, where it is published), and Kukin (responsible for the publication at IML). Only M.A. (Suslov) spoke. Conclusion: "The book was prepared at a very low theoretical level, with gross political errors."

What was the matter? The period under discussion was 1946-1958. It turns out that the authors allowed a negative evaluation of the Party's activity. They downplayed its role. Accentuated the criticism. Incorrectly assessed the XIX Party Congress.

How would an "astute reader" understand this, i.e. the interested public that got wind of information about that Secretariat?

They would understand it very simply: after all, Brezhnev was first elected to the Party leadership at the XIX Congress! How could this Congress be criticized! On the contrary, its role should be elevated, like the Battle of Novorossiysk, for example.

This is how Sparrow presented the matter to me. I first found out about what happened from him.

Apropos: The Department of Science gave a critical opinion of the layout, but not a devastating one. It was sent to the secretaries before the meeting, as is usually done. However, M.A.'s speech was not based on this note, but on another note, prepared by Brezhnev personally based on information from his assistant Golikov.

The Science Department has its own agenda – to take a jab at B.N. again. The thing is that Zaitsev is the editor of the fifth volume, and he is a consultant in our department. To all intents and purposes, for the last fifteen years he has been Ponomarev's lieutenant on CPSU history and something like a foreman in the preparation of CPSU history textbooks, as well as other books edited by Ponomarev. Trapeznikov has been trying to get at him for a long time now. And what an opportunity this presented. But the blow turned out to be more severe. Zaitsev told me today that he is done for.

It is symptomatic that B.N. did not know anything, i.e. he did not know what turn this affair was taking. He was not present at the Secretariat either, because he was in Zavidovo with Brezhnev, preparing the Plenum and Leonid Ilyich's trip to the FRG.

For now we can make only one conclusion: Trapeznikov plus Golikov did a great job pushing their line by fully exploiting the senile weak-spots of the leadership. And, in fact, it's hard to argue against them. After all, what was so bad or wrong at the XIX Congress? Stalin's speech was actually very interesting and insightful...

Timofeyev stopped by. He always acts as if people have nothing better to do than listen to his intrigues. His sense of self-importance has ballooned so much, it seems his skin could burst any second. In the episode with the CPSU History he saw only one thing: an opportunity to get at Fedoseyev.

Note on relations with the social democrats.

Note on a new meeting of fraternal parties on European security (Berlinguer's suggestion) similar to Karlovy Vary.

Note on a meeting of communist parties on ideological struggle (against anti-Sovietism).

Note on the creation of a research department on the ICM under Ryzhenko (Rector of the Lenin School), to help our group of consultants.

April 14, 1973

Modifications and finishing touches on Ponomarev's speech for the forthcoming Plenum.

Party meeting regarding the Subbotnik; offensive mediocrity of our Party secretary Parshin. I get infuriated when I see him, and especially when I hear him (all the more when it is from the podium). It is not even the fact that he is this way; there are plenty of cretins in the world. It is the fact that B.N. is "satisfied" with him, the fact that B.N. promotes him and has recommended him for this position for the third time. The only reasonable explanation is that B.N. knows whom he has to deal with in the party committee of the apparatus and in the

Secretariat, and, knowing that the party organization of a CC department amid the apparatus is a complete nonentity and has no effect on the work and state of affairs, B.N. prefers to have a party idiot to cover for the “intellectualism” and “freedom of thought” that he allows in his operation, because without this the Department could not perform its complex functions.

But I think he is mistaken in thinking that Parshin does a good job in this role. Rather, he actually exposes the dirty laundry that B.N. would like to hide behind his idiotic face and dense cretinism. He does not do this out of meanness, but out of simple, primal stupidity and malice for certain persons.

I was at the premiere of “Pushkin” at the Taganka Theater. PB Member Polyansky was there (his son-in-law is the Jew Van’ka Dykhovichnyi, who plays one of the “Pushkins.” He is a wonderful guy, maybe even a great actor, musician, etc. He leads the “Pushkin the Hussar, playboy, loafer” line).

In some places a shiver runs through your spine from the lines or whole scenes, which use Pushkin’s words to throw a cheeky challenge to the present order. All of this passed [the censors], despite the fierce resistance of the “cultural authorities,” because Lyubimov perfectly mastered and deftly used the “emperor with no clothes” principle. Every more or less thinking person will ask the question: what social meaning did the director instill in this production? There can be only one answer – “he’s giving the finger behind his back, and sometimes he shows it openly, too!” But nobody wants to or can say it publicly, for fear of looking like an idiot or a reactionary. Everybody applauds loudly, from representatives of the raikom to members of the PB, not to mention the general public, which is laughing mischievously to boot. Technically, everyone applauds the skill of the director and actors... It really is quite stunning at times, even though this play, as all the previous ones, is not without the usual Lyubimov vulgarities, for which he sacrifices taste, or maybe his good taste simply leaves him in those moments.

April 16, 1973

I met with Ponomarev. He gave me an assignment to write the resolution for the upcoming Plenum. Gave me Brezhnev’s draft version. I don’t know what will remain in the final version, but for now:

1. If [the events in] Czechoslovakia hadn’t happened, right now there would be no Brandt, no Nixon, no détente, no cooperation.
2. Trust in Nixon. Regarding Brandt, for the first time we say that he is an anti-fascist, an émigré who fled Nazi Germany and came back in the uniform of a Norwegian officer. The Germans have elected such a person – is this not a psychological change?
3. About the Common Market: for the first time [it is referred to] not as the “economic base of NATO,” but even somewhat the opposite.
4. Economic cooperation with the West and Japan – at the heart of our entire “international corner.”
5. Things are going badly with the Comecon [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance]. It’s our fault, our departments (and possibilities). Hence the unfavorable balance of trade with socialist countries, the unfavorable export structure, and the fact

- that their volume of trade with the West is growing faster than the volume of trade within Comecon countries.
6. Unequivocally positive about Poland and (!) Hungary. The same with Yugoslavia – the Politburo always considered it a socialist country, so to speak.
 7. The Chinese (in connection with the U.S., Europe, Japan) are finally “slipping through” as the main danger.
 8. For the first time [we mention] that we are economically interested in arms control and that without the materialization of a political détente through disarmament (reducing arms) there can be no real peaceful structure of international relations.
 9. Praise for U.S. and West German businessmen (must be Arbatov’s work) with the message that their desire to make a profit is a factor that is more reliable than any political commitments. So that is what we should use to take our bearings.
 10. The idea for a new Karvoly Vary-style conference of European communist parties on European security has been approved. An idea for a new general meeting of the ICM has been proposed – for the indefinite future.
 11. The upcoming trip to Germany as a way to define our friendship and cooperation with West Germany for the “long term,” forever!
 12. About the GDR, it says that they have not yet figured out what to do in the new situation.
 13. The Romanians and Koreans are the black sheep.

A very frank report.

April 29, 1973

About the Plenum. The report was truly outstanding in terms of recognizing the realities and understanding that we need to be guided by these realities. From this perspective, there were the following breakthrough ideas: a) our economic ties, as well as others’ economic relations with us, ensure the solidity of peace and peaceful coexistence; b) rejection of the policy of seeing foreign economic relations as a filler for the economy for plugging holes. Instead, it is an integral part of planning our national economy, especially for the long-term; c) the Chinese are really our #1 enemy.

The problem of the “cult.” We came across it even before the Plenum, when we were preparing the resolutions and Ponomarev’s speeches. At the level of the deputies we debated for a long time whether to include a mention of the “personal contribution” or not. We included it. Ponomarev removed it and, it seems, got approval (most likely acquiescence) from Suslov. This was followed by an “outcry” from Aleksandrov-Agentov, who turned to Zagladin to find out who prepared it. Of course Zagladin brought it to B.N. The latter started to backtrack, but in a reserved manner. The draft remained without mention of the “personal contribution” until the middle of the second day of the Plenum. Then, during an intermission, at Kirilenko’s urging, the Secretariat quickly added the formula that appeared in the published text. For B.N. it was a total loss: he opened himself up, and Suslov seems to have set him up.

It is unlikely that B.N. was motivated by “ideological consideration;” most likely he misjudged the alignment of the main forces and underestimated where things were inevitably moving. Here are the facts:

Podgorny spoke first at the Plenum. During his speech, three times the audience stood up to applaud when Podgorny mentioned Brezhnev. After this speech, every mention of Brezhnev, even in passing, triggered more or less strong applause.

That evening, Ponomarev called me to his office. He was frustrated and angry, sitting at his desk with the draft of his speech in front of him on the table, as well as some paper with scribbles about the importance of Brezhnev (as I later saw). Flashing me with his eyes, he asked: “Do you see what is going on?” I told him that I had no doubt that it would happen.

He relaxed a little and started speaking with disappointment: “I did not expect this from Podgorny. He always held himself like … (he made a gesture to show distance). And now… What’s going on!?” And so on.

I blurted out, “Maybe we could include something on his ability to link domestic and foreign issues?” B.N. stared at me [and said], “Include where? In the resolution? Are you serious? (He almost said “crazy”)… For the whole world to see!?” I said, “No, add it to your speech.” B.N., “Oh, that is a little better”… then suddenly he got wound up, jumped up and slammed his leather folder on the edge of the table. It slipped and fell to the floor. At this moment I suddenly thought that he may be concerned for more than just his personal situation.

Evidently, he felt very much alone in his stubborn and secret desire to defend some small line, which for him turned out to be quite strong for a number of reasons, stretching from the XX Congress. The dull echo of Bolshevik public morality.

Suslov spoke very clearly, with honed orthodox formulas, which contained carefully considered recognition of the “new approach” to world politics and class vigilance, an emphasis on strengthening the ideological struggle. About the General Secretary’s role, he spoke in moderation (not as profusely as Podgorny) but weightily. In general, he looked true to himself and the reputation he has in the Party. One could almost physically sense the power of his authority by the way the audience was listening to him: there is something in him of the old “mystery” that surrounded leaders of the Stalin era.

Almost a month before the Plenum, Ponomarev told us that there are plans to hold it “in a new way” – to break with the rule established after the XXIII Congress. Members of the leadership, except Brezhnev, do not speak at the Plenums. This time it was assumed that many members of the Politburo and Secretariat would speak. And in general, there would be a discussion as opposed to just an “approval of the report.” But none of this happened. Except for Podgorny, Suslov, and Kosygin, no one from the “center” got to speak, despite the fact that people prepared. Among those was, needless to say, Ponomarev, and also (I found out) – Pelshe, Kirilenko…

Besides the abovementioned, everything went the usual way: Leningrad, Sverdlovsk (Ural!), republics on the perimeter and in the bushes (Azerbaijan from the Caucasus, Kirgizia from Central Asia); Sniečkus from the Baltics – he lost his voice on the second sentence and made the rest of his report in a whisper. Nobody could hear anything even through earphones, but nevertheless he finished his speech and got his applause. Masherov, in a loud, theatrical voice, erupted in a stream of lush words – completely meaningless propaganda blabber. It was obvious that people were not listening to him, same as to many others. Representatives of the workers, peasants, the intelligentsia. During such speeches the auditorium was buzzing with chatter, some people talking openly. The chairman kept ringing the bell to call to order.

So, it was an ordinary performance, same as at public events, interrupted occasionally for important points: Andropov, Gromyko, Grechko, Patolichev, and partly Shcherbitsky.

A little from their speeches:

Andropov. I jotted down, “a united front of imperialists and anti-communists, left and right-wing revisionists, Maoists and Zionists” – against us. The wide use of tourism for espionage, or more precisely to perform “ideological sabotage.” And – “the Zionist activity is not aimed at securing full freedom of emigration for our Jews, it is aimed at creating a ‘Jewish question’ in our country.”

He was received very warmly, especially after Brezhnev digressed from his speech to say a few words about Andropov and the KGB, along the lines of, “The KGB provides enormous help to the Politburo in foreign policy. People who think that the KGB is all about seizing and jailing people are deeply mistaken – the KGB first and foremost means colossal and dangerous work in foreign countries. [KGB personnel] must be capable and have character... Not everyone can... not sell out, not betray, and resist the temptations. This is not like this... with clean hands (he ran rubbed his palms together). This work requires great courage and great devotion.”

All of this was followed by thunderous applause.

Gromyko. He talked a lot about the fierce political battle that Leonid Ilyich led during his meetings with Nixon; about the “mighty Central Committee” that all the Sovietologist press is writing about. Some of his phrases stuck in my memory: “The former Germany died; it collapsed under the weight of its crimes.” About the People’s Republic of China: “Our country is big and prosperous, but we have no spare lands,” and “Our country has no intention of conceding its place in the world, which it holds by right.”

He gave an evaluation to the Politburo and the General Secretary: “they are doing their work well and respectably.”

Later, when he was elected to the Politburo, I remembered that during his speech I made a note in my journal, “He acts as if he were the second person in the Party and the government.”

Grechko. What struck me is that our estimates of China’s nuclear capacity are much less than U.S. estimates (in the press): several dozen missiles with a range of 2000 km, around 200

nuclear units. Grechko joked: "As for us..." he interrupted himself, turned to the Presidium and asked: "What do you (!)⁶ think, Leonid, should I say how much we have?" Brezhnev replied from the Presidium, "Don't say it, don't scare us!"

I was also shocked by the following: he said that their [nuclear] capacity cannot be compared to ours, and that according to our estimates, they will not reach our current levels for 15-20 more years. Alright. But in 15-20 years even if they do not reach our capacity, they will get close. And our current capacity is enough to destroy all the vital centers of our country several times over. What then?

Patolichev's strong side was that he wasn't reading from a piece of paper but speaking freely. You could feel the old Party schooling of a public speaker from the 1930-1940s (he was an obkom secretary at the time). In a word, he is a character. However, after a good start in the spirit of a report on the significance of foreign economic relations and our helplessness and clumsiness in dealing with big business, the latter part of his speech was petty, with hints at Baibakov (Gosplan [State Planning Committee]). Baibakov sat with a contemptuous scowl on his face (I was sitting very close to him); he knew well (and he knew that Patolichev knew too) where it is a matter of incompetence of the cadres, and where it is objectively a matter of robbing Peter to pay Paul, i.e. where Patolichev was striking below the belt and everybody saw it.

Kosygin's speech was interesting: it was very frank in being a totally technocratic speech, with figures, etc. Quotes: "We cannot develop the STR [Scientific and Technological Revolution] in isolation from other countries;" "we need a new concept of cooperation with other countries;" "we should be able to look at these things with a fresh perspective. Our future depends on it."

Facts: 2/3 of our loans are going to Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia; weapons and equipment for developing countries make up 25 percent of the value of our exports; 2/3 of our economic ties are with socialist countries.

And not a single word about the General Secretary's role. He was the only one of all the speakers to do this.

Finally, one more point in connection with the Plenum. During the last intermission the participants received copies of the draft resolution. Two people were sitting behind me, Stukalin (chairman of the press committee) and Khrennikov. The former says, "Look, the draft is just three and a half pages but it contains all the main points of a report that was three and a half hours, and it is pretty accurate." Khrennikov agrees, "Amazing!" Stukalin: "What skill, eh?!"

This was nice to overhear, because I wrote the resolution. Of course, I wrote it the only way I could have written it since this "labor" of mine has no influence on policy (although it is possible that in another manifestation something might have been overlooked, or some stylistic nuance might have been accented differently). However, after this "dialogue" of people who do

⁶ Grechko uses the familiar form of address when asking Brezhnev the question. [Trans.]

not know me, I felt strange to look around the auditorium where the vast majority of the people had absolutely nothing to do with the political content of the Plenum.

I held the meeting on the first volume of the multi-volume project on the International Labor Movement. We have a solid group of people. It could be interesting. Time to start writing the introduction (Ponomarev is the author!).

There was another Secretariat resolution on the fifth volume of the “History of the CPSU.” Zaitsev was removed. It looks like he will be removed from the apparatus. Fedoseyev was approved as the editor-in-chief of the entire publication: he emerged unscathed and even got a raise, even though he signed the proposal together with Pospelov and accompanied it with positive feedback in the CC. Pospelov was transferred to the rank and file of the editorial board. Trapeznikov’s people have been put in charge of volumes V and VI, i.e. the entire period from 1946-1964. Trapeznikov himself was put on the main editorial board.

My secret (handwritten) note to B.N. in Zavidovo on the eve of this decision, in which I expounded my views on the situation as it relates to him, based on the words of Timofeyev, Volobuyev, and others. He called me afterwards; he was very sad and helpless.

It all started when Trapeznikov and Golikov slipped something to Brezhnev about this wretched volume. He raised the question at the PB, asking why the XIX Congress and the work of the Party during that difficult period are being maligned. The Secretariat was assigned to look into the matter. Now many people are under the impression that Suslov used this occasion to carefully “put down” Ponomarev as an ideologist, or in any case to cut off his claims to play the ideologist on the domestic front with his “History of the CPSU” hobby.

Before the Plenum, which was scheduled to bring personnel changes that were unprecedented since 1957, this operation was “quite timely.”

May 5, 1973

Ponomarev has already adjusted. I have a pile of routine work for him (and the other deputies probably do too), but he has no time for that right now. He is busy with the commotion surrounding preparations for Brezhnev’s visit to the FRG, even though he has no direct orders for it. Yesterday he called Shaposhnikov and me and assigned us to urgently prepare: a) a message for the press conveying Brezhnev’s appreciation for the worldwide flow of congratulations on being awarded the Lenin Peace Prize; and b) Brezhnev’s speech at the ceremony after receiving his award.

On this occasion we stayed up working until 11 p.m., and today (Saturday) is a work day. However, this is not the problem, we’ve been spoiled with too many days off anyway, with all the May holidays and Victory Day. The problem is that we are not doing our work, including the work stemming directly from the Plenum, which was assigned to us, the International Department, specifically!

May 6, 1973

In the morning I was at the dacha. Played tennis a little. Watched a movie based on Mikhail Bulgakov's play about Ivan the Terrible – "Ivan Vasilievich Changes Professions." It is funny, but bitter at times.

In the evening Iskra and I went for a walk from Ploshchad' Nogina to metro station "Dynamo." We talked about everything, and everything became clearer and easier. She is very wise, and very good to me. It is astonishing how she sees everything.

Brutents stopped by, told me what he heard from Gavrilov (Demichev's assistant): Yakovlev was removed on direct orders from Brezhnev. After the Secretariat session where it was decided not to remove Yakovlev (for the article), Brezhnev called "the Chemist"⁷ to his office and lectured him for an hour. Demichev came back to his office red and white in the face and did not see anyone for the rest of the day. The next day he prepared a statement about appointing Yakovlev as ambassador to Canada. Gavrilov said that Demichev was framed and made to remove Yakovlev himself. The reason for this, according to Gavrilov, is Yakovlev's reluctance to understand what was required of him. And what was required was to "concentrate the propaganda on one person." They had tried to "tame" him, to "be nice" to him, but he, supposedly with "the Chemist's" silent support (this is quite doubtful!), pretended not to understand. Apparently Zamyatin complained that he "restrains," i.e. makes it difficult to roll out full glorification. [Ivan Ivanovich] Udal'tsov (Novosti Press Agency) was doing the same thing. (And I had seen him and Yakovlev together practically every Sunday at Uspenka!). According to Gavrilov, Demichev is in isolation. He is a nonentity to the rest of the leadership. It's telling that in the last year and a half not one of his candidates has been approved for more or less important positions in the ideological apparatus. This is supposedly a clear sign that "it won't be long" for him.

Gavrilov also told me that they (he and Demichev, we must understand) are getting daily complaints about the press from all ends of the country: the more or less serious criticism immediately evokes protest from the relevant departments, which immediately make suggestions like – fire the editor, reprimand, publish a rebuttal in *Pravda*, etc. Gavrilov said they are keeping them at bay as best they can. But the complainers are working "on message": they understand that they will eventually find support because at the very top they "want everything to look good and in order everywhere."

There are clearly many implausible elements in this picture, which were dictated by the bitterness of a man who feels that the ground is crumbling under his feet. For the last twenty years he had considered himself a representative of the ruling class, and he thought this position is for life. He behaved like a swine and a scoundrel who can do whatever he wants. Demichev as a fighter for democracy... that idea is too incredible to accept it without scrutiny. It seems something else is behind these "palace" affairs.

⁷ This was Demichev's nickname in Moscow, given to him by Lyubimov. It is a reference to his deceitful nature and intrigues ("khimichit") [literally: to do chemistry; figuratively: to do deceitful manipulations]. At the same time, the nickname was a mockery of the fact that a chemical engineer is in charge of our ideology, because that was Demichev's university degree.

I wonder, is there any connection between Volume V of the “History of the CPSU,” the Yakovlev case, the “Chemist’s” position, the affair with Zagladin and Shaposhnikov’s punishment for drinking, and the atmosphere at the Plenum?

May 9, 1973

It's Victory Day today. As always, I met up with Kolya Varlamov. We walked around the streets, wearing our medals and ribbons. We hung out and drank vodka. Did not talk about the War. Talked about our present-day affairs, about our daily fuss. He talked about the General Department, I talked about mine. He recalled how he nearly knocked Stalin off his feet on a staircase in the Kremlin (he worked in a special sector at the time). I echoed him, relating how I nearly knocked down Suslov the other day when I was coming back from tennis in the morning, using the first entrance. The difference!

We are getting old. Though to be honest, I see it more in others than in myself. I don't feel the age myself, and I don't really show it yet either. Nevertheless, it has been 28 years just since the end of the war...

Yesterday before the end of the day there was another “intimate” scene at Ponomarev’s. He was asking for my advice on how he could refuse the editorship of the 12-volume “History of the CPSU.” I told him, “Ten volumes have already been published. You are listed there. How would ‘the public’ perceive you absence from volumes XI and XII? They would definitely connect it to the issue with Volume V.” He put off further discussion.

Then he said, “You work and you try – the multi-volume publications, the articles, the delegations, the papers, and materials for him (?)... And then they find some phrase you wrote, and everything goes to fucking shit...”

Suddenly he switched to another topic, though it was appropriate by association, “Take our prime minister... At one point he had the noose around his neck. In the late 1940s we lived nearby. I knew his wife well, and I knew his daughter, who is now Gvishiani’s wife, from when she was a little girl. I worked in a special sector of the Politburo back then... He told me himself how, as candidate member of the PB, he found out from the materials on the questioning of Kuznetsov and Popkov (the Leningrad case) that he, it turns out, was plotting together with them to give Leningrad to Finland and so on. I remember he told me then, ‘I have a couple days left.’

“Soon after that Poskrebyshev called me at two in the morning:

‘Do you send the materials to the PB?’

‘Yes, as always.’

‘Don’t send them to Kosygin!’

‘Why not?’

‘It’s none of your business. Do as you’re told.’

"I was sure back then," B.N. continued, "that he would be seized any day. Especially since his guards were increased from the usual twelve to forty-five."

"However, somehow it blew over... And now? All the time he remembers Stalin, when it is appropriate and when it's not: 'Stalin said this,' 'Stalin ordered that,' 'Stalin would have solved this issue like this,' etc. etc. Yesterday we received Assad (President of Syria), and even there he managed to bring up Stalin. The bust on Red Square is his work, plus Shelepin's. Brezhnev was reluctant about this idea, he was in no hurry. But Kosygin insisted and got it done. What is happening? I don't get it."

Then he switched topics to his article in the Encyclopedia of the Comintern. I was the one who wrote it about seven years ago for an historical encyclopedia. Since then it has been reprinted maybe three times. Right now it was supposed to go into the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. But as soon as Kovalyov, the editor in chief, got wind of the Secretariat decision on Volume V of the "History of the CPSU," he immediately sent a revision to the paragraph that discusses how the cult of personality led to the liquidation of some parties in 1938 and many prominent figures of the Comintern.

There has been an "explosion" in public life. After the Plenum and the mention of the "personal contribution" in the resolution, the ideological atmosphere is quickly filling with the General Secretary: speech on the Mausoleum on May 1st; speech in Warsaw when awarding [Edward] Gierek with the Order of Lenin; television: farewell – departure – arrival, trip to the GDR and speeches there, then there will be the award of the Lenin Peace Prize, then trip to the FRG, then the U.S. ... And everywhere speeches, speeches and speeches, which will be broadcast over the radio and television several times. Nobody feels the "reverse" reaction of the common man, of the masses, not to mention the intelligentsia.

For all that, his achievement in the work for peace is undoubted, and therefore his achievement in the general turn of world development toward true coexistence, i.e. to a completely new era, radically different from the one that was a direct legacy of the October Revolution and World War II.

Karyakin is inviting me to Neizvestnyi's. But I don't really want to go. Probably because the conversation will turn into a discussion of the incident with the State Prize for Zelenograd. And what will I say?!

In the last few days I've been doing a lot of work on the multi-volume publication on the labor movement, even though I have a great deal of daily work as well. I'm meeting with the authors of the volumes. All of this could be very interesting. But in order to produce something new and decent, we would need: a) time, and b) absence of Trapeznikov.

May 15, 1973

B.N. called a meeting with his deputies. He told us that Brezhnev said at the airport (from Berlin) that Gierek and Honecker think that we do not need a second Karlovy Vary conference; instead we should have a big meeting against the Chinese. Naturally, none of those present

(members of the PB, secretaries) objected. On the contrary, they praised the meeting of 1969. However, this is completely unprofessional: nobody would attend an openly anti-Chinese meeting, save for the completely puppet parties; an openly anti-imperialist meeting would look absolutely ridiculous in light of our foreign policy; a rejection of a European conference (like Karlovy Vary) would mean that we are going to do Europe[an policy] without Communist Parties and we are openly telling them as much. Moreover, the Karlovy Vary idea was expressed by Berlinguer in conversation with Brezhnev. And the latter approved it in general. The Italians already started work on this front. If we flip, they will organize a separate CP conference in Western Europe, the more so since they and the French (especially) are suspiciously watching our "world policy," on which we do not even consider it necessary to consult with the world communist movement. They, the Communists of the West, are giving more and more thought to the possibility of figuring out their own affairs in between or on the side of the big game of the "two superpowers"? ([Jean] Kanapa's article in *L'Humanite* on Nixon-Kissinger's idea about a new Atlantic Charter).

There is only one right approach: the European conference.

And the Chinese?... The Western Communists do not really care about them. More and more they are beginning to think that is an interstate fight. They do not think about its world significance, they have other things to worry about.

Zaitsev turned out to be noble, though he appeared to be a simpleton. He wants to leave quietly, along the lines of: "Let history be the judge, and you, Boris Nikolaevich, should not get involved in this business, it won't do anyone any good." B.N. is torn because he is afraid that he will get in trouble if he doesn't take measures against Zaitsev, it would seem like he disregarded the General Secretary's opinion and the Secretariat's decision. On the other hand, his conscience does not let him to do away with Zaitsev so easily. Plus, the "public" could perceive it as yet another blow to Ponomarev himself. Against this background, Zaitsev's noble behavior really irritates and embarrasses him.

He consults with me, but does not take my advice. It's just that he doesn't have anyone left to talk with about "intimate matters"!

May 16, 1973

Note on the preparation of the new International Conference of Communist Parties. I wrote it. We discussed it at Kuskov's with the other deputies. Kuskov is either truly becoming demented, or he is being clever: his slurred speech has become almost incomprehensible; you can just feel the anger or resentment in his incoherently strewn words.

A Leningrad writer named [Nikolai Vissarionovich] Masolov wrote a nonfiction book about the partisans of the Gdov region called "The Flint Strikes the Fire." I read it tonight. It mentions our Zaitsev, who, it turns out, was a detachment commissar; he is from that area himself. (His father was also a partisan, and was hanged by the Nazis.) And this Zaitsev was abused by two morally and physically deformed monsters – Trapeznikov, head of the CC Science Department, and Golikov, the General Secretary's adviser, with the help of the Politburo

and the Secretariat. They come off as the better patriots and communists although one was born lame and the other club handed, so naturally neither of them served in the war. When you think about these two bastards, this scum in the truest sense of the word, all you want to do is catch them in some dark corner and beat the shit out of their faces until your arm gets tired.

May 19, 1973

Brezhnev is in the FRG. Television is working at full capacity. Yes, this is certainly a symbol of a new era, and not in the tattered propaganda sense of this word, but truly. Alas, very few people in the party really understand this (much less accept it!), especially from the people who work in the multimillion ideological apparatus, 90 percent of which is still saturated with the spirit of Trapeznikov-Golikov.

John Gollan. May 17-18th on his way to Vietnam. In the evening I met him at the airport. At 5 in the morning I saw him off on the rest of his trip. Evening on Plotnikov Street. As they say, “besides harm, no good came of it.” He was irritated at being met by an official of my level, while “in Romania he was met by Ceausescu, in Hungary by Kadar, in Yugoslavia by Tito,” etc. (These are his own words! He is one of those people!) He was irritated that there was no reaction to his offer to meet with Brezhnev either on the way to Vietnam or on the way back. I felt tense and self-conscious because of his attitude, especially after all my attempts to start some kind of political conversation were met with contemptuous silence: he was not going to discuss these things at my level.

May 20, 1973

Arbatov was awarded the Order of Labor: “For contributions to the development of Soviet science (!) and in connection with his fiftieth anniversary.” And this (unlike what happened with the likes of us) was printed in all the newspapers. He invited me through Shishlin (ostensibly because he was in the hospital until yesterday – he injured his back while moving in early May to a new apartment on Starokonyushennyi Pereulok) to his reception, but solo (saying there were too many people and not enough space). I immediately decided that I would not go without my wife. It was a shitty move on his part, and I wouldn’t want her to be offended and mad at him for the rest of her life. I composed a telegram that he can easily understand in light of the upcoming Plenum. That should suffice.

May 22, 1973

Brezhnev is back in Moscow. Everything went as expected. This is a symbol and start of a new era, for which our society (and our apparatus) are not ready economically and especially culturally and ideologically. It is usually the other way around during moments of drastic changes in history.

In the meantime, preparations for the visit to the U.S. are in full swing. Our department is working on the General Secretary’s speech on American television. Brutents-Zhilin wrote a beautiful text. But already at the level of Kuskov the “struggle” started over how much

ideological primacy to include so as not to offend [the hosts] and interfere with the most important thing – collaboration.

The issue of informing fraternal parties about the Plenum. Kuskov fussed about it pointlessly and exhausted the consultants. While Ponomarev (with my help) wants to knock out all of this, even though there is already a Secretariat resolution (which was made without Ponomarev's knowledge). Seriously, it is absurd to confidentially report something that the whole world has been talking about for a month. And the aspects that are really "for domestic consumption" should not be brought to the attention of Communist parties (both so there are no leaks, and so as not to shock them with the true motives of our policies: they are not ready for it, and many of them don't want us to follow these policies because if we are completely successful, these parties will have no place in the historical process).

Arbatov stopped by. His KGB fears. He is horrified that Bovin was quietly telling jokes about Brezhnev at Arbatov's birthday party, "in this new home!" He railed against Bovin, who does not know how to use his magnificent brain. He told me some things I did not know from the "story of [Bovin's] downfall." Besides the fact that Bovin visited [Bohuslav] Chňoupek (ambassador of Czechoslovakia) and when he'd had a few too many drinks told him all kinds of things that the latter dutifully reported to the appropriate places, there was also the following episode: in December of 1971, towards the end of a regular meeting at Zavidovo, Bovin took advantage of [Brezhnev's] departure on a hunting trip and got disgustingly drunk. He was "rowdy, harassed the women, said obscenities, including about the man himself in the presence of Andrei and Zagladin." Brezhnev found him in a beastly state and, it seems (Arbatov thinks), at that moment decided to "distance Bovin from himself."

Already after Bovin's expulsion, Andropov suddenly summoned Arbatov. He talked about Bovin as if he wanted to "help" and stand up for him together with Tsukanov. But "just look at what he is doing" – and he showed Arbatov a photocopy of a letter. Bovin had written it from his "creative holiday" in the South to his Avochka.⁸ "General delivery... and you know, we are suspicious of such letters." He wrote about the mediocrity, stupidity, and ignorance surrounding him, Bovin, and how hard it is to work and live... along those lines. And even though the NAME was not mentioned, Andropov thought that he was primarily talking about the General Secretary. "I (Arbatov), tried to assure Yu. V. that Sashka meant Rusakov (head of the department), maximum Katushev... I don't know whether he took the letter to the General Secretary or not, especially since Bovin was already out of the CC."

Andropov also told Arbatov that he summoned Delyusin and met him with the words, "Interpret this any way you will: I invited you to a former acquaintance of mine, we worked together at the CC department, or..." Arbatov thinks that it is clearly a "prophylactic measure." Yu. V. rebuked Delyusin for his connection with Lyubimov and "all those conversations" with him and especially with Mozhaev, "who has dealings with Solzhenitsyn." "He behaved badly (Yu. V.'s words). Denied everything," etc. "You should warn him," he advised Arbatov.

⁸ The wife of professor V. T. Loginov, later Chernyaev's friend and colleague at the Gorbachev Foundation.

For some reason when Yurka was telling me about Bovin's photocopied letter, I thought that "the Avochka affair" appeared at the Party Control Committee in connection with this, even though formally she was cited for "not getting along with the team, personal use of work car, exceeding her authority" – in the "Znanie" society where she worked.

He railed at Lyubimov for not repaying the trust that the General Secretary vested in him. He kept on with "his antics." And now (Hear! Hear!) he chose Polyanski as his patron. "He should pick one thing" – pointedly concluded the wise Arbatov.

Iskra stopped by today. Tomorrow she is going to the Caucasus with her husband. I gave her a present for her daughter. Iskra still has a strikingly beautiful face. She is smart and deep. But age has already ruined her body forever, she lost her form and stateliness: she is an elderly woman.

May 26, 1973

I turned 52. I do not feel elderly in any way. I do have what is called the "weariness of the soul."

Yesterday Ponomarev gave me the ill-fated draft of Volume V of the "History of the CPSU," for which Zaitsev was fired. What he was accused of is pure slander and falsification. All the necessary information (regarding the Party's work to restore our economy and such) is there. That means that a scumbag who is close to power can slip a completely falsified version (for the sake of his shady dealings), and this becomes the grounds for a CC resolution. And even a CC Secretary (Ponomarev) is powerless to refute the barefaced slander. Even more – he considers it a breach of the rules of the game to even try to say that it was a nasty lie.

June 2, 1973

I read some of the foreign policy program of the Labour Party (we got an unpublished draft). Tomorrow a big delegation from the Labour Party is coming (the Chairman, General Secretary), they want to establish "good relations" with the CPSU!

B.N. is planning to get off easy with some banal formalities. If that happens, we will be missing a chance. Then again, people like B.N. do not make the policies around here. But at least he could try to play up to the real policies, rather than holding on to the phobias of social democracy and fear of Trapeznikov & Co.

On the 28th, Vysotsky + Marina Vlad (lovely!). He sang new songs. He is becoming more openly philosophical. Ivan Dykhovichny (Polyansky's son-in-law), a great guy with his modern Hussar ballads. Sasha Mitta and his Lilichka. An emerald.

Tennis on Petrovka, surrounded by youth and healthy bodies, the self-confident and calm life of sport.

Matkovsky and the whole sector are helpless trying to prepare materials for the Labour delegation. Their approach to the work is dismal; they can't even simply carry out tasks. He is

the yesterday of the International Department. If we don't take measures (and all our sectors are on this level, there is a huge gap between sectors and consultant groups) very soon we will be pushed out of our sphere by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MFA is already taking some of our work: information for communist parties on Soviet-Chinese relations, for the first time it's no-nonsense and truly businesslike, and for the first time it was prepared by the MFA, not us. They even included a list of parties to send it to. Though they still "listened" to our corrections.

I am reveling in an anthology "Dostoyevsky on Art." What power, and how little we knew him on the whole!

June 6, 1973

The Labour Party delegation has arrived. Seven people: the Party Chairman, General Secretary, Deputy Leader [Edward] Short, one woman – a redhead, large, with a very beautiful, fine and haughty face. They say she supports a kindergarten through her own means, she is raising four adopted orphans, and she is not married even though she is only 35 years old.

We received them in Sheremetyevo airport, followed by dinner at "Sovetskaya." Cynical politics came through right away. "We came here as a political party that wants to be in power. If you, the USSR, would like to see a Labour Party government in Britain, help us. For that, Brezhnev and Gromyko have to receive us. Even for just five minutes. The most important thing for us is to meet with them and report this to our press. A discussion would be nice, of course. We are even ready to listen to your comments on our new foreign policy program. But the most important thing is your support of the Labour Party's prestige. Dozens of reporters saw us off at the London airport; they are gleefully awaiting our return. If you don't meet us halfway, all of England will be laughing at us for a week. And we will certainly lose in the upcoming Parliament elections. Recently, your Kosygin met with [Peter] Walker (Conservative, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) for three hours. There are at least three potential future Walkers among our group, as well as one possible Deputy Prime Minister (Short)," etc. along those lines.

I understood that these speeches will have no effect on Ponomarev. The Labour Party for him is not just an ideological problem, but a personal ideological problem because he is afraid that the Trapeznikov camp could again accuse him of connivance with revisionism. In view of this, as well as his intellectual-educational backwardness, and in some part his sincere conviction that "all of them are betrayers of the working class," he is not capable of "doing politics" (and with social democrats it is completely out of the question). He looks really foolish (even to me) as a person who only wants one thing from the social democrats – that they would think "like Marxists-Leninists" (in his understanding of the term) and would concern themselves with nothing but applauding the CPSU's every step in foreign and domestic policy. It is simply embarrassing to listen to him rant on the subject (including in connection with the visit of this Labour Party delegation).

So. I knew that something had to be done to bypass Ponomarev, or we would lose a political opportunity and maybe even make some enemies. In that case it would have been better not to invite them at all... and not get this thing started. Although, B.N. did even this quite reluctantly, with great pressure from me.

I suggested to Inozemtsev to call Gromyko directly (they know each other). N.N. agreed. We went to Plotnikov [street] to the direct phone line and he called, but did not get through (Gromyko was already at home). In the morning he reached him. He called me and said, "Gromyko thinks we are doing everything right and is prepared to receive them himself, but the International Department has to put in a formal order to that effect through the CC." Gromyko advised Inozemtsev to see to it that the International Department note is written in "hysterical tones, so it gets through..." And, he said, we should definitely insist on a meeting with Brezhnev.

A propos: here is the fundamental difference between a modern politician and a political ideologist (Ponomarev). Gromyko immediately grasped the main point: if the biggest social democratic party of one of the major countries comes to Moscow and practically begs for help in coming to power, and turns to the "Bolsheviks" for it, whom it had slighted for so many decades – this is a chance. We have nothing to lose, but we may have something to gain.

Inspired, I went to Ponomarev (he didn't want to receive me so early, he had to edit some paper, but I insisted).

"What is it?!"

Quite insistently, I conveyed to him the delegation's requests. Added some things from myself. Set out all the obvious political benefits for us, etc.

"Anatoly Sergeyevich! Do not fall for it, do not be naïve. They're sweet talking now, but when they get home they will start saying bad things about the CPSU again. I know them. Many of them personally. This Healy for example..."

And he started telling me how he and Suslov were in England 15-20 years ago, how they were at the Transport House, had good conversations about everything, and then, what happened?

"So that's that. Now they want to see Brezhnev! Not if I can help it! You, Anatoly Sergeyevich, should not succumb to illusions. They are only after their own interests."

"I never doubted that for a minute. Would you, B.N., like them to come here for the sake of our interests?"

He got angry, even red in the face.

"No, no, Anatoly Sergeyevich. We had an agreement: if they like, I can receive them here. If not – sorry!"

"But Gromyko agreed to meet with them and thinks that it wouldn't hurt to have them meet with Brezhnev as well," I played my trump card.

"How does Gromyko know?"

“Inozemtsev told him.”

“That is not right. He should not have done that. And in general, you and Inozemtsev are exceeding your authority... However, of course, we cannot hide their requests. Alright, write a note and the draft resolution of the Politburo.”

I wrote it in a very pressing tone and even with quotes from [Ronald] Hayward (General Secretary). B.N. crossed out all this “lyricism,” together with the proposal for a meeting with Brezhnev. We were left with a meeting with Gromyko.

Reception by Suslov, Ponomarev, Inozemtsev and Chernyaev in the CC CPSU.

This passed. The draft turned into a resolution in a matter of hours. This morning B.N. told me to make an “official” announcement about it to the delegation, in a formal setting. I arrived toward the end of their conversation at the Committee for Science and Technology and there, in Kirillin’s office, told them that the Politburo discussed it and gave orders, that Suslov is the second person in the party, etc. They were polite. It was obvious they were pleased that Gromyko would be there. They reacted coldly to the Suslov-Ponomarev meeting. And Hayward said after all that he remains deeply disappointed that there will not be a meeting with Brezhnev.

However, this was not the end of it. B.N. told me that we will not be able to receive them until Monday (and their return flight tickets are for Monday morning!), so they should delay their departure. I suggested this to them very politely. Almost all of them grimaced. Simpson (member of the delegation) said that they will discuss it and give us their answer later.

Gromyko received them after lunch. Inozemtsev, who was there, told me that the delegation was charmed by the sincerity and the candor, and the truly political approach to affairs.

In the evening I told this to Ponomarev. I did this deliberately. He made a face. I added that they haven’t given their answer regarding Monday, but from my conversations with their staff it seems clear that the answer will most likely be negative: they will leave.

B.N. called the materials we prepared for Suslov an “amateur poster.” He said we should wait till tomorrow. If they do not agree, then we can hand over all these papers to the archive. I turned around and walked out.

This is the state of Ponomarev’s big politics nowadays.

By the way, in “pendent”: a week ago, he ordered us to “boil down” the question of the CPSU’s policy toward social democracy, planned for discussion at the CC Secretariat, to offering information to our fraternal parties on the “CPSU’s work with social democratic parties.” The same Trapeznikov fear mechanism is at work, as well as the staleness of his political thinking.

Ciphered telegram about [Herbert Richard] Wehner's conversation with Falin before Wehner returned to Berlin to meet with his old friend from the anti-fascist underground Z. Honecker, who now seems to believe that "I, Wehner, folded at some point..."

June 9, 1973

The Labour Party saga continues. They agreed to stay until Monday. We (with the sector, consultants, and Inozemtsev) were rewriting various memos to Suslov for the umpteenth time – what he should say at the meeting. Ponomarev, as usual in such cases, does not know what might be good or bad. So, one day he calls something an "amateur poster" and the next day he praises it. He nitpicks but does not carefully read anything that we bring to him (Suslov materials included). Neither does he have time to listen: he is busy sweating Brutents and Sokolov for Brezhnev's TV appearance in the U.S., then for his conversation with "businessmen." He is fussing frightfully.

He told me, "You have never worked on the Labour Party" (I thought it beneath my dignity to tell him that students are still using textbooks in which I wrote the chapters on Great Britain and its Labour movement, and that I gave special lectures on the Labour Party). It was his roundabout way of telling me that I do not understand the matter with the Labour delegation... And he started to scold Matkovsky... (Although partially it was deserved!) I defended him, "We do not have a position and until their arrival we had no idea that they meant serious business. We were not ready for it. Matkovsky's sector could not and cannot change anything. We need a political solution, a political approach, we need a position, and it is not Matkovsky's place to define it. I also cannot do it. And you do not have the time."

"I have a position," he announced. However, he chose not to reveal it to me, saying he was too busy!

When we were discussing the draft communiqué, I got another strong whiff of what really concerns him – the fear of smearing himself with social democracy. Why was their delegation put before ours? (Although it was always done this way in such cases!) Why is there no word about our different ideological positions? (Even though it is clear that if we had offered this in the draft, they would have jumped on our readiness to discuss ideological issues and reduced the entire conversation at the CC to a discussion of Czechoslovakia!).

I feel sad that fate tied me to a small man in a big chair. Still, he is not the worst. And, it is hard for me to imagine myself in a similar position under anybody else. At least with him we can speak openly, even if it doesn't have any effect.

June 10, 1973

A terrible accident last Sunday (June 3) at Le Bourget with the Tu-144. Self-sacrifice + possibly sabotage + maybe something of our Russian chaos.

The great Dostoyevsky... I am reveling in the anthology on art. For the first time, he appears to me as a completely different person from the one I knew through his novels and what

I'd read about him, and even from what I learned from Karyakin. This is our Tocqueville, and consequently, he is ten times more powerful than Tocqueville.

In the past year it has become particularly clear that there is no alternative for me: I will be at the International Department until I'm dismissed. A party official who is essentially powerless. The sphere of my work – the communist movement – is hopeless and either dying or completely changing. The people who control our relations in this sphere, like B.N. and Suslov, have become cemented in the era of the "Short Course"⁹ and do not allow it to naturally develop into something constructive, revolutionary in a new way and at the same time relevant to us. Or, if matters take a sharp turn, in Western Europe for example, these people will be the objective reason for us severing relations with the communist movement (or rather, it will sever relations with us); or in the best case scenario we will have complete sterilization of real content in our connections with them. We have already come very close to the latter.

June 16, 1973

On Monday there was a reception for the Labour Party delegation in the hall of the Secretariat. Suslov, Ponomarev, Inozemtsev, myself, Matkovsky. Suslov was bolder than I expected. He (on behalf of the CC and Brezhnev) took their "challenge" for better relations. They were impressed by the meeting, in part because contrary to their expectations, our "Party level" reception was actually quite impressive! And in the CC building to boot. Afterwards, Suslov took them to Brezhnev's (empty) office!

The day before, on Sunday, after the England-USSR soccer match, there was a dinner at Sovetskaya. Toasts, which soften the ground for politics. My toast. Joan Lester's toast. She wore a white dress with a train and got drunk.

Kuskov told me yesterday how Suslov was receiving a delegation from the Colombian Communist Party and talked about the Labour delegation: "It is a testimony to the profound changes in the global community."

Yes... he is pleased. So is B.N. (his fears have faded, though he did try to "educate" the Labourists in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism during the dinner, in his usual manner).

And despite our reservations regarding "ideological differences" (which suited the Labourists as well), the myths are crumbling. (Then again, they are not myths, but an ideological superstructure over the inevitable past. But it is going away).

Bezymensky stopped by before returning to the FRG. He told me how the Swedish ambassador to the FRG (naturally, a social democrat), with whom he is acquainted, told him about an evening at Brandt's (Werner was also there). They "shook their heads" for a long time regarding the latest publication by the USSR Academy of Sciences "on the issues of modern social democracy." However, they are already laughing about all of this. They themselves

⁹ "A Short Course of History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)," a textbook of Party history published in 1938 under Stalin's direction. Until Stalin's death, the "Short Course" defined not only Party history, but also broad elements of the study of history in general. [Trans.]

(Brandt – like a missionary) are building a social democratic Western Europe on the basis of the wealth and organizational achievements of state monopoly capitalism. Berlinguer and now Marchais are clearly conforming to this process.

So: we talk about ideological incompatibility, but at the level of practical policy, no serious person can really specifically point to these truly fundamental differences between the average modern social democracy (Brandt-Palme-Mitterrand) and the average Western communist movement (PCI, PCF, CPGB, and the Swedes and so on). That is why things are moving towards a social-democratic Western Europe. And we are quite satisfied with this in the political and especially economic sense.

Brezhnev has left for the U.S.! Another sharp turn... but in the same general direction. Our press is full of “business” embraces with America.

June 24, 1973

The Brezhnev-Nixon agreement for the prevention of nuclear war has been signed. In the rational history of humanity this is probably more significant than Germany's surrender in 1945, in the madness of that time. Although, there are still plenty of reserves for madness: China, “Trapeznikovism,” the “third world.”

Brezhnev's whole trip signifies, of course, a significant ideological turn. The intensification of ideological struggle, which the Trapeznikovists will insist on with all their might (using the official thesis “on the inevitability” of such intensification, because imperialism has understood that it is impossible to crush us with the threat of war) only serves to confirm the reality of the ideological change (Zhdanovism arose under similar circumstances, but times have changed since then).

Here are the symptoms. In conversation with our consultant Kozlov, Professor Kovalyov, head of the Department of Scientific Communism at Moscow State University and a moron, so to speak, ex officio, lamented: “How can this be? Peace is good, of course. Lenin was also for peace. But we are concluding economic agreements with capitalism for 30-50 years... We are creating an economic structure for peaceful relations. At the same time we are tightly binding ourselves with the capitalists. We are helping them to emerge from crises, etc. Hence, we believe that for another 30-50 years there will not be any revolution? Then how are we to teach scientific communism and talk about the death of capitalism?”

Indeed! Put yourself in his shoes. Whatever he may be, but he comes into daily contact with students, for whom the things they see on TV and read in newspaper (if they read them), and the things they hear from the pulpit of “scientific communism” in their seminars and such – these are two very different things. They do not overlap in any way, there's not even a hint of similarity. From their point of view, what kind of theory is this to predict the future?! (*By the way, this theory in the form of textbooks, lectures and professors, all of it – psychologically and logically – grew out of the “Short Course,” it came from the era of Stalinism and represents either a distortion or scholasticism of Leninism*).

As the result, the students (this is already a fact, not a possibility) in the best case scenario are indifferent to “scientific communism.” For some, it is only a compulsory subject on the exams; the rest simply despise and mock all of this “theory,” they are increasingly cynical about the values of Soviet society, including the truly heroic parts of our history. Our future leaders will come from this environment, but they will be even greater cynics, careerists, and God forbid, scum. However, they will rule in the name of the same “scientific communism,” and rely on the total indifference of the masses. Right now, these masses are being handed a real “perpetual peace” from Brezhnev, and possibly material prosperity in the near future as well.

A way out of this is to declare war on Trapeznikovism. The established peace necessitates it. The enormous difficulty of such a war is that we are not talking about just professors and a part of the apparatus, we are talking about a whole layer of society that spans several generations. It cannot be reformed, and most importantly – you cannot make it into smart and educated supporters of something new. You have to start with a strong-willed restructuring [*perestroika*] at the level of the General Secretary of the main theoretical concept itself; a genuine revival of Leninism on a modern basis; the liberation of public life from ideological dogmas. In their day these dogmas had a real meaning for social development, especially in our country, and this lasted for a long time. But now they turned into ideological myths, into obstacles and dangers for our society, and the source of its moral corruption.

I wonder what language will Brezhnev use when he meets with the leaders of socialist countries after returning from the U.S. – the language of ideological myths, or the language of real politics? Or a mix of both?

Sunday evening. After coming back from the dacha. Brezhnev’s final scenes in U.S. are on TV. Goodwill, openness, and even a friendly manner in interactions with Nixon and his wife, the senators, the business circles, etc. As if the reciprocal barking that lasted for a quarter of a century was nullified with one fell swoop. The commentator cited the American newspapers’ assessments: Brezhnev acted like a major politician, world-scale statesman who sees the perspective, with courage and boldness that is necessary for such a major turn.

American newspapers probably don’t even suspect that for all their high praises, they are still underestimating what Brezhnev has achieved over the last year. For us, the consequences of his achievements will be more significant than the XX Congress (unless, of course, there is another “restoration,” even though it is unlikely).

It required great political skill to bring our top leadership to agree to such a turnaround. And it required truly great courage to make this change on such a scale, not half-heartedly, with petty glances at ideology and the like.

Now, is there enough generalizing power and political culture of the highest kind to draw **all** the overdue conclusions from this turnaround?... However, this would require infinitely more trained and “willing” cadres than the beginning of the turnaround in foreign policy. ...Cadres that would be able to understand, explain, and create a new ideological-political atmosphere in the country, and who can work, really work according to today’s standards.

Instead, the cadres right now are starting to hiss – “selling out the country’s wealth,” “why can’t we master our own pantries,” “have we run out of talent,” and other banalities.

June 30, 1973

Yesterday the Politburo was in session all day. Discussed the visits. The resolution was published in *Pravda* today. There is an “anti-imperialist” balance there. The spirit of Suslov is still alive. And people are still afraid of this spirit. He is our form of political realism (“healthy distrust” of the partner-opponent, and a balm for the revolutionary conscience). We are still formulating the outlook for the upcoming meeting between Brezhnev and Gierek, Husak, and the rest. Zagladin made comments on my text. They pushed me to strengthen the social aspect, to connect the “irreversibility” with the growth of the Left and its potential rise to power in the form of social-democratic governments. Zagladin complained that he is sick of it all. He would rather spend his time on the students of the Lenin school – “real life,” which to me seems to be nothing but political chinwagging. In this (windbag) style he kept making his comments, but I accepted only his premises, not his conclusions or specific suggestions. By the way, he said that he “worked with Kosygin” on the forthcoming official visit to Austria. Praised him for “examining, analyzing, asking questions,” seriously reviewing the materials... “Which Brezhnev does not do... The latter just wants to act, but does not want to know anything. He does not read anything longer than three pages!” Here Zagladin must be speaking from his experience at Zavidovo.

July 14, 1973

I haven’t written in a long time because I was sent to the “woods” – Volynskoe 2. It is not far from Stalin’s dacha. They say Zhdanov lived there at one point, and Marshall Vasilevsky lived nearby in a smaller house (during the war). The property is several hectares, fenced off by a dilapidated (but “green”) fence. Paradise: clearly it was once a large estate; you can still guess where the alleys used to be, now lined with lindens and elms that are over a hundred years old. It is overgrown with verdant and thick foliage, grass is at a man’s height, crisscrossed with asphalt roads for cars going to the dachas, and these roads follow the curves of the old roads for horse drawn carriages. The place is cool even on very hot days.

So, I was summoned there by Aleksandrov-Agentov himself. The people gathered there (to remember), besides Aleksandrov-Agentov, who was, of course, in charge – Blatov, Mikhail Nikolaevich Smirnovsky (MFA, former ambassador to England), one more guy from the MFA who spent five months in Vienna on disarmament, Shakhnazarov, Pekshev (head of the economic consultant group from Katushev’s department), Gorbachev (from the same place as Pekshev), Zhilin. Then Zagladin arrived and deputy of the MFA Kovalyov (straight from Helsinki). The task at hand was the same as I already mentioned: materials for Brezhnev’s meeting with Gierek, Husak, Kadar, etc. But this time it was not Ponomarev’s “amateur” efforts, even though they were done following PB orders, but the main take-away text.

From the essence [of the discussion]: for peace – sincerely and unconditionally, without deception. Disarmament – the honey is sweet, but the bee stings. In other words – we have an abstract wish to reduce the resources we send into this abyss. But we know for sure that this will

not happen. Because in the end, everything is based on the belief that our foreign policy successes and our internal stability are the result of, mainly, a powerful and unquestioning military machine (by the way, precisely when we were preparing the materials in Volynskoe, Brezhnev flew from Zavidovo (where he was preparing speeches with another group for the acceptance of peace and friendship medals and the opening speech for the 70th anniversary of the II Congress of the RSDLP [Russian Social Democratic Labor Party]) to Kubinka to inspect the “new war machines,” as Aleksandrov put it).

On China, nothing new and nothing good. Despite all the irritation, quite reasonable irritation actually, and despite all the menacing terms of condemnation, we are effectively working from the position that it is a socialist country and thus can be persuaded. The only original idea that came from this policy was – “Maybe we should send them a joint address?” It’s Katushev’s idea. Colloquially we call it – Letter from the Cossacks to the Turkish Sultan. I opposed this stupid idea every way I could, even tried to make fun of it. But I was rebuffed. Although, they made a good point: “Do you have a better idea?” Indeed, it’s not like we can suggest the nuclear castration of China...

“Our” problems in the Communist Movement in general did not cause any disputes. Berlinguer’s idea for a “2nd Karlovy Vary” conference of European communist parties was up for discussion, as well as the idea of a “big Congress” (though this time Brezhnev himself suggested not to mention China in the section about the Congress, so it would not leak through the Romanians, otherwise we would not be able to gather even a third of the communist parties!). However, if you think about it, the real meaning of either option is strictly anti-Chinese. Characteristic in this regard were my failed attempts to include in the text a mention of our support for the “left blocks” of the communists and socialists in Italy and France, and that we view their eventual rise to power as evidence of the irreversible turn toward peace. Aleksandrov threw it out twice. (Though he kept the mention of social-democratic governments along the same lines regarding the irreversibility. He said it does not go outside the boundaries of our international affairs, while the support of the “left block” is interference in internal affairs with the goal of changing the social structure). Clearly, it will continue this way – we will not draw in the communist movement into our sovereign affairs, it would only get in our way. Indeed, it would get in our way! That means (even though it is not stated) that we need it as an anti-Chinese factor, in order to morally isolate China and harmlessly (from the perspective of relations in the top leadership circles) maintain our moral prestige in the revolutionary public opinion, which still exists as a certain type of myth.

We had big debates in our Volynskoe group about “the exchange of people and ideas” – an item on the agenda for the Conference of European states. Kovalyov insisted that this meeting will be foiled if we don’t come up with something. Judging by world press, he is right. They (in the West) say pretty openly that the West wants compensation, which, simply put, consists of creating a “free public opinion” in the USSR with the help of their ideas. This public opinion is supposed to be able to influence policy (and the makeup of the leadership), thereby making “sinister designs” impossible. They’re worried that the Soviets will lull people with their “peaceful coexistence” and then suddenly take over all of Europe.

Some of their articles talk about “restoring Europe” to how it was 100-200 years ago; about how “real détente” is when people can live where they want, read what they want, and travel wherever they want.

The primitive (or consciously ideological) nature of these arguments is to juxtapose our leadership and the people who, as Douglas Hume said in Helsinki, everywhere want very simple things – to eat and dress well, to have a place to live, to feel safe and use the opportunities available to everyone.

But our leadership does not want war either, sincerely and forever. But the West cannot understand that Czechoslovakia was an internal ideological problem, not an expression of “the true Soviet foreign policy.”

Kovalyov spoke in support of Blatov, others joined in. But Sparrow got ruffled up and started making speeches about how we don’t understand that there is one alternative – either we allow ourselves to become ideologically soft, or we don’t (the thesis of the inadmissibility of ideological penetration) but still achieve our goals. Because the West really has no choice: we are talking about the inviolability of borders and they are demanding a free flow of ideas, i.e. the right to interfere in our affairs. Any man in the street, according to Aleksandrov, could tell you that these things are not equivalent and it would be madness to give up one without getting the other. Of course, he is right in the tactical sense. But from a historical perspective – it’s an ostrich-like move.

On Friday, July 13th, we had a collision between these two approaches, though far from a conscious one and vaguely distinguished by the participants themselves. There was a high assembly at the Grand Kremlin Palace on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the II Congress of the RSDLP [Russian Social Democratic Labour Party]. Brezhnev gave the opening speech, Suslov made a report.

Before the event, Ponomarev told me that it was decided to elevate the level of the event (initially it was going to be a scholarly conference at the Institute of Marxism Leninism) to “balance things, because recently we’ve been concentrating on foreign policy and we did not want to create the impression that we are moving away from our class goals.”

Of course, this was done with Brezhnev’s knowledge and consent. But if you carefully compare his speech at the presentation of the Lenin Peace Prize on July 12th and even the abovementioned address and Suslov’s report, the difference is striking. The report consists of our iron stamps: “crushing imperialism,” “class foreign policy,” “uncompromising ideological struggle, which will worsen,” and the rest of the pathos that only our way is right, only a party like ours can come to victory... Peaceful coexistence (with all its high estimations, which are evident) is put in its proper place – the prevention of nuclear war.

Brezhnev’s approach is broader and wiser. He said during his U.S. trip that humanity has grown out of the chain mail of the “Cold War,” it wants to breathe freely and easily. People noticed this. And, it seems, this was more than just a beautiful image. Brezhnev understands that the rejection of the “Cold War” and a truly radical change in the world order is bound to have

profound socio-psychological, and consequently ideological consequences... That one cannot open the door to foreign capital and seriously plan to use the international division of labor (and expose a great number of Soviet cadres to direct contact (and new forms of professional activity) with the West) and still believe that the dry dogma inherited from the "Short Course" can unwaveringly remain as the real worldview of the conscious part of the population. Hypocrisy and doublethink has already shaken our ideological life to the core. Turning a blind eye to this would mean deliberately leading society to a dead end.

Neither Brezhnev nor the Volynskoe sages like us know what concrete steps to take (even in relation to an entirely practical problem created by the European Conference). They "don't know" partially because Suslov, who embodies the stability of official ideology, and the multimillion army of its servants all over the Soviet Union will not allow even a thought about a new approach to class struggle in the international arena. The class struggle is really happening but needs to be conducted differently if we want a real victory and if we care about the spiritual wellbeing of our people.

By the way, the audience in the Grand Kremlin Palace greeted Suslov very warmly. No wonder, since the crème de la crème of the "servants" was there.

I can't know Brezhnev's thoughts, of course. And I do not know anything about this... but I cannot believe that he wouldn't have noticed the difference between his approach and Suslov's. (It doesn't matter that the source material is not prepared by the speakers themselves. For one of them it is prepared by the Institute of Marxism Leninism and possibly the Department of Science, for the other by Aleksandrov, Blatov, Zagladin, Arbatov and the rest, under Brezhnev's direct supervision.)

Experience shows that Brezhnev is a great tactician in personnel matters. I am not saying that he may be dissatisfied with Suslov already. No... Up to a point, Suslov may even be beneficial – after all, Brezhnev takes into account that his international power is partially based on the fact that he represents an ideological state. *However, I wonder if Brezhnev feels some awkwardness when listening to Suslov. After all, against the background of this report, his words and manner with the people in the West, and even his very policies may seem hypocritical and a conscious, clever deception. Certainly many people will say (tomorrow all of this will be available through TASS): "What did we tell you! Brezhnev's peaceful coexistence is nothing but Russian ("Eastern") deceit. The true nature of Soviet politics and Soviet intentions is in Suslov's report, which Brezhnev blessed by his presence and his introductory speech."*

Indeed, from a tactical point of view, did we really need to rush with this ideological evocation [sic, evocation written in English]. We should have finished at least one thing before we were at it again. At least we should have done the European Conference without tripping ourselves up and stumbling halfway! Brezhnev, Gromyko, and many others who look at things realistically could not have missed this! However, the ideological complex is too strong for anyone to dare to object to the "balance" initiated by Suslov. (No wonder he blurted out, or maybe made a bad joke, or deliberately released his stinger when he was meeting Brezhnev at the airport on his return from the U.S. and said, "Good thing that you, Leonid Ilyich, didn't forget that you're a communist and met with Gus Hall and Marchais.")

But the symptoms of discontent with our ideology are becoming apparent. At Volynskoe, Zagladin told us that while working at Zavidovo (after returning from America), Brezhnev repeatedly and in everybody's presence, including the service and medical personnel, ridiculed and vilified Demichev; he spoke about him with obvious disdain, hinting at his ignorance and mediocrity. However, he casually let it "slip" that "for now, we will let him be," the more so because he cannot even be put in charge of the food industry, despite his background in chemistry. Zagladin believes (and others who witnessed this do too) that it is a question of rotation: Brezhnev supposedly said that people have to be properly fed first... (i.e. according to the law of rotation, the Polyansky issue has to be resolved first).

Yesterday I stopped by Sasha Mitte's place. He was recently in Japan. He is absorbed by his latest film. His film "Tochka, tochka, zapyataya" [Dot, dot, comma] is competing at a festival in the category of children's film. He is a talented and kind man. He was raised in an orphanage, by the way. His wife Lilichka is wonderful; she is a renowned puppeteer and designer of children's books. She started out as a cleaning lady at Obraztsov's theater. Now they are happy as kids about their new furniture, where the couch alone cost 4000 rubles.

July 17, 1973

In the morning I met the Irish delegation. They came [by train] from Vilnius with Sniečkus in his lounge car. Tomorrow there will be talks with them in the CC. Commotion over the draft communiqué. B.N. is afraid of something again, that the text is too big, that "people up there will say something, you know?"

Zagladin is once again at Volynskoe-2 to write Brezhnev's speech for the ceremony to award an Order to the Ukrainian SSR. The gist of it: couple words about the visit and the rest is on domestic affairs. He wants to say that in the past, all administrative reorganization did not address the essence of management. Now (with the creation of industrial associations) there has to be a substantial change in management! He will speak about the harvest. Apparently there are 190 million tons this year. Unheard of. I hope we can gather it.

By the way, Suslov was supposed to present the Order to Ukraine. A group had been working on the text for a month and a half (from us – Kozlov). But Leonid Ilyich decided to do this himself too.

I asked Zagladin whether he noticed the dissonance of Suslov's report at the 70th anniversary of the RSDLP (I probably shouldn't have asked). Firstly, it became clear that Zagladin did not read the report. Secondly, he said that Brezhnev didn't notice anything. About Suslov's report, he said: it was unbelievably boring, the whole auditorium must have been falling asleep. It was like beating posts into the concrete with a driver. The same thing here – not a single living word, not a single thought. Everything was written and heard a thousand times before.

That's all. But, there is something to this.

July 21, 1973

It was a difficult week: the Irish, B.N. fussing over the communiqué (he keeps worrying about appearing immodest). He crossed out one out of two mentions of Brezhnev and reminded me several times not to show anyone the draft where Brezhnev is mentioned in both instances. He insisted I return it to him. Comedy!

Sniečkus – sauna with the Irish at the Lithuanian mission. My toast to internationalism.

Prior to this, during the day – the delegation had a conversation with B.N. at the CC. He led it quite smartly, and quite aptly for his position.

I worked on a text for him for the Crimea meeting, at which Brezhnev invited him to speak.

Veber – an article against Pitterman (flirting with the Chinese). It turned out well. But will B.N. let it go through?

It's interesting that nobody noticed Suslov's report. Arbatov, who was there, said that he only recalls that it was very boring. The Western press also did not pay attention to the contrasts that I wrote about. And none of my colleagues in the Department read the report. There you go.

July 22, 1973

The work week was busy with preparations for Ponomarev's departure for the Crimea (tomorrow the meeting between Brezhnev, Gierek, Kadar, and the others begins there), draft speeches for Brezhnev's visit to India (it will probably take place in September), an article for *Pravda* about the Chinese. All of a sudden, B.N. decided to send this article around the CC Secretaries; he didn't want the responsibility for it. Although this is probably the result of Blatov's phone call to him. The latter objected to one paragraph in our information note for European CPs, "about relations with social democrats." He didn't like that we excluded the possibility of getting in touch with the Socialist International. He does not have good arguments for it; it's just that Brezhnev recently mentioned in passing in a conversation with his advisers, why don't we engage with the Socialist International? However, the info note remained the same: we want nothing to do with the current leadership of the Socialist International.

I read in the white TASS an interview with academician Sakharov for a Swedish newspaper. The most surprising thing is how he does it. He nails our healthcare and education, which are in a sorry state; the economy, which is inefficient and wasteful. He says socialism as a system has demonstrated its ineffectiveness. Capitalism has proven to be much more successful in providing material conditions. In the creative and spiritual realm it goes without saying – socialism "did not give freedom and democracy." The reason for all of this lies in the Party's monopolization of social life. On the one hand it created an apparatus of people who care only about the stability of an order that provides them with privileges; on the other, it bred cynicism, dependency, lack of interest and desire to "put one's heart into it" etc., on the part of the masses. Its great flaw is the lack of internal information (instead we have propaganda), etc.

"Can it be changed?" the journalist asked.

“No, the system is remarkably stable. Plus, a radical change would be yet another catastrophe, and our country has had enough of them already.” He, Sakharov, is for gradual, piecemeal reforms.

“Why do you bother, if nothing can be changed?” the journalist asked.

There was no clear answer, just the intelligentsia’s usual “just so you know” (i.e. in the West). But he immediately added that (because of the lack of information) he knows very little himself.

Prescriptions? “Another oppositional party,” private initiative in small business and in the service industry, information – i.e. the things that official anti-Soviets have been suggesting for a quarter of a century.

Again, this interview will be hyped up. Heinrich Böll has already welcomed it, etc. It is all nonsense. I recall there was a similar character in [Vladimir] Voinovich’s *Vera Figner*: a liberal daredevil who became very disappointed that people didn’t take him seriously and that he was not “in great demand.”

Zagladin put together some new brochure “in his spare time,” i.e. while he was writing (at the dachas) texts for the General Secretary. This is done with the help of the Department’s technical means – stenographers, typing pool, Xerox, etc. I leafed through it, it’s a compilation of jabber, even if it is very readable.

A conversation in his office with Luigi Nono (Italian composer and communist), Lyubimov, Tselikovskaya. Her empty chatter, “they want to show how educated they are.”¹⁰ Nono and Lyubimov started preparing a pop-opera about the revolutionary movement from the Paris Commune to Che Guevara for La Scala. It became possible after Berlinguer’s meeting with Brezhnev that was leaked to Kat’ka (Furtseva) and her deputy Popov. It’s going to be something! Zagladin got all of this going.

Yesterday: impressions from the opening of the youth festival in Berlin (on TV). There are some worthwhile things... At any rate, the détente may, it seems, breathe some new life into these old ideas of ours. However, the struggle against imperialism increasingly begins to look (including in our own *Pravda*) like a struggle against imperialist policies, or even against the “acts” of imperialism, as opposed to capitalism as a system.

I heard the story about the Israeli delegation to this festival. The SED asked the CP of Israel to be “late” to the opening ceremonies. If the Israeli flag had appeared in the parade next to the multitude of Arab flags, it could have caused some “incidents.” But what will they do at the closing ceremonies? The Israeli flag will already be “revealed” during the festival.

August 4, 1973

¹⁰ Quote from Anton Chekhov’s “The Wedding.” [Trans.]

At work this week: speeches for Brezhnev's visit to India. Samoteikin (assistant to the General Secretary) wouldn't get off my back.

Reply to [Roland] Leroy about the "Common Market," because Brezhnev told [Michel] Jobert (MFA France) that we will be establishing contact between CMEA-EEC. By the way, Brezhnev's conversation with Jobert was quite tough. Brezhnev cut him short: who are you arming against, perfecting your nuclear weapons, etc.? This is in the atmosphere of détente. The U.S. is your ally. You already have more than enough bombs for the FRG. All that's left is us, the USSR. We don't like this and are beginning to worry.

Jobert replied: you, Mr. Brezhnev, recently said yourself (in Kiev) that the struggle between two systems continues and détente does not cancel it; that the goals and ideology of these systems are irreconcilable and contradictory. You talked about class warfare in the international arena. We trust you. We trust that you are sincerely following a peaceful course and that you take coexistence seriously. But you will not last forever!...

He used different words, of course, but that was his meaning.

Brezhnev did not reply to that and turned the conversation to another topic.

Katushev sent some serious materials around the PB in preparation for the Crimean meeting on the situation in each of the socialist countries. The economy is bad everywhere. Almost everyone has huge foreign debt to the West (especially Bulgaria and Romania). In Poland the financial situation was improved at the expense of national income. Of course, agricultural collectivization is out of the question, even in the distant future.

The moral-political situation is particularly worrisome. The GDR is shocked by Brandt's "peace offensive." He is already a national hero, the standard-bearer of national unity. The opening of the gates for West Germans into the GDR led to a massive demand for visits from the GDR to the FRG. Refusals lead to public protests; increasingly there are cases when high officials resign from their posts if their travel requests are denied; party members return their party membership cards. It seems like the youth festival will unravel GDR society even further.

It turns out that in Bulgaria, in addition to terrible neglect in personnel matters (inaptitude, moral bankruptcy, intrigues, nepotism, etc.), there is a very sharp nationalities question: eight thousand Turks, around seven hundred thousand half-Turks, plus Macedonians and Roma. The local authorities are openly oppressing and discriminating them. Matters come to violent clashes. There are mass demands for exodus to Turkey. Zhivkov is quite pessimistic about the situation and sees a way out by transforming Bulgaria into a union republic of the USSR.

In Poland and Hungary we have anti-Sovietism and nationalism. Although the "problem" of youth and intelligentsia is everywhere, even in Mongolia, where the civilized (at our expense) stratum does not want to integrate back into "their own" society, they freeload and despise everything around them. In Mongolia there is also the problem of [Yumjaagiin] Tsedenbal. It seems he has completely discredited himself and everyone there is sick of him. He does not trust

anybody to such an extent that in the year and a half since [Jamsaranglin] Sambu's (chairman of the Supreme Khural) death he has not let anyone take his post. And he doesn't want to take it himself, because he doesn't want to give up his position as prime minister. It's a circus, in other words.

It appears Kadar has tried to resign twice. He really is sick. But, they say, he is also tired of reconciling two groups in the government – the pro-Soviet group (Komochkin & Co.) and nationalist-liberalist group (Atsel, Fok & Co.) It is possible that he spoke with Brezhnev about his resignation when they were one-on-one (and interpreter Nadya, who grew up in the Soviet Union).

In Czechoslovakia the store shelves are full, but the reserves are exhausted, and the main heavy industries are stagnant. The normalization is on the surface, because the masses are fed and clothed. The opposition is working in the environment (and under the cover) of general political indifference and contempt for the authorities. Young people who join the party immediately feel the change in attitude from the foremen, engineers, and others – there is a wall of scorn and ridicule, isolation from friends.

The obkoms in Brno and Ostrava are headed by anti-Soviets. Attempts to remove them at recent conferences failed. The overwhelming majority voted for them again. Many in the top Party echelons are secretly communicating with [František] Kriegel, [Josef] Smrkovský, [Zdeněk] Mlynář and the émigrés. All the creative intelligentsia (film, television, writers, theater) are openly ignoring the authorities. They don't respond to any appeals or entreaties, they don't submit anything to the official publishers or the stage, choosing to write "for the drawer" instead. And those who are trying to break out of this environment and break the silent conspiracy of contempt and neglect are inept and produce garbage that is ridiculed by young people. Students are completely outside the influence of the Party. The church is becoming active. There is no unity in the Politburo. Husák-Bilyak are trying to solve things on their own. But there is no certainty that even between them there is real "unity of views." Husák knows that Bilyak is a favorite in Moscow. Husák is drinking heavily and is a very poor organizer.

July [sic] 5, 1973

Last week – meeting (together with Zagladin) in "Ararat" with Herbert Mies (soon-to-be General Secretary of the DKP [German Communist Party], replacing Bachman) and Gautier, his future deputy. Their approaches to us are somewhat coarse, even though they are smart. We pushed back when he tried to please us by criticizing the Italians. It came out a bit rough, but I think they got the point.

Meeting with Bernt Carlsson (International Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden), together with Shaposhnikov on Plotnikov Street. He is shy and just overly cautious. The same problem as Jobert: we trust Brezhnev, but you have people like Shelest, too. Twice I made fun of him – about Shelest (saying that we removed him because he couldn't manage in Ukraine) and about rumors that we want to restore the Comintern. They have such a primitive image of us. Even well-informed people are affected by the propaganda clichés.

August 27, 1973

Returned to work after a vacation; I was in Tesseli. Issues: preparing Brezhnev's speeches for the peace congress; preparing "ideas" for the meeting of CC secretaries of socialist countries – the result of the Crimea meeting. Plans for our work with social democracy (based on our information for European Communist Parties); miscellaneous stuff. By the way, after reading the transcript from the Crimea meeting, I discovered that 75 percent (of text) of Brezhnev's closing remarks consisted of materials I prepared for a speech Ponomarev was supposed to make at this meeting (but ended up not giving).

A kaleidoscope of all kinds of top secret information from everywhere. In Chile, it seems things are coming to an end. Our attempts to "hold on to" Egypt are barely holding together. The Algerians want to turn the upcoming Congress of the "non-aligned" into an act of institutionalization of a movement like the "UN for the less-developed," with permanent bodies, etc. The main task is to resist the division of the superpowers' spheres of influence. The Yugoslavs wouldn't mind joining this effort, but on the condition that they are allowed hegemony over the whole affair.

The Italians' reaction to the idea of a new International Conference was sour. Incidentally, Ceausescu spoke categorically against it in the Crimea. People's reactions to this were restrained. But his statement that China is contributing to détente roused rebuffs from everyone who spoke after him: Husak, Zhivkov, Tsedenbal. With Zhivkov it even came to an argument. Ceausescu interrupted him, saying that he won't allow his party to be criticized. Then Brezhnev, as chairman, intervened and practically gave Ceausescu a dressing down, calling his comments tactless, and that he "completely shared the comrades' views." In his concluding remarks, Brezhnev again blasted him for his proposal to consider dissolving the Warsaw Pact.

August 28, 1973

Ponomarev sent a note from the South: we have to prepare our positions for the European meeting of communist parties and the International Conference.

He told me to give a positive answer to Aarons: let them come to Moscow at the end of September for talks. This is despite the caricature in "Tribune" (Nixon and Brezhnev hug while a tiny Marx is running around their feet and trying to draw their attention to the *Das Kapital* he's holding in his hands); despite the big document from the National Committee that condemned the hegemony of the CPSU and the ICM and other such things. He says we will lay it all out here. He's concerned that we may lose a "unit" on the threshold of a new meeting. On the momentum of "state interest" he made the right decision, one that goes in the direction of "recognizing the realities" of the ICM. Otherwise the movement will disappear.

Sakharov is the No.1 subject in world press and radio. (Another interview for the French media: advising the West not to agree to détente on the Soviet Union's terms because détente is resulting in police-ideological tightening of the regime here). I just saw on TV a report about a letter signed by around twenty academicians denouncing Sakharov, among them some real luminaries like Frank, Nesmeyanov, Vul, Engelgart, and others.

Reactions by Nenni, Pitterman, "Avanti," Galutsi, and social-democratic bodies to an article by A. Borisov in *Pravda*. I inspired the reaction. Many will gloat about my (tactical) blunder, but strategically I am right.

September 7, 1973

Events: "Nationwide condemnation of Academician Sakharov. Frenzy of Western democrats." Solzhenitsyn's interview in *Le Monde*.

The Yakir-Krasin trial. Press conference with them in the House of Journalists.

Episode with Brezhnev's congratulatory message to *L'Unita*: its release coincided with the ICP's Central Committee's reaction to Sakharov-Solzhenitsyn. Our B.N. and Kirilenko hinted that maybe we shouldn't send a message under the circumstances. But Leonid Ilyich said to Tsukanov over the phone, "Tell them that we are doing politics here, not some bullshit. Let them send it as is." Nevertheless, Suslov managed to have the message not published in *Pravda*, but placed in the next issue of *Party Life* instead.

Today a note of appreciation from Brezhnev was published in response to the congratulations he received after being awarded the Lenin Peace Prize. Zagladin's version of the note was published, not the one that was approved by the CC Secretariat! Zagladin mentioned the CPSU Program in there! To the joy of Ponomarev and anger of the Chemist and tutti quanti.

The X Congress of the Communist Party of China. Zhou Enlai's report. Our leadership is mentioned as "the new tsars," "Soviet-revisionist-imperialist clique," etc. Moreover, people noticed that only Brezhnev is identified by name (quite a few times). In other cases (less frequently) they say, "The other leader of Soviet imperialism." Andropov's analysis (the word is that the MFA analysis is completely worthless): Zhou's faction (pro-Western technocrats) is growing, they are being joined by Wang Hongwen's Shanghai group (number three after Mao and Zhou), and Zhang Chunqiao. Wang is 36 years old; the Western press is predicting he will take Mao's post. He is an ideologist, but not from the Red Guard, he's a rationalist. The "Cultural Revolution" faction has clearly been moved aside, the military is strongly pressed. A third of the report was devoted to us, a third to Lin Biao and his lessons ("negative teacher"), and the rest to everything else. In the part about us, the following phrase shows up amidst the admonishments, "Brezhnev's group has talked a bunch of nonsense about Soviet-Chinese relations, as if the PRC does not want to normalize state relations." In reality, he suggests, that's not the case. This is the thread we are planning to grab onto for Brezhnev's upcoming speech in Tashkent. In the meantime, Western propaganda is talking everyday about how we are preparing the "nuclear castration" of China. Stupid. Although nobody knows what to do exactly.

In my opinion, the most important reality from the CPC Congress is that Zhou Enlai, who holds the real power, has personally forever associated himself with the "course toward the West" plus Japan, with anti-Sovietism, by insulting Brezhnev (from such a podium!).

B.N. is calling from the South. His main concern is Brezhnev's speech at the peace congress. Today Aleksandrov got involved in this too. I had to keep Brutents and Yermovsky

working on Saturday to edit what the consultants did over three weeks. The idea is to form a new “forward-looking” Peace Program.

It turns out the consultants submitted the draft to Zhilin ten days ago. For days he kept feeding me promises, and in the last three days just didn’t show up to work at all – he was drinking. He is blatantly freeloading on other people’s work. At the same time he has the audacity to present the work of others as his own to Ponomarev. He is at the point of moral disintegration.

September 9, 1973

The annual review of capitalist economy has come out in the IMEMO [Institute of World Economy and International Relations] magazine. It’s not a happy outlook for us (or rather for our ideology). These reviews are strikingly objective; the same goes for many other articles with nonsense analysis, as they say. For example, Manukyan’s article No. 8: “Some changes in the economic development of capitalist countries.” How does this work alongside Trapeznikovism?!

However, a few months ago I read a letter from an IMEMO employee to Brezhnev. The employee accused Inozemtsev (director) and “that whole crowd” of revisionism, of predicting “many long years” of life for capitalism, and of focusing on the growth of capitalism and absence of revolution in the foreseeable future. The letter was being reviewed by Trapeznikov and Demichev. They pounced on it for a long time. Demichev sent a copy around the Secretariat. It’s perfect fodder for them, of course. But I found out recently that the letter was handed over to the archives, and the author was “replied” that he is not objective. Probably they did not dare to encroach on Kolya (Inozemtsev) – after all, he is on the General Secretary’s team, a candidate member of the CC, he provides materials for Kosygin, and he’s an academician to boot.

September 11, 1973

Military coup in Chile. Three commanders-in-chief formed a junta. They bombed the presidential palace and commenced a military assault. The junta declared martial law, restricted people from leaving their houses and bearing arms. Government radio stations have been ordered to go silent; there were crackdowns on anyone who did not obey. This is the language of counterrevolution. Allende’s revolution just talked, persuaded, and made loud declamations.

This, of course, is a fundamental defeat of modern revolution in general. It is practically a fatal blow to the very concept of a peaceful revolution. The only plus is that Lenin’s iron laws of revolution are confirmed once again: it is a serious thing and can never and nowhere be sustained without a true proletarian dictatorship. This is the main lesson, but it is also a huge defeat – political, ideological, psychological, international.

What about us? Today’s latest news on the radio started with Brezhnev’s note of thanks to Zhivkov & Co. for awarding him the title of Hero of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. Next – about Brezhnev’s reception of the personal representative of the President of Afghanistan in the Crimea. Then – about the upcoming Congress of Forces for Peace (!) in Moscow, particularly

how happy everyone is that Moscow was chosen as the venue. A great subject: we and the modern revolution! Absorbed with ourselves, we are losing touch with reality.

September 12, 1973

Allende committed suicide. I had a feeling yesterday that is how it would end. The junta is already getting to work. They announced the names of 40 people who had to appear at the Ministry of Defense by 16:00 o'clock, "or extreme measures would be taken with all the ensuing consequences." At the top of the list are Corvalán, Altairano... Many of them I know personally. The list includes sisters and wives of the leaders. Over 100 communists and 60 socialists have already been captured in Santiago and Valparaíso. The junta announced they were severing relations with Cuba and other communist countries.

In a word, it's fascist terror.

It seems the socialists were right when they tried to convince me when I was there in the fall of 1971 that "things will not end peacefully, we have to force the revolutionary process and get armed," and asked for help. And Calderon (then Deputy General Secretary of the Socialist Party) took me aside at an embassy reception, took me deep into the garden and tried to persuade me to "persuade Moscow" that they need weapons, "a lot of weapons, secretly, to arm the Party militia, to win the army over to our side." Maybe back then it was not too late. But over the last two years, the government's political, administrative, and especially economic helplessness discredited the revolution. It seems few people wanted to put their lives down for a clearly lost cause. And back then dictatorship [of the proletariat] was still possible, leaning on the sympathy of at least 50 percent of the population.

The ideological and political mistakes of this defeat are countless. Including our mistakes. Brutens was probably right when he called today the "day of Trapeznikov." The idea of block parties, the peaceful road of revolution – all of this now is "pure revisionism," proven! And the Communist Party of Chile got what it deserved for dividing its hegemony with a socialist party (even though the latter was more politically right).

Today Kirilenko called me, asked for "help" in preparing the November 7th report. His tone was very friendly. When I told B.N. about it (he called from the Crimea) he was very upset: this report will keep me busy for a whole month.

September 14, 1973

About Chile – we burst out (with the usual delay) with a strong statement from the Central Committee. The whole world is worried about the events there. There are protests from the Socialist International, prime ministers of social-democratic governments, even the FRG government, not to mention the communists. In the meantime, our Basov – the ambassador there, a "hero of Novorossiisk strikes" – advises in his telegrams not to say anything "officially," just to give information with references to news agencies.

Yesterday I sent an outlined plan for preparing the Conference of Communist Parties of Europe ("Karlovy Vary-2" as we call it) and a new International Conference of Communist Parties. The fraternal parties want neither of them, according to our information. What they want is to consolidate the communist parties and left-wing forces in Western Europe. They want their own Western European revolutionary path and their own truly Marxist model of socialism, developed on the basis of a highly industrialized capitalist society with highly developed democratic traditions. More and more often they (the British, French, and Italians) emphasize that the "Soviet model, the Russian example" is not acceptable for them. They view the October Revolution and the Soviet Union only as an objective reality that influenced and continues to influence the course of world affairs. This reality has to be reckoned with and its consequences have to be taken into consideration. But [the Western European parties] do not feel the need to imitate us or tie their politics with the intentions and desires of the CPSU. Under no circumstances do they want to identify with Soviet and Eastern European communism. The Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and Yakir-Krasin cases triggered even greater crystallization of these sentiments, thrust them into the public eye once again even more openly – and in a situation when we have to "swallow it" and keep quiet.

This week, following a PB resolution, we stopped jamming state radio stations ("Voice of America," "BBC," "Deutsche Welle," etc.), but not Beijing, Tirana, Tel Aviv, "Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty." At the moment, the airwaves above Moscow are full of "the problem of Sakharov & Co." We are being compared to South Africa and the like.

The same resolution issued an assignment to "think over" the possibility of allowing foreigners access to a wider range of areas around the country and removing the 40 km. zone around Moscow for foreign journalists and foreigners in general (without special permission), as well as facilitation of contacts with various Soviet organizations and institutions (not just through the appropriate MFA department), the simplification of visa practices, reduction of taxes on international passports for people traveling on private business, etc., etc. All of this is in connection with the second phase of the European Conference starting on September 18th, and the heated focus on the agenda point "on exchange of people and ideas." Brezhnev sent an order about this from the South, soon after the Crimea meeting – to devise measures that would not break our ideological principles, but would keep the European Conference on track as well.

In that case, why did Yakir-Krasin have to be tried right now? Why deal with Sakharov this way and at this exact time?... Either the overall strategy is not thought-out, or it doesn't exist at all, and the right hand has no idea what the left hand is doing.

Vad'ka stopped by. Again about Sakharov. Among other things, I told him: I don't know what I would do if I became the leader of the country. But there is one thing I would never allow – no matter what – and that is material prosperity at the cost of legalizing kulak psychology and a kulak lifestyle.

September 16, 1973

I leafed through George Marchais' book, *A Democratic Challenge*. From the point of view of Trapeznikov's (and not just his, alas!) orthodoxy this is more of challenge to the Marxist-Leninist type of socialism than to capitalism. Indeed:

1. Private ownership of the majority of the means of production **will not be** abolished when French socialism is established.
2. There **will not be** any collectivization of agriculture.
3. Crafts and trades **will not be** organized in cooperatives. In general, "comprehensive collectivism" will not be allowed.
4. There **will be no** control of the economy from a single center. The state will only regulate.
5. There **will be no** censorship. "We cannot prosper without creative freedom; we cannot develop without freedom of thought, without its free expression and dissemination."
6. Unconditional recognition of the principle of "rotation" of leadership; submission to the electoral will of the people. The people have the right to withdraw their confidence in the communists, who will then leave without a murmur.
7. One-party rule is out of the question during the transition to socialism; right to opposition, to the existence of opposition parties.
8. The possibility of "our philosophy" (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) turning into the official social ideology is out of the question.
9. Integration of the state with "our ideology" is out of the question.
10. In general, why should we object to the term "democratic socialism." It is slander to say that communists are against democratic socialism. On the contrary, they cannot imagine socialism that would violate the democracy that was won in the people's revolutions of the past (i.e. bourgeois democracy).

The question is, what do the abovementioned points and our textbooks on historical materialism, scientific communism, the history of the CPSU, and hundreds of other books and articles in theoretical and political journals have in common? What do they have in common with the CPSU Program, or with the documents from our congresses?

But if French Communist Party chose revisionism as its Program, then what is left of the communist movement, and can the International Conference of Communist Parties continue to have an ideological nature? What ideological unity can we speak of?

September 17, 1973

Tiring day. Again issues about the text of Brezhnev's speech for the Peace Congress. Again text for Kirilenko's November 7th speech. A phone call and resolutions on my notes for B.N. His corrections for the "Karlov Vary-2" plans. Speeches for Brezhnev, who is going to Bulgaria tomorrow to receive his Hero award, and from there straight to Tashkent.

Shemenkov with a sealed packet from Surgut (near Tyumen), with KGB photos of [Nikos] Zachariadis hanging in the noose (until 1956 he was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece). He committed suicide on August 1st, after threatening to do so if he

was not rehabilitated and reinstated in the Party. Terrible. (A copy of his suicide note found its way into his son's hands, who was raised and educated here, 23 years old, doesn't even speak Greek).

We are the benefactors and philanthropists of the communist movement and all the dirt from the inevitable back alleyways always stains us. Although, consider this case, what else could we do... to an extent, we protected him for almost 20 years from his own party.

September 22, 1973

"Creative agony" together with Zagladin (he did a lot more work, he even got two nosebleeds) over two successive versions of a speech for Leonid Ilyich for the forthcoming "Congress of Peaceful Forces."

Tinkering with a draft version for Kirilenko; on Thursday he sent a group to Serebryanyi Bor. On Friday I went there myself. Listened to comments from Richard and Kosolapov (head of the Propaganda Department group). I behaved with dignity, gave unassuming and dutiful replies, and only one time almost exploded (though at a couple of their comments I grew red in the face but restrained myself). However, it's unpleasant to listen to a narcissistic fop, to feel his arrogance, which he cannot hide behind a contrived naturalness of a man who is put in charge of people who are above him in rank and years. Many of his comments were a simple ego trip. When I returned to the Department, I stayed there until 9 p.m. and re-did everything. But I was out of it when I came home.

What is this for? So the speaker can take a nice vacation in the Crimea, and then read this from the podium of the Kremlin Palace to the pompous indifference of the audience, which won't even listen to this ritual celebratory banality. It's not supposed to be anything more! But how nerve wrecking it is; after all, we have to give a new spin to the things we talk about every day.

We severed diplomatic relations with Chile. I knew about it since Monday, it was the decision of the PB. This is a very good action. We should have done the same with Indonesia back in the day.

It sounds like Chile is going through some truly fascist horrors. According to some reports, Carlos Altamirano was executed. I met him when he came to visit Brezhnev in Moscow in June, 1971. Together with him and Calderon we took a boat on the channel to the Solnechnaya Polyana resort. We toasted the Chilean revolution, I made a speech about its international significance, and that they should "take care of it for all of us." The last time I saw him was at the Presidential Palace, in that very cafeteria where Allende committed suicide. The president was giving a lunch on the occasion of our visit (we went there at the invitation of the socialist party, in October of 1971). Romanov (from Leningrad) headed the delegation.

Our ambassador there, Basov, is a complete moron. Even after the CC CPSU made the statement about the coup, he persisted in his censored telegrams that we should not sever

relations. Maybe he was just worried about his post? Of course, he won't find another warm spot like this.

October 14, 1973

Big gap [in the journal]. Like it happened at the front when I tried to keep a diary. In the days and weeks of fighting there was no time to write, not even to make notes. It's not even that there was no time, it was just physically impossible. When things quieted down and I managed to write something, the result smacked of memoirs with literary overtones, not really a diary.

In the meantime, these three weeks were full of things "inside" and "outside" me.

On September 25th we went to the Gorky dacha (Zagladin, Zhilin, Sobakin, Brutents, and I), to finish up Brezhnev's speech for the Peace Congress. B.N. was pressuring us both verbally and in writing, he wanted us to give the text a "sense of urgency," even to "scare the public." His idea is that détente is détente but preparation for war continues. Billions are spent on the arms race, on unthinkable improvements of destructive weapons, etc. All of us – "the team" – objected to his approach both internally and vocally. I told B.N. that the very fact of détente to a great extent depends on whether we, the USSR, believe that it exists. All we have to do is to publicly voice doubts regarding the changes we've achieved, and the next day there will be no more détente. Zagladin used an even cleverer argument: a Chinese official spoke at the U.N. and gave dozens of facts to prove that détente is a "superficial phenomenon," including facts from the arms race. And these are facts, not fiction. The point is how to interpret them, and what to set them against. Lenin, Zagladin reminded, said that facts can be found to fit any argument.

Finally, we all delicately hinted to B.N. that Brezhnev would never give up something that is connected to his name all over the world, no matter what negative events and facts may occur. We drew his attention to the fact that despite the massive attack on us over Sakharov and the Jews, despite the fact that the second phase of the European Congress is stuck (because of the "third basket" – exchange of people, Jackson's frenzy over the most-favored nation legislation, etc.) Brezhnev persistently continues to personally receive every one of the American businessmen who come to the USSR, especially when it has to do with commerce. In conversations with them he stubbornly insists on long-term cooperation... He is not bothered even by Congress' refusal to approve the above-mentioned law... And the problem of us vs. the U.S. is still the most important one in terms of the possibility of a new world war.

But the old man with his 1930s *mentalite* [sic] is stubborn. He got upset when we passed over even the slightest of his suggestions; he reprimanded us, etc. As the result the text is neither here nor there. There are big statements about the changes, but right next to them is great concern over the ongoing preparation for war.

The war in the Middle East that began last Saturday, October 6th, seems to have worked in favor of B.N.'s concept; although, of course, he was aware of the intensive work done over the "red telephone" between the Kremlin and the White House. And Brezhnev said practically the next day, during a lunch with [Kakuei] Tanaka, that "our foreign policy can only be peaceful." In other words – in spite of everything and against all odds.

He was not embarrassed by a recent reminder from a Chinese official that the Middle East war is being used as a means of intimidation, a threat that the world is on the brink of a global conflagration. The official said this is the jabber of the superpowers, who benefit from keeping the world in a state of “neither war nor peace.” Indeed, as soon as the war started, all our propaganda and all the political acts I am aware of have been aimed at presenting this as a local affair. Even news of the battles are reported somewhere towards the very end of the latest news reports on TV and radio.

October 21, 1973

Monday through Friday I was at Volynskoe-2. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Zagladin, Inozemtsev, Zhilin and Chakovsky – the writer. Inozemtsev and I settled in a small dacha (former dacha of Vasilevsky, during the war) by ourselves. I was in the same room as this summer, when we were preparing the Crimea meeting.

Work proceeded at a pace and spirit that was easy to predict.

After gathering all of us in the same room plus a stenographer, Sparrow started dictating practically without corrections something between an outline and the final text, based on the plan that was put together in his office on Friday. He maintained a strict line of optimism regarding détente. Moreover, he introduced a novelty: to mention Nixon, Brandt, Pompidou, Kekkonen, Palm, Gandhi... in the context of the creators of modern-day détente, i.e. (considering the nature of the event – Congress of Peace) as the “creators of peace.” This was quite bold, of course, considering that all anti-imperialist and other such forces declared Nixon a bloodthirsty murderer and a criminal of Hitler’s caliber (especially in relation to Vietnam).

We did not object (in general, Sparrow differs from B.N. and others like him by the honesty of his political thinking – more on this later!). But we drew his attention to a difficulty of another kind. It would be awkward not to mention the socialist statesmen in this context... But whom exactly? Following the iron tradition – the whole set? But then Ceausescu and Kim Il-Sung (!), i.e. people who are doing everything to stink up our foreign policy? And with regard to Ceausescu, there is an additional delicate matter – he recently made a tour of Latin America. Then the Communist Party of Romania declared his trip as a great contribution to world peace! Thus, if Brezhnev named Ceausescu in the list, he would sanction this statement in front of the whole world.

However, we set to work and assigned people sections to write. I got the last section, “What kind of peace everyone wants,” “combination of current and universal tasks,” “issues on the waiting list to secure détente,” “our philosophy of peace – why are we optimistic?” and the grand finale.

My relationship with Aleksandrov – our Kissinger – is the same. He can’t stand me, probably because he can sense with his penetrating intuition my dislike for him... Even though I have been trying not to show it for a long time. Any of my suggestions or comments caused automatic irritation. He would only consider them if others supported me. Even though he liked my section (he said this to Chakovsky and Zhilin), he scrutinized it, especially in the places

(ironically) that were written based on Aleksandrov's own ideas. He ridiculed some of the ideas, and I was forced to tell him that they were his own. He only glared at me through his glasses.

It seems in the Middle East this week there was a final turn in Israel's favor. The Israelis broke through the front at Suez and for three days now the west bank of the canal has been occupied by 300 tanks, the bridgehead is over 25 km deep. American supplies have caught up and overtaken our supplies (via airlift through Yugoslavia). Sadat's triumphant reports from a week ago already look ridiculous, and his rejection of our services through the UN – to offer a ceasefire – are tragic. Kosygin was in Cairo for three days but it looks like he was not able to get compliance. On the day of his return to Moscow (Thursday) the Israelis attacked the channel and broke through into Egypt.

Last night Kissinger arrived in Moscow, "at the request of the Soviet government." But what can be done? Seems like the only thing we can do is to mutually cease arms supplies. But in that case, it will be game over for the Arabs a few days later. And we will be condemned by everyone who is not "pro-Zionism."

From September 27-October 6, a delegation from the Communist Party of Australia (Aarons, Taft, and Mavis Robertson – a woman) was in Moscow. At the first and main meeting – with Ponomarev – they were obnoxious: Aarons made an official speech and laid out everything they have approved in their policy documents – that the CPSU is leading a hegemonic policy in the ICM, that peaceful coexistence is only the public interest of the USSR, that the Soviet Union is a country with only a "socialist base" as opposed to a socialist society, we are stifling democracy, suppressing dissent with prisons and mental hospitals, and so on in the spirit of Sakharov; the CPSU is aiming to split the communist and labor movement in Australia (followed by a series of big and small facts about our relationship with the Communist Party of Australia).

B.N. fumed, even interrupted him to declare "a protest against slander."

His own speech was helpless in terms of providing real, substantive arguments, and in places it was embarrassingly incompetent, which only strengthened Aarons' position in the argument. They just smiled ironically at B.N.'s "refutations." However, they responded to a firm and threatening tone, which was to say "if you keep at it, don't expect any normalization with us... so much the worse for you, because we couldn't be bothered by your criticism!"

Then, on October 2nd and 3rd (I came from the Gorky dacha for this) on Plotnikov street and in my office in the CC – I did most of the talking. I sensed that on some things, they could still be convinced as opposed to just intimidated. As usually happens in these kinds of debates with foreigners, my "patriotic and internationalist complex" kicked in, and I worked with enthusiasm, believing in everything I was saying in the moment. It worked, first in the tete-a-tete with Aarons, then with the whole delegation. They changed before my very eyes. Mavis made some specific proposals for the development of CPA-CPSU relations, Taft promised to change the "program" positions with characteristics of the USSR.

They really wanted to have a communiqué. B.N. used this and told them to add the recognition of "successes in the building of communism" and "approval of our foreign policy,"

i.e. things that fundamentally opposed their position at the beginning of the talks. After much debate and hesitation, they agreed. With that, [their trip] came to a close. We parted "warmly." Zhukov and I spent four hours at Sheremetyevo airport, seeing Aarons off. We informed the CPA about everything. They had been expecting a breach. It seems things are moving towards normalization after all. They understand that a break with us would isolate them from the majority of communist parties and eventually would bring them to the position of a sect.

October 22, 1973

In the meantime, today through the combined efforts of the U.S. and USSR the war in the Middle East has ended. This is a huge event in terms of prospects for world peace. It means that the words in our agreement with Nixon about "consulting on principal matters" regarding conflicts that can potentially escalate, etc. – these are not just words. It is a reality, and what a reality!

This is how it happened (according to Ponomarev). Kosygin did not bring Sadat's agreement to a ceasefire from Cairo. Nevertheless, we decided to offer it to Kissinger. He flew here with the broad powers from the President. And he acted in a big way, with irony, he did not haggle over the little things. He was confident that things would work out. While he was here, the Israelis blasted Sinai on the west bank of the canal – 300 tanks and 13 brigades steadily expanded the bridgehead and created a real threat of capturing the main crossing from the west. At 4 a.m. on Saturday Sadat summoned Ambassador Vinogradov, in total panic and losing his self-control. He practically begged the ambassador to immediately call Brezhnev (i.e. get him out of bed) and ask him to seek an immediate ceasefire. This was finalized with Kissinger in the morning, transmitted to New York, to the UN. The Security Council immediately adopted a resolution by 14 votes (China abstained), with which Egypt and Israel immediately agreed. Assad, however, grumbled that no one even bothered to consult him.

The sides were given 12 hours for a ceasefire. Although Kissinger said, laughing, that the international practice in such cases is to give 24 hours. The reply was, "Why should people die for 12 additional hours?" He responded, "Fine, let it be 12!"

So, it seems, the war has already ended.

The Arabs got sidelined again. It is hard to imagine that the Israelis would just leave the Golan Heights, Sinai, and even the west bank of the Suez Canal (implementing resolution 242!). It is even harder to imagine that the negotiations between the warring parties "under the auspices" would start soon.

However, we also will not be able to return to the policies of 1967-1973: i.e. rearming the Arabs again, sending tanks, planes, rocket launchers, etc. their way, while at the same time "speaking up" for political resolution. And the most important thing – even though it's clear to everyone that we saved them from destruction once again, they will never forgive us for it. Our game there is up. We should put an end to our superpower concerns and keep our authority in front of them, and in front of the whole world, with just one thing: that we will not allow you to start a world conflagration! As for the liberation movement, not much is left of it. Who will

believe in the progressive regimes and any kind of “ideas,” if Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Morocco came forth as the fiercest carriers of the “just cause”? All of it is the most vulgar nationalism.

Ponomarev once again is trying to teach the communist movement: an article for *Problems of Peace and Socialism* in connection with the 50th anniversary of Lenin’s death; a report on the *PPS* anniversary in Prague; and again about the two paths of the labor movement for *Kommunist*. It would be alright, if everything didn’t get boiled down to barely veiled Comintern formulas. Against the background of what is really going on in the sustainable branches of the communist movement (Italy, France, and a few other places), it is embarrassing and ridiculous.

November 4, 1973

Yesterday Pomelov (Kirilenko’s adviser) summoned me to finish up the report for November 6th. It is sheer torture when a politician (the fourth person in the Party and the country!) does not know what does and does not need to be done. In particular, mentioning the nuclear alert that Nixon announced on October 25th? (In connection with Brezhnev’s alleged intention to send Soviet troops to Egypt to save Sadat from the Israeli tanks and brigades that made it over the canal, which were 50 km. from Cairo). Brezhnev talked about it at the Congress. There was a TASS announcement. What else? I wavered myself... On the one hand, “ignoring the bluff,” as Western press assessed it, made an impression on the West. Western Europe had a fright (U.S. bases) and discord in NATO, a public spat between London, Paris, Bonn, and Washington. Kissinger accused the allies of disloyalty, and they accused him of disregarding their legal rights. The squabbling continues, ten days later. While we, in our official speech, will act like for us it is in the past, a minor episode. And everyone will calm down (!) in NATO.

On the other hand, to say something, and sharply, and to rub salt into NATO’s wounds, would mean to anger the Americans, while we still have to finish up the Middle East with them. Plus, our cancan could bring the Western bloc closer together.

But these are just my hesitations. I am not privy to the complete information...

However... when the report was sent around, the comments came in as follows: Podgorny, Pelshe, Mazurov, and partially Demichev opposed this topic. While Andropov, Ponomarev, Gromyko, and Suslov passed it by with no reaction.

Yesterday at 10 p.m. the speaker decided to remove the topic.

... However, the primary cause of our suffering is the fact that the speaker cannot articulate his thoughts, even at the level of a lower-level party organization. His every second word is a curse word. Not to mention putting words together in some sort of order for a public speech. He does not even have the resolution (though he is quite a resolute man) to pick the more or less necessary subjects from a list of possibilities. As the result, for twelve hours we were reenacting an “accordion” – he would tell us that the speech needs to be cut down by one third. We would cut it down, bring it to him. He would swear and restore the previous version, saying

that he is used to that text and we should cut something else. So we cut something else. He restores it again. Etc.

However, to return to Brezhnev. His conversation with Gromyko. The Minister asks: Leonid, what are we going to do (in the Middle East)?

Brezhnev:

1. We will participate in negotiations, and we will do it persistently and everywhere. We have a right and duty to do this.
2. We will participate in guaranteeing the borders. And Israel's borders too, because that is what we are talking about. They are the apple of discord.
3. At the appropriate time we will restore diplomatic relations with Israel. On our own initiative! Yes, that's right.

Gromyko: But the Arabs will get upset, they'll make a fuss...

Brezhnev: They can go to hell! We have offered them a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn't have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrambled. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, "Save me!" He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them. The people would not understand that. And especially we will not start a world war because of them. So that's that. We will act like I said.

On October 31st, the last day of the Congress, I met with Urban Carlson – the International Secretary of the Swedish CP. Once again I was convinced that Western communist parties are less and less likely to identify their policies with us. We were talking about the upcoming January conference of Western European communist parties in Brussels. To this they go willingly. But to the Common European Conference of all socialist countries – only with large strain and suspicion.

In light of the Congress of Peace Forces, a curious situation is developing: the non-communist democrats (including the purely bourgeois) on the basis of peace are getting closer to us, while our "friends" are drifting away the more détente becomes a reality. That is to say, "While there was a possibility of nuclear war, we were with you, because you were the only power capable of preventing war. And when the threat is practically gone, excuse us, but we will do our business ourselves."

Carlson noted, by the way, that at the West European conference of communist parties, there may be an attempt to create a common model for the future of socialism for developed capitalist countries. "But I," he said, "am afraid that this will be an **anti-model**" (i.e. everything opposite of the Soviet Union!).

I had an odd and somewhat unusual conversation with Ponomarev. He stopped me after editing the text with Kirilenko. After some hesitation, he reminded me that we need to look for candidates for the position of director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, since Fedoseyev needs to concentrate on the Academy of Sciences (Suslov also thinks so). Keldysh is very sick. The other deputies also do not measure up. "And that one," B.N. made a face to portray Trapeznikov, "already got wind and is moving forward his Kuzmin, who is a stupid and cowardly man."

I replied: "Boris Nikolaevich, why are you asking me? You can't just go out in the street and pick up an academician and member of the CC like Fedoseyev. There are many capable, intelligent, and practical people. But they don't have the requisite rank and position. Nobody would take them seriously... For example, Zamoshkin from the Lenin School. But you must admit, it would be ridiculous to even suggest him as a candidate."

B.N.: "Well, why do you say so... Nowadays they would not notice, they would just see that he is young. Suslov wants to propose Yegorov (from *Kommunist*) for the position... But then who would be at *Kommunist*?!"

In the end we did not come up with anyone.

November 9, 1973

On the 7th I was on Red Square in the rain. Once again, as every time, there is the feeling of power that overwhelms all "intellectual arguments." The power of the State is the viability of a nation. This is true right now, and it seems will be true for a long time. At the Peace Congress there was also a demonstration of power, only in different form. That's why many who came to protest about Sakharov, the Jews, etc., saw the irrelevance of their protests from the point of view of the main cause, the cause for which they worked – peace, and consequently the right to live.

November 10, 1973

The last day of the holiday. Yesterday I visited Dez'ka (David Samoilov, poet) in the hospital. One of his eyes is still covered up, the other does not have a dressing on it but still cannot see. I found him asleep. When he woke up, he started cheerfully telling me about his neighbors in the room: Garin, a famous actor (went home for the Sunday); a Serb – a handsome 50-year old man, KGB agent, for whom it's not the first time here; a "landowner-Marxist" from Argentina, whom Dez'ka dubbed Stepan Stepanovich, and who pays \$500 a month to stay at this hospital. For this kind of money he could have gone to a good private clinic in Europe. However, this is the Helmholtz Institute!

The conversation did not really come together. We skipped from topic to topic. I could feel that Dez'ka does not really trust me fully anymore, and doesn't know how to act around me. He called Sakharov the only pure and truly sincere figure in all of this. He mentioned casually that there hasn't been a Russian social movement where the traitors were not considered heroes, or even right and the winners. As for Yakir and Krasin (who, incidentally, has already been

released), right now the “opposition” is treating them with deference... “In general, all of it is abominable, this so-called opposition movement, not only in its impotence, but also in its content”... “What does Galich have in common with Sakharov? The former is a schmuck who got upset at everyone because someone at the top did not like his little songs... That is the whole nature of his opposition. But he hovers around Sakharov, stains him, writes political texts for him. Sakharov’s woman (Bonner), too, plays a vile role. She herself is totally stupid, and vulgar too”...

... “You know, Tolya, I would make a great (with gusto) reactionary. When I come out, I’m going to write them (!) some poems”...

He acts cheerfully. It seems that great spiritual potential always helps you to stay strong and maintain your dignity. But actually, he is in a bad spot – in the best case scenario, in 2-3 weeks he will be able to read for maybe an hour and half to two hours a day with very strong glasses.

November 18, 1973

I spent the whole week at Serebryanyi Bor. Yet another “theoretical problem” -- theses for the meeting of CC Secretaries of socialist countries on foreign propaganda and ideology. It is scheduled for the second half of December. The team [at Serebryany Bor] – Shakhnazarov, Medvedev, Veber, Pyshkov and respectively from the other departments. There was a sea of people, which made work more difficult. Burlatsky... he was Shakhnazarov’s boss, he is the creator of the group of consultants in the Socialist Countries Department (when it was under Andropov, he fostered Arbatov, who then replaced him as head of the group). During the preparation of the Party Program and the XXII Congress of the CPSU in general in the summer of 1961 in Sosny he was quite an important person. I was an “errand boy” back then at that dacha. But he was indulgent towards me. Now the tables have turned and everything is in reverse: he is the head of a sector in the Institute of Law and considers the very fact that he was invited for his kind of work a boon. Shakhnazarov is his superior. And Burlatsky’s former arrogance has vanished. Overall he is a fairly talented person who, like Belyakov, at some point decided that “anything goes” and instantly was cast down, he even lost his right to travel abroad. But his old friends, who owe him a great deal, do not forget about him.

December 1, 1973

Brezhnev’s visit to India is over. Thousands upon thousands of nice words have been said. Possibly and almost certainly something useful will come of it in practice... but at the cost, oddly enough, of another big step (to use the language of our “journalism”) towards the loss of any prestige: people are sick of the newspaper columns with speeches, toasts, documents, endless TV broadcasts of speeches, receptions, presents, kisses, handshakes, meetings and farewells. No one tries to understand, people couldn’t care less about these ceremonies. Our leader looks absolutely ridiculous with this passion for profuse public speaking coupled with his terrible articulation and muttering of the simplest words. When it comes to Indian names, it’s a complete embarrassment. The absurdity of it all is so universally recognized that all kinds of people talk

about it openly, with no embarrassment or reservation, in the street, in trolleybuses, everywhere. Khrushchev has been “surpassed” on this score a long time ago.

By the way, I found out from the documents that during the peak of the war in the Middle East, the situation was not at all like Zagladin described it: as if that night in Zavidovo, in their pajamas, the three of them together in the sun room with telegrams to Nixon, anger against our own extremists, who proposed a crackdown against Israel, etc. It turns out that when Israel violated the ceasefire agreement on October 22nd, seized a large piece of territory on the west bank of the Suez and moved tanks towards Cairo, Brezhnev did two things: a) he wrote a letter to Nixon with a proposal to send Soviet-American troops into Egypt together; or if Nixon did not want to do that, Brezhnev would do it alone. That is why the Americans announced defense readiness condition 1.

b) Brezhnev wrote a note to Politburo members, suggesting to do “something” immediately – to bring the Soviet fleet to Tel Aviv or allow the Egyptians to strike Israel with our medium-range missiles (but not Tel Aviv or Jerusalem), or something else.

Two things remain a mystery:

- Why have Nixon and Kissinger not leaked information (over a month has passed), even though they found themselves in a very difficult position and had to justify their actions to the allies and the Americans, and to public opinion in general – why did they take such a menacing action seemingly without having any serious reasons.
- Why did Brezhnev’s note to the PB not have any consequences. Who stopped this initiative and how.

Moreover, it is astonishing that the letter has not been confiscated. Even some staff in our department have read it, and are still reading it, when everything turned out differently. The image of Brezhnev that comes through in the note is not the same image as he presented at the Congress of Peace over the same issues.

All of this is incomprehensible to me.

December 5, 1973

The last day of the Stalinist constitution that has not been cancelled yet. Yesterday we were preparing for the meeting of deputies of International and Ideology Departments of the Central Committees of socialist countries. I will have to chair it, because Shakhnazarov was summoned to Zavidovo to prepare the CC Plenum. Over the last day and a half we were preparing our own contribution to the speech at the Plenum, about the International Communist Movement... at Ponomarev’s dictation. How is one supposed to think about the fate of the communist movement! On the four pages that Aleksandrov-Sparrow allotted to us, we can barely fit the “personal contribution” (i.e. Brezhnev’s meetings with Marchais, Gus Hall, Rao, Bachman, etc.) and a proposal for a pan-European Conference of Communist Parties and International Conference (the 4th, as B.N. prefers to call it). Then again, he told us Suslov’s opinion: the conference should be held after the next CPSU Party Congress.

And in general there is no time to think about the cause. Nobody really cares about it, to be honest. Other concerns are draining the nerves and resources of the mind:

- On the 6th there is the meeting of deputies from socialist countries;
- On the 18-20th meeting of CC Secretaries from socialist countries, Ponomarev's report is 50 pages;
- On the 24th, Ponomarev is speaking at the meeting of ambassadors and representatives of propaganda agencies for abroad;
- On the 27-28th, Ponomarev is speaking in Nalchik on the occasion of Kabardino-Balkaria being awarded the Order of Friendship. At the same time he will make a report on the international situation of the ICM.
- On January 7th, Ponomarev is making a report in Prague on the fate of the *PPS* journal.
- On January 20th, Ponomarev is speaking at the 50th anniversary of Lenin's death. The topic – the ICM over half a century.

All of this I have to do in addition to my ongoing work.

Yesterday B.N. told me that Ryzhenko must be removed from the Lenin School. He went to the GDR and “in certain circles” there (probably drunk) railed against Gromyko and Suslov, and said that Brezhnev should take an example from Stalin, who wrote his own reports and speeches. Honecker, horrified, immediately reported all of this to Moscow.

B.N. is suggesting to replace Ryzhenko at the Lenin School with Matkovsky, our chief of department on Great Britain. Well, thank God for that, I'll be free of that mediocrity.

When I was in Serebryanyi Bor and had two-three hours of free time from the official texts, I would read Herzen, volume XII about Vorontsova-Dashkova, his letters to Alexander II, correspondence with Russian friends about his transfer from one tsar to another. This method – to read Herzen all the time – was suggested to me by Academician Tarle 20 years ago. To read Herzen by opening any volume at random, even just one page a day. It's very fruitful, very refreshing. The genius of his insight into events is so great, and the language is so precise and powerful, that it seems you are reading about our times. I read all of this 25 years ago, but right now I perceive it quite differently, like it is more relevant (and for a Russian person, also much more emotionally significant) than, for example, reading Brzezinski.

December 7, 1973

Volobuyev stopped by. Talked about his boys. One is a physicist, the other an engineer, the third is studying economics. They and their friends are backing him into a corner. Pashka [Volobuyev] complains that he hasn't got a leg to stand on. This public, he said, follows one of two trends: one seeks salvation in the leader, while the other – in democracy (for example, in alternative elections, etc.). What are they trying to save themselves from? From thievery, drunkenness, idleness, irresponsibility, the degradation of relations between power and the people on any basis but fear.

He talked about his trip to Omsk, how the representative of the city executive committee, a woman, showed him around the city and kept saying: Oh, this developed socialism! We would take any kind of socialism, even a measly one, just as long as it was real, so we could put up some public restrooms and pave the sidewalks.

Why did he try for a whole month to see me? He is being driven out from the directorship of the Institute of History. Rybakov, the Academician-Secretary of the Department of History, already suggested that he should resign (saying that he, Rybakov, needs to be working on archeology and writing his book, but instead there are constant scandals and squabbles because of Volobuyev). It seems this has been discussed with Trapeznikov. Pashka wanted to find out from me whether it has been discussed with the CC Secretaries.

I spoke with B.N. today. He is not aware of anything like that. However, that does not mean that Demichev is not aware of something. B.N. retorted "Why should Volobuyev leave?" I thought to myself: then help him, if you don't want him to leave.

B.N. was flattered and scared (he even turned red in the face) about an idea that is going around Moscow about why Trapeznikov and Golikov are hounding Volobuyev. The idea is as follows: Inozemtsev, Arbatov, Timofeyev, and Volobuyev – all these institute directors are Ponomarev's satellites. The first three are well "covered." But Volobuyev is not. Moreover, he is engaged in subjects that are easier to attack, like the history of Soviet society, i.e. Trapeznikov's monopoly. B.N. got furious and told me to tell Volobuyev not to say such things.

December 17, 1973

The main worry these days is preparing B.N.'s speech for the meeting of socialist country secretaries on foreign propaganda. Back in Serebryanyi Bor we made the first version, with an attempt (a very timid one, of course) to formulate the specifics of our foreign propaganda as it relates to détente. That version was rejected with disgust. B.N. dictated some bits – an abracadabra of words, which, however, carried the key message that the nature of imperialism has not changed, so we should keep hacking at it the same way. Overcoming our own internal resistance and still trying to push the idea of a new stage in propaganda, Veber, Pyshkov and I struggled over a new text. Now he likes it. But... herein lies the senselessness, the Kafkaesque nature of this whole idea. Today he says to me:

- I heard that they want to make copies of my report. Does that mean they are going to give it out to the conference participants?

- Probably. You know that is what they always do.

- No, no Anatoly Sergeyevich! It would be one thing if the Chinese got their hands on it, but what if the imperialists get it! It will look like we are gathering our friends here and telling them that détente is one thing, but we should continue to barrage America and the West like we used to... No, no. The text can be given only to trusted people.

...Mother fucker! Why do you, a politician, convene such a meeting, if you are afraid that people in the West will find out that you are calling for a struggle against the West despite all this peaceful coexistence stuff? Are you not proving once again that the only reason for this report is so you personally can position yourself as an ultra-orthodox proponent of revolutionary ideology in front of Suslov-Demichev-Trapeznikov, and all those behind them?! But at the same time you are afraid that your report would resonate politically (which would happen if it reached the West), and then you would catch hell from Brezhnev, Gromyko, and other real politicians. That's the extent of this high philosophy, on which we spent so much energy and creativity. It makes me sick to my stomach.

In the meantime, on December 10-11th the CC Plenum took place. There was a review of 1973 and a discussion of plans for 1974.

I was present at the first day of the Plenum. Brezhnev spoke. I came away with some kind of vaguely grave impression. On the one hand, there is a gut feeling that we'll endure. On the other, there is a gnawing feeling about the lack of prospects.

The year was seemingly successful – 7.8 percent growth instead of 5.8 percent. But maybe that is why it's even harder to reconcile oneself to the situation. The Plan was not met this year in energy, metals, chemistry, light industry, etc. The Plan for next year is extremely intense, otherwise we will not meet the Five-Year Plan. Over the first three years there was growth of only 44 billion rubles out of the 103 billion planned for the five years. That means in the next two years we need to do 59 billion rubles.

Brezhnev put the question in “Stalinist terms”: either we tell the people “sorry, we can't do it,” or we mobilize all forces, and come hell or high water we meet the Plan. Bolsheviks always chose the second option.

It seems there really is no other way. The first option would be a collapse, and there is no alternative to the current regime; we also don't have the conditions for an effective regime change without a terrible national disaster.

The second path, the Bolshevik way – it is a way of rushing. But in the changed social conditions, this method is psychologically rejected by the people. Brezhnev himself told Arbatov, “All the success of this year was achieved by political means (using student, army, and citizen labor during the harvest). We do not have an established automatic mechanism, so we will have to again rely on socialist competition, awards, decorations, etc.”

This is the situation:

Baibakov, when making a 15-year long-term plan based on the requests from the Ministries and departments, calculated that if we adopt the project on this basis, the real income of the population will grow by 2 percent per year. That is less annually than during the past 15 years.

Sixty-seventy million tons of metal goes to waste in our manufacturing processes.

Based on the tonnage of our metalworking machines, we produce as much as the U.S., Japan, and the FRG combined; but based on numbers of machines made from that metal and their efficiency, we are far behind each of these countries.

Finland exports 10 times less timber, but makes twice as much currency from the export, than we do. That is because we export it in basic raw form.

We signed an agreement with Germany to construct a pipeline for them as compensation, but did not complete it in time and they made a claim against us for 55 thousand dollars per day of the delay.

We have 2 billion rubles-worth of slow-moving goods accumulated in our warehouses, i.e. goods that were rejected by consumers. This is almost equal to the amount of capital investment in all of light industry for the remainder of the Five-Year Plan.

The construction of the KAMAZ project was estimated at 1 billion 700 million rubles. Now it appears that it will take another 2.5 billion, and then perhaps more. This is considering that we have a planned economy, and everything is centralized.

In 1955 we decided to build a polished glass plant in the town of Salavat. The blueprint was ready by 1962. But in 1961, the British offered us a license for a different kind of production method – firing technology. In 1965 we bought the license, on which three plants have already been built and are producing great glass. In the meantime, construction on the Salavat plant continued. In 1972 it was completed, but it turned out that the equipment that was installed does not polish the glass, but breaks it. It all had to be melted down. We still have not found the responsible party.

We produce three-quarters less material from one cubic meter of wood than the capitalist countries.

Our aircraft and car engines have a much lower motor capacity than theirs.

In Kursk we built a knitting mill with foreign equipment to make the types of fabric that are in short supply. But it works only at half capacity because there are not enough workers. It turns out when the factory blueprint was created, they forgot about housing.

A huge amount (I didn't have time to write down the exact number) of grain that was collected this year was stored in piles out in the open air. It rotted.

The losses of grain, cement, fruits and vegetables, etc., are counted in the millions of rubles due to lack of packaging and delayed transportation.

Because of the poor quality of metal, we are using more tons of it in construction than we would need to [if the quality was better].

Etc., etc.

We planned for Group B [production] to exceed Group A. But since 1971, the balance is still changing in favor of A. Plans for the production of consumer goods are systematically not implemented.

Brezhnev admitted that we cannot overcome this situation while enterprises benefit from lying to the government, and there is an explanation for it: on the side of quantitative indicators we have the Plan, the awards, the tradition, and the chain of command. No wonder that in the battle of quantity vs. quality, quantity always wins. All we have on the side of quality are appeals and smart newspaper articles.

What suggestions are there to overcome this? They are all from the same sphere of reorganization, creation of committees, prodding and appealing. Only this time they are packaged more intelligently than before, because they were written by Arbatov and Inozemtsev, under Tsukanov's leadership.

Because of the critical nature of Brezhnev's speech, the majority of the speakers in the debate threw out dozens of facts like the ones I listed, taking them from Brezhnev's and Baibakov's speeches.

Have we formed some kind of inert, bureaucratic, ossified force of hopeless indifference (following the principle – just to survive a few more years), a force that will swallow anyone who tries to do anything new? If we have any people left who are capable of doing that.

Today at the reception house on Vorobyovy Gory [Sparrow Hills] we coordinated the theses on the results of the meetings of CC Secretaries of socialist countries. The Romanians' claims looked pathetic and ridiculous; the Bulgarians were very active.

By the way, Brezhnev said at the Plenum that we are forming a "special relationship" with the Bulgarians. They have embarked on a path to transform their country into another Soviet republic. At the meeting of Secretaries they proposed this thesis: someone can be considered a patriot only if he loves the socialist community as much as his own homeland! The rest (Hungarians, Germans, and others) exchanged looks, but did not object.

I noticed the way [Brezhnev] speaks in front of our "friends." Great power attitude. The outwardly democratic posture looked more like familiarity. He was above them, the patriarch. He has the right to paternal frankness and suggestion. He spoke without notes and the whole time the subtext was anti-Romanian. Everybody realized this, and the Romanians cringed.

December 25, 1973

B.N. suddenly began having doubts whether we need the European Conference of Communist Parties like the Karlovy Vary one. Wouldn't it be better to just steer the course for the big conference. It seems there are good reasons for it: it's not right for the communist movement to adapt to the International Conference on Security in Europe. It would be even more impossible to contrapose the two conferences; it would be a diplomatic scandal. And since no

one in the communist parties wants to go beyond the framework of international problems at the conference, there is really no platform for it.

At the meeting in Prague for the journal *PPS*, B.N. wants to jump the gun and appear as the guy who was the first to say, "What about the big conference?" Though maybe he will get put in his place for this claim?

December 30, 1973

The week was filled with preparations for Prague. With Yura Karyakin's help we conducted an "education of Ponomarev" on the lessons of Chile, this time expanded to not only confirm the "dogmas" of revolutionary theory, but actually give some real lessons.

I had a clash with Ponomarev over his assessment of the current situation in the world (social). He insists, as he has for many years in every one of his reports, that a crisis of imperialism means a rise in revolutionary struggle. There really is a crisis. And it has its own face: energy. It has tied everything else into its knot. But we don't see a revolutionary upsurge, and there is nowhere for it to come from. I tried to argue with Ponomarev that historical experience belies his dogmatic optimism. In peacetime, economic upheavals were always advantageous to reactionaries and even fascism: 1921-3, 1929-33, 1947-48. During these times, the revolutionary movement either suffered a direct defeat, or fell into long periods of stagnation.

Even now – a shift towards the political right is evident everywhere. Even social-democrats are being pressed everywhere. Naturally, the average guy does not believe in his ability to deal with the crisis. And he, this average guy, wants the crisis to end, not to escalate to the revolutionary point. So he is tempted with the "order" of an authoritarian leadership. Signals are coming from everywhere about the danger of the right wing. (It's another matter that it may accommodate our peace policy!). But it is simply ridiculous to talk right now about the approach of an "excellent revolutionary situation" in the spirit of the Chinese. Not to mention the shortsightedness of such evaluations.

Of course, he got the upper hand in the end. He is the one who will be giving the speech! But for now, while changing the accents, I still kept a large piece about the danger of the right wing.

December 31, 1973

Probably the best summary of 1973 in terms of domestic politics came from this morning's announcement on the radio about [holiday] greetings (!) at "23:45, from the CC CPSU General Secretary Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the Soviet people on the occasion of the New Year".... This is unprecedented. Not the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, not the CC and the Soviet government... not even "on behalf of".... No. A personal message.

For all his undoubted merit (especially in foreign policy), he has, unwittingly to himself and noticeably to the rest of the world, slipped onto Khrushchev's path. The apogee of contemptuous irritation (which could be heard everywhere, even in conversations on the street)

about the position he put himself in were the televised broadcasts of his visit to India. Apparently, he was not informed about it. This is the result: his New Years appearance.

It is difficult to judge how his “colleagues” feel about it at heart (!). The only thing I can observe firsthand is that it grates on Ponomarev. His “position” is manifested in his grimaces and gestures, but not in his formulas. Judging by the context of these grimaces (for example, during the discussion of the April Plenum preparations, when “and personally” was officially said for the first time!), Gromyko is also not happy with what is happening.

People in the apparatus know that Demichev hates him fiercely, but he is cowardly and servile. But God forbid if this kind of dissatisfaction (from this side) turns against Brezhnev.

Polyansky, about whom people were talking practically in the street before the December Plenum as a candidate for removal from the Politburo, does not really hide his dislike. Rather he even wants it to be known. I heard this: Vanya Dykhovichnyi, an actor at Taganka Theater who is married to Polyansky’s daughter, is good friends with her brother, Polyanski’s son with whom the latter “shares everything.” So, before the Plenum, Polyansky told his son, “I don’t care whether I remain in the PB. I, like the others, haven’t really been a member for a year now. Nowadays this is the routine there: Brezhnev talks, while we nod and play along.” It seems Polyansky is spreading this so when he is kicked out, it will look like he is not being let go “due to incompetence” (which is probably the case), but suffering for the cause.

The “personal” moment can be quite favorable; and as these years have shown, an effective factor in foreign affairs. But it can also be very dangerous. The Cuban missile crisis happened precisely over a “personal moment,” which nearly led to disaster. This October in the Middle East it seems there was something similar. I recently read an interview by Morgenthau in the *Washington Post*. He said that the high alert in the U.S. was announced because there was reliable information that a Soviet ship was headed to Alexandria with nuclear missiles on board. After the alert was announced, the Soviet ship turned back.

This is consistent with what I wrote earlier: one night, after October 22nd, the General Secretary cried “We have to do something!” And a paper was even sent around the PB. This was probably that “something” that no one dared to argue with (already!).

Yesterday I read a very substantial collection by the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences on Brandt. They write so freely and smartly when the product is not censored and distributed among a trusted and “understanding” public, not under the influence of alien views.

* * *

Postscript to the year.

This year showed the **inertial** nature of the Soviet Union.

The economy was in a state of depression. But not the kind of depression that is normal for a capitalist economy and that is a part of cyclical renewal. It was the beginning of stagnation and irreversible decline. Because it was a state-run economy that relied on party discipline and the careerism of the nomenclature, it continued to exist, but could not develop.

This was starting to be felt, if not understood, by the ruling stratum. Even smart and well-informed people like Inozemtsev and Arbatov could not suggest anything besides stopgap measures, which did not take us outside the stalled system.

It became clearer and clearer that ideology was falling victim to the hopeless economic stagnation. As a quasi-religion, it was dead at the core. Nobody believed in its dogmas, from top to bottom.

For the first time, official ideology (as a theory) met with internal opposition, which could no longer be stifled by Stalinist means. Sakharov and the dissident movement appeared; they criticized and condemned Soviet power by appealing to its own laws and policies.

The de-facto anti-Semitism of the state spilled out along with the “Jewish question,” undermining the integrity of the internationalist Soviet ideology. Jews, who were the most active ethnic group during the Revolution and the formation of the Soviet state, took advantage of the strengthening of Israel as an international player and demanded the right to leave the Soviet Union. So the former Bolsheviks, their children and grandchildren ran away from their ungrateful and abusive homeland.

Soviet socialist ideology lost its role as a world (essentially expansionist) factor. Enrico Berlinguer’s famous formula – “The momentum of the October Revolution has dried up” – accurately reflected the situation. Communist parties that had some kind of social base in their countries started to break away from the paternalistic roof of the CPSU, following the tracks of “Euro-communism.” The small parties that were insignificant at home and entirely financially dependent on us also rejected the Soviet model for their countries. The USSR ceased to be a symbol of hope and inspiration, a source of enthusiasm. But communist parties without the USSR or against the USSR were doomed. So against their will, they remained loyal to proletarian internationalism.

Thus, the International Communist Movement also continued to exist only **by inertia**. It did not want, nor was it capable, to carry out even the role of a propaganda mouthpiece and defender of its one-time revolutionary “forbearer.” The feverish efforts of Ponomarev’s CC Department to preserve at least a formal shell of the ICM revealed a growing helplessness.

The USSR’s position as one of the two superpowers became a clear contradiction to its claim to be the center of world socialism. Brezhnev, after definitively establishing himself as the undisputed leader, and not being an aggressive or malicious man by nature, recognized his responsibility in avoiding nuclear war. “Peaceful coexistence” became the *realpolitik* for him. He acted accordingly, preferring détente on the main front of the Cold War – in Europe and in

extinguishing regional conflicts (even together with the U.S.) in the third world; he began to search for approaches to normalization with China.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 dealt a fatal blow to the halo of the national liberation movement. For the first time Soviet people and the ruling circles felt that the liberation movements were not a support for us, but parasites capable of drawing us into major trouble when it came to solving the main and vital foreign policy problem – preventing a world war.

In the socialist camp, in our external empire, the trouble was more noticeable. Contrary to expectations, the intervention in Czechoslovakia did not strengthen the socialist system, but became an additional reason for its decay. The burden of fueling a decent standard of living in our allied countries grew heavier for the Soviet people. The connection of economic development of these countries to the Soviet market and the Soviet model of industrial development caused increasing dissatisfaction. The groveling servility of the ruling stratum of our satellites increasingly distanced the power from the people, among whom anti-Soviet sentiments were growing, fueled by powerful Western propaganda.

You could say that the socialist camp also existed **by inertia** from this time forward, rather than on the basis of mutual interest.

Brezhnev's realism was opposed, more and more brazenly, by pressure from his circle – ideologues and conservatives, personified in Suslov and Andropov. He waved them aside in his main foreign policy cause. In everything else, he conceded or was indifferent, even though sometimes he “corrected” them (in relations with creative intelligentsia and Western communists).

As Brezhnev got older and more frail, the negative features of the General Secretary's personality became more prominent. His inordinate vanity often made him ridiculous, and absolute power atrophied his self-control. As his energy levels dropped, his physical weakness caused him to adopt the policy of “disturb as little as possible.”

This played into the hands of the conservatives and ideologues, who determined the social atmosphere. It became more and more gloomy and hopeless. The “creative intelligentsia” either showed its finger behind its back, or sought refuge in the eternal truths of love and everyday worries, or lulled itself and the public with reminders about the nobility and heroism of their fathers and grandfathers in the recent and distant past.

In the apparatus of power (I don't know about the state, but in its main apparatus, the CC, in some of its departments, especially the International Department), a circle of people formed who played by the “rules of the game” and became aligned with the most enlightened and freethinking part of the scholars in the humanities institutes of the Academy of Sciences, in newspapers and magazines, and increasingly felt a sense of responsibility for their country. Inwardly, spiritually and morally (at the level of culture) they already separated themselves from their superiors. The leadership was alien to them and unpleasant even on a human level, in basic interactions.

However, they continued to operate **by inertia**. They tried to correct some things, improve some things, impose some elements through style (being speechwriters and advisers) in the spirit of *realpolitik* and common sense. But they did not try to break away, because they did not know how and were tied down by habit, lifestyle, and intellectual doubts about everything and everyone.

But at this time, in their milieu, there gradually began to form the nucleus of the future staff of perestroika.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1974

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

Translated by Anna Melyakova

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

January 3, 1974

Trukhanovsky (editor of *Questions of History*) stopped by. We talked about Khavinson (editor-in-chief of the journal *World Economy and International Relations*) and his deputy Kuzmin, who was assigned to write on anti-Zionism and pursued the subject with quite an anti-Semitic spirit. A certain Bolshakov from *Pravda* (deputy head) – an avid unmasker of Zionism – came to Khavinson with an article and was rejected. He then took it to *Questions of History*, where it was accepted despite the editorial board's opinion and Trukhanovsky's position, which was recorded in the minutes. Kuzmin took advantage of Trukhanovsky's absence and criticized Khavinson's journal in the article "for mistakes in the struggle against Zionism."

"I thought," Trukhanovsky said, "that it was just a simple case of lack of discipline or editorial mistakes. I certainly did not suspect that Kuzmin and Bolshakov are bosom buddies on very 'ideological' grounds. But Bolshakov's New Year's greeting card to Kuzmin explained everything. The secretary opened the card, which is standard procedure for almost all such greeting cards sent to the journal. It read: 'Dear (Kuzmin's first name)! I wish you new victories. All this scum is nothing against our Rus'!'" (Kuzmin works on Russian antiquity).

There you go!

Trukhanovsky proposed that we tell Ponomarev about this and ask him to suggest to Fedoseyev to find some "higher" position for Kuzmin, to transfer him to an institute or something like that.

January 5, 1974

Yurka Karyakin (my friend, we worked together in Prague, in the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*) with his intrinsic intellectual honesty continues to delve deeper and deeper into Chile (by inertia after my assignment). He already had three meetings with [Volodia] Teitelboim (one the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party). He found out the following: ten days after Allende's victory, Kissinger said at the National Security Council: "The main danger from Chile is in Western Europe. If it proves the possibility of a peaceful path to socialism, then our (i.e. U.S.) cause is lost for the future! Therefore, the task is to disrupt the Chilean experiment. That way, we will show that the peaceful way is impossible. And the average Westerner (including the so-called working class) will never want to take the armed revolutionary path! That will do the trick."

Right away, an operations center to eliminate the "Chilean case" was created in the U.S.

Yurka made the following conclusions and already gave them to Teitelboim:

1. To argue the correctness of the strategy of the peaceful way at every possible opportunity. Its failure is the result of a combination of accidental circumstances, not a defectiveness at the core. We need to make as much noise about this as possible.
2. We should not become apathetic, beat our chest, or look for shortcomings in the CPC's [Communist Party of Chile] course. Instead, we should argue that its strategic line was correct. We should not engage in intellectual drivel with allies in Unidad Popular (with socialists, and especially with MIR [Revolutionary Left Movement]) – although "your" general concept was not acceptable, in many ways you were right tactically. Keep in mind that this is an irresponsible public who will say anything, forgetting that those who want to remain grounded in real politics cannot afford to

open up their chest and publicly poke around their wounds. Remember that even when Marx and Lenin faced defeat, even if they were in the extreme minority, they always vehemently argued that their way was right. The only and exact way they showed before the events, during the events, and after the defeat! This revolutionary conviction is the secret of political success. Even if it appears thick-headed, there is no other way to do politics, which is itself a very rough thing. But internally, for yourself, you have to be very thorough and analyze everything very carefully, with no excuses or mercy to one's own ego. Consider every wrong move, every mistake, every oversight, and all stupidities. And make mental notes!

Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago* was released in the West. It's making a lot of noise. Looking at Solzhenitsyn, you really feel what class hatred is, and what could happen again (like in 1919-21 and 1929-31) if it was allowed to spread among the masses. He went so far as to declare the Vlasov Army – truly one of the most disgusting and ugly phenomena of the war, and not just the war – as ideological heroes. He celebrates their service to Nazism, admires their "heroic acts," etc. He attributes the "idea" of concentration camps to Marx and Engels, and suggests that Lenin embodied it in politics, while Stalin was only an imitator who perfected it. The "Gulag" is presented as the norm of Soviet society, as the source of all of socialism's material achievements for the last half a century.

Many people "over there" tastelessly took the bait. They are afraid of us, afraid of themselves (no alternative), afraid of their own, especially right now amidst the energy, economic, and currency crisis. We appear as an organized society, i.e. the only kind of society that can in principle deal with the problems of the modern age, the kind of problems that are insurmountable even for the "state-monopoly democracy."

And one more idea. Chile has not yet found its own Marx and Lenin...

The Paris Commune (just three months) was the first defeat of an armed path of proletarian revolution. But what a colossal amount of experience and lessons were taken from this defeat by the Marxists (Lenin first and foremost)! How fundamentally this defeat served the future revolution!

Chile (34 months) was the first defeat of the peaceful path of socialist revolution. And if we take the same kind of lessons and experience from this defeat as the Marxists were able to take from the Paris Commune – then Chile will join (in our lifetimes) the ranks of great events, such as the Commune.

So far, we have been underestimating the significance of this experience and this defeat.

Marx said (though in a slightly different sense): revolutions win, even when they fail.

This is why it is dangerous to doubt the strategy of the peaceful path based on Chile's experience. The history of the Paris Commune cries out against such an approach.

January 21, 1974

From the 6th through the 11th I was in Prague. Ponomarev, Rakhmanin, Tolkunov, and I. Plus Larisa, who was working with me in the editorial commission.

Teitelboim's sour reaction to "Ponomarev's teachings on the lessons of Chile."

Jean Kanapa – member of the French CP's Politburo. His outburst about the proposal for a "Karlovy Vary-2" and a European Conference of Communist Parties. The initiative is from PUWP [Polish United Workers Party].

[Hermann] Axen (SED Politburo member) – the chairman of the editorial commission. The "battle" in the editorial commission on the resolution and communiqué. Two confrontations (which took up about 18 hours) along the following lines: Romanian [representative]-Japanese-Italian-Spanish-me-Axen. Sometimes the Bulgarians. I made around 20 speeches. In the end, we achieved a "single communiqué" (Kanapa effectively supported it). This is a "victory of unity" as Kanapa assured me. The Bulgarian representative complained to his delegation head that the CPSU – Chernyaev – "made too many compromises."

Reception in the Spanish Hall in Hradčany.

Prague. The streets, the shop windows. Well-fed Czech men, and gorgeous Czech women.

The Czechs' jokes about themselves at the lunch with Ponomarev.

Overall, it was the first rehearsal for the new international conference.

Problems concerning the Brussels meeting of the Western European communist parties. The Italians, French, and especially the Spaniards are against mentioning that the "material base of communism is being built in the Soviet Union" in the document.

Return from Prague. Routine again: B.N.'s report on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Lenin's death. It took place on Friday, the 18th, at the Hall of Columns. We are getting congratulatory messages from everywhere. In general, based on the norms of our ideological work, maybe it really is pretty good. I'm exhausted again.

January 25, 1974

We finished two reports for Ponomarev: he is going to Nalchik to present the Order of Friendship to the people of Kabardino-Balkaria.

Zagladin is at the Congress of the Communist Party of Austria. His telegrams: the party has completely returned to the fold of the CPSU. Confessions of Party Chairman [Franz] Muhri (how he wavered during the events in Czechoslovakia, how he "reformed"!).

Reconciliation between Egypt and Israel on the basis of Kissinger. We were fooled. And no wonder: you cannot build a policy based on the expectation that Sadat et al. are representing a "national liberation" movement (or rather, that he will take into consideration the fact that we view him as a representative of this movement. In reality, he only speculates on our "obligation"). They represent nationalism, which under certain circumstances can easily turn into fascism. However, maybe it is a good thing that it did not work out: we will gradually get used to the fact that new categories are operating in the world, which can no longer be measured with the yardstick of Stalinist foreign policy. Because in this region we have been operating precisely like that: an imperialist strategy under the guise of ideology.

I had a conversation with B.N. He told me about an exchange of opinions at the Politburo. Brezhnev started by saying that it's bad that there are almost no Jews left in leadership positions. There is only Dymshits (Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers), whom we parade everywhere for this. We need to change this. Why create an impression that we have

some kind of anti-Semitic views in these matters... Others supported him. B.N. thinks that this conversation was prepared in advance, probably not without Andropov's involvement in particular.

B.N. himself supposedly said during the "exchange" that he agreed, though of course at one time (!) we had the opposite extreme, when Kaganovich came to the International Department and the apparatus in general... He started putting Jews everywhere, and expelling Russians. That's why *uglanovshchina* was created, to accuse people of Trotskyism. While in reality, they were revolutionaries, real workers and Leninists...

I am reading Andre Maurois in *Inostrannaya Literatura* [Foreign Literature], his *To an Unknown Lady*. The concentration of the French style – from Pascal, through Anatole France, to Valerie. Delicious to read, and instructive, too.

January 29, 1974

Yesterday I arrived in Uspenka to spend my ten days of vacation that Ponomarev took from me last year.

In the morning I had a wonderful time skiing: three and a half hours at a very good speed. I could have kept going for at least two more hours. While I was skiing, I thought to myself that I couldn't ski as well 20 years ago, and I wasn't in such good physical shape, either. Right now I feel young, aired out by the fresh wind and doused with some kind of life-giving water.

I brought a heap of books and other "information," if only I had time to get into it. I am reading, once again, Lenin's "Reply to Kievsky" and "On Caricature of Marxism." When you think deeply about the text of these two wonderful works, Lenin's famous thoughts appear differently than they do in our customary ideological interpretation. The amazing diversity of Lenin. His phrases and images create such a polarity, like a magnetic field, which creates a multitude of associations and reflections built upon one's own political experience.

I am reading Herzen again. This time, "Russian Germans, and German Russians." It's amazing how many roots of our modern times you find in Herzen. Is it the nature of genius, or the nature of life, which does not really change at the core? The same with Andre Maurois: the basic laws of relations between a man and a woman do not change.

February 8, 1974

I'm back at work. Read the telegrams. Sadat threw out [Mohamed Hassanein] Heikal, apparently because he got in the way of leaning in the American direction. Heikal was a supporter of Nasser, and this is becoming a problem for Sadat. In a word, our "game" in Egypt is lost.

Sokolov (a consultant at the Department) returned from the U.S., from the Pugwash Conference. His Pugwash "colleagues" became tougher. They are positive that we are lying to them about everything (in trade, in military affairs, and in the Middle East). These intellectuals are practically demanding that an aircraft carrier to be sent to the shores of the oil sheiks. The average American motorist is tired of getting up at 6 a.m. to stand in line for gasoline.

The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences removed Volobuyev from the directorship of the Institute of History, without waiting for his resignation letter. I know how it happened. He called me twice, but lied about the main things. He should have left a long time ago, but he was

brought up in “the corridors of party committees and party bureaus.” He knows neither pride nor contempt, he is shallow and vain. He was removed for “revisionism,” but he will write a complaint to Suslov, saying that he was fighting against revisionism 15 years ago in the journal *Voprosy Istorii (Questions of History)*. Although back then he was kicked out of the CC for “dogmatism,” because he did not understand the spirit of the XX Congress. At the time, he complained to the CC about Rumyantsev (Head of the Department at the time), who supposedly was not acting on principle.

It’s unpleasant for me to associate with Volobuyev, but of course not because of his downfall. He couldn’t have won, because as a small and unscrupulous man he ended up fighting for a just cause – against Trapeznikov & Co.

B.N. told me that we have to prepare a report for V.I. Lenin’s 104th anniversary!

Mochulsky died. For a second this was a *memento mori*, but I did not feel upset. In a way, he is also a “son of our time.”

I am reading [Natan] Eidelman, *The Secret Political History of Russia in XVIII-XIX Centuries and the Free Press*. The book is designed for the reader to draw parallels. But the material and execution are wonderful. By the way, it is one of the signs that our “historical science” is gradually going back to its original purpose, which is to tell about the past, as opposed to only extracting the “general laws” from every fact (which Soviet historical science has been doing for decades). Facts were losing their independent meaning; they were serving only as symbols of sociology, its shell.

February 10, 1974

In the morning I started working on the multi-volume set *The International Labor Movement*, the introduction to it, which will be B.N.’s.

Played tennis. Right now I’m leafing through *Vospominaniya o Gertzene* [Memories of Herzen].

In the afternoon I went to the Pushkin Museum, which held a memorial for 137 years since the poet’s death. Dez’ka (Samoilov) made a speech about Pushkin. The small hall was extremely overcrowded. Later, the museum director, who is by the way a cousin of our consultant Kozlov, said that the hall’s capacity is 200 people, but there were 300 people there, plus 150 more in the other rooms, listening through speakers. The public ranged from intelligentsia grannies to little kids, there were some famous people from the cultural sphere. About 50 percent of the people were Jewish. The most superficial reason for this is that they like all kinds of intellectual events. In the meantime, Dez’ka’s speech could have gone down in the history of social thought. He spoke for no more than 10 minutes. He had three powerful and clearly articulated ideas:

1. The image of a modern civilized person in our country is based on Pushkin. We do not notice it because Pushkin permeates the entirety of the cultural tradition in which we are raised.
2. Pushkin found and gave to us a measure of the relationship between our country and the rest of the world; he determined the place of the Russian people in the intellectual history of this multicultural world.

3. Pushkin is closer (must be closer) to us than the people of the XIX and the first half of the XX century. We inherited Russian literature – our spiritual tradition – from him. He is a man of honor, not conscience. Remember Lermontov, "...he's bound by honor." Dostoyevsky and others wrote about conscience, Pushkin never wrote about it. Conscience is when a person does something against his own rules, and then repents and often believes that he redeems himself through repentance.

Being bound by honor does not mean being a slave to honor. Honor is when you voluntarily adhere (not serve) to noble rules. A modern person should be guided precisely by that.

The director of the Pushkin Museum very delicately accompanied Dez'ka to his place on the stage, so those who don't know that he is practically blind would not have noticed. He was wearing glasses, but took them off before he started speaking. He was calm and confident from the start. He spoke sincerely, clearly, without a hint that the speech was memorized, even though he did not misspeak or say a single filler word during this conceptually complex speech.

Then there were musical arias, flute, harp, reading of letters and diaries of people who were near the dying Pushkin. Not particularly professionally done (one actress sticks in my mind, a woman with a long nose and big, Esenin-style eyes. She sang terribly... it was embarrassing). In the middle of this program, Dez'ka's guide made a scandalous amount of noise and pulled me out of the crowd, I had been stuck in the mass of people in hallways. The guide, Rafka, performs Dez'ka poems and is a former actor from Taganka Theater. He dragged me backstage, where Dez'ka and I kissed each other and embraced. Right off the bat, Dez'ka told me the hospital anecdotes of his own creation (I had heard them from him before). He told me that he is writing a book about rhyme (actually a brief history/theory of Russian poetry). He said he was given an apartment, 50 square meters with a 9 square meter kitchen in the Kolomensky district. He invited me over, "I will read my prose to you." He's hugely talented. I promised to visit him in Opalikha next Sunday.

February 15, 1974

Events of the week. I tried attending Mochulsky's memorial service, but the body was delayed for two hours on the way from the morgue, and I had to leave. This was at the old Moscow State University club on Herzen Street. It was wretched and poorly attended, mostly by people from the university. I saw all the same people who looked senile even 25 years ago. They have changed somewhat. Zastenker immediately rushed to reproach and lecture me about social democrats. The others – the people who were still graduate students when I was beginning to teach: Ado, Yazykov. Masha Orlova was there too, she is now a professor. Everything about them – their conversations, their looks, their boring, mundane attitude toward "the event" – reeks of such stale, intellectual provinciality, such oppressive melancholy, that all I could think when I was interacting with them was "Thank god that life pushed me out of this environment in time!"

They said that Mochulsky was sick all the time. He was all twisted from sciatica, then he got polyarthritis. Mashka commented: "You probably heard that his wife left him. And he needed to be on a special diet. He wouldn't eat anything for days because he couldn't have normal food, and there was nobody to make him special meals. His son would bring some beet salad from the cafeteria, and that would be his meal for the day." "He concealed his illness," Drobyshev continued, "even when he was hospitalized, he asked me not to mention it at the

university. Then he got worse, his kidneys failed. For ten days his screams filled the hospital ward, it was terrible. I was hospitalized there too at the time."

So that's that. He lived a dull life. Became a professor. All he produced during his entire academic career were a couple boring articles about England in the 1930s and a brochure based on his thesis. He did not love anybody, he was angry and spiteful. And nobody loved him. Most people despised him, some feared him. He was huge and ridiculous, somewhat square in shape and at one time very fat. And he died at 55. He did not leave anything to anyone, not even a trace in people's memories.

On Wednesday Solzhenitsyn was deported to West Germany. The operation was cleverly, correctly, and elegantly done. I don't know the details yet (Brandt's agreement). Already (two days later) the serious Western newspapers acknowledge that he will inevitably burn out very soon. One more "flash" of noise, and then he will become boring for them pretty quickly.

We put together a plan for how to "arrive" at the European Conference of Communist Parties: first a telegram to the French, then to socialist countries and the ICP, then a four-way initiative (ICP, PUWP, PCF, CPSU) publicly – to convene a consultative meeting in May of this year.

We composed a telegram to all the CPs we have relations with, outlining our position on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. But B.N. put it on hold for now, so as not to "devalue" the work of the European Conference.

Things are clearly moving toward a big crisis in the West and the capitalist world in general. This crisis will be very different from the crisis of 1929 in its economic characteristics, but it will probably lead to a shift to the right with incalculable consequences.

We composed B.N.'s speech in the Hall of Columns – today he presented the Order of Friendship to Soviet women.

Started preparing his report for Lenin's 104th anniversary. Zhilin suggested to put the following idea at the center of the report – the transformations of the recent years are just as important to the victory of communism as the analogous (equal) transformations in the 1920-30s were to the victory of socialism...

February 21, 1974

On Sunday I visited Dez'ka in Opalikha. He is not weak or melancholy (even though he can barely see anything). He is cheerful, cracking jokes, and exudes confidence and activity.

Why is that? For two reasons, it seems. He has talent, which must strengthen self-confidence and build resilience. "I am a master of my craft," so to speak, "I excel at what I do, so I will never perish." And secondly, apparently it's the "environment." An environment of kind and selfless camaraderie based on a common "social status" and worldview, as well as, of course, personal affection for each other (and in this case also respect and love for Dez'ka, and admiration of his poetry). This environment is outside the system. That is how it views itself; it opposes itself to the system. And some of its representatives may even be hostile towards the system. For example, they helped Solzhenitsyn and *Samizdat*, supplied various materials for the *Chronicle of Current Events*. Of course, I can only guess about these things.

This community is probably united by (alongside the listed emotional circumstances) a sense of hostility toward the socio-political situation in the country. For a while, one part of the intelligentsia expressed its alienation from the authorities and the entire so-called public life through nostalgia for our revolutionary past and the revolutionary purity of the youth of entire generations. Hence the enormous popularity (incomprehensible to today's youth and mass audience) of movies such as "No Path Through Fire," "Bumbarash" and "The White Sun of the Desert," in which this audience saw the natural, selfless internationalism of a regular Russian person, internationalism of the crystal idealism of the Soviet "Grenada," instead of the banal Soviet ideology.

... But this wave passed. They grew tired and realized that this is just helpless nostalgia for a past one cannot bring back. And one part of them budded off into complete rejection of the entirety of our Soviet past – in a somewhat Solzhenitsyn-like style – "Everything was wrong from the very beginning." Of course, in most cases this was done without Solzhenitsyn's class hatred towards everything Soviet... It was more a state of detachment "above the fray," a semi-contemptuous belief that the present regime does not have the power or the desire to maintain society at the level it deserves.

Superimposed on this is the "Jewish problem." Of course, people like Dez'ka will never leave (although who could have thought that Korzhavin would leave). But the anti-Semitism that became the inevitable companion of the "Israeli problem" as a whole, struck these people in the heart and completely destroyed their intellectual connection with the "system." When it comes to each specific instance, I think Dez'ka with his wisdom and intellect rises above the narrow-minded reactions and assessments. But I doubt that he is not hurt deep down!

Meanwhile, Vad'ka Babichkov (school friend) asked what happened with Daniel (the one who together with Sinyavsky was sentenced in 1965 and now came back from the gulag). Dez'ka explained to me that he is living in Moscow, he refused to follow Sinyavsky (who is now a professor at the Sorbonne), told his wife to go to hell (after he was sentenced, she distinguished herself by fanatical anti-Soviet Jewish activity and would up in prison herself, though she's been released) and married a pretty young creature. He is being published, mostly translations. Under a pseudonym, of course. He built a house near Moscow. Did he build it by himself? No, of course not. People helped...

This element of "helped" seems to shine a light on the inner life of the "commune" I was talking about, this special community that is ready for great sacrifice and a level of devotion to each other that is unusual for today's social norms.

This week... Yevtushenko. An open letter "to the Soviet people" in the Milan newspaper *Il Giorno*. His concert in the Hall of Columns (on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of his creative work) was cancelled after he sent Brezhnev a telegram protesting Solzhenitsyn's arrest. I was disgusted by this letter. I cannot accept that this show-off has the right to speak "on behalf of the people" and to "show concern about the fate and prestige of his Motherland." Every line reeks of petty vanity, of undeserved claims, and of political infantilism... And one more thing that really rubs me the wrong way – his appeals to Western public opinion against his own government, which supposedly would not dare to touch such a figure if it is backed by "such forces." Solzhenitsyn barely finished taking advantage of this, and here is another one.

However, this really makes me sad. If you look deeper, all of this is happening because of the state of our ideology, because it lost all sense of clarity, not to mention its appeal, in the hands of people like Demichev (Minister of Culture).

By the way, the other day I read a letter sent by Suvorov, the Party Bureau secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, to Kirilenko. Kirilenko had ordered Grishin and Yagodkin (i.e. the First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee and the Moscow Secretary of Ideology) to meet with Suvorov. They met with him. And attached an explanation to the letter.

According to Suvorov, our entire “philosophical front” is infested with revisionism, and not only the philosophical front. He names historians, economists, sociologists, even mathematicians and natural scientists who, supposedly, are out of control. They say and even write whatever they want, which is all sheer “positivism” and worse. He lists dozens of names, starting with Academician Kedrov, the director of the Institute of Philosophy, and finishing with authors of “some articles.” Here we have Zamoshkin (Head of the Lenin School), and Frolov (editor of *Problems of Philosophy*, former assistant to Demichev), and Kelle (my former philosophy teacher), and others from Moscow State University. The ranks of genuine Marxists have grown so thin, Suvorov says, that if we were to immediately remove the revisionists from all the key positions they’ve assumed, there would be nobody to replace them. Fedoseyev is mentioned several times as a centrist, who, Suvorov says, condones all of this and looks the other way.

The specific nature of these people’s revisionism is not explained. There are only hints: one of them supposedly believes that a new age of biology will come and it won’t take orders from our philosophy; others are increasingly reducing historical materialism and dialectical materialism to a “philosophy of man”; the third group does not consider it necessary to quote Marx and Lenin in their books at all. This just about sums up his claims.

At the bottom of the page there is a list of about twelve people on whose behalf Suvorov makes his appeal and asks to accept the entire group into the Central Committee. At the head of all this is Academician Mitin – a scumbag who was an informer in the 1930s, a plagiarist who stole the work of people under him. The next in line are Rutkevich, Kovalchuk, Oduyev and a couple other mediocrities whom Kedrov removed from the Institute due to incompetence.

So what is being done about this case?

Instead of shaming the scoundrel, Grishin and Yagodkin talked with him for several hours and then made a report along the following lines: the Moscow City Committee has been taking measures since 1969 to correct the ideological situation in Moscow. They listened to such and such institutes in the Moscow Committee, adopted such and such resolutions, inspected such and such units, and removed five directors. However, when the Kievan passed away, nobody asked the Moscow City Committee and appointed Kedrov as the new director of the Institute of Philosophy. So now the CC should figure this mess out themselves. The report ends with this point. It seems it went to Kirilenko and the CC Secretariat in this format, along with Suvorov’s letter.

Annensky, *Vospominaniya o Gertzene*. Belinsky, “Letter to Gogol” (re-read it in a completely different light).

Started reading Faulkner – sandwich prose in which you drown.

March 10, 1974

Increasingly there are gaps in the diary. This is partially due to late nights at work, and partially because in my spare time I have to read and prepare the publication of a multi-volume edition on the labor movement. By the way, yesterday at the dacha in Uspenka I finished editing the 90-page introduction, most of which was put together by Galkin by means of clever and creative compiling of Ponomarev's reports and articles. It successfully uses the majority of his own (B.N.'s) and our thoughts and ideas.

From the week's events: the Labour party is in power [in England]. A minority government. They settled the miners' strike. But what will they be able to do?

Today Brezhnev flew to Pitsunda to meet with Pompidou. The game with France continues (for example, we support its extravagance in the energy issue: their refusal to participate in the Washington initiative to coordinate the capitalist countries on this matter). But the "pettiness" of the moves we're making (supporting those who aggravate "inter-imperialist" tensions) is clear to everybody. We will not be able to achieve anything realistic, because (as Raymond Aron correctly wrote) France will make noise about independence and such through the lips of Jobert and even Pompidou, but quietly it will do almost the same thing as everyone else (FRG, UK) because there is nothing else they can do. This is what it does in NATO, and the same thing will happen in energy matters.

In front of the whole world Kissinger (his trips to Egypt and Syria) is robbing us of the fruits of many years of Ponomarev's Middle East policies. He and Sadat publicly show their embraces – they are best friends. Our bet on the "progressiveness of the regimes" did not yield dividends, because we thought up this progressiveness ourselves. And we can't compete with the Americans' deep pockets – we come up short.

Somehow I can't get into writing today... I'll just outline the major events.

O'Riordan broke his ribs. Conversation with him on Plotnikov Street.

Timofeyev's message that Trapeznikov will read our multi-volume publication on the labor movement himself (the drafts). I am not sure whether to tell B.N. I'm afraid that he will get scared and delay the publication. I saw this Trapeznikov on a road in Uspenka. I wanted to get out of the car and kick that gnome into a ditch.

Volobuyev has already been "removed" by the CC Secretariat. B.N. told me about Kirilenko's move. Kirilenko proposed to consider the matter with "utmost strictness," using the note from the Science Department, which included [accusations of] revisionist mistakes, departure from Leninism, and even political factionalism. By the way, Suslov agreed with the note, even though Volobuyev had previously written him a long letter (that he is being persecuted, etc.). Demichev and others also agreed with the note. That means they either did not read his letter, or they ignored it. Kirilenko seemed to be hearing about Volobuyev for the first time, and had the expected reaction: if a person is such a revisionist, why be liberal with him (he said as much to Ponomarev). I don't know what B.N. did, but in the end the reason behind Volobuyev's removal was boiled down to the formula: "Unable to perform the duties of a director."

Of course, Volobuyev as a leader of Soviet historical science is a joke. It was a joke when he was appointed. But the story of his removal has its own significance, and a very instructive one.

I did a good deal of skiing. I would get up at 6 a.m. and go to the ski-track while it was still dark outside, and watch the sunrise. The morning temperatures dropped below negative ten degrees Celsius, the ski-track would be squeaky-crisp and breezy. I would ski at sprinter speeds. It was beautiful – Levitan’s March. I would come home around 11 a.m., completely “spent.”

I went to the Mayakovsky museum – the place where he shot himself in the former Lubyansky alley. An informative museum. And what an era it was! What spiritual wealth our Revolution and Soviet Republic had! There was never anything like it, and there couldn’t be. A great nation. By the way, after visiting the museum you start to understand what Dez’ka was talking about when I visited him in Opalikha: the “literary community” is moving farther away from Mayakovsky, some are even irritated by him... Of course, partially this is due to the anti-Soviet snobbery of the current “literary community.” But there is also an objective element at play: the people and the times Mayakovsky depicted with his supreme genius were absolutely unique. That era had temporarily broken away from the so-called “eternal human nature.” Pushkin, on the other hand, is timeless because he is tuned into this human nature.

Arbatov stopped by with a problem – a woman was fired from the Institute of US and Canada for marrying an Italian, even though he is a communist. This is the kind of problems our authorities have, while they hold the fate of the country in their hands!

April 3, 1974

There is a gap in the diary because from March 15th-April 2nd I was at the “dacha” in Volynskoe-2. We were writing B.N.’s report for Lenin’s 104th anniversary.

Intriguing ideas that he wants to include in this text:

- Leninism is spreading around the world;
- To reflect on the 50 years since Lenin’s death;
- No other teaching has met with such obstacles;
- The “foundation” left by Lenin – ranging from the science of building socialism, to the experience of the ruling party, to the “framework” of international socialism;
- The work done by Lenin’s “disciples and followers” has multiplied his heritage 100-fold (including B.N. himself, of course);
- The Party of the 20th century (new type) as Lenin’s great discovery that determined the subsequent course of events;
- Lenin created the science of building socialism, the CPSU right now is creating the science of building communism, and on this basis builds communism step-by-step.

The last point calls for comment: as it turned out from our phone conversation (B.N. left for Gagra, to spend the remainder of the two week vacation he gets as a candidate member of the CC) his concern about the building of communism and the theory behind it is brought about by his desire to indirectly remind people about the Party program. He had been hinting at this to me for a while now, but I had no idea. He explained it like this: “Do you remember when the program was accepted, there was a big fuss about it. Then a lot of things happened. Now it is rarely mentioned. At one point there was even a suggestion to reexamine it, etc.” In the meantime, B.N. considers himself the creator of the “Third Party Program,” and to some extent

this is justified. He really knows it inside out, it contains some of his favorite pet ideas, which he tries to carefully position in his articles and reports.

April 5, 1974

We've been preparing the Lenin report and B.N. expressed his dissatisfaction three times with how the theoretical work of the party is portrayed, namely – the way it deals with the problems and challenges of the transition to communism. As I said, for a long time I did not understand what he wanted, because I couldn't imagine that he believed our theoretical thought is up to par. He talked about it with disdain on many occasions, but then he was talking about the "theoretical thought" of others! Finally, I realized that we have to talk about "his" – Ponomarev's – Party Program.

Another challenge is (Brezhnev's) "personal contribution." At first B.N. wanted to be reserved about it. I told him that it might be misunderstood, and that the General Secretary had in fact often made bold decisions. If it wasn't for him, we wouldn't have made any progress.

"This is true," B.N. responded, "If we did not have the history that we have, there would be no question about it. But you know..."

In the meantime, his edits of the draft versions we kept sending him while he was on vacation in the South showed that his common sense prevailed. The name appeared in the text more and more often, and assessments assumed a grander scale.

He made the "fight for peace" the underlying theme of the report; the fulfillment of this "world-historical task of saving humanity" that is fitting for Lenin's motherland. He wants us to write about it with flourish. I was always surprised by his insistence in this matter. It seemed to me to be somewhat incompatible with his "Bolshevism" and his 1920s-kind of revolutionary mentality. Now I'm gradually beginning to understand. The old man is wise and informed. He knows that nobody believes in our "revolutionary example" anymore. But as a superpower, we have to maintain our ideological character – partly for the outside world and partly for the communists. Therefore, we have to have a global humanist mission. Peace is such a mission. And our ability to carry out such a mission comes from the Great Revolution. Plus, this is not just ideological trickery; there is a real logic and a real problem here.

Nobody thought in 1920 that capitalism would last so long and have such a powerful ability for unprecedented economic transformation. In these circumstances, the problem of "world revolution" changes its emphasis and becomes the "peace revolution."¹ B.N. is trying to adjust the leading revolutionary role of Lenin's motherland to precisely this shift (of meaning).

Secretly, he, as an old Bolshevik, is waiting for the universal crisis of capitalism, similar to, or even worse than, the crisis of 1929-33. In every one of his speeches and articles he tries to use the tools of propaganda to blow any sign of a crisis completely out of proportion to the point of absurdity. We are always doing the best we can to temper this passion of his, so he does not look ridiculous and nonsensical.

The same thing is happening now (especially in light of the real crisis in the West). He is pressuring us with "unprecedented force" (to use one of his favorite phrases).

¹ In the Russian, Chernyaev uses a play on the words *mirovaya revolutsiya* [мировая революция], which can mean either "world revolution" or "peace revolution." [trans.]

We are currently laboring over the issue of “Karlov Vary-2.” On the one hand, by delaying it we are giving up our leadership in the European communist movement little by little. Our fraternal parties are simply drifting away from us, from our influence. On the other hand, we can’t force it because the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is in progress. And, considering that it is barely moving right now, if we set it off against the communist conference it will fail completely. And it is “realpolitik” in contrast to the ideology of “Karlov Vary-2.”

April 13, 1974

The week flew by very quickly, the most painful period of the Lenin report preparation. After returning from Gagra, B.N. spoke with me confidentially three times. He trusts almost no one in “this matter.” He even asked me about Zhilin: “What does he think about the ‘personal contribution?’ I recall we were in Berlin together at a conference for the 125th anniversary of the ‘Communist Manifesto.’ I would ask him to add something, and he (Zhilin) would produce a paragraph or two with the General Secretary’s name all over. Just try to remove it, when so many eyes had already seen it!” I explained that Zhilin is just doing his job and trying to make sure that there wouldn’t be problems for B.N.

It is a completely different story with Zagladin. B.N. asked me to show him the text. Then he forgot that he asked me and gave his own copy to Zagladin, but with edited pages that talked about the “personal contribution.” When B.N. found out that Zagladin wound up with both copies and could compare them, he became terribly upset and started instructing me how to “seize” them both, and the sooner the better. But Zagladin did not compare anything (he is above that). Instead, he wrote two inserts based on the December Plenum, personalizing everything to the extreme. He cannot even imagine that this issue is causing B.N. so much suffering and doubt. Zagladin just accepts it as it is, as a natural process that everyone understands.

I did not show B.N. the inserts; I only used the thoughts on the transformation of “the entire national economic mechanism.”

In connection to this, B.N. is also worried about what to do about the “other two” (Podgorny and Kosygin), whether to mention them in the report. He told me to re-read Podgorny’s ciphered telegrams from Paris, where he was at Pompidou’s funeral and where he (as he said at the PB) barely managed to fend off the “supplicants” – heads of state and governments who wanted to demonstrate their “contact” with the high representative of the Soviet Union. According to B.N., Podgorny was amazed to see that at the reception (the wake) Nixon was standing as if he was in a vacuum, touching the shoulder of the Crown Prince of Morocco – the boy was the only one to approach the U.S. President and linger near him. The others tried to take a bow from a distance, and Nixon was clearly agitated, he was looking around and waiting for a crowd to finally form around him. Podgorny, on the other hand, had a line of twenty people waiting to say hello and chat.

After telling me about this and asking my impression of the ciphered telegrams, B.N. said: “In these circumstances, how can I say just one name in the report? Look at your draft, take page 21 for example... one, two, three times [Brezhnev’s name is mentioned]... It’s enough to make one question who’s the subject of the report (i.e. Lenin or Brezhnev). Think about how we could reflect this better.”

Naturally I thought about it and came up with an idea. I am not sure if he'll like it. For the last two days he was busy with Assad: the Syrian President is visiting, he is our "last hope" in the Middle East.

By the way, I read the draft version of Brezhnev's upcoming speech at the PCC [Political Consultative Committee] in Warsaw on April 18th, a copy was sent around the PB. It's a well-made speech, you can really feel Aleksandrov's hand in it. It is more reminiscent of a diplomatic report (with evaluations and accents, of course) than an outline of a new Program. I did not notice any new big ideas for the future. But that is not the point.

I drew B.N.'s attention to how the Middle East is presented in the speech. Aleksandrov must have gotten so carried away outlining the details that he didn't notice (although this is just his style) that we are essentially admitting to our friends (plus Romania) that we were defeated, that the Americans beat us. Egypt is essentially out of our control and Sadat drags us through the mud in his public speeches over the last couple of weeks. He lies shamelessly, distorts the facts, and denies having cried "Help! Save me! Secure a ceasefire!" when Israel broke through to the western bank of the Canal, etc.

It's one thing that I, for example, think it's time for us to change our policies in this region. It doesn't look like this will happen. But we also can't do what Aleksandrov does in the speech – to essentially admit that the policy has reached a dead end without offering any alternative except a hope that Assad will be more honest than Sadat and will secure our participation in the Geneva Conference!

I told all this to Ponomarev, he got worried. The next day he told me that he talked with Aleksandrov, who supposedly agreed to "lighten the pessimistic tone." I doubt that Aleksandrov will change anything unless he gets an order directly from Brezhnev. I can't help but wonder about another thing: B.N. told me that Brezhnev sent him the text personally and asked for his opinion. Why then does he need to discuss such things with an adviser, instead of going to Leonid Ilyich himself?

I heard about enforcers-activists chasing after students who were brought into the streets to demonstrate Soviet-Syrian friendship (Assad was leaving Moscow). Wet, heavy snow was falling, so the students took cover in apartment building stairwells and the metro. The kids made a game out of it, it was entertaining for them. They don't give a damn about Assad. Sometimes our "establishment" flashes an idiotic grimace. The mechanism has reached a point where the end that gives orders doesn't see or hear what comes out of the other end. In fact, it would be indecent and unacceptable if these ends converged.

May 12, 1974

From April 23rd I was in Volynskoe-2. Brezhnev's election speech. The team was led by Tsukanov ("Tsu-Ka,"² as Arganovsky dubbed him; I think he even wrote a hymn about it). Arganovsky is our most outstanding journalist from *Izvestia*. Bovin made up a bunch of nicknames for him, including "Nonpartisan Jew," "Golden Pen," and others. He is a man of great charm and diverse talents. He draws (he drew a profile of Bovin staring at a naked girl who vaguely looks like our typist Valya), he composes, sings and plays guitar, and he tells great

² In Russian, the sounds "Tsu-Ka" are similar to the word *suka* [сука] – bitch. [trans.]

stories and hilarious jokes. He is calm and natural, without a trace of the servility complex that would be understandable in his position.

Others: Inozemtsev and Arbatov, who are now also candidates for the Supreme Soviet. One from Georgia (but at least [he is a candidate] to the Council of the Union), the other – Arbatov – from Azerbaijan – to the Council of Nationalities. Here you have our entire electoral system at a glance.

There were also Shakhnazarov and the aforementioned Bovin, who acts as if nothing ever happened to him.

I was the outcast [*ишибомник*]. The others were all addressing each other in the familiar form, and only on a first-name basis. Everyone there doubted my abilities. Why then did Tsukanov plead with Ponomarev to let me come? He clearly flattered him to get me, saying that Aleksandrov has his team and we'll have ours, and our texts will be no worse than his. Since I was the “unskilled labor,” the following routine developed: Bovin would make small cosmetic changes to my text and read it aloud at the “general assembly.” At this point it would be deemed ready and “good.” The same text with minor adjustments based on commentary from the first reading, but without Bovin's touch, would be read aloud by Inozemtsev and deemed worthless. Then Bovin would be assigned to remake it!

All of this depresses me, I have to say. After such a turn of events I have an intense urge to run away from here.

In any case, whatever we come up with for the international section of the speech is going into the trash can, which became clear after the following episode. On the morning of the 8th there was a call on the direct phone line. I answered.

“This is Aleksandrov. Whom am I speaking to?”

“Chernyaev. Hello, Andrey Mikhailovich!”

“Hello, Anatoly Sergeyevich (sourness in his voice). Could you please ask Georgiy Emmanuilovich to the phone.”

(The rest of the conversation is based on Tsukanov's words, he later told us what happened.)

“Georgiy! Are you writing the entire speech?”

“Yes.”

“Including the international section?”

“Yes.”

“Why didn't you say something to me? That is disloyal. How can you do that? You know that I am supposed to be preparing it. You are acting like a real pig!”

“Oh yeah? If I'm a pig, why don't you go to hell!”

And Tsukanov slammed the phone down and went into his room.

Bovin, like the others who were present, commented as follows: “Member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU, Adviser to the General Secretary of our Leninist Party, called Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, First

Adviser of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of our Leninist Party a pig, for which he was instructed to go to hell by the latter..." And more (again by Bovin): "Earl! Now you can write your international section at the level of Marx, Engels, and even Lenin, but 'Sparrow' will still peck it apart and smear it in shit."

There are real issues, besides our vanity. It is an election speech. We need a platform, even if it is within the framework of the "Peace Program" (such a document was adopted at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU). We have to say something. In politics, you cannot stand still. The change is really almost unbelievable if you consider where we were at the turn of the 1970s.

Right now this is the situation: the words (by the logic of the struggle and for other reasons) go beyond what we are actually prepared to do. We already achieved what we hoped to achieve when we started the "peace offensive." We cannot and do not want to go further. If we go any further we will come up against the ideological "class" boundary. (Europe is a case in point. We already have détente and security in Europe. But in response they launched a counterattack. They demand an ideological détente. This is unthinkable for us.) Since this is the case, we should cease with the flowery language. We should not make fools of ourselves or open ourselves to blows from our partners. We need to calmly solidify what we achieved already. This is my position.

Arbatov and Bovin, on the other hand, believe that we should continue and intensify our rhetoric. Because by doing so, we constrain ourselves; we put ourselves into a bad position and then we are forced to take some real measures (to get out of this situation), such as disarmament, or relaxation of our ideology.

This is all nonsense, of course. Arabesques of a geek-romantic (i.e. Arbatov), who can't sleep at night because of Kissinger's laurels.

May 13, 1974

I got up early to write.

It's getting even worse with disarmament (Arbatov thinks that he knows some secrets). The whole world sees that we have become the obstacle in this process. We've reduced military tension. We do not want war and we will not provoke it. But there's also no real disarmament. For completely different reasons.

The same thing with the blocs. The reason we need the Warsaw Pact is not because we need to counteract NATO (and the same with why the Americans need NATO – not because of us). The entire world has known this for a long time. Why make noise about this? Why do we need a "Cold War" of words?! Therefore, I suggest a pragmatic platform: to solidify what we have and to direct all our attention to economic ties. Inozemtsev (who is well-informed) says that our foreign trade is a terrible mess. It's not just that we don't have enough goods to export. The main problem is our system of dealing with the capitalist world; and the complete lack of authority at the expert level (authority in the sense of being able to make decisions). And, consequently, the reverse – lack of expertise at the decision-making levels.

Telegram from London. Our ambassador talked with [John] Gollan (General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain) on the subjects we assigned. Gollan is still hissing about the international Conference. He says we only consult with those whose opinions we know in advance, and then we present it as if many of our fraternal parties support our idea. And in

general, there is no point to these meetings because you can't really talk; all you do is read out prepared speeches...

So I thought, what has our ICM come to; what does it look like nowadays. For example: Portugal. Fascism is ousted after fifty years of domination. Toppled by an army coup. A real "February 1917" is unfolding. It's a huge deal. The next day [Álvaro] Cunhal returned to the country and was received at the airport like Lenin at Finland station. But that's not my point. A week hadn't passed after the coup before the leader of the Socialist Party of Portugal [Mário] Soares visited the countries of Europe. He met with his friends from the Socialist International, attended the Congress of Socialist Parties of Northern Countries. And everywhere there were public resolutions in support of Portugal, promises of political and material support for the democratic development of Portugal. Is this not true internationalism, in the style of social democracy? In the meantime, the resolutions are adopted at the initiative of the **ruling** social democratic parties. They are not afraid of diplomatic scandals; they don't feel any inconvenience from their collective actions. Just imagine if the communist movement tried something like that! If someone suggested a conference on Portugal or something along those lines – everyone would scatter and run away.

All of this is easy to understand. And nevertheless, it's sad!

May 17, 1974

Yesterday I came back from Volynskoe-2. My suitcase is still there and I'll have to go back and work in short visits. Tsukanov, Arbatov, and Inozemtsev took our "material" to Brezhnev and read it to him. Tsukanov assures us that Brezhnev was impressed ("I've known him for 15 years and I'm sure about this"). There are only a few comments, it would be a matter of hours to incorporate them. We did that yesterday.

The version presented to Brezhnev was closer to my point of view than Arbatov's or Inozemtsev's regarding how we should conduct ourselves in the future (against "illusionism"). Brezhnev asked to personally mention Brandt and Pompidou.

In general, the end of April and beginning of May was an eventful time:

- Brandt resigned (the case of Guillaume, the GDR spy);
- The Mitterrand-Giscard d'Estaing battle in France (Chervonenko's visit to Giscard; scandal – statement by the PFC PB in *L'Humanite*);
- Portugal, where the government just formed and Cunhal (Minister without portfolio) is one of its main figures;
- In Israel three Palestinians occupied a school and demanded the release of their murderer associates from prison. This was followed by a storming of the school – 20 dead, 70 injured, mostly children. Commentary in our newspapers: Israel is to blame!
- In Italy, in a referendum on divorce the communists' line received an unexpected (even to themselves) majority – 60 percent;
- The "Common Market" is cracking: Italy and Denmark imposed tariffs. Right now there is a stream of assessments – pessimism and disappointment from everyone who saw Europe's future in the Common Market. Personally, I always thought, was convinced, and argued that the "Common Market" is rooted in Europe's way of life more strongly and irreversibly than turned out in reality;

- In connection with the Portuguese Revolution, the last colonial empire in Africa has collapsed.

In a word, everything is changing and fermenting.

The European Conference of Communist Parties is hanging in limbo. Our insistence to conclude it “at the highest level” is becoming meaningless since the widely recognized creators of détente (except Brezhnev) have left the political scene, and Nixon’s presence in his current situation is unlikely to add credibility to this “highest level.”

Both at home and abroad you hear concerns about the future of détente. I think it is not threatened by anything. Nobody will get into a big fight over the Middle East; Southeast Asia – even less so. We are all busy with our own affairs; we all have our hands full trying to keep abreast with “consumer society.” And people are getting used to détente, just as they once got used to the “Cold War.”

The solidifying new reality is that there are no grounds for a major war. If war happens, it will be because of ideological myths, i.e. human stupidity, which is inexcusable in our day and age because it is not justified by history. Earlier societies and governments had no alternative to war (due to material underdevelopment). War was inherent in the very laws of objective development. This is no longer the case. Now war would happen only if the global Trapeznikovs take center stage.

Brezhnev’s unpublished speech from his meeting with veterans of the 18th Army. I read the transcript in Volynskoe. Navy pants with 36cm-wide leg; for some reason he got upset when he was talking about how we shook world capitalism with our Peace Program... He spoke without notes.

Volume II of Khrushchev’s memoirs was published in the West. This time the material was taken from tapes stored at Harvard, anyone can come and listen to them. Nikita [Khrushchev’s] meetings with [Pyotr] Kapitsa and [Andrei] Sakharov regarding the hydrogen bomb. His regret over the “police action” against Pasternak and the treatment of Yevtushenko; regret over his attitude towards the “new schools” in art. He comes off as such a nice guy, who is sorry *post factum* for the misunderstandings with intelligentsia, and sad that it took him too long to understand the meaning of “creative freedom,” etc.

And yet, Nikita is directly responsible for the fact that for the last ten years we have Demichev and Trapeznikov in their positions. Although the roots of these figures go back to Stalinism.

June 11, 1974

In late May I flew to Switzerland, for the X Congress of the SPL (CP of Switzerland, which is officially called the Swiss Party of Labour) and a trip around the country. Kozyr’ was the head of our delegation, he is the First Secretary of the Odessa Regional Committee. Later Pankov and Yakukhin joined us from France.

In the evening in Zurich we met Igor’ Mel’nikov, a correspondent for *Pravda* in Vienna. A modern hotel on the outskirts of Zurich, by the hillside.

On the morning of the 31st we made a trip to Rhine Falls. Lunch on the banks of the Rhine in Shaffhausen – the town where Lenin departed from Switzerland.

By evening we were in Basel. Dinner in a restaurant with Vincent, Hoffer, Dafflon, Ediger (the hope of the party). The careful first contacts: Ediger looked at me with suspicion, made snarky comments. I think he only started to respect me after the delegation's meeting with the new Politburo in Lausanne, and especially after my speech at the meeting in Geneva that same evening. Before that, at the congress, he was dry and hostile. Same with Magnin. It was only in Lausanne that Vincent appreciated that we came with serious intentions and that I was the one sent there to take care of these serious intentions.

The Congress was from June 1st-3rd. Vincent's report – not a word about the USSR, but everything else evidenced their "return to the family." Kozyr's speech. Practically 80 percent of the audience "did not hear" him. But when he walked onto and off the podium there was rousing applause, a standing ovation. The only other two people who got that kind of welcome were the Spaniards (most likely because there were a good number of Spanish immigrants in the audience) and, of course, Vladimir Teitelboim from Chile. His speech was very powerful. It was mostly about "the lessons," clearly prepared by Karyakin for me (for Ponomarev), which already became one of B.N.'s doctrines "on the lessons of Chile."

Walks around the city. Basel trams. Solzhenitsyn's book in shop windows. Italians in the empty city streets on Sunday as if they were in their Neapolitan or Sicilian village: playing, tinkering, joking with their girls... The sleek, haughty Swiss (Germans) who look down with contempt on this "inferior" race, which, however, makes up a sixth of the country's population. In some factories, as many as 80 percent of the workers are foreigners. Forty-fifty percent is the norm.

In the evening – a meeting with the activists. My first big speech, most of the time was spent on Q&A.

June 12, 1974

A young woman with a question about inflation in the USSR. Gray-haired man of letters, who asked me at the Congress whether he could talk to me about "creative freedom." He asked the following question: how do new ideas form in your society?

I talked a lot, though I did not always sound convincing to myself. Kozyr's explanations about the occasional price difference for potatoes and strawberries in Odessa in the spring (stores vs. farmers markets) caused bewilderment and ironic smiles.

We met with the new Politburo in the People's House in Lausanne. I did most of the talking. Vincent said something along the lines of, "We said everything at the Congress, you heard everything, now you talk about what you think is necessary." The problems of China, Watergate, the European Conference of Communist Parties and the international Conference.³

June 15, 1974

The next morning we went to Bern. A dirty hotel in the city center. I wandered around the city for three hours. A student demonstration on bicycles.

In the evening there was a reception at the embassy – the entire Politburo. The splendor of Vincent as a host (he is a lawyer, well known even outside Switzerland). He and his guests had a European dimension to them, and Kozyr looked like such a mediocrity in comparison.

³ CSCE

They received the CC CPSU greetings to Vincent solemnly and ironically (on the occasion of his election as Chairman of the SPL). Vincent's recollections about his participation in the French Resistance, a pleasant reverie, chatting about trifles, like the kind of bread they had back then, or an umbrella in Karlovy Vary in 1945 – but all of this elegantly presented. This is the skill of filling dead time with conventionalities that weave into politics.

Toward the end of the evening he called Pankov aside and said the following: "The Party is on the verge of a serious scandal. Our newspaper is going under because of inflation. In order to cover a deficit of 200,000 francs, we dipped into the insurance cash of our typographical workers. If people find out, the newspaper will be confiscated and there may even be a court case, i.e. a political scandal that would embarrass the party for a long time. We need your urgent help."

In the morning, Pankov and I stopped by the embassy and sent a ciphered telegram to Moscow through the resident (the Ambassador does not have access to such information). We asked Moscow to help. When we returned to Moscow I found out that the issue was resolved: they are getting \$12,000 above their normal annual rate, immediately.

B.N. was with voters at the time. When he returned, he asked as a matter of formality how things are going with SPL. Maybe he didn't even need more than the information we sent in the two ciphered telegrams? For his politics!

Today he is in a state of euphoria again; he is getting ready to go to France as the head of a delegation to discuss the conference of European CPs. I found out that he asked Zagladin to tell me, as soon as I returned, to start working on materials for "the Six" (a meeting of CP CC Secretaries of the Warsaw Pact countries), which will take place on June 26th. I was supposed to head Zhilin's group in Serebryanyi Bor. However, Zagladin did not tell me this. This "appointment" of Zhilin came up when both of us, Zagladin and I, were sitting in B.N.'s office. B.N. got angry; he understood that "unprincipled considerations" were behind this (i.e. behind Zagladin's maneuver). B.N. said to me, "Don't hesitate to take things into your own hands."

Yesterday Brezhnev gave a speech to his constituents. I only managed to hear parts of it on the radio, because I had to work during the Kremlin meeting. There were some changes to the international section, on which I worked in Volynskoe-2, especially to the sections on Soviet-American relations and disarmament. But it seems "Sparrow" wasn't able to tear it apart at the core. Brezhnev's pronunciation is getting worse. He mangles the simplest words.

Brezhnev's meeting with constituents yesterday reminded me: two weeks ago, at the end of May, I was walking to work and ran into Khavinson (he takes a stroll in a certain direction and then a car picks him up). At the time I had just returned from Volynskoe. "Yes, I know," the wise Khavinson⁴ said, "Kolya (Inozemtsev) told me... He, together with Arbatov and Tsukanov, had seen the General Secretary regarding 'this work of yours' in Volynskoe. Kolya once again came away with the impression that 'nothing will happen.' The General Secretary listens to the

⁴ In the beginning of the "Cold War," Yakov Semyonovich Khavinson regularly wrote for *Pravda* under the pseudonym Marinin, brilliant articles on foreign affairs. During World War II he was in the leadership of the Soviet Information Bureau. He was knocked down during "cosmopolitanism" and was "exiled" to the Institute of Academician Varga, which in the 1950s was transformed into the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Khavinson became the editor-in-chief of the academic journal of the same name. He is a tall and handsome Jew, sarcastically intelligent. At the time [of the diary entry] he was around 70 years old.

arguments, agrees with the proposals, talks about his own concerns, etc... But you look at him and you see that nothing will be done. Inozemtsev told him several times that practically nothing has been done since the December Plenum, just like in 1972. The apparatus and the Council of Ministers are blocking everything. And once again – fitting words and sharp criticism just stir the air. The General Secretary knows this... but nothing will change. What do you think about this, Tolya?"

Once again there was a good speech. But Kosygin, Demichev, and others remain in their positions. Nothing will change.

June 18, 1974

Preparation for "the Six." Visit to Serebryanyi Bor.

Yesterday I met the delegation from the Belgian Socialist Party (sixteen obkom secretaries) in Sheremetyevo airport. Since Zagladin is going to Paris, I'll be busy with them. "A new quality of relations," for the first time in history not with a fraternal party, but with socialist-democrats. I made a speech about how relations between the CPSU and the BSP represent a trend of the future.

A smart article on world economy by Ye. Pletnev in Khavinson's journal.

Tadeusz Jaroszewski "Individual and Society" – for the first time something written sensibly about existentialism. And in general it is an unusual book against the background of our "philosophical" Talmudism.

June 20, 1974

Yesterday morning I went to see Ponomarev off to Paris. He asked me to come just to make a bigger crowd for himself, as he openly told me, "There's nobody around from the CC Secretaries."

Then I went to Serebryanyi Bor to finish up the document – directives for "The Six."

In the evening I went to Bolshoi Theater to see La Scala's *Norma* by Bellini. Beau monde. At times I was nearly chocking with laughter. The actions on stage profane the music and the truly powerful voices. And even though at the end the artists were bombarded with flowers (literally, not figuratively), I left the theater convinced once and for all that opera is dead as an art form, or worse – it is laughable. Only a professional or a snob can seriously dispute this. You have to be a very primitive or limited person to truly enjoy this kind of art.

Today I was invited to SovExportFilm to see Fellini's new picture *I remember*. A very characteristically Italian film. The personality of the city and way of life, expressed in a setting from the 1930s. Very precise analysis by purely cinematic means. Character types, situations. However, there is also a fair share of Fellini's antics.

July 6, 1974

On June 26th, "the Six" met and decided everything: the dates, the schedule of preparation for the European Conference of CPs. Persuaded Axen (SED) to propose for the CPSU to prepare all the documents for the conference, and then coordinate everything with the five-six others.

[Gyula Horn, deputy at the International Department of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the young man who was my interpreter in 1960 when we went from Prague to Lake Balaton for a vacation. He practically hasn't changed, even though it's been 15 years. Back then his translation was something like this: "A stallion's wife" (meaning a mare).]

Now the Poles are going to Rome to put together a confidential letter (already coordinated with us) from the Italian Communist Party and Polish United Worker's Party to all European CPs with an invitation to a consultative meeting in Warsaw in late September.

The PB made a resolution based on the results of "the Six." According to this resolution, we are supposed to prepare drafts of the conference Declaration (analytical document) and the "Appeal to the Peoples of Europe" over the next month and a half. Following B.N.'s orders we are moving to the Gorky dacha (B.N. lives nearby and will come visit us).

It makes me furious. When I took a closer look at the topic, I realized how much work needs to be done, how we need to get into the material, try at least a dozen versions, find the right words, combine the existing Brezhnev formulas with the West-Communist ones from Brussels, etc., etc. But the consultants couldn't care less. If I rub their nose in it – no problem, they'll do it how I tell them. But they couldn't be bothered to spend their own time and effort on it when they could be playing billiards, chess, or running down to the river. Why should they, Chernyaev will take care of it! What's the problem! Everything works out in the end.

The only other person who is worried about this decay is Brutents. He is truly a spiritually rich, remarkable guy. And he is probably the only one with whom I can talk openly about everything, knowing that I will be understood and that it is interesting to him. In other words, he is my friend, despite all the reservations over the fact that we have such vastly different personalities.

By the way, we had a "friendly" dinner in Volynskoe after we finished preparing the speech for Brezhnev. An episode took place that may have some consequences. Kolya (Inozemtsev, academician and Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, candidate member to the CC, etc.) was already tipsy and made his second toast "to the International Department," for its role in Party policies, in our social development, etc. Arbatov, Shaposhnikov and others quickly jumped in. They sensed that this could take the wrong turn and rushed to say that the International Department is just supporting the important work of the CC and so on. But it was already too late – Gavrilov was at the table, he is Demichev's adviser and close friend and drinking buddy, and at the same time Karen's friend. He immediately caught on and started getting ready to leave. People got him to stay and talked about the unity of international affairs and propaganda, trying to play down the awkwardness, knowing that "this topic" should not have been raised in the presence of this scumbag informer.

Returning to the European Conference, I have to mention the following. The original idea for the foundation of the conference was to combine détente and struggle for socialism in Europe. That's how we envisioned the difference between this new conference and Karoly Vary. We wanted to use this to attract and interest the Western CPs. They keep suspiciously watching our peaceful coexistence with governments and leaders against whom they are waging a fierce political war. When B.N. was visiting Paris (before the meeting of "the Six"), he probed Marchais on the subject. And what happened? It turns out that they (French Communist Party) don't want to raise "social issues" at the pan-European conference at all. The moral of the story: do your détente, since there is really no alternative, but we will keep doing our thing, with a

long-term goal of our “own,” Western European, truly developed socialism. You, the socialist countries, should not meddle in this, you would only harm our relationship with our allies (the Social Democrats), and harm us in the eyes of public opinion, because we do not want the kind of socialism you have in the USSR and in the “people’s democracies,” and moreover, “our masses” do not want it either.

Nevertheless, B.N. thinks that we will not abandon the idea of combining peaceful coexistence with “social progress” and “class struggle.” It’s a matter of language!

Nixon’s visit from June 27th-July 3rd. There is less noise, but the condominium is emerging quite realistically. There was an episode with the draft PB resolution on the outcomes of the visit. As always, B.N. took it upon himself to prepare it, even though he did not have a direct connection to the talks. He assigned it to Kuskov. At the last moment, after editing it personally, he couldn’t resist and gave it to me to look at. I drew his attention to the fact that a Party document cannot repeat the formulas of a joint communiqué, making it look like the Politburo of the CPSU seriously believes that “American imperialism” will fight for the progress of humanity, for justice in the Middle East, for the interest of all peoples, etc. B.N. got wound up. He declared that he was also correcting “along these lines,” but didn’t get around to those parts... He swore at Kuskov, who huffs and puffs about a “class approach” to everything in the world, but missed something like this.

Yesterday a similar thing happened with preparation of information for the CPs on the outcomes of Nixon’s visit.

July 13, 1974

We are putting together a “draft of the outline of the plan of the prospectus of the Declaration” (this is how my consultants dubbed the task – five words in a row in the Genitive case) for the Pan-European Conference of Communist Parties, and it’s not even clear whether it will happen. Although according to Frelek, who was in Rome, the Italians agreed to send the PCI-PUWP letter to all the European CPs, but they smudged all the specifics.

B.N. visited us at the Gorky dacha. For two hours he talked about his idea, the gist of which was to show in the “document” the crucial role of socialism for Europe, and to “mobilize” everyone against anti-Sovietism.

However, when I visited him yesterday about other matters, he was already saying something different, that the Western CPs are a majority, and we keep talking about ourselves all the time... This is Katushev’s influence, B.N. met with him the day before. Shakhnazarov brought Katushev’s opinion to the dacha two days earlier. But Katushev has his own crazy ideas. For example, to show that we, the socialist countries, approve and support the Western CPs’ line for the “popular front” (as a prospect for revolution). I explained to Shakhnazarov that what these Western CPs are afraid of most is our “approval” of their domestic policies, since it immediately makes their “allies” and the general population suspect that it is “Moscow’s line.”

He is also suggesting to include an item into the Program for European Peace, which we are writing for the conference, on the creation of a Pan-European cultural center in West and East Berlin! (Like the CSCE “Third Basket” in Geneva!)

In general, this “theoretical” work reflects the growing “divergence” between real policies and ideology. It is very noticeable in the inner-Party document – the CC information on

the outcomes of Nixon's visit. The entire section dealing with the assessment of our policy towards the United States leads one to conclude that our constructive and improving relations with the U.S. are not only helping to avoid war, but contributing to the progress of mankind. Only at the end, in a four-line paragraph that feels like an afterthought, it says that we should remember that we continue to have fundamental differences. There is no mention of the necessity for ideological struggle.

By the way, during B.N.'s speech to us at the dacha, he remarked in passing and with obvious regret (but also with hopelessness in his voice) that we've stopped writing in the newspapers about our struggle against imperialism, but we should at least compensate by struggling against anti-Sovietism.

In this regard, Shishlin (a consultant in Katushev's Department) said an interesting thing yesterday when we were on the porch together, editing the "outline." "You know," he said, "what the General Secretary once said about your Ponomarev? That he keeps going on about imperialism this, imperialism that... While the times have changed. And imperialism looks different depending on who represents it" ... something along those lines.

Yes. The real work that Brezhnev does every day will push us to tone down our ideology above all in our international relations. And our connection to the Communist Movement will feel more and more like an impediment. Our Marxist-Leninist didactics on how they, the Western CPs, should move towards socialism will become increasingly irrelevant, and our attempts to ideologically butt into their affairs will meet increasingly open resistance. The Italians understand this better than anyone, which is why they openly encourage our "realpolitik" (Berlinguer in his conversations with Frelek was most concerned that our European CP Conference should not interfere with Geneva!). We should be the ones concerned about it!

I very much fear that we will get into the preparatory work for the conference, and then Brezhnev-Gromyko will make a face and we'll be the ones to start wrapping it up.

August 3, 1974

From July 16th-25th I was in Finland. Meeting at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland, [Arvo] Aalto is the General Secretary. My impression of him: smart, calm, unhurried like a Finn, handsome, strong, fairly young, knows his worth, self-assured. According to our official view of him – he is the leader of the right-leaning revisionist majority group; organizer of the "right-wing forces" in the Party. The apparatus and the press are in his hands.

For three days I traveled around various pretty towns and attractions of Finland, and was very well received. I've never danced so much or so well.

We spent the whole night over dinner with the ambassador, accompanied by adviser Andreyev. The ambassador is smart and efficient; he used to be our resident there. From our pointed and direct conversation it became clear that our consultants (from the International Department), who often worked in the embassy in Helsinki and formed personal ties to many politicians, conduct their "own" line towards the Communist Party of Finland. To a certain extent, our consultants have artificially constructed the notions of the right wing and left wing of the party. This division became a reality after it was internalized by Suslov, Ponomarev, Pelshe, and others (i.e., our Central Committee). The consultants inform the CC based on what they hear from the left. But the left-wing politicians happen to be dumb and stupid, and their influence

does not extend beyond Turku. And yet, they want to take over the Party with our help. The majority of communists are sick of the “ideological struggle” at the top. At the regional and local level there is no division between right and left, and it does not affect their work.

I agreed with the ambassador’s analysis and promised to do something to “correct” the situation. For example, by ignoring Aalto we embitter him and his followers, and we risk “losing the Party” because it is Aalto and his people who are getting things done and keeping everything in check. We have no facts or reasons to believe they are anti-Soviets. They are trying to do everything they can to show that they are our best friends. And they are not doing it quietly; they are willing to show it in front of the whole nation. If we keep pushing them away and pitting Kainulainen & Co. against them, we will turn them into Aarons’es (the vehemently anti-Soviet leader of the Communist Party of Australia) with our own hands.

I agreed with the ambassador and spoke with Shaposhnikov about this (he oversees Finland in our Department) when I got back. He listened to me with suspicion and made it clear that I should not have interfered in this whole affair, knowing how difficult it would be to overcome the “stereotypes” in the minds of the CC leadership. In particular, it would be difficult to get a positive reaction to the recent letter from the Finnish social democrats to the CC CPSU, containing a proposal to develop inter-party exchanges. (This letter wasn’t even shown to me, though I oversee social democrats in the Department).

The Cyprus crisis broke out while I was in Finland. Archbishop-President Makarios fled; there was a bloodless overthrow of fascism in Athens. Both events are very symptomatic of our time: the NATO imperialists (the British and Americans) prevent war between Turkey and Greece, overthrow the fascist coup (Samson) in Cyprus, and eliminate the fascist regime in Greece!!

August 5, 1974

Yesterday I met McLennan and [Jack] Woddis – members of the Communist Party of Great Britain – at Sheremetyevo airport. They are here to sort things out with the CPSU over “the idea of an international conference,” which we are supposedly (!) pushing on our fraternal parties. Dzhavad correctly assumed that Romanians had a hand in this. It seems after last year’s meeting in the Crimea they presented it like this: “Brezhnev demanded a conference, and of course everyone supported him. But we, Romanians and Ceausescu, we have principles! We stood our ground, we objected, we put down conditions. Now the CPSU is twisting arms of the Communist Parties of capitalist countries. Many are easily giving in. But you, the British, you also have principles, so you should not fall for their tricks, and especially do not give in to pressure. Stand your ground. The Russians need this conference to counter the Chinese. We can’t let them impose this line, it would be the end of our parties’ independence.” It seems the British and Romanians discussed something along these lines.

So here they are. B.N. refused to see them today, he is busy with the Syrian delegation. For three hours I talked to them in my office at the CC. I laid it all out regarding the conference of European CPs and the [preliminary] meeting, except, of course, “the Six,” the Gorky dacha, and the like. We talked about the Chinese and the Jews. I was extremely honest. Woddis could not find arguments to counter me, because really, if you want the ICM to exist and function as a unified body, there are no reasonable arguments. I think they were especially impressed by my openness on the European problem. We’ll see what happens. I’m afraid we may have some

“discrepancies” with Ponomarev, which is quite possible. He may try to be cunning and they will immediately catch on to his “tactics.”

August 10, 1974

Nixon resigned after all. Ponomarev is fussing more than necessary over the “propaganda support” for this event and for Brezhnev’s response to Ford (today the U.S. Ambassador visited Kirilenko and handed him Ford’s letter to Brezhnev). Because of this, B.N. has been keeping me on a leash since yesterday, even though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing and sending all these documents and does not plan on asking for Ponomarev’s advice. Gromyko is on vacation, but yesterday he showed some initiative – an editorial in *Pravda* that looks like a government statement. It was prepared by Zamyatin (TASS) and Afanasyev (*Pravda*), and was called, “The Events in the USA and Soviet Foreign Policy.” After reading the monstrosity, I called B.N., who was already at his dacha, and told him that we cannot print this. He called Kirilenko, who is “in charge” during Brezhnev’s and Suslov’s absence. We managed to interrupt the publication. If it had gone ahead, it would have revealed that we are in a state of panic and sorry to see Nixon go, that we are uncertain whether the CPSU’s policies are built on a solid foundation.

Still, Ponomarev is going to publish a big article in *Pravda*, and I will have to start working on it immediately, on top of Brezhnev’s response to Ford, which has to be made “less formal” and “with more humanity.”

Everything is fine with the British delegation. B.N. was in top form. He immediately dispelled their fears about the [preliminary] meeting by saying that it is a long-term project and only in the conceptual stages right now, first we have to finish the CSCE... They expected that we would twist their arm. Woddis, who had earlier assured us that they first heard about the conference from the joint PUWP-PCI letter the day they left London, on the spot developed a whole program for the conference. He made a very enthusiastic speech on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain regarding the CC CPSU’s foreign policy, the likes of which we haven’t heard from the Brits since Harry Pollitt, and not at all after Czechoslovakia. We haven’t heard anything like this from our closest friends, like the French...

The next day at Plotnikov Street we had a conversation about Ireland, and I saw them off at Sheremetyevo Airport.

Ponomarev was at the Gorky dacha in the evening of the 6th, the day when we received the Brits. He was complaining about the draft speech that was prepared for him for the Consultative meeting. He said that kind of speech would be appropriate at an assembly of pacifists, not at a meeting of Communists. At the core it contradicts the Marxist thesis that war is inevitable so long as capitalism exists. I immediately interjected – what about the other thesis, that it is possible to eliminate war even before the complete victory of socialism in the world? Everybody laughed and on this joke (i.e. consideration for the old man) we changed the subject.

However, it’s an ongoing problem with the Comintern-minded Ponomarev: how to reconcile his deeply-rooted class nature, his vocal vigilance over NATO’s machinations and the arms race – with Brezhnev’s line. With Aleksandrov-Agentov’s help, Brezhnev states in every one of his speeches that the main trend of modern development is the tendency to peace and security, and that it is possible to create a world order that would exclude war. In a word, here we go with the “accordion” again, back and forth.

B.N. is demanding that I give him a draft speech for Brezhnev for the European Conference of Communist Parties (even though it will take place in February-March of 1975, i.e. after Brezhnev will make many more speeches, including at the CSCE). B.N. needs it now so he can put his best foot forward when he goes on vacation and will be somewhere near Brezhnev.

Balmashnov went off his rocker, he was Ponomarev's assistant. Krasin found him in the service stairwell, one leg already over the rails. He was sent to a psychiatric hospital.

August 18, 1974

The week was very busy. Before Ponomarev left for vacation I had to finish the drafts for the Consultative meeting (declaration, Appeal to the People of Europe, B.N.'s speech at the meeting, and a "script" outlining with whom to meet from which parties, whom to pressure, whom to persuade, who can take an "assignment," how to distribute between the parties the issues that we do not feel comfortable raising ourselves, etc.).

Brutents was taken from our team to Serebryany Bor to work with Shishlin and Shakhnazarov on Brezhnev's speech for the 25th anniversary of the GDR.

I had to meet one more time with [William] Kashtan (General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada) on his return trip from Bulgaria to finish telling him everything he wanted to hear but did not have a chance to at the official meeting with B.N.

Yesterday (Saturday) I also had to meet with O'Riordan, who is returning to Ireland today, and explain to him about the Consultative meeting, about the Conference, the Romanians, Yugoslavs, etc.

B.N. stopped by the Gorky dacha, after asking me beforehand to invite Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tolya Kovalyov, who recently returned from the talks in Geneva. We had a big discussion about the prospects of the European state consultations. Tolya laid everything out very clearly: if we want to finish it this year, and to complete this whole undertaking (the Helsinki Conference) successfully, we have to take some steps. For example, nobody can accept or even understand our position on confidence-building measures. We do not agree to notify about troop maneuvers at a distance greater than 100km from the border, and even this we only want to tell our neighbors. However, for practically the majority of European nations, 100km is their entire territory. And what does it mean to only notify the neighbors? Poland, for example, will only do it for its allies in the Warsaw Pact, who will know about these maneuvers long beforehand even without this notification. It's obviously absurd. But B.N. told us how this issue was discussed at the Politburo. Grechko (Minister of Defense) strongly rejected the proposals of the "Geneva negotiators" to notify about maneuvers at a distance of 500km from the border, because that way, he said, "they" will know everything about us. Meanwhile, Tolya told us about the following episode. In Geneva, two Americans from the U.S. delegation approached him and asked, "What was going on in Ryazan three days ago?" "I don't know," Tolya said, "Why do you ask?" "There were surprisingly many *Chaika* cars standing on the square by the regional committee, and they didn't have Ryazan tags." "How do you know this?" Tolya asked. "What do you mean, how do we know? Don't you know that the photos you can obtain from satellites can be as detailed as license plates, or the pattern of someone's tie?"

On the "third point" (the exchange of people and ideas) it's also pretty bad. "We," Tolya told us, "are following our directives and emphatically objecting to the creation of various cultural centers in the USSR; centers where people could freely read literature from France,

England, the FRG, etc.; where people could buy any newspaper they liked, watch movies, etc. We are alone in our stubbornness. Our brothers and allies in the negotiations just sit quietly, because these kinds of centers already exist in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, not to mention Yugoslavia."

To make a long story short, what Ponomarev took away from the conversation with Kovalyov, as I understood from his meeting with deputies before going on vacation, was the following: it's unlikely that the Helsinki Conference will end this year. "And in general, it's not clear yet how it will go, since they are demanding such things from us..."

After Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the country, Yura Karyakin again requested to go to Prague. I am sure that it will not happen. Zarodov (editor-in-chief of the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*) and others who would make the decision about Yura's candidacy know him inside out. When I talked about it with Zarodov, he did not object directly, but said, "Send him for a review. We'll see how it goes... I am sure that he is involved in the Solzhenitsyn affair and other such things." (A review is a request sent to the KGB for information from their files on whether there are "questionable" elements in the file. The review is accompanied by a recommendation on whether the person can be allowed to go abroad). I did not send a review request; I didn't want to draw the KGB's attention to Yura for this. I think they have something along these lines on him, even though Karyakin carefully hides his connections from me. That's the fate of an official: you can be someone's friend a thousand times over, but he still won't trust you! In any case, now any connection he had with Solzhenitsyn is history, same as his friendship with Korzhavin, Maksimov, Yakir and the others – they all emigrated.

Yura told me that Erik Neizvestnyi is also planning to "go." I made a speech about this. Karyakin agreed with me, even though he initially intended to justify Neizvestnyi. I don't know, maybe the latter changed his mind already. It would be a great loss for us.

September 29, 1974

B.N. decided to school our fraternal parties in economic policies in case they come to power. He was inspired to do this on his trip to Italy. And before that, the story with Allende in Chile, then the Portuguese revolution. He remembered Lenin's works, *Impending Catastrophe and How to Fight It*, and *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power*. B.N. decided to follow Lenin's example and publish an article based on the current crisis in the West. Back when we were at the Gorky dacha, Diligensky (scholar from IMEMO) and I, and partially Lesha Kozlov wrote about forty pages on the subject, with references to the Communist Party's economic programs. I sent it to B.N. [while he was on vacation] in the South. Yesterday he responded: "No good." His tactlessness is incredible. We wrote an article for him, even if it is "no good," he doesn't even try to pretend that he is co-authoring it with us, that he will edit it to his liking. He just demands that we make it "good." After talking to him, I realized that he has an old-fashioned conception of a crisis, in the spirit of the exertions of the Red Professors of the 1930s. He doesn't even know that Communist Parties have been developing this line thoroughly; many things have been reconsidered from the former models. He wants to present his "teachings" on the modern crisis but he doesn't have a clue about Keynesian economics. He thinks it is some apologia for capitalism and only has to do with the struggle against Marxism, but no relation to the very real policies of state-monopoly capitalism through which the West and Japan rapidly developed over the last quarter of a century, at more powerful rates than socialism ever achieved.

I am writing this down to remind myself once again of the intellectual and moral atmosphere I work in.

And this is not even the worst of it. I believe I wrote earlier about the story with Volume V of the “History of the CPSU” and the consequences for our Zaitsev, who was the editor of that volume. B.N. was a member of the editorial board of the whole publication. Well, Zaitsev has been in a psychiatric hospital for three months now. In the meantime, a new team of authors prepared a new text. Fedoseyev sent it to B.N. The latter told me to take a look at it. Krasin and I looked at it... There is no mention of VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the Soviet Union] and Lysenko, no “Muddle Instead of Music” (about Shostakovich), no philosophical discussion with Aleksandrov, no linguistics, no “economic problems of socialism” with Stalin, and of course no Cosmopolitanism, the “doctors’ plot,” or the Leningrad affair. It doesn’t even mention the Agricultural Plenum of 1963. No changes are reflected since Stalin’s death, and the time is counted in Five-Year Plans (1946-50, 1950-55). Everything is nice and smooth. The Party anticipated everything and did everything right, including in ideology.

I told B.N. about this. But the point I stressed was not that there’s not a shred of scholarship in the volume, but that it could end up like the recent story with Soviet abstract artists. I wanted to warn B.N. of what could happen when all of this reaches the General Secretary.

Last Sunday eleven artists got the idea to give a preview of their works on some vacant lot on the outskirts of Moscow. Among these artists were people who had their works exhibited for sale (to benefit the State, of course) in New York and London at the direction of the Ministry of Culture. Before exhibiting in the vacant lot, they applied for permission from the Moscow City Council. They did not get a response and decided that silence was a form of consent. Their exhibition was ruthlessly broken up with fire hoses and bulldozers. The paintings were confiscated, some destroyed. Two people were arrested and jailed for five days, while foreign journalists and one diplomat were harassed. This affair instantly received international publicity. Newspapers and “voices” raised a huge fuss. Fraternal newspapers *L’Humanité*, *L’Unità*, *Morning Star*, and even *Land og Folk* condemned the actions, and announced that their communist parties would follow a “completely different cultural policy” if they came to power.

A few days later, the paintings were returned to the artists. Apologies were issued. An exhibit was allowed in Izmailovo Park. It turns out that Aleksandrov-Agentov sent Brezhnev a note expressing outrage about the situation. The gist of it was: “How much longer can we keep shitting in our own pockets?” Right away there was an order to allow the exhibition and punish those responsible, who will probably end up being... the bulldozer drivers.

So, I reminded B.N. of this story and said, “When all these ‘voices’ will start laughing at this version of the CPSU history, our communist friends will not dare to stand up for us. On the contrary, they will have to support, in their own way, the campaigns against the USSR. In short, we are shitting in our pockets again.”

B.N. heard me out, and then changed the subject. But I started on a similar topic again. In August there was a congress of sociologists in Toronto. A consultant from our Department, philosopher Krasin, went there. The [Soviet] delegation was headed by Academician Konstantinov and Institute Director Rutkevich. Yura (Krasin) told us it was a disgrace of unprecedented proportions. Not only the Americans, but even our Poles could not understand what was happening – it seemed like for a number of years we had been moving in the direction

of common sense, closer to science. And suddenly we were singing psalms of the “Short Course” again. People like Zamoshkin tried to save face in their speeches and especially in informal conversations, which, by the way, they were able to hold in the foreign language of their interlocutor. But in the report that was sent to the CC CPSU there is no word about these guys, only Rutkevich & Co. are lauded. I suggested informing Fedoseyev. Yura visited him. He said Fedoseyev was at a loss about Rutkevich in general, whom he once pushed against me in the debate on “who makes up the working class.” “I,” Krasin said, “took that to mean that Yagodkin (Secretary of the Moscow City Committee) is behind Rutkevich, and Demichev (CC CPSU Secretary of Ideology) is backing them at the top. People in Moscow know that this gang is targeting Fedoseyev and accusing him of protecting various revisionists.

In mid-September the city of Novorossiysk was awarded the title of Hero City. Brezhnev bestowed the award. There was the expected media coverage: emotional visit to “Malaya Zemlya,” tears and embraces, appropriate words... and then articles equating Novorossiysk, which secured the entire left flank of the Soviet-German front, to Stalingrad. Brezhnev is portrayed as having played a decisive role as a colonel and chief of the Army’s political section. A week later, when Grechko was bestowing the same award on Kerch, Shcherbitsky called Brezhnev “a great soldier and outstanding commander” in his speech.

A film has been released on the award of the Hero Star to Novorossiysk.

By the way, in the aforementioned Volume V of “History of the CPSU,” the country’s industry was restored because Zaporozhstal was restored, where Brezhnev was the Party organizer. And new lands were developed because Brezhnev was sent as second secretary to Kazakhstan.

On October 11th he will be making a speech in Kishinev on the 50th anniversary of the Moldavian Autonomous (!) Republic.

Almost every day there is something in the newspapers and on radio and television about Brezhnev: letters to Brezhnev, or his speeches on the opening of some factory, power plant, construction site, or some initiative, or the victory of some collective in the socialist competition. Not to mention that practically every day Brezhnev welcomes some kind of international conference, and of course they are “very impressed” by these greetings, and then give reciprocal greetings.

Also not a week goes by without someone being awarded the Hero of Socialist Labor. Last week it was Grishin, a PB member, for his 60th birthday. This week it’s a dozen writers, among them Simonov, Kataev, Boris Polevoi, Georgiy Markov, and other such mediocrities.

Kanapa arrived to prepare the Consultative meeting and the European Conference of Communist Parties. Lunch at Plotnikov Street. His smugness.

A lot of small tasks. Social democrats. Guyla Horn (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party).

Yuri Ivanov (Zionism) – a pathological anti-Semite as a consultant in our International Department.

I am reading the manuscript of Volume I of the history (and theory) of the International Communist Movement. High level. Even the familiar things are well written. Will it be possible to publish it?

October 3, 1974

Half the day with Guyla Horn. He is very active and ready to implement the decisions of "the Six." I tried to restrain him, since we will be the ones to essentially implement them, i.e. to write the final collective texts.

Yesterday B.N. called Zagladin and me to tell us about Suslov's comments on the draft Declaration for the European Conference of Communist Parties. Earlier I wrote about Ponomarev's tendencies, but compared to Suslov even Ponomarev looks like a liberal.

Suslov ordered to remove words like "cooperation," "good neighborly relations," "a system of European peace." He crossed out (and cursed for a long time, B.N. said) the proposal to create a pan-European energy and transport system (even though Brezhnev talked about this repeatedly). He drew a thick line striking out the points on troop disengagement, the liquidation of bases on foreign territories, and prevention of confrontation on the seas. In his view, all of this is not Party language and not the Party approach. B.N. conveyed Suslov's words, "Of course, we say these things for propaganda purposes. But we only do it because we are certain that the imperialists will never agree to military détente. These measures we are clamoring for are not advantageous for us. Our troops play a very important role in foreign countries, they provide... (and he showed a clenched fist)."

I tried to object, saying that we did not include anything in the draft that was not in the documents from the Congress, the CC Plenums, and Brezhnev's speeches. But at this point B.N. said on his own behalf, "Do not overestimate détente, Anatoly Sergeyevich!" Of course, we fixed everything like we were told.

Today Frelek arrived (Deputy of the International Department of PUWP) to coordinate the final positions before the Consultative Meeting in Poland. I was not invited to these meetings. It seems the people who will go to Warsaw will not be the people who worked on the drafts and ideas.

October 4, 1974

To continue regarding my conjecture from yesterday.

In the morning Ponomarev summoned me to his office. I came.

"I need to speak with you."

"Here I am."

"Why weren't you at our meeting with the Poles yesterday?"

"Because nobody asked me to be there!"

Silence... then he went on.

"Yesterday Zagladin proposed to include himself and Shakhnazarov in the delegation to the Warsaw Consultative Meeting. He said other parties are sending 4-5 people and that's a good idea, because there will be various committees and such..."

“Boris Nikolaevich, I understand. You are uncomfortable adding two of your deputies to the delegation. Out of the two of us, Zagladin is the obvious choice. But I will not go as an adviser, I hope you can understand that.”

“So you will not go to Warsaw at all?”

“No, I will not. It’s good that Shakhnazarov is going. In connection with this whole issue, I would ask that you allow me to distance myself from this conference and everything related to it. I won’t pretend that I did not invest a great deal into this project... But it seems to me the issue of prestige is not as important as to some others. I have plenty of work to do besides: the social democrats with Hungarians and “the Six;” the economic policies of Western European Communist Parties; the multi-volume publication on the Labor Movement; and now your article on the role of socialism in the revolutionary process (for the 25th anniversary of the socialist system). Plus, there has to be some kind of concentration of responsibility. What have we had so far? Today I am in charge, tomorrow Zagladin. We crowd each other, interrupt each other... this is unnecessary. So far it has worked out alright, but it is time to make a decision. So I ask you to release me from this issue.”

“Why do you put it like that, Anatoly Sergeyevich! Your participation is important for the cause. On the other hand, you are right. After all, Zhilin is also working on this subject. (I kept my mouth shut!) Alright, I will think about it... But I wanted to have a comradely talk about it with you...”

I turned around and left.

This is all nonsense, of course. The only unpleasant part here is that Zhilin (with Zagladin) will feel victorious: how they smacked Chernyaev, despite all his huffing and puffing, trying to act like he is in charge of this whole thing!

When Brutents found out about what happened, that’s exactly how he saw it.

Just now a reception is starting at the “Arbat” restaurant on the occasion of the GDR’s 25th anniversary. I didn’t go.

I spent the day with Gyula Horn again, going over social democrat issues. We had lunch on Plotnikov Street.

October 7, 1974

Volobuyev visited me today, he’s a retired director of the Institute of History. Told me all kinds of things about our academic world. Scenes from meetings of senile academicians, how they nominate candidates for the next election to the Academy of Sciences. Ass-kissing and swindling completely in the open. Nobody is ashamed anymore, because they all know that this is the only way to get in. Trapeznikov exploits this readiness of scholars of all levels to sell their soul and publicly grovel. It gives him the opportunity to organize any kind of witch hunt for revisionism that he wants. Not only decent people, but even those who allowed themselves the liberty of staying neutral are expelled from academic councils, from their positions, and sometimes from whole Institutes. It’s a vulgar mess of carping along the lines of 1949 in historical publications, in reports, in everything... People are so scared they are losing their humanity.

Volobuyev whines, rails against everything, he's dissatisfied with everything. It's unpleasant to look at him in this role because he built his whole career on the things he is outraged by now – unscrupulousness, cynicism, demagoguery, anti-Semitism, "what can I do for you," and so on. And now, what do you know, it turns out he is a good guy. But his discontent is not just the grumbling of someone who was thrown off the cart. It goes deeper... and one feels afraid – not for him, not for yourself, or the people around you, but for the country.

In the meantime we see our General Secretary on TV kissing Honecker, giving speeches, hanging new medals on his breast, waving his hand to the organized German crowds, etc.

October 8, 1974

It was 21 years after Lenin's death in 1945. In 1974 it is 21 years since Stalin's death. By 1945, what was left of Lenin? Only the general things – that if it hadn't been for Lenin, history after 1917 would have taken a different course. What is left of Stalin after the same amount of time? Everything! With the exception of mass repressions of anybody and everybody. This is the continuity of the "structure." This is self-propagation of mediocrity, once it seized power!

In the morning, B.N. summoned me to his office and silently handed me the CC decision regarding Warsaw. My name was there. He looked at me triumphantly, as if presenting me with a dime. I already knew about it, so I indifferently handed the paper back to him. Right away he showered me with comments on papers (related to Warsaw) from which I had consciously distanced myself over the last few days.

Meeting with Galkin. Circulation of the manuscript of Volume I of the "History of the Labor Movement". I was the only one who signed it.

Meeting with Butenko (specialist on the socialist system at the Academy of Sciences). B.N. assigned him to prepare an article for PSS on the role of world socialism in the world revolutionary process (the 30th anniversary of the socialist system). This is what he is most interested in right now.

Tomorrow "the Six" deputies of International Departments are meeting in a secret apartment on Sivtsev Vrazhek Lane to work on a script for Warsaw. Today there is a meeting with Suika (Deputy Head of PUWP) at Zagladin's to coordinate the Poles' "own" proposal!

I am reading a very thick book by Giorgio Bocca, *Palmiro Togliatti* – facts about the life of a man who adapted to Stalin out of necessity in order to become a great man and oppose Stalin's legacy.

October 13, 1974

Thirty years ago, we were taking Riga under battalion commander Tolmachev. On the radio I heard that this date is being celebrated.

Yesterday was the anniversary of Moldavia (it was also presented like a "50th anniversary," even though it is the 50th anniversary of Moldavian ASSR, without Bessarabia). Once again the General Secretary did not leave the TV screen and newspaper pages. All the first secretaries of the republics were there. Like they have nothing better to do at home right now. As far as I can tell, the main political point of this is to formally make a statement (addressed to Ceausescu, of course) to the whole world, in the presence of such (!) a group of people, that:

- 1) In 1918, the imperialists used Romania's reactionary regime to steal Bessarabia from the motherland;
- 2) In 1940, justice had finally been done and all of Moldovan people together with Bessarabia voluntarily joined the Soviet Union **forever**.

This should interest the big press in the West. Ceausescu will be furious. On top of everything, a grand military parade was organized (for extra confirmation) in Kishinev.

However, the public does not see any point in these performances [sic, *performances* is written in English], except the wish to demonstrate again and again the "personal contribution." All that people notice are the speech defects, the absurdities of the "protocol," etc. In other words, from the perspective of building authority, all these countless anniversaries and speeches are backfiring.

Tomorrow I am going to Poland for the Consultative Meeting of the 28 European Communist Parties.

October 26, 1974

From the 14th-19th I was in Warsaw.

A separate lounge train car for Ponomarev and Katushev. Dinners there till 2am. Zhilin in the role of arrogant buffoon. Familiarity with Katushev.

"The Six" in Warsaw, at the villa assigned to Ponomarev.

"Swedish" hotel where everyone else lived, including people from other countries.

Behind the scenes work together with the Poles on the problem of the two Greek parties. We knew that at the minimum, the Romanians may raise the issue of inviting the "internal" Communist Party of Greece and that the Italians may support them. A phone call was intercepted from Sergi (ICP) to Athens, he advised the "interiors" to send a telegram to Warsaw. In response, an urgent analogous request from Líster⁵ in Paris was organized, as well as an interview in Rome of a representative of the "Manifesto" Party⁶ by a "neutral" reporter, saying that "Manifesto" supposedly also had some "interest" in Warsaw. Both of these things were "subtly" brought to the attention of Romanians, Italians, and Spaniards. They backed off...

However, Andrei (Secretary of the Communist Party of Romania) could not resist and mentioned the problem of the "united delegation of the Communists from Greece." In response the Greek delegation circulated a very rude written protest. And at the closing session Kanapa made a brief remark to say that the party that is teaching us here about independence and non-interference (i.e. Romanians) is the only one among those present to interfere in the affairs of another party.

In general the Romanians look quite comical and trigger mild contempt by their annoying repetition about non-intervention and independence. Indeed, the atmosphere of the relations between the parties has changed so much that nobody really feels any interference or pressure from us. Moreover, everybody knows that they may disagree with us on any question, and "nothing will happen." For our part, we refrain from raising issues that can meet with

⁵ Enrique Líster – hero of the Spanish Civil War – created a small pro-Soviet party to counterbalance the official Communist Party of Spain, which had become revisionist.

⁶ A small group that split from the ICP and held leftist views.

“disagreement.” For example, when we were still in Moscow before the trip, B.N. offered to remove the paragraph about the Chinese from his speech. And that was wise. It immediately disarmed all potential opposition and brought a sigh of relief from the people who would have considered it their duty to follow us and speak on the subject (mainly the socialist countries).

We did not expect anything unexpected from the Yugoslavs. But their very presence aroused curiosity. They made their usual incantations: against blocs, about grounds for non-alignment as a condition of independence, about the movement itself as the main international force, etc. Nevertheless, they are here and they agree to stay.

Looking at the participants you can physically sense the inexpressible craving to demonstrate themselves as an international movement. Explanation: hard and uncertain times are coming, and it’s better to “stick together” to be on the safe side; or at least not to offend Moscow, whose help might be necessary at any moment. The small fry, the ones who are almost unnoticed at home, have a demonstrative need to appear as a part of an international whole. The loyal ones from the small fry, like the Luxembourger Urbany or the West German Schroeder and others, directly asked Zagladin for talking points. In other words, they don’t really need this whole affair. But if the CPSU needs it, you are welcome, they are ready to do whatever is necessary because “the CPSU knows what it is doing,” and a lot depends on it everywhere.

For our part, we need a demonstration of unity to remain an ideological superpower: it is both our external and internal capital.

The immediate political significance of the forthcoming conference is zero. It will not change anything and will not influence anything, same as the European Conference of States (in Geneva). Ponomarev tells us, his team, about that almost every day. Everyone understands this.

Even on the theoretical front... At a communist meeting we can’t openly say everything about the current situation in the world and in Europe. Because we cannot politically oppose ourselves to our “class enemies” to the extent that is conceivable in terms of our Marxist-Leninist theory, and to the extent that our fraternal parties from capitalist countries would like us to. We need a real economic peace that does not depend on the communists. The other day I read some materials on our economic ties with capitalist countries. There are some very impressive things there; we are integrally tied to the capitalist economy.

Next to this you have problems that no Communist movement can solve. A week ago Kissinger gave a philosophical interview to Reston. Kissinger appears there as an “historian,” not as a government official. He starts by saying that all civilizations eventually died after exhausting their ideological resources and historical imagination. His task, as he sees it, is to push back the end of the present civilization. It is threatened by hunger and limited energy resources. The food problem will become catastrophic. (By the way, recently Krishnan – one of the leaders of the Indian CP – met with B.N. He said there are already cases of starvation. There is a rising wave of right-wing reaction on these grounds and Indira faces the very real threat of a coup. Krishnan asked for 2 million tons of grain to save the situation. Indira asked Brezhnev the same thing a month ago. Alas, they were refused both times).

Inflation hovers above all of this (inflation is the result of the exhaustion of Keynesian capitalist development) and threatens complete chaos.

We, the USSR, are operating on the assumption that we can “sit it out” when it comes to these disasters. But Kissinger thinks we will not be able to do that. To some extent he is right.

For example, we already told our socialist friends that we will not be able to continue selling them oil at 16 rubles per ton when the prices on the global market are 80-120 rubles per ton. But if we raise the price of oil and other raw materials then the economies of our fraternal countries, which were developed under our influence and pressure, will collapse in a few months. The political implications of this are clear!

A new fascism is looming over us worldwide, it grows out of the crisis. There may also be a new war, or several small wars to start.

With the rise of the crisis, communists are gaining points and their advance toward the government sphere is becoming more noticeable. But the ruling circles not only see it, they are beginning to openly say that the army is now necessary for internal purposes.

Interesting times are coming in general. I haven't seen anything sensible in all the material I read regarding what may happen in the short term. And who would dare to make such predictions.

Warsaw is an impressive modern city. Even though the Poles say that they rebuilt the historic part of the city from old blueprints (which they probably did), there are some modern additions: blocks of high-rise buildings, highways with intertwined junctions, passages and galleries of shopping centers, "Swedish" hotels and so on. Warsaw no longer has a provincial feel like Prague, Berlin, and even Budapest. It is a Western city, which in places reminds one of Dutch cities.

Striptease in the "House of Science and Culture" – a high-rise building similar to the one we have on Kotelnicheskaya Embankment, which was built by Stalin as a gift to Warsaw! Beautiful girls. One was particularly good, she shook her stuff two meters away from Ponomarev, who naturally was sitting together with other members of PUWP in the place of honor. I noticed a while ago that B.N. has a taste for such Western entertainment. I wonder how his orthodox mind squares with the fact that this is a normal type of evening or holiday entertainment for leaders of our fraternal socialist countries; and that in the "developing" socialism in Poland and Hungary this business is becoming more and more common.

Warsaw stores, unlike ours, have everything! Any quality you wish – from mass consumer goods of the sort you find in our stores, to the best quality products you can find in the West, including things made in Poland. But these are fantastically expensive. Maybe not more expensive than at home... but at home these things are only available in a section of GUM that is closed to the public.

November 3, 1974

On Friday B.N. invited me to a conversation with Cunhal. History is being made in front of our eyes. A great deal depends on this person right now, and not just in Portugal. Cunhal spoke quickly and with some embarrassment, as if he was at confession. He told Ponomarev what was happening, who is who, what he plans to do and what he expects.

Rather inarticulately, B.N. schooled Cunhal on how to save and advance the revolution: know what's going on in the army; have your own intelligence (under the Party's Central Committee); ensure the security of the leaders (we can provide you with five-six people and the necessary weapons); and, of course, keep an eye on the CIA.

I remember how in 1962 the late Tereshkin invited me to a conversation with Cunhal when the latter had just escaped from prison and came to Moscow. Could I imagine then how things would turn out? I probably thought about the hopelessness of his cause and his personal heroism. He made a big impression on me back then, but he was crushed. And now he is leading a revolution.

November 8, 1974

Boring day. Yesterday I was at the parade. The whole time a mixture of rain and snow was coming down, I got drenched and of course was not wearing a hat. And in general... even compared to our consultants I must look pretty shabby in my old gray coat and cheap shoes. I make up for it by my ability to wear clothes well. But I am always puzzled by how people (even these consultants) whose salary is at least 70 rubles below mine, always manage to dress nicer and look better-off than me. If it wasn't for my trips abroad, I wouldn't have any decent clothes! Where do people get the extra money? Or rather – why don't I ever have any extra money?

The stands were unusually crowded. I don't remember the last time there were so many people, you could barely squeeze through the crowd. For the first time, Grechko's speech didn't have the famous line, "but the forces of imperialism are still a threat, so we will continue on..." This theme was presented more elegantly. Moreover, he went beyond his usual subject and said for the first time at this level that in the conditions of détente, the class struggle is intensifying.

The parade ended and everyone waited for the demonstrators. But time went on, and they were nowhere to be seen. Then street cleaning machines appeared from behind the Museum of History. The demonstration was cancelled, but only after the demonstrators waited outside in the rain since 7 a.m., and had already started moving towards the Red Square. The cancellation was probably presented as "concern for the people."

Then there was a reception at the Palace of Congresses. I usually don't go to these events, but this time Dzhavad talked me into it, saying that I could meet with the Australians (Clancy, the Chairman of the Socialist Party of Australia, is here) and be done with them for the rest of the holidays. I did get a chance to talk to Clancy. Podgorny made a boring speech. All our leadership actually left within half an hour. Noteworthy: Martha Bushman, an Austrian beauty from the FRG; Arbatov with his wife, who shone among the academics. Elections are coming up soon, and Arbatov is one of the chief contenders. Aleksandrov-Agentov, dressed up in his diplomatic uniform with all the medals and the Order of Lenin. Nesmeyanov, the former rector of Moscow State University, former president of the Academy of Sciences. He became ill and was carried out, which, however, made no impression on the others.

In the evening I visited my school friend Felix. Our other school friends were there too. It's amazing – we've gone in such different directions in life, and had so many opportunities to find new interesting friends and environments. And many times we did. Nevertheless, something remains that irresistibly draws us to each other.

November 15, 1974

A very busy week. Poles and Hungarians came over to "coordinate" the plan of the Preparatory meeting in Budapest. The work took us two-three hours in Zagladin's office. In the evening, B.N. received them, but it was just protocol.

The meeting is scheduled for December 16-19th.

On Monday, Suika and Horn are going to Rome, they will coordinate the invitation letter and things will get moving.

Today B.N. agreed to let me go to London for 2-3 days to work with Woddis, whom we promised to include in the Working group to prepare the conference documents. But B.N. edited my telegram to such an extent that haughty Brits will not want to host me.

Pleasant meetings with Poles and Hungarians when we were seeing them off. They are a young and smart bunch, for example Beretz, Head of department of HSWP CC, is 44 years old. The Poles and the Hungarians (unlike the Czechs and Bulgarians) don't have a trace of servility or flattery. And at the same time we have "complete mutual understanding," as they say in the language of "internationalism." They are proud. The Hungarians are sometimes even arrogant in business, and at the same time they are very friendly, although sarcastic in conversation.

B.N. gave me a dressing down for an article I wrote for him before the holidays. The article is on the 30th anniversary of the socialist system and was meant to be published in *PSS*. As is usually the case with B.N., he "forgot" what he told me to write and "scolded" me precisely for the things I wrote directly on his orders. Plus, he has his basic rules:

- Always reject the first draft, so we "rework" it and don't think too highly of our abilities;
- Show that all we are capable of producing without his personal involvement is shit.

But because I react to him as a person with whom I've had a generally pretty friendly relationship for years, my blood boiled. Mainly because he is losing all shame and openly yells at people who wrote **his own opinion piece for him**. He does not ask for advice and participation, does not ask for help or say that he is very busy (i.e. indirectly apologizing). No, he demands this as if it were an official paper. In his mind, it is part of our duties to write his articles and reports. He sincerely believes that our zeal in this work is a manifestation of our Party spirit, our service to the Party.

I managed to cool down because he took so much time to say this nonsense. Nevertheless, I was rather rude and very direct in my response.

Later (a day later) he let me know that he went "too far." But we did make a new version for him. Right now in the elevator (we ran into each other on our way out, and he invited me to take his personal elevator) he said: "This one is much better"...

So this week consisted of two major events (the work with Hungarians and Poles, and Ponomarev's article), which is characteristic of my life situation in general: almost simultaneously I feel on the one hand like a political figure who can make decisions relatively freely and independently, who can discuss and promote his views on an international level. On the other hand, I am a scribbler, a petty official who is scolded for a poorly prepared opinion piece (!) for his boss.

Demichev has been removed! Ponomarev informed me with sheer joy and joked, "Throw some candidates my way!" Demichev was appointed Minister of Culture, it was published in *Pravda* today. The way it happened was even "worse" than with Polyansky (in the 1960s and early '70s he was a member of the Politburo and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers). Suslov chaired the Politburo. At the end of the meeting he said, "Comrades, there is one more

question. There is a proposal to approve the decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium to appoint P.N. Demichev as Minister of Culture." Everyone nods or voices approval. "Very well, it is approved." But Demichev asked to speak, stunned by this surprise. He mumbles something pathetically about how much he did for "our ideology," for some reason mentions the number of students in schools of economic self-education. He says that he has been "doing Party work for a long time," and this appointment is unexpected for him, but that he is a "soldier of the Party," etc. B.N. told me all of this mockingly and with undisguised malicious joy.

I also replied jokingly, "This is good for our politics and certainly for the CC, but I doubt it's very good for our culture."

There are two people in Moscow who would qualify for his position: Zimyanin and Abrasimov. I personally prefer the former and we have a good relationship, but he is hot-headed and not very independent, he would try to adapt himself to everyone and everything.

So, Brezhnev did not move away from the principle of "stability," and he "kept" Demichev until Furtseva died. Now [the demotion] does not look like an act of political discontent with Demichev (he will remain in a leadership role of the ideology sector), but as a removal of an employee who did not meet the technical challenges of the job.

How does it look in the so-called "public opinion"? Some think that it is a continuation of the policy to appoint members and candidate members of the PB as ministers (Polyansky, Gromyko, Grechko). Others are like my son-in-law, who asked me upon hearing these news, "Who is Demichev?"

I am reading Fejtő *Lenin's Legacy* – he is a former Hungarian communist who fled to the U.S.

Marquis de Custine, *Nicholas' Russia*. Written in 1839. Published here in 1930. Endless allusions and associations.

November 21, 1974

I'm going to England in early December to discuss with Woddis our "joint actions" at the Budapest preparatory meeting.

Today I worked nonstop on "perfecting" the draft Declaration based on materials from the Warsaw Consultative Meeting. The goal is to let many parties (or at least the important ones) recognize themselves in the draft, but the spirit of it has to remain "ours." I have to say, this is much more interesting than writing articles for Ponomarev.

Yet another vulgar bacchanalia of elections to the Academy of Sciences. In the Department of Science, Pilipenko (head of the philosophy sector) openly summoned corresponding members and academicians to his office and told them to vote for certain people, including himself. The corresponding members and academicians then went to Kuzmin (an intellectual whom they trusted) and complained, they were at a loss how to react. Kuzmin called Krasin and eventually this matter reached B.N. He was outraged and said, "Maybe this Kuzmin, or what's his name, he could go to Suslov and explain what is happening?" Krasin replied, "I don't know... You see, he still has to go through the Higher Attestation Commission to defend his Doctorate..."

Arbatov received a passing grade in the Department of Economics and is almost an academician. He's had a fantastic career: in 1962 Ponomarev offered him the position of junior consultant in our Department... and now he is a deputy of the Supreme Council, member of the Auditing Commission of the CPSU, academician, and in the General Secretary's close circle. It's not that I'm jealous. Considering the general depravity of our ranks, Arbatov is much better than most. The others are hardened scoundrels and brokers with some distant relationship to scholarship, and in their dirty heap there are some "individual, real" scholars who get their 2-3 points in the first round and leave the game...

I had the following conversation with B.N.:

"I wanted to discuss something else," he said, talking about "his" article. "I would like your advice. What should I do? It's likely that Zimyanin will be nominated for Demichev's position. I am for it. But who will go to *Pravda* instead of him? The position may be offered to Zagladin. Of course, I can't object. But let us consider this from the point of view of the Department. Would it be good for us?"

"I have no doubt that Zagladin would do the job well," I said, "And there is no doubt that he will accept the position. But firstly, why do you think that Zimyanin will be proposed for the CC Secretariat. Why not Abrasimov? As you know, he is coming from Paris specifically for this. He has some pretty strong backing."

"What are you talking about! He is a complete ignoramus. Even Zimyanin is not all that competent. But Abrasimov is just too much. Although he is very self-assured, cocky and pretentious. But not everybody wants him. For example, I know three PB members who are strongly opposed to him (and he started counting on his fingers, but not out loud)."

"I would not worry about Zagladin's ability to succeed," I went on, "He has become enough of an authority figure that he would not have to adapt, people would adapt to him. Plus, despite his external determination, he is very cautious on the main issues."

"What about his health?"

"His phenomenal capacity for work and his love to 'get things done,' as well as his ability to do everything quickly and without delay overrides [his poor health]. He is worth a dozen Zimyanins for his knowledge, education, and ability to write. And even if he stumbles, he has someone to lean on: Andrei Mikhailovich (Aleksandrov-Agentov)."

"Very true!"

"However, this is also his weakness. When you talk with Zagladin, he seems to have decent views. But the moment Aleksandrov gets involved, Zagladin will write 'whatever necessary' without taking the time to think – his pen will fly ahead of his thoughts."

"Also true!"

"And for the Department," I went on, "Zagladin's departure would be an irreparable loss. Nobody can replace him. Nobody has his reputation with our fraternal parties, nobody has his connections, or his ability to work with 'our friends,' or his multilingualism and ability to influence interlocutors, or his ability to find the right approach to anyone."

"What about Zhilin?"

At this point I let out everything I thought about Zhilin. I said that I had kept my silence for a long time for fear of being misunderstood. I said how for the last two years he's barely done any work, that he doesn't write anything himself (he made a whole theory out of it) but rants to the consultants, who submit half-finished work or plain raw material to the deputies. Zagladin loves Zhilin so much that he is ready to do the work for him not to let him down. Zhilin has no authority left with the consultants, both because of his drinking and because of his cynical idleness. We used to be friends. But our relationship permanently soured on these grounds. I am even thinking about giving up the consultant group because I physically can't stand Zhilin. He is repulsive to me.

B.N. listened to me silently. Sometimes he would nod his head or make a questioning expression.

The "explanation" was interrupted when Aleksandrov called and B.N. rushed, as I understood, to tell him about Davidson's book on Brezhnev.

I am re-reading Dostoyevsky's *Demons* for the second time. Thirty years later. The first time I read it I was still in school. I was stunned. Now I am intoxicated by the language more than the plot. What language, my god! Every phrase you want to re-read a dozen times and memorize. I think this is the most venomous of Dostoyevsky's works. Every phrase revolves on endless mockery and irony.

December 5, 1974

From November 29th-December 3rd I was in London. It was as I had thought about and imagined for decades, since the time in my childhood when I found a portrait of Byron in an old, pre-revolutionary copy of the journal *Niva* and could not figure out why his name was spelled with a "y." Even then, at the level of the Roshchinsko-aristocratic governess I "knew" French, but I wouldn't have a clue about English until I entered the university.

Trip to the CP of Great Britain to "coordinate" position for the Budapest meeting. I was given a visa only late in the evening on the 28th, and in the morning we flew out of Sheremetyevo.

Below I will give a condensed outline of the trip, because to write out everything in detail would take a week.

Dzhavad convinced the CC Administrative Department to get us first-class seats, thinking that there would be a red carpet rolled out for us at Heathrow. But there was not only no carpet, there wasn't even a meeting party. They were not expecting us (because of the visas), but just in case they sent Misha Sobolev to the airport (he works on inter-party relations at the embassy). He is a very nice guy.

Driving into London – first encounter with the unique design of the streets – blocks of houses spanning the whole street, separated into sections of private two-three story apartments. And no two identical "rows." Astonishing variety in the uniformity.

Hotel on Queen'nay terrace [sic] in Hyde Park, a ten-minute walk from the embassy, which is located on a "private" street.

We were asked to pay in advance for the hotel. Sixty pounds for the two of us for four days. But we only had money for three days (I underestimated in my note to the CC). We had to borrow from the embassy.

At the embassy: meeting and conversation with Deputy Ambassador V.M. Semenov (the Ambassador was summoned to Moscow that morning). He is a handsome, smart, and (as rarely happens) modest MFA official. He brought us up to date and called Woddis. The latter's reaction, "What's the rush?" But he still invited us to visit him at the CC at 3 p.m.

First drive through the city. First impressions: London is a power in its own right. Its whole appearance – the monuments, palaces, parks, architecture (which carries the mythology of British imperial power and omnipresence) – carries the history of the centuries that I know so well. Even driving on the left, when you are always confused about which way to look when crossing the street. The red double-decker busses and uniquely shaped black cabs.

At 3:00 p.m. we arrived to the building of the Central Committee. It is a regular provincial building, about six floors, on the border of Soho. In the lobby we were met by a careless young man with his feet up on some counter. He was quite indifferent to us. An elderly lady rushed to Dzhavad and led us to Woddis' empty office. The office was cold, had shabby furniture and folders, books, and piles of newspapers lying everywhere. Woddis walked in as if we lived across the street. He seated us across from him, took out a piece of paper and without any introductions gave me a look that said, "I'm listening."

I started throwing out our "considerations," just barely revealing the script we developed with the Poles and Hungarians. Every now and then Woddis would smile spitefully and make some notes. After an hour he asked me to stop and expressed his "agreement with everything." He said that he cannot go himself. Doctors allowed him only two airplane trips per year, and he's already met that quota. I was disappointed at this news, because he knows the internal workings and knows when it is hopeless to resist our initiatives, so he would not strain our nerves needlessly. A new person will be guided by "pure principles" and push for his rights.

Woddis had a very reserved reaction to our proposals on ties between the Labour Party-CPSU. He reminded me of what he told me in Moscow ("Although I could tell by the look in your eye that you did not really believe me: we cannot communicate regularly not because of some political considerations, but because we do not have the people or the time for it."). He added that they are a small Party with the responsibilities of a big Party like the PCI or PCF. Moreover, their executive committee believes that the main goal of his International Department is to develop internationalist campaigns within the country (Chile, Vietnam, Portugal, Greece, Cuba). And even though Woddis is the head of the International Department, the only person he is in charge of is himself.

As if apologizing for the shabbiness of the surroundings, he joked: this building is the headquarters [of the organization that aims] to overthrow British imperialism.

Five minutes into our conversation, John Gollan walked into the room as if by chance. Feigned surprise and even more feigned happiness to see us. He said hello, made some joke, stayed under a minute and left. It was an orchestrated scene – to show us that they have more important things to do than dance to our tune at European meetings. The same thing happened five minutes later when Falber (Deputy General Secretary of the Party) walked in. He led the delegation in Warsaw.

Woddis walked us to the door, where the young man continued to sit with his feet propped up. In the four hours we were there, he did not offer us tea, did not invite us to tour the building (a common ritual), and even though he knew we would be in London for almost three more days, he did not suggest to meet again.

Towards the end of our meeting I told him that Hayward (General Secretary of the Labour Party) knows that we are here. Of course I did not say that we were instructed to meet with him. Woddis once again spoke well of Hayward, saying that right now their relations with the Labour Party are better than ever. He reminded us that Hayward is probably very busy right now with the Labour conference and expressed “some doubt” whether he would be able to meet with us. (If he only knew how enthusiastic Hayward was about the possibility of our visit; how he called the embassy every day to ask when we could meet; how he boasted that he was the one who made Callaghan get visas for us and forced the Foreign Office in London and the consul in Moscow stay at work for four extra hours to make sure we would get our visas; that he invited us to the closing session of the conference, which is unprecedented! And that we had a meeting already scheduled for Saturday night!)

After leaving the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain, for a long time I could not shake the feeling that there was something Dickensian and miserably hopeless in all of this “activity” of theirs, that their communist aspirations were doomed.

We got back to the embassy. Kubeykin (Cultural Attaché, but actually the resident) told us what was going on at the Labour conference after turning on the “jammer”: the embassy is “shot through” by listening antennas on all sides. We agreed that in the morning he would “confirm with Hayward.” We would stay in the city, so as not to lose time, and periodically would call the embassy [to check on the details].

Dinner at an “Austrian” restaurant. We brought vodka with us, got the waiter and the musician tipsy, talked, and then went to see a movie in Soho.

On the morning of the 30th, after breakfast at the hotel, Misha and I went to see the city, Oxford Street. The splendor of the city center, mansions, clubs. Trafalgar square. Nelson. We stopped by a bunch of shops to note down some “objects” to buy, so we don’t spend too much time when we go to spend our meager pounds. The shops have a staggering abundance, variety, and class of products. At the same time, people say that London is the “cheapest” capital of Europe. The French, Belgians, Dutch, and even Swedes and Norwegians come here for a weekend to find a bargain. Though it costs six pounds to have a modest meal for three at one of the pubs, and books run from 2.5-5 pounds and more. The Press Attaché’s wife told us that their family spends 100 pounds per month on food, while the salary is 300 pounds. The apartment costs 60-70 pounds.

From this it follows (given free medical care, including prescription drugs, and even eyeglasses and dental; free textbooks and school breakfasts; free museums and other public places) that their standard of living is much higher than ours. And most importantly you don’t have the humiliating worry about where you are going to find decent clothes to buy, what hoops you’ll need to jump through to dress nicely, etc. [In Great Britain,] shopping is fun, entertaining, and relaxing as opposed to our irritating crowded lines that usually end in disappointment.

Around 11 a.m. Misha called the embassy. It turned out that Kubeykin was already waiting for us by the entrance to the Labour conference. Ten minutes later we were by the former church that is now a conference hall, next to Westminster Abbey and the Parliament.

There were police by the entrance and a couple dozen young people with banners: they were waiting for the arrival of Schmidt, the German Chancellor. There were some very rude banners. (The newspapers were full of expectation of a scandal: Schmidt was coming to persuade the British to stay in the Common Market.) We passed through the gates and I asked to see Kubeykin. He rushed over. I told him about my doubts: the day before he gave us two invitations that he got “under the table.” I wanted to get invitations from Hayward. Otherwise we could run into a big scandal: Moscow communists from the CC CPSU at a Labour Conference! Unheard of!

Kubeykin ran off, found Hayward’s secretary, she found the man himself (he was sitting in the middle of the presidium table) and he said, “But of course!” And told her to give us the invitations right away.

At the entrance we were thoroughly checked (for explosives). Not long before this, a bomb went off in Birmingham, it was probably an Irish attack. Seventeen people were killed and one hundred injured. In addition, several mailboxes exploded in London itself. Later we saw the police examine people’s handbags and briefcases at the entrance to the National Gallery and British Museum.

Wilson (Prime Minister) was standing downstairs in the lobby, he was also waiting for Schmidt’s arrival. On the stairs we ran into Short (Deputy leader of the Party, Chairman of the Parliamentary faction, he was in Moscow in 1973 as part of the Labour delegation). He stared, but a moment later pretended he didn’t see us. This is very British. He probably immediately figured out that this is Hayward’s “doings.” To say hello would have meant to “respond,” either now or later.

A circular room, amphitheater on all sides. Resolutions were under discussion (when we got there they were discussing number 42 out of 62). The atmosphere is like nothing we have at home. “For” and “against” a project: a noisy, active reaction in the room if the chairman (Callaghan) tried to impose a vote by show of hands (the left knows that they will be in the minority and rush to the presidium table to demand a vote “by mandate.”) In three cases they were able to force Callaghan.

Sincere and great enthusiasm when discussing the resolution on Chile.

A rousing cheer when unexpectedly (for us) Golda Meir appeared in the room. I later brought it up in the conversation with Hayward. He quickly came up with an explanation – it’s not that the Labour Party loves Israel so much, or especially its policies. They just like this old woman, who keeps pushing her line so persistently. The British are impressed by this.

When we entered, Schmidt was already seated at the presidium between Hayward and Wilson. He got a very warm welcome. Then he spoke – he was the only one of the foreign guests to speak. It was probably the first time that I saw the art of political oratory in person; until then I’d only read about it in books. Firstly, he spoke pure “Oxford” English with English stylistics. He would make sharp jokes then turn serious; he subtly suggested compelling arguments in aphoristic format; he would speak ironically about the common truths of politics and how it’s done. And so on. He spoke for 40 minutes. The audience was on their toes the entire time and

had the “right” reactions to all his “moves.” He got an ovation, even though he was calling a “fraternal party” and “fraternal government” to solidarity within the framework of the Common Market in these difficult times for Europe and the entire industrialized world.

He is elegant and handsome, and he conducts himself freely and confidently.

When I later went over everything in my mind, I understood that England will never leave the Common Market, and the “fraternal alliance” of the two major social democratic parties is an enormous political force in Europe, and this force is democratic. If we truly wish prosperity and peace for Europe, if we want “social progress” on the continent, we have to take both of these factors into account in our policies (and, alas, in our ideological struggle).

In the evening we were at the embassy waiting for Hayward. Kubeykin brought him over. Right away he started talking about the conference and their success in pressuring the right and the government. Once again, same as in Moscow, he repeated his credo: as he sees it, the goal of his time as General Secretary is to finally give Great Britain “a real socialist government.” To do this, it is necessary to break the tradition of the Labour government and Parliamentary faction allowing themselves to ignore the decisions of the Labour conference and not recognizing the authority of the Executive Committee. He has already done a great deal to raise the role and authority of the Executive Committee by using the surge on the left in the Labour party, which this time was unusually long-lasting. On these grounds, his conflict with Wilson is growing, though they have been friends since their youth. (During the first session Wilson left the room as soon as Hayward started speaking, and came back as soon as he was finished.)

He made a stake to develop relations with the CPSU for the same reason. I don’t think he has any ideological affinity for us. But he is unprejudiced and operates from positions of “common sense.” The Soviet Union is not only a real and lasting factor in world politics, it is a superpower and a clear guarantor of peace. He does not see any threat to England from the Soviet Union, just as he does not see a communist threat in his country in general. In the meantime, good relations with such a country (i.e. if the Soviet Union views him, Hayward, as a major political figure) can provide big dividends in terms of popularity and domestic perspectives. Plus, he is a plebeian by nature and sincerely hates the British aristocratic style and capitalism. And even though he knows the worth of our “plebeians,” it seems he likes us as a people. With us one can be “candid” and behave naturally. Although maybe he is deliberately playing this card, taking us at our word so to speak: since we declare ourselves to be such big democrats, then we should behave with each other accordingly, since he is also a democrat.

We talked at length about a reciprocal delegation from the CPSU. He wants to have it at the “highest level,” I think ideally he would love to have Suslov lead it. But they sent the invitation through Inozemtsev’s Institute, i.e. the same way as they were invited in 1973, and they insisted on this. The right wing of the Labour Party doesn’t want direct contacts with the CPSU for now, even though they visited at a very high level and promised a reciprocal reception at the highest level – openly and publicly. There is an element of pride, prestige, and most importantly a real reluctance among many to get too close to us.

Hayward assured us that the “masses” would welcome the delegation. In general, he said, do not judge our relationship with you by what’s written in our press. The people are no longer anti-Soviet.

But he “cannot be a loser in this” (his words), because it would mean total defeat for him. If he made every effort but the Soviets did not want any serious relations with him, this would be used to crush him.

He said he has to act with caution. He has a 1-2 voice majority in the Executive Committee right now, and if one of these people is sick or absent, any question could be turned against him. Although he is preparing a young generation and putting them in key places, he helps them to get noticed (quite a Leninist personnel policy). However, they have a long way to go until they reach key positions, it takes time.

We talked like this for over three hours, interspersing “business” with digressions. I nonchalantly paid him several big compliments. For example, when he began to prove what a socialist he is, I interrupted him and said something like: “You don’t need to prove it to us. In Moscow we saw that your actions are not a matter of tactics or favorable conditions, they are a matter of conviction. We believe in your devotion to your ideas and the labor cause.” He even blushed, though it would seem what does he care about my praise. Then again, I was speaking with the “voice of Moscow.”

We reminisced about the war. He was a pilot. I said to him, “It is my first time in England. When we were flying up to London yesterday morning, I was struck by its immense size. It is literally full of life. Millions of homes and tens of millions of people. And I thought, what courage, dedication, and devotion it must have taken to defend this city from the Nazis. You did it. And the world will always be grateful for that. We held out against the enemy in 1941. You held out in 1940. This is our common contribution to the salvation of civilization.”

My Hayward nearly wept.

We talked about their relationship with the communists [Communist Party of Great Britain]. He got a little agitated: “I am the first person in the history of the Labour Party who does not hesitate to speak on the same platform with the Communists. There are some activists among them whom I consider to be the best fighters for socialism and the interests of the working class. I would gladly welcome them to the Labour Party.” He named McGeehee (member of CPGB Politburo, Vice President of the Union of Mineworkers). “Twice I even spoke at meetings with John Gollan. And at the meeting dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations I gave a better speech than he did!” He pointed to Kubeykin and Misha and added, “Isn’t that true?! But in politics and elections they are our opponents.” Then he criticized them for their behavior at the last elections: they put their candidates in the places where every vote mattered for the Labour Party, and as a result Tories and Liberals won some of the seats.

I did not argue with him. And how can one argue? The CPGB has around 30 thousand members (though as they say, who counted them!), while Hayward represents 10 million people. To argue with him that the communists are better and bigger fighters for socialism would be pointless and... insulting. He sincerely believes that he is better than them in this sense; he is more needed, more reliable, and stronger. The CP of Great Britain does not help him in any way. Right now he is preparing to go to Cuba at the invitation of Dorticos; he got Mikardo (leftist Labourist) to go as an observer to the Congress of the Romanian Communist Party. He met with Berlinguer when the latter visited Gollan. In other words, he wants to deal with real political players. He has no time for anything less.

He said that his parents left him a farm in Kent, he made it into a dacha. He invited us to come visit him next time we are in England.

He told us about his visit to Chile (when it was still under Allende), and cursed at the British embassy in Santiago and the British diplomatic service in general, which he promised to purge completely when he comes to power.

He is fierce and a little reckless, but the cunning Englishman in his personality does not let go for a second. He looks for an advantage in everything, otherwise it's "not serious." He never allows familiarity (we Soviets are inclined to it as soon as the atmosphere takes a friendly tone). But he is natural and doesn't have any automatic prejudices. He has a fast and practical intellect... with his parted red hair and his untraditional English face.

The relationship we have with him is something quite unusual and seemingly unthinkable between Communists and Social Democrats. How far we've come in the recent years from Stalinist taboos... But alas! Even though this is real politics, it is behind the scenes. For millions of our Party activists and "scholars" (like Trapeznikov) nothing has changed. Look at any "solid" book on social democracy published in 1974.

Sunday, December 1st, was a full day off. Misha and I started early: City, Fleet Street, dragon boundary marks on the boundary of London City where the Queen still pays a one-penny tariff when she passes through; the cathedral of St. Paul by Sir Christopher Wren, we went inside to listen to the service; outskirts of London; the old train station; on a deserted little square the Karl Marx library where Lenin worked, next to it a stone trough for horses from the XVI century. Sunday fair.

Greenwich – entrance to that village, a huge green lawn with one branchy tree in the middle and rows of colorful peaked houses surrounding it. Like a postcard. Park leading up to the observatory. The old building of the observatory. And most importantly – the meridian! And a clock with 24 divisions, the clock that is the reference for the entire world, Greenwich Mean Time! This is England!

The observatory stands on a hill. There is a wide lawn going down to the Thames. On top of the hill there is a monument to General Wolfe, the conqueror of Canada: "From the grateful nation of Canada." This is also England.

At the bottom of the hill stands the Old Royal Naval College – palace.

We went down. To the left of the College, *Cutty Sark* is permanently dry-docked. *Cutty Sark* is the last sailing clipper, the fastest sailing vessel in history with a distinguished military history, dozens of victories and other service "For God and the Empire." This creature (it feels like a living organism) is extraordinarily beautiful in the harmony and expediency of its forms, and the agility and energy of its whole look, with the keel the size of its own mast. A magnificent work of art.

This is England too.

We returned to the city by the Tower Bridge, past the Tower itself, past the last World War II cruiser that is permanently docked, past the monument to the "rescue" from the 1666 Great Fire that burned down most of London.

We rushed to the National Gallery. It is not as rich as the Louvre, the Roman or Florentine ones, but more varied than the last two. It is more like the Hermitage. It has many of the most famous paintings. Many Italians, French, Flemish, Dutch. And only two small rooms of British artists. They are “clever,” they keep their best [British works of art] in their country estates and private collections. Reynolds, Lawrence, Gainsborough, Hogarth... stunning portraits. Especially Gainsborough’s “Mrs. Siddons” – a beautiful thoroughbred Englishwoman, long-nosed and buxom, a refined noblewoman.

The British Museum. We had an hour before closing, but even if you run through it, it is still tremendous compared to our pitiful pottery shards and spears. Yes, they really robbed the whole world. But it resulted in an incomparable gain for the civilization. And note: beginning from the XVII-XVIII centuries, their conquerors were followed by scholars to every corner of the world. Scholars who collected, extracted, brought home, studied, systematized and preserved. If it wasn’t for the British Museum with its looting, over half of the things there would have disappeared without a trace over the last two centuries. They would have been lost to world culture and to the self-knowledge of humanity, and, by the way, to the nations that have now become (or are becoming) civilized.

In the evening we saw “Emmanuelle” – a film by the same author and in the same style as “Last Tango in Paris.” I fell asleep!

Monday, December 2nd. First stop at the embassy. I composed a ciphered telegram. It was going to the “top level,” so I wrote six pages of pretty candid conclusions and observations.

The next morning they saw us off. To make up for our botched arrival, Semenov made the departing delegation extra nice. On the day of our return to Moscow, I was back to writing reports and articles for Ponomarev. Once again nothing was ready, I came back to find things exactly as I had left them.

December 14, 1974

On the 9th we went to Budapest for “the Six”: myself, Shishlin, Veber, Ivanov. Zagladin joined us the next day, he just got back from Paris (he was on Brezhnev’s team with Giscard d’Estaing).

We were housed on “Lenin Hills” in Rákosi’s mansions on the hill, on the outskirts of the city. It was a luxurious place with a royal “level of service.”

Meeting with Beretz (Head of the International Department) in the CC HSWP.

Then there were two days of meetings with the Bulgarians (Ivan Ganey), Czechs (Vladimir Iancu), Poles (Bogush Suyka), Germans (Bruno Mahlow). A “secret Communist meeting” to go over the internal workings of the future meeting and a number of other matters.

- Scenario of the Preparatory meeting. Distribution of roles amongst us and other “faithful” ones. Draft documents, order of initiatives.
- Problems of modern social democracy: exchange of information on contacts, exchange of other materials on social democracy, coordination of policies of “the Six” towards social democrats.
- Ideological questions tied to the 200th anniversary of the United States. Coordination.
- The problems of repatriation of Greeks from our countries.

- Financing the Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions and others, because every year they have a deficit that almost exceeds the original budget. They burn it on their mistresses, various “events,” trips and a lavish lifestyle – these professional fighters for peace.
- Discussion of the participation in the congress of the ruling party “New Iran.”

The discussion of all these issues was frank, sharp, sometimes even smart. This is how it must have been in the early stages of the Comintern’s existence.

Zagladin and I acted as the authorized representatives of our Central Committee, and that is how we were perceived, too. Even though we had directives (not from the CC, only from B.N.) only on the first question.

Dinner on the first day. Toasts. My toast to internationalism and our many individual differences , to the pioneers of the modern revolutionary movement, whose style and tradition we are reviving at this meeting.

High political culture and good business-like manner of the Hungarians.

The city is magnificent. It must be in the top five great European centers.

Zagladin was only present at the discussion of the first two questions; he had to return to Moscow because he and Aleksandrov were assigned to write Brezhnev’s speech for the upcoming 16th CC Plenum (on the visits – Ford, Schmidt, Giscard).

On the 12th we returned to Moscow and faced the task of bringing Ponomarev up to date on the materials from Budapest.

Yesterday I heard that Brezhnev was angry because soon he will have to “travel” again – Egypt, Syria, Iraq. “Why am I going there? What’s the point? Gromyko imposed these visits on me back then... And I was not thinking. Now the more I think about it, the more convinced I am that is not necessary.”

Indeed, they are unnecessary and harmful. The International Department with B.N. in the lead always thought so. Unfortunately, we did not dare to speak up about this in time. Now the whole world knows about these visits, which will of course be “historic.”

But I think the real motives for his discontent are not related to foreign policy. More likely he sensed that the people and the Party are sick of his constant trips and tongue-tied appearances on TV. Plus the Plenum on the economy and the Five Year Plan is coming up, and the situation there is quite woeful. He is probably hearing reports (if not from his advisers then from Andropov) that, for example, in Perm (a big city with defense industry) meat is only available through vouchers once a week on Fridays. It’s no longer being distributed through stores but through the workplace. It would seem the people in Perm are not at all interested in watching endless TV broadcasts of theatrical appearances on the international stage, led by the man who ought to think about more pressing matters. World peace is really in our pocket already, if we don’t blow it.

December 16, 1974

The CC Plenum was held (Gosplan for 1975, the “completing year”). It took just one day, 5-6 hours. Overall we did not have many Plenums this year. Both of them were pre-sessional to the Supreme Council. And why have them?

This one was terribly boring. The same shortcomings, inconsistencies, and bottlenecks. Same problems. A languid and unemotional Baibakov presented the situation perfunctorily and monotonously. The subtext, and even the text itself: "Things haven't moved an inch." In other words, all of this was already discussed at the December 1973 Plenum.

The only burst of energy came from the Georgian Shevardnadze, who reported on his struggle against bribery, toadying, dishonesty, self-seeking, etc. Of course it's a sexy topic [*malinka*], but at the same time it stirred something pure in the hardened hearts and minds of these high-ranking bureaucrats – to see a fighter who is taking risks like they once did and who carries the moral charge that they left long ago in their past.

However, following Shevardnadze's passionate and honest speech, Lomakin (Primorski Krai Secretary) openly engaged in toadying, to the applause of the audience. He dedicated his speech to the Vladivostok meeting between Brezhnev and Ford, and accompanied it with unbelievable praise, citing the Americans themselves.

Brezhnev gave a multipage report. Bovin told me the following story: Arbatov, Inozemtsev, Tsukanov, Sukharevsky, Bovin, and somebody else, spent two months at Volynskoe-2 preparing Brezhnev's CC Plenum report. They wrote 42 pages of a "beautiful" text by studying a pile of various classified materials. But the writers themselves came to the conclusion that they did not come up with anything new as compared to the last years' December Plenum. Bovin suggested to give an exemplary punishment to two ministers and announce their immediate removal. This idea did not go through. The whole 42-page text did not go through. They were ordered to condense it to 5-8 pages. I think the gist of it could be boiled down to the facts presented by Ryabov (Sverdlovsk Secretary): in 1968 construction started on a pipe plant in Sverdlovsk, in 1970 the construction was suspended; that same year construction started on a similar plant in Chelyabinsk, in 1972 it was suspended. In 1974 it became clear that despite the import of pipes, there is a shortage. But instead of re-opening the existing construction sites (though they were already rusty), a new plant was started in another city.

The audience was listless during Brezhnev's report. Everyone is already used to beautiful speeches. They know that nothing will happen and even at a closed Plenum nobody will dare to offer a radical action that may look scandalous and blacken the "new grand successes."

The Plenum resolution was to continue "to be guided by Brezhnev's remarks on this issue."

Bovin said there was a moment when it seemed like Brezhnev would not attend the Plenum – he said he was not well, he was exhausted after Ford, Tsedenbal, Giscard, and in general. Bovin winked and said you could feel that "something was happening" behind all of this.

The procedure with Demichev was consistent with this atmosphere of fatigue and lush inactivity. He remained a candidate member of the Politburo, but was stripped of the position of Secretary of the CC. Indeed, why disturb the public and raise all kinds of talk? Things will take care of themselves by the time of the Congress.

It seems my version of the draft Plenum resolution that Ponomarev fussed so much about went into the trash bin, as could be expected. I don't know how and to whom B.N. presented it, but I did not see a trace of my work in the final resolution.

December 29, 1974

I asked for eight days off to spend my vacation in Pushkino.

Naturally, I wrote a lot about various things.

Here is one of my thoughts. We seem to live in an atmosphere of “public order and peace,” unlike other countries. Other countries have inflation, unemployment, strikes, social hatred, attacks and kidnappings, bombings in shops and cafes, or even outright military actions like gunfire and bombs in Vietnam and the Middle East. Or the trials and executions in Ethiopia. Is it too peaceful here? Have we become numb in our apparent well-being, which must really be widespread? Two weeks ago it was rumored that on January 1st the price of coffee and linen fabrics would go up. The stores were literally cleared out. People were snapping up everything – duvet covers, sheets, pillowcases and other linens, hundreds of rubles’ worth per person! As for coffee, people bought even the kind that’s been on the shelves for years and was probably completely stale.

On December 19-21st the Preparatory meeting for the European Conference of Communist Parties took place in Budapest. Before the meeting there were some rumors of serious complications with Honecker, that he is seriously deceiving us – making obsequious speeches to us while integrating with the FRG. As the result of the meeting we got what we wanted – the right working group. Now, the behind the scenes preparation begins based on the texts we composed at the Gorky dacha. After that, we will distribute it to those who fully support us.

Then again, fraternal parties outside the working group see everything quite well. The Englishman Falber told me frankly, “Everyone I talked to has the feeling that everything is happening behind their back. But nobody wants to take on the part of *enfant terrible*, though there were some timid attempts from the Yugoslavs, the Romanians, the Spaniards and Italians.” Nobody wants to be left out, to step off this old ship that is called the International Communist Movement. Since this is the case, they have to put up with the rejection of this immense democratic procedure: after all, it is impossible to write one or two documents with twenty-eight hands.

The Romanian made a speech with a subtext that was directed at us. He said roughly the following: “There is no real and genuine détente and never will be until the blocs are dissolved, the troops are withdrawn from other countries, nuclear weapons are destroyed, and the arms race is stopped... It’s time to move from words to action, from declarations to real measures.” Etc. I included this in the ciphered telegram to Moscow, for the Politburo. Ponomarev supported me. But Katushev, who supervises our socialist fraternal parties, was enraged: “It is always the Romanians and the Yugoslavs who are bad,” he said, “while your Spaniards and Italians are always great, even though they say the same things.” Katushev crossed out my paragraph. But then B.N. got mad and wrote in something similar. Katushev crossed it out again and declared that he will not sign the ciphered telegram otherwise.

When I returned to Moscow I found out from Rakhmanin (Katushev’s first deputy) that Katushev spoke about me indignantly when he was informing his Department about the meetings in Budapest.

Why does all of this happen? Because even within the Politburo things are not done in the open. People are reticent and “unwilling to trouble” their superiors. It’s fine if you don’t want to

strain relations with Romania, maybe this is wise. But then you should work to make this a common policy instead of trying to push your line from under the table, deceiving your friends and pulling wool over the Politburo's eyes. It's not just about the moral aspect of it. It is also because cowardice is always punished... in big-time politics, of course.

Postscript to 1974

This year's entries are a "Chronicle of Current Events." From the present-day vantage point, we see a trend. The mixed observations, reflections, and information (usually not publicly available) paint a picture with dismally hopeless colors and subject matter.

The peaceful Chilean Revolution collapsed, the Portuguese Revolution was victorious. In their experience we wanted to see an opening for movement along the path created in 1917 in Russia.

Contacts with Social Democrats and the Labour Party also encouraged us to think there was a second wind for the anti-capitalist process.

However, it was depressing to see that our allied, "fraternal" parties and the Left in general were growing disappointed in Soviet socialism. Against this background, our attempts to revive the "ideological" unity of the International Communist Movement looked increasingly hopeless and even ridiculous.

The rapid erosion of the socialist image of the Soviet Union, its loss of the "ideological superpower" role was evidenced and aggravated by the persecution of dissidents, the suppression of artistic freedom, the vulgar mini-cult of Brezhnev, forced lies in our propaganda, and the cynical falsification of the past and present in our social "sciences." Many people found disgusting the flagrant "divergence" between the Marxist-Leninist creed and reality, which had already plunged into a deep crisis.

The defeat of the Soviet Union's policy in the Arab world, where we masked our superpower ambitions behind support for the "national liberation movements," was yet another affirmation of the fact that the Soviet Union lost its revolutionary momentum and potential. This loss happened a long time ago, but was not yet completely apparent to our opponents in the "Cold War." This was the reason the USSR initiated détente in international relations; with the additional hidden agenda to deceive its partners in the "Helsinki process" and buy time.

Intellectual party apparatchiks who had access to classified information were beginning to understand that the world around them was rapidly changing, and that our policies were inadequate, deadlocked, and dangerous. The General Secretary himself, who was not a "quick wit" but was knowledgeable, would inadvertently admit that "imperialism is not what it once was" while we keep "harping on" about it like we did 20-30 years ago.

However, whatever reasonable statements were made, whatever beautiful and peace-loving speeches the increasingly tongue-tied CC CPSU General Secretary made (and sometimes even took steps in line with common sense), the system and its mechanisms ruled out the possibility of changing the strategic course that was defined by outdated ideology.

This "volume" has a great deal on the CPSU's practice of paternalistic interaction with foreign communist parties; on the attempts by some CC officials to somehow smooth out the imbalances in the communist movement – by their demeanor, by "smart" speeches, by their ability to listen and hold a discussion. The parties themselves tried to break out of the vicious circle into which they were forced by the Great Russian Revolution and the logic of the Soviet Union's development, especially after the XX Congress of the CPSU. They were torn between the "attraction and rejection" to one of the superpowers, the bastion of their original meaning and the very material possibility (!) of their existence.

It seems the factual landscape of this “volume” will also prove interesting: the inertial performance of official duties (and concerns regarding the inertia), the petty intrigues and vain ambitions, the hierarchical order and Pharisaical rules of the game of Party duty, the doublethink and ambiguity of the work done by thoughtful and educated officials close to the highest leadership.

Today, this way of life may arouse surprise mixed with contempt... though partially from people who deserve even greater contempt. But some day, this rare source of information about a unique period in the history of a great country will be of interest.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1975

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

Translated by Anna Melyakova

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

February 9, 1975

I can't believe this is the first entry in the new year. That's because I'm almost never home. Looking back, there have been a lot of events over these two months. Things are moving rapidly and at the same time there is a constant depressing feeling that you are fluttering in the same place, waiting for something that is about to happen (both in society and in your personal life).

Yesterday I worked with Blatov (adviser to the General Secretary) on materials for [Harold] Wilson's (British Prime Minister) February 13th visit.

At this point, I can only briefly summarize the main points of recent events.

Brezhnev's illness. Rumors that it is irreversible and the talk about successors, both from "voices" and among the general public.

January 14th-15th with Poles and Hungarians ([Bogumil] Suika, [Gyula] Horn), pulling together the results of the Preparatory committee for the European Conference of Communist Parties; preparing materials for the working group. This drafting committee work had actually been assigned to PUWP¹ and HSWP² in Budapest, but they asked us to join too. As the result we ended up with our concept: a 150-page "volume," an "Introduction" plus a set of quotes from Warsaw and Budapest arranged according to our logic, the logic of the Gorky dacha. And a summary of everything that was said in Warsaw and Budapest following the plan and even the formulas from our draft Declaration.

Now all of this has been translated and the Germans sent it to the 28 parties, so on the 17th the working group can get started in Berlin.

Evening at Zagladin's on Starokonyushennyi Pereulok with Suika and Horn. Debates.

On January 17th with Harry Ott at the Embassy of the GDR. Pavlov, Poplavsky, Gostev and others from the industrial departments. Toasts to the international affairs guys. The industrialists probably felt that we were acting like "blue blood" and showing off. It was not very comfortable.

January 17th – Ponomarev's 70th anniversary. Hero of socialist labor. Our congratulations. Our gift – "His collected works" starting from 1931. Zagladin's speech. B.N.'s response. For the first time I saw him deeply moved and patting his eyes with a handkerchief. He spoke about the "people," that we are part of the people too.

From January 20th-23rd – Berlin. Zagladin, Shakhnazarov, and I. From the other side – [Hermann] Axen, [Paul] Markowski, Malov, and others. They will be hosting the working group,

¹ Polish United Workers' Party

² Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

so we had to coordinate the strategy. Also about Chilean affairs: Communist and Socialist Parties of Chile. [Carlos] Altamirano. Plenum of the Socialist Party of Chile in Berlin, which of course the Germans eavesdropped on. The socialists are increasingly eager to take the Chile liberation movement into their hands. [Volodia] Teitelboim is a wet noodle. Going over the mistakes, and who is to blame?

The socialists are guided by Fidel Castro, who almost publicly said that defeat was inevitable no matter what kind of assistance had been provided to Chile. This corresponds to my report during the visit to Chile in the fall of 1972, based on the words of the Socialist leaders: "If we don't arm the people, and if you don't supply us with weapons, we will perish. The revolution cannot develop further without a civil war." During lunch in Varadero, Cuba, [Carlos Rafael] Rodriguez said, "We knew they would be overwhelmed, so we stocked up on their magnificent wine in advance." This was a joke, but at the same time not open to discussion or questioning.

Right now Altamirano is apparently moving things towards armed resistance. For him, the Chilean Communist Party is either a hindrance or an auxiliary power. But he will never accept its hegemony, which is why he does not have "our" understanding of "unity."

Haus an der Schpree [sic in German]... Dinner in a hut. Dinner in Potsdam, i.e. trip there late at night, 150km around Berlin. An incredible undertaking in the German style.

Reception dinner with Honecker... He gives off the impression of being a person who is competent and very loyal to us, but one who knows that he would do a better job dealing with West Germans than we do. For this, we would need to give him a longer leash, if not complete freedom.

The level and tone of the reception ([we were treated] almost like members of the CPSU Politburo) could be explained by the fact that right before our visit the Germans got a "dressing-down," which was supposedly coordinated with Brezhnev but was initiated by Gromyko. The East Germans developed a plan of collaboration with West Germany – the "11 points," including the construction of an autobahn to Hamburg, the Beltov channel, and other economic developments mostly paid for by the FRG. Naturally, all of this was coordinated with us in advance. One of the MFA Department heads, Bondarenko, even went to Germany in connection with this. However, maybe he didn't report on time (although I saw the ciphered telegram from Berlin myself, in which Honecker reported to Moscow about these plans). Or maybe it was a deliberate provocation by Gromyko, Rusakov, and Blatov (who climbed on the bandwagon) to use the opportunity to "remind the Germans who they are, that if they want to have common policy with us, they should follow our policies." Either way, Gromyko initiated this dressing-down, and the Germans were made to understand this before our visit.

That is why when they received our delegation (which had nothing to do with this affair) they did everything they could to show that it was some kind of misunderstanding. I must say,

we did the same (including Shakhnazarov; he and his boss Katushev were against this whole idea). We tried to emphasize that nothing is happening and “our friendship is as strong as ever.” When we put together the ciphered telegram we wrote it with the subtext that suspecting the Germans of disloyalty is silly and ludicrous, as well as harmful. By the way, Gromyko held the telegram for three days; it seemed he would not release it into broad circulation at all. He eventually released it, but not before the resolution was signed to immediately invite Axen, Markowski and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs [Oskar] Fischer to Moscow to carry out the planned dressing-down.

And in fact they were in Moscow the day after we returned from Berlin. I had a nasty feeling that they might suspect us of adding fuel to the fire of Gromyko’s provocation.

Shakhnazarov later told me that the meeting (Gromyko, Katushev, Blatov, and Rusakov from our side) was “rough.” The Germans were put through the wringer and their “11 points” were effectively revoked, despite Axen’s reasonable arguments and references to the fact that “all of this was coordinated with you in advance.”

According to our ambassador, Axen’s report to the SED Politburo was “formal”: “a common point of view and complete agreement with Soviet comrades.” There was nothing about the atmosphere or the outcomes of the meeting in Moscow. It turns out that Honecker ordered the whole Moscow delegation to keep silent under threat of losing their party membership card.

On January 29th I gave my triumphal speech at the theoretical conference of the CC Apparatus, in the great hall. “The Scientific-Technological Revolution and Contradictions of Capitalism.”

January 31st-February 6th – raid on Cuba.

February 10, 1975

Supplement to notes for Brezhnev on Wilson – about Portugal (not to encourage the socialists to split with the communists. Historical examples of such actions and the consequences).

Comments to the draft speech for Brezhnev at the dinner with Wilson. Ciphered telegrams, more ciphered telegrams, and papers. Response to Kadar in connection to the confidential letter the CC HSWP sent to the Party organizations about our oil price increases. It’s a pretty angry letter, and in our estimation – quite a “nationalist letter”: now if there are any downturns in their economy, the Soviet Union will be to blame; since we did not even take into account that “they have a Congress coming up and they already put together their Five Year Plan.”

Meeting with B.N. plus Katushev, Zagladin, Shakhnazarov, Brutents – on the upcoming March meeting in Prague of Secretaries on international issues (coordination of foreign

propaganda). I've been assigned to this event, especially to B.N.'s report in Prague. This is now my most important project, of course (!).

I have a meeting with the guys who will be working on Ponomarev's report.

Short morning report to B.N. about Cuba. There was little that interested him. He kept interrupting me to call his secretary about various trifles.

I read [Herbert] Krolkowski's (Deputy Foreign Minister of the GDR) denunciation of Honecker, Politburo members, and other figures. What a bastard! I would return such papers to the [K]GBs of the respective country. Especially since everything [in the denunciation] is based on "personal impressions" rather than facts. And where would an MFA official get these impressions about the Politburo and its internal affairs if not from the stories of his brother [Werner] Krolkowski, who was recently kicked out of the Politburo.

Cuba. Shakhnazarov – Darusenkov. Flying at night. A barn – transit airport in Casablanca. Moroccans. Ten hours over the ocean at night. Meeting at the airport. "Residence" – an oasis on the outskirts of Havana, where Brezhnev stayed a year ago. Relocation to Varadero – a resort area 150km from the capital. New roads. Palm trees with "concrete pillars." Bungalows. Mosquitoes, the beach, Canadian tourists.

Havana is a city without storefronts. The Spanish and American parts of the city. Fidel: "Havana comes last. We are not building a façade, we are building a new building."

February 2nd: Raul Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Raul Valdes. Conversation at the Central Committee. Our main goal – to coordinate the European Conference of Communist Parties with the Latin American Conference of Communist Parties, which will take place in Havana in May.

March 2, 1975

Another break [in the diary], it's because I spend most of my time working in Serebryannyi Bor. I'm almost never home. Report for B.N. in Prague – the meeting of CC Secretaries to discuss foreign propaganda and ideology of socialist countries. This is the next one after the December 1973 meeting in Moscow, before which we were also sitting in Serebryannyi Bor. Plus all kinds of "joint" documents (drafts) that will be accepted for coordination. The Czechs will present them, but we are preparing them (like everything else).

We used Zagladin's dictation but removed the parts where he went too far in exposing our capitalist partners in détente. He recently came back from Berlin, where the working group was preparing the Conference of Communist Parties, deeply impressed (his political philosophy is often influenced by his latest confidential conversation with a Western politician). This time his "impression" was based on what that the French, Italians, Spaniards and others said at the working group. For them, détente (for the Western CPs) has negative aspects along with the

positive ones. It strengthens the authority of the governments we are fighting against as a class hostile force. And they need “compensation,” so to speak. Zagladin believes this could be achieved by tightening the capitalist order in France, in the FRG...

Actually, this is to B.N.’s liking. He loves to expose capitalism, especially now that there is an economic crisis and all kinds of contradictions. But he is being cautious because he knows that people in the West are watching him and are ready to present him as a “hawk” towards Brezhnev’s line [for peace].

Brezhnev came to the last Politburo. Unexpectedly. And, by the way, he started talking about the upcoming Prague meeting on foreign propaganda. He said he was not informed, while it’s a serious matter.

B.N. began to fuss and make excuses. He said it was the Secretariat’s decision and so on. But he made a note to himself (and told me about it a couple days ago): someone whispered to Leonid Ilyich that this ideological jabber about foreign policy could harm the actual foreign policy. B.N. suspects Andropov. It’s possible... In any case, he rushed to remove some of his favorite pet ideas from the report, like criticism of bourgeois governments and systems. He even removed the attack on Poniatowski...

So Zagladin’s “compensation” was just too out of place.

The talks with Wilson could not have concluded with anything but a “great success.” However, I was surprised to find that the documents they accepted were practically Soviet in the vocabulary, wording, etc. Yes, the Brits are a practical people. What do they care for words! They gave us a loan of 2 billion dollars. They got the better of the Americans (300 million dollars – as per Jackson’s law). B.N. and Blatov hinted to me that “our guy” didn’t use 80 percent of what we put in his notes. They gestured to show that “he is just not what he used to be.” But Wilson & Co. were delighted with his activity and dynamism. So it seems we have the same aberration as we did in 1963-4: foreigners admire while Soviets are at a loss. On TV – at the reception in honor of Wilson – Brezhnev looked very “disorganized,” it seemed he did not understand what he was saying and all he had the strength to do is read off some text that was written for him in big letters.

Right now he is being prepared for the HSWP Congress. It’s a delicate matter (due to our price increases on oil and the letter from the CC HSWP to its activists, openly “criticizing” us). Is Brezhnev turning into a symbolic form that by inertia is being filled with content along the lines of his past way of thinking?

Meeting with Arismendi before his trip to Cuba.

Conversation with Canadians – members of the CC executive committee who spent two weeks traveling around the Soviet Union. When you engage in these kinds of conversations,

again and again you feel like a significant person. But as soon as you go back to the regular and primary work – writing texts for Ponomarev – right away you “get back to your place!” – a petty official who can push his opinion only with clever verbal variations that might slip past B.N.

March 9, 1975

From March 3rd-6th I was in Prague. Meeting of Secretaries of socialist countries regarding foreign policy propaganda, especially in connection with the 30th anniversary of Victory Day. We were housed in the Presidential Palace in Hradcany. All of Prague was spread out before us. B.N.’s speech was first, of course – the text we worked on in Serebryannyi Bor. This was followed by an exchange of monologues. Each of them contained: a) praises for Brezhnev’s defining role in the modern world; b) effusive commentary on B.N.’s speech, which supposedly reflects the wisdom, realism, and theoretical depth inherent in the CPSU (especially the Bulgarians – Milov, the Czechs – Bilyak, the Germans – Hager, but not the Hungarians, and course not the Romanians. The Pole Shidlyak “praised” and joined in, but was restrained).

Stress over the collective documents and the report telegram. Awkward situation with Romanians: they refused to participate in accepting the documents (their representation at the meeting was at the level of deputy heads), and when it came to the communiqué, they declared that if the words about the struggle against “left” and right-wing opportunism were not removed, they would request to remove any mention of their participation in the meeting, only note in the end that the Romanian representative informed the participants about the ideological work of his party.

There was an altercation in which the Mongolian and the German attacked the Romanian for his unwillingness to fight against opportunism. Bilyak was leading the meeting, and he did it pretty stupidly. Katushev intervened and offered to accept the Romanians’ version. (Clever B.N. did not say it himself, but told the “mediator” Katushev to do it). Everyone agreed. But in the evening the Romanians came over and asked everything to be restored: they got it in the neck from Bucharest. Embarrassing. B.N. made a snide remark to Katushev about it: See, how important it is to be firm on questions of principle!

Here is how they dealt with our higher oil prices: they raised the price of gas, but cancelled the direct tax on car owners. As the result, all Czechs are happy, they even benefited from it. But if the state can afford it, it means they have the reserves! I remember two or three years ago we were hearing alarming information (including from the embassy) that the Czechs were eating away at their national income by diverting all of it into consumer goods to “butter up” the population and prevent the growth of political opposition. But it turned out that this policy (in essence the policy of our XXIV Congress) had a direct effect – the well-fed and happy Czech worked better, and the national income did not get eaten up!

The people in the street are better dressed and more fashionable [in Prague] than in Berlin for example, or Budapest (in Warsaw you notice the stark contrast between the super-fashionable and nearly-beggarly). A lot of things are getting built and decorated. Prague is beautiful.

On Friday, the 7th, the following incident took place: Blatov called B.N. and said that the General Secretary is dissatisfied with the Prague communiqué – the celebration of the 30th anniversary of Victory Day is not subordinated to the idea of the struggle for peace in the modern world. B.N. replied that firstly, it is apparent from the context if you read it honestly; secondly, it is apparent from the report, the telegram, i.e. the entire meeting was held under this overarching theme. And thirdly, why didn't they say anything during the twenty-four hours they had to review the draft communiqué with an embargo until a special permission? Be that as it may, B.N. was very disappointed. It's a fly in the ointment and all the more upsetting because it was the only thing that was shown to the General Secretary, and he is unable to see the positive aspects himself.

Of course, the advisers set this up. Most likely Sparrow (Aleksandrov-Agentov). Brutents commented that it's time for them to be thinking about their souls (in the sense of looking for consultant positions at the Departments), not spend their time tripping up CC Secretaries.

Then again, I read the conversation transcripts from Brezhnev's meetings with Wilson. They show that unlike the publicity from the breakfast, the General Secretary was in good shape and pressed the sly Wilson more than once in the polemics. He wasn't relying on a piece of paper, though he took into account the ideas and information included in his notes. And in general he appeared as a much bigger statesman than the Brit... I understood the enthusiasm about personal contacts Wilson expressed upon his return to England. I also understood (including from the remarks about our communiqué) that Brezhnev's main idea right now is the idea of peace. This is what he wants to be remembered for. In practical politics in this sphere he prefers real actions over any ideology. That is why at the Politburo before our departure for Prague he expressed a vague concern that ideological rants about foreign policy could harm the foreign policy itself.

I read a transcript of a telephone conversation recorded (or transmitted) by one of our intelligence officers in New York. It's a conversation between two Soviet émigré Jews, our former scientists – a cry of despair about émigré life in the U.S. Some émigrés are ready to crawl back on all fours, if we only would let them. Cheers to Andropov, who made it possible for thousands of Jews to leave, almost everyone who wants to. But what is his plan? What's the goal in the long run?

By the way, Shakhnazarov recently told me "in confidence" that he has reliable information from private sources that the "Chairman's" primary dream is to become General Secretary after Brezhnev, that's what he is counting on. Maybe it would be good. We'll see.

B.N. was assigned to give an instructional report next week to ideologues from all over the Soviet Union in connection with the 30th anniversary of Victory Day. Once again we barely had time to get off the plane before we were working out asses off. B.N. is essentially carrying out the role of the CC Secretary of Ideology. That's how he perceived (in conversation with me) this new assignment.

Visited the Tretyakov Gallery. They have an exhibition of XVII century portraits from the provincial backwaters of Novgorod, Orel, Yaroslavl, Samara. Impressive. Mostly the portraits are by unknown authors, but there are some works by Panin, Orlov, and the like. There are two halls from the collection given to the Tretyakov Gallery by Sidorov, especially the Soviet hall: Larionov, Mashkov, Chagall, Kandinsky, Malevich, Petrov-Vodkin, and others. They are wonderful; these drawings and paintings are such a reflection of the era, of the 1920s.

Le Monde published large excerpts from [Josef] Smrkovsky's³ memoirs – reprinted, by the way, from an Italian Communist journal. He talks about his meetings with Brezhnev here in May of 1968, when Smrkovsky led a parliamentary delegation; about the actual days of August 20-21st; about how they were taken and brought to a dacha outside Moscow; about talks in the Kremlin, the protocol, their departure; and about [Frantisek] Kriegel, who refused to sign the protocol. By the way, there are quotes of what he said to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny in the CC CPSU when he and the others were brought from the dacha to begin the talks (in early September):

“Comrades, you have destroyed the centuries-old friendship that existed between our peoples. For over 100 years our people cultivated a Slavophile love of Russia, and in the last 50 years a love for, and loyalty to, the Soviet Union. In the eyes of our people, you were our closest friends. And in one night you destroyed all of this!”

Taking into account that the “action” was taken in a historical period when the idea of a nation as a people’s primary form of life was far from outdated, and to some extent had resurged as a factor of viability and self-awareness; and taking into account that (based on historical experience) it takes a long time (if ever) to get over national humiliation... perhaps we really did pay too great a price to prevent something that probably wouldn’t have happened in the first place.

In the end, having well-fed people is not the point; the Czechs would have organized that quickly enough, even if they had to live through a small civil war. Anti-Sovietism could not have won without outside intervention, and if such intervention had happened, then it would have been the perfect time for us to take that “action.”

³ One of the leaders of Prague Spring. [Author's footnote]

Another week has passed. We put together one more report for B.N. He gave the report yesterday at the meeting of ideological workers (how to organize the 30th anniversary of Victory Day). I had to essentially write the leading article in *Pravda*, too.

I am tired of it all. Even in the “functional” sense it’s ridiculous: for weeks and sometimes months I don’t read TASS systematically, not to mention journals and books. I only skim through the ciphered telegrams and other classified information. I have no time to think about anything.

March 22, 1975

Last Saturday I was at B.N.’s dacha. His birthday in a close circle. Toasts – Zagladin, Shaposhnikov, Balmashnov, and I. B.N.’s brother was there, he is a general; and a couple of B.N.’s comrades from the Komsomol in the 1920s. [B.N.’s] wife – a beauty from the frescoes of Rublev. She is great in general – she holds herself wonderfully and intelligently. And B.N. himself was great too. He was sincere and straightforward, talking about those among his friends and comrades who almost didn’t make it in 1937 and miraculously survived; the people who will never sing the praises of... he made a gesture with his fingers to imitate Stalin’s mustache.

We played billiards; Vadim played the piano and sang. In the intervals we talked, the kind of conversations that as a rule we allow only “amongst ourselves.”

I would say B.N. is a rare type of person on our active political front: he combines our “pure” past with the cynical present. In general, ideology is still alive in him. It is a significant force that largely explains his boundless energy and his seemingly unnecessary (for the sake of his career) initiative.

Finishing up the draft declaration (for the European Communist Conference) before the working group (April 8th in Berlin). Zagladin and Zhilin went to Paris for the meeting of “the three”: the PCF, CPSU, and SED. “Worked over” the text after the first working group. As we found out yesterday, they were praised by [Gaston] Plissonnier (member of the PCF Politburo) for “a united (with the French Communists) revolutionary approach to the problem of Europe.” When I looked at the product [of the Paris working group], I realized that such concessions turn the conference into a dangerous rant that is essentially directed against our political détente (“force imperialism to retreat even more,” only then would détente be secured, “defeat it,” “overcome it,” “turn all of Europe to socialism,” etc.). In accordance with this, the united foreign policy program was joined with the social program and the fight for socialism and communism. This made the program even more unrealistic: nobody will fight alongside us for socialism and communism. Many CPs will even object to a common program of struggle for socialism. Phrases about a broad coalition and cooperation with non-Communist forces turned into mockery.

I told Zagladin about all of this. He partially agreed, but he was busy – he is preparing a delegation for the Congress of the PCI. He asked me to fix some things, “and then we’ll see, all the work is still ahead of us”...

B.N. was interested in the draft and gave instructions not to give the Germans the go-ahead to send the draft out to all the parties (28) without his knowledge. I shared my concerns with him. He grew alarmed. At the same time I found out that Katushev read the draft and was even more worried.

We agreed to invite two Germans and fix some things with them. Of course, to some extent this is disavowal of Zagladin and Zhilin (in Paris), but what can you do... We fixed it. The Germans left, and the next day [Jean] Kanapa showed up in Moscow en route from Korea.

I fought it out with Kanapa until 2a.m. Jean very quickly figured out that “I am the cause of this.” He started to pressure me, but it was easy for me to squash his efforts because his arguments either contradicted each other, or were mere demagoguery, to which I responded calmly and when possible with a chuckle.

For example, Kanapa said, “You have socialism and want peace. We want peace too, but we also want socialism. Why do you interfere with our struggle for socialism?” And so on. According to him, the Program should be communist, not social-democratic.

I said sure, the Program should come from communists and in that sense it is a communist program. But it should be addressed to both communists and non-communists. Otherwise the Conference would turn into a sectarian project.

How to explain such revolutionary sentiments? I remember when we were preparing the Conference in 1969, Kanapa was making fun of us for being too revolutionary-minded and aggressive against imperialism. “Now,” he said, “we have raised the stakes based on the new situation in the world, while others like the PCI have lowered them.” Clearly. But what will they get from it; what can they get at all by exchanging politics for demagoguery, when Giscard d’Estaing is being practically compared to Hitler and French foreign policy is being portrayed as the Americans’ errand boy?!

We agreed to 3-4 changes. Today I conveyed them over the phone to the CC SED. I made it in time: they already had Honecker’s order to send it out and weren’t expecting any more changes. By the way, the German Winkelmann, First Deputy Head of the International Department, spoke very harshly with me and categorically rejected one of the changes. They are tired of acting on our orders, plus he was probably irritated that we are forcing them to give up their German precision and order.

March 29, 1975

A contradiction has erupted between our state foreign policy, and our “communist” policy. In the most important link. Marchais & Co. got wound up over Prime Minister Chirac’s reception in Moscow: pomp, press, front pages in the newspapers, TV, three hours with Brezhnev, etc. The trigger was Chirac’s impudence: he told our reporters that he knows Brezhnev and Marchais have some kind of relationship, and he will tell Brezhnev when he sees him that the PCF has an inconsistent policy when it comes to the armed forces of France. The USSR is in favor of a strong France, but the PCF undermines the French army’s fighting ability, etc.

A few hours later Marchais was already calling Moscow and demanding that Chirac receive a public reprimand for it (and Brezhnev should say something during their conversation, too). Naturally, considering our bureaucracy of reviewing such messages, nothing was done (or could be done) immediately.

Chirac returned home surrounded by the loud buzz of the press (France needs to emphasize that it has a privileged relationship with us) and right at the airport announced, among other things, that Brezhnev told him, “We trust Giscard. He is a person we can trust, he keeps his word!”

Georges immediately convened the PB and published a resolution: “Chirac’s visit to the USSR is insignificant, it produced no results, it is all a swindle – like all of Giscard’s policies. It was necessary only to reinforce the anti-people policies of the government and strengthen the anti-communist campaign.”

A letter was composed at the same PB, “To the Secretariat of the CC CPSU.” Back in the day you could only find something like this (from a fraternal party) written in Chinese.

The general sense of it: “Everything that happened in connection with Chirac’s visit causes great harm to the interests of the working people of France and the policy of the PCF. You, the CPSU, asked for our advice and recommendations before this visit. We gave them to you. But it seems you ignored them. Moreover, our policy is to do everything we can to show the French people that they cannot trust Giscard, that his entire policy is a lie. But you announce to the whole world that he can be trusted. You undermine our efforts in this difficult fight that we are fighting in the interests of the working people of France. We declare to you that you have violated the principles of proletarian internationalism. With fraternal greetings, Georges Marchais, General Secretary of the CC PCF.”

This caused a fuss. Brezhnev gave an order to prepare a response. (By the way, before they convened the Politburo, right after Marchais called Moscow, one of our embassy staff in Paris visited them and asked them not to rush. He said they would receive detailed information from Moscow about the talks with Chirac... but it “did not have an effect”!) Gromyko prepared quite a stupid response. Our sector made a slightly better one. The two texts went to Blatov (who is afraid of Gromyko). Zagladin flew in from Rome and was sent to Blatov. In a word, yesterday

the text was not ready. But they gave something to *Pravda* (under Sedykh's name, he is a correspondent in Paris). The article's title speaks for itself: "Positive Outcomes." It mentions, by the way, that "some media outlets" (!) tried, as always, to use the visit for anti-communist purposes. Of course, this is not sufficient for Georges.

In light of these events, what happened between Kanapa and me becomes crucial; and I'm afraid the European Conference of Communist Parties, with its main idea of combining official foreign policy with class struggle – is hanging over a precipice.

Brutents and I put together a draft address (based on a draft prepared by the consultants) from the CC, Presidium, and the government to the peoples, parliaments, and governments regarding the 30th anniversary of Victory Day. We rejected a completely idiotic text prepared by the MFA (I gave my opinion on this text to the Deputy Minister of the MFA Rodionov, it will turn into a little scandal yet). The whole thing is not a very good idea... But what can you do, it was the CC resolution. By the way, our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition said in response to our confidential probing that they do not plan to "celebrate" the occasion.

Overall I've been in a state of bliss this week since B.N. left on vacation: I've caught up on almost all my reading and read a lot of interesting things on top of that. Including the notes of the Kirilenko-Ponomarev talks with the Finnish delegation. Almost the entire Finnish Politburo was here. Once again I am convinced that "our guys" from the Finnish sector, headed by Shaposhnikov, have already caused damage (perhaps irreversible) to the Finnish Communist Party. They have set it on a divisive path, and it seems this schism will happen. Belyakov⁴ started this line ten years ago and it has been persistently followed since. They are playing on the ideological myths of B.N., Suslov, and others; and openly exploiting the opportunity to rudely "pressure" the Communist Party of Finland [SKP] in a way they can't pressure many other CPs. They are inventing some obviously artificial and absurd ideological deviations in the "majority" and setting them against careerists ([Taisto] Sinisalo) and indignant old men. But if you think about it, even these forced deviations look like pathetic babbling in comparison to what the Italians, for example, are printing in their newspapers and saying at their Congresses. Compared to "Finnish deviations," the Italian line is beyond revisionism – it is a full-blown bourgeois ideology. However, through Kirilenko's lips we endorse and support the Italians at the Congress of the PCI; while here we twist arms and create enemies, we are breaking up the party... It's very simple: we don't have the reach in the PCI.

April 12, 1975

On April 4th I went to the Mayakovsky Theater. "Conversations of Socrates." It's a strange feeling when for minutes at a time you can't understand anything, you can't make the connections... either you've grown coarse and don't get clear and simple ideas; or these ideas are so banal and flat (considering your volume of information and your inner freedom of

⁴ In the late 1960s he was Ponomarev's First Deputy, then was sent as ambassador to Helsinki. [Author's footnote]

thought) that you wonder how this can be shown to intelligent adults. Or maybe it is the claim to relevant associativity (suggestions) that is mind-numbingly irritating, because it is flipping the finger behind one's back, which is stupid and anti-artistic in general. Radzinsky rewrote Plato.

Yesterday – Bach's 3rd, 5th, and 8th Brandenburg Concertos at the Conservatory. Wonderful. Especially the fifth with the bassoon. Barshai's Orchestra.

Nadezhda Mandelstam's memoirs – many moving passages that gave me pause.

[Oswald] Spengler's *The Decline of the West*. Picked up this book again. Last time (ten years ago) I didn't take it seriously and did not read carefully. It makes a huge impression. Essentially, Spengler accurately predicted the main aspects of world development after 1917. And by the way, his philosophy is not pessimistic. It is realistic. It calls us to look at things, at history and at the future, soberly, straightforwardly, and knowledgeably (with expertise).

The working group met in Berlin from the 8th-10th (documents for the European Conference of Communist Parties). Zagladin mentioned some things over the phone but hasn't sent a report yet. He is distancing me more and more from this project. He took a bunch of good-for-nothings to Berlin with him...

"The incident with Mitterrand." On April 14th a delegation from the Socialist Party of France was supposed to come to the USSR, virtually its entire leadership. By the way, the visit has been postponed about five times, including once because of Mitterrand's "anti-Soviet" interview. This Tuesday, the 8th, Blatov called Zuev (head of the sector) and said that the visit needs to be postponed and to come up with some arguments and prepare a letter to Mitterrand and Marchais. They came up with the following excuse: we are busy with the preparation of the Five-Year Plan and celebrations for the 30th anniversary of Victory Day. This caused a commotion in Paris. The Communists got more wound up than the Socialists (Mitterrand was in Tahiti at the time). Leroy and Plissonnier rushed to the embassy at night and said, "What are you doing? Is the scandal with Chirac not enough for you? Now you are postponing Mitterrand for the fifth time, you are practically saying that you don't want anything to do with the leftist forces of France! What does this mean? We are going to make a Politburo statement..." and so on.

And if the Socialists issued a message without any qualifications ("postponed at the request of the Soviet side"), Marchais "expressed regret."

In the meantime, today the TV program *Vremya* opened by showing Brezhnev holding the hand of U.S. Secretary of Commerce Simon in both his hands for 5-7 minutes. Simon is in Moscow for another session of the Soviet-American Commission. Afterwards, Brezhnev "received" him for a long time...

The CC Plenum will open on the 16th, as B.N. told me when he assigned me to prepare the draft resolution (!). However, it will not be about the Five-Year Plan, but about foreign policy, and Gromyko will make a report.

The mutiny in Paris produced results. Maybe the fact that B.N. returned to Moscow and “said something” at the Politburo also had an effect. Mitterrand will be coming on the 23rd after all!

However, how do we make policy!? Two days before, Zuev had predicted to Blatov what would happen. But Blatov did not dare (!) “to inform,” and instead obediently did what he was told, even though the instructions were clearly unqualified and harmful. It is terrible and dangerous when advisers are meek and spineless. And it’s bad that they make political steps without consulting with people who can and should calculate the inevitable consequences.

I had to coordinate the draft address “To the peoples, parliaments, and governments” [on the 30th anniversary of Victory Day] between Gromyko, Ponomarev, Katushev and the CC Propaganda Department. Almost until the very end I managed to leave the word “Germany” out of it, but Gromyko (whose signature is final) put it in there after all. Still, I convinced B.N. to try to take it out.

I’m sitting at home, editing Suslov’s report for the Lenin days. It’s boring. If some regular propaganda worker was giving this report, the audience would walk out. But here the banalities look like serious ideology and policy. Some parts (on the communist movement and Vietnam) were written incompetently. I’m about to head out to give the comments to B.N.

April 18, 1975

I’m awfully tired. What to do? It’s unclear where my life is headed. But first a couple words on how political documents that the whole world has been talking about for days are created here.

Last Friday Ponomarev told me that the CC Plenum will take place on the 16th. Apparently we should prepare the draft resolution. The subject: the international situation and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Gromyko was to give the report. I was supposed to think about it over the weekend.

I thought about it and wrote the draft resolution in two hours. B.N. was busy with the Iraqi Hussein and read it late in the evening. On Tuesday morning he ran over to Suslov with it; Suslov corrected two-three phrases. B.N. was in a rush to get back to Hussein, so he summoned me to the CC Secretariat room next to Suslov’s office and passed the comments to me. Then, on the 16th, half an hour before the Plenum started, Suslov ran the draft text by his Politburo colleagues and afterwards read it out loud at the Plenum. Brezhnev said that of course members

of the Plenum may want to change some wording, but he personally thinks the draft is excellent and he is ready to vote for it all the way.

In the evening I watched the newscaster expressively read my text on the TV. I did not attend the Plenum and did not hear Gromyko's report personally. The people who were there – Arbatov, Zagladin, and even Sparrow (Aleksandrov-Agentov) himself, not to mention B.N. – all considered the report to be boring and empty. Arbatov told me (not knowing that I wrote the resolution) that the resolution is by far stronger than the actual report, and that "everyone was saying so during the conversations in the lobby."

Shelepin was removed. This came as a surprise to Ponomarev, too. Even the fact that the Brits may see it as the result of their caterwauling about him to the Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade-Unions two weeks ago didn't stop this. Judging by how *Times & Co.* are presenting it, that's just how they perceived it. Shelepin filed his resignation to the Plenum, saying that for seven years he carried out the orders of the Central Committee, but after giving it some thought he decided that he does not have the "qualification" to lead this section!

Of course it's good overall that Shurik is out; he was one of the potential "little Napoleons." Nevertheless, it was done in a confusing manner... and why now?

The XXV Congress has been scheduled for February 24, 1976.

B.N. already began to fuss and today among other things I had to urgently prepare assignments for the sectors on our three subjects: the ICM, social democracy and the national liberation movements.

Besides that, there is B.N.'s academic report, two drafts of an article (following a PB resolution) on the "Great Lesson" – assigning credit for the Victory. A scandal in Yugoslavia after Minister of Defense Grechko's article on the 30th anniversary of Victory Day. He equates the Yugoslavs' contribution to that of the Bulgarians and Czechs. It's a stupidity, but not accidental. It was prepared by our entire line of propaganda and our manner of correcting history to fit the current political situation. Tito made six angry statements about this and all of Yugoslav press has broken loose. Now, to "correct the awkwardness" there was an order to prepare an "objective" article. It is supposed to appear like a general article, but in reality it is aimed at this. The first *Pravda* version was very weak and dumb. The second one is more decent, even though it says some things about our allies...

B.N. still makes us attack the social democrats: why are they interfering in Portugal. It is ludicrous. He is planning to publicly lecture them while at the same time unrolling the red carpet for Mitterrand, who is coming on the 23rd for a meeting at the highest level... And at the same time he is receiving (at my insistence) the New Democratic Party of Canada (social democrats). Today Arbatov held a "round table" at his Institute. These are all vestiges of the Comintern.

Yesterday B.N. made me insert a section into Brezhnev's May 8th speech (for Victory Day) on the "ideological and political level of the people." I feebly protested, arguing that it is demagoguery: what level can we speak of when there is bribery, self-seeking, truancy, protectionism, drunkenness. A huge number of workers couldn't care less about the common good, etc. Still, he insisted. But I worked around it by writing "abstractly."

April 26, 1975

[Michael] O'Riordan visited after the Congress of his party (Communist Party of Ireland). His excuse for coming was that he wanted to inform us about the XVI Congress, the "Ideological Congress." They canceled the 1968 resolution on Czechoslovakia. There are 600 members in his party. I had a boring conversation with him. When I asked him about the work the communists are doing, the specifics of what they are doing in the country, he once again started to tell me about the general situation in Ireland. And he was rather embarrassed. His requests? To pay for the delegation to visit the Congress of the American CP and to accept 23 people into the Lenin School.

However, when I prevailed upon B.N. to receive him, O'Riordan prepared and made an impression on B.N. as a fighting, ideological, and loyal leader; the kind "we could use more of in other parties." Nevertheless, B.N. asked him about the size of the party and then kept coming back to it and saying that everything is very good, but "you need more, more members"...

O'Riordan was shown on TV, seated at the presidium in the Palace of Congresses for the Evening of Lenin (Suslov's report). He was treated very nicely. Before coming here, he spent several weeks in the GDR, where he was also treated very nicely. That's how he keeps his party, which, of course, does not have 600 members, but 100 at best.

Mitterrand. Delegation from the Socialist Party of France at the highest level. From our side – Suslov, Ponomarev, Zagladin and others. Vadim was telling me some quite extraordinary things. The surprising thing is not that Mitterrand fully supports our foreign policy. It is the very fact of a conversation of peers in which both sides acknowledge the legitimacy and even the necessity of each other's existence and actions. Mitterrand admires Brezhnev not just as a statesman, but as a communist whose qualities (precisely as a communist) enabled him to firmly, persistently, and steadily work towards his goals, no matter what.

When Zagladin tried to use our regular formula for the communiqué – "the Socialist Party of France notes the progress in the building of communism" – the French suggested different wording – "success in the building of socialism based on the plans and program of the CPSU." In other words, go ahead and build whatever you believe socialism to be, while we will build our socialism. And we (!) agreed with this.

On other issues Zagladin depicted Mitterrand's position as follows: "NATO! Why are you so sensitive about this issue? Yes, we are for NATO because Western Europeans have

grown accustomed to associating their security with NATO. It is a mass-psychological phenomenon that will gradually disappear as we work together to eliminate both blocs.

"PCF. We recognize it and believe that France needs it. But France also needs us. This is the objective reality. This is our position in the union of leftist forces. We have some competition with the PCF. It is inevitable and we don't see anything dramatic in this."

What about us, the CPSU? We agree with this, it follows from the very fact of such a meeting. What about our ideological premise of the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist Party? How does Trapeznikov feel about this, our guardian of Stalinist orthodoxy in the Central Committee of the CPSU? Or perhaps he and others like him think that this is only an opportunistic tactic on our part?

At lunch: open, warm, and natural conversation. "Suslov really got into it," Vadim noted. Suslov remembered that he had some impressionist paintings at home and sent someone for them. He gave them to Mitterrand. Mitterrand gave him an album of original drawings from the days of the Paris Commune. Hugs, jokes and so on. This is Suslov! The guardian of the purity of Marxism-Leninism and a champion of the fight against all reformism, revisionism, and deviation!

Perhaps all of this is a mostly impulsive, not completely thought-out approach to new realities, a rejection of the stereotypes of an era that has irrevocably receded into the past.

But alongside this we have B.N.'s aforementioned demand for a note against social democrats. Alongside this we have Palme's recent report at the Plenum on "Dubcek's letter" and Husak's speech about it. Then again, this does not mean that Palme, who is aiming for the chairmanship of the Socialist International, Kraisky & Co. do not recognize the realities of Communism. They are simply asserting the reality of social democracy and expecting a liberalization of communism.

But then why does Mitterrand need us? After all, he carries some weight in the Socialist International. It's very simple: contact with us solidifies him as an alternative to Giscard. If this change happens, he will strive for "their own socialism" in France, using the situation in the world, in which the USSR is one of the main poles and one that has already renounced its aspirations to unify all revolutions on the model of the October Revolution. People in the West already understood this. This explains Palme's audacity, and Brandt-Mitterrand's eagerness to be friends with us. The people who have not understood it (and never will accept it) are Trapeznikov and millions of others like him in the CPSU.

Brezhnev-Mitterrand meeting. An hour before the meeting Blatov called and together over the phone we composed a draft report. We infused it with the significance of this meeting, which, of course, will be discussed in all the major news media around the world. Zagladin told me that Ponomarev winced when he saw the draft. But he did not have the authority to "water it

down" because he was told that it essentially already had the General Secretary's approval. Mitterrand did not make a single change.

Bovin called me in the second half of the day and invited me to "rally somewhere on a solid Marxist-Leninist basis." I picked him up at the "Izvestiya" building. We went to the [restaurant at the] House of Cinema. For a long time they would not seat us, but we looked respectable so they did not show us the door, either. They kept asking if we were members. Finally a waitress seated us, but it cost an extra five rubles. To be honest, I thought Sasha had something interesting to tell me. But nothing of the sort. He just had nowhere to go and was hungry.

He told me the following story from the time of the XXIII Congress. At the time, Shurik (Shelepin) was the focus of attention of the foreign press, there were rumors that Brezhnev was "temporary" and that the time of the "Iron Shurik" was coming. "His 'boys' came over to recruit me," Bovin said, "They said they need smart people. 'Why are you sticking with the eyebrows!'⁵ He won't be around for long! We practically have everything in our hands already.' I looked at them and replied, 'Guys! I did not see you and this conversation didn't happen.' 'Fine, as you wish. But you'll be sorry!'"

I'm guessing that Bovin was not the only one who was aware of such activities by Shurik's Oprichnina.

April 29, 1975

Jacques Duclos⁶ has passed away. Ponomarev went to his funeral.

The Portuguese Communist Party won 13 percent of the vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly (30 seats). The Socialist Party – 38 percent (116 seats). There is a big buzz around this, even though it's perfectly natural. The Socialist Party did not really earn this victory and it does not reflect (by far!) the real role of this party.

I found an album of works by Hieronymus Bosch. Mindblowing. It turns out even surrealism appeared 500 years ago, not to mention that Shakespeare has said it all already.

I finally got Dez'ka's (David Samoilov) latest book – *The Wave and the Rock*. I read it and wept. Great Dez'ka, poor Dez'ka! Everything he writes feels so close to my heart.

May 13, 1975

From April 30th- May 11th I was in a hospital out of town. I made the decision to get the operation on my nose. The doctor's note gives me leave until the 14th, but I went to work right away on the 11th. At the hospital I didn't want to do any official work. But while I was on this

⁵ Reference to Brezhnev. [Editor's footnote]

⁶ The oldest and most renowned leader of the French Communist Party. [Author's footnote]

“suspension” I felt even more keenly that I am nothing without my work. Whatever they may say about freedom, there is no freedom without dignity, and dignity is a social category.

I am preparing for a meeting with Brown (member of the Politburo of the Socialist Party of Australia). He is visiting us before their Congress (second since the founding of the party) and wants to hear our opinion on their draft program. It is a boring and chaotic text; it contains almost all the right things... copied from a Lenin School textbook. The people who wrote it studied at the Lenin School. The graduates are considered theoretically sound cadres. In reality, if these people did not learn anything before the Lenin School and do not intend to learn or think independently afterwards, they are just people who memorized the “Prayer of the Short Course” and lost their ability to analyze events independently and realistically.

What will I say to this Brown about his draft?

Ponomarev’s report for the USSR Academy of Sciences, which will take place on May 21st. Keldysh will be dismissed. As B.N. told me, “the situation is paradoxical. Usually there is a crowd vying over the seat. But this time, no one wants it.” Yes! Even in this environment the other “system of social values” is increasingly taking over.

May 16, 1975

I talked with Bill Brown about the draft program they will accept at the second Congress in June. Three hours! He could not argue with me. In fact, it was impossible to argue because I explained to him (“following Lenin”) that the “pure communism” they included in their program is good for nothing from the perspective of the real struggles of modern communists (the possibility of war among the imperialists, the police and army, the “two stages of revolution,” and the possibility of independent policy and prevention of fascism under capitalism, about the various crises, etc. And especially about the fact that nowadays a communist party without a foreign policy is a hopeless affair).

In the evening I was on Plotnikov Street. Jose Vandel – in the last eighteen months, he is the first Chilean from the leadership of the Communist Party of Chile to cross the border into Argentina and come to Moscow. He flew back yesterday.

I got hot tempered about the Latin-American Conference of Communist Parties. The orthodox types from the Lenin School started to peck at the draft resolution. They even found various contradictions with the Declaration from the Meeting of 1969, and some thought it was intentional. They complained to our CC and even looked for support, showing off how ideologically vigilant they are. Suddenly, all these nitpicking theoreticians found a supporter in [Luís Carlos] Prestes,⁷ who said that the conference should be postponed because of the “useless” draft.

⁷ The elderly leader of the Communist Party of Brazil, a national hero. [Author’s footnote]

When [Rodney] Arismendi found out about this, he was furious. Today I signed his telegrams to Bogota and Jorge del Prado in Lima: warning and urging to rebuff Prestes.

Yesterday I was explaining to the Chileans (including [Volodia] Teitelboim and [Orlando] Millas, who came from Berlin, Correr, and their Youth Communist League leader) that if this conference is thwarted the Cubans would never agree to another one. They don't need it. Are the parties really so politically childish that they would jeopardize a matter of principal and maybe even historic significance – the virtual restoration of the unity of Latin American communists (in a new environment of unity with the Communist Party of Cuba, which is unprecedented)? All of this because of some differences in wording?

When I told B.N. about it, he "hinted" that he always suspected Prestes. And indeed, there is something perplexing about him. After all, he is the one who broke up the party. Plus, he has been in the country illegally for twenty years, and not a hair on his head has been harmed. And he is a figure that every schoolboy in Brazil knows. I don't think... But then again, who knows! Crazier things have happened in communist parties.

Today I had a conversation with Mendes, Cunhal's adviser. He came to discuss economic affairs. They want to sell us train cars, ships, bridge cranes. They are negotiating for us to supply them with cotton, from which they will make goods and export them back to us. Except the quality [of those goods] is not very high. And they missed an opportunity to unite the small textile businesses for this work; the government technicians already united the ten largest manufacturers. The most important issue for the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] in all of this is to reduce the unemployment rate. There was no unemployment in Portugal before the revolution of April 25th, 1974.

May 18, 1975

In the evening I was at B.N.'s. I told him about Brown, Prestes, Arismendi, and about Cunhal's adviser. I warned him about the possible breakdown of the Latin American conference.

He in turn told me about his conversation with [Aleksandr] Grlichkov (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) about the European Conference of Communist Parties. "Did the Yugoslavs finally say what they want and what they are afraid of?" I asked. "They repeated the same things we already read in their documents," B.N. replied. "They don't want the document to be binding. I asked them, 'Do you want to just write it like that, that the document is not binding?' They laughed. Everyone understands that it's silly. But they don't want any collective actions. They say it would be the reestablishment of the center."

I said, "But even the World Peace Council makes collective decisions and agrees on joint actions."

B.N., "They agree and nevertheless... They don't want to jeopardize their nonaligned status. By the way, they also presented a party classification system consisting of four categories: parties in power and part of the bloc; parties that are not in power, but are influential; parties not in power and not influential; parties (the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) that are in power but not in any bloc.

"They also have a reasonable argument. They said they cannot allow the European Conference of Communist Parties to damage their national foreign policy. I (Ponomarev) supported this idea. And, in fact, the Geneva Conference is being pushed back once again. It will not happen before the fall. Which means we have to conduct our conference in the fall as well, because later on the Congress will be pressing. So the communists will have to come together immediately after the state conference and either essentially juxtapose themselves to the Geneva-Helsinki Conference, which is what the French want, or trail behind the state conference, which is what the Yugoslavs want."

And once again B.N. started cursing the day we agreed to the Conference of Communist Parties and the people who supported the idea. (He said the Italians are kicking themselves right now for stepping forth with this initiative).

The European Conference of Communist Parties (and its preparation process) is not giving us anything besides a demonstration of the growing distance and deepening differences between the communist parties. The Communist Party of France is getting more and more wound up. Marchais said in a recent interview, "We are no less independent than the ICP. If the document does not suit us, we won't sign it."

L'Humanité explained it: the differences and arguments in the working group are between the people who want to "whitewash imperialism" and those who think that peace can be won through the struggle against imperialism and victory over imperialism in every capitalist country. Judging by the tone of the article, it was written by Kanapa ("some already have socialism and want peace; we also want peace, but we want socialism as well"....).

What about us... what do we want, and what can we do?

With the current situation at the top, the PB can't even discuss a dilemma that is clear to all communist parties and clear to us – the international relations specialists, clear to Ponomarev, Katushev... Because the majority of the PB cannot comprehend how this question can be raised, they will think it is "wrong." For example, if B.N. dares to raise this issue, it will turn into "who is to blame" and "how was this allowed" instead of "what can be done." But he can't raise it because the General Secretary "must not be encumbered with such trifles" since he's been assigned a "low-stress regimen" (and Suslov too, by the way) and after the celebrations of May 8-9th he scaled down his activity level again. Because of this, Brandt's scheduled May 14th visit was cancelled (or postponed) and the Western press is making a fuss about it, trying to figure out

whether it means that Moscow is changing its foreign policy course, or the FRG has gone too far in its games with West Berlin, or if Soviet-German economic relations may break down, etc.

Oh, Mother Russia! Oh, mass media! – there is no way you can apply your refined Western methods to understand our motives and reasons!

May 24, 1975

Towards the end of the day on Thursday, around 6p.m., Vershinin brought me a “Special Folder” and another thick folder that clearly contained a manuscript. He said: “B.N. asked you to read this, but you have to do it today. You must return it for the night.” Diligensky was in my office at the time, we were working on the multi-volume “Labour Movement” publication and also on Peregrudov’s book on the Labour Party, which the publisher is afraid to publish and so on.

Diligensky left, I opened the “Special Folder.”

There was a note from two departments (Propaganda and Organizational Party Work) about Andropov’s note to the CC “On the anti-Party activity of L. Karpinsky, Glotov, and Klyamkin.” L. Karpinsky is the son of a renowned old Bolshevik [Vyacheslav Karpinsky] who always sat in the Presidium of the Palace of Congresses on major holidays, Party Congresses, etc., from the XX Congress until his death two-three years ago. He must have been close to 100 years old. Until 1962, Len (name derived from “Lenin”) Karpinsky was the secretary of the Komsomol CC, then the Head of the *Pravda* department. He was fired for an article he co-wrote with Burlatsky in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on how the Moscow cultural organs stifled yet another play at Taganka Threater (Burlatsky was also fired from *Pravda* at this time). Afterwards Karpinsky was ill, it was either his liver or his blood... then he got some kind of small position in the *Progress* publishing house.

I knew him a little, we met a couple times at the Taganka Theater, and once we bumped into each other on the trolleybus. He stopped by my office a couple times and brought lists of foreign books from which we, the International Department, were supposed to select the ones we needed and they, *Progress* publishing, would translate them into Russian for a “special list.” I made only one observation from my conversations with him: he is a soft, very intelligent man and at the same time a simple, open person, pleasant and responsive in communication. It was very easy to become friends with him. He used the informal form of address with me and talked as if we were childhood friends. He never expressed “those” views in front of me or to me. But he always looked sad and depressed, and his whole old-Russian-Muscovite intelligentsia appearance bore the stamp of “Weltschmerz.” He had big eyes, a thin aquiline nose, thin oval [face], a beautiful well-shaped mouth, black hair; [his frame was] bony, broad-shouldered, a little stooped and narrow-chested. He must be a little over 30 years old.

Everything about his manner showed that he was dissatisfied with the “regime,” though he couldn’t have been a malicious oppositionist by his nature.

I’d never come across the last names Klyamkin and Glotov before. Turns out they are department heads of the editorial staff at *Molodoi Kommunist* [Young Communist].

The gist of this affair: Andropov reports to the CC that it was discovered that these three men (led by Karpinsky) were planning to publish an underground (samizdat) journal *Solaris*. The first issue was supposed to have an article by Karpinsky called “Words are also Deeds,” an article by [Mikhail] Gefter on Leninist methodology of the study of society, and Latsis’ work called “The Great Turning-Point Year.”

Karpinsky, Klyamkin, and Glotov were summoned to the KGB and gave signed statements renouncing the idea. They were given a warning. The rest is left up to the party organs (i.e. the question of their party membership and dismissal, whether they can keep their jobs).

The file contained a tape recording of Karpinsky’s conversation with KGB [Political Police] Department director [Filipp] Bobkov and a photocopy of Latsis’ manuscript (the thick folder I mentioned earlier). The tape recording stunned me. It turns out that Bobkov and Karpinsky worked together until 1962 in the Komsomol CC. They hadn’t seen each other since then. And now they met...

They talked about it. Then Bobkov reminded Karpinsky, as if suddenly remembering himself, that he is an officer on duty now. He asked whether Len can guess why he was invited “here.” Karpinsky pretended that he did not know. This was followed by what is probably standard phraseology – shall we be honest with each other, why waste each other’s time.

Bobkov led the conversation very smartly, decently, without the slightest hint of intimidation or blackmail. He said straightforwardly that he was talking about *Solaris*. After some very mild and feeble resistance, Karpinsky understood that Bobkov knew everything about everything and disclosed all the names and activities. This started an almost theoretical discussion, even though both men periodically repeated that they are not here to have theoretical discussions.

Karpinsky denied that the journal was meant to follow “the samizdat line.” Bobkov reasonably countered: why then do you need to express your thoughts in the format of connected articles, why edit the texts (Karpinsky did this with Latsis), and even write an afterword (to Latsis). Karpinsky argued that it was only an exchange of ideas in a very small circle and they needed to record them in order to clearly express their ideas, build consistent and organized arguments, have some kind of order in their thoughts, and to record the results of the discussions, etc. Bobkov responded (and quite competently) that all samizdat publications started out the same way. As soon as something is printed, the thing inevitably gets out from under the control

of the initiator, no matter how good his intentions were. “For example,” he said, “your journal (even if you want to call it just a ‘library’ that you planned to fill up your own shelves with) is known to Yanov.” (Yanov, it turns out, is that same writer who published an interesting article in *Novyi Mir* [New World] two-three years ago about the Scientific-Technological Revolution and the modern hero of the industrial novel. I recall it caught my attention). “Now this Yanov is in Israel, working for the ‘Voice of Israel.’”

“Or consider: you have to type up what you write. For this you need a typist. You find the typist Alexeyeva. But we were not the only ones who found out about what she was typing. We conducted a search and now we have your *Solaris*, but someone else could have gotten it as well. And perhaps they did.”

At this point Karpinsky exclaimed, “Then we got the wrong girl!” They both laughed.

In between these “digressions” Karpinsky expounded his credo. For over ten years he has been plagued by the question of where Stalin came from. He has studied and thought about [this phenomenon] and as the result has been living a double life, which made him miserable. (It seems he is unhappy in his regular life as well. I heard that his wife left him, or maybe he got the divorce himself. He fell in love with someone else, a woman who has four (!) small children. Apparently they live in perfect harmony, he takes care of the children. But he is poor, sometimes downright destitute. His always looks shabby and unkempt, like a truck driver coming off a shift, or a plumber...)

The reason he is tortured by this question is because after observing what is happening in the country, he came to the conclusion that it is due to the inconsistency of the XX Congress. The analysis of the “Stalin” phenomenon at the Congress only scratched the surface and was theoretically untenable. After the Congress only a few political conclusions were made (mainly the elimination of the camps), but in the social and economic – and consequently ideological – spheres everything remained the same. Democracy is not developing, and this is the source of our troubles and woes.

Bobkov agreed. Two or three times they came back to the subject of democracy and Bobkov’s reaction was always unambiguous – we need to develop democracy, “but not through some illegal publications.”

Karpinsky fervently argued that it is harmful to conceal and distort our history, that [without knowing our history] we will not be able to find ways to effectively solve our economic and spiritual problems. In fact, it is impossible to conceal our history. Russia’s long experience with this shows that it is impossible. We also cannot do it because our enemies, our foreign enemies, are analyzing the things about which we are silent. Everything will become known anyway.

Bobkov objected, "Who is preventing you from doing this research? There are dozens of institutes, scholars, etc. who are studying this."

Karpinsky reasonably retorted that nobody would print the things he would like to say, and the kind of thoughts he's had. As for the institutes, even the verbal conversations there are limited to a framework that barely approaches the point at which real research and understanding of the subject begins.

This was their pleasant conversation.

Karpinsky implored [Bobkov] not to touch Klyamkin and Glotov. Bobkov replied that nobody is going to "touch" them, in a certain sense. But they have been summoned for a conversation and behaved stupidly. They denied everything.

Karpinsky: "I'll tell them to stop fooling around."

(Though from the conversation, and from the note, it's unclear what the role of these two guys from *Molodoi Kommunist* was in the *Solaris* affair.)

Bobkov: "What about Gefter?"

Karpinsky: "Gefter has nothing to do with this. I talked with him, in general we discussed these subjects a great deal. He is an intelligent, deep person. But he told me (Karpinsky), 'Do what you will, but I will not participate in this.'"

I've known Gefter since 1938, my freshman year at the university. He was two years ahead of me. I remember him at first as the Komsomol leader – he was the secretary of the university Komsomol committee. Before the war (he was finishing his fifth year in 1941) he was the secretary of the history department's party bureau. Gefter was idolized far beyond the history department. He was an excellent speaker, his line of thought was clear and distinct, and he had great culture of the spoken word. He could bend any argument in his favor; he captivated audiences with his conviction. I remember how I was amazed that I would walk away from his speeches thinking something completely different from what I was sure about before and during the meeting. (Of course, he did not know or notice me. Back then I was a very ordinary and very passive element). There was something in him of the revolutionary leaders, of the civil war era. He probably represented the kind of statesman that stemmed from Trotsky and Zinoviev. A powerful tribune with a good dose of demagoguery that is distinguishable only for the experienced listener (or for a not very orthodox intellectual). In contrast to the statesmen like Kirov, who was also an orator and a tribune and also had a burning, irrepressible energy. But people like Kirov were sympathetic to people's weaknesses and circumstances, they were capable of understanding a regular person – in a word, they represented a type of Russian revolutionary and fighter. But Gefter was (like probably Trotsky and Zinoviev) a statesman with a Jewish personality, an unforgiving rigorist who would not tolerate any objections or

weaknesses, who recognized only “black” and “white,” and who had some admiration for his own superiority and “iron principles.”

Maybe right now I am modernizing my impressions from those days (and my “awe”) from the pre-war Gefter. But it must be close to what my impressions really were. One must also remember that these were the years “1937-1939”!!

On June 22, 1941, we were gathered for a meeting in the auditorium, many people spoke. Gefter spoke too. It was fire and flames. We left that evening without a shadow of confusion or bewilderment that had gripped us, or me at least, after Molotov’s speech on the radio. On June 26th or 28th (I don’t remember exactly) we were already taking the train towards Roslavl to dig anti-tank ditches. Gefter was riding as the commissar at the head of our detachment of several hundred.

[At the front] he was also strict, omnipresent, and implacable. We called him “Misha,” but you could always feel the distance between him and the masses. His authority was absolute and quite natural. Everyone admired and truly respected him. Indeed, a difficult role fell on him. We had to be fed (and food had to be gotten from God knows where, including from evacuees who were fleeing to the east), our spirits, discipline, and even more importantly – our enthusiasm – had to be kept up. Later, when the Germans started getting around us and we barely had enough time to finish digging a line of trenches before we had to get out of semi-encirclement and start digging at another position – again Gefter organized all of this. He contacted military units, distributed the assignments and supervised the work.

I recall how once we got a lice infestation. Misha gave an order: everyone is to get a haircut immediately. The hair cutting began. He, by the way, picked up the clippers and helped the volunteer hairdressers do the work. I rebelled: at the time I had a luxurious head of hair. Misha gave me a long public reprimand, but condescended and allowed me to only get a trim.

Towards the end of August the grumbling began. We had to retreat all the time (cars came at night to evacuate us). Because we were under constant surveillance by [German aircraft] the “frame” [Focke-Wulf Fw 189] and the “crutch” [Henschel Hs 126], the Germans kept deeply bypassing us on the left and right. The guys called Misha and demanded that we be given rifles, otherwise we would be captured like helpless ducklings. Misha gave a speech (of course we did not get any rifles), but I remember that he did not have the same confidence in his manner that everything will end well for us. At the end of August, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th-year students were evacuated to Moscow “on Stalin’s orders.” I remember the furious speed the driver of the echelon kept up day and night, and how the students got him out of the car at Kiev train station and carried him on their arms for about 20 minutes. The 1st and 5th-year students stayed. Gefter stayed too.

The rest I know from hearsay. They kept digging until they were completely surrounded. Then everyone got out as best he could. Misha reached our line without his party card – he buried it when he was in a situation that he could not imagine getting out of.

June 8, 1975

I talked with Ponomarev. He got sick too.

“Have you heard? About Karpinsky and the others. And Latsis stuck his nose in there. [He is] from the journal (*Problems of Peace and Socialism* in Prague). We were the ones who sent him there. Who is this Latsis?

“I don’t know, this is the first I ever heard of him.”

“Is he not the husband of that poetess who visits us often? She keeps saying, ‘My husband, Latsis, he is so talented, so talented.’ There’s your talented... and we need to remove Krasin⁸ as soon as possible. I hope he is not mixed up in this. Roy Medvedev would be right around the corner!”

I tried to draw him into a serious discussion. Karpinsky’s naiveté does not convince anyone, which is both a problem and a tragedy. I started to describe what I managed to read from Latsis’ folder (it had three chapters: “Stalin against Stalin,” “Bukharin against Bukharin,” and I think “Lenin against Lenin”). I only had time to read the first, brilliantly written story of how Stalin and Bukharin strongly defended and conducted Lenin’s general line (after Lenin’s death) and how Trotsky, Zinoviev & Co. were defeated – partially because Stalin controlled the apparatus and partially because Trotsky, Zinoviev & Co. went against the Congress-approved general Party line and therefore were doomed from the start. Latsis provides numerous quotations from Stalin, which we all once knew by heart (I was amazed [to realize this]), especially from 1927, the XV Congress... in which Stalin truly looks like a consistent and skillful conductor of Lenin’s (NEP) approach to building socialism.

But then it was January of 1928. Stalin went to Siberia and his speeches there are unrecognizable, as if he was switched for a different person. By the way, it turns out these speeches were only published in 1949, when “Stalin was no longer afraid or embarrassed of anybody.” He switched completely to Trotsky’s positions, which Bukharin had Aesopically pointed out six months later in his “Notes of an Economist.”

There was more along these lines. I tried to explain this to B.N., but it came out rushed and muddled. His reaction was, “This is not relevant right now.” I replied, “What could be more relevant in our history than this?” These are the roots of our current ideological struggle. I told

⁸ Krasin was a consultant at the International Department. Following somebody’s recommendation, Ponomarev “summoned” him from Leningrad about ten years prior. Krasin associated with Roy Medvedev and was “exposed.” [Author’s footnote]

him that after reading Latsis, I understood for the first time that by keeping a monopoly over this period in our history, Trapeznikov gets to decide who is a revisionist and who is an orthodox. I understood why he holds on to this monopoly so furiously, sinking his claws into it. After all, in our ideological turmoil right now we have a division along the lines of Stalinist – anti-Stalinist (or, which is also “suspicious,” non-Stalinist). And it was Trapeznikov who was at the control panel and took this position in “History of the CPSU.” As long as this persists, he will set the ideological atmosphere and various “Karpinskys” will appear again and again.

B.N. listened to this tirade impatiently and repeated that “it is irrelevant.” He added, “They (?) have to see that during the celebration of the 30th anniversary of Victory Day, there is not one mention of...” and he ran his hand over his mustache. That’s what’s important.

At that point our conversation came to an end, somebody was in a hurry to see B.N.

Of course it’s “important”! But Trapeznikov and others have grown used to ignoring that. And they get away with it. Most importantly, the conclusion I wanted to confine myself to today: nobody took the trouble to get to the core of the case (except for the KGB man Bobkov, but his functions are limited and he does not have to make ideological conclusions). Even B.N. did not want to read the conversation between Bobkov and Karpinsky, or Latsis’ es brochure. But all the CC Secretaries signed the case in support of the two departments. It looks like the same thing happened at those two departments as well; the only person who read the materials fully was some instructor. All of this was transferred to the Party Control Commission [PCC] to determine the Party standing of Karpinsky, Glotov, and Klyamkin.

There were all sorts of events in the last two weeks. Woddis visited on the 25th. I met him at the airport and had dinner with him. Ponomarev received him on the 26th. Everything was pretty cut and dry, though considerably friendlier than in previous times. Then we had two big “discussions” about different issues: “Why do you want a summit between the CPSU and the CPGB so much?” “Will there be an informal conversation?” He didn’t like that B.N. called the Thai, Malay, and other such communist rebels “pro-Chinese monkeys sitting in trees and shooting from there.” Woddis gave me a lecture about the legitimacy of their armed struggle and the appropriateness of Chinese influence there, as well as in Africa.

I replied: if this is how we prepare the Brezhnev-McLennan meeting, we will only cause a quarrel between our parties. It is not a theoretical symposium. Do you have anything political to offer on the discussion of such questions? No! Then we should not raise them at this level. For example, we don’t have anything to offer to resolve the problems of the communist movement in these countries, therefore we should let time do its work, not Brezhnev and McLennan.

We also talked about our specialists and Chinese specialists in Africa and whether there is a “starving English working class” (Ponomarev asked Woddis this question), as well as “Who needs the European Conference of Communists Parties; who needs it more – us, or them?”

Lunkov (Ambassador in London) at the Sheremetyevo airport. He predicted 60-40 on the “Common Market.” Now we know it was 67-32. And 20 million Brits did not go to the polls at all, that’s how much they are about this “Common Market”!

Tension with Ponomarev before his departure to [meet] the voters: speech and report (for the activists). In a fit of anger I told him, “Why fuss so much? Nobody reads these speeches anyway!” That hurt his feelings and he didn’t “bother” me about it anymore; he put Vershinin to work, telling him that the working class is starving in the West after all, and our scholars and statisticians are all lying.

On Friday, May 30th, B.N. met with Arismendi before he left for the Conference of Communist Parties in Havana. I prepared a discussion outline for him, but I wasn’t present.

I had to see the Chileans off for the same conference. For Ponomarev they are now the defeated party, and he is not really interested in them. We had a big conversation – about the meaning of the conference, about the fact that we would like a mention of the International Conference, a mention of Maoists and the like.

They told me about Altamerano’s trip to Romania. He returned in a rage. Among other things, when he asked why Romania maintains diplomatic relations with Chile, Ceausescu replied, “Why not? In 1939 the Soviet Union even signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler!”

The bastard! But what can we do?

Right now Ponomarev is very concerned about Brandt, Palme, and [Bruno] Kreisky’s solidarity with the Portuguese Soares (financial support too), and their zeal to unleash an anti-Communist offensive (after Vietnam). He writes me all sorts of resolutions on every ciphered telegram that comes in, saying that something needs to be done. I once offered him a concrete action plan (before Mitterrand’s visit). I was sure that he wouldn’t use the plan, and that’s exactly what happened. This time I composed a beautiful reply, “Measure of Responsibility,” seven pages long. Supposedly it is for *Pravda*. But this kind of material has to be sent around the Secretariat, and once again B.N. won’t do it, making excuses that it is “not quite there” and “not quite right.” In reality, on June 20th Brandt is coming to visit Brezhnev and of course B.N. doesn’t know how things will go there and can’t influence anything. Naturally, he will not agree to stick his nose out with a critical, persuasive article about social democrats. Plus, the General Secretary’s election speech is coming up!

On Monday, June 2, Aksen and Markowski (SED) were here. They discussed with B.N. what to do with the European Conference of Communist Parties. They discussed the French incident as well. In the meantime, the French are getting more and more wound up. Pankov writes from Paris that he met with [Gaston] Plissonnier. The latter was unusually harsh, saying that their party is fundamentally at odds with the Communist Party on the analysis and evaluation of the essence of peaceful coexistence. [Plissonnier said,] “The CPSU has departed

from the principles and from the agreement. It followed the Italians, Yugoslavs and Romanians. The CPSU is ready to bend its principles in order to ensure those countries' participation in the Conference. The document presented to the subgroup in Berlin in mid-May is unacceptable for us. It cannot serve as any kind of foundation. If there is no return to the April avant-project, we will not sign the document."

Marchais is also publicly threatening not to sign the document. *L'Humanité* published an article with all the things that Kanapa said to me on Plotnikov Street when he was on his way back from Korea.

Kanapa became a member of the Politburo at the last Plenum! (He divorced his Soviet Valya just in time!)

On June 3rd we had the first meeting of the *Questions of History* editorial board with the new members. Now we have Khromov (Trapeznikov's man from the Department of Science) and about five more people like that from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Institute of World History, etc. The close atmosphere we developed over the last ten years – the camaraderie, the ironic humor, the trust and openness (with the ground rule of never taking offense) – is completely gone. Khromov objected to my points three times (indirectly) by "strongly" supporting the people who disagreed with my assessments (on three subjects). Trukhanovsky maneuvered deftly. Gaponenko leaned over to me and said, "It will be tough for him now!" But Khromov's interventions had a very clear goal: to show who is boss now. He sat down next to the editor-in-chief and constantly muttered something in his ear, on every article.

Until the first big clash... It's a shame. After all, this journal was an outlet for me into a different sphere. And now? Should I be demonstrating my adherence to principle? For what? In a situation like this, when essentially nobody really cares.

The newbies tried to show off, and all for the benefit of Khromov. Loudly, persistently, they demanded an ideological approach to everything. I watched them and thought: what drives these 50-60-year-old men? Why do they need this? Are they driven by some kind of idea, some kind of personal principle? Do they believe that if a paragraph in an article is written with their wording, something will change? Or is it the simple inertia of holding on to one's chair? Not just inertia, but an entire philosophy.

On June 5th I visited Dez'ka (David Samoilov), his birthday was on the 1st. He read his prose. Two big chapters (about an hour and a half). It is a memoir, but deeply objective. At times I felt like I was present at the reading of something akin to *War and Peace* by the scope and structure of the thoughts and feelings.

One of the chapters was about [Ilya] Ehrenburg as a phenomenon of Soviet history and the Soviet way of life. The other, "Mountain Girl," was about the mountain division he served in on the Volkhov front in late 1942-early 1943.

It would be pointless to try to recap them here. The passages are very different, in manner and subject matter. But they are united by Dez'ka's worldview, which is very distant from Solzhenitsyn's; from cheap anti-Sovietism; from petty savoring of our failures, inconsistencies, and shortcomings. But he positively rejects the official and semi-official, closed and half-closed (though permissible in a small circle) explanations of our history. He does not proclaim his own explanation and he does not formulate it directly, at least in these chapters. But it seeps through from this very real prose: the nation lives by its own laws, it changes under the influence of unforgiving circumstances but not how the inveterate politicians, philosophers and writers would have it. The people change in their own ways, and eventually determine the direction the country takes. This happened before the war (to a lesser extent than during the war), this is the case now and it will continue this way in the future. The nature of the nation's development comes through the vivid images of soldiers (not necessarily always "good"), as well as from the calm, dispassionate and unstoppable exposure of Ehrenburg as a teller of lies and half-truths, as a profiteer on people's feelings and ideas. It's a little terrifying to realize that it is impossible to escape the fate that is contained in this unconscious force. It comes through in the language that Dez'ka first heard during the war. He heard it and understood that the language of the people is something completely different from the language of intellectuals and politicians.

Dez'ka's outward appearance is quite terrible. He is old and shabby. But his vision is better. He reads. And he is cheerful, not with the feigned cheerfulness of despair, but with cheerfulness that comes from the fullness and confidence of intellect. And from the fact that he has so many friends. The atmosphere in which people don't sweat the "little things in life" must also be an important factor.

June 14, 1975

Yesterday Brezhnev spoke before the voters. I wanted to go, but as soon as I realized that every sentence will be followed by applause (which is exactly what happened) I felt irritated and didn't go. I feel ashamed (personally, and in general) for these applause-games in a serious matter. His speech (i.e. pronunciation) is getting worse and worse. The text on internal affairs was very trivial – more trivial than before (even though it was written by the same team of Bovin, Blatov...). There were some new things on foreign affairs. He lashed out at Ford and NATO for toughening their position (after Vietnam), for their various threats and pressure, and for inflating military budgets. He's doing the right thing. Sterner language will not spoil anything and in the modern struggle it is useful to show your fists at the right moment.

Everybody noticed that Kirilenko appeared before his electorate (in Leningrad, by the way) after Suslov (in Ulyanovsk) and just before Kosygin. Everyone is wondering what this could mean.

B.N. ended up making me write a piece for *Pravda* in response to the West's tougher position after Vietnam, with an accent on social democracy. I had already finished it by last

Sunday. But, as could be expected, he put it on the shelf. It's time to get used to the fact that his hyperactivity dies down as soon as we have to move from making noise to actually doing business on a political level. That's when he immediately feels the "limits of his capacity."

On June 11th there was a meeting of "the six" socialist countries in Volynskoe-1. Regarding the European Conference of Communist Parties and the situation in Portugal. They also discussed "the French incident"; the majority were inclined to attribute it to the "prestigiousness" and arrogance of the French. However, this is only on the surface. What actually stands behind it is a policy that relies more sharply and confidently (than the Italians, Spaniards, and many others who have a real position in their country) on a distinctly "non-Moscow" direction as the main factor of their survival and movement forward. Just the day before yesterday, *L'Humanité* brazenly chastised the Poles for "praising" Giscard d'Estaing, who is scheduled to visit Poland very soon. They're saying that peaceful coexistence does not require us to praise imperialist leaders who are practicing deceitful politics and engaging in anticomunism every day by calling socialist governments "fascist," "totalitarian," etc.

Axen offered to discuss Portugal when he visited on his own. B.N. readily agreed and gave a long didactic speech. However, it became clear from Axen's, Telalov's, Frelek's, and Denesh'es speeches that their countries and parties are more actively and effectively involved with Portugal than we are. Their aid to Portugal surpasses our aid not only in proportion to their size, but in total amount of aid as well. I wrote Vadim a note about this, which he ended up giving to B.N. The latter agreed, with sadness.

A week or so prior to this he said (in connection to the honors bestowed on Jean, the Grand Duke of Luxembourg, and the elegant Margrethe II of Denmark, who were in the USSR on official visits), "We are receiving and courting the devil knows whom, while nobody really wants to pay attention to Portugal, a country that is of great importance to our entire mission!"

By the way, Kostikov, head of the Poland sector in Katushev's Department, told me about Gierek's meetings with Palme. Gierek was in Sweden for an official visit. They met one-on-one with Palme (both are fluent in French). Gierek later told Kostikov about the conversation in detail.

Gierek: "Knowing that we will be talking about Portugal, I called Brezhnev from the airplane." L.I. told him, "Tell him (Cunhal) that we're not meddling and will not get involved in the future. Tell him that we are restraining the Portuguese communists' enthusiasm for socialist reforms and their relations with other parties. We don't need any bases in Portugal and we have no plans to get involved."

They also discussed Czechoslovakia. Palme was supposedly very surprised when he found out that Husak was one of the leaders of the Slovak uprising and served time after the war "for nationalism," while Dubcek demanded that "all people like Husak should be hanged." Palme was sure that Husak was a Gottwald-type of Stalinist.

By the way, during “the six” I was assigned to the Poles (Frelek-Suika). Despite my sincerity and openness, I didn’t feel a reciprocal “affection” from them. At the going-away party Zagladin and Zhilin (the latter knows both of them much less than I do) were much more popular, not to mention Shakhnazarov, who is their “boss” in Katushev’s department. It seems I don’t invite familiarity and consequently “heartfelt Party emotions.” Plus, even though Frelek is a Secretary of the PUWP, he is also a poet, writer, and artist and therefore more susceptible (like everyone) to crude flattery.

B.N. told me that when Karpinsky was summoned to the PCC, he declared: “I will not give you the pleasure of picking me apart. I am leaving this Party.”

The planned CPSU delegation visit with the Labour Party fell through. We had delayed it for two years despite Hayward’s insistence. The reason is very simple: Suslov doesn’t think it’s very important and he needs Ponomarev here to deal with the U.S. senators. And while Ponomarev understands that by walking away from the visit we are blocking a very important channel to England and the European socialist-democratic movement and wasting the work that we started ourselves and invested quite a bit into over the last two+ years, he does not insist on the visit. He is sure that Suslov suspects him of “just wanting to take a trip to England.” This is the level of political relations between them!

Of course, Hayward and the entire left wing of the Labour Party, same as Wilson & Co., could not even imagine that such “simple things” are the cause for canceling the visit. They will wonder whether we changed our policies and our relationship with the Labour movement and social-democracy overall, maybe even with England.

It’s also sad because there is no one besides Ponomarev (and maybe Suslov himself) in the entire Central Committee who could lead this kind of a delegation. The head of the delegation would have to discuss a wide range of issues right off the bat, he would have to know these issues and be able to use this knowledge in a debate with the sharp and acerbic Brits. This kind of debate can’t be read off a paper prepared in Moscow (as Kapitonov requested, for example). That would make a laughing stock of our entire Party.

My conversation with Morris (Gus Hall’s deputy). The incident with Andropov’s election speech – the *New York Times* speculated on one phrase from his speech, something along the lines of: despite all the democracy in America, the unemployed can protest by the White House as long as they want but nothing will change. Gus Hall was furious and demanded an explanation from the CC – why are they struggling and making sacrifices, sometimes even getting shot at during these demonstrations, while in the CC’s point of view they are wasting their time and none of it matters! Should they just sit and wait for a revolution and socialism?

B.N. and later I spent a long time giving Morris explanations, but in the end we had to send Hall a written explanation prepared by Andropov’s guys with his consent.

During his visit here Morris, and Kashtan and Woddis before him, officially protested an article by a certain Dm. Zhukov in *Ogonek* from October 1974 for being clearly anti-Semitic. Woddis even met with Safonov, the editor of *Ogonek*. The latter acknowledged that the article is bad and that Zhukov "let him down" and wasn't accepted into the Union of Journalists "for this."

I also told everyone that it's a bad article, that it "does not reflect," and so on. They replied: alright, but nobody besides us knows your views about it, while Zhukov's article has been disseminated around the world by the bourgeois press.

I reported to Ponomarev along these lines. He told me to take measures "together with *agitprop*." I will take measures, but I'm sure that the fact that Zhukov's article is anti-Semitic will remain "between us" with Morris, Woddis, Kashtan, and the Chairman of the Communist Party of Israel [Meir] Vilner (who at a recent reception with B.N. also sharply objected to the article).

June 29, 1975

I went to Budapest. Once again we were housed on the government hills. I slept in a bed that had been previously slept in by Elizabeth II, Brezhnev, and the like. The Hungarians joked that they have changed the sheets since then.

"The six" – Bulgarians, Hungarians, East Germans, Poles, Czechs, and I. Deputies of international departments. On the agenda: what to do about socialist democracy; Portugal; anticommunism.

I had to lead all the discussions (this time I was "the CPSU"), which is a role I'm not used to. Everyone except the hosts adjusted to me and would not say anything if I was being modest and waiting until "later" to speak. The Hungarians were stubborn (even though we came to an agreement with them in advance of the meeting) and pushed their illusory maximalist plans. I kept gently bringing them down to earth.

I got back on the 18th. A couple days after my return B.N. left with a delegation to Syria, taking with him our new deputy Rumyantsev (who "passed" by Suslov, while Brutents did not).

I was left to write yet another report for B.N. for the 40th anniversary of the VII Congress of the Comintern! I've been struggling with this anniversary for a year now. But I could not resist the second wave, which was started by Timofeyev as self-promotion. Even though twice already I argued with Ponomarev about the poor timing and absurdity of this anniversary – waving Comintern flags at a moment when the European Conference of Communist Parties is coming to a dead end (precisely because the CPSU is suspected of hegemony), and the Yugoslavs are openly talking and writing about the nostalgia some feel for the Comintern.

And so I'm struggling once again, chewing over the associations and allusions to the VII Congress and the present day. Over the last 12 years I wrote about five articles and reports for

him on Dimitrov, and 3-4 reports and articles on the Comintern, including one for the 30th anniversary of the VII Congress. In other words, it's all about the same thing but with an update for the current state of affairs.

B.N. certainly has "graphomania" for speeches. Right now he is breaking all the records: he gives speeches 3-4 times per month. Besides his claim to the title of "theoretician of the Party," i.e. his petty vanity, it seems he has a political idea behind this as well.

He is popular in anticommunist literature. People follow his speeches and comment on them with the idea that he reflects the so-called true, secret plans and intentions of the Kremlin – to use détente to undermine the West, to export revolution or at least encourage revolution in capitalist countries. There are special articles about him in which he is portrayed as a secret leader of the communist movement, the driving force behind communist activity and propaganda, the organizer of financial and other support to communist parties. He knows all of this, of course. He knows that he is contrasted to Brezhnev, who is seen as a sincere supporter of peace who plays fairly. And of course B.N. knows that Brezhnev is also aware of how Ponomarev is seen in the West. But for now everything has worked out.

Recently all of this culminated in a big provocation and TASS even released a refutation yesterday. The French paper *Quotidien de Paris* printed a "Letter from Ponomarev" that supposedly contained directives to communist parties on how to seize power in a crisis situation. The newspaper obtained this "document" from Portuguese socialists. This is making noise all over Europe. Communist parties are coming out one after another with angry rebuttals. Leroy and others showed up at *Quotidien de Paris* and demanded to see the original. (By the way, all of this is very characteristic of the present situation in the communist movement – everyone's worst fear is to be suspected of receiving directives from the Kremlin.) The Portuguese Communist Party denounced the allegations.

The purpose of this campaign is clear as day – to instill fear of communism (from Moscow) because of Portugal, the PCI's election victory (33 percent of the vote) and other symptoms of left-leaning tendencies due to the recession.

Naturally there never was, nor could have been, any such letter. But the provocation has a rather "material" basis. (It was organized by employees of the Portuguese newspaper *República*, as we were notified by ciphered telegram from the CC of the Portuguese Communist Party. *Quotidien de Paris* only reprinted their material.) The material was put together from excerpts of Ponomarev's speeches and articles, including first and foremost at the Consultative meeting in Warsaw and the Preparatory meeting in Budapest. Naturally it is made in the style of Sovietologists. Just the bare essence (we should use the crisis to overthrow capitalism) with a tone of a directive in a circular letter.

By the way, B.N. was supposed to go to Portugal with a CPSU delegation on July 6th at Cunhal's invitation. Now in the aforementioned ciphered telegram they are asking him not to

come. They think it would be “misinterpreted” and there could be provocations, etc. However, as far as I can see, B.N. is in great spirits. It’s possible that he even enjoys this role of a “gray Majesty” of the communist movement, a “consistent revolutionary,” a “Leninist,” and a “fighter against imperialism.” Perhaps he is tying his immediate and posthumous future to this “fame.”

If this assumption is correct, then it is understandable why he is once again ready to celebrate the Comintern anniversary.

The story with the publication of the Declaration of the Havana Conference. While I was in Budapest *Pravda* published the TASS “summary” on two pages, which contained only what we imposed on the Cubans (Shakhnazarov and I – in Cuba through Arismendi): speak more strongly about the USSR’s role, invite the Chinese to the Conference, call for an International Conference, etc. The Cubans were furious.

The decision was made to urgently publish the Declaration in *Kommunist*. But how? The Declaration is three printed pages. That’s the first thing. Secondly, it criticizes Ford “by name.” Despite this (or maybe not having read it) Shaposhnikov, who leads the Latin American sector, made a note to publish it in full. B.N. initialed it before leaving for Syria, but asked that it be shown to me before sending it to the CC. I objected [to publishing it in full].

Suslov agreed to a “summary” (mostly because *Kommunist* can’t really accommodate the full length). I reduced it by 1/5, naturally taking out the bit about Ford. When B.N. returned the *Kommunist* already had the revisions. He summoned Shaposhnikov and me. Shaposhnikov insisted on his point of view (we should publish it in full because the Cubans will never let it go). I insisted on my point of view (We have our own policies, we are serious people and détente does not depend on the Cubans, etc.). B.N. was clearly on Shaposhnikov’s side, but did not dare to scrap the work already done in *Kommunist* because it was backed by Suslov’s agreement.

Clashed with Shakhnazarov over an article in *Pravda* about the same Declaration. Blatant ignorance and irresponsibility of *Pravda* employees and Darusenkov (Shakhnazarov’s head of sector), who composed the article. Scandalous. I yelled at Shakhnazarov on the phone.

July 4, 1975

Fifty leaders and members of the Central Committees of various communist parties who are currently visiting Moscow have been invited to a performance at the Hall of Columns where Suslov and B.N. will be speaking. I’m sorry that I did not oppose this idea. It will be a demonstration with the background of “Ponomarev’s Letter” and such. Fedoseyev was the initiator; he got Suslov’s approval while Ponomarev was busy and brushed it aside. I didn’t have the energy to take any measures against it.

The world will notice once again the Suslov-B.N. contrast on the one side, and Brezhnev-Brandt on the other. Right now Brandt is here on a visit following an invitation from the General

Secretary of the CC CPSU. Yesterday at lunch they exchanged speeches. Brezhnev's speech both in style and spirit (I saw it when it was initially sent around) is categorically different from Ponomarev's attempts to appear as the "principled fighter for ideals."

I cannot shake the suspicion that B.N. is deliberately moving in this direction, he is pressuring our fraternal parties: this is who I am and you are going to have to take that into account. But he is cautious. He made noise over the publication of the Havana Declaration: what are we afraid of, look at Cubans living right next to the biggest imperialist country and they are not afraid. (This is in connection with the passages in the text that would be offensive to Ford, which I insisted that we take out). But in this report at the last moment he removed even the slightest mention of Ford and Kissinger (regarding their statements that the US has to be the most powerful country, first and foremost more powerful than the USSR) and replaced "socialism" with "social progress" throughout. He agreed with me that it's not the right time for him to come out with the theme of Communists joining governments and he crossed out the corresponding pages, which he had made us compose (it had been one of his main ideas when he was "planning" the report).

July 6, 1975

On Saturday I didn't come in to work. I wasn't feeling well.

Started on the album *Mir iskusstva* [The World of Art]. It came out recently, magnificent illustrations and an inspired 100-page preface that would have been impossible [to publish] even five years ago. Along with genuine pleasure I once again feel bitterness and frustration. Decades of persecution of the greatest artistic discoveries of Russian genius: Somov, Benois, Dobouzhinsky, Bakst, Golovin, Kustodiev, Ostoumova-Lebedeva... Or suppression, for example of Lanceray, who had actually been awarded the Stalin Prize in 1948 [sic] for his pseudo-Russian ornamentation of "Komsomolskaya" metro station. And there is still a ban on Mashkov, Larionov, and Goncharova.

What did that do for our ideology (in the true sense)? It fostered vulgarity and consolidated the right of foolishness (in the social sense), which even now triumphs "when necessary" with no argumentation or explanation (the case with Neizvestny).

And now they release a magnificent album with fairly objective and reasonable introduction that explains what they, these *miriskusniki*⁹, meant then, now, and in the future.

Or: on Friday I stopped by the exhibition hall at the Union of Artists on Kuznetsky Most. There was not a single visitor. A few contemporary artists were on display, it seems they are all young. In the "modern" style there is something of *Mir Iskusstva*, and of Petrov-Vodkin, Léger, Picasso, and first and foremost of our 1920s. But even to a layman it is obviously imitation: there

⁹ Members of the *Mir Iskusstva* [World of Art] movement. [Translator's footnote]

is no search for new content = reaction to the official theme of our time. And the imitative nature of the form, sometimes downright naïve, makes one smile (rather than get irritated).

By the way, this is one of the outcomes of Stalin's cultural policy and that of his heirs in the Union of Artists, Ministry of Culture, Demichev and Furtseva and their apparatus. And another sad smile appears when you look at this exhibition. Nowadays these kinds of modern-style exhibitions are commonplace. People don't even go to them unless the artist is famous. But only 3-5 years ago the emergence of several such paintings was a sensation and the subject of merciless abuse in the departments "in charge of the arts." Party memberships were lost, biographies were ruined, people lost their jobs, means, reputations. What was it all for? What was the point of this Erasmus-style iconoclasm?

So these so-called abstract artists started last fall to illegally and then half-legally exhibit their works, and now they are exhibiting abroad. They are probably even worse – all they have is a vulgar pretense for protest through art, but there is not a hint of art in what they do.

The general and main outcome of the cultural policy is the complete disconnect of professional talent (and I mean talent, not professionals and amateurs) and the environment, the material that needs to be expressed through the appropriate art forms. Hence the absence of the general development in art; although there are individual successes, they do not move things forward.

Today *Pravda* finally ran the editorial on the Latin American Conference of Communist Parties with my edits.

An amazing paradox is forming in present-day international life. Brezhnev meets with Brandt. Both emphasize that "we have different ideologies" that are incompatible and should not be mixed. Both say that reason must be the prevailing force in relations between countries and peoples because the alternative is a nuclear catastrophe; or at least the inability to solve the problems of humanity (economic cooperation, division of labor, energy, raw materials, hunger, poverty, etc). But the most basic question that arises from this situation is the following: why do we need ideologies if they get in the way of us solving essential problems, if they only put us at risk of disaster – in other words, if ideology contradicts reason as we see it in the XX century?!

Indeed, word history has evolved in the struggle of ideologies (with all the horrific, bloody consequences). But it seems that the same way the logic of perfecting weapons leads to the impossibility of using them even to develop society, so the logic of the struggle of ideologies becomes meaningless and inhuman in the modern world. This is something you cannot undo. But the same common sense that made us engage in international affairs is now presenting these naïve, "childish" problems.

July 13, 1975

In a couple hours I'm leaving for the Riga beach, the resort "Yantar" [Amber], somewhere near Kemerī, where I was fighting in the fall of 1944. The Latvians say that it's the most luxurious place in the Soviet Union of all the government dachas.

And B.N.? Once again he was right. The report on the VII Congress was great. Suslov praised him, Podgorny even muttered some approval at the PB. B.N. is ecstatic. He smoothed out the edges a little more before publication. (The publication in *Partiynaya zhizn* [Party Life] went through at lightning speed, publication in *Kommunist* is coming up.) The world press is talking about him again, this time as a mouthpiece of Kremlin's reconciliation with the social democrats.

By the way, around this time Brezhnev dragged Brandt into a session of the Supreme Soviet and the deputies met him with thunderous applause. This is a sign of the times for you! This is how Brezhnev solves the age-old problem of the split in the labor movement and everything connected to it. Through common sense, through human relations, through the "trust complex."

In this sense Bondarev's new novel *Bereg* [The Shore] in *Nash Sovremennik* [Our Contemporary] is quite symptomatic. It is certainly written with talent. But that's not the point. Bondarev is in our orthodoxy by now, and probably in the top five truly and officially talented writers, i.e. the ones for whom the CC Culture Department is no longer an authority. It's amazing how he examined the human material that secured our victory in those days, how he disregards the well-established rules of the game and ideological taboos. And in the background there is a discussion with contemporary Germans. This is also (like with Brandt) a conversation on the human level using today's language of common sense, not an argument between two dummy figures representing two different worlds. All of this is very symptomatic! Peaceful coexistence is drawing us into a completely different climate, in which familiar concepts take on a new air and hackneyed stock phrases shed their scabby shells and appear in their original form of simple and good ideas.

After B.N. made his report, he intensified his efforts on the preparation of materials for the XXV Congress and almost foiled my vacation because of this. He organized a group led by Brutents. He personally took the trouble to get us a "theoretical dacha" and finally got the Administrative Department to give us Novo-Ogarevo – the place where the idea for the "Peace Program" was born before the XXIV Congress, and where it was formulated. The group is already there. I will settle in there myself when I get back from Latvia. The preparatory work could be interesting. We really have to try to reflect the "new reality" of the communist movement. Life is already ahead of our clichés. In the next five years a lot of things will happen and all in the direction of a complete renewal of the ICM. And if we cannot give a frank assessment of this new reality, at least we will try to use language to open cracks through which common sense could seep through in this sphere as well.

Curious: how will the Congress Report reflect the new situation in the world, what will we say about imperialism, the capitalist system, the “national liberation (from whom?) movement”? But we have to develop our ideas first, then put together the words. We need to make such a breakthrough into the new understanding of what is happening that later neither B.N. nor “Tireska” (Aleksandrov-Agentov) can edit everything out. Something has to remain besides the inevitable platitudes.

It will be an interesting project.

I didn’t have time to look at the materials supplied to us by the Institutes of the Academy of Sciences in connection with the XXV Congress. I wonder, will they sense something and will they dare to say something new in substance, instead of trifles?

August 1, 1975

From July 14-28th I was at the “Yantar” resort in Yurmala. Essentially it is a government dacha. Grishin was staying there at the same time (PB member and Secretary of the Moscow City Committee). The house was built in 1974. It’s modern, regally comfortable. They say it cost 8 million (the planned construction cost was 2 million). The Latvian staff: unsmiling precision, almost imperceptible helpfulness without Russian-style fawning.

Our mansion in the center of Majori stuck out like a luxurious obelisk to the privileges of power. Crowds of passersby would stop with simple curiosity, and you could read in their eyes: “the masters are having a good time.”

In the evening, the beach and the streets turn into avenues of fashion and beautiful attire. But alongside professional vacationers there are a good number of Russian provincials, throngs of them, tourist groups.

I ran into Yu.P. Lyubimov several times at the beach. He was on vacation at the House of Writers in Dubulti, two kilometers away from our “Yantar”. He was in a very spirited mood. When he would see me, he would leave his entourage and take me on walks until I was exhausted. He would tell me about his struggles with the authorities, with Demichev (whom he calls “Nilovna” – Pyotr Nilych – a mocking reference to the heroine of Gorky’s novel *Mat’ [Mother]* that we all know from our schooldays). He was yelling loud enough for the whole beach to hear that Demichev is a bastard and a scumbag and that he, Lyubimov, is not going to take it anymore! That’s it! Enough of this mockery! Let them drive him out of the theater, but he’s not going to take it anymore. He will come back from vacation and write “to the highest authority.”

The fact of the matter is that after Demichev became the Minister of culture, he finally deigned to visit the Taganka Theater. He saw the preview of the long-suffering “Kuz’kin” by [Boris] Mozhaev. He said that he will “allow” it and sent his people with notes. Lyubimov spent

two months editing the play according to the notes. When it was ready, Demichev's apparatus showed up to the new preview and "banned" it without making any references. However, Lyubimov later learned that when the Minister of Culture came back to his office the morning after visiting the Taganka Theater, he said to his subordinates: "It will not go through!"

So Lyubimov is in a rage: what kind of minister is this? He tells some people one thing, other people another thing, and then does the opposite.

Periodically he would stop and, immediately gathering a crowd of onlookers, artistically portray some bureaucratic scene, acting out the parts. He was especially good when "Kat'ka" (Furtseva) was one of the characters.

I visited the Riga Cathedral twice. Mozart's Requiem and Bach. Violin and a Sonata for violin and organ. It was truly marvelous.

Went on tours of Riga and its suburbs.

Visited the places where I fought my last battles – in Sloka and Kemerī.

In Kemerī I stopped by the famous sanatorium that was intact when we entered the town but all its windows were shattered and several dozen meters of broken glass covered the ground around it. Then we drove out to Džūkste, which we never managed to capture in January of 1945 and from where the Germans launched a counterattack. That's when I was wounded near the Putnu-Jidi [Путну-Жиды] farmstead, three kilometers from Džūkste. I remember the front line, which started right at edge of the forest clearing. The Germans were 50 meters away at the farmstead. And we just couldn't drive them out of there, while their machine gun constantly forced us to crawl on our bellies.

About five kilometers from there we reached my final front line. I couldn't find the farmstead where our headquarters were located approximately 1.5 kilometers from the trenches. Everything is overgrown. But I'm pretty sure I clearly made out the grove where from May 2nd-5th of 1945 under the cover of darkness we were digging starting positions for the division that was supposed to replace our regiment and go on the offensive. A bridge, a creek, and a very distinctive edge of the forest clearing. Here, 30 years and two months ago, I led my last "mission"; here we fought off German sorties that tried to prevent us from consolidating our positions, tried to scare us. Here our sergeant-major was killed point-blank from a machine gun, he was moving in front of me when we rushed for the newly dug trench. I was told the Germans occupied it as soon as we left. Here I was nearly blown up on a spider mine and froze when I felt my hands touch the trip wire. Here we were ferociously blanketed by mortar and machine gun fire almost constantly during nighttime hours until we retreated to our front line at dawn. From here we carried on our waterproof capes three, four, and sometimes up to ten wounded and dead soldiers. After these nights, our regiment engineer, a captain who was very scared but kept himself together, told Bambal' (the commander of our regiment) right in front of me: "Well,

Comrade Colonel, our captain (referring to me) has courage and nerves of steel. He walked around with such an aura of calmness while we were digging that I am still amazed. Without him, we would have run away from that horror..."

Even before this, one night I was arguing with a much-decorated battalion commander from Georgia until we almost came to blows; he refused to send his deputy on patrol. I organized a search team myself to capture a prisoner for interrogation. Five people and I was the sixth. But we didn't make it to the German front line, they discovered us, set off some rockets to make us visible, and opened frenzied machine-gun fire. We barely got out of there.

I also remember the terrifying sensation I felt here: when you would be checking the overnight posts in the trenches, standing near a soldier, and suddenly there would be a shot from the German side. And they are shooting directly at you, though of course blindly because at night you cannot see who is looking out of the trenches. The shots from a rifle could be very loud, like from a small-caliber gun, and with a bright flash. And indeed it was almost point-blank: the line of our trenches in some places was 100-150 meters from the Germans.

I recall it was precisely here that I once woke up in the morning in our headquarters to find a German sitting on a stool right in front of me. I was taken aback. He turned out to be a prisoner that our guys had just brought in for interrogation.

We returned from Tukums via an excellent highway, worthy of Switzerland and Belgium.

It feels strange. At dinner I even felt awkward telling my neighbors at the table where I went and why. This is all my personal past and my personal feelings about it. It would look like I was bragging.

August 4, 1975

Last day of vacation. Today I'll start on the introduction to the multi-volume publication. Before I went to Riga I left a new version with B.N., it reflected his June remarks. The gist of them: now we went too far to the left. This is new, coming from B.N. I think the wind of change is starting to affect him, or more likely it's the situation on the top – Brandt, détente, and so on. Back in June he reproached me because the draft didn't contain his central idea about the two paths of the labor movement: the revolutionary, which led to such (!) victories; and the reformist, which led to "we all know what." I quickly fixed it using the template we made with Veber about five years ago in the form of a large booklet. When B.N. read it he got scared of excessive "revolutionism" and such vilification of the reformist path – the path that is incidentally used by the majority of the working class in the capitalist world and which eliminates the prospect of unity. Now the draft needs to be reworked "a little bit in reverse."

The European Conference of Communist Parties! (which I've mentioned before numerous times). I haven't spoken with Zagladin, who once again went to Berlin at the end of

July for the working group. I don't know how it went. But apart from the contradictions that the French exposed and I wrote about earlier, right now a more serious and general circumstance is coming up. After Helsinki (which was truly a milestone in the social sense, I am sure of this) it is absurd and stupid to continue with communist initiatives like the aforementioned conference. What will people talk about there, what goals will they set? And what for? It's clear that global politics are done differently nowadays, not through confrontation and pressure. And that's essentially the kind of methods the communist movement is designed for: methods of implacable, hard-edged struggle with the enemy. But alongside whom will this European Conference of Communist Parties call us to struggle? Alongside extremists who are raging [against the system] and who do not participate in the creation of policy and will never be allowed into the key aspects of mainstream politics. But then the communist movement will veer off the highway of history and doom itself to the role of picking up litter on the flanks. It will not agree to publicly demonstrate this kind of transition. So why should we convene?!

Tomorrow I'm going to Novo-Ogarevo, where a group has already gathered to prepare materials for the Congress.

The Congress materials need new ideas too. It would be pointless to develop the ideas as the continuation of the XXIV Congress and the ones preceding it. The very structure of the General Secretary's report (instituted by Stalin) now looks like an anachronism. Yes, it seems that we are entering a new stage of "revisionism." It's inevitable and it's already coming – through the Italians, through peaceful coexistence, through embraces with Brandt, etc. In other words, it's determined by the objective circumstances of our world today. We need new ideas. Deep, fundamental changes in our approach to the critical ideas of Marxism-Leninism. We need a turning-point that would be equivalent in significance to the creation of bolshevism, or the NEP. Otherwise, our theory will become totally pointless. We need ideas that would completely outrage the ministers of ideology, as was the case with the NEP and the XX Congress. And we need somebody with great authority, someone who could deal with the outrage. For now, it seems like Brezhnev's authority is still capable of providing this kind of turning-point (though he has really deteriorated physically).

We'll try to come up with something in Novo-Ogarevo. I wonder if the guys there now are thinking along these lines, or just taking the same old well-worn roads?

August 10, 1975

I went to Novo-Ogarevo. Took over the reins from Brutents. Read what they put together. Not very impressive. When I flipped through the academic material, I understood that our guys did a hack job overall because even the academic materials were better and more interesting than what the speechwriters produced. When I sized up the situation, it was the same old problem – they didn't put in any special effort and definitely didn't do their best.

But that's not the point. The day when I told them everything I thought about them and made suggestions on how we should proceed, we found out that on Brezhnev's and the Politburo's orders another group was coming to the dacha, headed by Aleksandrov-Agentov. It turns out that Ponomarev knew about it. They made a concession to him and included me and Brutents in the group. The rest of the guys had to evacuate the same evening.

As could be expected, our text was "ignored." Although during the first discussion they graciously agreed to consider how to build a bridge, our plan on which this text was built. Naturally, Aleksandrov-Agentov pushed aside our plan's idea (to bring to the front our international achievements that the whole world really saw) and suggested that we take the traditional route: the socialist system, the crisis of capitalism, etc.

In addition to Aleksandrov-Agentov, Chernyaev, and Brutents, our group included Kovalyov (Deputy Minister), Blatov (Brezhnev's adviser), Zagladin and Shishlin.

Right at the first discussion we had a "musical moment": a clash between Aleksandrov-Agentov on one side and Kovalev and Blatov on the other. The rest of us watched this circus. Kovalyov asked whether it might be expedient to present a new formula of peaceful coexistence at the Congress, one that would not scare off our partners, since we keep reminding them that it is a special form of class struggle in the international arena.

Aleksandrov-Agentov pounced on him with a hysterical fury (he doesn't care that the whole world now knows Kovalyov, that in the span of two years in Geneva he accomplished a tremendous amount for the Helsinki Conference). He accused him of opportunism, of rejecting the Party Program, of pacifism and liberalism. Tolya [Kovalyov] calmly objected. Blatov stepped in [to defend Kovalyov]. And then the real hysterics began: if that's how you feel Anatoly Ivanovich (Blatov), then we will not be able to work together!

To us this argument looked absurd and primitive in its essence. The form it took is quite symptomatic. Aleksandrov-Agentov's intolerance and fanatical egotism will cost him dearly!..

For now, this is what happened: after the discussion Aleksandrov-Agentov, of course, started preparing the draft himself. He dictated all evening and the next morning. He has an astonishing ability to work, but of course a draft created in this manner is full of banalities, no attempts to say anything new. And most importantly – it is a draft of a speech the Minister of Foreign Affairs might give to diplomats, not the CC CPSU General Secretary's summary report at the Party Congress.

August 17, 1975

A week has passed under the leadership of Aleksandrov-Agentov. Impressions of him as a person: bigotry, morbid self-importance, a combination of outwardly intelligence and gentlemanly ways with women and inner boorishness and hysterical rudeness.

In the end we had the following division of labor: Shishlin and Blatov – socialism; Karen – the third world; I – the crisis of capitalism, the labor movement, the communist movement, the common revolutionary process. A three-tiered cake, as Aleksandrov-Agentov himself put it.

Aleksandrov-Agentov took on all of foreign policy but didn't start writing. He is waiting for Gromyko's version. As Ponomarev explained to me, the Politburo assigned Gromyko to submit this version by August 1st, but he couldn't care less even though his guys already composed the text.

We wrote our sections. I worked like a madman, perfecting each phrase and trying to use the new formulas and ideas from the academic materials as much as I could.

We discussed these preliminary versions on Saturday morning, sitting in the sunshine on the first warm day after a week of cold weather.

Blatov accused Karen and me of being too academic. But Aleksandrov-Agentov jumped in to defend us, since he already feels partially invested in the texts. He snapped at Blatov and thereby saved everything else.

Next week we will be finishing up our sections.

B.N. returned from the Crimea, where he was with Brezhnev and American congressmen. Once again he started to pester me about the "Introduction" to the multi-volume set on the labor movement. He's still afraid. He says it's too early to submit it to the publisher (in the meantime, Volume I has already been set in type) and God knows what is written there, judging by the fact that we've had to redo the "Introduction" five times already. I objected: I don't know about God, but I personally know what is written there and how, because I read and edited this volume twice.

August 23, 1975

One more week in Novo-Ogarevo. To mine and Brutents' surprise our relationship with "Sparrow" (Aleksandrov-Agentov) is quite normal. Daily interaction (at the table, swimming, jokes, discussions on "extraneous topics" about literature, etc., especially since he likes to show off his erudition and knowledge of poetry from D. Bednyi to Goethe and Kipling) take place in quite a "friendly atmosphere." Our work-related interaction is better still.

On Wednesday we were discussing the second drafts of our sections, and to my surprise both he and Blatov started praising my section. From this Brutents concluded that for whatever reason Aleksandrov-Agentov wants to make me into an alternative to Zagladin (it's possible that

he is jealous after Brezhnev's public statement that he only feels confident about a text after it goes through Zagladin).

In any case, this time working with Aleksandrov was not only relatively peaceful, but with this group of people it was interesting. I am still enthusiastic about working on my sections, at least.

It was only yesterday that we received the section on foreign policy written at the MFA by Adamishin and corrected by Gromyko. It came from Brezhnev in the south. It seems he looked it over and really did not want to send it out for fear of offending Gromyko. Aleksandrov is under the impression (he shared this with Brutents) that Gromyko has really changed and gained influence (with Brezhnev), which he uses without ceremony and crudely. It turns out that two speeches were prepared for Helsinki – one by Gromyko and one by Aleksandrov's group. Andrey Mikhailovich naturally believes that his version was better (and it probably was). But Gromyko threw a fit and Brezhnev said, "Alright, don't quarrel. I'll read the MFA version, what's the difference!"

Karen and I invited ourselves to visit Ponomarev at the hospital, he was there for a pre-vacation check up. We told him how things were going and our relations with Aleksandrov. He looked "frightened" to see us – worried that we wanted to see him because we got into a conflict with Aleksandrov. He calmed down, but then started worrying about the opposite scenario – that we fell too much under Aleksandrov's influence and are now ready to give in on everything... including on matters of principle. Then he gave us advice = "thoughts" for the summary report. For all his political savvy and awareness, he is a retrograde. He thinks about the communist movement in police terms and about the struggle for peace in Grechko's terms – from a position of power. If Brezhnev pays tribute to our "historical tradition" but essentially has long moved away from the concept of "how can we cleverly swindle the imperialists," Ponomarev staunchly holds this exact position. It's no wonder that the anticommunist propaganda placed them in different "camps" in the Kremlin correlation of forces.

B.N. suddenly went to his bedroom and brought out Tvardovsky's *Distance After Distance* [Za dal'u dal'] and started reading aloud to us the chapter on Stalin. He read expressively for a long time and made comments. He approved some parts but was indignant that Tvardovsky entertains the idea that the nation may be to blame for having that kind of leader. It was a "scene worthy of the brush of Aivazovsky." Once again we saw a man who was completely made up of pieces of Party history and permeated by its spirit, with its almost unbelievable fate and actions, contrasts and incompatibilities.

Things are going badly in Portugal. B.N. believes that it will end with [Mário] Soares; that there is no energy for a fascist regime. I don't know, I don't know. I hope so! But the communists are overdoing it, though maybe they are not the main reason either. The progression from Cunhal's reception resembling "Lenin's return to Petrograd" to the current siege of

buildings where he is giving speeches, pogroms and arson of PCP headquarters, is terrible. It seems there is some kind of general anticommunist trend emerging everywhere – on the grounds of the CPSU's disconnectedness – a factor of peace and yet an unacceptable model to follow.

August 31, 1975

One more week in Novo-Ogarevo. Each one of us was polishing his own section. When we put it all together it came to 75 pages. And it should be about 40.

Yesterday Brezhnev returned from Crimea to Moscow. This may have some effect on our work in Nogo-Ogarevo. Kirilenko told Aleksandrov: "Don't rush. Even though the deadline is September 1st, do not sacrifice quality for speed. You can work on it for a week or so more."

Aleksandrov spoke with Suslov as well, who also recently got back from vacation. He said that he likes our plan but that we should press imperialism harder. He said we restrained ourselves before Helsinki and now our hands are freer. We should remind them about Chile, Portugal, and Vietnam.

I wonder, do we have a common propaganda line, or is it everyone doing his own thing? Most likely the latter (of course, as it relates to personal sympathies and fears for one's seat). After all, no one systematically thinks about and manages our ideological activity at an authoritative level. We mostly make do on a case by case basis, usually with a delay and without planning even two steps ahead.

September 6, 1975

Yesterday we finished our stint in Novo-Ogarevo. The week consisted of polishing up the text and petty mutual nitpicking. Now, following the Politburo decision, it has to go to Suslov and Kirilenko and they will decide whether to give it to Ponomarev and Katushev or someone else.

The section on socialist countries gave us the most trouble. There is really nothing to say there, it's all mythology. But we need to make it sound impressive and beautiful, because it is "the most important thing." Then came my piece on the crisis of capitalism (inserted into Aleksandrov's section on our foreign policy). There were "doubts" every time because the critics are astonishingly ignorant on the subject and claim that the speaker and the "first readers" will be even more confused "with the various theories in there." I didn't really get into any particular theories, but I wanted to at least systematize the specific features of our current state of affairs.

I think we have surpassed all the parties of the ICM in our "dislike of theory" (which Lenin wrote about). We have a distaste for any theory that goes beyond propaganda. So our scholarship on capitalism, which nowadays is fairly advanced at Inozemtsev's institute and the materials it produces, does not "engage" with our policy. From this perspective (i.e. from the standpoint of political theory) this scholarship is unutilized and useless.

The situation now is that not only the main leaders of the CPSU haven't picked up Lenin's works in decades (I won't even mention Marx), but even their highly educated assistants don't know Lenin and couldn't care less.

September 11, 1975

The workweek is in full swing. I am reading a lot about social democracy and Portugal. Zagladin is there on a special mission, he sent us three telegrams. His task (CC directive) was to "suggest" to Cunhal not to "go too far left," to stop, maybe even to retreat and gather his strength. The course to power through the military failed. Apparently the Leninist tactic turned out to be missing some essential elements.

"Zagladin's mission" should have happened sooner, specifically when Cunhal was in Moscow. But at the time he was given a trivial reception. Brezhnev didn't want to meet with him; and B.N. said some platitudes along the lines of his textbook on the "History of the CPSU" (I was present at the meeting).

Our department's feebleness is now obvious. Pertsov (consultant on Portugal) "informed" the CC (through Zagladin and Ponomarev) by transmitting what the Portuguese told him, without a drop of analysis or his own interpretation. He gave everyone the impression that the Communists had Portugal in their pocket (and first and foremost the Movement of the Armed Forces [*Movimento das Forças Armadas*], the army). And it's not just Pertsov! Nobody wanted to seriously work on Portugal. I think that's due to a) senile indifference to matters that aren't directly connected to us and aren't urgent; and b) the almost subconscious division of spheres of influence with the Americans (Czechoslovakia is "ours," Portugal is "yours").

Today I received [Henry] Winston (Chairman of the CPUSA, he is black, blind). I filled him in on the ICM, the European Conference of Communist Parties, the outlook for the CSCE, the CPSU's relations with the ICP, PCF, PCE, and the Middle East. He was very pleased. They don't need much, these party leaders!

Yesterday I read Yu. Trifonov's new story in *Novyi Mir* called "Another Life" [*Drugaya zhizn'*]. It's like he took a scalpel to the everyday life of Moscow intelligentsia; a terrifying thing against the background of "building communism." We are either in the process of universal social disintegration, or a new society is quietly forming – one that is banal, ideologically uncommitted, aimless, boring.

Brezhnev's inability to function is becoming more and more noticeable. He returned from vacation on August 29th but hasn't made any appearances and there is no sign of him at the CC. All matters of any significance are dependent on him, so nothing is getting done. One only has to look at his schedule for the next three months – Costa Gomes, Giscard d'Estaing, Ford, congresses in Poland and Cuba, and at least some sort of CC Plenum – and it becomes clear that

there won't be a European Conference of Communist Parties (even if we manage to get it ready and prevail upon the fraternal opposition).

September 13, 1975

Today I met with O'Riordan (General Secretary of the CP of Ireland). He stopped over from Budapest to visit his beloved. And while he's here, he wanted to get up to speed on the latest developments. I spoke frankly about Portugal, the European Conference, our work before the Congress. He replied with platitudes. But he is a smart man who understands what you can do and say in his position.

I read V. Afonin's "Letters from Yurga" [*Pis'ma iz Yurgi*] in *Nash Sovremennik*. Like Trifonov he is very talented, but his subject matter is very different. And yet, the social aspect is the same: the hopelessness of our life both in the city and in the village, the total loss of a unifying idea, complete break with our revolutionary past and even with "hopes for the future," which had been the resolute image created in society. Similar to the Russian society of the 1870s, there is no "point of reference," as happens some time after a turning-point historic event. There is an incredible gap between the official ideology, daily press, radio, and television on the one hand, and real life on the other. We have not yet gotten used to the fact that we've turned into a trite society. We are still emotional about it. The French and the English, for example, got used to it a long time ago.

On Thursday Harry Ott (ambassador from the GDR) came to see me. He brought me the SED's proposal for the schedule of preparations for the European Conference of Communist Parties. They are suggesting to convene a working group at the level of CC secretaries on October 9-10th. B.N. called from the south and he agrees. At the same time he told me about his conversation with Brezhnev, who is not too enthusiastic about this conference, primarily because of the "density of the program."

September 24, 1975

I'm sick and staying at home.

Friday night I was at Bovin's for dinner. We talked. He is working in the economic group that is preparing the XXV Congress at Volynskoe-2. Gostev is in charge there. He is the first deputy of the CC Planning and Finance Department, Kirilenko's right hand. Arbatov, Inozemtsev, and a couple other apparatchiks from the industrial and agricultural departments [are also there]. It's a depressing scene. At first they spent a long time arguing over what to use as the reference point to measure the successes of the five-year plan. It would seem natural to start from the Directives of the XXIV Congress. But then it becomes impossible to hide the glaring failures on all fronts. If they measure from the Five-Year Plan Law the picture will be even worse, because the law was passed a little later and with an emphasis on intensification of indicators. The only remaining option was to measure from the sum of the annual plans because each one

had been more or less lowered opportunely, and as the result just barely met many of the parameters. Of course it is a completely ridiculous reference point, one that has never been used before. And of course it will be immediately evident, especially to Western Sovietologists, who will not fail to calculate everything in our Directives (naturally!) and report on this through all the “Voices of America” to Soviet listeners.

Bovin says (from hearsay, of course, he doesn't rub shoulders with Brezhnev) that the General Secretary is grumbling about all these discussions over the reference point. Now it looks like it is all Kosygin's ideas with these Directives and the like... “After all, we've made achievements! Everything is growing, multiplying, increasing. What more do you need? Why should we poke around in ‘methodologies,’ etc.?”

Indeed, seemingly there is growth. But where are we going, and how? It is already obvious that nothing is left of ideology. Now it looks like we are beginning to trample central planning (one of our three pillars) underfoot as well. Bovin said that the speechwriters (the best minds, the most skilled and experienced writers are assigned to this project) can somehow manage to present failures and backlogs as new historical successes. But they are completely at a loss when it comes to defining perspective for the future. Everything is so tangled, so uncertain in terms of potential and resources...

That means that for the most part, the Tenth Five-Year Plan will be put together from guesstimates pulled out of a hat. And then, what's the central idea of the new five-year plan? At the XXIV Congress it was very nicely stated in Arbatov's words that the foundation of the Ninth Five-Year Plan was supposed to be the improvement of people's well-being; that rates of growth of Group “B” [consumer goods] now had to be higher than rates of growth of Group “A” [capital goods]; that we reached a level where we can successfully solve problems of accumulation and problems of consumption. Finally, the Ninth Five-Year Plan was the plan of quality, labor productivity, and the fusion of socialism with NTR.

There has not been any major progress or achievements on any of these parameters since the Congress. So what new idea can be incorporated into the new Five-Year Plan? The Five-Year Plan of quality? But we said the same thing about the Ninth, at the XXIV Congress and all the CC Plenums in between the congresses, and in all our propaganda. That's the only thing we talked about in the routine resolutions of the CC on economic issues. In this situation, the working group (speechwriters) is stumped, and the same goes for the departments, starting with Gosplan, that supply data to the working group.

We chose the path of peace, which is certainly a great achievement. Right now we need to pray that we don't stop halfway, like we did after the XX Congress with the cult of personality, etc. We need to make the decision to stop the arms race, to have real disarmament. Otherwise things will become blurred and possibly even revert back. Our people, especially the post-war generation, perceive the problem of peace the same way as people in the West (despite

the memory of World War II) – as something that any normal person in a government position is obligated to do. They no longer see any special merit in it. This political capital is quickly spent and the stagnation and confusion of our economy is becoming clearer. In the West there is a recession, inflation and so on, and yet they are giving us credits and supplying us with grain – over 20 million tons per year. People know this. There is even a ditty going around now, “New tradition in old Rus’, start the day with BBC!” [Повелося на Руси в восемь слушать Би-Би-Си].

In the meantime, the decision was never made to hold even one special Plenum on the economy after the Congress, even though a working group was preparing and perfecting materials for this type of Plenum almost constantly (I should know!). That would have been the minimum: the regular Plenums are of little use, when one person talks and the rest listen, lost in their own thoughts, and later discuss in the lobby the various appeals and teachings from the podium. And even after special, seemingly concrete CC resolutions – there were a great many over the last several years – essentially nothing changed.

Overall there is a feeling of some kind of helplessness, inactivity, and inefficiency “at the top.” This is felt in the CC apparatus and probably in the so-called public opinion too. This feeling is exacerbated by the CC’s or Brezhnev’s daily salutations for various occasions like the 40th anniversary of the Stakhanovite movement, or the commissioning of a bridge over the Lena River, or the launch, for example, of the Ryazan state district power plant, or whatever else. Plus almost daily there are new awards of the Hero of Socialist Labor and various other orders.

Everything points to the lack of real leadership in the country. All of our major “leaders” are over 70, and it seems that Brezhnev overstrained himself when he personally took on the entire cause of peace. Now he is physically unable to fulfill his role, which is once again, just as under Khrushchev, disproportionately concentrated on the General Secretary.

Sadat, who rails against us daily, recently said in an interview: “It’s impossible to work with Soviet leaders – they take three months to vacation in Crimea, and then need another month and a half to rest up from the vacation.” Voice of America, BBC, etc., broadcast these words all over the world and around our great, vast country. Unfortunately, he’s right. Brezhnev hasn’t “governed” systematically, daily, as required for the modern politics of a superpower, in over a year. He is on a sparing regimen for both information and physical activity. At the same time, all the key, fundamental, and even daily political decision-making is confined to him. It’s the same situation as with Nikita and Stalin, although it didn’t happen in the two years before Lenin’s death when he was no longer able to lead the country directly.

Everything I’m writing here is fairly obvious. Sovietologists fill their studies with similar conclusions and the common anti-Soviet propaganda is full of them too. However, “Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.” It’s a shame that a country with such resources is most likely already turning into a typical big state with an irrational logic of domestic and foreign policy that

is soulless and uninspired, but inherent to any big country. We respond to all kinds of things at home and abroad, but without our own ideas or inspiration. And nobody knows what to do. It's not like we can follow that scumbag Solzhenitsyn.

The most frustrating thing is that in all these decades we haven't managed to fill the stores from Brest to Vladivostok with modern goods and food. It seems this would require real courage and willingness to take risks without getting stuck in the calculations of senile Baibakov and his ilk.

Zagladin came back from Portugal and France. The Politburo listened to him for an hour and a half. That is unheard of, but even more unheard of is that we agreed to a socialist democratic Portugal and conveyed it to Cunhal through Zagladin. This could have fundamental implications, but not for our propaganda and scholarship, which will continue to chew over and turn over paragraphs from old textbooks. In this sense, the full-page article in *Pravda* about the objectives of philosophical science in the modern day is striking. It is something! On the one hand, according to the article we are operating on a scientific basis. On the other hand, for a person who knows the situation, this article is a cynical confirmation that our Marxist-Leninist science is nothing but chatty scholasticism that is completely disconnected from real life and politics. The wheels of the institutes are turning; good salaries and royalties are getting paid; little intrigues are starting up; the hunt for revisionists is in full swing. Individual lives get broken and someone might lose his or her Party card, which on the whole lends a serious air to the "ongoing work" and raises the "consciousness of political responsibility." But all of this exists only to keep the wheels in this part of the stagnating establishment turning, showing "compliance."

According to Zagladin, his meetings in Paris with Kanapa, Denis, and Fiterman were outrageous. He said he wanted to get up, knock over the table, and leave. The French rudely and arrogantly told him that we are doing everything wrong, that their views on détente and general world developments are fundamentally different, that we've drawn the wrong conclusions from peaceful coexistence, etc.

It seems that Berlinguer and the Yugoslavs already passed this stage (demonstrative and no longer surprising independence from Moscow, they no longer need to talk about it every day) but Marchais still needs to overcome this problem. Paradoxically, they accuse us of reformism and revisionism in our foreign policy, but essentially they are defending their right to lead a reformist policy domestically. In other words, they want us, the USSR, to help them come to power by directing our anti-imperialist rants at Giscard d'Estaing, so they can bring socialist democracy to France.

What is our position? We have none. However, Brezhnev's unexpected meeting with Zarodov (editor in chief of the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*) left all of us confused. Zarodov recently published a scathing article about Marchais, the Italians, and the Spaniards in

Pravda. And Brezhnev meets with him at a time when he doesn't see anybody and it's impossible to get a meeting with him. And he's not really aware of what's going on, anyway.

So we are left to guess whether this top-level punch in the teeth is intentional or just carelessness, when one action is not connected to any others and even directly opposed to them.

September 25, 1975

B.N. returned from Crimea. He called me twice on the internal line, asking me what I think about the European Conference of Communist Parties. Axen (SED Politburo member) was supposed to arrive today to haggle [*пядитъ*] with B.N. "What should we do?" I told B.N. that the new draft of the Declaration (communiqué) attempts to accommodate both the French and our new critics. But I said that I made a number of significant revisions and expect that they will be taken into account.

B.N.: "Isn't there a risk that neither party will end up being satisfied?"

I: "It depends on their chief objective. For example, if the French are set on disrupting the conference, they won't be satisfied with anything."

B.N.: "What are you saying! Why would they want to disrupt?..."

I: "I think they have their reasons. Right now Marchais is doing what Berlinguer did a few years ago: he wants to show and convince everyone that he is not the hand of Moscow, that he is completely independent. So he is rudely and arrogantly demonstrating this, 'solving his chief problem.' In this situation he really doesn't want to put his signature under any collective document, i.e. the CPSU's document."

B.N.: "Indeed Anatoly Sergeyevich, something is rotten in our household. Think on it. Let's talk tomorrow. And then... Zagladin keeps telling me that we need to hold the conference. But are we even ready to hold it? Say on October 9-10th we get everyone in the Berlin working group to agree to hold the conference before the end of the year. And then in Moscow we'll be told that there is no time."

I: "That's right, Boris Nikolaevich. December is completely out of the question for us – the PZPR Congress, the CP of Cuba, Ford... Consequently, all we have left is November, i.e. one month to prepare... Moreover, I'm troubled by the fact that in the draft document for the conference we essentially "fire off" the whole "Program No. 2" (95 percent of it) that's intended to be the continuation of the Peace Program for the XXV Congress. In our day and age, will our leadership agree to repeat at the Congress something that will be "developed" together with Romanians, Spaniards, and "other Swedes"?"

The Taganka Theater is back from Bulgaria, from their first tour abroad. Demichev had to agree to let them go under pressure from Zhivkov and because there had to be some response

to the 42 invitations Lyubimov received from abroad. Bulgaria was picked as the “safest” choice. Zhivkov gave the theater special attention. And it will be more difficult to harass it now; it will be embarrassing in front of our “brothers.”

September 28, 1975

I started reading Byron’s diary again. It’s a magnificent thing. Who (including me) is going to read his famous poems nowadays? Who will be satisfied or even just seriously interested in his poetry (aside from specialists)? But it is such an extraordinarily spiritual experience to touch this quite “realistic” person through letters and diaries.

On Friday at the end of the workday I spent two hours with Zagladin, Shaposhnikov, and Zhilin going over the state of the ICM in preparation for Axen’s visit to Ponomarev and the upcoming preparatory meeting for the European Conference of Communist Parties. I am firmly convinced that it will fall through... Not just because we don’t have time. No, it is because we don’t need a conference that won’t produce the desired “Hurrah, hurrah” for the CPSU and won’t demonstrate unity around us. And there is no way we are going to get that kind of conference.

October 3, 1975

On Tuesday I was at the CC Secretariat. Suslov presided. He gave a generalized tonguelashing on one of our projects – Soviet organizations participating in the “USSR Days” in Italy; in 10 cities of Italy’s “Red Belt” – Bologna, Ferrara, Siena, Rimini, Reggio Emilia and others. The plan was to send 450 people (ensembles, exhibits, lecturers, athletes, cooks, general artists, etc.). It’s actually the same number we sent to Naples in 1972 and Rome in 1973 for similar events. This would cost us 150,000 rubles and no foreign currency. The Italians are collecting 300 million lire for this event themselves. The initiative came from the regional government of Emilia-Romagna and of course the PCI CC.

The Italian Communist Party, with whom we don’t have the smoothest of relationships, is using its positions in the political life of the country to maximally open the door to Italy for us. This is just common sense, not to mention our concerns, internationalism. We could not get this from any other capitalist country.

As usually happens in such cases, Suslov did not listen to anybody and started an attack: “Outrageous! The scope of it! We are trying to save every ruble we can and you want to send 450 people to a regional event, and not somewhere in Donbass, no! You want to send 450 people to Italy, not just for a few days but for almost a month! Cut the budget! Cut it sharply!”

This is despite the fact that there was a reference note explaining that a number of activities in Italy that are in the annual plan have been organized to coincide with the “USSR Days”; everything is approved by the CC; and the money is already released. The additional costs are minimal.

There were some noises of assent from other members of the Secretariat, including Ponomarev (who was on vacation when the materials were being prepared, so he has an alibi to dissociate himself from the work of his own department). Suslov fired off a new round: “Why 10 cities! Take just one city, Bologna for example, as your base. The other cities should bus people in... Why so many days for the ‘roundtable’ discussion? Two is enough.” (Meanwhile, the note explains, though it’s pretty obvious anyway, that the PCI is organizing this! Not us! We can’t tell them to take Bologna as a base and bus the rest of the people! How many people can you bus in, anyway? The Italian communists want this to be a popular festival, not just events to check off a list, like we do.)

This attitude is shameful for our country and our party. How are we going to face the Italians now, after they spent a year preparing this with our respective organizations, renting all the venues, etc.?

The very fact that we are trying to save on such things is sad. Suslov reminded that the day before, the Politburo discussed the Tenth Five-Year Plan and said, “Remember how difficult it will be for us to balance the budget”... I ran into B.N. in the hall on Monday evening after the PB, he shook his head (about the meeting) and gestured that it’s hopeless.

The day after the Secretariat I learned about the demands we are making on states that buy weapons from us (mostly Arab and African) – to pay the amount due in advance and at world market prices, not the agreed prices, and in convertible currency, which wasn’t specified in our agreements. Bakr, the President of Iraq, brazenly replied to this, “The Soviets won’t get any of this, and if they push us, they’ll get a second Egypt!”

But why is it so bad?

Incidentally, here is one example why. On the same day, the Secretariat approved a trip to Canada and Mexico for deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Novikov with an accompanying party of eight to discuss the upcoming Olympic Games. Suslov was in the same peremptory mood and the audience made the same approving noises. So: first class airfare for ten people; 450 gold rubles for each of the scheduled meetings; money for souvenirs, etc. Overall (in real value for the country) it’s not less than our poor affair in Italy’s “Red Belt.” But from the standpoint of the interests of the party and the country, Novikov’s trip has zero value. It is bureaucratic protocol. But it didn’t occur to anybody to save on this; they even ignored the currency costs.

And here’s another reason. Suslov’s adviser Vorontsov gave away the “secret” of economizing on the Italians to our consultant, whom I sent over to try to convince Suslov and explain the political importance of the event. “Kirilenko started all of this,” Vorontsov said, “when he was at the PCI Congress. He made a bunch of promises to Berlinguer. But it did not work! He was unable to present the CC with a fait accompli!” Suslov strongly dislikes Kirilenko, his rival for second place.

Kirilenko is on vacation right now. If he were here, Suslov might not have started this disgrace. And if Kirilenko had been presiding over the meeting, we might have gotten more money for this event. And the audience would have been nodding its approval the same way they just did, only “vice versa.”

And that's all there is to this fundamental economy!

Finally, one last thing. B.N. summoned me for something, and then said: “Mikhail Andreyevich (Suslov) gave me your text from Novo-Ogarevo, asked me to read it and prepare my opinion. He read only a few pages (this is from September 8th!).¹⁰ He is going blind. Did you know? He hasn't been able to see out of his right eye for a while now. He only reads with his left. You can't get much reading done with just your left eye!” – B.N. commented innocently. “And now his left eye is starting to fail. Our doctors treated him. Then he consulted a Swiss professor. He recommended to train the blind eye... In a word, he can't really read anything anymore.”

Indeed, the man is 73 years old. And now he can't see. In other words, his level of awareness must be at a minimum. And he is in charge of our country's vital issues. He presides over the CC Secretariat and often the Politburo.

Everything I described here seems to be tied to a particular incident. But I think to some extent it explains why we are doing so badly financially, and not just financially.

I don't attend the CC Secretariat meetings often, but when I do, as a rule I come out with rather gloomy impressions. Same thing this time. It's depressing – the feeble level of discussion, the incompetence when it comes to questions raised by others, the pettiness of the questions themselves. Out of the 20-something small questions raised at this Secretariat, around a dozen dealt with awards for people and organizations. Or various texts for speeches. Kapitonov commented on one of these speeches (in connection with the 250th anniversary of the USSR Academy of Sciences). It was like he was at a lesson in a village school, clearly using a cheat sheet prepared by his department; he droned on, “This word is repeated, this one doesn't really work, and this comma doesn't seem to be in the right place,” and so on.

B.N. told me that Kuskov visited him yesterday. “He doesn't look ready for work at all,” B.N. said. “He can barely string his words together. We talked. I considered that he's been suffering for almost a year and the doctors can't promise anything, and went ahead and asked him: ‘Elizar Ilyich, perhaps you should retire. Right now you are a member of the CPSU Auditing Commission, and first deputy. It will be easy for us to get you an all-Union pension and save your Kremlin hospital privileges. It will be more difficult after the Congress. And you could overstrain yourself if you start working in your condition. To my surprise, he took it calmly,’ ”

¹⁰ The text in question is the draft summary report for the XXV Congress. [Author's footnote]

B.N. went on, “and he agreed. So now we have to think about a new first deputy. I remember that when we first talked about this you spoke in favor of Zagladin. What about now?”

I: “I still think so. Shaposhnikov filled this role very well when you were gone. However, even nominally it would be difficult to present him and not Zagladin, who is a member of the Auditing Commission and well-known and loved at the very top.”

B.N. “This is true. But he is trying too hard to get to the top. His trip to Portugal, for example. He didn’t do anything special, but the PB listened to him for an hour and a half! Or consider this: he holds on to some important projects and no matter how much I urge him to finish the work, he hangs back and stalls until I go on vacation or a business trip. Then he immediately takes the matters up to the top to show himself. He hasn’t once gone abroad, even on vacation, without sending highest-level ciphered telegrams about his outstanding work there!”

The old man caught on to Zagladin’s plans to take over his chair. And although he does not believe that it is possible while he is still alive, it’s still unpleasant. He doesn’t want his first deputy to be a person who would use every opportunity to show that he’s smarter than his boss. Plus, Zagladin has direct access to the General Secretary, not to mention his advisers.

I: “Have you spoken with Shaposhnikov about this?”

B.N.: “Yes, but Anatoly Sergeyevich, strictly between us please, he is against appointing Zagladin as first deputy. He suggests to wait.”

I: “That’s up to you. But it would still be awkward to present Shaposhnikov right now. And after the Congress, Zagladin will either be a CC member or a candidate member... Plus, with all of Shaposhnikov’s merits, he is not qualified (speaking, writing, knowledge base) to adequately represent the International Department in the present day.”

With this, the conversation ended.

Today I had a very unpleasant conversation with B.N. about Volume I. He did not read it and has no intention of reading it. All my attempts to tell him how interesting, original, and sometimes even thrilling it is are met with scornful skepticism: “The introduction had to be changed five times, and the rest of the volume was written by the same people!”

I am amazed at his brazen tactlessness. He impudently tries to project his doubts onto others, even though it is clear that anyone in my position would take it personally.

With this attitude, what’s the point of this large group’s intellectual efforts, this concentration of knowledge and enthusiasm, love of the subject and skill?! All of this is present in Volume I. B.N.’s almost innocent cynicism reflects the same internal decay in our leadership that was exposed in the case of “USSR Days in Italy.”

October 5, 1975

I visited Dez'ka (David Samoilov) yesterday. We talked about this and that. About Portugal, Israel, Saddam, about which way Vietnam is going to lean... Even Dez'ka's great mind cannot compensate for the lack of necessary information. His attempts to generalize are banal, as usual for people who are not involved. Then he suddenly said, "I submitted my poem about Alexander I's abdication to 'Poetry Day.' By the way, they are going to be the first to publish a response to Solzhenitsyn's 'Letter to the Leaders.'"

He reads his own work wonderfully. And of course the piece is not just exceptional; it's truly a major work – both in terms of its ideas and its poetic quality.

He has a sober view of Solzhenitsyn, no slobbering and reverence. He summarized *The Oak and the Calf* [*Bodalsya telenok s dubom*] for me... "Of course," he said, "it's impressive when one man stands up to the powerful KGB [ГБ]." He said there was nothing there about Tvardovsky, who helped him so much. In general this whole undertaking is nonsense. It won't lead to anything. As a writer he is "secondary." This became especially evident in "August 1914." His artistic strength is as a memoirist-debunker, he is clever and fanatical. But that's it.

October 10, 1975

Right now we are celebrating the 250th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences. Speaking of awards. All the academicians, corresponding members, directors, and deputies received awards, except for people who already received something in the last two years. Arbatov got an Order of Lenin, even though he recently got the Order of the October Revolution on the occasion of his 50th anniversary. Inozemtsev and Fedoseyev were nominated for the Hero [of Socialist Labor] award but didn't get it. They only got the Order of Lenin. The award orgy continues. The Academy of Sciences has been celebrating for almost two weeks – meetings, sessions, endless mutual praise. Serious grown up people are working up a sweat engaging in these activities... Devaluation of awards, celebrations, protocols, toasts, speeches, reports – based on our general inflation. But any inflation at a certain stage becomes a sign of ill health, or at least some trouble in society.

Ponomarev suddenly decided to go himself to the Berlin working group to prepare the European Conference of Communist Parties. Representatives of 27 parties are gathered there, at the level of Politburo members and secretaries. It seems everyone understood that it is risky to delay any longer (for different reasons for each CP) in the atmosphere of practically excitement in the Western press over the prospect that the conference will fall through.

I don't know the results yet, even though B.N. is coming back tomorrow. He got the "go ahead" (from L.I. [Brezhnev] at the PB, although it's not final) to move things toward holding the conference before the XXV Congress. Before he left, he had a "serious talk" with me. Essentially he accused me of wanting to foil the conference. For several days prior he kept asking for my opinion about the conference and the draft documents. I spoke frankly: firstly, I don't think that Brezhnev will find the time; secondly, I don't see the point of having this

conference right now – it will not say anything new compared to Helsinki; thirdly and most importantly, it could turn into a demonstration of dissociation of the most influential parties from “Moscow.” As if to say that since they made the concession to the CPSU by coming to a conference that the entire world sees as the “Kremlin’s” desperate attempt to show its leading role and its ability to have its way – since this was inevitable, they will use this public tribune to tell the world in front of Brezhnev himself that they are “independent” and will do things their own way come hell or high water.

I told Ponomarev, “You reproached me for not understanding ‘the interests of our department’ and that it would be important for the prestige of our department to make this present in time for the Congress; for it to be our department’s present. But what if we end up with an across-the-board demonstration of independence (as Zagladin once said – it’s no longer a ‘unity in diversity’ but a ‘variety of diversities’), how will our department look then! Right now Brezhnev is selectively informed about the situation with communist parties, some facts are omitted to avoid irritation. He does not see the full picture of the collapse of ‘our household.’ But at the conference he would see this picture in full size.”

This made an impression on B.N., but he backed out by saying, “We need to think, we need to think.” The whole point of the serious talk was to make sure that my concerns and arguments do not reach Aleksandrov. He started out by asking whether I already brought them to his attention. He went on to say, “I am trying to get Aleksandrov as an ally for his ability to influence Brezhnev, and you are undermining my efforts. I became convinced that you (Chernyaev) are against the conference when I read the draft Summary report for the Congress. Your section talks about the conference of communist parties as something that might happen after the Congress.”

I reassured Ponomarev that Aleksandrov doesn’t know anything about my arguments, he never heard them. But I was disgusted with the whole scene. He essentially suspected that I would sabotage the conference because I was pushed aside from the planning process and the numerous trips to Berlin, etc. I wouldn’t put it past him to have these suspicions, even though he’s known me for over 15 years.

Yesterday Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. I wonder where this is going to go.

October 11, 1975

I have in front of me the page-proofs of Salychev’s article for *Kommunist*. It’s called “Revolution and Democracy.” Deputy Editor-in-chief Bagramov asked me “strictly confidentially” to take a look at it. I did. Revolutionary scholasticism. One more example of what happens when relatively intelligent and educated people operate within the framework of our ideological logic and create politically illiterate compositions, which are even harmful from the perspective of real policies.

If this article is published it will bring a surge of suspicion regarding our seriousness about Helsinki from the official West; and a stream of contemptuous comments and disagreement with “Moscow” from such friends as the Italians, French, and the like. So why is this article in an official organ of the CC CPSU? For ideological self-gratification.

I am reading Bykov’s *To Live to See the Dawn [Dozhit’ do rassveta]*. The war, and again I feel moved. I’m always moved when I read Bykov because he writes about the selflessness in the hearts of the soldiers, which did not always lead to heroic results.

October 15, 1975

Afanas’ev called me today (he is the editor-in-chief of *Kommunist*): “You are going to have to join our editorial board after all.” He first called me about this about ten days ago, on Suslov’s instructions. I told him that I would prefer to stay at *Questions of History*. Ponomarev summoned me to discuss this too. I explained to him that I don’t want to leave *Questions of History*, and I’m already connected to *Kommunist* because for every more-or-less serious issue they send someone over to me with materials to look over.

“It’s up to you,” B.N. concluded.

Afanas’ev kept pressuring me, referring to Suslov. This was unexpected for me. Supposedly Suslov said, “If you need someone from the CC International Department on your editorial board, you better take Chernyaev. He is more competent than the rest.”

Ponomarev called again, this time he knew about Suslov’s opinion. He didn’t try to talk me into it like he did during our first conversation, he just said, “Anatoly Sergeyevich, didn’t you say that you don’t want to...” The old man has something in mind. But I have no idea what.

On Sunday I organized an “October nineteenth” get-together at Uspenka (in imitation of Pushkin). Dez’ka, Vadim, Luchana, Felix, and others. We had a lot to drink. Nice atmosphere. I avoided escalating a political discussion with Vad’ka. Dez’ka read some of his new stuff. His writing is very strong right now. He wants to buy a house in Pärnu (Estonia) but they won’t sell it to him because he does not want to rent out his apartment in Moscow. Today I called Vaino Valjas (CC Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia) about this; I met him last year in Finland. He promised to make an “exception to the rule.”

I read the transcript of the working group in Berlin (October 9-10th) on the preparation of the European Conference of Communist Parties. People liked Ponomarev’s appeals to the glory of internationalism, but it didn’t change anything in the communist parties’ positions. The discussion was a firsthand confirmation of the fact that the communist movement is not an international political force. The only things they could agree on were the same things that heads of state and governments agreed on in Helsinki. Perhaps the key to understanding this is in a thought expressed by the Italians: it’s time to put a stop to the idea of the unity of communist

parties. This is sectarianism. It would be relevant and realistic to have unity of communists, social democrats, socialists, Christians, and all democrats in general. This would have potential, this has real social force. This idea corresponds to the majority of participants' statements; including those who did not quite understand it and those who are fundamentally strict towards social democrats (like the Austrians), but who noticed that the draft of the final document weakly reflects the need for unity with social democrats. Meanwhile, as [Erwin] Scharf pointed out, social democracy is in power in most of Western Europe. And we are going to have to deal with it, if we want to build any kind of new Europe.

The participants were not troubled by the resolution of the Socialist International, which was recently adopted in Lisbon and directed towards strengthening anticommunist activity.

So, Berlin has shown that the communist movement is "irrelevant" and that from the point of view of the participants, it is an "outdated form" of historic initiative and the formation of real social force capable of bringing about change. Thus, the Italian "historic compromise" is spilling beyond national borders the same way that Palmiro Togliatti's idea of "unity in diversity" imperceptibly became a reality.

Today I saw Clancy and Simon, the chairman and the general secretary of the Socialist Party of Australia.¹¹ They are infiltrating the trade union movement. But their overall level is pathetic, they keep asking for handouts. We recently gave them one when we signed up for 100 copies of their newspaper *Socialist* and cancelled our subscription to the CPA's newspaper *Tribune*. It was a CC decision, it made them happy.

Clancy on people from Timor, saying we should not delay in recognizing this fragment of the Portuguese empire.

The story with Midtsev's (department consultant) correspondence in *Pravda* about a Socialist International conference in Tunis. That Stalinist asshole, led by Ulyanovsky (deputy head of the department) wanted to sneak in an article about social democracy in the spirit of the late 1940s. Good God! Politicians! I nixed this idea, luckily *Pravda* noticed it and sent me the article before printing it.

Giscard d'Estaing in the USSR. A demarche by the PCF – a warning to the CPSU not to act like we did with Chirac earlier this year. Insolence. Then again, it's the same aspect of the communist movement's evolution. Before (a year ago) they would complain and insult us in closed letters. Now – in *L'Humanité*.

I am reading a book on Giscard, prepared "for official use" by the Information Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It's well put together from French sources. Informative reading.

¹¹ A group of "Marxist-Leninists" who broke away from the Communist Party and were loyal to the CPSU.
[Author's footnote]

It seems Zagladin was confirmed as first deputy today (Brutents told me). I don't know the precise details of how it happened or why B.N. suddenly rushed with this.

October 16, 1975

The situation in the top tier of the Party and country is practically deadlocked. Brezhnev's illness and mental decline is becoming apparent to everybody. He gave a lively speech at the lunch with Giscard d'Estaing, but beforehand at the airport he was "boring"; all of Moscow noticed this from the TV broadcast. The next day the French were once again asked to postpone the talks until Friday. Giscard went to Yasnaya Polyana and Borodino. All of Western mass media are buzzing that something happened. What will tomorrow bring? Ponomarev told me that Brezhnev "isn't feeling well" and waved his arm in a hopeless gesture. Ponomarev himself is jittery over the fate of the European Conference of Communist Parties. The contradictions and disagreements with fraternal parties are creating uncertainty. But the main uncertainty for B.N. is whether Brezhnev will be able to participate in the conference.

It sounds like Brezhnev will preside himself at the PB tomorrow. They will be deciding who will go where: the PUWP Congress is on December 8th; the CP of Cuba Congress is on December 17th; then a meeting of the PCC (Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact); then the General Secretary's trip to the U.S.; Conference of European Communist Parties... Plus, we promised to receive official visits from the Mongolians and Algerians in December.

It looks like Brezhnev is planning to attend the Congress in Cuba, since it is the first congress of the Cuban Communist Party. From there he would go directly to the U.S. What will the "Beard" think of this? It's unthinkable for the General Secretary to miss the Polish Congress, too.

Where are we going to squeeze in the European Conference? Especially since neither Brezhnev, nor other PB members besides Suslov and B.N., have any real understanding of why we need this conference in the first place and what it will give us. And today Suslov is getting admitted to a clinic for his eye operation, i.e. he will be there for about a month and a half.

How long can this go on? After all, I only know about international affairs, and mostly the aspect of international affairs that has practically no influence. But there are domestic affairs too, matters that are connected to people's daily lives. In the meantime, the country's leadership is essentially paralyzed. Nobody can take any substantive actions, i.e. make decisions, because we have an absolute leader who holds indisputable power in his hands. But his hands are feeble now.

Talked with B.N. about my conversation yesterday with Clancy and Simon. He couldn't care less about it all, including the question of Timor.

Dzhavad (head of the British sector) visited Malta. He confirmed that they have a Communist Party. But B.N. didn't even want to hear about it, not to mention consider including it in the preparations for the European Conference. His only concern now is not to overload the conference boat with some new problem.

October 18, 1975

Yesterday there was a reception in honor of Giscard d'Estaing in St. George's Hall. I haven't been at this kind of performance in a long time. This is how it happens: there is a crowd of "our people" on the main entrance staircase, the usual set of faces invited from list №... They form a tight corridor and are not allowed inside until the diplomats pass through this corridor. As usual with us, this is done in a rude and insulting manner. Some women complained.

Then the people are allowed into the Hall. More or less quickly, the crowd rushes through the tall doors to the tables and gets seated in the familiar small groups. For example, I noticed that the deputies of the CC apparatus were entirely concentrated in one part of the Hall... And everyone immediately starts eating and drinking, talking amongst themselves, raising toasts, and grabbing the tastier and more unusual appetizers (sterlet fish, caviar, etc.).

At a designated time the key guests gathered at the entrance to the hall. This time Brezhnev, Giscard, Kosygin and Podgornyi were in the front. Behind them were members and candidate members of the Politburo, followed by the wives of the top leaders, and then the French officials closing the assembly. The Marseillaise played, then our anthem. Then the group slowly moved past the tables, to the applause of the guests. Brezhnev smiled, waved to people he recognized. Others, like Kosygin, who is always frowning, walked as if the hall was empty. Ponomarev was cheerful and bowed left and right. His noticed me momentarily and seemed to be surprised.

Once the main group reached their seats in the hall, everyone went "back to business" with even greater fervor. I wound up sitting next to Kovalyov (deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Samoteikin (General Secretary's consultant), Tsvigun (Andropov's menacing deputy), and their wives. I concentrated my attention on Tolya Kovalyov's wife – a smart, down to earth, intelligent woman.

There were no formal toasts or speeches. Exactly one hour later, the "main group" left the hall in the same order as they came in, accompanied by less organized applause. That was it. It's been nearly two years since I saw Brezhnev up close. He looks fatter, flabbier, his face is darker.

This evening I'm reading Jean Ellenstein, *Historie du phenomena Stalinien*. He's a French communist, author of a four-volume *History of the USSR*. The book is written to support the PFC's current political position – "We are following our own path. What happened in Russia was a result of its pre-revolutionary backwardness. Stalinism was as inevitable in Russia as it is

impossible in France..." And more along those lines. The factual data in the book are shocking once again.

October 19, 1975

Ponomarev's former first deputy, Elizar Kuskov, recently retired and was given the following pension: 270 rubles, plus he gets to keep the Uspenka [dacha] until next year, and access to the Kremlin cafeteria and hospital. The man has left the stage... And he was such a bigwig for so many years.

One of Ponomarev's casual remarks caught my attention. He was telling me about our agenda (PUWP Congress, Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, the European Conference of Communist Parties, Brezhnev's meeting with Ford, etc.) when he said, "[Brezhnev] dismissed the materials for the congress, saying 'Later, later'..." B.N. commented, "It's strange, I don't understand it. This has never happened before... After all, the CPSU Congress is just around the corner..." He again threw up his hands and made a face.

I wonder if Brezhnev may be getting ready to retire. Every time he appears in public his physical and mental decline becomes more apparent. He must feel it himself. In the TV broadcast from Vnukovo-2 airport yesterday, sending off Giscard, he looked pathetic. He kept holding his hand by his hat as if he was giving a military salute, but you could see his hand was shaking. The whole ridiculous protocol looked gloomy, boring, and meaningless. Surely, he must be concerned about his legacy?

It seems he has lost interest in materials for the Congress. He hasn't inquired about them since giving the order for writing teams to go to the dachas. It is possible that he does not plan to personally deliver the speeches that are written for him. I can't imagine how he would stand at the podium for 4-5 hours in his current condition. Maybe he will follow the example of the XIX Congress – make a brief opening speech himself, then assign someone else to give the main report (as Stalin did in 1952).

On Sunday I took a walk with Brutents. He is concerned too. There are holidays every Sunday (today, for example, is the Day of Food Industry Workers), anniversaries, greetings, awards, receptions, congratulations, meetings, farewells, talks... What's going on? Where are we? Where are we going? What's going to happen a year from now? Not to mention – what will happen with the Congress?

Official reality – or, more precisely, mythology – has completely diverged from real life, from people's mindsets and interests. Newspapers and literary journals are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Newspapers print optimistic gibberish according to the old familiar rules. Journals are full of highly artistic works about everyday life – melancholy, hopeless, with no goals or aspirations. In the past, *Novyi Mir* "transgressed" with this kind of material. People picked on it, it was the black sheep. Now all journals are like this. I don't think their editors are

gradually and maliciously pushing this atmosphere (which reflects the lack of ideals and convictions of today's society). Maybe there are some hidden liberals of this sort. But the majority would probably suppress this material like they used to. However, that seems to be impossible now, because there would be nothing to print. Readers would not accept filler. Plus, the level of professionalism (and "ethics" in this environment) seems to have reached a point where they can no longer create artificially "inspired" things.

There is a sense of expectation everywhere, practically on the streets. People are openly talking about the "senility of the government." Indeed, probably no other civilization in all of human history had such an elderly "body" in the government.

A great thing has been accomplished – détente. Brezhnev is its author. But we've reached a point in the process where we don't know what to do next. Détente has potential if we keep moving forward. Otherwise we will inevitably come to a new edition of the "Cold War." Giscard gave a sensational speech at the dinner in the Kremlin, in which he accurately laid out the only possible way forward for détente. Namely, there are two directions – disarmament and renunciation of the "Cold War" in the sphere of ideology, i.e. ideological détente (while maintaining the battle of ideas). We are not moving toward one or the other. And the West isn't moving, either. But the fact is that they can take their time, even in a recession they can afford both "guns and butter."

Furthermore, since we are the initiators of détente and we are the ones who need it most, as we claim, the West expects us to continue "leading by example." They can afford to wait, blackmail us, provoke us, try to catch and expose our inconsistencies, our deviations from Helsinki.

But we can't let ourselves tread water... Then again, maybe we can. And probably nothing will happen. If for so many years, in worse circumstances, we could pour half the national income into army and weapons, then why not keep doing it now. And what else is there to do? Having created a military apparatus with dozens of marshals, tens of thousands of generals, and hundreds of thousands colonels, and a military industry infrastructure that employs millions – we can't just ship them off to the moon! By now it is a self-propagating force. It is a social category of our society, one that is highly privileged and influential. You can't simply part ways with it.

It's even worse in ideology. We have come to a point of ideological idiocy (in no small part due to our economic and military policies), which will eventually produce a "new quality" (when a completely new generation grows up, free of the revolutionary-patriotic convictions of their fathers). But that's still a ways away. For now we can pretend that everything is okay. Plus, the problem of our society's ideals cannot be solved by ideological means. It is rooted in the cadre-psychological tumor that is clinging like corals to the political and economic infrastructure of our society, and does not let it breathe, choking it and pulling it into a rotten swamp.

But I digress... The West already understood that we've reached a point in our policy of détente that is very difficult for us to cross (disarmament and ideological détente). This is where they'll take us to task (they are already doing it), using the "civilized" methods and principles of Helsinki that we brought to life ourselves.

This is why the European Conference of Communist Parties is becoming critical. If it takes the route preferred by the French (and, as we found out in Berlin, the majority of our "fraternal" parties), i.e. the path of "increasing the class struggle against imperialism," then our Helsinki partners will immediately seize us by the arm. And I'm afraid the Chinese will be right in their rants about a false détente. Alas, Comrade Ponomarev with his Comintern psychology is likely to go precisely in this direction. And, considering the fact that the main author of détente is clearly becoming disconnected from practical policy and is physically unable to figure out what is happening, it seems that Ponomarev (with Suslov's support) might succeed in this operation. This portends years of balancing in uncertainty between the Cold War and détente; nothing will be solved, all problems will be frozen, nothing will move forward and the social dementia will grow stronger.

Ponomarev loves to shout about disarmament, to expose the arms race everywhere, etc. At the same time, with his European Conference he will make a contribution commensurate to his abilities to reinforce this race at this stage.

October 24, 1975

It was a very informative week. On Tuesday I inadvertently overheard a phone conversation between Katushev and Ponomarev: I was in Ponomarev's office when Katushev called. From their exchange I figured out that the European Conference of Communist Parties is falling through. But I didn't let on. The next morning B.N. called me to his office and after talking about the Congress report, he suddenly flashed a sly smile and said, "Well, it seems your point of view about the conference is winning." The conversation, telegraphically: Apparently Suslov fundamentally supported the idea and wasn't backing down, but he is now in the hospital. According to B.N., Kirilenko is humoring... and took the course to block the conference on the pretext that it would be too much of a load on Brezhnev!

In response to these "explanations" I once again made a "short speech," suggesting that it would be better to have no conference at all than the kind of conference that is coming together right now. The Italians (Segre and Pajetta) gave an interview about the working group in Berlin, in which they cynically devalued the conference, openly said that the mountain is giving birth to a mouse. They brought the solidarity of the participants' views to a bare minimum, equivalent to interstate relations. They are explicitly warning that by giving in to Moscow and attending the conference, they are using it as an opportunity to demonstrate their "independence" and disdain for the CPSU.

The French are even more coarse in their methods, and although they are coming at it from a different side, they are achieving the same result (demonstrating the lack of any kind of communist unity whatsoever) with Kanapa's interview, Marchais' new speeches, etc. We set ourselves up with our incessant activity: now to the entire front of anticommunism we appear as the party that for some reason has an almost vital interest in this conference. But why we need it – even the bourgeois press doesn't understand it anymore!

B.N. dutifully listened to me and instructed me to prepare materials in favor of not holding the conference this year (I am supposed to write it by hand, so even the typists wouldn't know).

Meanwhile, a group of Germans has been in Moscow since Monday, led by deputy head Bruno Malov, who is working with Zagladin, Zhilin, Sobakin, and Ermonsky to urgently prepare a new draft document for the conference (based on the results of the working group). The new draft is supposed to be discussed by the end of October with the Spaniards, Italians, French, and Yugoslavs. The dates are already set for them to arrive in Berlin. This draft has to go out to all twenty-eight Central Committees two weeks before the drafting committee, which was supposed to meet around November 20th in Berlin. In short, the work was in full swing. In an effort to do everything properly and accommodate the CPSU, the Germans have been increasing the pace. They grew suspicious when B.N. refused to look over the results of the joint work and to put his signature on the draft.

Last night, when Zagladin and I were holding the main drafting committee on Volume II of the *History and Theory of the International Labor Movement*, a note was slipped to us on the table: "Ponomarev is coming back from the Politburo and asks all his deputies to wait for him." It was after eight o'clock when we were in B.N.'s office. Without preparing us, he announced: "The Politburo has decided not to hold the conference before the Congress."

October 31, 1975

The Politburo's decision was not based on political considerations at all (like the ones I expounded in my doubts about the usefulness of such a conference). Brezhnev simply realized that "all of this" is too much for him. As B.N. told us, the Politburo members understood (and did not hide the fact) that we went too far [with the conference preparations]... But nothing to be done about it! B.N. tried to make excuses: why didn't they mention this "possibility" before the Berlin working group? He would have handled things accordingly and used the PCF's outburst as the scapegoat. At this point, how can we turn back? We put the SED in a very difficult position. But they calmed him down by saying that the PB trusts his (B.N.'s and the International Department's) "skills" to get out of this situation without any damage.

After B.N. told us the Politburo's decision and discussed strategies for backing out, we went over to Zagladin's office. We were wound up. I watched Vadim and Zhilin, who had carelessly pushed B.N. to force the conference and worked in this spirit on the Germans and

other fraternal parties. How would they behave now? Not a shadow of regret! They were trying to outdo each other, with cynicism and gusto going over anything and everything that crossed their mind in terms of arguments against the conference, and how to hoodwink the people they dragged into it, how to shift the blame for delaying (and essentially failing) the conference.

B.N. assigned us to think everything over and write out the tactics and arguments. Since I knew about it before they did, I quickly wrote five pages in the morning – political motivations for why the conference is inappropriate and how to convey this to the various parties.

On Friday B.N. received Malov, but didn't say anything to him. But the latter sensed the "loss of interest." He called Berlin. Over the phone, Axen invited himself to come to Moscow immediately. He arrived on Sunday, met with Ponomarev and Katushev. B.N. laid it all out frankly. Axen was upset, he argued and tried to "prove" something. But then he thought better of it and said, "If the CPSU Politburo made this decision, it is our internationalist duty to carry it out."

Ponomarev delegated all of this work and switched his attention to the international section of the Summary Report we wrote in Novo-Ogarevo. Brezhnev asked him to make comments (even though Suslov had asked him the same thing and he had the text since the beginning of the month, but he didn't do anything until he got Brezhnev's note). He did not like the section.

November 1, 1975

B.N. said it is all run of the mill and common knowledge. He believes that it is impossible to step away from the "tradition of our congresses" – we have to start with a picture of the world, the correlation of forces, the retreat of imperialism and advent of socialism. The recession is presented "weakly" ("remember how Stalin did it at the XVI Congress... Although Varga prepared it for him..."). We should write more sharply about the shocks, unemployment, inflation; and we should present it against the background of our "steady rise," our successes. It would be beneficial to us to show this right now – we don't have recessions, unemployment or inflation. The communist parties are waiting for this. The masses are waiting.

As for why it is "common knowledge," from his point of view it is because the text goes into detail on how our relationships formed with the U.S., FRG, France, etc. (He is right in the sense that we broke it down under pressure from the MFA version, which was sent to Novo-Ogarevo by Brezhnev himself).

However, what is B.N. suggesting that is new? It turns out, saying that "the nature of imperialism has not changed," that it is escalating the arms race to undermine détente, that "peaceful coexistence does not mean class status quo," that we need to intensify the struggle against imperialism, etc.

He wrote his comments along these lines (showed them to me) and sent them directly to Brezhnev. However, in the final version he didn't include the formula "the nature of imperialism has not changed," even though he schooled me on this for several days in a row. He suggested to make the Peace Program central in the report on progress and to advance the World Conference on Disarmament as the central idea around which we will continue to make noise in the struggle for peace and détente. It would be something like the next step after Helsinki, i.e. Helsinki-II.

I didn't really argue when he told me all this, but I fought off slowly and doggedly: what will we achieve with this traditional class offensive? Will we please Georges Marchais? Hardly. He has a completely different goal. His aim is not to compel us to a policy that would make us, the USSR, look more revolutionary. It is more to distance himself from the CPSU, to erase any possibility of associating him with "orders from Moscow." He is losing sleep over Carrillo and Berlinguer's laurels in this regard. Therefore he is looking for any excuse to insult and provoke us to a scandal and disassociation from the PCF.

We got nothing from Marchais anyway. Yes, if we do it your way, we will please our loyal friends – DKP, Sinisalo, the Danes, Austrians, Luxembourgers, and of course Gus Hall. But they don't mean anything in the real politics at home or on the international arena.

However, a "toughening of class [struggle]," even just verbally (but from such a podium), could seriously damage the general direction of our foreign policy offensive – the course of peace and economic cooperation. These are real things both from the standpoint of slowing down the burden of the arms race, and the standpoint of much-needed economic ties with the outside world.

So we have to choose between propaganda (poor and ineffective propaganda, by the way), and politics.

The same goes for their recession. Yes, they acknowledge that it is very deep. Maybe it really is worse than the Great Depression of 1929-1933 (in its fundamental laws). But in contrast to what happened then, this time capitalism is dealing with it pretty well. In 1929 they were completely unprepared for the hit. Now, on top of having immeasurably greater wealth and economic resources at their disposal, and the absence of contradictions that led to a war between the powers at the time, they have international mechanisms and psychological readiness to take on "the challenge," as they say. In fact, even this sharp and prolonged recession resulted in only a 1-2 percent reduction in the standard of living, and even this happened only in some countries. Can we really compare it to the social devastation of the 1930s?!

B.N. interrupted me by saying: "You are in the grip of our liberal scholars and Western propagandists. Look at their inflation – 16, 25, 34 percent! And the mass strikes!"

Fine, I said, but the workers use these strikes to get salary increases of 30-50 percent at a time. This has never happened before. Unemployment – yes. Nobody is saying that a recession is

good for the people. But in some sectors, the unemployed are paid more than CC CPSU consultants...

B.N. got angry and again started to tell me that I am under the influence of wrong data and falsifications.

I said alright, if we really want to “press the devastating disasters” and such, then we need to have data, numbers. We don’t have them – not from our institutes, not from the communist parties. Where are we going to get them? We can make them up. Otherwise we will look ridiculous. It would be irresponsible to engage in cheap propaganda from the podium of the Congress, especially for a person like Brezhnev, who has a specific reputation in the world. It won’t give us anything but sneers both at home (we buy bread from these decaying imperialists) and especially in the West, including in our fraternal parties.

Moreover, we again have to choose – is it beneficial to the interests of our economy and foreign policy to dance the cancan about their crisis and wish them more of the same? [*и кричать «таскать вам не перетаскать»*]?

B.N.: Why the cancan? We should just state things as they are.

I: First of all, you don’t want things as they are; you want it tougher for propaganda. Secondly, this is a political report at a Party Congress, not a lecture on the global economy! So there is always the question: why do we need this or that topic in the report, from a policy perspective?

Of course these are not the exact words we used; I’m conveying the gist of it here schematically. The conversation=debate was lively and uneven, but I think I got the main points of my ranting to B.N. across correctly.

Last week I had a similar discussion with B.N. about his idea to publish an article on “Peaceful coexistence and class struggle” in *Kommunist*. I told him frankly that it will be primarily perceived as a “response to Giscard d’Estaing.” He responded in his usual style: “We don’t need to refer to Giscard, though of course no one in his right mind would get that idea anyway.” B.N.’s idea once again was born out of necessity “to justify ourselves before Marchais,” to tell good communists that we, the CPSU, are also good fighters in the class struggle, and even though we are pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, we are not giving up the goal of destroying imperialism.

We wrote the article. But when I brought it to B.N., he didn’t take it. Instead, he told me to distribute it among the deputies and have them answer three questions: is this article necessary? Do we have a basis for it? What can we add? And specific comments on the text. Now the deputies are working on it. I asked Zagladin to put it all together and personally report to Ponomarev.

So B.N. is torn between statesmanship and his propaganda-class nature formed in the 1930-50s. He slipped up with the European Conference of Communist Parties because the latter part of him took over. If he had given it some serious thought in due time, he would have realized that such a conference was not necessary. Plus, it's impossible to put back together the unraveled shirt [*расползшийся кафтан*] of the Communist Movement, especially with methods that only exacerbate the unraveling.

During the week B.N. received Morris Childs – member of the CPUSA who is Gus Hall's special envoy for “these kinds of matters.”¹² B.N. called me over. The formal reason for Morris's visit is to inform the CC CPSU about their recent Plenum (as payment for our financial assistance, so to speak. Nonetheless, B.N. refused to provide it). But in his presentation, and in Gus Hall's report at the Plenum, there was pressure on us regarding “peaceful coexistence and class struggle” – in the spirit of the French Communist Party. They expressed “doubts” about Academician Arbatov's article on the subject, in which he supposedly rejects the thesis that “peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle on the world stage.” Later Morris visited Arbatov, after which the latter called me, very worried, and asked to explain to B.N. that the Americans misunderstood him because *The New York Times* published only excerpts from his article with some incorrect translations.

Nevertheless, he bitterly swore at Morris and Hall for meddling in our affairs and wanting us to once again shout to the whole world that we expect to overthrow imperialism with our policy of détente.

Of course, B.N. knows a great deal and has a lot on his plate; he is accustomed to thinking big, on a “theoretical” level so to speak. But the huge amount of information he consumes daily from the ciphered telegrams, from TASS, from conversations with communist parties – all of it is fragmented, varied, and contradictory. He doesn't have the time or strength to synthesize it. When he tries to summarize it, the data follows the law of energy conservation and falls into the ancient “theory” patterns that B.N. ultimately inherited from Stalin, though he genuinely denies this and would be outraged if someone said this to him.

After all, he is over 70 years old. He has a functional response to information, as a conscientious official. Only in his weary spare time does he begin to think about prospects and consequences.

Because of my own position in the bureaucracy, and because B.N. belongs to that leadership circle that, according to mass psychology, is supposed to know and understand everything – because of all these reasons I myself can't help but look to B.N. for answers to our “great problems.” In this sense I am like a man on the streets who thinks, for example, that Brezhnev is supposed to see and know everything – from the state of affairs in literature to what

¹² In 2001 it was revealed that for decades, Morris Childs was a CIA [sic, FBI] insider in the CPSUSA. [Author's footnote]

is available (or not) in stores, what happens in transportation, the thieving and corruption in the administration, the state of our economy, everything. And he is supposed to fix everything himself. This is the legacy of tsarist psychology, which was toppled by the revolution but revived in a different form at the same time, and then restored, strengthened and solidly consolidated by Stalin.

I got a copy of Willy Brandt's London speech. I'm impressed by the scale of his political thinking. It seems that from the point of view of the West's interests, he expresses the best approach to the problem of confrontation of two social orders. We should have an approach on a similar global scale, from the standpoint of our socialist world. And we don't have one. Not just because we are in the grip of obsolete ideological clichés that we are afraid to let go. It's also because such an approach involves a lot of money, material wealth that would be at least somewhat comparable to the American-European-Japanese levels.

November 2, 1975

There was an election meeting, a regular formality. But since it happens once a year, B.N. made a speech. He spoke in platitudes that could have been said 5, 10, and 25 years ago. As if nothing is happening in the ICM, as if things are as smooth and great as ever, it's just "not clear why the French are behaving this way," etc.

We have one deputy of the Scandinavia sector who has been in the department for about 30 years. He is dumb and meanly cunning. He needed to show his adherence to principle, so he picked on me in his speech (he said I do not educate the sectors on what to do with social democracy; I only go abroad to various meetings on the subject but nobody ever finds out the results). It is all petty nonsense, but everyone noticed: a deputy head is being publicly criticized! From a professional standpoint this is obvious disloyalty, I could have summoned him and let him have it, and no party committee would say a word about suppressing criticism. But I don't give a damn. However, it is noteworthy that he dared to do this against me... Why? Either because he thinks (like many others) that I don't have enough actual power to "press" anyone, or because they think that I'm too much of an intellectual to seek revenge.

I am reading Viktor Afanasyev [sic, Astafyev], the collection *War is Raging Somewhere* [*Где-то зреет война*]. He is one of the authors who represent our great contemporary Soviet prose. Tremendous master. Each one of his stories has a point where it becomes impossible to restrain an explosion of feelings.

November 8, 1975

Second day of the holiday. Yesterday I was at the parade and partially lingered to see the demonstration. I noted that Grechko's speech from the Mausoleum was done in quite a peace-loving spirit, he even mentioned "Soyuz-Apollo." And – this was especially interesting – the

parade was given in the “defense mode.” The new things were launchers for low-flying aircraft, the infantry carrier rocket “Strela” without strategic missiles.

I went to the reception at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. Brezhnev gave the toast himself, it was also pretty peaceful. Then he made a joke suggesting that the marshals and generals should court the ladies. (There was quite a variety of ladies in the room, all of them lavishly dressed but very few with taste.) There was one episode that everyone paid attention to: the Patriarch of [Moscow and] all Rus' and his entourage, clearly already tipsy, walked towards the presidium. Brezhnev stood up to greet him. They embraced and then for five minutes chatted in front of the astonished public, as the saying goes. And then the Patriarch marched across the entire hall to the exit.

We've been back at Novo-Ogarevo since November 3rd (Aleksandrov, Blatov, Karen and I, and Shishlin). Zagladin comes by on short visits and only participates in discussions. He obviously does not want to get engaged. He told Karen “privately” that the text is boring and that we should play up the “class aspect”; that both East and West benefited from talk about détente but it is nonsense; that Helsinki took place and “never mind about it,” we should keep our course for chipping off at imperialism bit by bit, etc. Who knows whether he picked this up somewhere at the top, or if he came up with it himself under the influence of the French.

Incidentally, the comments we got to our August text from Brezhnev and especially from Gromyko give reason to think that although Zagladin is running ahead, he is moving “in the right direction.”

Brezhnev's remarks are vague and not clearly formulated. He listened to the text, made some marks in the margins or underlined some things, following the “figure it out yourself” principle. He put question marks in some places and said that we should be more careful and restrained when it comes to assessing the “establishment of peace.”

Gromyko, although he “highly approved” the text, essentially rejected any disarmament perspective and virtually excluded the possibility of curbing the arms race. He made it clear that it is not to our advantage and we shouldn't bind ourselves because, he said, we aren't going to do it. We were all left with our jaws hanging open, and Aleksandrov nervously said that he cannot agree with this.

Andropov, on the contrary, seems to have approved the course we set out in the text – that détente essentially has no further prospects without an emphasis on doing away with the arms race.

November 9, 1975

Nobody really made comments on my section (“The CPSU and the revolutionary process”). But Brezhnev put a bunch of question marks next to paragraphs on regional

conferences of communist parties and said that it “reads like a lecture.” Plus, I will have to reduce the whole text by more than a third. This section will now have to cover the recession, which must fit on a page and a half and “not have all kinds of terminology or sound too academic,” but still needs to feel new. Really, God forbid having this task: using all the resources of your mind and nerves to depict the extremely complex modern world in the most primitive language, all the while trying to make some of the ideas look Marxist. For example, the client made the following remark: we have to better define what the revolutionary process is, it must be clear that it is the struggle for independence and peace!

November 15, 1975

Another week spent entirely cooped up at Novo-Ogarevo. It is torture to waste your effort on making things sound as primitive as possible, even ideas that are presented more or less intelligently in *Pravda*.

After editing the report to reflect Gromyko’s, Andropov’s, Ponomarev’s, Katushev’s, and of course the speaker’s comments, we managed to reduce it from 58 to 47 pages, but we need to get down to 40 or even 35. But even with this volume, the text is visibly drying up, while any eloquent wording takes space. It looks like we’ll be spending another week here, cutting down the text.

November 20, 1975

Yesterday Sashka Bovin stopped by to visit me. He just got back from a trip to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (as a correspondent for *Izvestiya* but with an assignment from us). He said he wrote several telegrams while he was over there, thinking to help our policies. But when he got back to Moscow, he found out that nobody paid attention to them above a deputy minister of foreign affairs. A common occurrence.

Bovin continues to sit in the group at Volynskoe-II (the Economic section of the Summary Report). They also prepared the speech for the General Secretary at the Plenum that will take place on December 2nd, covering the plan for next year and the economy in general (pre-Congress issues). Brezhnev met with them. There was, as Bovin put it, one musical moment: they wrote that we had to buy grain abroad. The General Secretary told them to take it out. They tried to argue, saying that everyone knows about it and people might say something. The General Secretary: “While we are alive, nobody will say anything. When we die, let them talk!” Meanwhile, we are harvesting 50 million tons of grain and there is a PB resolution to purchase 30 million tons abroad, we already purchased 24... And yet, it’s true that nobody will say anything for now.

I get the impression from Novo-Ogarevo and from today’s conversation with Ponomarev that the General Secretary is practically incapacitated. The advisors – Aleksandrov, Blatov – have no way of contacting him, not even by telephone. Members of the PB and Secretaries can

only get in touch through the Head of the General Department Chernenko. There is an order "not to disturb."

Aleksandrov couldn't say anything worthwhile regarding the future development of the Congress materials before he left. He only knows what we already knew from B.N. before leaving for Novo-Ogarevo: Brezhnev said at the PB that from January 1st he will go away to Zavidovo and devote himself entirely to preparations for the Congress.

The editorial committee for the preparation of the ill-fated Conference of Communist Parties met in Berlin. B.N. didn't go. Katushev and Zagladin went. Today I read their ciphered telegram report: they are informing the CC that we do not need a conference that would showcase our differences before the Congress. In other words, exactly what I'd been telling Zagladin and Ponomarev since August.

November 21, 1975

Hectic day. B.N. called me over and asked if I'd read the joint Marchais-Berlinguer interview after their two meetings in Rome and Paris. They made a mutual and final statement that they will only move to socialism through the maximum expansion of democracy; that the Soviet way decidedly does not work for them. And even though the October Revolution and the Soviet Union's contribution to the world are huge, the condition for moving forward is a union of all democrats (and not just democrats). It is time to put the unity of social-democrats on par with the significance that was previously assigned to the unity of communist parties, and the unity of the latter is only possibly on some issues, such as European security and progress in Helsinki. That is the only reason we need the Conference of Communist Parties, they said.

I have been telling B.N. for a long time that I see no fundamental difference between the PCI and PCF's positions on policy issues; and that French criticism of our policies supposedly from the "left" is not leftism but anti-Sovietism. They need it to assert their party's national positions.

But he is no longer capable of going below the surface. The abundance of information slips through him without penetrating his police mentality. And he continues to have blind faith that if, for example, *Pravda* publishes an article, then everything will fall into place.

This time, too, he called a stenographer and started to dictate an outline for an article on how good our democracy is; that the critics need to know it before they criticize. And those who don't want to know, there is no changing them. All this despite how well informed he is! He does not want to understand that the main reason why they (CPs) disassociate themselves from us is because from their point of view, our democracy does not have guarantees against Stalinism. They, like you [B.N.], have only one thing with which to counter the anticomunist propaganda on this question, and that is the CPSU's good will. In the West, nobody believes such a guarantee, and some even refer to historical materialism.

I read Regis Debray's new book, *Criticism of Weapons* (he is the author of the famous *Revolution in Revolution*, an associate of Che Guevara in Bolivia). He is a man of great intellect; his analysis of the situation in Latin America is almost on the scale of Lenin.

Yegorov, the director of the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin, sent his review of the manuscript for Volume I of *History and Theory of the International Labor Movement*. It is positive. This will come in useful against Ponomarev, who still has cold feet and keeps grumbling (instead of taking a look at the manuscript or page-proofs). He again told Timofeyev in my absence that because we remade the introduction five times, the rest of the volume must be shoddy. I decided not to speak with him about the volume until it comes out, just put him before the fact. Otherwise we could jeopardize the whole publication, which involved hundreds of people and tens of thousands of rubles, salaries and so on.

November 23, 1975

Yesterday I was at the Museum of Fine Arts. The main hall had XVI-XVII century Italians. A couple Caravaggios and five-six paintings from Naples. For people who have been in the West, this is boring: every European capital has a ton of them. Our public is pretty indifferent to them, too (except for assiduous girls and old ladies, who make notes on the names of the paintings and artists).

But the side galleries showcased contemporary French artists. There was almost no abstract art; the only one that might come close is "Laser beam." One artist – one painting. There were at least 200 there, aside from feeble imitations of Picasso, Degas and others.

Especially striking was the Vereshchagin-style attention to detail, but the level of spirituality (through skill that has absorbed all the extravagance of our century) does not compare. And everything is very much "not ours." The scenes and objects are similar to the best examples of the Russian classics, but they are nothing like it. The feeling is completely different.

Yesterday I read a bunch of papers, especially on social democracy. In the spirit of the above-mentioned speech by Brandt. Social democracy is surpassing communism because it is based on the efficiency, power, and wealth of modern capitalism. In the past, the bourgeoisie used social democracy at its convenience, but now social democracy is using capitalism for its "democratic socialism" and to beat communism. For now we will ride the wave of peace (they are prepared not to interfere and even to help us, so we exhaust the momentum). They will ride the wave of economic efficiency, using the "benefits of peace" and détente.

The only ideological weapon we have against them is archaic rhetoric. We are already blocked in the fight against them politically, because they are our main socio-political partner in the struggle for détente.

November 24, 1975

I spoke with Zagladin, who participated in the Berlin meeting of the editorial committee on the European Conference of Communist Parties (November 17-19). The “loyal” parties (Austria, Ireland, the FRG, Belgium, Denmark) said tête-à-tête: “We no longer understand the CPSU. You rushed us with this conference. We tried to support you, to adapt our affairs to suit your needs and interests. And suddenly – stop! You should have warned us!”

It is true that some of them received very confusing information from the embassies. The ambassadors understand (and know) even less than we do. Most importantly – there were no explanations. At the committee itself about ten of the “loyal ones” spoke in favor of holding the conference as soon as possible, expressing willingness to remove additional comments and suggestions from the draft document to lighten the load. But after the Romanians, Spaniards, Swedes, and others made a bunch of comments it became clear that things were moving towards a total devaluation of the document. After Katushev’s speech they started to understand what is going on and backtracked in their follow up speeches, insisting on careful preparation of the document. The “loyals” were offended by the very need for such a large-scale maneuver in front of everyone, despite the smart speeches like O’Riordan’s.

One-on-one they said: “Of course we condemn George Marchais’ anti-Soviet practices. But there is some reason behind such things. It’s starting to become unclear to us how you, the CPSU, resolve the problem of balancing your state and Party priorities and interests. There is a huge flow of receptions for various state leaders, and a total lack of receptions and meetings at a high Party level in the last two years. It seems the meetings with Arismendi and Arnedo on November 7th were just in passing, either at a parade or some holiday reception.” The German said, “Comrade Mies has been chairman of the DKP for four years. We’ve asked for a visit and reception (even if not at the level of Brezhnev) ten times, to no avail. We will stop trying.” (By the way, the ICP had asked three times between August and October for Brezhnev to receive Berlinguer. They didn’t even get a proper response.) Scharf (Communist Party of Austria): “The CPSU provides monetary and other assistance. But nowadays this is not enough. Communists need political support. When we do manage to get some level of conversation in the CC CPSU, we hear the same things again and again: “we have to work with the masses,” “we must increase our numbers,” “we need an alliance of leftist parties,” etc. These are all very true, but we’ve known these things for decades! What we would like is a concrete and competent conversation with the CPSU on exactly what we should be doing in the specific current international context. After all, nobody [in the CPSU] really knows what we are doing and what our current situation is.” (Here Zagladin tried to object).

The “loyals” are saying that one gets the impression the CPSU has lost interest in the communist movement, that it is inclined to “do business” on matters of state with its Warsaw Pact allies. Then why should we be surprised that first we got Brussels (the Conference of West European Communist Parties, January 1974) and now the Marchais-Berlinguer “historic declaration,” which legalizes the special path of the West European communist movement and openly disassociates itself from the CPSU’s experience. It does not even mention the socialist

countries in its framework of fighting for democracy, social progress, and socialism. The Soviet Union is only given a truly prominent role on issues of détente, peace, etc. related to Helsinki.

I asked Vadim: “Did you tell all of this to B.N.?”

- Yes.
- And?
- Nothing. What can he do?! He understands all of this.

By the way, when I returned from Novo-Ogarevo and met with B.N. regarding other matters, he suddenly broke out in obscenities about the fact that “they are receiving the lousy [Giovanni] Leone, but we haven’t been able to get them to meet with Berlinguer for over three months.”

Indeed, due to the force of circumstances, we are increasingly inclined to view the ICM as an instrument of our foreign policy propaganda (we don’t need it for anything else!), but on a greater scale we lost any real ability to use it even for this purpose.

Naturally, the communist parties are looking for explanations. Just as the Sovietologists in the West, they are prone to using formal logic, which they derive from our doctrines. They come up with various concepts to reconstruct the logic behind our behavior.

Maybe there is logic to it. But it is not the logic of behavior, i.e. not a thought-out policy. It is objective logic – the inevitable result of the power structure’s development. It wouldn’t even cross their minds (i.e. they wouldn’t allow themselves to think it) that the situation is primitively simple. Brezhnev is old, tired, and sick. He is only capable of a bare minimum amount of informed political activity. The others are also old and feeble, for example Suslov, who “manages” the parties. Plus, everything is locked into the General Secretary. If he is not around, there are no meaningful decisions. Gromyko, who is a pig but Brezhnev’s friend, uses every opportunity to take advantage of this situation and impose people on Brezhnev that he, Gromyko, thinks are important: people like Leone, etc. Ponomarev does not have access to Brezhnev anymore, not even by phone. There is no one to suggest a meeting with someone like Berlinguer to him, or to explain why it is important.

The situation is such that take for example the famous Declaration of Marchais-Berlinguer. The world press has deemed it an “historical turning point” that marks the end of the traditional Leninist communist movement, in which socialist countries (in one form or another) were leaders and had authority, they were the first to be consulted in decisions on any issue.

But I’d be willing to bet that Brezhnev has not even heard about it. So what politics, what priorities can we talk about in these circumstances? The Secretariat or Politburo, as the decision-making bodies, did they pay attention to this declaration, did they assess it and draw conclusions for our policy?! No, and they will not. That means we don’t have a policy on the ICM. We have

sporadic, inertial connections; the political and ideological content is becoming increasingly uncertain, vague, and of course it is beginning to elude our attentive friends. Naturally, they are at a loss.

November 29, 1975

Romesh Chandra¹³ (who cost the Soviet people at least seven chemical plants, they say) awarded Brezhnev yet another medal: the Joliot-Curie Medal of Peace. This was announced in Leningrad, at the meeting of the peace movement, which was attended by Shaposhnikov. Immediately after the announcement, Shaposhnikov got a thrashing from B.N. over the government communications line. One of B.N.'s senior colleagues sternly asked him why they were not aware of this ahead of time. To B.N., this question sounded like suspicion that he is seeking to gain personal favor. But others thought the question might have a hidden message as well, namely: "Enough of this!" However, everything went well. Everyone was present in the Sverdlov Hall. B.N. was sitting in row with the man of the hour, listening intently to Chandra's undulating speech ("to make sure he doesn't say too much!" Which he did, by the way). This has been the life of the press and media, not to mention the Soviet people as they are, for the last three days.

Yesterday I read Brezhnev's speech for the upcoming December 1st CC Plenum. It was written by the Bovin-Arbatov-Tsukanov team in Volynskoe-II. Very skillfully and sensibly done. In terms of the volume of production, no other five-year period has had such figures. However, the national income fell by 160 billion rubles due to two lean years (the drought in 1975 was the worst in 100 years). There will be "difficulties with milk and meat. There is a risk of a massive loss of cattle. There is a possibility of a new crop failure in 1976. Most importantly, 'Group B' did not surpass 'Group A,' despite the decisions of the XXIV Congress. Have we rejected this goal? No. But we have not yet learned how to ensure its fulfillment."

They cite Tyumen as an example that "we can when we want to" (Tyumen is responsible for the entire increase in gas and oil production). But he says himself, "we spared neither strength nor resources," which means it does not really work as an example. In light industry we did not even come close to what was promised. We are competing with the U.S. in the arms race at the light industry's expense. Once again, in 1976 the growth of "Group B" is set at only 2.7 percent!

"We don't know how to work!" Indeed, it is sad when we invest into the production of the most powerful tractors K-700 and T-150, but then do not manufacture attachments for them. And they are used at only 50 percent capacity. Or: we dump untold resources into cotton production, but our textile, dyeing, and clothing manufacture is so outdated that the final product gathers dust on store shelves. However, carelessness is probably not to blame here. The fact of

¹³ Chairman of the pro-Soviet World Peace Council. [Author's footnote]

the matter is that there is barely enough money for the K-700s (and to manufacture them is a matter of prestige), but for the “components” to the tractors – sorry, no money!

Despite the skillfulness of the speech, it worries me that our main methodology for the future is the same thing we said at the XXIV Congress and the Plenums. And it seems until there is a “psychological” turning point about the arms race, there is really nothing else to offer. Brezhnev once again in the face of the whole world bound himself to the cause of peace when he sincerely and emotionally responded to Chandra. But the objective logic remains: peace through the threat of force. The Americans follow this logic openly and publicly. It is easier for them: they dump a significantly smaller share of their national income into the arms race than we do. Technologically, they are approaching a level of modern weapons that could turn all our nuclear and tank strength into a pile of nonsense one of these days. Do we really still believe that the Americans will attack us if we stop the arms race?!

In this context, what to make of the Church Committee’s report on the CIA, which over the course of nearly 20 years organized assassinations of Castro, Lumumba, Schneider, and other disagreeable political leaders? Most likely they were crazed and driven to distraction with fear of us, of communism. Of course now they look abominable. But the amazing thing is that the world was not surprised. As if to say, what can you really expect from modern politics? The best and wisest course of action is not to pay attention to their provocations, including the arms race they are imposing on us. It is nothing more than a provocation against us. We need to decide once and for all: we are not afraid of you and we are going to go on with our own business, not giving a damn about all the “fears” that you are trying to strike into us. It seems this primitive approach is the only way out, and the only choice.

December 28, 1975

We were in Zavidovo from December 15-27th, preparing Brezhnev’s speech for the XXV Congress. We got back last night. Before we left there were a ton of events that I will only have time to briefly jot down.

On December 8th there was a Party conference of the CC apparatus. I was elected to the drafting committee, so I heard only parts of what was said. I noticed that along with bureaucratic ritual and completely preset sequence of the entire conference – from the opening to the elections and the requisite number of times that Brezhnev has to be mentioned – some interesting things were voiced as well. Especially by Gostev (head of the Department of Planning and Financial Organs), an acrimonious and intelligent pragmatist. For example, 95 percent of enterprises do not manufacture any high-quality products; 2/3 of ministries did not fulfill the plan. Prices had to be cut on 2 billion worth of consumer goods due to poor quality and outmoded styles, but they remained unsold anyway. The Party bureau secretary from the Party Control Committee provided a ton of facts about corruption at all levels – from regional executive committees and national ministries to journalists and industrial managers. It turns out Nasriddinova, who was the

Chairman of the USSR Soviet of Nationalities for many years, was relieved of the position and later removed from the CC for unbelievable scams involving dachas, fur coats, and cars. Her daughter's wedding cost the state almost a million rubles.

That day we also had a meeting of deputies with B.N. on the situation in the ICM. B.N. thought we would only talk about what to do with the Italians, who (communist senators led by Pajetta) demanded in parliament to take measures regarding the Soviet government's refusal to let Sakharov travel to Oslo. But we (I started and Zagladin took over) talked about the "deep tendencies," about the fact that the Marchais-Berlinguer Declaration is a format for the new direction of the ICM that breaks with traditional Leninist and Soviet [path]; and even though Moscow pretended it didn't happen, we will have to react. Not before the Congress of course, so we don't turn it into a symbol of the ICM's collapse, but afterwards. We can do it in two ways: there is the "Yugoslav option." A month ago by the decision of the CC an article was prepared and published in *Pravda* on the persecution of Cominformists [коминформовцев] (the persecution has been going on for 3-4 months and it has already taken on the nature of a massive ideological-repressive campaign. Two hundred people have been arrested, and no secret is made of the fact that Cominformists are agents of Moscow). In any case, in this article the CPSU condemned the Cominformists using the wording from Yugoslav press, as traitors and counterrevolutionaries. We basically told the Yugoslavs – "Do what you want. It's your business what to do with ideology, and your domestic and foreign policy. The only thing that's important to us is not to get into a conflict with you and for you to remain a 'socialist country.'"

We could follow the same strategy with the PCF-ICP-Spanish CP and the whole trend in question: do and say whatever you want, however you want; just don't speak ill of the CPSU and everything will be alright between us and in the ICM. This is precisely what they want to get from us. However, like the Yugoslavs, they insist on their right to criticize us and disassociate themselves from us (especially on freedom of expression and administration in ideology). And they do it with an aim to provoke us. The latest example was when Marchais and *L'Humanite* picked up some kind of fake secretly taped documentary about a labor colony near Riga and again started condemning us for "political prisoners for ideological reasons."

But I digress... B.N. listened to us tensely, then contemptuously rejected our analysis of the objective reasons behind Marchais-Berlinguer & Co. He said the most important thing is the "personal aspect" and then "moved on to other matters." He obviously does not want to be present at the collapse of the ICM (same as Churchill once did not want to witness the collapse of the British Empire). However, the collapse is happening and we need to adjust. (For now I made a version in the traditional spirit for Brezhnev's XXV Congress report, but conciliatory.)

I thought my participation in the preparation of the Summary Report would end in Novo-Ogarevo. The summons to come to Zavidovo was unexpected. Aleksandrov called and told me the General Secretary's orders. I think it worked out this way because Aleksandrov suspects Zagladin of wanting to distance himself from Brezhnev in due time, because the latter is

relentlessly deteriorating from progressive senility. Aleksandrov hinted about Zagladin to me and Brutents back in Novo-Ogarevo. He also took advantage of the fact that Vadim was supposed to go to Rome and Berlin around this time.

So, the Novo-Ogarevo team was called to Zavidovo to work on the penultimate round of the Summary Report: the advisers Aleksandrov, Blatov, Rusakov, and Brutents and I.

First of all: contrary to fears and expectations brought about by impressions from televised appearances and rumors in the apparatus, which are supported by Brezhnev's long-term disengagement from affairs, I found him to be in a more or less normal (for him) condition, i.e. the same way as I remember him from my previous visits to Zavidovo over four years ago. He hardly remembered me, even though I've been to Zavidovo five-six times since 1967. Brutents appeared as a completely new person to him. However, that did not stop him from acting as if we were some petty distant relatives. His jokes with the women (stenographers, typists, doctor, nurse, waitresses) were borderline rude and risqué. Those who had been with him for a while took it calmly, but newcomers like the typist Valya were initially at a loss. Sometimes it seemed she was about to faint. For example, at breakfast: "Why did you paint your lips such a bright color? Is it so people don't touch you? Such a thing wouldn't stop me..." Then he saw how embarrassed she got and said, "Here, take this pastry (he gave her one from a platter, even though she had the exact same thing in front of her)... Why are you like this, I'm only joking!"

Every morning at breakfast he would tell us in detail how he spent the night. He has trouble sleeping and constantly complained about it. For example, one time he said: "I went to bed in a sleeveless shirt, but I don't like when my arms are bare. In the summer it's a different matter... So I got up and put on a robe – you never know, the doctor might come in. I went to the table thinking to drink some milk, I like Mozhayskoe, but there wasn't any. The doctor must have swiped it or drank it himself. (The doctor, Mikhail Titych, a sharp young man, objected and laughed it off.) So I had to make do with Borjomi. I called Volodya (the guard), told him to bring me the newspaper. I thought I would read Suslov's speech in Havana. Volodya brought it, but I didn't feel like reading anymore. Then I almost went to bed, but remembered about the sleeveless shirt and took it off. I got my favorite shirt from the closet; it must be fifteen years old, it's been mended all over. I immediately felt calm, because I'm so used to it... Valya, there is another hole in it. Will you come tomorrow night to mend it? You know, half my bed is empty..." (Everyone laughs and the toothy experienced Valya (another one, the stenographer Mishustina) winks at the crowd and says mischievously, "Of course Leonid Ilyich, just be sure not to change your mind!")

Or [another episode]: he leaned over to his neighbor at the table, Vika (Victoria, his most senior stenographer, a woman of about thirty, pretty and smart), "I don't remember on what occasion I had to have a bowel movement. The doctor gave me some kind of pills. I took two, then three. Then a handful – no result. Everyone in the hospital was amazed; they'd never seen anything like it. There was no effect on me at all. But in an hour and a half it suddenly exploded

– I could have flown like a rocket to the moon. Everyone was a little embarrassed, but they went on like it was a normal thing.”

Or he would start telling us in detail how he shaved, went to the pool, how long he thought about what to wear. He would start admiring one of his jackets or sweaters, remembering where he got it. One time he came out in a jacket that he said he hadn’t worn in fifteen years, he had forgotten it existed and then found it in the depths of his closet.

On one occasion he announced that he loves watches and guns. Indeed, he has a whole collection of watches. He was given a bunch more for his birthday on December 19th. Shokin, the Minister of Electronics Industry, presented him with some complex electronic watch, which didn’t have a clock dial but the time would “pop up” every minute. For a long time Brezhnev was showing us the watch and explaining how it works.

Once he came to the “winter garden” in a military belt with an American-style holster (handle on the outside). We were all curious and surrounded him. He drew the gun with a flourish (he clearly has some talent for acting; he said that in his youth, when he was a student in Kursk, he worked part time as an extra on the stage) and aimed it at Arbatov’s stomach. The latter shrunk back. “Don’t be scared academician, I’m kidding!” He explained to us that he got this unique silent gun from the KGB guys. The little gun has great stopping power, no less than the “Colt” given to him by a cowboy actor in the U.S. He showed us the “Colt” too, on another occasion. He told us how he finished off a wounded boar with the little gun – [the bullet] tore right through the boar, but the animal kept kicking and when the people stepped away, it jumped up and ran another 50 meters. “What tremendous strength! A surprisingly tenacious beast!”

Everybody oohed and aahed, “What tenacity, can you even imagine!”

He talked a lot about hunting (he hunts for two-three hours every other day) during meals and while we were working on the texts. “We climbed on the tower and waited. For a long time there was nothing. Then suddenly a whole herd showed up. The first one came out from behind the tree, I shot – bam! Got him. The second one followed: again I shot, bam! Got him. I got eight in a row, without a miss! This is a smart and sensitive beast. But it can only see at eye-level. It can’t look up, and we were there in the tower. But they have an astonishing sense of smell and hearing. They can smell things for miles and if the wind changes and carries the hunter’s scent, then don’t hold your breath; there will be no hunting that day.”

Every day there was something along these lines.

Postscript to 1975

The year of Helsinki. The year Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Perhaps it is no coincidence that around this time began to emerge a contradiction, if not yet a break, between the state policy of détente and the activities of the CPSU, the ruling communist party.

Despite the hypocrisy and the secret hopes to cheat and beat the West (“imperialism”), in a certain sense the Soviet leadership chose to stick to the Helsinki Final Act. The diary entries show that Brezhnev embodied this attitude, the “post-Prague Brezhnev.” Indeed, he was for **peace** by his “nature,” though he was not really capable of “philosophizing” on the matter. He was probably the only person in the Soviet leadership who felt the huge responsibility of his position to prevent a world war, a nuclear war (the word “realized” is perhaps not suited to his mental abilities). In those days, if the General Secretary of the superpower thought so – it was more than enough.

However, under Brezhnev détente could not become irreversible and grow into something greater. First and foremost because he vigilantly protected and encouraged the fortification of the system’s main pillars – the military industrial complex, the KGB, a closed society, censorship, a repressive ideology, an essentially Stalinist mechanism and control apparatus, the appointment of cadres from the top to the very bottom.

All of these pillars of support had long outlived their usefulness as “tools” to serve the interests of the people, in the sense that was instilled in them by the Great Revolution of 1917. They had always been inherently hostile to the outside world, to its most dynamic and progressive aspects. Therefore they became potential carriers of a military threat.

This volume contains a great number of observations about Brezhnev as an individual, episodes and facts that illustrate his intellectual and cultural mediocrity. His everyday behavior, mannerisms, his whims and passions were oftentimes ridiculous, embarrassing, and humiliating alongside his kindness and generosity. In relations with people of “all ranks” he combined a plebeian democracy with a provincial Russian haughtiness.

It was one thing when thousands of people at some meeting or congress would burst into applause when he entered the room and after every phrase he uttered. That was an official ritual that could not be avoided. In such instances individuality is lost in the crowd. But it was sickening when in a narrow circle, such as during the preparation of a report or some other materials with his participation, grown men, doctors and professors, people of culture, war veterans no less than him would slobber over his vulgar familiarity, laugh at his stupid jokes, be thrilled by a nice word from him, echo and praise his platitudes. Especially because you despise yourself while doing it.

Brezhnev’s illness, which I would call “intermittent senility,” clearly manifested itself in 1975. The periods of clarity became increasingly shorter. What better evidence could there be

that the system was losing viability and progressively deteriorating than the fact that a person who was mentally and physically on the decline (for 7-8 years!) stood at the helm of this great nation!

Nevertheless, it is Brezhnev's historical achievement to have kept the momentum of détente until it was broken by Afghanistan. In light of Brezhnev's illness, we can only hold him minimally accountable for Afghanistan.

In parallel to Brezhnev's line there was also present, often in close contact, the international activity of the CPSU, personified by Ponomarev and Suslov. In this volume the CPSU's activity is amply represented in the hectic efforts to organize the European Conference of Communist Parties, in which the author of this diary was directly involved and was tormented by the senselessness of what he had to do despite his beliefs and common sense.

As he had predicted (and warned his superiors) this work ended in failure for many reasons:

Firstly, it was at odds with the line and intentions of the General Secretary.

Secondly, unlike the General Secretary's line, it did not correspond to new realities, including the needs of the communist parties, which finally realized the vital necessity for them to fit into the national identity of their countries.

Thirdly, the goal of the CC CPSU traditionalists was to revive the unity of the communist movement. However, "by the nature of things" (i.e. following the tradition and historical mission of the International Communist Movement) this unity could not avoid being **ideological**. For the parties it meant maintaining subordination to the CPSU. But by the mid-1970s, this was not an option for the communist parties that amounted to anything domestically. Not least because the Soviet Union in their eyes ceased to be a symbol and model of the kind of socialism to which they aspired. Precisely during this year the unequivocal rejection of the CPSU's policies and practices was bared publicly by the majority of European Communists. The parties did not want to draw on the CPSU's experience and listen to lectures on the subject.

Fourthly, our "fraternal parties" could not and did not want to continue serving as an unquestioning mouthpiece for the apologetics of Soviet society and Moscow's policies – because of the aforementioned reasons and due to the pitiable state the majority of them found themselves in for their own internal reasons. In these circumstances, the Soviet leadership, starting with Brezhnev himself, lost interest in the fraternal parties. They became unnecessary in the context of *real politik*. Their dissent and oftentimes hostile statements and actions caused resentment and outbursts of anger in Moscow. There were attempts to cajole them, to reconcile against all odds. But all of this was done without any real conviction that things could be turned back, that "order could be restored in the ICM." It appeared as an automatic function of officials

and institutes like the International Department of the Central Committee. It was as if we were carrying out orders received in the distant past.

For all these reasons, the year 1975 can be used to mark the beginning of the end of the communist movement as a significant factor in Europe or internationally. There was no longer a position of influence for the ICM in the global balance of political forces.

The 1975 volume turned out to be fairly large, and it contains a great deal more than the abovementioned issues – curious episodes that reflect a way of life in the USSR, strange events, observations by the author as well as his friends and colleagues.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1976

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

Translated by Anna Melyakova

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

1976

January 1, 1976

I've been busy at work for the last three days. B.N. was asking me about Zavidovo. He is anxious to know Brezhnev's views on his colleagues. Karen and I told him that right now Leonid Ilyich particularly distinguishes and elevates Suslov. I remember from my previous visits to Zavidovo that Brezhnev used to treat Suslov derisively, mockingly (for his boring texts and orthodoxy, for his refusal to touch vodka and his preference for kefir, for his complete lack of a sense of humor). Now he calls him "Misha" and worries over how he was received in Cuba (Suslov replaced Brezhnev as head of the delegation to Cuba for the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party). [Brezhnev worried] whether Castro might have treated Suslov badly because Brezhnev could not attend.

Several times Brezhnev raised the question of assigning Suslov to open the Congress. He, Brezhnev, wants to do it himself; he is the General Secretary after all. But then he would have to deliver the greetings to foreign guests for half an hour, calling out all those difficult to pronounce names... He would "get tired before even starting the report." (Brezhnev was very concerned that his jaw problems would get in the way of speaking clearly for several hours in a row. He really does get tired after 25-30 minutes of speaking, and begins to slur his speech).

During one of these discussions Shishlin suggested that Leonid Ilyich should enter the hall alone. He would open the Congress, hold the Presidium elections and then give the floor to Suslov to name the fraternal parties. That's what Brezhnev decided to do. He calmed down and said, "That's better. Last time Podgorny opened the Congress, some Party figure he is!" On another occasion he put down Podgorny in connection to the question of "eliminating the Union Republics' Communist Parties and turning them into Republican Party organizations." "I suggested this a long time ago," Brezhnev said, "but Shelest was against it and Podgorny was his primary supporter. Already then I sensed that something was off in his attitude..."

The following episode is noteworthy. At Zavidovo we were discussing the international section for Brezhnev's report at the XXV Congress. He suddenly got wound up. He remembered Khrushchev, who, according to Brezhnev, left behind a state of affairs that made it more difficult to move towards peace than it had been a decade before 1964. He got into a stupid gamble with the Cuban missile crisis and then shit his pants. "I will never forget," Brezhnev said, "how Nikita, in a panic, would send a telegram to Kennedy, then 'en route' order it to be stopped and recalled. And why? Because he wanted to f*ck up [об...амъ] the Americans. I remember he was shouting at the CC Presidium: 'We can hit a fly in Washington with our missiles!' That fool Frol Kozlov (under Khrushchev practically the second secretary of the CC) echoed him: 'We are holding a gun to the Americans' head!' And what happened? A shame! We nearly plunged into nuclear war. How much we had to withdraw, and how much work it took to make them believe

that we really wanted peace. I sincerely want peace and will never back down. You can believe me. But not everyone likes this line. Not everyone agrees."

Aleksandrov was sitting across from him and said, "Leonid Ilyich, there are 250 million people in our country, there might be some among them who disagree. Should we worry about them?"

Brezhnev replied, "Don't spin it, Andryusha.¹ You know what I'm talking about. The dissent is not somewhere among the 250 million, it is in the Kremlin. They are not some regional committee propagandists, they are the same as me. Except they think differently!"

I was amazed. He said this impetuously, with emphasis, and while Karen and I were present (he had only met with Karen two days ago).

He cannot speak about Kosygin without obvious irritation. He told us about one incident, apropos. Kosygin went to England and called Brezhnev from there on a regular phone line: "You know, Lenya,² the Queen herself received me at an ancient castle. This castle had been boarded up for decades, and now they opened it for the first time in honor of my visit..." And he went on and on. I told him, 'Aleksey, you will tell me about it when you get back.' And hung up the phone. Some politician!" He shook his head with contempt.

He spoke about Mazurov as a helpless and clumsy leader. "I received a letter from Tyumen oilmen," he told us. "They complained that they don't have fur hats and gloves, they cannot work in -20° Celsius conditions. I remembered when I was Secretary in Moldova, I built a fur factory there. It later became known in the whole Union. I called Kishinev, they told me their warehouses are packed with furs, they don't know what to do with them. So I called Mazurov, asked him if he is aware of what's going on in Tyumen and Moldova on this subject. 'I'll look into it,' he said. That's an all-Union statesman for you!"

Now about Ponomarev himself. At one point B.N. called me there [in Zavidovo]. We talked. He asked me how Castro's report at the Congress was viewed "over there." I said it was viewed very positively and that Brezhnev was planning to let Castro know this through Suslov. The next day (B.N. couldn't help but get busy) a paper came to Zavidovo from Ponomarev. It was a draft letter to Suslov, which essentially suggested that he should instruct "through our Cuban comrades" Cuban embassies in Latin America to disseminate Fidel's speech in the respective countries. (I understood this move on B.N.'s part: Communist Parties have almost no resources, and the Soviet embassies in Latin America are few and far in between.) But to Brezhnev this argument seemed ridiculous. He flew into a rage, "Who is this Ponomarev, he is an academician, right?" (He looked at us with feigned surprise.) "What nonsense! They can't

¹ Diminutive version of the name Andrey, used with the familiar and informal form of address. [Translator's note]

² Diminutive version of the name Leonid, used with the familiar and informal form of address. [Translator's note]

write such a simple thing. Am I supposed to edit every piece of paper? A consultant probably wrote it, and he threw it in there. Is this what you call work... academician! What the hell is this. Call the stenographer... (he dictated the letter to Suslov himself). That's it. There is no need to drive a messenger [*фельда*] 150 kilometers with such a paper, please pass this on to Mr. Academician!"

All of this was said with irritation and contempt, with the explicit calculation that it would get back to B.N. (two people from his department – Karen and I – were sitting right there). It was evident that the misstep with the paper was only an excuse to publicly express his long-standing and deeply hostile attitude towards Ponomarev.

Why does Brezhnev dislike him? Maybe he cannot forget that B.N. “hesitated” in 1964 when the decision to remove Nikita was being made. Maybe (and most likely) it is for his bookishness, dogmatism, tediousness. Or maybe – and this is most important – it is because the Western press portrays Ponomarev as the representative and even the “leader of the revolutionary-class movement” in the Kremlin, in contrast to Brezhnev’s “pacifist” movement?!

The incident with [Ivan Vasilievich] Kapitonov. After we “went through” the international section (and were expecting to go home) Brezhnev suddenly suggested that we should call in a second team – the economy team. “You will look at it together, after all it’s our mutual work, Party work.”

The following people arrived on Monday the 21st – Bovin, Tsukanov, Inozemtsev, Arbatov, and Sedlykh (agriculture, head of the sector). We read through it and first discussed it without Brezhnev. We were lenient, since the task at hand is difficult: it was a dreadful five years but the text had to be inspiring and instill optimism about the future. Brezhnev read the section, listened to Aleksandrov’s presentation of our opinion, then got up and walked out of the room, leaving us in speechless confusion. He returned a half hour later and said, “I categorically disagree with your opinion (about the economic section).” However, after this alarming declaration he did not actually add much to what we came up with: more austerity, less boasting and loud words, more criticality and specificity. It would be great if we manage to maintain the text at this level! I don’t believe it’ll happen.

However, I am just now getting to subject of Kapitonov.

The next day at breakfast Brezhnev announced that he would like to get an idea of the report as a whole. He assigned Aleksandrov to get the text of the third section (on the Party and ideology) from Kapitonov, without summoning any of their people. In a few hours the text was in Zavidovo and we had to read it... It was unbelievable, as if they just copied a *Pravda* newspaper editorial. Around fifteen people had been working on it in Volynskoe-I since June.

We shared our impressions with Brezhnev. He said, “Let’s read it together.” We sat down to read, got about halfway through. Suddenly L.I. shut the manuscript, got up and said he has no intention of listening to any more of this nonsense.

Brezhnev: “Summon Kapitonov here immediately!”

Aleksandrov: “But he doesn’t write anything himself anyway!”

Brezhnev: “I know that he’s not capable of writing anything himself. But he is a CC Secretary. He is responsible for this section for the Secretariat. This blabber was written under his leadership, following his instructions. Who is responsible?! Why do I need a secretary who doesn’t even understand the requirements of a Congress report?! Summon him immediately and give him a dressing down so it gets through to him.”

Aleksandrov managed to insist that Petrovich should be invited also (he is Kapitonov’s first deputy, Brezhnev had unflattering words about him as well) and Smirnov (first deputy of the Propaganda Department). In the morning during breakfast we collectively “snuck in” Zagladin and Kovalev’s names, too. Brezhnev said a few “nice words” about Vadim, gave him a fatherly scolding for breaking away from “our group” for too long. “He is a capable guy and he should be called here immediately,” which we did.

Zagladin from the International Department and Kovalev from the MFA³ were assigned the Party-ideological sector and rewrote everything (especially Vadim) the day they arrived.

Kapitonov sat across the dinner table from the General Secretary, who on the first night told him everything he thought of his section, in rather derogatory terms and in our presence. [Brezhnev] immediately assigned us to pick the section apart. He told us not to talk to Kapitonov as a CC Secretary (“then there will be no use!”) but as an “author.”

However, Aleksandrov asked all of us not to attend this exercise and gave the message to Kapitonov and his new team only in the presence of other assistants (Rusakov and Blatov... Tsukanov did not want to go. He has some difficulties with the General Secretary and he is cautious about alienating the CC Party Organizational Secretary as well).

January 2, 1976

I am waiting for the call to go to Zavidovo any hour now. Nobody knows anything and nobody dares to ask Brezhnev. People are guessing that departure may be rescheduled for tomorrow.

³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Translator’s note]

About Yagodkin, the Moscow City Committee secretary for ideology. He is a Black Hundredist and Stalinist, he organized crackdowns in the Institute of Economics and Philosophy and other similar organizations.

His name came up by chance in the course of our work. I recall it was in connection with Brezhnev's complaints about his colleagues who disagree with him and do not want to understand him. Aleksandrov offhandedly threw in, "What do you expect when Yagodkin is at the head of Moscow's ideology..."

Brezhnev responded, "I've been told about him. But Grishin started defending him, although he wasn't a big fan before. He says when Yagodkin was secretary of the Moscow State University party committee he supposedly claimed that he doesn't like Brezhnev. As if I need his approval! But it seems he is good now that is he on the Moscow City Committee. I don't really believe it, but to hell with him."

We all jumped in: how is this possible, Leonid Ilyich. The Party suffers directly when such a man represents it, especially to the intelligentsia. People can't stand him. He recently published a full-page editorial in *Novy Mir* and if you read carefully it is clearly against the cultural policy outlined in the XXIV Congress. Plus he blatantly distorted Lenin in his article. It is inconceivable for a person like him to keep his post after the XXV Congress. And so on.

Brezhnev listened to us, looking from one person to the next, and finally said, "Alright, when I get back to Moscow, I'll speak with Grishin."

A couple days later Zagladin came to Zavidovo and of course found out about this episode. Without letting on, he wrote a note about a conversation in Rome with a member of the PCI⁴ leadership, [Carlo] Galluzzi (he is very right-leaning). This Galluzzi (I remember him) supposedly said to Zagladin: "You claim there is no opposition in Soviet society, but you have it within your Party. Look at Yagodkin's article in *Novy Mir*, does it correspond to the line of the XXIV Congress?"

We were at breakfast (Zagladin showed us the note ahead of time, including to Petrovich and Smirnov – the leader of our entire propaganda). Aleksandrov leaned over to Vadim and said, "Vadim, this is the perfect moment. Put the note in front of Leonid Ilyich." Vadim got up, walked over, said a couple words and asked him to read it. Brezhnev read it slowly and carefully. Then he put it in his pocket, turned to Zagladin and said, "We already discussed this man here. Yes, yes. When I get to Moscow, I will definitely speak with Grishin."

Finally, when we were already back in Moscow, on December 29th B.N. called me to his office. I came over while he was on the phone.

⁴ Italian Communist Party, *Partito Comunista Italiano*. [Translator's note]

“No, no Viktor Vasilievich, it is not that we do not trust him, but you know, it wouldn’t be good if there was such a conversation and despite this fact he (I understood he was talking about Yagodkin) would be opening an important political event in the Hall of Columns. Of course we are sorry that we (!) are giving you extra work in connection with this, but it would be better if Grekov were to open, he is a second secretary, etc.”

I understood: the next day Pelshe and Ponomarev were supposed to give speeches in the Hall of Columns at the House of Unions on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Wilhelm Pieck. Yagodkin had been assigned to open this meeting. So, B.N. was “cancelling” it. As it turned out, Grekov was the one to open it. (B.N. mentioned to me in passing that a month ago Suslov assigned Smirnov to write a note to the CC about Yagodkin, but Smirnov didn’t dare to. By the way, he was terribly pleased when guys from the International Department took on this matter in Zavidovo, i.e. someone else did the work to bring about his secret dream of getting rid of Yagodkin.)

So, on the eve of the XXV Congress an important action has been taken in the implementation of what was written (also by Zagladin and Aleksandrov) for the “cultural policy” aspect of Brezhnev’s XXIV Congress report.

One more thing on this subject. As I mentioned, Brezhnev lost his temper when discussing Kapitonov’s section [of the draft Congress report]. “We removed Shelest, we removed Mzhavanadze, and before him Aliyev and Kochinyan.⁵ That, by the way, was an ideological matter too, not just because they failed at their jobs. But there is not a hint of this in the text. It doesn’t say anything about work or how we should work. I recall this episode. Samoteikin (his assistant) brings me a letter. It is from Lyubimov – the director of the Taganka Theater. The latter writes that the city committee wants to expel him from the Party... he put on some show that they (!) didn’t like. I call Grishin, tell him, ‘Cancel the resolution if it has been adopted already. We cannot deal with the intelligentsia this way.’ Grishin canceled it, it seems he met with Lyubimov. And look what happens: a couple months later he puts on such a play... what is it called? (We all jumped in, *A zori zdes' tikhie* [It's Quiet Here at Dawn].) Not a single person leaves the theater without tears in their eyes. (He got teary eyed himself and a lump rose in his throat). That’s how you work!”

The way he spoke, I couldn’t help thinking – maybe he went to Taganka himself? Or maybe someone made a recording for him? Later I checked. They say L.I. hasn’t been to the theater, but Tsukanov saw the play.

Here is another example of how we do politics:

⁵ First Secretaries of the Communist Party Central Committees of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia. [Author’s note]

On the eve of Brezhnev's birthday (he turned 69 on December 19, 1975) Gromyko came to Zavidovo. They talked one-on-one for three hours. Everyone thought that Gromyko came to congratulate him, after all they are considered to be friends. But the next morning, at breakfast, L.I. casually mentioned, "Gromyko asked permission not to go to Japan, there was a Politburo decision that he should go there in early January. I agreed: of course he doesn't want to spoil his New Year's with preparations, it is a difficult trip. There is really no point in going: they want the islands and we aren't handing them over. So there wouldn't be any results anyway. It won't make a difference whether he goes or not."

Aleksandrov frowned, turned pale, then exploded: "This is wrong, Leonid Ilyich. Are we a serious country? Do we keep our word? Or do we not give a damn? We promised them four times, the Japanese have already announced the visit in newspapers. Aren't we supposed to take their prestige into consideration? Or do we want to let them go to the Chinese completely? Would you look at that, Gromyko doesn't want to spoil his New Year's celebrations. The Politburo decision means nothing to him! He came here to beg off! You did the wrong thing, Leonid Ilyich."

Brezhnev, who clearly wasn't expecting such an attack, replied: "He asked – I agreed..."

Aleksandrov objected again: "It was wrong to agree. Kissinger visited Japan five times this year. It also appears that nothing changed, but this lack of change favors the Americans. Our Gromyko was happy to go to Belgium, Italy, France, some other places. But as soon as it was time to do truly difficult work, he 'doesn't want to spoil his New Year's.' We have to talk to the Japanese, even if we can't give them anything right now, as you say. We have to negotiate, show our good will. It is a major country and it wants to have relations with us. We should value that and take it into account. This is the point of diplomacy. You did the wrong thing, Leonid Ilyich."

Blatov jumped in, saying something along the same lines in his methodical, monotonous tone, but rather resolutely. We started speaking in support of "Vorobey." Brezhnev turned gloomier by the minute, he tried to change the subject and hold us off with little remarks. Finally, he got up and threw his napkin on the table, "What a nice present you prepared for my birthday!" and he left the table.

Soon we relocated to the winter garden. Sat down to work, but it wasn't coming together. Brezhnev came in an hour later. He went straight to Aleksandrov: "You won, Andryusha. I just spoke to Gromyko for a whole hour. I told him to go to Japan."

On another occasion, in the same key, there was another conversation in the same vein. Brezhnev reminded us that at the talks in Vienna, NATO members made a proposal: they would withdraw from Europe one thousand missiles with nuclear warheads and we would withdraw one thousand tanks. This would be a start, to move the negotiations from a standstill. "There are no obstacles from the point of view of security," L.I. went on, "Neither the Americans nor the

Germans would attack us after this kind of an agreement. There is nothing to be afraid of. The issue was with our socialist friends, they would be against it. They need our tanks for completely different reasons. Otherwise I would have agreed to even more. I don't know, did you hear about this?" (He turned to Andrey Mikhailovich) "No? Only Sukhodrev knows about it (the interpreter). I said this to Nixon one-on-one. I offered him: let our Supreme Soviet and your Congress solemnly declare that neither of our countries will never, under any circumstances, attack the other either with nuclear or any other means. We would pass this law and declare it to the whole world. And we would add that if a third party attacks either one of us, the other would help to curb the attacker. I remember Nixon was interested in my proposal. But then he was hunted down and deposed, and the whole initiative vanished into thin air.

"And now even after Helsinki, Ford and Kissinger and various senators are demanding to arm America even more, they want it to be the strongest. They keep pressuring us because of our Navy, or because of Angola, or they come up with something else. Then Grechko comes to me and says they increased this, they are threatening to "raise" that. Give me more money, he says, not 140 billion but 156 billion. What am I supposed to tell him? I am the chairman of our country's military council, I am responsible for its security. The minister of defense tells me that he is not responsible if I don't approve the funds. So I approve [the increases] again, and again, and again. And the money goes flying..."

This was the first conversation "about disarmament." Later, in a wider circle (the economists arrived) at lunch Andryukha⁶ again reminded about NATO's initiative. Brezhnev responded sharply: "We will not accept this proposal. We've had this conversation with the Americans several times before, and every time I told them that it is unacceptable for us. Now it will look like I got scared. We need to prepare an answer in the negative."

We all sat grimly in silence. Nobody dared to object.

[This episode was] continued the day before our departure, on December 26th. In the evening after hunting Brezhnev stopped by the little room next to the winter garden. We call it the television room, Bovin writes there and simultaneously keeps an eye on the screen. Little by little, people started congregating there. We were chatting about all kinds of things. Brezhnev commented (for the umpteenth time) – there are too many papers and (jokingly) Andrey keeps handing me new ones.

Andrey got wound up: "Why are you upset, Leonid Ilyich. We don't have to make reports. As you wish!"

Brezhnev: "Why are you doing it again!" (As if to say, why is he agitated.)

⁶ Familiar version of the name Andrey. [Translator's note]

“Yes, I am agitated. I cannot be otherwise. For example, what should we do with NATO’s proposal? It is very easy to say ‘No.’ But there is the big-time politics. Do we want to continue with détente, or do we only want to say that we do. We started it – ‘political détente must be supplemented with military détente.’ Now what’s happening? We aren’t offering anything ourselves. They are offering a completely harmless move. We have 16,000 tanks in socialist countries. What will change if there will be 15,000. Absolutely nothing! Likewise, nothing will change for them if they withdraw one thousand obsolete missiles. But détente would win, because everyone would see that we are prepared to talk and do something when it comes to the arms race. If we simply say ‘no,’ we will be the ones to suffer. You can be sure that their propaganda will make the most they can out of our negative response.”

Brezhnev got up and left, Andrey followed him gesticulating and explaining something. Brezhnev turned back and yelled, “Time for dinner!” But when he was going downstairs he made a detour to the guard room (where the communications center is) and spoke on the phone for about 40 minutes. He came out and said, “I assigned Grechko to prepare proposals for Vienna. Let them think about how to respond to NATO’s move... And I told him to organize some type of maneuvers before Kissinger’s visit (01.19.1976) and invite NATO representatives.”

January 3, 1976

I will conclude about Zavidovo. (If something pops into my mind later, I’ll record it). I just remembered the following. We turned on the television one evening shortly before departure. There was some broadcast about the upcoming Olympic Games. Brezhnev said, “What fool suggested to host the 1980 games in Moscow?! It’s nonsense! We will waste a ton of money, and for what? ... Kosygin kept worrying about this. Once he called me, asking would it be alright for his deputy Novikov to be our chairman of the Olympic committee. I said sure. But I thought to myself: what is this guy spending his time on. It doesn’t occur to him that we won’t gain anything from these Olympics but a couple anti-Soviet scandals.” And so on. Everyone at the table eagerly agreed with him, adding our own arguments. Although I think Rusakov said that we’ve come too far, if we cancel abruptly there will be a huge uproar. I added: they will once again attribute it to our difficult economic situation.

Brezhnev responded to our comments as follows: “Naturally we shouldn’t call it off tomorrow... We have to pick the right moment, prepare the propaganda. But we definitely have to call off the Olympics here.”

Leonid Ilyich’s birthday was on December 19th. He started talking about it long before. You got the sense that he felt it was an important occasion, and that in general he has a very high opinion of himself. And this view is unconditional, so much so that he probably wouldn’t even get angry if someone doubted the importance of his role. He would simply think these doubts are ludicrous.

He told us ahead of time that he didn't want to celebrate his birthday in the company of "his colleagues." He came up with an excuse, "Ustinov recently lost his wife, so he is not in the mood for parties. And it would be awkward not to invite him." He repeated this argument several times. "We made an agreement with Viktoria Petrovna (wife) a long time ago, so there won't be any hurt feelings. She will bake a birthday cake and send it to us, and we'll drink to her here."

He ended up flying into Moscow by helicopter, but only to spend time at home, he didn't meet with any "colleagues." Though they clearly were eager to at least congratulate him over the phone (judging by Ponomarev's calls to me).

Chernenko collected the congratulatory telegrams and sent Brezhnev a list of the authors. Brezhnev told us that he received congratulations from every oblast committee and so on. What he really enjoyed were the "letters from workers." These letters covered more than birthday congratulations, some were for the XXV Congress. He read excerpts to us: one guy suggested to make Brezhnev a generalissimus; another to make him a General Secretary for life; a third wrote a poem about his accomplishments. Brezhnev was clearly moved by such things. With certain simplicity he commented approvingly on the enthusiastic and often naïve reviews of his work.

At 6 p.m. L.I. returned to Zavidovo (once again by helicopter). From 7 p.m. until 12 a.m. we sat at the table, "by candlelight." We made toasts. Overall you could say there wasn't any outright fawning. People said things about his real accomplishments and his truly good human qualities. I also said some words...

Some aspects of his personality materialized in his actions, with national and worldwide significance... a combination of sincere simplicity and statesmanlike scope... The toast ended up being a little enthusiastic. But I stand by every word I said.

"Everyone knows what you did for humanity, for peace. Unfortunately, people are starting to get used to it the way we get used to air or everyday food. However, these things are not transitory; they will remain in history and in national memory. I would like to draw attention to one thing. In your thoughts and actions the question of peace encompasses not only all areas of policy (foreign and domestic), it becomes a matter of party ideology.

"Lenin saw and understood that it was impossible to eliminate war back then. He always approached peace as a respite, while war was a condition for revolutionary action.

"Later we knew a time when talk of peace was only used to deceive our opponents. It was used as a tactical weapon. This only increased the danger of war. It so aggravated and confused the situation that in 1964 it became much more difficult to maintain peace than it had been ten years prior. You recently told us yourself how it was.

“Unfortunately this view of politics of peace still exists today. This is why there is resistance and lack of understanding.

“Your sincerity and conviction in the struggle for peace have embodied the living refutation of the idea that peace is incompatible with revolution. You personally proved that in our time to be loyal to party ideology and Marxism-Leninism, to be a revolutionary, is to be a passionate fighter for peace. In this sense our party is very lucky. You gave it the authority that our people have earned for more than just victory over fascism.”

The atmosphere was very down-to-earth. It was six of us international affairs guys, not counting the general, gamekeeper... later he called over two more guards, very nice guys.

Leonid Ilyich himself spoke several times. He noted some of our exaggerations in the toasts. But he mentioned in passing that he dreams of writing a book, *Resume and Life* [*Анкета и жизнь*] i.e. what life stories are behind each one of the lines of the “short biography” on the posters that go up on the streets before elections to the Supreme Soviet. This topic was widely discussed in the toasts and in general was, of course, the main subject of conversation at the table.

In the end we persuaded him to read some poetry. He once again (like in 1967 in the “hut”) very expressively read Aptukhin, Yesenin, and somebody else.

He does have something of the actor’s gift. The next morning, still a little bit drunk, for some reason he remembered the Victory Parade in 1945. He got up and described three episodes: how he showed up at the banquet hall before others, went closer to the side of the presidium where Stalin would be appearing, and knocked over a chair with a heap of replacement dishes (about three dozen); how he and Pokryshkin were drinking in the “Moskva” restaurant and how Pokryshkin took out a gun and started shooting at the ceiling when they were asked to leave after midnight (the next morning it was reported to Stalin, who retorted: “A Hero is allowed!”); how he [Brezhnev] was totally drunk on the walk home from the victory banquet with his wife and started up a conversation with the Tsar Bell. This last story he depicted especially picturesquely, with gestures, drunken antics, stumbling and so on.

L.I. hinted that he wouldn’t mind spending New Year’s in Zavidovo as well. But by then our “company” would grow threefold, even our lunch table would need an extension. We started whining for various reasons. On Saturday, December 27th, Brezhnev unexpectedly announced that in the evening we would be going home until after New Year’s. He gave everyone time off and forbade us from coming to the Central Committee.

But Karen and I have our own boss (or more precisely, I do).

The following episode was of interest from the three days at the CC before the New Year.

Andropov presented a note to the Politburo on the situation with “dissidents” in the USSR. According to him, Soviet people are surprised when they hear on the radio that the PCF⁷ suddenly started defending [Leonid] Plyushch and [Andrei] Sakharov and in general hounding the CPSU about “having political prisoners in the USSR.” The note doesn’t say what to do about it. I got the impression that the hidden agenda of the note was to justify before the Central Committee the fact that we “have to keep doing it” despite protests from our partners in détente. The document contained interesting data: over the last ten years, 1500 people have been arrested for anti-Soviet activities. When Khrushchev announced to the world in 1954 that the Soviet Union has no political prisoners, there were at least 1400. In 1976 there are about 850 political prisoners, 261 of them on charges of anti-Soviet propaganda. I was struck by the following number: the KGB has seen 68,000 people “prophylactically” [профилактированных], i.e. people were summoned to the KGB and warned about the “unacceptability” of their activities. Over 1800 anti-Soviet groups and organizations uncovered through “penetration” have been given warnings. Overall, in Andropov’s opinion, there are hundreds of thousands of people in the Soviet Union who either are acting against the Soviet regime or are prepared to do so under the right circumstances.

January 6, 1976

For New Year’s my secretary went to Kostroma for her stepdaughter’s wedding. I asked her:

“How are things there?”

“Bad.”

“How come?”

“There is nothing in the stores.”

“What do you mean, nothing?”

“Just that. Herring that has turned a yellowish color. Canned soup – borscht, cabbage soup, you know the kind? Here in Moscow it spends years gathering dust on the shelves. Over there nobody buys it either. There are no sausages, no meat products at all. Whenever there is a meat delivery there is a huge crowd at the store. The only cheese they have is local from Kostroma, but I hear it’s not the kind we get in Moscow. My husband has a lot of friends and relatives there. In the course of the week we visited a bunch of people and everywhere we were treated to pickles, sauerkraut, and marinated mushrooms, i.e. the things people stocked up in the summer from their gardens and the forest. How do they live there!”

⁷ French Communist Party, *Parti communiste français*. [Translator’s note]

I was struck by this story. We are talking about a regional center 400km from Moscow, with a population of 600,000! What enthusiasm can we speak of, what ideas?

About Zagladin. He keeps showing up on the pages of the bourgeois press. Yesterday I read in “Le Monde”: a big leading interview on the situation in the communist movement in Europe in connection with the December 15-19th Working Group in Berlin. Zagladin is described as “Brezhnev’s closest adviser,” his *porte-parole* [spokesperson, sic in French]. His trip to Rome and meeting with Berlinguer is presented in this light. They paint a picture of Zagladin everywhere carrying out direct orders from Brezhnev, who supposedly decided to give concessions to the Italians, French, Yugoslavs, and Romanians in order to ensure that the conference takes place. However, the concessions are being made *de facto* in such a way that we could not be taken at our word or caught “deviating from our principles.” Supposedly there is only one condition – that communists remain communists. But nobody can say what that means anymore. The newspaper sardonically suggests that communists from the East and the West should gather for a colloquium to answer one question, “What is socialism?”

Brezhnev supposedly did not agree to these concessions right away, only after he became convinced (during preparatory meetings for the European conference) that otherwise the CPSU would get neither the European nor the international conference.

If they only knew how things stand in real life! That Brezhnev mostly doesn’t concern himself with Zagladin’s numerous evolutions; that he looks bored when he listens to him (if he listens) and doesn’t react at all. That’s exactly how it was in Zavidovo, when Zagladin just got back from Rome and Berlin and tried to present his “results” and considerations at the breakfast table. Brezhnev was periodically exchanging jokes with the women and the gamekeeper, he simply wasn’t listening. It looked like he had zero interest in what Zagladin was saying and like it wasn’t even intended for him, more for his neighbors at the table.

Brezhnev made just one comment about Marchais’ antics, in passing while he was complaining that he hadn’t been sleeping well, “I am being crushed under information and on top of it I have to worry about why Marchais is going crazy!”

On another occasion, at the working table, he was informed that the French are asking about the composition of the CPSU delegation to their XXII Congress. He said, “We should teach them a lesson” (meaning to lower the level of the delegation).

January 10, 1976

The rush of preparations for the meeting of Secretaries of the Central Committees of socialist countries has begun (January 27-28 in Warsaw). B.N. once again wants to “stun the world.” His vanity is laughable against the background of: a) Brezhnev’s attitude towards him, which I described earlier. He isn’t going to be made a member of the Politburo, he would be

lucky to remain at his current level. Despite this (and maybe because of it!) anti-Communist yellow press continues to publish articles that depict Ponomarev as the head of a mighty agency (the International Department of the CC) which is higher and more powerful than the KGB and which directs all the secret revolutionary operations around the world, finances and subordinates everyone they can to Soviet interests and politics.

b) Because the dissolution of the traditional ICM⁸ has become obvious and irreversible. Although the Italians did “apologize” for an interpellation in Parliament about Sakharov (after our presentation). But they are just smarter and more tactful than Marchais. They understand that it is not in their interest to quarrel with the Soviet Union. Whereas Marchais keeps at it.

The CPs⁹ of socialist countries want some kind of explanations from us, that is why they insisted on a meeting in Warsaw. The meeting will be devoted to coordinating external propaganda after Helsinki. But we won’t be able to say anything substantive about the situation in the ICM because the Romanians will be present! And what’s the point anyway, if we will speak in “our traditional spirit”?

January 12, 1976

Today consultants from the Department and I were preparing B.N.’s speech for the Warsaw meeting. In the evening he called me over and dictated to a stenographer “his own approach” – a bunch of platitudes. Once again he is torn by contradictions: on the one hand, he wants to teach fraternal parties to be vigilant regarding the “Montblanc of weapons” (his term), and on the other hand Kissinger will be in Moscow soon and we can predict that his meetings with the General Secretary will be “positive and informative.”

On the one hand, he wants to say something about the bad guys Marchais and Berlinguer, on the other hand he understands that the Romanians will immediately report it to them and we will have a scandal before the Congress.

I met with Drozdov (former adviser in Paris, now our consultant) – information for the CC “on negative developments in PCF’s policy.” Everything is smoothed over and attributed to Marchais’ subjective approach. Nothing on the substance of the developments...

I am reading the CC Secretariat protocols (I get them every week) – 95 percent is about awards to people and enterprises, about “greetings from the General Secretary” to this or that factory, construction site, etc. The rest is about personnel transfers. Rarely you see a fundamental question on domestic or foreign policy.

⁸ International Communist Movement. [Translator’s note]

⁹ Communist parties. [Translator’s note]

I found out about the CC CPSU's comments on the draft of the SED's new program. Honecker "gratefully" agreed with all the comments except one – to mention the "disengagement" of politics with the FRG. He protested pretty sharply and was backed up by Hager and Axen, without naming the true reason for their disagreement.

B.N. told us he heard from Zagladin, who called from Zavidovo, that they held a reading of the Congress summary report in its entirety. Supposedly the General Secretary once again really liked the part of the international section that deals with the "third world" and the revolutionary process (i.e. Brutents-Chernyaev), but the piece on socialist countries he allegedly told Aleksandrov to rewrite. At the same time this contradicts that Brezhnev was said to have taken a large marker and written across the enter international section: "Accept!" Zagladin was persuading B.N. to "raise the level" (if [the report] is sent to him for review). I warned B.N. of the danger of interfering with the text with "fundamental" objections at this stage. I essentially think that any Ponomarizaiton of the summary report text would be politically harmful.

January 14, 1976

I received Janos Berecz – head of the MSZMP¹⁰ CC International Department. We talked about social democracy, the conference in Budapest on social democracy, which is once again being postponed till May.

He asked our opinion on the Marchais-Berlinguer Declaration. I responded by just shooting the breeze. I did tell him that we are preparing closed "presentations" on Marchais activity regarding dissidents, but I said in general our CC hasn't discussed "this question" and we have no intention of stirring up trouble before our Congress, we don't want to turn it into a platform for a split. Overall, I said, never mind them – let them try their democratic way. We will see what they do when they come to power, for example with their fascists, etc. If they weren't lashing out at us, at the foundation created by our efforts and sacrifices, we wouldn't even be thinking about a "theoretical" public refutation of their intentions. We only want fairness: if it wasn't for us, for all our mistakes, failures, and achievements, our dramatic experience, they not only wouldn't be able to talk like this, they couldn't even imagine their "democratic way."

I.I. Udal'tsov was removed from his position (as director of News Agency "Novosti"). He was the one in Prague in 1968 responsible for the "information to the center" that led to the actions, it's on his conscience. I've known about his Stalinism and his longing for order for a long time, as far back as the XX Congress, when he was head of a sector in the International Department, and then deputy head of the Science Department. However, he wasn't removed due to these "beliefs," but for their consequences: for saying that we have no order anymore, that

¹⁰ Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party, *Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt*. [Translator's note]

useless old men have seized the top leadership and won't let the qualified younger generation (i.e. Udal'tsov & Co.) advance. That's the cause of all our problems, according to him.

Zagladin, who just got back from Zavidovo, says that the "impetus" about Udal'tsov recently came from Moscow to Zavidovo, where the issue was decided in a matter of seconds. Consequently, Ivan Ivanovich [Udal'tsov] is being sent as an ambassador to Greece, where, as we all know, "they have everything" and the last thing they need is him.

Zagladin told me about the Demichev problem, how it was taken up there again. It started the same way it did under our watch, from the fact that ideological sectors [of the Congress report] are once again (as before the XXIV Congress) being prepared by the international affairs guys, while the corresponding CC departments and the Ministry of Culture have nothing to do with it. Apparently Brezhnev made a remark that we don't have a good candidate for the position of Minister of Culture, otherwise... To which Kulakov replied (he was summoned there to work on the agricultural sector): "Let's move [Vasiliy Filimonovich] Shauro there. We don't really like him as head of a CC department, but maybe he would do better as a minister."

On top of this word reached Zavidovo that at the latest PB session Demichev allegedly said that we need to "take action"... we have a mess in the economy, in the International Communist Movement... How long are we going to tolerate it?

"Oh that little shit!" the General Secretary exclaimed, "Did he have order in ideology!? Does he have order in culture right now!?"

According to Zagladin, Brezhnev was very mad.

B.N. suggested that I think about whom to nominate for the new body of the CC (from "our core group," i.e. people who can work on our assignments – in the ICM and among social movements). I suggested: Nekrasov ("Pravda"), Naumov ("Novoe vremya"), Ratiani ("Pravda"), Polyakov ("Izvestiya"), Trukhanovsky ("Voprosy istorii"), Stukalin (printing committee), Aganbegyan (academician from the Siberian division).

B.N. indignantly rejected Ratiani, ignored Aganbegyan, argued with me about Trukhanovsky but in the end left him on the list. I also mentioned Timofeyev, with all the caveats of course. B.N. is very hesitant, although he wants to have a more obedient entity in the Central Committee than Arbatov and Inozemtsev.

I think the General Secretary will add Sashka Bovin to the CC (the Auditing Commission).

January 19, 1976

Inozemtsev stopped by today. He, Arbatov, Bovin, CC Secretary Kulakov and the General Secretary's advisers returned to Zavidovo after New Year's, unlike me, Brutents, and Kovalev. He used my high-frequency phone line to call Shevardnadze in Tbilisi.

He asks me:

"What are you working on?"

"As you see, I'm preparing for Warsaw (meeting of CC Secretaries), writing B.N.'s speech."

"You know, there was such an outburst on this subject at Zavidovo the other day. I don't remember how it started, only he (the General Secretary) suddenly flared up, 'What the hell are they doing coming up with some kind of meeting. Do they have nothing better to do? Instead of helping us to prepare for the Congress they are doing this nonsense. What can they say there before the Congress anyway? Who needs this?!' And he just kept going and going against your Ponomarev. Aleksandrov even defended him, saying, 'Why do you say that, Leonid Ilyich. Ponomarev's first deputy Zagladin is here working with us. Before that Chernyaev and Brutents were here and contributed a lot, they are also from Ponomarev's department. The CC International Department has already done a great deal for the summary report.' And so on. But to no avail. Poor B.N. got a worse lashing than that time with the ill-fated Cuban telegram."

I practically shouted, "How is this possible, Kolya? We were against having this meeting before the Congress, not just us deputies but B.N. himself. For two months he held it back, even though Katushev and the Czechs were pressuring him. But he could no longer resist when we got a message from the PUWP¹¹ Congress in Warsaw that at a meeting of a delegation of fraternal countries Brezhnev strongly supported this idea, which was put forward by Husak and Bilak. They were the ones who suggested moving up this meeting to January; it had been scheduled for June (in Warsaw). There is a record of this in the Soviet delegation's telegrams from Warsaw, in the invitation letters from the PUWP CC by Lukashevich and Frelek, who made a special trip to Moscow this week. We aren't idiots and realized that it would be pretty absurd to hold a meeting on coordinating foreign propaganda ahead of our Congress. However, who could disobey direct orders. Kolya! You must go and tell B.N. about this right now.

He hesitated, then called reception. B.N. was busy with a delegation. [Inozemtsev] sat around, thought out loud, and suddenly started persuading me not to tell Ponomarev anything, not to upset the old man since we can't really change anything at this point.

But I went to B.N. and told him what happened. He was surprised and upset. For a long time he was telling me how it really happened, even though he knew that I already know. I told

¹¹ Polish United Worker's Party. [Translator's note]

him: “You still have to give Leonid Ilyich your comments on the summary report (the text had been sent around to the CC Secretaries), so you should “by the way” mention that you are carrying out his orders.”

B.N. said that calls to Brezhnev are not allowed. He will be submitting his comments in writing. And in general he won’t get involved in this affair. Let Katushev... At this point I left.

What’s going on?

Either Brezhnev was misunderstood (although when I was in Zavidovo he praised the “ideological coordination of socialist countries” on one occasion); or his dislike for Ponomarev is so strong that the very fact of his presence in a matter turns it into an empty exercise and showing off, into “the academician’s folly” in the eyes of the General Secretary. In the meanwhile, Ponomarev is bending over backwards to show how he’s giving everything to the job, how he “serves the Party” without regard for his health of old age.

On Saturday I was at Yevtushenko’s recital. He invited me personally and left two tickets for me, which he paid for, in the lobby at the Central House of Writers. I gave one ticket to a woman who was shivering in the cold by the entrance. We ended up sitting together. Turns out she is from Tula, works in a printing office. She adores Yevtushenko, “I clip his poems from all the newspapers.” What wonderful spontaneity and simplicity. I was once again amazed at our provincial erudition, which makes up the mysterious Russian power. Although this is quite comical from the point of view of metropolitan intellectuality (even the genuine kind, not snobbishness.)

[Yevtushenko] reads himself well, brilliantly. A bottle of kefir, pulling up his pants, which after all is the latest fashion in London, from where he just arrived.

Especially “The Old Women” [*Starukhi*]. The new poem about Ivan Fedorov is so-so, a rehash of his own (and others) popular theme: culture and power through ancient times. Perhaps it is under Dez’ka’s (David Samoilov) influence, but without his education and historical insight. Plus, Yevtushenko covertly criticizes [the Soviet government], but he does it too crudely.

The audience is 90 percent Jewish. I tried to figure out why, but got exhausted looking for an answer. It is mostly a pseudo-literary crowd and just regular visitors for this sort of cultural event. That said, everything was proper, there was no wild applause for passages that smelled of “anti-Sovietism.”

January 27, 1976

I just got back from Warsaw. I went there on Sunday for a meeting of CC Secretaries from socialist countries on international and ideological questions. Our delegation: Ponomarev, Katushev, Smirnov. Plus deputies and advisers.

At the meeting – the usual jabber, which, however, indirectly reflects the political mood of each participating party.

But first we had a meeting of “the six” (without the Romanians and for some reason without the Cubans and Mongolians) in the Radziwill palace. The park and palace are just like in Polish films.

B.N. informed [the group] about the positions of the French and Italian Communist Parties. Instead of reading our notes, which were clear and logical, he chewed the cud for an hour and a half. Sometimes he would return to the text and get confused. I don’t think people could follow his “train of thought” as there was none.

Afterwards everyone played along and expressed their concerns, the Bulgarians even outlined a theory about revisionism, etc. We came to an agreement based on our advice – do not make noise about it, do not engage in open debate, but in a “positive way” theoretically demonstrate that these new views are wrong and dangerous.

Then, this morning, when B.N. and Katushev met with Gierek separately (Kostikov told me about it, he is the head of a sector in a fraternal department and translated at the meeting). B.N. took a much more pessimistic position regarding the prospect of “rectifying the PCF” than he usually takes with us. When Gierek suggested to influence Jeannette Vermeersch to challenge Marchais’ references to [Maurice] Thorez about the dictatorship of the proletariat, B.N. objected: it’s not out of the question that these references are justified.

Naturally the French and others were not mentioned at all at the general meeting for which we officially gathered. The planned meeting of international department deputies fell through when the consultant who accompanied the Romanians mistakenly invited their deputy. It was a scene from *The Inspector General* [Revizor], but Frelek (a Pole, presiding at the meeting) quickly got a hold of himself and just started shooting the breeze, which we all actively supported.

I didn’t go to the farewell concert late last night: I had to work on the ciphered report. And I didn’t want to. I get sick of this deliberate spontaneity at formal parties.

In the morning I was finishing up the report together with B.N. and Katushev.

January 28, 1976

At work: B.N. is running around with the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Kirilenko is breathing down his neck, he is going to the PCF’s XXII Congress and at the last moment Marchais agreed to see him “during the Congress.” Kirilenko is demanding that B.N. outline what to say about the dictatorship. Of course Ponomarev is demanding it from me. I dictated three pages, along the lines of: “Almost none of the CPs use this terminology, and until now no

one made a big deal about switching the wording. You [PCF] turned this issue (which you need for internal reasons) into bait for anti-Soviets and instigators for a schism in the ICM. We never objected to adjusting theory in accordance with the situation, and we, the CPSU, starting from the XX Congress sharply and fundamentally raised the question of taking into account the specifics of each country. I have no intention of arguing with you publicly about the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, a lot is unclear. First and foremost, what is the ‘new power’ that will defend the gains of ‘new democracy’ from those, who, as you say yourselves, will start expropriating. You shouldn’t disparage Chile’s experience quite so much.” And so forth.

B.N. did not like it. While I was in his office he dictated his version. The gist of it: rejecting the “dictatorship of the proletariat” is a revision (although he doesn’t use that word) that threatens to split the party. However, he immediately commented, “They won’t listen anyway!”

In other words, he is once again torn between orthodoxy, common sense, and a desire to “hit the bullseye” in the eyes of his superiors.

He was infuriated by the last conversation between our ambassador with [Gaston] Plissonnier in Paris. The latter swore that the PCF’s attitude to the CPSU and USSR is a matter of principle. The disagreements are just particulars, while overall they will always be loyal and declare it loudly and write it in a resolution on the importance of the Soviet Union and proletarian internationalism. However, the Frenchman insisted, there will be one paragraph on “disagreement with the CPSU” on questions of democracy. “We can’t avoid saying it now!” That’s that.

Political logic is inexorable. Now in their Congress document they will solidify their right to criticize the CPSU, thereby legalizing differences in the ICM as an integral part of how it functions! They will drive an official nail into our thesis (and our nostalgia) about a monolithic front.

B.N. wrote three pages for Kirilenko, what to say to Plissonnier about it. I don’t think it’ll work!

February 10, 1976

This morning B.N. gathered me, Shaposhnikov, Zhilin, and Brutents and announced that we urgently need to write an article about Soviet democracy. Supposedly there is information that in the eyes of our dissidents Marchais is turning into a messiah who will bring them and “the Soviet people” freedom and democracy, and defend the persecuted. Of course we should not call Marchais by name [in the article], but we need to “let him know,” and warn everyone who is counting on him that “we will defend our state by all possible means.” Exactly that – warn them, “so we wouldn’t have to jail people later, which is undesirable.” [Ponomarev] says it’s all

because “they listen to all kinds of voices.”¹² Crimean Tatars are appealing to Marchais. “You know how it was with Plyushch: Marchais and *L'Humanite* defended him more fiercely than ‘Free Europe.’ Then Plyushch had a press conference in Paris and *L'Humanite* published the whole thing.”

Yevtushenko is allegedly going to head a student march during the XXV Congress to call for “freedom” (I don’t think this is true).

So, the task is to explain how democratic we are with the subtext of warning Marchais that his schemes won’t work! We went off to write it.

The PCF XXII Congress took place on February 5-8. B.N. put a lot of effort into writing Kirilenko’s speech (he was the head of our delegation) to convey in Aesopian language that we are very displeased with the PCF’s new line. However, French communists acted like they didn’t notice our displeasure and greeted the CPSU delegation and Kirilenko’s speech with thunderous applause.

In substance, the Congress was a turning point in the ICM. An official document from the Congress of the most orthodox and authoritative communist party in the capitalist world has legalized the right to develop Marxism-Leninism without the CPSU, in spite of the CPSU, and in some aspects against the CPSU. All of this is dressed up with “fervent” recognition of the CPSU’s achievements, the role of the USSR and the October Revolution, including the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat, swearing allegiance to internationalism, solidarity with the USSR, with countries of victorious socialism, etc.

With this, the right to disagree with the CPSU has been legalized “on a friendly and internationalist platform,” and even the desirability of criticizing the CPSU, its politics, its methods and so forth.

These last few days the world press is inundated with commentary on PCF’s XXII Congress and everyone recognizes that even if this is all tactics, it cannot remain without consequences because there is no going back after what’s been said and done. An attempt to turn back now would be disastrous for the party.

We are behaving foolishly: we printed Marchais’ report in *Pravda* but censored the most important parts that defined the “turning point.” Now Comrade Ponomarev is surprised, “A politically mature, theoretically competent teacher or Marxism called me,” he says, “he is a very experienced person and he was going on and on, ecstatic over Marchais’ report...” I retorted loudly, “What do you expect? Misinformation in such matters always turns against us, and nowadays it happens almost immediately.”

¹² Reference to Voice of America radio broadcasts. [Translator’s note]

“Where were you looking? I gave you the excerpted text for *Pravda*. ”

“No, you did not give it to me. Just the opposite, you only asked my opinion afterwards if we should ban the sale of *L'Humanité* with Marchais' report. If you remember, I strongly objected. We reprinted articles from *Neues Deutschland* that praise the dictatorship of the proletariat, we even stooped to such a sleazy move as reprinting Ceausescu's speech in defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”

But we can't say anything ourselves. Firstly, because our resounding speech in defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat for others (we already have a “people's state” here) will raise universal suspicion, including in our foreign policy line. Plus, you cannot set anyone on the right path anymore. (By the way, the consultants group calculated that only 14 out of 89 CPs retain this concept in their program documents!). It is theoretically ridiculous to refute the French since they essentially are keeping all the main elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a socio-political category (according to Lenin, in the broad sense of the word), but rejecting its use in the narrow sense of the word (also according to Lenin) as an instrument of violence that has no regard for any laws.

Ponomarev understands this. It's no coincidence that today he let it slip, “This is their internal affair, we shouldn't touch upon the dictatorship of the proletariat in the article.”

Meanwhile, before the delegation left for Paris, he tortured me for several days on this subject – he wanted to include a reprimand regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat in the memo for Kirilenko's conversation with Marchais. I kept making him drafts with the theme of “we were surprised and concerned by the format in which [the PCF] rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was sensational and anti-Soviet, while other parties did it in a way that nobody in the world noticed.” He rejected it. In the end, Suslov and Kirilenko decided not to raise this issue with Marchais at all and instead to stress “the inadmissibility of criticizing the CPSU in their summary report” (about democracy). However, Plissonnier, who met the delegation at the airport, and later Kanapa and Marchais himself categorically rejected our protest.

The old man can't keep up. He is torn, getting stuck on the little thing, frazzled.

One more example: in January two high level social-democratic conferences took place in Elsinore and Paris. The central question was about the relationship with communists (in light of such evolution!). [Ponomarev] suggested that I respond with a note in *Pravda*. We wrote it. Now it's been sitting on his desk for two weeks, among a heap of other papers. But the moment is gone!

February 14, 1976

I am “in general” tired of B.N.’s endless nonsense initiatives that require constant “creative” effort, i.e. I constantly have to come up with something “original,” engage in pharisaical journalism.

The French Congress is done; our delegation is back. But our ordeals are not over. Ponomarev teaches us that we have to prepare “a page” for the Summary report – give a specific response to the French situation, though without mentioning the term “dictatorship of the proletariat.” “You’ve read the ciphered telegrams,” he says, “the good parties are waiting for the XXV Congress to respond to the French. Our people (you read the selection of letters to the CC from various ordinary people, they were outraged by Marchais’ behavior!) want an answer too.”

I asked him what to do about the article.

“Either postpone the article or give it to the consultants to finish.”

As soon as I got back to my office Andrei Mikhailovich (Aleksandrov-Agentov) called me. He asked if I was working on any assignment for Leonid Ilyich’s report. I had to confess. Then he opened his cards. It turns out Andropov proposed an insertion: on the general laws that bind every Marxist-Leninist, and which were signed by the entire ICM at meetings in 1957, 1960, and 1969. [Aleksandrov-Agentov] said Brezhnev approved this idea, Suslov enthusiastically supported it, and Ponomarev “not very coherently” agreed. What was my opinion? (Then he read the text of the insertion). I said that it was too point blank and 20-year-old meetings aren’t really an argument for anyone right now. They (including the PCF) are precisely appealing to the creative development, even of Lenin. What do they care about meetings! Not to mention that by doing so we would suggest that the passage regarding the SKJ¹³ from 1960 is still *valable* [valid, sic in French] for us.

Aleksandrov started to energetically defend Andropov’s insertion, as he always does when the matter is practically settled. Naturally I did not continue the discussion. We finished the conversation on a peaceful note. “I’d like to celebrate with you now the fact that the foundation of the international section, which we laid in Novo-Ogarevo, remained unshaken.”

Nevertheless, he asked: “Are you going to work on the insertions?” I said, “I can’t just blow off Ponomarev’s assignment. Take it up with him!”

A couple hours later Blatov was breathing down my neck with the insertions, though he was objecting to B.N.’s initiative. I made these insertions (with Karen): it’s a veiled but obvious to all attempt to poke Marchais where it hurts.

¹³ League of Communists of Yugoslavia, *Savez komunista Jugoslavije, Савез комуниста Југославије*, SKJ/CKJ. [Translator’s note]

However, Karen and I get the feeling that this “initiative” won’t reach its target, just like the article on Marchais. B.N. feels it himself. His enthusiasm noticeably waned between morning and evening.

There is a flood of various references and memos for those (CC members, ministers, etc.) we are attaching to fraternal delegations (following a CC order). I don’t really have time to work on it properly, but I can’t pass by the more important ones – I read and edit them. I’m annoyed and cursing nonstop. Besides obvious indifference and utilitarian approach (shoddy work just to get it done and turn it in) of our apparatus, [you see] not just many people’s pitiful capabilities (by today’s requirements), but also rigid thinking, the inability to understand and react to the completely new situation in the ICM. The lack of a political instinct used to work in our favor one way or another, now the same thing will work against us.

February 22, 1976

B.N. managed to get his article written and published just a few days before the Congress, on the 20th. What a pain it was for me... Initially it was called “Freedoms we will defend.” Zhilin came up with the title and B.N. really liked it. But Suslov didn’t like it at all and he suggested “Real and imagined freedoms” (as Karen predicted).

At 2 p.m., after a clean linotype printing, the article went around the Politburo. Soon their comments started coming in. Andropov insisted that Jewish emigration only be referred to as “family reunification” in all cases. I – in a group of three people who received comments – argued that “it doesn’t correspond to reality.” You have to understand that he does not want to encourage emigration at all, on any grounds.

In general, I think that from an internal standpoint the most important point of the article is the paragraph about Jews, which I wrote straight off and which did not get corrected by anyone at any point. [It says] that most Jews are regular Soviet people just like everyone else, and the Soviet Union is their only and beloved homeland (contrary to Israel’s claims of a double loyalty, to the right of Jews to have two homelands!). They indignantly reject the very idea of leaving. This kind of official moral-political rehabilitation of the Jews in “Pravda,” on behalf of the Central Committee (the article is signed “I. Aleksandrov”) is long overdue. It is necessary for our Jews and against our anti-Semites, both semiofficial and amateur ones.

Kosygin called Ponomarev and protested the expression, “socialism provided freedom from need,” giving to understand that we still have need.

Andropov and Kirilenko “asked” to remove the intimidating reference [*yezpozy*] about only arresting 15 people for anti-Soviet activity (meaning propaganda) last year.

Polyansky demanded to significantly reduce “the piece on crazies” (i.e. about our psychiatric hospitals).

Suslov, who was reading it for the second time, carefully removed the word “emigration” (of Jews) and replaced it with “departure” everywhere.

Blatov asked to give the part on the Helsinki Final Act in more active form. He didn’t say anything else. This was seen as a tacit endorsement from Brezhnev of the “fact” of this article coming out. We were actually expecting someone from his circle (or Brezhnev himself) to object that the timing is wrong, on the eve of the Congress! But no objection followed, even though Solomentsev, for example, was pushing for it.

Katushev sent us his text littered with editorial corrections. We accepted some of them, but the majority is personal preference of a man who doesn’t know much about writing. Zimyanin wanted to reject all of them, he was dismissive and throwing around epithets that surprised and shocked Lukich (G.L. Smirnov).

In the evening, at around 8 p.m., Zimyanin asked me to come to *Pravda* to go over the text together one more time after all the corrections. We worked till 11 p.m., i.e. right until it was time to hand over the morning edition of the newspaper to the printers.

I think there will be a lot of noise over this article. It is another explanation that we have no intention of changing our ways because of Helsinki, and that we never had that in mind.

Another article was published on February 13 after Ponomarev’s approval only, Veber and I composed it even earlier (on the socialist-democratic conferences in Elsinore and Paris). Ponomarev, who initiated it, sat on the text for 10 days, then suddenly called and said, “I approve, you can go ahead!”

It seems it wasn’t noticed in the West, while I thought it laid a “new style” of conversation with social democrats.

Alongside all of this I have an enormous amount of routine work: various notes and memos in connection with the arrival of fraternal delegations to the Congress and the upcoming work with them.

Karen and I are also assigned to write the toast that Brezhnev will say on March 5th at the reception in honor of foreign guests to the Congress. (They say Stalin’s famous speech at the XIX Congress was born out of such a toast, on the banner of bourgeois freedoms...¹⁴ We aren’t

¹⁴ “[...] The banner of bourgeois-democratic freedom has been thrown overboard. I think you, representatives of communist and democratic parties, have to pick it up and carry it forward if you want to bring the majority of people to you. There is no one else to pick it up.” [Translator’s note, Russian text found at: <http://petroleks.ru/stalin/16-59.php>]

claiming anything like that of course, especially in this verbally saturated age even the brightest political aphorisms live no longer than one newspaper day.

By the way, Marchais is not coming to the Congress, but Berlinguer is. The Italians in general are constantly producing “warm fraternal statements about the CPSU” – scoring points at foolish Georges’ (Marchais) expense.

March 7, 1976

The Congress took place over the last two weeks. It would have been more interesting to jot down at least something every day, of course. But in cases like these it’s similar to what happened at the front: during the hottest time it’s impossible to even remember about the diary, and when the fighting stopped the entries would turn “literary.”

Nevertheless, I want to leave something of “my own” to remember.

Brezhnev was unexpectedly alert and his pronunciation clear. And the farther he got, the more energetically he read the text. I think he was on par with his speeches (in oratory) from 4-5 years ago. The foreign press and communist delegations noticed it.

The report sounded (as I expected, since I knew it in detail) more “Party-oriented” than the XXIV Congress and especially compared to all of Brezhnev’s major speeches of the last years. In the sense that it wasn’t a report of the head of state and government, which Brezhnev has been and appeared as over the recent years, but a text of a Party leader. Though in language and formulas it was very different from the orthodox Party reports of the Khrushchev-Stalin era.

First and foremost – by the critical view of internal affairs and the lack of blatancy and demagoguery over foreign affairs. Everyone in the West and in the audience noted the “balanced,” calm tone, and the “self-confidence.” There was even self-restraint with respect to the ICM, which, if it hadn’t been Brezhnev but anyone else from the current PB instead, would have never happened.

Of course the skill of the writing team contributed to this, but Brezhnev’s personality and approach was the deciding factor. This I can say “first hand,” so to speak. I saw it with my own eyes and participated in some measure. This [document] is called the CC Report. But the CC never even saw the text. At a Plenum four days before the Congress, the CC was given a “message” (by Brezhnev) about the report in 30 pages, while the actual report was 130 pages.

Members of the PB and CC Secretaries read the report once, while a select few (Suslov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Gromyko) had an opportunity to see one of the final drafts. Essentially these four were the ones to make some comments that were taken into account. B.N.: to strengthen the topic of disarmament and talk about women. Suslov: more about the crisis of capitalism and say that concessions to opportunism (in the Communist parties) will eventually

turn against the Party. Andropov: talk about the general laws of the socialist revolution, citing the 160 meeting of Communist and Labor parties. Last summer Gromyko suggested to combine the sections on the “third world” and the capitalist world, but this was not accepted... by Aleksandrov. Suslov and Andropov’s comments “toughened” the corresponding places in the report, but didn’t influence its general tone. So you could say that it’s not even a Politburo report, it is entirely Brezhnev’s report.

My 12-14 pages remained practically unchanged from the Novo-Ogarevo version, though with a notably “tougher stance.” My other inserts and edits (in other sections) were accepted. Brutents’ text (on the third world) was more altered, but the “spirit” and main formulas were preserved.

I was in the auditorium only for the report (on the first day) and for the closing on the 5th. The rest of the time I was behind the scenes, in dressing rooms in a semi-basement along with the rest of our department.

My job was to “produce” speeches and greetings of fraternal delegations for the transcript and for *Pravda*.

Sometimes I essentially had to rewrite them. In many cases, especially when it came to small, hopeless parties, the basic political illiteracy was astonishing (even to me). Our intricacies and various finessing, for example to separate détente from interference (“revolutionary”) in the affairs of others, are completely over their heads. Our creativity with wording is simply beyond them. They reveal in “class” terms the things that we would like to conceal by various means in our press and documents. So with the help of “editing” I often had to hide the “most impossible” bits. Sometimes it was done through translation, sometimes by advising the speaker to change or remove something, suggest different phrasing. Most often – by leaving things for the transcript, but decidedly expunging for *Pravda*. Of course it was relatively easy to convince a Syrian to drop the paragraph on how the ICM must unite “around the CPSU.” More difficult – to get Siad Barre (President of Somali Democratic Republic) not to publish in *Pravda* damning paragraphs on French imperialism in Djibouti; or to persuade a Moroccan and Algerian not to start a row over Western Sahara.

And it was completely impossible to change anything with Berlinguer or McLennan. In fact, we didn’t even try. Everyone understood it’s hopeless.

Both of them, same as Plissonnier (Marchais did not come) politely said everything they wanted: about “their socialism,” democracy, freedom of culture, the (Italian) wish to remain in NATO, the (French) disagreement with us over Giscard and French foreign policy as a whole.

All of this attracted attention. So when Masherov, Shcherbitsky, and some others spoke about opportunism, the “modernization” of Marxism, about internationalism – these passages

were practically met with a standing ovation. Gus Hall devoted his entire speech to practically a direct attack on the French, Italians, Spaniards and English and was accompanied by thunderous applause.

But Hall has nothing to lose and nobody to answer to for his words and his policies, which he doesn't really have. Same as he doesn't have any political influence, not to mention prospects. However, McLennan is essentially in the same position. And the fact that he "dared" was perceived as an insult to the Congress. The Presidium had a worse reaction to him than Berlinguer. "Gods may do what cattle may not." He is trying the same, so to speak!

In a word, our Congress "exposed" the real situation in the ICM before the whole world. Now we have to reckon with all of it. There is only one way out: without admitting it openly, to retreat in the direction of "new internationalism" (the Italians) to save at least something of internationalism at all.

To finish this topic, I met with several delegations during and especially after the Congress at hotel lunches and at the CC as well. It's wretched. They are very poorly informed, if at all, about each other (one party about another). They don't amount to much themselves: the Canadians, Irish, Australians, Germans, the English too, plus now the Maltese and a host of Latinos.

Here they are being driven around in "chaikas"¹⁵ with police flashers. They are making all kinds of claims to us and even getting offended. Kashtan threatened to leave the Congress if he doesn't get to speak at the Palace of Congresses. Meanwhile, he and his party are not worth more than the six dozen others who instead of the Palace of Congresses had to speak at rallies in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Volgograd.

I was struck by the fact that, for example, the Canadians only have secondhand knowledge of the PCF's position, Marchais' antics, the situation in the European communist movement in general. They aren't even aware of what's written in *L'Unita*, *L'Humanite*, they don't know *Morning Star*, though it's in their language.

All of this is more and more proof of the fact that the majority of our fraternal parties are purely symbolic. If there were no Moscow, they would have as much significance (if they existed at all) as other small political groups that exist in any country of the "free world."

Against this background, Ponomarev's attempts to "teach" and "mobilize" them with his APN¹⁶ articles and brochures look clearly ridiculous.

¹⁵ Luxury Soviet-made cars used by top level party and state officials. [Translator's note]

¹⁶ APN-Agenstvo Pechati Novosti, News Press Agency, a Soviet political news agency. [Translator's note]

Brezhnev's "philosophy" on the ICM is much more realistic, even if not completely formulated.

A real alternative to capitalism is the PCF, the PCI, and social democrats, of course under "the current balance of forces on the world stage," i.e. with us in the picture. The ICM as a whole is a purely ideological and hopelessly outdated category.

On the other flank this is substantiated by the massive presence at the Congress of black Africans and some Arabs, who are not in the ICM.

March 13, 1976

At the Congress I was elected to the Central Auditing Commission, i.e. to the CC. About a month and a half ago, when B.N. asked me to think about who from our core (international department) group we could recommend for the CC, he casually mentioned that he spoke with Suslov about me and Shaposhnikov. At the time or at any point afterwards I never even considered that it could happen (especially considering Suslov's attitude towards me). Therefore, when after a closed session of the Congress B.N. told me that I had been included in the list for secret voting, I took it as a surprise. I didn't find anything to say in response except to ask, "What about Shaposhnikov?"

"Shaposhnikov – no. There cannot be three people from one department (he meant Zagladin, too)."

I got details in the evening. Bovin called me (he is a delegate at the Congress and attended the closed session) and started to congratulate me: "Frankly, I was waiting for Shaposhnikov's name, and was pleasantly surprised when I heard your last name instead of his... Only between us, Zagladin really pushed for Shaposhnikov back in Zavidovo. But the General Secretary winced. He kept saying that he doesn't know him and so on."

This was the only hint that the question was discussed in Zavidovo. I still don't fully know how it happened. It's clear that Suslov was the decisive element in selecting candidates for the CC. Maybe some of them were "presented" for Brezhnev's decision. There are two possibilities: either Suslov got both candidates from Ponomarev and then chose himself or consulted with the General Secretary. Or B.N. was invited to decide himself and out of us two he chose me.

When [Ponomarev] was congratulating me officially, I mentioned that I'm "a little uncomfortable," and he replied they don't know Shaposhnikov "over there," and in general his profile is more in organizational questions and he works only on the scale of the department.

The department obviously wasn't expecting this turn of events. By the logic of the department-apparatus, it would have seemed more normal to people if Shaposhnikov had been

selected. He even carried himself like he was in charge, though he gave Zagladin his due as the official first deputy. Lately he practically didn't leave Zagladin's side. It was clear from his behavior and attitude (especially during the Congress) that he really wanted it.

Friends tell me that among colleagues, my "promotion" was received with a "positive surprise." I got many congratulations from other departments too, and most of them were from the heart. People feel it was "fair" and "well-deserved" for my work. They know that I wasn't seeking it, wasn't preoccupied with it and definitely didn't [use] "intrigue" to get it (as Arbatov put it). People at the department, and in general, know that I did a lot of work at the dachas, i.e. directly for the Congress. Some of those who don't like me say (among themselves) that it's a reward for Zavidovo. But even they can't deny that it was earned, not obtained through connections.

For all that, I feel like my appointment was seen as a kind of mini-sensation, but if Shaposhnikov had been in my place people would have taken it as a perfectly normal step.

That's why Shaposhnikov is now in a stupid situation. He is really taking it hard. I think he must hate me – after all, "with all due respect" and outwardly friendly relations, he always considered himself senior to me, and was perceived as such. I played along too, to please his vanity and "do something nice" (it didn't cost me anything, it only satisfied my inner contempt for him) I acted as "junior rank," though equal in my readiness to take on any responsibility.

B.N. did not move up [to full Politburo membership]. At 72 years old, he remains a candidate PB member. He was waiting and was clearly convinced that it would happen this time. Of the people close to him, only Brutents and I knew that it wouldn't. But he too was thinking of "fairness" and a "deserved" reward. He held himself accordingly: among the candidate members he was the first to enter the Congress auditorium, beaming and greeting people left and right, "patronizing" a huge part of the presidium filled with delegation heads.

He ran into the Sverdlov Hall for the CC Plenum in the same manner. Half an hour later I saw him again at the Congress presidium, in his old place – they were announcing the election results for the CC governing bodies – he was tense, pale and had a forced smile on his face. He was next to the beaming Romanov, who was elected to the PB and was ready to burst from excitement. Only Polyansky looked worse than Ponomarev. He was removed from the Politburo but still sitting in the front row of the Congress presidium and had to vigorously applaud the proceedings along with everyone else.

March 14, 1976

B.N. is really a man of steel, I must say. At work he was "back to normal." He was congratulating me and explaining why Shaposhnikov wasn't elected. He only said that "Suslov is not a generous man, I feel it on my own example." Then he "moved on to the next matter at

hand” (a quote from the Short Course of History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)).¹⁷ I need to write an article for him for the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* journal on the outcomes and significance of the Congress; prepare a summary note to the CC on the situation in the ICM in light of the fraternal parties’ attendance at the Congress; prepare a report of a Congress delegate to the organization that sent him there (for some reason in Lithuania, even though B.N. was elected in Dmitrov). Trifles and daily routine. As if nothing happened.

When I talked with Brutents about it, he retorted: “You are measuring him by your own yardstick. You would send it all to hell and concentrate on your own work, at the Academy of Sciences, for example. After all, he is 72 years old, how much longer can this go on! But B.N. follows a different logic in life: he will doggedly wait in the wings, he will wait for another Plenum, he will wait for Suslov to leave.”

Maybe he is right. But I don’t understand this logic. At least he could tone down his fountain of initiatives, 80 percent of which goes into the wastebasket and triggers the exact opposite effect at the top – it reduces his chances even more.

I was at the CC Secretariat on Thursday. Suslov chaired it. He made a curious comment about our (and the Propaganda Department’s) draft on publicizing Congress outcomes. There was an innocent phrase: “to use fraternal delegations’ speeches to show the CPSU’s role in the ICM.” He started nervously objecting: “We can’t write that. Where are you taking us? Do you want us to be accused of hegemonism again, of claims to a special role in the ICM? No, we cannot have that. This [passage] needs to be categorically changed.

Another episode. An article on Stalin for the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* was under discussion. Suslov said, “I compared it to an article that was published in 1970 in the *Historical Encyclopedia*. Comrades essentially took that text, but removed certain things from it: 1. That Stalin made mistakes during collectivization, but later they were fixed by the Central Committee “with Stalin’s participation.” 2. From V.I. Lenin’s letter to the Congress about Stalin and more, a passage is removed that mentions his rudeness and other traits that are unacceptable in a political figure in such a position. I think it was a mistake to remove this. It should be restored. Otherwise people will compare and ask questions. On the other hand, another passage should be restored “on the opposite spectrum.” The earlier text mentioned that Stalin proved himself during the Civil War as a major military-political leader and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1919. For some reason this was removed. It should be restored.”

¹⁷ “A Short Course of History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks),” a textbook of Party history published in 1938 under Stalin’s direction. Until Stalin’s death, the “Short Course” defined not only Party history, but also broad elements of the study of history in general. [Translator’s note]

After the meeting was closed, Suslov suddenly stopped everyone and in a very didactic and sharp tone made a speech about the “orgy of awards” for various people and institutions. He called for a more rigorous and principled approach to this.

By the way, speaking of Suslov. Everyone expected that at the XXV Congress Bovin would be “promoted somewhere.” He is once again in great favor with the General Secretary (I saw this myself in Zavidovo) and did a great deal for the text of the Summary Report. He is a deputy of the RSFSR and so on. However, it “didn’t happen.” I think the question was resolved before the Congress, in connection with replacing the editor in chief of *Izvestia*. Moscow was full of rumors that Bovin was under consideration. Turned out it was more than just talk. B.N. told me that the question really came up. But Suslov declared, “How is this possible! He is not a member of the Party!”

My numerous meetings with delegations from the communist parties of the U.S., Canada, Ireland, newborn Maltese CP, Australia, New Zealand were all more or less the same. The main problem was the French. They asked questions and I explained.

I think today was the last delegation. Phew! By the way, we (the International Department) exist for them and only because of them.

March 15, 1976

The draft document for the European Conference of Communist Parties, which Zagladin and Zhilin coordinated with the Germans, has taken on quite an Italian feel as the result of numerous amendments, edits and adjustments. Every page mentions “equality,” “independence,” “non-interference,” “respect for self-sufficiency” and sovereignty, “the right of each party to choose its own path”... and not a single mention of “unity of action” among the CPs, or “proletarian internationalism” – this word doesn’t even appear there, not to mention Marxism-Leninism. But there is plenty on cooperation and unity with other democratic forces, social democrats, etc.

In other words, slowly and imperceptibly, in exchange for our stubborn wish to hold a conference, we got a radical change of its very nature, which is what the Italians along with Yugoslavs and others wanted the whole time.

Today I read a conversation between [Herbert] Wehner (SPD)¹⁸ and “our man in Bonn.” He does not understand: the Franco-Italian model is the only realistic path to power for communists in Western Europe, but the XXV Congress condemned it unequivocally, thereby sentencing all others (who won’t follow the PCI-PCF because of loyalty to Moscow) to further

¹⁸ One of the historical leaders of Social Democracy. At some point, before World War II, he was no stranger to the Comintern, and never lost a secret connection to Moscow throughout his life. He was a “spiritual father” to Willi Brandt. [Author’s note]

stagnation. In the meantime, Wehner, who understands the risk of the aforementioned model from an internal point of view and in terms of order in the socialist camp, still believes that this model could be acceptable to the USSR from an international standpoint. He is asking for clarification: is there some secret tactical agreement between the CPSU-PCI-PCF, maybe they've distributed roles?

I think he won't get a response.

March 27, 1976

Yesterday I got permission from B.N. to take the eight days I have left from my vacation. I'll catch up on some sleep. I got a suggestion to go to Uspenka, get up early, go for a run, then with a clear head work on the report and a speech for Hamburg (I'm going to Hamburg on April 12th to celebrate Erns Thälmann's 90th anniversary). Then I would work on my papers or serious books, then go for another jog and go to bed, with my nose in the next book. Maybe I will do that. But right now, even though I'm tired of crowds around me, I don't want to be alone. I'm afraid that I won't be able to concentrate and won't get much done in an empty house, and I'll get tired of pure relaxation after two days. I don't know, we'll see.

On Monday the 22nd I spoke at a party meeting of the entire CC apparatus in the Grand Kremlin Palace. This kind of circus parade [*напад-аллея*] is rare, only two or three in my memory. It was dedicated to the XXV Congress with Kapitonov's report, which presented Brezhnev's Summary Report.

From our department Zagladin was supposed to present (he is now a candidate member of the CC). But he is in Bonn for the DKP¹⁹ Congress, so I had to do it. The Party Committee only wanted Congress delegates or those elected to the body of the CC for debate participants. I was nervous for a whole week: I hate publicity. I even tried a trick and told Ponomarev that if he wants a high-quality article, he should "excuse" me from speaking, as my entire nervous system is distracted by that task.

He replied: "Anatoly Sergeyevich, you are a political figure now, and political figures have to speak. Assign someone, Veber for example, to prepare a speech for you. If you want, I can help however I can. But your first speech before the communists of the apparatus is very important. This is your personal prestige and the prestige of the entire department. So if you please..." It didn't work.

I prepared for no more than an hour. My topic: the significance of the Congress for the ICM, arguing that under current conditions it could be equated to an international meeting... and why (six bullet points).

¹⁹ German Communist Party, *Deutsche Kommunistische Partei*. [Translator's note]

The second topic: the “departure” of the PCF and the CP of Spain. The gist of it and how we will act in light of the Congress’s provision.

They chose me for the presidium. I sat close to the place where Stalin sat for the last time in public at the XIX Congress.

Two thousand people. The discussion started and I started getting nervous. However, as the speeches went on, I began to get angry. You would think, this is the epitome of primary Party organizations. There are serious issues to discuss in this circle of one’s peers – the CC apparatus – the outcomes of the Congress, specific problems, concerns. But it was nonstop showing off: 30 percent of each speech consisted of bowing to the General Secretary, 5-10 percent to the speaker, who was called by his full title (no matter how many times he was referred to) “Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Comrade Kapitonov Ivan Vasilievich.” The rest was a rehashing of Congress materials or something on the work of “subordinate” ministries and institutes. Smirnov (Propaganda Department) was yapping on about something like the circulation of Brezhnev’s report and so on. Fifteen minutes into his presentation the auditorium started to buzz, i.e. people started talking among themselves as usual in such situations. From the top rows you could see a lot of people just opened up books and started reading. In this atmosphere I got more and more brazen every second. I wanted to be called on as soon as possible and “in protest” I would give a speech completely unlike the rest.

Rakhmanin beat me to it though (first deputy of the Department of Socialist Countries). The auditorium woke up during his presentation, he intrigued them with a “behind the scenes” look at the CC’s activity. [He talked about] How Le Duan came to Moscow 11 times in 10 years and how Brezhnev and others explained to him what to do and how. This helped their victory no less than our guns and airplanes, because it taught the Vietnamese about real politics, restrained from Sino-opportunistic ambitions. And so on.

Or – Castro! Look at where he was 10-12 years ago and how he appeared at his Congress and ours. This is also the result of our patient, steady work with him, our well thought-out policy towards Cuba.

Aside from the demagoguery that went through Rakhmanin’s entire speech, there was some truth to what he was saying. The audience appreciated it: it was frank and to the point, instead of the empty chatter and stamping out incantations. Rakhmanin walked off the stage to thunderous applause.

I was announced after the debate part was concluded – I was left as a chaser. And Kozlov (party committee secretary) announced my last name in about the same manner as Muslim Magomayev or Leshchenko would be announced at a concert. A murmur went through the auditorium, people livened up when Kozlov said, “Chernyaev get ready!” I wonder why?

It seems some sort of telepathy exists. I was sitting in the presidium and had a weird feeling: it seemed the auditorium (at least a majority of it) is waiting for my speech and expecting to hear something different from “the others.” Later a friend of mine (he lives in my building) said: “People in the apparatus know that Chernyaev gives good speeches, that’s why they left him for the end, so [the meeting] wouldn’t end in total hibernation.”

The auditorium listened to me in total silence, which means my presentation was interesting. I mostly spoke without looking at my notes and everything I said was to the point. Of course there were some “highlights” (Marchais’ position, Carillo’s statement about our “primitive socialism” and so on, about which only a couple dozen people in the apparatus know). But as I was told the next day, I had “my own idea” and the audience perceived that as a sign of respect. There were no coined phrases or genuflections. I didn’t call Brezhnev by his full title, simply “Comrade Brezhnev.” I only mentioned Kapitonov once, and only to say “Ivan Vasilievich mentioned this already...”

When I walked off the rostrum, followed by applause, I had a feeling that something didn’t quite work out. Maybe I was still embarrassed for misspeaking once and calling the XXV Congress the XX Congress. However, when the meeting was over and the mass of people started moving toward the wardrobe, many people came up and congratulated me. The next morning, I was getting one phone call after another with a bunch of different congratulations, most of them not from sycophancy.

I was particularly surprised that Ponomarev called and said, “Looks like your debut (!) was quite successful!” He was clearly pleased that “his Department” looked better than others. Someone filled him in early in the morning. I think he inquired himself as soon as he could.

Why I am writing about it at such length? Out of vanity, of course. But also because it’s things like these (being elected to the “highest party organ,” getting a chance to speak at such (!) a meeting, giving a good performance there, and so on) that make up the facts of life for a person who belongs to “party society.”

I came away from the meeting with something else, too – a feeling of “civic” concern. One could see in advance that the audience would enjoy speeches like mine and Rakhmanin’s, instead of the stuffy coined compulsory material and primitive false pathos of the rest of them. We can also assume that the speakers (aside from the totally dim ones) understood that their speeches wouldn’t be liked. Nevertheless, they chose to give this type of speech. They must believe that this is “necessary,” “this is how it’s done,” and they “shouldn’t stick their neck out”... this way is more reliable. After all, the speaker’s “position” and “authority” doesn’t depend on the audience in the orchestra and balconies. No, it depends on those who are behind him while he is at the podium. The audience understands this as well. Over 99 percent of those in

the hall would have spoken like Smirnov, not like me, if they were given the chance. This is sad and dangerous.

Today *Pravda* ran an article on the 90th anniversary of Kirov's birth. In it, Kirov is not being praised for qualities characteristic to the speeches I described above!

The Midtsev incident. I wrote earlier that he published a brochure without getting permission (there is a rule: an employee in the apparatus can publish only after getting permission from the leadership of the department). He works on Africa, but at CC affiliated Academy of Social Sciences, which he finished about 10 years ago, he specialized in exposing revisionism. In this article he supposedly is exposing revisionism in general, but any French or Italian communist will easily recognize him or herself in the article. Moreover, Midtsev openly called Grupp (member of the CC PCI) a revisionist and this and that. Before the Congress, a journalist from *L'Unita* in Moscow saw this brochure and warned our guys that "there will be a scandal." That's how I first heard about this brochure.

I gave Midtsev a dressing-down. He went around the department, hinting that it's clear that the revisionist didn't like to see the revisionism of his "spiritual friends" exposed.

I told Ponomarev what happened. He hesitated between essentially agreeing with Midtsev and disapproving the fact that we might "end up with a story." He said, "We'll see. If there is any reaction to the brochure, we'll quietly transfer Midtsev to some institute." Zagladin grilled Midtsev at the party meeting, both for "breaking the order" and so others don't do the same.

Then we had the Congress, there was meeting between Brezhnev and Berlinguer, and notable pleasure that Enrico didn't follow Marchais' example, didn't succumb to pressure from his side (and there was pressure, we now know for sure, [Armando] Cossutta informed us). Berlinguer came to Moscow, despite some opposition in his Politburo, and made a very positive and laudatory report about the XXV Congress at a CC PCI Plenum. And so forth.

Now last Friday (03.19) *L'Unita* broke a scorching editorial, "The reasoning of philosopher Midtsev." The article begins by saying there are 40,000 copies [of the brochure] and the author is in the International Department of the CC CPSU. The PCI took the criticism of Grupp personally (and correctly so). All of bourgeois press is buzzing. Of course, the Yugoslavs have joined in. Long story short, it's another excuse to make a lot of noise over the split in the ICM.

I came to B.N. and told him about what happened.

B.N.: "Maybe he is right to criticize them?"

I: "Even if that were the case, it's not the point!"

B.N.: “What’s the point?”

I: “It goes against the paradigm in Brezhnev’s report at the Congress.”

B.N.: “Hm!... But they always want an open discussion...”

I: “They may want it. The question is whether we want it. In any case, the question of an open debate with the Italians should be decided by the CC, not Comrade Midtsev. What if they start bombarding us now? Are we prepared to respond in kind, to engage in direct polemics?”

However, the next day he showed “initiative.” Ordered to publish in *Pravda* an interview with L. Longo, which he gave to the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. A gesture at the Italians...

March 29, 1976

Yesterday I went to Dez’ka’s (David Samoilov) evening at the Central House of Writers. Libedinskaya spoke first, she always appears as his commentator, including on television. She spoke well – about the generation to which she and Dez’ka belong, and I do too... We couldn’t get butter in our rations, so we ate potatoes without butter. We walked around in whatever we could find... And we didn’t see any heroism in this, we didn’t feel we were unhappy or suffering...

And another thing that struck me and the audience, it is something that always moves me and I still can’t quite explain why it disappeared. She said that none of us were interested in nationality, we never asked and it didn’t make any difference. We first noticed it when new children appeared in our classrooms and they only got “A’s” in German language. These were children of Austrian Schutzbund members. Then Spanish children showed up. And we started to understand: when people start being interested in nationality – it is fascism.

In contrast: the evening mainly consisted of Yakov Smolensky’s compositions. The standard was high. He tried to imitate Dez’ka’s manner, his intonations. At times his skill got the better of me and I let go of my hostile feelings, I even got teary eyed at “Anna Yaroslavna” (this poem resounds with me with some kind of crushing force every time). The pop canonization of Dez’ka was unpleasant (especially at first), it doesn’t suit him at all. Maybe I feel this way because I know how Dez’ka presents his poetry himself. Another thing: [Smolensky’s] reading manner exuded smug and arrogant Jewishness, which is absolutely alien to Dez’ka himself (either in thought or content, in his lifestyle or his poetry. He is a “great Soviet Russian poet.” This label characterizes him perfectly). Smolensky, on the other hand, reminded me a great deal of assistant professor Zastenker at the Department of Modern History when I was a graduate student and later a professor at Moscow State University.

Lyal'ka and Galya were there – both of Dez'ka's wives. He quipped: "I was married twice and both times successfully." Lyal'ka is still beautiful at 50. The new one is quite the shrew, "Marfa the Mayoress."

Boris Slutsky spoke after Yakov Smolensky. I ran into him on the stairs during intermission. He said, "Now I'll have to take the rap. They forced me to say a few words about Dez'ka. I told him I'll include a couple critical remarks about him. But he said no way. So I'll have to restrain myself."

He talked about how Dez'ka was when they first met in 1938, i.e. precisely during "our" time. Dez'ka left school (us) and went to the Institute of Philosophy, Literature, and History (them).

Dez'ka himself read badly. He chose pieces that were not suited for a large audience, but for a dozen closest friends. Even though the room was mostly filled with his admirers, nevertheless it seems there are certain "laws of the masses" which can never be broken.

But he wasn't embarrassed... Judging by how he was downstairs near the wardrobe when we were saying goodbye and Lyal'ka said, "I already told him that he read badly."

April 22, 1976

Today is Lenin's Day. I listened to Andropov's speech on the radio. Ordinary things but presented in a big way. Our B.N. is incapable of it, because he has been looking over his shoulder his entire life. He never understood that without risk, without the necessary courage you cannot rise above the average. I bet a lot of people are listening [to Andropov's speech] and thinking to themselves, "He could be the next General Secretary!"

From the 12-16th I was in Hamburg for the 90th anniversary of Thälmann.

One hundred kilometers along excellent highway. Flatlands along the road, resembling our landscapes. With groves and farms.

In Kiel we went directly to the Schleswig-Holstein regional committee. The regional committee officials were young cheerful guys. They were friendly but looked at us a little ironically.

A walk around the city. Kiel canal. A base for Olympic sailing. A nursing home overlooking the dock (pray to God we get one like this).

At 3pm we met with regional committee secretaries at their "club." The young people (about 15 of them) came straight from work. I behaved naturally. Latecomers came up without ceremony, shook hands, exchanged couple words with their colleagues and found seats wherever they could. The conversation was strained at first, then Rykin (head of the German sector in our

Department) provoked a downright attack. He asked: how did your workers (not party members) react to the XXV Congress?

They started talking, interrupting each other, with notes of aggressiveness and offense that I didn't understand at first. They were challenging us. It turned out that overall, they didn't have any reaction to the Congress. They don't care about it.

After my "crafty" questions it became clear that things are not that simple. They all started by saying that workers don't care about anything besides their salary. All they read is Springer's newspapers, which presented the XXV Congress as a commonplace event that didn't concern anybody.

Détente? Why, sure! The workers are for détente. But they don't see it as Soviet Union's achievement. Some believe there wouldn't have been war anyway. If détente helped this – that's great, but why worry about it now? Others think the USSR needs détente to get new technology and grain from the West. Once that's done, they'll be back to their old games. Why, for example, is the USSR building such a powerful navy? Why isn't it disarming, if it's for détente?

Plus – democracy! In general workers say they don't really care, everyone is the same when they are in power: communists, fascists, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Free Democrats. But they prefer to be able to say whatever they want.

I retorted – what makes them think that our workers can't say what they want? Sakharov is not a worker. Workers do not need the things Sakharov wants to say; workers despise Sakharov's yapping. Our workers, like yours, are realists... The guys were silent. It somehow didn't occur to them to consider the difference between a worker and Sakharov.

I asked them: do you feel sufficiently armed, do you have enough arguments to use in your discussions with your "colleagues" (that's how they call non-party people they work with).

Silence. Then one guy says: "If only! They don't want to listen to the arguments we do have. They say, 'If it's so good over there (!), why don't you go to 'your' GDR?!" It's very difficult to get them to read *Unsere Zeit* (the CP newspaper)." Another guy said, "I get two copies of *Unsere Zeit* and leave one on my coworker's workstation in the evening. He comes in the morning and throws it away. Not because it's *Unsere Zeit*, but because it's not sports, tabloid, or porn. He has no time for it. Or he might keep it till evening so he could use it to wrap something."

Another one: "I came up with a trick. I leave an issue in the restroom. When people have 'nothing to do' in there they might end up taking a look at it. You know, it worked. Two weeks later people started coming up to me and asking if I have any more of that '*Unsere Zeit* of yours?'"

APN brochures?... That stuff is impossible to read. It's simply not written in German... the language sounds dead. The content is nonsense. The only thing made clear is that life in the Soviet Union is better than anywhere else. But workers want specific facts. When facts are available it becomes clear that the things workers care about are not at all better in the USSR.

Soviet work orders – now that is something! When your ships dock here for repairs, we communists have a celebration. Nobody can deny – that is quality work! But even this our workers see from this point of view only, and no other.

One young man from those present visited the Soviet Union (with the Friendship Train). He said it gives him an advantage: "When they push me with anti-Soviet facts, I tell them, where did you get these 'facts'? From *Die Welt*? I was there. I saw everything for myself. And your 'facts' are boloney. Although," he added with an embarrassed smile, "by far not all the 'facts' are untrue... unfortunately. But of course I don't mention that."

I liked these guys. They aren't in the party for any kind of personal gain. "Pure idea." How much effort, how much thought and time (with all the temptations around) they have to spend to stand their ground daily and to convince, debate, insist, in an atmosphere of suspicion, ridicule, sometimes outright hostility.

Their personal qualities do not go unnoticed. They say colleagues readily elect them to work councils, as delegates to negotiations with the administration, to trade union positions. But when it comes to municipal elections, i.e. when workers have to make "policy-based" choices, they rarely give their votes to communists (the same people). It goes without saying that nobody favors a communist in parliamentary elections. Then it's not Hans and Helmut, good guys and true friends. Then – it's "Moscow" looming behind him.

I left the conversation in a sad mood.

April 24, 1976

In Hamburg we had lunch at a "fish quay." At home when we have distinguished guests for lunch it is usually heralded as something special, an "event." Here lunch is lunch. This time, for example, I was sitting at a table with drivers, since we were a little late and all other seats were taken.

The day before we went to a port where Herbert Mies (Party Chairman), Gautier (Deputy Chairman), CC Secretaries Karl-Heinz Schröder, Willi Gerns and others were already assembled. We got on a boat and sailed along the docks and piers, greeting, incidentally, Soviet ships. Sailors waved at us suspiciously from above, as if to say what is this drunken bunch?! It was true: as soon as we went aboard the din of beer and vodka started, with Mies leading the revelry.

They brought out a basket of Thälmann-themed hats and we tried them on, exchanged them, took photos.

I walked over to Schröder (one of the secretaries of the DKP Central Committee) and said, “Karl-Heinz, I am giving my speech in three hours. Could you look over my text, cross out everything that is not necessary. It is longer than specified, could you trim it as you see fit.” Schröder, together with Gerns, another member of the DKP leadership, and Rykin, retired to a far corner of the deck to read with the hubbub in the background. About 50 minutes went by when Rykin came up to me. “They are at a loss,” he said, “They don’t know what to remove. They are immensely impressed. They did not expect such a ‘non-official’ text.” Then I saw they both ran over to Mies and started excitedly telling him something. Then they came over to me with all kinds of words, exclamations, pats on the back. They said they got approval to give me 25 minutes instead of the allotted 15, because it was a pity to throw out even one line, and they will publish the speech in full.

The main event took place in the “Community Hall.” It was packed, mostly young people. They looked nice, with intelligent beautiful faces, boys and girls, very direct and interested, some were sitting right on the floor between the stage and the first row.

The hall, designed for 500 people, was packed to overflowing, people were standing in the isles and along the walls. Jan Wennike, a Hamburg regional committee secretary, opened the meeting. I sat in the presidium next to Mies, and with us a representative of the SED, director of the Thorez Institute [Jean] Burles from the PCF, secretary of the Danish Communist Party Christiansen, and others. When foreign guests were announced, the audience gave a rousing welcome to the CPSU, so-so to the SED, normal to the French, and a warm welcome to the Dane.

Mies’s report. Very loud, polemic towards their own Social Democrats, explaining the tasks of the DKP Congress that just took place in Bonn.

I was given the floor after the break. I said a few words of greeting in Russian. Next to me on the podium was German Gunther, he is a party secretary from one of Hamburg’s districts. He is a good speaker and was assigned to read my text in German. He studied it beforehand with German thoroughness, even practiced it out loud in private to get my accents right. And he began to read loudly and aggressively what I had written: about the shock of 1941, our disappointment in the Germans, whom we had considered the closest to us after the revolution, about Thälmann and the DKP – without whom it would have been impossible to heal the past, about the great German people, the nobility and strength of the spirit of the German worker’s movement – qualities that were crystallized in Thälmann...

The room was filled with a tense silence, occasionally broken by bursts of applause. When I started talking about current affairs, about new and old internationalism, about the fact

that the CPSU doesn't need a hegemony, and so on, the audience reacted precisely and keenly to every such passage. I was amazed at how well they understood the subtext. When at the end I talked about the grave of Soviet soldier Maslov, who died storming the prison in Bautzen where Thälmann was believed to be held still alive, people jumped up in their seats. It was a long time before they calmed down and quieted down enough for me to finish my speech.

I left the podium in a "triumph of approval." Later many people came up to me, said something. Erika – one of the editors of *Unsere Zeit*, very nice and just glowing with intelligence and kindness, a typical "Western" journalist in appearance – kept telling me that evening and the next day why I created such an impression: the combination of thought with inner feeling, sincerity, a serious approach and trust in West German communists and German people, respect for the audience's ability to understand complex issues, and a decisive, "provocative" (her words) reluctance to talk in platitudes that people are sick and tired of.

Mies was satisfied, but restrained in his praise. It seemed to me that he was not quite sure that I reflected "official" thoughts and feelings. Apparently he still remembers how he was "received" in Moscow during the XXV Congress of the CPSU, and how our delegation of CC CPSU Secretary Dolgikh and Zagladin behaved at the DKP Congress. Rykin "whispered" to me the impressions of delegates from the congress: official clichés, trite platitudes, pompousness and orthodoxy in personal communication...

Mies was also uneasy over the contrast between my speech and the speech of the SED representative. The DKP is dependent on the SED financially and politically. My Walborg,²⁰ who was sitting next to me, didn't know what to translate in the speech that mentioned "Comrade Honecker" after every other word, as well as "Thälmann's legacy in the GDR," "developed socialism," and three times that "loyalty to the CPSU is a criterion for internationalism..." Later I was told the audience noticed that in each one of those three cases, I was the only one in the room not clapping.

The Frenchman spoke after me. When he was talking about the brotherhood of the past (Thorez-Thälmann) things were going well. When he started talking about socialism painted in the colors of France people pricked up their ears, fell silent, and gave the speaker a very sour reaction when he was finished. Once again I was amazed at their "awareness" about Eurocommunism.

In the evening, at a banquet in Thälmann's house, I got a stream of congratulations – from the Germans (except from SED representatives), from our correspondents and consulate employees. The clash between Mies and Burles took place during the dinner, too. I was sitting near them but kept my mouth shut. In the heat of the argument both of them kept looking over

²⁰ Schröder's wife, she studied in the GDR, knew Russian, and was "assigned" to me as an interpreter. [Footnote in the original]

“at the CPSU.” The Frenchman started to praise Mies’s report for strongly emphasizing the “national factor” – the special conditions of the country and the consequently unique features of their actions and policies. Mies interrupted him, “I understand what you’re getting at. But don’t hold your breath for us to follow you to Eurocommunism. And overall you are behaving arrogantly, not comradely. When we were at your congress, you didn’t give us a chance to speak. You sent us to some kind of meeting with a couple dozen people. Still, we didn’t say a word regarding what we think about your ‘new ideas.’ Now you come here and say whatever you want. Today you completely laid out your program. When I was preparing my report I took out even the slightest hints that we disagree with you (though I was tempted to leave them in). But we won’t keep quiet forever. You think you are big and we are small, so you can treat us this way... However, under Thälmann we were the biggest. This means it’s possible for us to grow here. And please, let’s not have familiarity. We will have our say yet.”

The next day there was a rally – columns (tens of thousands) marched past Thälmann’s house. Mies was standing on the balcony of his apartment. I was next to him. Many of the participants recognized and greeted me. At the meeting after the rally Gautier was speaking (Deputy Chairman of the Party) instead of Mies. Three times in his shrill speech he shouted oaths of loyalty to the Soviet Union. The first time, the audience responded with thunderous applause and shouts of “Hoch!” with a raised fist to the temple (Thälmann’s gesture). The second time he got some weak applause. The third time there were some catcalls...

Karl-Heinz Schröder joined Rykin and me at the hotel in the evening. We drank our vodka. He got into it, called Gautier every name in the book, “If he wasn’t an idiot, he might have been considered a provocateur.” We talked “heart to heart” for a long time. He kept stopping, taking me by the shoulders, and saying, “Anatol! Rede!” [sic in German] (i.e. my speech). He would lower his head, drunkenly shake it from side to side, as if he couldn’t find the words. “That was it! That was real! It [will live on] for decades. We will never forget. We’ll include it in our Party education program. You understood us. You understood what the relationship between the CPSU and us should be.” He railed against the SED, Honecker... And again and again, as a refrain, “Anatol! Rede!”

April 25, 1976

Yesterday morning I went to a bakery and a dairy shop. Hordes of people! The grumbling symphony of a random crowd: there is no order, they can’t organize things, two saleswomen are moving crates and opening boxes, instead of selling... Spending our day off standing in line... And they don’t even have groceries... We can forget about farmer’s cheese, don’t even remember what it smells like anymore! Etc. etc. Above it all came the rough voice of a man who’s about 40.

“What do you want! That’s our system. These women (saleswomen) are not to blame. Blame those who are devouring caviar behind the green fence. They have farmers cheese over there. Our country doesn’t have a leader. All our leader does is make speeches about the bright future of communism, and even that he does worse every year. It’ll stay this way until we get a real leader.” And so on.

No one was surprised, no one protested. It must be a regular occurrence – such speeches in stores. The crowd mostly made encouraging noises and comments, including a young police officer who was in line for milk. And there I was, excuse me, a member of the CC CPSU Auditing Commission, standing there surprised and keeping quiet. What could one say when the others have their “facts on the store shelves.”

In the bakery women got into a fight over some Easter cakes, and when a voice from between the shelves said, “We are out, that’s it! There won’t be any more!” there was such a ruckus that I was ready to jump headlong out the door.

April 28, 1976

The department party meeting with B.N.’s report just ended. It’s a rare event. About our objectives after the XXV Congress. He repeated our draft note to the CC – on the situation in the ICM – which I finished today. And another text, which Kozlov prepared for him for the occasion (a trimmed version of his own lecture on the ICM). It’s a boring, unpromising, bureaucratic reaction to events that may be truly approaching a historical turning point.

About a CPSU delegation to the Labour Party in England. Even before our Congress, after yet another reminder from the Labour General Secretary Hayward to our ambassador, we promised (for the umpteenth time) to come in May. Hayward repeated it at the executive committee. Then he started bombarding Lun’kov with requests for the composition and level of the delegation, since he needed to put together a program, meetings with the Prime Minister, with prominent Labour Party members. [He needed this information] at least a month before the visit, which was scheduled for May 17-18. I pressured B.N., he pressured Suslov. The latter stalled (as he had for these last two years), made excuses, put it off. B.N. shared his puzzlement: Why? Does he want to go himself, or does he have some ideological grounds? Today Brutents suggested that it is more likely Suslov did not want B.N. to go. Last year he went to the U.S. as head of a Supreme Soviet delegation. Now England, with whom we are starting a serious game... Finally, B.N. prevailed upon Suslov and got permission to present the “proposals” to the CC and today Suslov signed our memo himself.

But a week ago Hayward warned Lun’kov that if there was no response by April 26th, they would have to cancel the visit. On the 27th was the meeting of the Labour Party Executive Committee, where the visit was to be discussed. Yesterday Lun’kov got a phone call, explaining that the Executive Committee of the Labour Party has postponed the visit indefinitely due to a

lack of response from Moscow. Today we found out that Hayward gave a newspaper interview in which he publicly explained everything, placing the blame for the failure on the CPSU. Our ambassador found out indirectly that there was a heated discussion at the Executive Committee, it mentioned an “insult,” the fact that it’s been three years, that “we (i.e. LP) sent our entire shadow cabinet to Moscow, but they...” And so forth. And the “left” wing of the Executive Committee (Hoffer) declared, “Why do we need to deal with the CPSU at all? It would be better with the PCF or PCI, who are welcoming ‘democratic socialism.’”

That’s how it works out. We make all sorts of projects to influence the Social Democrats, the Socialist International, we offer different ideas, some of which even are even pronounced from the podium of the Congress – contacts with social democracy and so on. We write comments and articles in *Pravda*. Then in one fell swoop it all goes down the drain. Why? Because of senile impotence and political sclerosis, which is natural for a person who is well past 70 years old.

I saw “all of this” yesterday when I was at a SS Secretariat session. My god! What serious political activity can we speak of?! The main issue under discussion was restructuring the political education system. Medvedev (Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department) was speaking. From the questions he received it became clear that, first of all, Suslov and the CC secretaries don’t have a very clear idea of how the system of political education works right now. The “main ideas” of restructuring, as I understood it, consisted of transferring the Institutes of Marxism-Leninism from the jurisdiction of city committees to regional committees, and creating a Central House of political education in Moscow.

Kirilenko, in his usual brusque manner, declared (and then stubbornly stood his ground) that this is all a waste of money and effort. Why not entrust the matter to the CCs of national communist parties? Actually, from the point of view of common sense, all of this restructuring is nothing more than “bureaucratic enthusiasm,” veiled under the importance of the times we are living through and other such loud phrases.

The following episode was the most curious at this session. Those present were surprised and puzzled at the behavior of the newly made CC Secretary Zimyanin (this entire project was done under his leadership in the Department of Propaganda). He defended the project passionately and forcefully – according to official logic that there is only one Marxism-Leninism and we cannot allow it to be interpreted one way in Tashkent and another way in Yerevan. When Kirilenko started to interrupt him, appealing to common sense and cost cutting, Zimyanin interrupted him in turn: “Excuse me, Andrei Pavlovich! I will allow myself to say what I wish to say!” The latter shut up... It was awkward. Until now, nobody allowed himself to turn his tail up at the almighty A.P.

This is something new. The mature apparatchiks looked at each other, not understanding what's going on.

Concluding, Suslov "saved face for A.P." but essentially supported Zimyanin.

May 5, 1976

Ponomarev's absence (he is at an editorial committee meeting in Berlin to prepare the European conference of communist parties) fundamentally changes the course of my workday: I have enough time to really think about the information and reflect in general, instead of cracking like sunflower seeds all of those ciphered telegrams, radio intercepts, TASS, KGB and institute reports, abstracts and journals in general.

Now that parliamentary elections in Italy have been scheduled for June 20-21st, the crystallization process of "non-Moscow" communism has sharply accelerated. Openly, right before our eyes – in interviews, articles, statements – all the central concepts are being rejected, eroded, filled with different meaning. Things like "independence," "equality," the balance between large and small parties, the center's rejection of a leading role among communist parties, the development of Marxism on the basis of one's own experience, consideration for national characteristics, alliance with other parties and movements, cooperation with social democrats, democracy, stages and conditions for the progress of socialism, etc. etc. – i.e. everything that for a long time we have been accepting in word is now becoming a reality and policy of the Italians, Spanish, French, British, Belgians, Swedes, not to mention Romanians and Yugoslavs.

In order to gain credibility and recognition as a national party they are disassociating themselves from us. They have to do it more often, more harshly, acutely, uncompromisingly and irreversibly because the Soviet Union and Soviet socialism has been successfully discredited through the campaign conceived in anti-Soviet headquarters and carried out with the help of Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov & Co. Our prestige in the eyes of the world public has been struck a terrible blow. It will have long-lasting consequences and it may be nearly impossible to recover. We have lost the biggest ideological battle of the XX century.

The result will be this: socialism that according to the theory of Marx-Lenin will finally grow on the basis of highly developed capitalism, which we made possible at the price of sacrifice, suffering, loss, and so on, this socialism will arise as an antithesis to us, as a force that, if not hostile (like the Chinese), will in any case be alien to us. And we will finally come to the model of society that the French and Italians will create (i.e. as Lenin said, "they will do it better than us"). The fact that it is taking us so long to let go of Stalin's legacy will go down in history as a mistake, and we will be judged for it. Only a handful of eccentric historians 50-100 years from now will assert that our path between the XX and XXX (if it takes place!) Congresses was necessary, they will argue that Stalinism (a weaker form of it) had to happen in order to ensure

the emergence of world forces that made it possible for the Italians and French to have any kind of socialism at all...

I just hope to God that we will not exacerbate what history will mark as our mistake through hostility and ideological condemnation of the French and Italian “models” of socialism, when they become reality.

It is quite possible – because the ideological and political substance of French and Italian socialism is the same as the 1968 Czechoslovak model. However, our attitude to the latter was guided by cynically-pragmatic considerations: concern about the balance of power. This time pragmatic considerations may give rise to a different reaction.

May 8, 1976

It's the eve before Victory Day. Again, as always on this day, I am torn by a dilemma: to put on my service ribbons or just the Order of the Patriotic War. For some reason I want the latter. And once again I am cursing the corps commander who refused to give me an Order of the Red Banner, saying, “You (i.e. our regiment) weren't the ones on the offensive! You just prepared the starting lines.” By the way, the regiment that relieved us on May 5, 1945, also didn't get to advance – the war ended. While we dug those trenches every night, 30-100 meters under the noses of the Germans, we lost dozens of people and risked our lives up until a few days before the war ended. Anyway.

In the evening I watched an episode of the TV movie based on Vasil Bykov's “The Long Roads of War” [*Dolgie dorogi voiny*]. His work always feels natural, without nonsense, and honest about the war. I got emotional again. And again that strange longing for something irretrievably gone (?!) and lost.

May 9, 1976

Victory Day. There is less fanfare than last year. But... Brezhnev was made Marshal and a “bust” [sculpture of Brezhnev] (as Shcherbitsky called it) was unveiled in Dneprodzerzhinsk. The entire *Vremya* program on TV was dedicated to this event.

There can be a lot of explanations. But, honestly, I personally do not understand it at all. Is it really possible that “up there” (as a person from the street would say) they do not understand that such events have a 95 percent opposite effect than intended??!

I walked through the streets of Moscow with my friend Kolya Varlamov (commander of a machine gun platoon in a naval infantry brigade – 1942). We talked about the war and everyday trifles. Drank vodka. I came back home and caught the minute of silence on TV. I felt very sad for some reason...

May 12, 1976

Yesterday B.N. and I discussed the prospectus for Brezhnev's speech at the European Conference of Communist Parties. B.N.'s regular gimmicks: "‘Montblanc of weapons,’ despite détente, communists should directly say why this is so. It's time to move ‘from words to deeds’..." And the same as before the Congress, it doesn't cross his mind that Brezhnev cannot announce to the whole world that he hasn't been making peace this whole time, just talking about it. It is not true in substance, either. There was a colossal turning point. The psychological change turned into a "material force."

But I still have Ponomarev's report to foreign propagandists to finish ("The XXV Congress and the world revolutionary process"). It's coming to 75 pages. Incidentally, the preparation of such materials reveals how much our sectors are worth. In this case, the Middle East sector brilliantly demonstrated its shabbiness.

May 16, 1976

I went to an exhibit on Kuznetsky Most. There are two halls next to each other. The large hall is showing war veteran artists. It's plainly boring. I wanted to leave but when I glanced at the small hall I saw some A.A. Labas.²¹ It was the first time I heard that last name, so I reluctantly wandered in. Later the artist himself (born in 1900) showed up, together with his wife, who is depicted in some of the portraits in the exhibit. It was a discovery for me. The kind of work I'd seen in the vaults of the Russian Museum back in the day. High class Soviet expressionism. 1920s. The spirit of the era is captured with great accuracy and artistic force. There is a series of drawings about "October." Two paintings from 1928 – "Red Army Soldier in the Far East" or "Morning after Battle in the City" – they are staggering. Or...1932, a painting that even anticipates "Guernica" in style and theme.

And another thing: cities of the future (drawings) – Western futurologists have only recently started "discovering" this. The Moscow metro as a symbol.

This Labas participated in some exhibitions, about a dozen of his works have been acquired by the country's leading museums. The rest are at his house. This exhibit is his first "solo exhibition" in his nearly 60-year career. Nobody knows him from among the general public. Those who are not in the know about the broken history of our art won't understand it at all. They will walk through the hall indifferently and immediately forget about it.

At work we had an outing to Serebryanny Bor to prepare the General Secretary's speech for the Conference of European Communist Parties. Politburo discussed the outcomes of the Berlin editorial committee meeting (they even published it). Brezhnev had the following reaction

²¹ Aleksandr Arkadievich Labas. [Translator's note]

to the report: "They won't understand it if I don't go!" Regarding the remaining unsolved issues (references to proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union as the main force of détente and the primary target of anti-communism) Andropov said: "Who cares! Who is going to look for it, what will these words matter a week after the conference! This is no reason to get upset. That is not the point."

May 20, 1976

Today I was told the following story. The day before yesterday Brezhnev spoke at a meeting of regional, oblast, and republican party workers. This was reported in *Pravda*, but a transcript wasn't provided. One could guess, and it turned out to be the case, that it was a meeting of Organizational Department representatives. They used to be called the "special sector" attached to party committees of various levels.

The Azerbaijani and Armenian – participants of the meeting – were talking over each other in a rush to tell what happened. They were in a state of complete shock, they didn't know whether to be surprised, make fun, protest, or what else to do.

"The meeting was called but not a lot of people showed up, the auditorium was half empty. Probably because it wasn't announced ahead of time and the guys were out doing some shopping. You know why there was no advance notice... He [Brezhnev] came in through a back door, walked down the aisle through the auditorium. Of course everyone jumped up, applauded, cheered... Understandable. He got up to the presidium and started speaking. Something along the lines of:

'Kostya (that is CC Secretary, Head of the General Department Chernenko!) is making me speak here. I don't really know what to talk about. It seems we had a meeting two years ago. (Chernenko jumps up: 'Two years and 31 days, Leonid Ilyich!') There you go... See what memory I have! Did we make a promise back then? We did. And we kept it. Back then you were heads of sectors, now you are heads of departments. Your salary is different, and your position. Am I telling the truth?! (Thunderous applause).

'So, you know that we held a Congress recently. A major event. Now we will carry out [the resolutions of the Congress]. What can I tell you? I don't have any notes (shows them his pockets). They say the French and Italians are talking about our democracy. They don't like it. That's fine. We will follow our own path! (Gestures like Lenin's statues). The Americans are acting foolishly. I woke up the other day, didn't want to do anything (he stretched himself)... They bring me a cabled telegram. It says Ford is asking to delay signing the agreement on nuclear explosions (for peaceful purposes). You [bastard], I thought to myself... Gave the resolution to Aleksandrov, telling him: Let's postpone it, but he's going to have to ask me properly next time he wants to sign it.

‘You know the other day there was a big event. A bust of me was erected. The Politburo passed a resolution to award me, as the General Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Defense, the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. This is important. (And he jokes...) Of course you marked this event in your speeches at the meeting. (Chernenko jumps up: ‘Yes, of course Leonid Ilyich, everybody talked about it with great enthusiasm...’).

‘Kostya tried to convince me to come here in a Marshal’s uniform...’ (Chernenko: ‘Yes, yes, Leonid Ilyich, everybody really wanted to see you in uniform. But since you... We did...’ And he raised a portrait of Brezhnev from under the presidium table. He held it in front of him with both arms. Ovation).

Chernenko put the portrait on the table, looked out from behind it and yelled to the auditorium, ‘Leonid Mitrofanovich, do it!’ Zamyatin (director of TASS) got up from the second row and bought another portrait to the presidium, also in a Marshal’s uniform but this one in color (the first was an enlarged photograph). Two portraits raised up high... Ovation!

‘What else can I tell you,’ Brezhnev went on. ‘There are a lot of events. Let those who don’t like us make noise. We will follow our own path!’ (And once again Lenin’s gesture).

The other day B.N. asked me to read a ciphered telegram from Pekin. Australian Ambassador Fitzgerald told our Ambassador Tolstikov about New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon’s meeting with Mao. The Helmsman was escorted in supported on both sides. Muldoon was brought over to him. Mao stretched out his hand, but was looking sideways (he has a loss of coordination). Chinese ceremonies, seating. In order to play along, Muldoon started the conversation with almost a quote, “There is great excitement in the Celestial Empire. The peoples of the world are rising to fight for independence. And they will certainly win!”

Mao was quiet for a while, then said, “No!”

Muldoon, “Of course, if they have real leaders!”

Mao: “No!”

Muldoon wouldn’t give up, “And if they unite.”

Mao: “There is still the Soviet Union.”

With that, the reception was over, as the Helmsman became tired and was escorted away. The philosophical debate lasted ten minutes.

May 22, 1976

One can observe curious “transformations” while preparing “key” reports for B.N. Right now this work is at the finish line. He is speaking on the 26th. Twice he “straightened us out” in

our drafts. The main issue is how to treat the PCF's rejection of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." We wrote it, of course, with the consideration that he will still call it revisionism (it's ok in a closed report). Therefore, while we created a condemning tone, we tried to avoid labels and insults.

So we couldn't believe our ears when B.N. started to reproach us for being illogical. "Nobody will understand what we are calling for. I am speaking in front of propagandists; they need practical advice. And what do we have here? On the one hand, you are saying that in 1968, during the preparation of the Document for the International Conference of 1969, the CPSU agreed with arguments that it is inexpedient to include this term in the Document. Now we are condemning the PCF for doing the same thing as the most orthodox fraternal parties have been doing for the last 10 years (they no longer use the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat'). Let us be consistent. And in general, comrades, the Comintern doesn't exist anymore and we cannot interfere in other parties' internal policies. If we discuss something from this sphere, we can only do it 'theoretically' (i.e. anonymously), on our 'issue' articles. We did not criticize the PCF anywhere specifically for rejecting the 'dictatorship of the proletariat.'"

I: "Yes, Boris Nikolayevich, we did not criticize them ourselves. But we published an article from *Neues Deutschland* in *Pravda* in an approving spirit, and from Czech and Bulgarian newspapers. Everyone understood why we did it, including *L'Humanite*."

B.N. "Well, that was a mistake. I, for example, disagree with the article in *Neues Deutschland*." (!!)

All I could do was throw my hands up in the air in response.

"It's another thing," B.N. continued, "when they criticize our party, our democracy, etc. That is interference in our affairs. Here we need to fight back."

And one more episode. I signed off on an International Department newsletter distribution to CC secretaries (internal party information for core members, with a circulation of 25,000). It contained an article on the XXII Congress of the PCF. I was signing for it because Zagladin is "at a [writer's] dacha." I was struck by the harshness of its assessments, including personal ones directed at Marchais. And the whole spirit of the article was as if we're in 1951 instead of 1976.

I called Zagladin. I think he was a little "embarrassed" but then tried to convince me that it's appropriate, "the core group should know the truth." I sent it out. But I felt uneasy. So, at the risk of getting in trouble, I called Pomelov, Kirilenko's assistant (he headed the delegation to the PCF Congress) and warned him, "It's pretty sharp, watch your boss's reaction." Then I called Ponomarev, even though it was a move against Zagladin. B.N. lost it, "Why the hell are we sending this information to those slackers! What do they have to do with anything?! Do we want

to sever relations? If not, why do we need such things? We are restricting ourselves, we are driving ourselves into a corner. We are ideologically reinforcing our disagreements, making them insurmountable for ourselves (meaning “at the top”)!” And so on. “Hold this publication!”

With actions like these, B.N. reminds me of Derzhavin from Dez’ka’s poem:

He, old man, [...]
Thought something quietly to himself.
[...]
Derzhavin was a flatterer and a cheapskate,
And in the rank, but great of mind.
That’s the kind of old man Derzhavin was!

Brutents, who finally became a deputy last Friday, told me what took place “at the dacha” in Serebryanny Bor. The following crew went out there: Zagladin, Zhilin, Pyshkov, Brutents, and others. Preparation of the General Secretary’s speech for the European Conference of Communist Parties. They’ve got a tight little group there. Brutents was the white crow, but he was used as an excuse to drink (in connection with his new appointment). There were all kinds of conversations. Brutents gathered from them (I laughed at his admission) that the department’s porridge is cooked by “the four”: reputations are compiled, references are authorized, personnel issues are discussed, the division between “ours” and “outsider” is determined. They’re a vulgar group.

The hardest for me to understand is Zagladin. Maybe it’s just a combination of boundless indifference and unscrupulous cynicism regarding people (anyone), combined with the desire to have a comfortable microenvironment. To look like a “good guy, one of us.”

Shaposhnikov is torn. He was deeply and irreversibly offended by my appointment to the Auditing Commission. This is driving him to rash and despicable acts.

B.N. senses all of this. But he may be afraid to air dirty linen in public, or sees his inability to change anything.

A “musical moment,” again from the preparation of B.N.’s report. Yesterday he kept me at work till 10 p.m., he kept editing it, though not heavily. Finally, he must have left for his dacha. He calls me from the car, “Anatoly Sergeyevich, we need to say it more warmly, it all sounds too dry!”

I: “About what, communist parties?”

B.N.: (irritated) “No, of course not... Alright, when I arrive I will call you on a different phone. Don’t you understand? All the events...”

I: "I understand, Boris Nikolayevich. It will be done."

B.N.: "Don't make it too heavy. But we should have something at the beginning and the end..."

I remembered this because I heard some things at the store today, and then my neighbor told me [some stories] too. People are openly saying things for which, as she put it, under Stalin half of Moscow would have been shot. At a minimum: "They are putting up busts of themselves, donning Marshal stripes as if they're planning to go to war. In the meantime, there is nothing to eat. They brought the country to a state where peasants have to come to city stores to stand in line for some green onions..."

B.N. was telling me and boiling inside, "Kissinger, Ford, all those senators – they give interviews at the slightest provocation. They say whatever comes into their head. They pommel us indiscriminately. Whereas here, Gromyko suggested twice that Brezhnev should give an interview... After all, they will print it all there, down the last comma. But the latter: 'Why do it... to hell with them, what will I say?' But with his prestige in the world, he could fight off any slander against us right away." And so on.

I listen to him and think: what are you saying, Boris Nikolayevich?! As if you do not understand that with the command of thoughts and words demonstrated at the meeting Chernenko organized, there can be no question about any interview. Plus, with his almost physical aversion to any mental exertion. That is the reason he tries to avoid meetings with important visitors, though it would seem the meeting is extremely important (with Kaysone Phomvihane, the Cambodian [sic] Prime Minister, for example).

May 28, 1976

B.N. has a new idea – to publish a didactic article about proletarian internationalism. If the approach is similar to [what we did with] the dictatorship of the proletariat, it would be beneficial. Right now nobody can make out what we want and what we'll defend, why we are so interested in proletarian internationalism, and in general what do we mean by it if not our own hegemony and worship of us (which no serious person can defend anymore).

For example, Korionov slipped me page proofs of a *Pravda* article on proletarian internationalism. There are enough loud proclamations [звонарств�] and quotes to fill a page, but as for what we want – nobody could understand from the text or even from between the lines... I don't think Korionov understands it either.

Ponomarev told me about his displeasure with "the group" he took with him to Berlin for the editorial committee meeting: Zagladin for "taking liberties," he is too much on his own and made some mistakes. Zhilin, Sobakin, Yermonsky – for drunkenness. I will try to convey it in his

words: “They got so brazen that they didn’t attend meetings. Then at the table, in Katushev’s presence, just imagine the current situation, but none of them care, no one raised a single question, they didn’t want to discuss anything, they kept drinking... Zhilin now gets drunk after two glasses and starts talking nonsense. He spars with Sobakin, it’s cheap and disgusting to listen to. What is going on! Not a word about the matters at hand. And you understand what kind of matters [we were working with]... There was a serious faux-pas because of their laziness: they didn’t notify me that the French are planning to include “proletarian internationalism” into the Document. Katushev asked to speak and started going all out in favor of “international solidarity” (the earlier Italian proposal). I had to step in and support the French proposal. It was a mess, Katushev was saying one thing and I was saying another. Right after each other. Meanwhile, Zagladin is sitting next to me, red in the face, and suddenly says to me, ‘We are making a gross political mistake.’ I frankly had to tell him later that such behavior is unacceptable...”

And more along those lines.

It’s not the first time I’m listening to his complaints. I do not really understand them. It is true that he won’t “get along” with Zagladin anymore. (I happened to be in Zagladin’s office when a fellow from the General Department brought him [a card] to sign – congratulations [to Brezhnev] for “making Marshal” from his very close circle.

Of course I did not share my impressions. But I asked a provocative question: will the conference of communist parties take place or not? B.N. shrugged. “Here is Brezhnev’s letter to Berlinguer. Have you read it? Read it.”

I: “I’ve heard about it. But I am not sure it is the right move. Let Honecker ‘finish the business with Berlinguer.’ (During the SED Congress in Berlin a letter came from Berlinguer, asking to postpone the conference because at the end of June, immediately after their elections, it will be impossible to find time for it, etc.). This letter was discussed in a small circle in the CC SED, with Suslov’s participation, and the resolution was made to ‘pressure the Italians.’ Supposedly they keep playing up to the bourgeois segments and to Americans, they want to increase their distance from the Communist movement, they ignore others’ interests!! It is an imprudent decision. Whatever is driving the Italians, they are currently at the forefront of international communism,” I got into it. “Finally, a historic question is on the table, one that was posed under Lenin: how to win under highly developed and highly organized capitalism. Nobody has come close to a practical solution to this problem. The PCI is getting there. It would seem, it is the duty of all communists to do everything possible to help them... and first and foremost **not to impede** the Italian’s chance to win.”

Italian parliamentary elections on June 20th and this stupid European Conference of Communist Parties, which nobody wants and, if we are serious, nobody needs – these two events

cannot even be compared in their significance. And the latter can really harm the former, truly historic, event.

In the meantime, we are resorting to our main weapon – a letter from Brezhnev. I think Brezhnev does not have a clear idea of the situation, and his assessment of the Italian phenomenon is guided by almost philistine prejudices, based on the “Short Course” ideology. But the informed and all-seeing experts Zagladin-Zhilin-Aleksandrov, who sit in Novo-Ogarevo writing Brezhnev’s speech for the conference, are pushing such a move on him!

I am almost certain that Berlinguer will politely decline. [This response] will be triggered not just by the objective interest of giving their all to victory in the elections, but also by consideration from the sphere of political cunning – what if the pen pushers find out about Brezhnev’s letter the way they found out about Berlinguer’s letter to Honecker! They will say that Berlinguer is standing at attention to Moscow, that despite the interests of his party he accepted humiliation by going back on his earlier decision to seek postponement of the conference to make sure these two “events” don’t overlap.

I think Berlinguer will refuse. It will be embarrassing! Brezhnev will get mad, which the Italians – i.e. the ICM! – really don’t need right now. Brezhnev’s anger will be directed at Ponomarev too, not just the Italians.

If Berlinguer goes to the conference, he will demand a great price for it – both in the Document and in his speech at the conference. And we will have to bite the bullet, listen to everything and not say a word in response!

Either way, it will be bad for the International Department.

That was the gist of my comments to B.N. I said a lot less. However, I did say that I “foresee” a negative response. The Italians need the conference right now this much (I drew my finger across my throat). Their position will be met with understanding not only by the SKJ and PCF, but by the French and the British, and privately by most Westerners. We will find ourselves in an awkward position. Of course, I understand the comrades in Novo-Ogarevo. But, alas, theirs is the logic of apparatchiks. Nowadays it is not always far-sighted logic.

Boris Nikolayevich listened to me silently. He looked at me skeptically but did not object. Once again he reminded me of Derzhavin. He is torn himself between apparatchik logic and real politics.

I am reading a book by the Englishman A. Taylor, [*The Origins of the] Second World War*, which, as he says, it took him 30 years to write. A conglomeration of thoughts and assessments. I think he is closer than others to the truth, even though he personifies events a little. Finally, our role is properly recognized (by the pen of a major historian!).

June 1, 1976

Difficult day. Text for yet another report for B.N. to the CC apparatus (it most likely won't take place).

A private assessment for B.N. (in secret from the Novo-Ogarevo team) of the General Secretary's text for the conference. A note based on [B.N.'s] demand to do something to repel the anti-Soviet line in the U.S. presidential campaign (indefatigable B.N.... the MFA won't support this and all this work will fly into the wastebasket).

He is busy with affairs of the European conference today. It turns out that Axen (member of the SED Politburo) on Sunday sent a message from Rome that Berlinguer is not giving in to persuasion, and that possibly it would be best to refrain from giving him Brezhnev's letter (the ambassador hadn't had an opportunity to give it to him yet).

Today Axen is already here, in Moscow. He says Enrico was unusually harsh and uncompromising: "It is not a question of dates; we agree to the end of June. It is a question of unanimity with regard to the final document. If the French refuse to sign even one part of it, we won't go to the conference. If anyone from the 28 parties refuses to attend, we won't go to the conference. If the French don't go, we won't either. We don't want to look closer to Moscow... We curse the moment we agreed to tie the conference to a document. And in general, we will never agree to something like this again! You (Germans) keep talking about an International Meeting (it was in Honecker's report at the Congress). What is it for? You know that we and others disagree. You are only provoking unnecessary speculation. Or maybe you already have a draft final document of the new meeting in your pocket?

"We have to agree that only an unanimously adopted document can be a condition of the conference. This means we have to throw out everything that any of the participants disagree with. Otherwise we are not going to the conference."

And so on along those lines.

After hours-long discussions today, B.N., Katushev, Axen, and Zagladin came up with a stupidity – to send CC representatives (Ponomarev and Katushev, respectively) to Paris, Rome, Belgrade to persuade them to compromise and to deliver a message from Brezhnev. This in itself is humiliating. When I read the drafts for Brezhnev's letters and the notes for the conversations, I lost it. The way it appears, if there is no conference – it will be a catastrophe for the CPSU. The CPSU is so interested that it's ready to make any concession necessary. We are agreeing to things we protested just a little while ago – the French formula for a "conference with a limited agenda"; to throw out our analysis of the state of affairs and leave only points-goals; to back away from mentioning not only "proletarian internationalism," but even from our own achievements in détente.

Meanwhile, at the same time as B.N. is signing such papers, he tells me angrily, “Eh! We should just slam on the table and say – if you don’t want it, fine. Do we need this more than anyone else? Go to hell with your conference...”

I reply: “You are right. Except we should have already done it in the fall!”

On Thursday the PB will decide whether to send these letters from Brezhnev to Paris and Belgrade, and agree to hold the conference “utterly and completely” like the Italians, Yugoslavs, Spaniards, Romanians want it, instead of how we wanted it.

It’s possible that June 3rd will be the day when Brezhnev slams on the table and says about the same thing as Ponomarev said to me today. But with the difference that Brezhnev’s words will be partially directed at Ponomarev, if not directed at him first and foremost.

June 3, 1976

Today I spoke at the presidium of the Academy of Sciences – “praised” Inozemtsev, who organized this whole thing himself. He forced Ponomarev to send me to this unprecedented event. Formally: the social sciences sector of the presidium was discussing IMEMO’s²² work over the last five years. I was supposed to talk about how the Institute “helps” the CC’s International Department. My presentation brought some dissonance into the pompous academic chatter. I named names of those who actually did something. Among them 70 percent are Jews. I praised old man Khavinson and his journal (*World Economy and International Relations*).

Episode: Kuzmin, deputy of the Department of Science, was sitting at a table with a U-shaped layout, across from Murat Urmancheev (an official in the presidium). He asked me to come sit next to him. I innocently thought he wanted to tell me something before my speech... As it turns out (as everyone understood), he simply wanted me to approach him in front of all the academicians, instead of the other way around. My god!... However, he is a stupid and shallow man who gets a chance to put on airs due to his position as curator of the Academy. We formed a tacit Vivendi [sic]: we are pretending that nothing ever happened between us. Meanwhile, he was one of the organizers of my persecution “during the Fedoseyev campaign.” He is one of those who finishes (according to them) the condemned and bootlicks those on their way up (just in case).

I must really have “grown up”: all these games that are played seriously in all institutions (and not without reason, because position and salaries depend on them) sincerely make me laugh and give me a feeling of contempt.

Our Igor’ Sokolov (consultant) recently “organized a professorship for himself” at the Lenin school. He did it with an energy he’s never shown at work. He got me to sign a reference

²² Institute of World Economy and International Relations. [Translator’s note]

and gave meal kinds of instructions, arguing that this is precisely how the reference about him should be written. He mentioned, “You should note... according to the instructions, you could also do it... take a look...”

I did look, at him. He was taken aback and said, “What is it?”

“Nothing, Igor’. Except I will not do this sort of thing. I don’t need a “professorship,” or a doctorate, or anything of the sort.”

I didn’t like going to this Presidium either, I’m afraid they’ll think, following the logic of Sokolov-Timofeyev and others like them (and they are all like that there), that I’m getting ready “to be a Doctor [Ph.D.]”!

Ponomarev was getting ready for the Politburo and remembered that back in the fall of 1974 at the Gorky dacha we prepared another document, a short one, alongside the Declaration. Preparing that Declaration played such a cruel joke on the conference itself, the Communist Movement, and our authority it in. The document is brief – an Appeal to the Peoples of Europe. Without ideology, like a manifesto. I rummaged through my papers and found this Appeal... and gasped. Beautiful rhetoric and exactly what we need to “unite” and remove the problems of the “final document.”

June 5, 1976

An exhibition of [Viktor Efimovich] Popkov on Kuznetsky Most. Of course I’ve seen his work in reproductions and heard something about him. When I walked in a lot of things seemed familiar. But immediately, after the first careful look, I understood that it is something powerful and simple. “In the Cathedral,” “Silence” (with a girl, monuments of war and ruined church over the hill), “Babka Aksinya [sic, Anis’ya] was a good person” (a painting of tremendous poignancy and universal understanding of life. You can look at it for a long time, then step away. When you come back, you get a lump in your throat again), “Northern Song” (a contrast of civilizations in Russia), “A Couple,” “Autumn Winds,” and many others. I remember all these paintings, they are etched in my memory, I can envision them. I haven’t experienced something like this in a long time. This Popkov alone is worth an entire “school.” But here he was [treated as] mediocre. He died at age 42...

Early in the morning I went to the Department to “evaluate” an article prepared (by Zhukov) for *Pravda* against a French chief of staff, who blurred out something about the French troops’ readiness to fight “at the cutting edge.” B.N. flew into a rage. Plus, he really wanted to please Marchais-Kanapa, who always peck at us for supporting Giscard and now they can say, “Here! We told you so!” He ran to Suslov. The latter was cautious, said he’ll consult with Gromyko. In the meantime, B.N. already went to Zimyanin, who went to *Pravda*, and three hours later Zhukov penned a little article along the lines of “How could this be! Not good!”

It is all nonsense. It is politically insignificant. Giscard d'Estaing's policies are essentially no different from de Gaulle's or Pompidou's. I think the article won't be printed. Especially because it would dampen Gromyko's April visit and our "achievements" in détente, which were outlined at the Congress. In any case the article draft has to go "through the top" before it is released.

In the interval I met with Lyubimov. I drove up to his house on Chaikovsky street and we walked around for half an hour. He's been asking for meet for a long time. I suspected that it would be about a trip to France, Italy, or somewhere else, i.e. another instance of "using" me. So I kept making excuses. Yesterday Samoteikin (Brezhnev's assistant) called me and said that Lyubimov is scheduled to meet with Zimyanin and we need to "settle him down" beforehand. Supposedly he would pressure Zimyanin to allow Mozhaev's play "Kuzkin" (the play was made five years ago, but was first blocked by Furtseva, then by Demichev, then by Yagodkin). All of them "left" and now Lyubimov, apparently, decided to launch an attack on the new secretary. So, Samoteikin said, we can't let this happen. It's a hopeless cause and will only irritate Zimyanin, and "in this state" he will report to the General Secretary. He will have to report it because Zimyanin is meeting with Lyubimov on the General Secretary's orders, after Lyubimov sent him a letter.

So, I got my own "need" to urgently see Lyubimov, before the CC meeting. I tried to reason with him, warned him not to do anything stupid if he cares about the theater and his fame – just now everything could be easily destroyed if Brezhnev gets "disappointed" that after helping Lyubimov and saving him from getting expelled from the party, the "genius" is now at it again.

I think it made an impression. But too bad he turned to Zimyanin and Mozhaev this time.

June 6, 1976

By the way, yesterday Marchais "refused" to receive Ponomarev in Paris. He "doesn't have time." "Kanapa will come to Berlin for the editorial committee, you can talk there," so to speak. This is despite the fact that our ambassador informed him that Ponomarev is bringing "a message from Brezhnev"...

There you go. I think it is Zagladin's mistake again... even if the initiative of the visit to Paris came from Axen. This should have been foreseen.

With Dez'ka's help I noticed Yuri Kuznetsov (a few of his poems are in Issue No. 3 of *Novyi Mir*). They say he is turning a new leaf in Russian poetry.

June 18, 1976

On the 10-11th the Editorial Committee for the preparation of the European Conference of Communist Parties met in Berlin. Three hundred fifty speeches in two days. You could say we've agreed upon the "Document." We consider it acceptable because it is not at odds with the XXV Congress' "program of further struggle" and essentially signifies approval of our foreign policy. In return we gave up all analyses of the situation and any assessments that resembled ideology in the slightest. This is also good.

The counterpoint of this meeting and the entire 20-month long preparation for the conference could be the confrontation over "proletarian internationalism."

For a long time, the Yugoslavs did not want to mention this term in the document. Katushev was sent to Belgrade on the eve of the Berlin meeting and persuaded Tito and [Stane] Dolanc. They agreed, but insisted that this concept be expanded to include everything under the sun: independence, autonomy, the right to choose one's path of socialism, non-interference, solidarity with the nonaligned, etc.

However, when this was proposed in Berlin, the Italians balked (they never said anything about it before because they were sure the term would not make it past the Yugoslavs). We had to go back to the previous version – "on international solidarity in the spirit of Marx-Engels-Lenin." When everyone agreed, Kanapa made a "statement": "I am saying it for the record that with the support of the CPSU, MSZMP, BKP,²³ KSČ,²⁴ SED and other parties the concept of 'proletarian internationalism' is no longer used in the communist movement. This is a new situation, which I have to report to my leadership..."

B.N. was the first to recover his senses. (He told his deputies himself how it all happened). "I saw that everyone was waiting for our reaction: will we continue to back down to save the conference, or will we fight back. So I came forward." You could tell that he was extremely pleased and proud of his speech. Witnesses say it was a brilliant impromptu performance. He started out by saying: "Comrade Kanapa himself does not believe what he is saying. He knows that he is not speaking the truth." He went on to explain to Kanapa what the CPSU's internationalism was, is, and will be.

Lagutin summed it up as follows: "B.N. punched Kanapa between the eyes."

It took off from there. Eighteen delegations spoke after B.N. Everything came up: they called his statement a provocation, demanded an apology, explained that "the ideas of Marx-Engels-Lenin include internationalism," reminded him that when Marchais visits Japan or Yugoslavia he does not use the term "proletarian internationalism" in the final communique, because the other side does not want it. Kanapa thinks this is ok... They talked about the fact that

²³ Bulgarian Communist Party, *Българска Комунистическа Партия, Balgarska Komunisticheska Partiya*, BKP. [Translator's note]

²⁴ Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, *Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ*. [Translator's note]

he for some reason forgot to mention the party that categorically opposed this term for the conference document – the Italians – and instead named those who insisted on it for 20 months and now decided to meet PCI halfway in light of its pre-election needs. And so forth.

Kanapa was pale, but did not go back on his words.

I think he “ran ahead” and miscalculated. He essentially called for a referendum, putting the participants before a choice – Eurocommunism or the CPSU. The vast majority chose the CPSU for now, i.e. traditional internationalism. The SKJ, PCI, Romanians, and Swedes did not say anything. Some just did not get a chance to speak; the Irish, for example, who of course would have gone with the majority.

Meanwhile, in real life, “Eurocommunism,” led by the Italians, continues to rapidly gain momentum. Berlinguer is speaking at meetings or giving interviews almost every day. If some time ago he used to say that the PCI won’t demand the country’s withdrawal from NATO so as not to disrupt the international balance and undermine détente, now he openly says that NATO is necessary to protect “the Italian path to socialism” from the fate of Prague in 1968. In a manner that is uncharacteristically brusque, he reminds that when he met with Brezhnev after his speech at the XXV Congress of the CPSU, the latter did not say a word about the speech or about the PCI’s position regarding “Soviet socialism.” He keeps denouncing our “democracy” and our ways more and more often and harshly, almost a la Marchais.

Yesterday the CC Secretariat adopted a resolution on our analytical note on the situation in the ICM. It is very good that they adopted the methodology proposed by our department: do not panic, do not attach labels, do not rinse dirty laundry in public, direct all work with CPs to establish trust and friendly relations. Until the European Conference of Communist Parties takes place, there is a ban on publishing any articles that criticize communist parties, even anonymously.

This is a step towards recognizing the new realities of the ICM.

The following episode took place at the PB this Tuesday, after a discussion of Ponomarev’s report on Berlin (including Kanapa’s attack). In contrast to what others were saying, Gromyko suddenly declared, “Under these conditions, do we really need this conference? Maybe we should quietly derail it? Who knows what Marchais and Berlinguer will say! And why do we need a document that will clearly be inferior to the one from Karlovy Vary?!” (He is referring to a document adopted in 1966 at the European Conference of Communist Parties in Karlovy Vary.)

Of course, nobody “rebuffed” him. Brezhnev kept quiet and did not say anything on this subject at the PB at all. However, the next morning when B.N. told me about it, he added,

“Everyone was surprised and disagreed. I just had phone calls from PB members (?), Brezhnev’s assistants (?), and they are all unanimously outraged by Gromyko’s statement...”

I don’t know, I don’t know... After all, after Grechko, Gromyko is the closest person to the General Secretary. They share complete confidence... Could he have done this without warning? And if he did, I am sure he will continue his “speech” in a difference setting, especially since he felt isolated.

July 9, 1976

Important things happened during these 20 days when I had no chance to write anything. The Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties (June 29-30), my trip to France, my confirmation as a member of the editorial board of *Kommunist* and my first speech there. I was asked to say something about Berlin and Paris, just to get things going and let my colleagues hear my voice.

I think B.N. used the opportunity to send me to France so he wouldn’t have to bother with including me, along with Zagladin and Zhilin, in the accompanying team to Berlin.

Berlin is certainly a milestone: we recognized the right to publicly disagree with us and with the communist movement not only “on certain issues” but on questions of ideology. Our most intelligent class enemy (in the person of the columnist [James] Reston) appreciated our wisdom: it’s more important to save the communist movement than hold on to dogmas of faith that aren’t very clear right now.

Guys from the department (there are dozens of them – interpreters, assistants, consultants) tell stories about Brezhnev’s meetings with leaders of fraternal parties. Twelve meetings. He patted Mies on the shoulder – communique. Shook McLennan’s hand – communique. The meeting with Kadar was the most pleasant, according to Brezhnev. Kadar came up to him and said, “Leonid, I don’t have any questions. But *Pravda* is running one communique after another. I need a communique too.” They hugged – and a communique appeared.

It’s a circus.

B.N. told me how Leonid Ilyich once said to him, “Boris, I won’t meet with your guys, don’t have the strength.” “In truth,” B.N. continued, “he really was ‘off.’ He has hearing problems... The situation is completely absurd, and in the meantime we have ‘a historic success’...”

However, maybe this is for the best. Maybe it’s not our business to “coordinate” communist and other forces on a world scale? Maybe our job is to go like a wave-piercing boat [*волнорез*] – where there’s opportunity and ability, relying on Russia being unsinkable? The

most important thing is not to have nuclear war. Maybe all of our activity in the “third world” is only inertia and paying dues for previous ideological commitments?

Maybe our political fatigue and senile incapacity for leadership is – “the hand of God?”
Maybe it conveniently coincided with Russia’s objective need to be left alone to float for a while wherever and however it can, just so as not to be disturbed?

I must have written this under the impression of a book I just read. I bought it in Paris, *La tradition russe* by Tibor Szamuely. I read it with excitement, partially because I knew the author: after the war he studied in my department at Moscow State University. He is the nephew of the famous Tibor Szamuely (there is a photo of him next to Lenin on Red Square in 1919) – one of the leaders of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Tibor-junior was born in 1925 in Moscow. In 1951, during the “cosmopolitan” campaign, he was imprisoned. He was released in 1955 and left for Hungary, and after the “events” he emigrated to London, where he soon became a university professor. He died in 1973.

The book, which was published posthumously, is written with an astonishing love for and poignancy about Russia, for a man with such a fate. It is a tragic story. It presents Russian history as a never-ending drama of a great nation that for a thousand years has been defending its right to life and greatness. The book’s main idea is that Russians would not have been able to preserve themselves as a nation, could not have overcome the colossal obstacles, unparalleled by any other nation on this scale, if they did not sacrifice almost everything for the benefit of the State... including almost all values and rights (political, social, individual, etc.) that constitute the natural framework of West European societies.

France. A delegation “for sharing experience of ideological work”... V. Afanasyev – the editor in chief of *Pravda*, T. Zhdanova – Secretary of the Leningrad City Council, M. Nenashev – Deputy Head of the CC Propaganda Department, E. Chekharin – Rector of the Higher Party School, D. Moiseenko – our [department’s] assistant on France.

The surprise visit was a sign of “a thaw” between PCF-CPSU, which was noted by *Le Monde* and *Figaro*. On the 23rd Kanapa received us at the CC PCF, railed against the Socialist Party of France. “I love you Anatole, but I won’t tell you anything” (regarding the PCF Plenum’s resolutions on participation in the Berlin conference).

Meetings with other members of the PCF, conversations, heated debates, discussions.
Sightseeing and exploring the city, visiting museums and shops.

At work we are racing with results from Berlin. Zagladin and Zhilin returned two days after the rest of the delegation. For some reason B.N. dragged me to Suslov’s – to draft the PB’s resolution on Berlin (it was published on July 3rd in *Pravda*). Suslov seemed surprised. Then Brezhnev showed up. I was in the waiting room when he came to Suslov’s. I think he took me

for Suslov's secretary. He only asked me if Suslov was alone. At that moment, B.N. and Suslov came out from the next room. Brezhnev, holding on to Suslov's cabinet door, announced that in the morning he shaved, rested, called regional committee secretaries and for the rest of the day was working at the Kremlin. B.N. tried to bring up the idea of the draft PB resolution on Berlin, Brezhnev only said, "Is it not too soon?" But B.N., "We have to provide a foundation for analogous resolutions for parties that are loyal to us." It seems Suslov must have thought the same thing, because the resolution came out the next day. However, I think Brezhnev was also cautious because he did not understand that the draft would be circulated to everyone (including Gromyko and Andropov, without whose opinion, it seems, he does not pass anything in foreign affairs).

July 19, 1976

I spent last week writing an article for Ponomarev for *Kommunist*. It was tough going: to say it "our way" and at the same time without going beyond Berlin's "collective agreement," without letting an overly CPSU-colored interpretation of the conference seep in. B.N. clearly does not want that. Maybe the wise old man wants to use this careful way to let fraternal parties know that the CPSU "made conclusions" and calmly accepted the "new stage" of the ICM as something inevitable.

By the way, in the first draft [B.N.] asked me to remove the number of quotes "from our chief" and carefully put the paragraph praising his contribution to the conference in brackets. He verbally explained the changes to me. I wonder if he is getting ready for the "era after Brezhnev"??

My participation in the editorial board of *Kommunist* is already giving me a lot of extra trouble. There are weekly meetings of the editorial board. They keep sending me texts, and it seems I have to at least look at all of them.

Balmashnov told me that Iskanderov visited him and asked to convey to B.N. that Trapeznikov (secretly) assigned someone in the Institute of History to prepare an "internal review" of Volume I of the *International Labor Movement*. Balmashnov commented this way: they are plotting a repeat of what happened with Volume V of the *History of the CPSU*, when B.N. got a slap on the wrist (many thought it was the bell tolling for him). I don't really buy it. Most likely Iskanderov is weaving an intrigue: he really wants the position of director of the Institute of African Studies, so he is demonstrating his loyalty. It just seems to be a clearly no-win undertaking. In today's ideological situation, when things are being said at the conference of communist parties that would have given heart attacks to our orthodoxy two years ago – in this situation to catch unfortunate ideological phrases and accuse a CC Secretary... No, Trapeznikov is not such a fool, though he is a fanatic.

Plus, there are already positive reviews in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, in *Pravda*, in *World Economy and International Relations*. *Kommunist* perfectly captured its essence. In August there will be a piece in *Questions of History*. If Trapeznikov was up to something, he could have prevented this process somehow. Moreover, he knows there is an “internal review” of the volume’s manuscript from the Marx-Engels Institute. Whom will he lean on? Not to mention that his head of the sector Khromov – a member of the chief editorial board – gave a great review of the manuscript, and his main minions are also “smeared” by participating in the chief editorial board and discussions.

It must be bogus.

On Thursday I met with friends. Bovin, Karyakin were there. We attempted to figure out the meaning of our “positions” in each of our lives. Bovin was indignant: “If I had the freedom, I feel I could speak with the people how they deserve, to explain to them what is really happening in the world.” I lazily objected, “Who is stopping you, unless of course in your heart you think like Kissinger and Carillo.” My thoughts about myself – “frontier” [sic in English]. This frontier has already reached the West coast. Everything has been mastered, the Indians have been turned into an object for tourists. There is no strength left to do anything else. You are satisfied with a job well done within the boundary of your official microcosm, dismissing the thought whether it’s any use to anyone on the outside. Bovin deciphered it as follows: you sit in a pile of shit and force yourself to think that you can’t get out...

Yesterday at the dacha I was looking forward to Bovin’s TV appearance on “International Panorama.” He was decent. At least three times he departed from canonical views: on Spain, on Carter and presidential affairs in the U.S. in general, and on Lebanon.

August 31, 1976

I skipped a month and a half. Therefore, I will summarize what happened during that time.

From August 12-27th I was on the Riga coast, in the super comfortable “Yantar.” Before that, on August 3rd, I met with Andrew Rothstein, who refused to meet with B.N. because he thinks the latter is scared to treat the British Communist Party the way it should be to bring it back to the path of Marxism-Leninism. Naturally, Brezhnev and his friend Suslov did not want to waste their time on him. I invited Nenashev to the conversation, he is the deputy of the Propaganda Department, we went to France together. Old man Rothstein is living history of the Comintern and so on. As a boy he sat on Lenin’s lap while he played chess with his father²⁵... He says that “our trouble” (the “fault” of your leadership) is that you (the CPSU) have gotten full

²⁵ Theodore Rothstein was a prominent figure in the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, Lenin’s friend in exile, he moved to England permanently before World War I. [Author’s note]

of yourself. He remembered that Stalin refused to send a division to London in 1945 for an Allied parade... That's when the British working class realized that they do not count. And they – being Englishmen – do not forget such things. (By the way, Rothstein speaks Russian quite fluently, although a little too correctly). His main topic is the worthlessness of our propaganda. "You do not reach the Western public. Your journalists and propagandists are engaged in literary exercises, while we need facts, we need a skillful presentation of reality."

Nenashev assured him that we understand, that there was a CC resolution regarding the press agency "Novosti," which stipulated a staff of special observers who know the Western audience.

Meanwhile, a few days later I learned the following. After this resolution was released, the one that "strengthened and expanded" "Novosti," Brezhnev called Kirilenko (from Crimea), apparently unaware of this decision, started telling him that this organization only guzzles public resources and is "inflated," while its materials are gathering dust in embassy hallways...

A note along these lines appeared right afterwards, signed by two members of the Politburo, Kirilenko and Andropov. Immediately another CC resolution passed, it cut "Novosti" by 75 percent and brought it down to a level that, incidentally, it deserves. It should be closed entirely. It was a lifeless idea from the start. Now Tolkunov is trying to find new positions for his employees wherever he can. There are hundreds of them, it is hard to believe, thousands.

Before my vacation I met with a few CP delegations. An Italian delegation – 15 regional committee secretaries. I told them about the greatness of their party, what their work means for all of us. I said how important it is that we (Brezhnev and Berlinguer) demonstrate our friendship to the world "despite our differences," thereby disappointing and confusing our enemies.

September 18, 1976

In the first half of September I was in Hungary with my daughter. The Hungarians entertained us freely, showed a lot of interesting things.

While I was there I read a transcript of conversation between Brezhnev and Kadar in Crimea (August 26, 1976). Brezhnev calls Kadar by the familiar form of address [*на ты*], Kadar uses the formal [*на ВЫ*]. [Brezhnev takes] a lecturing tone, going as far as offering evaluations of Hungarian leaders and giving recommendations on their account. At the same time, there is a sincere expression of confidence, praise for Janos himself for internationalism, for understanding and wisdom. Brezhnev behaved as a "senior" and "indisputable," he did not "consult" he advised.

Incidentally, I was struck by Brezhnev's harshness when talking about foreign policy and ideological questions in particular (a lot tougher than in Zavidovo before the XXV Congress). In

regard to the FRG-GDR problem he gave “no easing” to Schmidt, and in regard to ideological intolerance of lurches he condemned [Gyorgy] Aczel (member of the MSZMP Politburo) for supposedly being dangerous with his liberal manners.

I was also surprised by his statement about a new International Meeting of the ICM. It is too early to put it in the practical plane, he said, but it’s time to think about forms, approaches, and methods. There is no use waiting for the Chinese to agree to a meeting. To him, the entire problem of the unity of the ICM (despite Berlin) boils down to a new meeting...

In Budapest we spent an evening with Nadia Barta, Kadar’s assistant. We had a nice conversation on literary and sociological topics. Nadia offered me *Kontinent* to read. “Don’t be shy, it’s simple here... Tomorrow when you are at the CC, just give it to someone and they’ll get it to me!”

So, issues Nos. 7 and 8. Maksimov, Nekrasov and a multitude of other names that used to be famous at home. I read it for two nights. Including a pamphlet by Naum Korzhavin – an appeal to “leftist intellectuals” in the West. His assessments of Fidel, Che Guevara, Allende... Not everyone would dare.

How powerful his words! I can see the absurdity of his views and I’m ready to debate him, I have killer arguments. But [his writing] is so effective! The style, satire and venom as such... The mastery of the written word. There are also chapters from Vasily Grossman’s second book, a continuation of *For a Just Cause*. It is called *Life and Fate*. It’s about preparations for the battle of Stalingrad. Incredibly powerful piece. There is an afterward by literary critic Yampolsky – about the final decade of Grossman’s life, after the arrest of his manuscript in 1963, and his funeral.

The protest of E. Etkind, a famous literary critic, his anger and reproach for judges and KGB agents who forced him to leave the country (in 1974). According to him, he did not do anything anti-Soviet, nor was he planning to. And he didn’t write anything [anti-Soviet] publicly. He was charged because of a few phrases in a letter to his brother-in-law, who was planning to emigrate to Israel. Etkind tried to persuade him against it, saying that he should fight for justice at home, that he would be a nobody in Israel. The letter really landed in the right hands. He describes how he was expelled from the Writer’s Union and the Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad, how his friends – writers and poets – treated him.

I was in a terrible mood after all this reading. By now probably hundreds of highly talented and educated people have emigrated to the West and are telling the inside story about us, armed with all their knowledge and skill.

In Budapest I found out right away that I was assigned to a delegation that will attend the Congress of the Danish CP (September 23-26), headed by Chernenko. I got back to Moscow and

the flurry of papers started: speech, memos, “gifts,” the main one being – orders for “Burmeister & Wain” ships, they have the biggest party organization there.

So far interaction with Chernenko (he is perhaps Brezhnev’s closest and most trusted person) shows that he is smart and simple, he doesn’t fuss even though it’s a new undertaking for him.

I am on the phone with B.N. almost every day, he is in Crimea. I’m working on articles on “social democracy” and “Soviet democracy,” the upcoming CPSU delegation visit to England.

Today I went to an exhibition of Konchalovsky. It must be the first time his work is exhibited in its entirety – all its stages, from the 1910s to the 1950s. Yes, we are finally growing up and aren’t afraid to show artists who, during the October Revolution, Civil War, and the first five-year plans, painted nude models, flowers and landscapes showing old-world scenery and family portraits.

Terrific drawings by Lithuanian artist Kraskaus – “Memory,” “Struggle,” “Life” – three series. It is up for the State Prize this year.

October 16, 1976

Morning till night I’m “getting B.N. ready” for England. A pile of all kinds of references, speech drafts, notes for conversations. All of this will end up in the wastebasket of course. His “guidance” consists of saturating these papers with more and more propaganda (in many respects demagogic), which will, of course, only offend the British. I am continuously surprised that he, a man with a sharp, critical, and practical view of things, with a tendency to view things from the inside and to see the bad rather than the good in people, to always suspect them of self-interest (if they are doing something that is not directly for him), a man with so much political experience and sometimes even a police approach to foreign affairs – that he can believe that the Brits, the Labour Party on the level of the LP and LD [sic in English], will give him the opportunity to give hours-long speeches with calls to détente, arms reductions, cessation of the arms race, reduction in military budgets... and at the same time “campaign for Soviet power” by pointing out that our bread and milk cost this much and trams and metro that much without change for the last 50 years!

No matter how hard I tried to convince him that conversations will be strictly business, he just got annoyed. I am willing to bet that Callaghan-Healey-Croslan will have the following questions: when is Brezhnev coming to England; why are we interfering with a peaceful settlement in South Africa; why are we building up our naval forces beyond what’s necessary for defense; about dissidents and Jews (the third basket of Helsinki); why are we choosing so poorly

with the half-billion loan that the Brits provided to us in 1975, and at the same time talking about the need for a world-wide development of economic relations.

B.N. does not have authority to speak on any of these issues. In response he will “make propaganda” and call for further cooperation for the sake of peace! And he will blatantly deny any accusations (for example, he does not even know the state of affairs with the navy).

I gave him articles on Social Democracy (before the Geneva Congress of the Socialist International, in light of our Berlin meeting) that have been edited over and over. He poked at them while he was on vacation in Crimea. I must say that Sasha Veber wrote an excellent, very political article on social democracy. It could become a turning point for the International Labor Movement, because it would be “penned” by Ponomarev himself. But now – Hic Rhodus, hic salta! [sic in Latin] Now B.N. has to go to Suslov and decide whether he will speak or not. The Congress of the Socialist International is just a little over a month away. I reminded him several times, he agreed. He sees Suslov every day, but no result. I’m sure the same thing will happen as numerous times before with this subject and others: it will be postponed and forgotten. Then, a year later, usually before a vacation, B.N. starts to grumble – I’ve been insisting on this article for years, this Veber of yours can’t get anything done (hinting at me, too), or he doesn’t want to, he clearly has reformist tendencies, so he puts it off. And so forth.

This is once again the outcome of his position in the bureaucracy, he essentially does not have much power in the top levels of the Party. Just as we interact with him, so he can only surreptitiously push through his agenda, he can make comments but they are often ignored. He does not determine anything there, and certainly he does not make the decisions.

Woddis was here last week. He came to work out a visit for his General Secretary to Moscow, but at the level of Brezhnev. This matter has dragged on over three years. But once again B.N. blew it off till next year.

These two weeks I also had to work with Blatov to prepare Brezhnev’s talks with [Agostinho] Neto (president of Angola), as well as prepare the text of Brezhnev’s interview for French television. It took place on October 4th, and it seems it made an impression in the West. Such are the laws of modern politics and mass media! The same words in hundreds of smart and authoritative articles produce almost no results. But here, even without any special arguments, they represent a real contribution to policy.

The Moscow public for days could not regain consciousness from surprise – how could Brezhnev speak so well, for half an hour, and without any notes. It doesn’t even occur to them how it’s done.

One more thing on this subject. It happened the day before yesterday. Yesterday it was published in full in the newspapers. I quote an excerpt from Kirilenko's speech on the occasion of Brezhnev receiving a second Hero of the Soviet Union star for his 70th birthday.

"Dear Leonid Ilyich! During this time, you, like nobody else, elevated the greatness of our country and its peoples to such heights, you so wisely changed the course of world development towards détente and consolidation of a lasting peace in the world. For this, you, Leonid Ilyich, deservedly gained the deep love of millions of people on our planet..."

"The Party and our people love you, Leonid Ilyich... Your whole life journey, wisdom and talent gave you the opportunity to collect and absorb such precious qualities of a party and state leader, which are unique to a great man of our time, a leader of our Party and all the peoples of our Motherland."

I think we are approaching the final frontier. I don't recall getting to this level with Nikita.

Yesterday I inadvertently was present during a phone conversation between Ponomarev and Grishin (the latter is ill and was not at the PB when Brezhnev received the award). B.N. told him how it went. They are not very close or on familiar terms with each other, but B.N. still told him what happened and in the end couldn't help saying, "Andrei Pavlovich spoke for a long time, and the same thing over and over, everybody already knows it... Everyone was tired already, but he kept talking and talking. More than others in such cases."

The old man is perturbed by this inexorable advance of the Brezhnev cult.

October 23, 1976

Brezhnev spoke with [Armand] Hammer, who, like Harriman, came to promote Carter. Brezhnev said to him, "I don't know, I don't know... What your president has said about détente and the Soviet Union is unacceptable." Hammer assured him that it was all only done to get in power. Supposedly things will be different [once he is in office]. He boasted that his billion-dollar deals with us are successful, that he will provide us with so much fertilizer we'll be exporting bread ourselves soon. He thanked us for continuing the construction of the shopping center in Moscow, despite the cooling of Soviet-American relations due to presidential elections.

Highlights: 1) he tried to persuade Brezhnev to restore relations with Israel. "It would make it easier to solve all your problems: first of all, with our Jews. You could send everyone who wants to leave to the Israeli consulate and let them figure it out. In general," he said, "You need to resolve the Jewish issue. You still underestimate the power and influence of Zionists in the U.S. They are the ones who got rid of Nixon."

Brezhnev said with emphasis: “I gave orders to let everyone go who wants to, with the exception of those working with defense or state secrets. The rest can go.”

“Secondly,” Hammer said, “You’ll have an easier time in the Middle East, you could directly influence Israel... Take Golda Meir as an ambassador in Moscow again, and I assure you, thousands of problems will immediately lose their acuteness.”

Brezhnev: “It is not a simple matter. We severed relations in protest against aggression. But the aggression continues.”

Hammer: “But you do not have to approve a state’s policies to have diplomatic relations, that’s how it is everywhere.”

Brezhnev: “It is an interesting proposal; we will think about it.”

2) “You have a huge number of artwork from the 1920s in the vaults of the Tretyakov Gallery and the Russian Museum. Works by Russian abstract artists like Kandinsky, Malevich, etc. It is unlikely they will ever be popular in the Soviet Union. Frankly, I do not really understand them myself, but they are fashionable and in huge demand in the West. You should organize an exhibition of these paintings in Paris or somewhere else. It would be profitable and it would be a good gesture in terms of the Helsinki Third Basket. Incidentally, you could make good money if you sell these paintings in the West, each one would fetch millions.”

Brezhnev: “We will think about it; this idea is not without appeal.”

Ponomarev is wearing me out with preparations for his visit to England. Dozens of versions for his speeches and so on. Any normal person would see that no one will let him sing his propaganda songs there.

Inozemtsev stopped by. He flipped through some papers and unceremoniously summed it up: this isn’t even propaganda, just cheap agitation. I told him, “Kolya, why don’t you go and tell B.N. the same thing. I have blisters on my tongue on this subject.”

“He can go to hell,” the academician replied. Only a person who has someone powerful backing him, such as the General Secretary who is not shy expressing his contempt for Ponomarev, can tell a CC CPSU Secretary and candidate member of the PB to go there. There is also an objective principle that is reflected by people like Inozemtsev, Arbatov, in part Aleksandrov, although the latter is more ideological. It is called the “political approach,” i.e. the ability to work from realities and act in a businesslike manner with Western politicians, to expect real results for the economy and for peace. Ponomarev, on the other hand, thinks in ideological, revelatory-propaganda categories of “the struggle against imperialism.” Of course, he irritates people, especially because he wants to appear as the implacable defender of “our class interests,”

even more than Leonid Ilyich. I am entirely on the side of Inozemtsev and Arbatov, and they know it, but they also understand that life has tied me to Ponomarev.

Overall, Brezhnev is close to this [pragmatic] concept (Czechoslovakia is another matter). Ponomarev's approach, on the other hand, is destroying the ICM. Everything still viable in the movement will never return to the Comintern corral, because it is a dead end, idiocy, suicide for communist parties.

November 7, 1976

I was on Red Square. Went to the reception at the Kremlin. The strongest impression – the magnificent wives of high-ranking officials: furs, diamonds, lordly demeanor. In a word, the salt of the earth.

From October 28th through November 3rd we were in England. The first visit by a CPSU delegation to the Labour Party. Headed by Ponomarev. The delegation consisted of Afanasyev (*Pravda*), Inozemtsev, Pimenov (VTSSPS)²⁶, Kruglova (SSOD),²⁷ and I. Our accompanying interpreters – Dzhavad Sharif, Lagutin, Mikhailov.

In advance of our visit, about 10 days before, the English press and radio organized an anti-Ponomarev coven [*шабаш*]: he is the main instigator of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, he is our chief anti-Semite, from the days of Comintern he has been teaching communist parties how to destroy democracy, and right now his main task is to undermine Western regimes. There were banners – “No[t] wanted in Britain!” [sic in English], i.e. the kind usually made for criminals.

Ian Mikardo himself, the Chairman of the International Committee of the Labour Party, one day before our visit told the BBC that Ponomarev was “undesirable” indeed, but they, the Labourists, do not get to choose the makeup of the delegation. “Same as when we went to Moscow in 1973 we would not have allowed them to dictate the makeup of our delegation, or I, a Jew and a Zionist, would have never been allowed to set foot there. It is my job to receive Ponomarev, but my wife will be outside with the others, demonstrating against the oppression of Jews in the USSR.”

The moment we arrived in Heathrow we felt what British security means. Later we drank cognac together. They are the knights of their field. It was a pleasure to watch how they work. Our security has a lot to learn.

From the very beginning and until we flew home, B.N. was playing the same tune: we are for peace, against the arms race, for Soviet-British cooperation, for trade, for friendship between

²⁶ All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. [Translator's note]

²⁷ Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts. [Translator's note]

our peoples. He did not let anything derail him. Only one time he lost his temper – at the parliamentary committee, but more on that later.

In Parliament we nearly had a scandal. We were seated in the visitors' gallery. Winston Churchill's grandson, also named Winston, as well as Margaret Thatcher, a "a beauty and a bitch" (as I assessed her the time I first saw her) and others, especially the Zionist speaker [Greville] Janner, who demonstratively came to the session in a yarmulke, organized an obstruction of the discussion on the agenda. The Speaker kept having to strike the gavel and shout, "Order! Order!" but the parliamentarians would not calm down.

In the end, someone shouted, "I spy strangers!" This is a medieval parliamentary signal, if it is said during a session, the Speaker has to call a vote (divisions [sic in English], i.e. the parliamentarians either move to the right or the left depending on whether they are voting "for" or "against"). If the majority is "for," the gallery has to be immediately cleared of strangers. We were told this kind of vote hadn't taken place in the British Parliament in 150 years.

Prime Minister Callaghan came to the rescue. He got up and walked out of the room, thereby indicating that he is ready to change the time of our meeting and hold it immediately in his office, which is also in the Parliament building.

We got up and went for the door, accompanied by scornful shouts from the parliamentarians. (The next day the newspapers wrote: the delegation wanted to avoid embarrassment in case they would be asked to leave. However, the vote was completely unexpected – 198 voted for us to say, and only 8 – against!)

Ponomarev was "wound up" on the Jewish issue to the limit. When we returned from Scotland and had a meeting with a group of Labour MPs in their office at Westminster, the following incident took place.

We were seated at a large round table. Joan Lester was chairing the meeting. Janner came in his yarmulke, demonstratively put a Bible signed by 250 MPs in the center of the table, and a "roll" of the Magna Carta. But as soon as he raised the Jewish theme, Ponomarev exploded. He spontaneously gave the most expressive speech I've ever heard from his lips. He got carried away, lost self-control, banged on the table, pointed his finger. The quick Zhenya Lagutin, an assistant in our department, could barely keep up with the translation. He started quietly, but flared up with every phrase: "I would like to know whether anyone ever explained to the boys and girls making a ruckus outside these walls, "Ponomarev out!" [sic] (he actually said it in English), that if it wasn't for the Red Army there would be nobody left to emigrate to Israel, not from the USSR or any other country?! There wouldn't be a Jewish nation as such!"

The honorable gentlemen were stunned at first, smiled ironically at his quick temper, looked at each other. Then they turned serious and started to give Janner disapproving looks.

One of them took advantage of a pause in Ponomarev's squall and threw a "lifeline" by offering to switch to the question of Anglo-Soviet trade. B.N. came to his senses and took the opportunity.

In the morning newspapers came out with big headlines, "Mr. Ponomariev shouts on M.P.'s" [sic in English]. That is how Janner presented the event in his press conference. But Joan Lestor, who gave her own press conference, responded to questions that she was sitting next to Ponomarev and did not see or hear him banging on the table or yelling at members of Parliament. Meanwhile, at the airport before our departure she gave me a large packet of letters with requests to allow our Jews to emigrate. During a "heart-to-heart talk" with the delegation on the airplane, B.N. summed up the results: "We need to do something about the Jewish question. We are underestimating the negative impact of this issue on our foreign policy and the possibility of promoting socialism in the West in general."

The Jewish theme was present as a leitmotif throughout the visit. Already at Heathrow we were met with posters on the theme of freeing the Jews, and it was the same everywhere. Groups of demonstrators of various sizes followed us with the slogans, "Civil rights to Soviet Jews!" "Helsinki is not a joke!" "Down with Ponomarev – organizer of repression of Jews!" "Freedom to Bukovsky!" and so on. These posters and others like them were displayed by the hotel where the delegation was staying, by Transport-House, by Parliament, by Westminster Abbey. Whole scenes were played out by the Abbey: people dressed in Red Army uniforms would seize people dressed in prisoner uniforms and drag them down the street, shackled with a ball and chain. In Glasgow the Ukrainians joined in the protests, "Mr. Ponomarev! Free 49 million Ukrainians!"

In Westminster Abbey the supreme hierarch welcomed Ponomarev with the words, "It is a high honor for us!" This was a second after we walked through a wall of demonstrators, deafened by insults, drums, and whistles. The deputy supreme hierarch led us through the Cathedral, making witty and ironic comments, like the British do, while showing us tombs and other "things," left here from the greatness and pettiness of those who made British history.

A reception at the General Council of Trade Unions: Murray, Jones, and others. B.N. lectured them on Marxism-Leninism. He led the conversation rather poorly, even though these smart, polite, large-scale politicians are very friendly towards us. They patiently listened to how much bread costs in the USSR, what the rent is, how much we pay for metro, etc. It was embarrassing. When B.N. reproached them on why they don't stop the race of military budgets, he was calmly rebuffed. Nevertheless, everything ended well, "warmly." We barely left Transport House when Murray, who represents 11.5 million trade union members, told the press, "The demonstrators against the Soviet delegation do not represent the British Labour movement."

Dinner at the embassy. Wedgewood Benn, [Ronald] Hayward, [Norman] Atkinson (treasurer), and a skinny Englishwoman whom B.N. kept ignoring in his toasts, and she turned out to be an influential lady. Finally, again with British irony, she started shouting “discrimination!!”

On the morning of the 29th we visited [Anthony] Crosland (Foreign Office). Same issues as with the others.

In the afternoon we flew to Glasgow. In the evening there was a reception at a regional council of Glasgow. It was chaired by a woman representative of the local Scottish Labour Party, naturally in a long tartan skirt. The atmosphere was as if we were in Hungary or the GDR, the Scots joke about themselves and the “foreigners” (that’s how they call the British in Scotland). An astonishing capacity for oratory: jokes and irony are organically mixed in with serious politics. Everyone loves to talk. Ponomarev’s toast, a fairly mediocre one, was spruced up by Lagutin’s masterful translation.

On the morning of the 30th, Saturday, we had a meeting with shop-stewards and ordinary workers... Communist trade union leaders. Q&A. I got the Jewish question and gave a “passionate speech” about the role of Jews in Soviet society. B.N. started to rein me in, and finally cut me off. The atmosphere again was like a good fraternal communist party, though apparently there were almost no communists in the auditorium.

Trip to Edinburgh. Watched a soccer match. A tour of the city. The famous castle, the birthplace of Connolly, a monument to Walter Scott, Burns. Hills covered with heather and red with fallen leaves, the bay, sheep in the city limits.

A reception at the Greater Edinburgh Council. Amazing goodwill. This time B.N.’s toast was more or less successful – he imitated the style of the Scots (added some soccer references to his political speech).

Nighttime transfer to Glasgow by car. On Sunday the 31st we took a trip to the lakes and bays of Scotland. I’ve never seen anything more beautiful in any other country...

B.N.’s conversations along the way, including at a tavern in St. Catherines with a fisherman and a miner, as the TV portrayed it.

In the evening a reception by leadership of the Labor Party and the Congress of Trade Unions of Scotland. The same chairwoman. Toasts, gifts... A conversation with my seatmate – Deputy General Secretary of the Scottish Trade Union (turned out he was a communist; he talked with me in “confidential” tones).

On the morning of the 1st – flight to London. Before that, a press conference at the airport. It seems they ran out of questions. At 3 p.m. we had the main conversation in the Labour

Party Executive Committee. Only five people showed up. B.N. expounded the entire “main memo” from Moscow, despite the fact that in the opening speech Mikardo made it clear they didn’t want a serious conversation, nor did they have the authority for it (he talked about three reasons for difficulties in the relationship between LP and the CPSU).

On Wednesday, November 3, we flew back to Moscow.

The next day I wrote B.N. a memo for the Politburo. He wasn’t expecting to speak. However, it happened. He came back very happy: “They listened with interest, asked a lot of questions, and said to ‘keep it up’.”

The result? There is none. Social Democrats will never make peace with us, no matter how “good” we appear and how politely we conduct the “ideological struggle” with them. The contrast in attitudes towards us between “ordinary people” and “top leadership” is striking, the latter reserved and reluctant. Like it was forced. Then again, if it wasn’t for the Jewish problem, it could have worked out and in five years or so we might have struck up an “official friendship.”

November 8, 1976

Yesterday I read materials for the editorial board of *Questions of History*. Among them is academician Strumilin’s posthumous piece “on historical sciences.” Around 70 pages. It is an amazing work and along the same lines as what I wrote about Konchalovsky’s exhibit. Everything is finally falling into place, and for Strumilin – even the God-BUILDER [Alexander] Bogdanov, who, it turns out, foresaw computers, the basic principles of cybernetics, systems theory [*оргнауку*], not to mention the fact that he died from a medical experiment on himself.

I wonder how the members of the board will react to this article? (It was rejected.)

I re-read my opus from 10 years ago (the piece that Fedoseyev made the object of his study of my revisionism back in the day). How brilliantly it’s written! I probably won’t be able to write like that now. By the way, it predicts all the processes in the labor and communist movements that have now come to the political surface.

November 12, 1976

Ponomarev and Zagladin went to Portugal for the CP Congress. I am in charge. I went to the Politburo: Gromyko reported on his talks in Sofia with the Egyptian Foreign Minister [Ismail] Fahmi. I listened to him, to the comments and “discussion,” and once again scratched my head in wonder. They seemed to be saying that Sadat found himself in a stupid position, he is not receiving “a single bullet” from the U.S., so he wants to restore “good relations” with us. Gromyko had a directive – to remain tough and make it contingent on restoring the Agreement. In other words, use Sadat’s difficult situation to get him to agree to “truly good relations.” But why do we need good relations with him? Why we need any relations with Egypt was somehow

completely out of sight... That is to say, the point of the policy (its goal) was completely absent throughout the discussion.

Admittedly, you could feel the “fatigue” from all these Arab affairs. Fahmi thinks that a meeting between Brezhnev and Sadat would be the main “weapon” to restore relations. Gromyko remarked on this subject: but then we would have to meet with Assad.

Brezhnev: “I don’t trust any of them. The only people who can be honest among them are the Palestinians.”

Other members of the PB politely raised doubts. Kosygin said that all of them (Arabs) are happy when any one of their “brothers” is defeated or beaten. And they all, he said, lie to each other and to us. Gromyko added that “they all” turned away from the Palestinians and are pleased there was some bloodletting. That is why, “even [Houari] Boumediene, who was their fierce supporter, now doesn’t give a damn about them.” And so on along these lines.

Our minister finished by saying that according to Fahmi, Assad is afraid of a terrorist attack against himself. He startles at the click of a camera...

So what?!

Then [the Politburo] discussed Gromyko’s note: to take “our own measures to defend the USSR’s interests” if West Berlin is embroiled in the election of a European Parliament (beforehand he tried to explain in layman’s terms what that is).

Maybe this is the class approach, “don’t touch what’s mine, or else!” But West Berlin is “not mine”... And does détente mean anything at all? What do we want with the West Berlin issue? What’s the prospect? I.e. once again – is there a **policy**?! After all, following this logic we shouldn’t have allowed the Austrian Treaty of 1955!

Today I was at the CC Secretariat. B.N.’s note (in his absence) for his conversations with Axen (what Zagladin and I wrote on Vorobyovy Gory [Sparrow Hills]). It was rejected with irritation, especially by Kirilenko and Zimyanin. Their reason was that, firstly, why are we only working with the Germans on this matter (i.e. agreeing on how to bring in line wavering Western fraternal parties who are engaging in anti-Sovietism). Secondly, if these parties find out, they will be offended and quarrel for the next 10 years... Axen likes to talk, and if we tell any others (socialist countries), a leak will be inevitable.

The only moral that can be deduced from this discussion is: to hell with them, with these Marchaises and Berlinguers. They can do whatever they want, as long as they don’t criticize us and we maintain “good relations”...

This is wise, this is right. I already wrote about this when I considered Chernenko's "attitudes and behavior" in Denmark (in contrast to B.N., who is burdened with dogmas and an ideological itch to teach, cultivate, encourage them to sermonize!).

Lyubimov [gave a] vulgar and cowardly interview to *The New York Times* (about bureaucracy, conservatives, Joseph [*Иосиф Прекрасном*],²⁸ etc.) He is making yet another tour of Italy and Yugoslavia. What a petty, stupid man. How can such a man possess great talent?!

November 13, 1976

"Medals are a promissory note of public opinion: their value is based on the credit of the issuer." This is Schopenhauer, I'm reading him again. Archaic, but periodically you come across "pretty decent ideas," which show that we haven't had a lot of new ones over the last 100 years.

November 14, 1976

I went to a performance by [Arkady] Raikin, "It depends on us." Boring. He has outlived himself and his genre. He was always a joker and overall an optimist. Now he wants to be a pure satirist with philosophical and political overtones (rather sad ones). This doesn't work anymore, nobody believes in the effectiveness of satire, or anything else. And covertly flipping the bird, even when it's fairly obvious, doesn't surprise anyone anymore and doesn't cause a reaction like it used to. The public knows that it's pointless, that even if much more was allowed it still wouldn't be effective and wouldn't change anything.

He was greeted with a big round of applause and a sense of gratitude. At the end he got a long standing ovation. As I was standing there, clapping, I thought to myself: this isn't the applause of encouragement, it is a farewell.

November 23, 1976

The day before I read Politburo dispatch with Brezhnev's upcoming speeches in Romania. I was jarred by all the superlatives: Ceausescu is a "prominent figure in the ICM" (the same was said about Tito in Yugoslavia). It's ludicrous – before mass media and fraternal CPs. "Complete unity of views..." "on the basis of Marxism-Leninism," "common ideology," "we are happy when Romania supports our foreign policy," "traditionally unbreakable friendship," and so on. As if nothing ever happened.

I said to B.N.: I agree with the tactics – we are bigger and should be gracious, we should crush the Romanians' complaints in a tight embrace, taking advantage of the fact that Mao died and disappointed Ceausescu's hopes, while the Western market didn't open up based on anti-

²⁸ Biblical Joseph, the son of Jacob and Rachel in the Book of Genesis. [Translator's note]

Sovietism alone (they need profits, too). However, the word choice is undignified, it is overboard, a little laughable.

B.N. was understanding and suggested at the PB to “correct it,” especially the parts on “common ideology” and “on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.” Brezhnev: “Let it go, Boris. When it comes to theory and all kinds of ideological matters, we have fallen behind him (Ceausescu). We will need to catch up: he is an iron Stalinist!” (??)

A week of English cinema. The movies are in the style of classical realism. We selected them ourselves. Nothing about the present. “Historical period drama” or historical comedies... But the supplementary documentaries... About the creation of the automobile, the history of rail transport, London, and especially about oil production in the North Sea. The latter is simply “ideological sabotage.” Amazing technology, people doing fantastic, skilled, and precise work, creating exceptional material wealth... If you didn’t know [what you were watching] you could think it was “the great building of communism”... except without slogans and “selflessness for the greater good”... The audience saw everything. Guys around me mocked out loud our versions of such documentaries.

November 26, 1976

The epic of Brezhnev’s 70th anniversary is underway. Our B.N. hopped in and volunteered to prepare Brezhnev’s responses to the awards he would be getting from socialist countries, to Soviet medals, and his speech at the banquet. As the result, Brutents and I have been writing enthusiastic texts for the last two days. It’s astonishing how our work is organized: two deputies of the Department (and there is no one else right now), who have a huge amount of regular work, lock themselves in a room and write speeches that have absolutely nothing to do with their direct responsibilities.

And most importantly – all of this will go into the wastebasket because Aleksandrov won’t allow “just anybody” to propose this kind of material. He and only he is the master of these texts!

Andre Malraux has died. I read an article in *L'Humanite*.

Yu. Zhukov sent a “top level” telegram from Paris, reporting on the attitude of French communists to the “peace movement” (in connection to yet another call to convene the “forum of peace-loving forces” in January in Moscow – a mini-Congress for Peace), the endless initiatives that Moscow sprouts like mushrooms, various committees... The French dubbed the “Committee to aid the continuation of the 1973 Congress of Peace-Loving Forces” as the “committee of runaway Congress participants.”

This is all the fruit of Shaposhnikov's relentless energy. It's costing our government millions, including in hard currency, and for what... Peace is "made" in completely different committees. But [this activity] does create hundreds of feeders for "activists" of various levels, "fighters" for anything you want, just as long as they get a good salary and handouts from Moscow.

Someday, we (the International Department and Cde. Ponomarev) will get slammed for all this activity.

December 4, 1976

I was in Budapest from November 29th – December 3rd. "The six" on social democracy – in particular, in connection with the just-convened (on the same days) XIII Congress of the Socialist International. We had to land in Belgrade due to weather. In Budapest – on the "hill" for three days in state dachas. Discussion. My main speech with a reference to Pasternak, using the analogy of social democracy as a "footnote" to the movement of history determined by communism. The possibility of using social democracy's opportunism to collaborate with them and use them... Some others tried to find original approaches to social democracy as well (though not the Bulgarians and Czechs, they are still at a scholastic level, just shabby and drab, especially the Czechs!).

(By the way, yesterday Zagladin told me about a conversation with Berlinguer: "Why do you always pick on the Czechs?" Berlinguer: "What about you, don't you see yourselves that they're morons?!"

At "the six": I intervened in an argument between the smart and pragmatic Poles ([Bogumil] Suika, Sylwester) and the rigidly scholastic Bulgarians, who were shocked that I essentially supported the Poles, although formally I gave each side credit.

Dinner with CC Secretary [Andras] Denes. He is wise, calm, and boring. My toast, which was later brought up at every opportunity.

December 11, 1976

Yesterday I met [at the airport] and talked with General Secretaries of Canada and England – Kashtan and McLennan. I also met Plissonnier, but we didn't talk about anything. They are flying through Moscow on their way to a party Congress in Vietnam. Kashtan keeps asking, like a pupil, "what do we think about events in Canada and how should they formulate, 'based on the CPSU's experience,' the communist party's policy." It's not even subservience (on the contrary, he is very moody and minds his party leader prestige), he would never ask B.N. about something like this. He simply wants to borrow ideas wherever he can. He doesn't have many of his own, nor does he have thinking people around him... He went as far as getting our

Institute of USA Studies at the Academy of Sciences to write the history of his party for him. Our guys are writing it, along with the party's program and so on. Then Kashtan presents it as his own work: full guarantee, after all, the Soviets can't expose the plagiarism!

It is completely different with McLennan: we talked about unrelated subjects, mostly about the crisis in the U.K. and so forth.

When you are dealing with people from such meager parties, you always get an annoying feeling that you are dealing with armchair politicians. They think about politics and the situation in their countries in this spirit – not from within, as participants of events, but as grumpy onlookers.

This is in sharp contrast to the Italians, the French, the Danes... By the way, I did not notice this "armchair" quality in West Germans, even though their position in their country is no better than that of the Communist Party of Great Britain.

I recently read a transcript of a conversation between Brezhnev and Tito in Belgrade. For a long time, I couldn't come to my senses and make up my mind. Leonid Ilyich calmly and good naturedly (in the presence of both delegations) explained that we, the CPSU, don't have anything up our sleeve, we don't have any secret plans, and all the chatter about our intentions to encroach on Yugoslavia is pure nonsense and provocation. We do not support "[Com]informists" [Информовце]. "I cannot imagine that anyone in the USSR could support someone who speaks against the SKJ, against you (Tito)! We recorded in joint and international documents that we recognize each country's right to choose its own path to socialism. Nobody should interfere or meddle. However, why does your press keep lashing out at us, attributing all sorts of fantastic intentions to us, and your officials sometimes talk of 'two superpowers' and 'two centers of hegemony and suppression,' dropping all kinds of hints, etc. They keep raising a fuss about Stalinism, even though we are done with it. The resolutions of the XX Congress remain in force. We cannot allow anyone to undermine our friendship and cooperation. Both of us have many enemies and they use 'all this press' against us and against you." This is the essence of it, though not the exact words, of course.

Tito responded the next day. He praised L.I. for his frankness and promised to be frank himself. He said, "We see contradictions in your statement yesterday." (Brezhnev and Tito mostly use the formal form of address with each other, especially when in the company of others. Brezhnev sometimes slips and uses the familiar form, but Tito – never.) "There is a lack of understanding of our domestic and foreign policy. You ask, why stir up the past? Of course we should not fixate on it, but we should not lose sight of it either. You cannot remove the past with declarations alone. A lot of things in your (i.e. the CPSU's) behavior remind us of the past. Yes, there are people on both sides who question the other side's sincerity. Those on our side are fueled by the CPSU Program's known positions (on the revisionist leadership of the SKJ). Allow

me to quote two paragraphs from the “CPSU Program”... Three Party Congresses have taken place since this Program was adopted, yet you haven’t thought to fix these passages.

“Your suggestion to restore ‘Friendship societies’ is unacceptable to us: too much of its work here would be ‘unnecessary.’ We are grateful to you for supplying us with some military technology, but overflights by military aircraft and ships entering our ports can only be allowed in accordance with our legislation (notification within 60 days).

“As for our press, we do not think that criticizing Stalinism, statism, and the cult of personality is anti-Soviet. Moreover, we have developed our own information system that is different from yours. We have no intention of changing it.

“... There is a desire to involve Yugoslavia in the socialist community. We believe it will only complicate our relationship and hinder our cooperation with you.

“We consistently adhere to the decisions of the Berlin Conference (i.e. the communique adopted at this year’s conference of 28 European Communist Parties in Berlin), while in your press you allow yourself to continue relations with CPs from “pre-Berlin” positions. Your statements and actions are contrary to the spirit of the conference...”

In response, Brezhnev only praised Tito for being direct and said that he will “take it into consideration, even though he does not agree with all points...”

I thought about it for a long time afterwards. In fact, we sincerely want friendly relations with Yugoslavia, and we sincerely have no intention of absorbing it and so on. But we have not recognized it “in theory.” Subconsciously, without realizing it, we consider it to be a “deviation from the norm” and expect it to “reform.” They see this. Maybe Brezhnev was speaking from the heart, they do not doubt it. But the fundamental concept of our socialism remains the same, essentially a Stalinist and “Short Course” one. The Yugoslavs, same as the Italians, and the French – they see it as fundamentally incompatible with them. Hence their reluctance to integrally accept the term “proletarian internationalism,” which reminds them, not without reason, of the Comintern. Hence its replacement with the “international solidarity” category, which is sporadic on the surface.

1976 Epilogue

I must correct myself: in the epilogues to the previous two “volumes” I gave an unfairly disparaging assessment of Brezhnev. I wrote him off as a statesman too soon. He clearly surpassed his “colleagues.” I did speak about his achievements in preserving peace, but I underestimated the depth of his commitment and the sincerity of his determination to prevent a nuclear war.

This volume describes the preparation of the CPSU’s XXV Congress. The preparatory work was done in Zavidovo, the remote General Secretary’s dacha (it was also a hunting ground). A small group of top-level apparatchiks-intellectuals gathered there and made what was probably the last attempt to save face of the Soviet state, impose some common sense to its policies. In the course of incredibly frank discussions with the General Secretary, his quality as a staunch and steadfast “supporter of peace” (I apologize for the cliché, but I cannot find a better term for it) came through all the way. Here his role is truly “historic.”

If not for “Czechoslovakia-68,” which (we now know) he reluctantly agreed to most likely because he did not yet feel completely confident in top leadership; if not for “Afghanistan-79,” which a trio of Politburo members swayed him to do, using his physical and mental feebleness (he almost did not understand what was happening around him), I now think he deserved the Nobel Peace Prize. In any case, for his work for the cause of peace, Brezhnev deserved it more than anyone else who received it in the 1970s. Of course to imagine him as a Nobel laureate at that time would be pure fiction. Nevertheless...

In contrast to what has been said, his personal degradation continued: endless awards to himself, blatant vulgarity in demonstrating himself as the indisputable “master” of the country, encouragement of disgraceful fawning, an orgy of greetings and congratulations sent in the General Secretary’s name practically daily to plants, factories, republics, cities, and all kinds of collectives; breakdowns that indicated his mental distress.

This new “volume” contains new evidence of the decline and disintegration of the communist movement. Efforts continued to keep it afloat in connection with the XXV Congress of the CPSU and the European Conference of Communist Parties, though the efforts were cynical, ludicrous, and hopeless. The people involved – from the top leadership to the various levels of CC apparatchiks – did not believe in its reality of viability anymore. Moreover, though they did not admit it to themselves, they felt that the communist movement had become useless to most countries where it existed, and even more importantly – it was useless to the Soviet Union. The author’s (and others like him) commotion over “fraternal parties” has only one, though flimsy, excuse: if we could not give up the myth, at least we had to do our best to keep the preservation maneuvers from looking too silly and ridiculous. We tried to preserve some

dignity, personal and political, while conducting an obviously failing and wastefully expensive policy.

This “volume” contains two important points related to the CPSU’s delegations’ visits to Germany and Great Britain. They expressively and substantively reveal how cut off Soviet society was from the Western world. Access to (and understanding of) this world was available to a select few Party “intellectuals,” who could see the reality and make sense of the secret and other information they received from the West.

As for public sentiment and culture during this year, it continued to become alienated from ideology, but the reader won’t find anything fundamentally new (compared to the two previous “volumes”), although some observations are interesting.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1977

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

Translated by Anna Melyakova

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

January 1, 1977

Conversation with Brutents in my office ... About our despair... About the dead end we find ourselves in. How is this possible! The festival of awards for our 70-year-old General Secretary has been going on for almost a month. Against this background, I doubt there is a single person – from a simple worker to a refined intellectual or even an apparatchik – who could watch this on TV every day without feeling surprised and indignant, without mocking and laughing at ourselves and our leadership.

All of mass media is full of unbelievable babble about the successes, victories, growing status, excellence... the stuff is so politically stupid that if it didn't have obvious bureaucratic motives, one could think it was a provocation.

I talked about ethics: Primakov is leaving IMEMO to become one of the deputy directors of TASS because Inozemtsev, the director [of IMEMO], was not elected to the Central Committee at the Congress, and now he "has no future."¹ Although Zhenya [Primakov] was Inozemtsev's deputy for 10 years and "best friend" for 20.

About Ulyanovsky, our 75-year old deputy, who wanted to become a corresponding member at the Academy of Sciences and wrote denunciations of his rivals, called vice president Fedoseyev and sent him packages with these denunciations by carrier.

And another point. Corvalan's release. Despicable remarks by Georges Marchais, *L'Humanite* and some of our Italian friends regarding the exchange of Corvalan for Bukovsky. My two-hour-long conversation on Plotnikov Street with McLennan on this subject (he was on a stopover in Moscow on his way back from a meeting of the CP in Vietnam). By the way, the Italians were cleverer in their reaction. They drew a clear distinction between the issues of Corvalan and Bukovsky.

Yu. Arbatov and I came up with Brezhnev's interview with Kingsbury Smith (in the form of a New Year's message to the Americans). It was published on the 29th, and of course caused a certain reaction.

B.N. assigned me to edit the manuscript of Brezhnev's biography, which is being prepared at the request of American publishers for the U.S. Up until 1960 it is vivid and convincing, afterwards it's a total drag. Still, the text is written without the cultish frenzy.

Karyakin gave me his book, *Raskolnikov's Self Deception* [*Samoobman Raskolnikova*], which he has been writing for ten years. We saw each other recently and he complained that "they won't let me say anything" (censorship). I asked him, "Tell me what you want to tell the people..." And I thought to myself: if we start talking seriously, it turns out these windbags don't really have anything to say.

¹ All words and phrases in quotation marks are similarly emphasized with quotation marks in the original. (Trans.)

Zagladin wrote an excellent essay for the first issue of *Novoe Vremya* on the subject of “Eurocommunism.” If we had started using this tone with the Communist movement a long time ago, and used it from now on, we wouldn’t have the current mess, and we would keep our authority! However, the paradox is that the first deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee understands this and writes about it to the whole world. Meanwhile his boss, the head of the department, not only doesn’t allow himself such things, but wouldn’t allow Zagladin either, if he knew what the latter was planning to write... He probably won’t read it anyway, aside from hearing responses to the article from TASS.

The story with Antonio Rubbi’s (PCI) article, “New Internationalism,” in the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism [PPS]*. It discusses the prospect of the emergence of socialist societies that would be different from each other not only in their political structure, but also “as socio-economic formations.” Zagladin allowed it. Harry Ott (CC SED) protested and now B.N. is torn: on the one hand, if we don’t give the French and Italians a platform in *PPS*, they will simply walk away, as they’ve promised to do already. On the other hand, how can we spend our money to publish something like this in what is essentially a Soviet journal, and in Russian!.. It goes against everything we stand for! The CC will be flooded with letters from propagandists, pensioners, and professors!

This is a symbol of the current reality of the International Communist Movement [ICM]. The journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* has become obsolete and should be shut down, as in its day was done with the newspaper *For a Lasting Peace, For People’s Democracy!*

January 5, 1977

I was talking with B.N. the other day. For some reason, he suddenly remembered that Suslov is sick. And he said something like: “He is sick once again... Not just his eyes. Something is wrong with his heart, it seems. Because his arm is affected. Overall, he really took a turn for the worse after the trip to Vietnam. People told him to take it easy, at least skip the [Politburo] sessions. But he showed up at the last Secretariat before the New Year, saying he would feel uncomfortable missing it because the issues are important and we need to balance the books... And now he fell apart again. Brezhnev is beside himself. I will tell you in confidence, yesterday he summoned Chazov (head of the 4th Department of the Ministry of Health) and announced: ‘Look here, if you don’t keep Mikhail Andreyevich well, I don’t know what I will do... I will resign!’

“Indeed, Anatoly Sergeyevich, he is the only one! The only one! (He lifted his finger to emphasize that there is no one else.) There is no other person at the Politburo who could support Brezhnev. Despite all his... (he didn’t say shortcomings) you know, you have to give him credit. He doesn’t have all these (gestures to indicate intrigues, backstabbing)... He doesn’t make any claims, doesn’t covet the top post. What can I say, he is selfless. And he is alone in this! You understand, he is the only one who truly thinks politically, thinks about the Party.

“It is really a big problem! (He didn’t say the word “age.”) Look at Mazurov, he has been out of commission for a long time now. He must be getting some kind of medication, too. When he shows up, he doesn’t look normal at all. He hasn’t been able to work for six months.

Pogdorny is very ill too, it's either his kidneys or his liver, I'm not sure which. Kosygin declined a long time ago, and this summer he nearly drowned and was recovering for two months afterwards. And all the others... This is a major issue, Anatoly Sergeyevich!"

Yesterday there was a meeting at the *Rossiya* Hall in honor of Corvalan. His speech... "pro-Soviet" in form but "Eurocommunist" in essence: Communist parties reject the leading role of the CPSU, all parties are equal (including the Christian Democratic Party of Chile), independent, and have the right to be different; all political movements (except the fascists) are legitimate and have the right to participate in building Chile's democracy. Even the word "pluralism" was mentioned, and for the first time it was quoted in *Pravda* in a political context. That said, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was mentioned as well (apparently so as not to be like Marchais), but only as a means to defend democracy against encroachments.

Yesterday I had a conversation with Marcel Trigon and Patrick Le Mahec (deputy head of the International Department and deputy of a sector in the CC PCF). We discussed the plan for the PCF-CPSU exchange for 1977 – the 60th anniversary of October. To start, Trigon gave a speech that was obviously planned out in Paris. As if nothing happened over the last two years: as if there was no Bukovsky over the last few days; the movie *Recognition* [*Priznanie*, 1976]; the meeting at the Mutualité with [Leonid] Plushch; Kanapa's articles in *Political Affairs*, etc., etc. Total "bhai-bhai!"² and not a single lead for me to start on the subject of what they are doing by putting Corvalan on par with Bukovsky. I couldn't start that conversation myself. After all, I couldn't trash talk the General Secretary and PB members of the PCF while sitting in the CC CPSU and speaking with PCF apparatchiks! They could have simply gotten up and slammed the door.

[Luca] Pavolini, editor of *L'Unita*, asked Brezhnev for an interview, with Berlinguer's blessing. There was one question on détente, the other five were on democracy in the USSR.

I suggested to B.N. to say no and cite *L'Unita*'s position on the Corvalan-Bukovsky issue as the reason. I don't know if he'll dare to do it. He is good at grumbling in his circle of deputies. But he is mortally afraid to take even the slightest step: like Churchill, he doesn't want to be present at the collapse of his empire.

January 9, 1977

On January 6th I was unexpectedly called to Ponomarev's office. He announced that Brezhnev is summoning "us," asked me to quickly get dressed and meet him downstairs by his car. We drove to the Kremlin. We managed to get Kornienko from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] while we were on our way. Blatov was already there. We couldn't find Bovin (he was "presiding" at a pub at the time).

Brezhnev began in his usual style, which I got to know well from Zavidovo. "I woke up today, did some exercises... I thought to myself, what was that idea I had yesterday? I didn't

² Reference to the "Hindi-Russi bhai-bhai!" slogan used from 1950-1980s to describe Soviet-Indian friendship, it translates roughly as "Indians and Russians are brothers!" [Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%98%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BB_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%83%D0%BF%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC] (Trans.)

remember it right away. Oh yes! It's not a bad idea, in fact: Carter takes office on the 20th. Why not say something to him beforehand, a kind of show of goodwill. We have a good excuse: Tula was recently awarded the status of 'Hero City.' I've never been to Tula, though I've passed through it dozens of times. Folks from Tula even repaired my rifle. So, I will go, congratulate them, talk about how they fought to the death during the war and saved Moscow. And while I'm at it, I will say an appropriate message to Carter."

He began pacing in front of us, along the length of his table, dictating the "outline," all the time qualifying his words by adding, "something along those lines..." "It should not be just about the U.S., of course. We should mention France, for example" (he didn't name any others). He came back to the people of Tula. "We should name the ones who fought and survived. I fought, but I'm still here..." And he teared up. He got up, walked over to his writing desk, took out a handkerchief from a drawer. Then he sat down heavily, supporting himself. "We should make it expressive. I am in the mood to give a strong speech. I will prepare... In general, I think I should speak before the people from time to time. Without long breaks. People find it uplifting, it creates enthusiasm."

When we were leaving, he asked us to do our best, even though time is short – the speech is on the 18th.

And the whirlwind began. The same day Leonid Ilyich announced his plans at the Politburo. Since Ponomarev turned out to be something like a "foreman," he started getting calls from other CC Secretaries – everyone wanted to "participate." As a result, ten people (!) ended up at Novo Ogarevo, even though the workload (if we are being serious) called for two-three people over two solid work days. On Friday, the following people left [for the state dacha] (besides Ponomarev): Blatov, Kornienko, Mendelevich, Bovin, Nail' Bikkenin (from the CC Propaganda Department), Voznesensky (political observer for television), Masyagin (consultant from the CC Organizational Party Work Department) and I. We separated into two groups – "internalists" and "internationalists." And the nonsense began. We had a dull debate for hours, but didn't even come up with an outline. Ponomarev, claiming general leadership, mainly engaged in discussions based on the ciphered telegrams he read in the last three days, with his usual "favorite (anti-imperialist) toys." Everyone in our department is used to them; we learned long ago how to deal with them and do as little harm as possible to real politics.

We more or less distributed the topics and split up into our different rooms. But on Saturday morning "Andryukha" Aleksandrov showed up from Barvikha, where he was staying for his pneumonia when Brezhnev called him and asked to intervene. He did not want to hear what we agreed upon the day before. As a matter of form, he stated his ideas, then refused to listen to ours or to our comments on his "ideas." He decisively deflected the slightest hint of other opinions and invited the stenographer. An hour later, the text of the international section was practically ready. It was loud and propagandist, but it set the course for the entire speech. Andrey Mikhailovich went back to Barvikha to continue on with his illness.

We were left with a text that many disagreed with, even Blatov. However, after grumbling a little, he started defending every word of Andryukha's dictation.

At Ponomarev's insistence we invited Arbatov, who added a section on relations with Yugoslavia and the Middle East, which Kornienko immediately struck out. We followed the "Sparrow's" outline, although later, after the "first reading" with Brezhnev, all that was left of his dictation were a few paragraphs, and even those were majorly reworked. Blatov, who was supervising us, was "frustrated" [by being torn] between his loyalty to Aleksandrov, common sense, and our "initiatives."

Georgiy Markovich Kornienko, then head of the American Department of the MFA, a clever Ukrainian, knowledgeable, a foreign affairs-man through and through, disliked Aleksandrov. People said he saw in him a competitor for Gromyko's place.

Mendelevich was an ambassador at large. I remembered him from the history department [at University] before the war. He was two years ahead of me, Gefter's classmate. He had all the answers, he was smart, clever, well-educated. He was the only Jew in the MFA who never tried to hide his Jewishness. He somehow managed to remain in senior positions his entire life; he must have been a professional of a rare degree. He not only knew which diplomatic document contained a substantial comma, where it was, why it was there and who put it there, but could quote the Bible by heart, as well as Gumilev, Goethe, Baratynsky. He showed off his knowledge of Latin, even though he only studied it before the war, at the University, same as me...

January 15, 1977

On Monday, Brezhnev called us to the Kremlin for the first reading. Bovin's privileges to read aloud have been reinstated. The General Secretary was in tears after the first pages, which referred to the defense of Tula in 1941. "Against this background," he thought the international section was boring (that's a fair assessment, though). He did not add anything on the substance of the speech. It was striking when two initiatives of the Political Consultative Committee [PCC] of the Warsaw Pact were mentioned (no first use of nuclear weapons by members of the Helsinki Conference and non-expansion by both blocs) and he asked "What does this mean? What's the point? Who suggested this?" It's been a little over two months since the PCC session in Bucharest where he suggested these things himself. It was recorded in a communique and our newspapers, radio and television incessantly paraded these initiatives as a new contribution by Brezhnev to the cause of peace.

He said he will visit Yasnaya Polyana and "we should include this in the speech – it will be important for our intelligentsia."

I thought to myself: our General Secretary is moving away from himself as an individual and thinking of himself as a symbol, belonging to the people... At the second reading, this comparison occurred to me: just as the tsar was dressed to appear before the people back in the day, now we "dress" Brezhnev in the text of the speech, which he will give without even really understanding what it says. The important thing (from the point of view of the state) is what the newspapers repeatedly write about in every way.

For the second reading, we created forceful passages – for applause (Boris Nikolayevich made an extra effort here). Some of these passages Brezhnev read aloud, with emphasis, the way

he planned to present it in Tula. He would look at us, asking, “Does it sound important? Yes, I think it does. They will applaud.”

The majority of the “discussion” (after approving the text as a whole) revolved around his intention to visit the arms factory. Blatov, Mendelevich, and Ponomarev started to dissuade him, saying the West will use it to say that he went to inspect military production, to “whip up the arms race,” while talking about peace, détente, etc. Brezhnev resisted, he really wanted to visit the arms factory. “Come on! I will be in Tula. They have been presenting me with hunting rifles for years, they have made special orders for me. How could I not visit them? It would be bad!” Ponomarev and Blatov went at it again, forcefully. Leonid Ilyich again did not want to agree with them, he just really loves guns, pistols, and all that stuff. (By the way, the famous Tula arms factory by that point had just one small facility that still made hunting rifles. The rest produced we all know what.) Finally we agreed that he would go to the factory but in the speech and in the newspapers we would say that Brezhnev visited a “mechanical plant”…

Ponomarev took me in his big car, Bovin joined us (the MFA guys went home, Blatov stayed at the CC). The three of us returned to Novo Ogarevo, technically to pick up our things, but we sat down to dinner while we were there. On his own initiative, B.N. suggested we have a drink. Bovin instantly made it happen. We “crushed” a bottle of cognac and a bottle of vodka. And we started talking…

I told the story of how Ernst Neizvestny was forced to leave. Bovin and I recalled some other examples of how we created dissidents with our own hands. Of course, we again touched on the “Jewish question”… And again B.N. declared, like he did on the airplane returning from England, that “we need to solve this problem!” As usual when he is drunk, he started reminiscing about the 1920s. This time, he recalled how Tovstukha (Stalin’s assistant) once let him into the leader’s personal archive (letters from exile, letters to women, etc.)…

We talked about the price increase (which went into effect on January 4th) and the fact that even in Moscow a lot of goods are not available.

Then Blatov joined us and took a “very active part” in the conversation. In particular, he described the onion production in the Ryazan region, which he represents in the Supreme Soviet. Women crawling in mud through beds of onions, and when you strike up a conversation, they mutter, “Just as long as we don’t have a war!”

As Arbatov used to say, “we had a good time.” It is astonishing that in this conversation, a member of the party leadership was equal to us in his powerlessness. By the way, he kept coming back to the theme of agro-industrial complexes. Brezhnev said they must be mentioned in the Tula speech. No one said anything, but “between us” Ponomarev argued in exasperation that we should not do that. Even in Moldavia this project did not work… These complexes will drive people to raise pigs and grow fruits and vegetables in their own gardens. What will that lead to?! How will we feed the country?!

The speech is intended to reach out to Carter on the eve of his inauguration on January 20th. At the same time, it aims to “pressure” the new president a little by refuting once again (at

the highest level) the “Soviet threat.” Another massive propaganda campaign has been launched before Carter assumes office. However, the noise about the “Soviet threat” is based on facts. Here I referred to Arbatov, who recently came back from the U.S., and his Institute “knows a lot.” We have not been able to conceal our missile and other buildup, and we won’t be able to conceal it in the future. Therefore, periodic statements that we are not threatening anybody will not work. The arms race, designed to exhaust us economically, will continue unless we make a real change in military policy and show in practice that we want arms reductions and aren’t seeking a “first strike” advantage.

January 17, 1977

Brezhnev’s speech in Tula is on the TV... with the text we prepared in Novo Ogarevo.

At the first reading of the text in the Kremlin, there was an argument between B.N. on one side and the MFA guys and Blatov on the other. The disagreement was over what to say to [Arnaldo] Forlani (Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs), whom Brezhnev was supposed to receive the next day. In his typical “ideological” manner, Ponomarev insisted that Brezhnev should take advantage of Italy’s economic interest in us and “pressure” – why do they Italians have an American submarine base near Rome. Say that it’s dangerous, and so on. Blatov and the MFA guys rumbled: this base is not important, and it’s not really a base anyway, it’s a fueling station. Anyway, the Italians can’t kick out the Americans, and they won’t leave NATO. So what’s the point of applying this pressure.

Brezhnev listened to this rather sharp argument in silence, but he made brief comments that made it clear he will not take Ponomarev’s way.

Later, in the car, B.N. poured out all his indignation at “these people”... “Where were they brought up?! They’ve completely forgotten. We are in a class war. Those Italians are cheating us too. We should pressure them, and instead... (he waived his hand). The General Secretary should not have met at all (with Forlani). Gromyko is the one who keeps dragging everyone to top-level meetings. Meanwhile, this Forlani may only last a couple months at the MFA, anyway.”

At the second reading, Brezhnev said some things about the meeting with Forlani: “[He is] pleasant, young, personable, sociable. He promised to raise the question of PCC’s initiatives in NATO... That is something. After all, NATO rejected our proposal... The Italians are giving us another loan, 700 million rubles.”

The meaning behind this statement was that Ponomarev got worked up for nothing. And in general – if we are pursuing détente, we should talk business instead of engaging in propaganda pressure tactics.

Today an article about [Jean] Ellenstein (for *Novoe Vremya*) got Suslov’s approval. This will be the first ideological attack against the PCF. They will respond.

Medvedev (deputy head of the Propaganda Department) was in France on a party exchange. He writes in his telegram that they are all pro friendship with the CPSU and so on. The same thing as in my office when Trigon and Le Mahec were here.

Meanwhile, Marchais and Kanapa continue to rage in the mass media. In the course of their fight against “any kind of lying in the party” they published a PB statement about the XX Congress of the CPSU. They dragged [Georges] Cogniot and [Pierre] Doize, who were in the PCF delegation with [Maurice] Thorez and [Jacques] Duclos, into the limelight and asked them to tell how it was. Their “confessions” were included in the PB text. They said Khrushchev’s text was given to the delegation in Russian, only for a few hours, and confidentially. They were asked not to make any notes. Later, when the CC PCF officially requested the text from the CPSU, the request was denied.

January 21, 1977

Incidentally, today is 53 years since Lenin died. Not that long...

Brezhnev’s speech in Tula. It was actively received abroad; the message came through to the Americans and to the Germans. Schmidt even noticed “with surprise” that his ideas about détente match Brezhnev’s. I wrote that piece all by myself. This means we got it right. The concept of détente should not have a “class” essence. “Peaceful coexistence” is a different story.

So, Brezhnev’s intention to extend an “olive branch” before Carter’s inauguration was realized. And it’s a good thing. The massive campaign about the “Soviet threat” immediately lost its edge.

Yesterday B.N. [mentioned] the PB session. He said Brezhnev was concerned that only half the Politburo members were present. Gromyko had a heart attack. Andropov has been sick for two months. Mazurov came to work but he is not doing well. Podgorny came down with something once again. Chernenko has respiratory complications after the flu. Kapitonov was admitted to the hospital yesterday. Suslov ended up getting really sick, even though he held out for a few weeks. Solometsev also has been sick for a long time.

B.N. has been assembling us frequently to go over his preparations for Sofia. As often happens before “important speeches,” his thoughts are jumbled and only those who know him well can feel that he wants to say something that is not very trivial. Something in the spirit of his orthodoxy, but more or less adapted to what our partners (CC secretaries of socialist countries) and the ICM movement as a whole need right now. We are racking our brains how to give these vague intentions some concrete form.

On Tuesday – at the CC Secretariat. Questions of “planning and stimulating” – they are going back to ideas of economic reform. I was very impressed with our ministers, especially Antonov (electrical industry). There is so much intelligence and talent in our people, their thoughts and acumen, the breadth of character! If they had the freedom to do what they are capable of, they would transform the country in five years. But, from Antonov’s own words at the CC Secretariat – the Plan gets in the way.

From the big and sharp debate led by Kirilenko, I understood that the most conservative force in our economic policy is Gosplan.

January 28, 1977

Curious considerations. Sharif Dzhavad (head of the British Sector) invites to his office in the CC an official from Lubyanka, who was in charge of the trial and other aspects of the Bukovsky case and accompanied Bukovsky (handcuffed) to the border. In his Oriental manner, Dzhavad tries to instill in him: "What are you doing over there?! You should have thought about the consequences a little. At a basic level: Bukovsky was convicted by a people's (!) court as a criminal. You release him and throw him out of the country. But who gave you that right?! After all, according to the norms of any democracy, only the people's court or the Supreme Soviet – the highest power – can release a criminal. So, the court or the Supreme Soviet should have issued an order that Bukovsky's remaining years in prison would be replaced with deportation and revocation of his citizenship. Then we would hold a press conference and announce that Pinochet is offering to release Corvalan in exchange for the criminal. He is welcome to it! We have dozens of criminals, why not exchange them for good people. And we would announce it to the whole world. They can take our criminals and call them freedom fighters if they want."

The comrade from the KGB "confidentially" told Dzhavad that in his initial "draft" his suggestions were roughly along those lines. But.. it was not approved!

Why? I think once again it is fear of transparency. They want to do everything behind closed doors. But nowadays this does not work.

Karen, who prepared all the plans for the Bukovsky-Corvalan exchange, but only knows "the other" (Corvalan's) side, says that everything was decided at Brezhnev's level. Alright. But the "chairman" (of the KGB) is a smart and experienced man. He could have foreseen the consequences.

In connection with this: tomorrow I will meet with McLennan and Woddis in Sheremetyevo (they are flying home, to London, from Tokyo). I told B.N. about it. He started schooling me: "Ask them if it is appropriate to conduct a high-level visit of the CPGB to Moscow right now" (hinting at the fact that *Morning Star* and the executive committee of the CPGB have fully joined the "Bukovsky-Corvalan" campaign, and recently also condemned the harassment of Czechs for their actions in connection with Charter-77). I told him what happened with Bukovsky in England (embrace with Thatcher in Parliament, Callaghan's refusal to meet with him, embrace with Strauss in the FRG, etc.). Turns out, B.N. didn't know about any of it, even though TASS provided this information every day. He started getting worked up: "Why aren't our sectors on top of this, why hasn't *Pravda* taken advantage of these events, etc." He threatened to call Afanasiev or even Zimyanin himself. I cooled him off and reminded him that *Pravda* hasn't once mentioned Bukovsky's name, not in any context. And now, suddenly!...

Overall our B.N. is either going senile, or he is losing the last remnants of decency. He keeps inviting Corvalan and instructing him (before the latter's trip to Europe), egging him on

against the French, Italians, Spaniards. He almost openly conveys that “you have to pay for your freedom,” or at the least – work it off.

B.N.: “Of course, we don’t engage in polemics, as you know. But keep in mind that the CC and the entire active body of the CPSU think that what is happening in France, Italy, and some other unfortunately big parties is revisionism, a move towards social democracy. What are the causes? Take a closer look at the leadership. In the PCF – who is Kanapa? A layman. He was a journalist and suddenly became a Politburo member. Anyway, he is not a Frenchman. Same with Fiterman, who heads their ideology, he is not a Frenchman. I don’t know about Marchais... But during the war, when everyone went into the Resistance, he ended up in Germany and worked in a factory there, voluntarily. You were in prison so you may not have read about the campaign the bourgeois press has launched in this matter. The PCF naturally defended its General Secretary. But the fact remains. Maybe he was recruited back in those days...

“...Did you get all the money we sent you? Through the Argentinean Communist Party?”

Corvalan: “Yes. But Lily did not take that money for us only, she distributed it among many families of prisoners...”

All of a sudden, [B.N.]: “Or take Carrillo... It’s unclear who he is. He wasn’t in the country for 30 years... The PCF financed him... with money that we gave them. Now he is the chief anti-Soviet in the communist movement.”

Corvalan sat through this (and there were three conversations of this kind) with a stony expression. Sometimes he would say “thank you,” sometimes he tried to interject about the shortcomings of our propaganda, which, he said, is unproductively criticizing “pluralism.” When Kirilenko and others honored him at a meeting in the *Rossiya* hotel, he openly and clearly spoke in favor of the broadest pluralism in Chile, including Christian democrats. In an interview for Italian television he expanded on this subject, in effect fully aligning himself with Berlinguer’s vision.

What is striking is not only B.N.’s rudeness, but also his blindness. Does he really think that a man of Corvalan’s stature will serve as a blind instrument of Ponomarev’s cheap propaganda just because he was liberated and given an apartment and a dacha?! Does he think that Corvalan will formulate a strategy for the struggle in Chile (he already announced that he got his freedom in order to unite all Chileans on a democratic platform against the Junta, and to be the initiator for the creation of such a platform) – can B.N. really think that Corvalan will create this platform under orders of B.N.’s outdated, Short Course³ lectures?!

Hasn’t it occurred to him, B.N., that if he acts this way, Corvalan may simply relocate to Yugoslavia, Romania, or even Italy – to the accompaniment of a huge scandal?

February 5, 1977

³ “A Short Course of History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks),” a textbook of Party history published in 1938 under Stalin’s direction. (Trans.)

Since Monday (January 31) I am in Serebryannyi Bor, in my old 100-meter room with views of pine trees, which are bent and have their “clusters” at the top.

We are working on the Sofia conference of CC Secretaries from socialist countries (which is coming up soon). Ponomarev, Katushev, and Zimyanin will be representing our side.

The ideological situation is as bad as can be: the Czechs have the “Charter 77”; the GDR – the [Wolf] Biermann case; in Poland, they are still dealing with the aftermath of the summer events around the announced price increases. The “Eurocommunists” are raging in the vilification of socialist regimes.

Zimyanin’s idea for Sofia is to “reassure our friends.” We are strong, so to speak, we’ve seen it all. These dissidents and their patrons are nothing to us. But they (Czechs, Germans) started to panic. We should support them, reassure them... Nothing will happen. Things will settle down and everything will go back to normal.

Marshal Ustinov’s article in *Kommunist* for the anniversary of the Soviet Army. It was sent around the Politburo. I gave B.N. a written review, which was totally impudent... I called the article an “echelon of firewood” sent to the bonfire of the “Soviet threat.” I expressed my surprise at [the author’s] complete reluctance to understand or at least know the foreign policy tactics of the moment, for which we racked our brains in Novo Ogarevo, preparing the General Secretary’s speech.

Then again, maybe that is how it is supposed to be: the CC CPSU and Brezhnev are one thing, and the generals are the exact opposite?!

B.N. did not respond to my note. And there really can’t be a response. Would he dare to say to Ustinov himself, or to Brezhnev’s adviser, or to Suslov, that “this is unacceptable”?

March 11, 1977

February 27 through March 4 – in Sofia. A meeting of deputies on social democracy (preliminary before the meetings of CC Secretaries). My speech. Polemics with Romanians, the petty provincials – neither here nor there. It’s ludicrous and embarrassing (for ourselves and for them).

The meeting of Secretaries in Sofia. “The Six” – B.N. mumbled when he digressed from his notes. Bilyak’s hysterics, eagerness to “name names” in his condemnation of the PCF, PCI, CPGB. Nobody supported him. B.N. appealed to the methodology we used to disrupt the formation of a Eurocommunist platform in Madrid (Berlinguer, Marchais, Carrillo). But Bilyak named the parties anyway in front of the Romanians during the meeting. I think he secretly had Katushev’s support. The latter at the [meeting of] “the six” in contradiction to Ponomarev reacted “sympathetically” to Bilyak’s question. On the way to the conference hall in the morning, B.N. again offered to Katushev and Zimyanin for the three of them to “approach” Bilyak on this issue. Zimyanin readily supported him, but Katushev refused. This is not political.

Katushev isn't a "hawk," he just wants to be nice to all "our people," including the Romanians. Plus, in a simple way he believes that neither of these approaches, the carrot or the stick, can stop "Eurocommunism" anymore.

On Saturday evening (February 26) there was a fire at the *Rossiya* hotel. Forty-three dead, mostly regional committee secretaries who came to Moscow for some meeting. There are rumors that there are hundreds of casualties. There are rumors about sabotage. The next day there was a fire at the Ministry of the Navy. The entire Politburo was convened at night in the CC. Zimyanin told me in Sofia that "for now we should still think it was negligence: the elevator cable caught fire."

March 12, 1977

B.N. is once again planning to school our Western European fraternal parties with a brochure called "Is Marxism-Leninism outdated?" Kozlov, Butenko, and Shmeral' are supposed to create it in two months. Yesterday he convened the abovementioned group plus academician Fedoseyev and laid out what he wants. Afterwards they came to my office (except Fedoseyev) and I cynically explained to them exactly what Ponomarev has in mind. They laughed and scratched their heads.

I am not writing here about world events, though I often worry about them as much as I do about my own affairs. But a diary, after all, is "about yourself" ... for example, the issue of dissidents. Carter met with Bukovsky and in general wants to become a sort of patriarch of all the offended, exiled, and arrested. Cynical European leaders (Giscard, Callaghan, Brandt, Schmidt) are snickering. Major newspapers are worried that the president's missionary outlook could hurt détente; they are advising not to mix politics and morals. We are nervous. In a closed letter to Carter on missiles, Brezhnev also gave him a piece of his mind regarding Carter's "personal" letter to Sakharov and his meeting with Bukovsky.

Our propaganda is raging about human rights violations in capitalist countries: this is called "offensive tactics" in the ideological struggle.

What I personally think about the dissident movement, which has been turned into the main weapon against us in the course of the real class struggle between two worlds. Carter, of course, does not realize that in the eyes of serious Soviet people he looks like a petty provocateur (maybe he does it to promote himself, for popularity with the average American). Because Bukovsky does not represent anyone (unlike the previous one, Solzhenitsyn, who represented some part of the intelligentsia). He is just a political rabble rouser, a petty troublemaker.

But he represents (or rather, reflects) the social troubles at home. They cannot be expressed in political terms, but they are real and the people feel it, even though they do not identify it with Bukovsky & Co. People are more likely to connect it with the fire in *Rossiya*, with explosions in the metro and on the streets (because Russian history naturally suggests this connection, not an appeal to other states against its government!).

The dissident movement in Lithuania, for example, is another matter: schoolchildren, students, plus the Catholic church and émigré centers... This is a special problem. Only life can solve this problem. And with this issue, we really do have to avoid responding openly.

However, we don't have a response to dissidents like Amalrik, Bukovsky, Sakharov. Our actions so far can be explained by surprise: how is this possible? This cannot and should not happen in our society! In other words, it is Shchedrin's approach, not Lenin's approach.

I also don't know what to do. But what our Western friends (Communist Parties) are offering is not the answer. They are pure dogmatists in this regard. They want to apply their own purely western models in Russia...

March 12, 1977

I am reading a novel in *Novy Mir [New World]* called *Safety Measures* by Yuri Skop, he is a student of Shukshin's. It's great, very modern.

[Yuri] Lyubimov staged *Master and Margarita*. People say it is like "a meeting with eternity." He invited me, but I don't want to go to the "viewing" (a prerelease show) because then I will have to tell Lyubimov what a great genius he is.

March 19, 1977

The biggest event at work was Katushev's "dismissal." At the same Politburo, at which they finally approved a letter to the CC PCF rebuking their "Eurocommunism" and anti-Sovietism, and finalized the outcome of Sofia, suddenly at the end, unexpectedly for all (B.N. told me this later) Brezhnev proposed to appoint Katushev as deputy head of the Council of Ministers and the Soviet representative in CMEA. He proposed to return Rusakov as head of the department. Of course, everyone agreed.

But what is the "sequence"? Was he not a good fit? Was he not a good match, or he couldn't handle the work? It seems the opposite. Everyone was happy with how skillfully he led a "careful" course with the Chinese, and Romanians, and with the economic difficulties in CMEA (oil prices, etc.). He is a reasonable, young, active guy who established good contacts with leaders of fraternal parties...

The truth is that "Rusakov had to be made a CC Secretary," people are saying this almost openly in the hallways. This is not about Katushev. The General Secretary really likes Rusakov and wants to reward him. That's all. A family matter, so to speak. But in this environment, with such "cadre policies," the emergence of political figures in our leadership is completely out of the question. They are all just bureaucrats who can be transferred, shifted, removed, promoted, demoted, etc. I can imagine Katushev's state of mind when he, who had just been actively speaking at the PB on the affairs of Sofia, heard this "proposal"!

March 22, 1977

I had a dream the night before the XVI Congress of Trade Unions. I am reproducing it as I recorded it when I woke up. "A park. It appears to be roughly at the location of the zoo, but the

configuration resembles Sokolniki. At the center, there are tsarist-style staircases leading to a platform. At the bottom on the right – a pool and baths. On the left – tennis courts. It is a warm spring day. A lot of people, waiting. I am standing at the edge of the platform. Brezhnev appears. He has a child in his arms, a girl of clearly Jewish appearance. Next to him is a woman, she is thin and unattractive, looks like one of my acquaintances. He is wearing a white suit. He is cheerful, joking with the people around him. The crowd is whispering: will he go to the baths or to the court? He seems to take a right turn, towards the pool. But a minute later he was on the platform again, this time in pajama pants and a sleeveless shirt (I saw him like this in Zavidovo once), with a scruffy robe thrown over his shoulders. He looked confused, drunk. The little girl is still in his arms. A young man is clowning around nearby, he is sporty and wears brown shorts and a t-shirt.

“Suddenly, Brezhnev takes out his dick, large and semi erect, and starts to piss. He pisses into the crowd rather than on the ground beneath him. Somehow the people close to him step aside and the stream is directed at me. Even though I am about 15 meters away and now for some reason in the corner of some hall, the stream nearly reaches me. I can see that he is not pissing on me “personally” (if you recall, he never turns towards me when I am speaking, even when I address him directly). Nevertheless, I don’t know what to do. Everyone is looking at me. I hesitate – would it be inappropriate or insulting to him if I duck to avoid his spray? Finally, I try to move away... Blackout. Brezhnev disappears somewhere in the vicinity of the tennis courts. At this moment, a terrible confusion sets in. People panic and rush to the fence, but before the fence there is a precipice, followed by a ditch, and then a street with speeding cars. People fall down the precipice, roll, knock each other down, climb through the bars of the fence and underneath them. Children are screaming, disheveled women are running among the fallen. There is a din and the sirens howling.

“I wake up and for a long time cannot understand what happened to me, was this a dream or did it really happen?”

At 10 am I am sitting in the front row at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. Elections of the “governing bodies” for the Congress. Shibayev is reading from a piece of paper, without pausing or looking at the audience. “The accreditation committee lists were distributed to the delegates. Those voting “in favor” raise your temporary IDs. Is anyone “against”? No. Did anyone abstain? No.” And so forth.

The General Secretary took the floor... And the dementia session began. Bovin’s oratorical clichés sounded completely absurd in this tongue-tied presentation. And it only got worse. The more tired he got, the clearer it became that he was barely grasping the meaning of what he was reading. Once he even stopped for a minute, turned back the page, and said to himself (but actually into the microphone), “Did I read that right?” At times he gathered himself (it was obvious this took a great effort) and tried to pronounce things “expressively.” He gesticulated but it didn’t really match the text very well. Then he again confused the word order, read words incorrectly, generating nonsense.

I leaned towards Mozhayev (deputy of the international department of the All Union Central Trade Union Council, our former consultant): “Do the simultaneous interpreters have the text, or are they going by ear?” “No, Anatoly Sergeyevich, we asked [for the text in advance] but it was not given to us.”

I took the headphones and turned to the channel in French, then English. My God! They either had word fragments, or a string of separate phrases that the interpreter reconstructed at his own discretion.

The speaker persistently called the “XVI Congress of Trade Unions” the twenty-sixth... The audience was “whispering” and the people in the presidium exchanged embarrassed glances.

When he got to the section on the Middle East, even I, who knew the text (I read it the day before) couldn’t follow it anymore. It seems the speaker started panicking. He could barely control himself. His face was dark and drawn. As he walked off the podium accompanied by thunderous applause, he was unsteady on his feet and couldn’t see anything in front of him. At the presidium he sat down in the wrong seat. I think he was “in a knockdown” [«в нокдауне»]. Fortunately, a recess was announced shortly. He recovered and began to greet people and chat with members of the presidium.

This raises a few serious questions.

Why did they make the speech two hours long?

Why did he give this report at all, especially before the report of the chairman of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council?

What impression does the “optimism” and cheerfulness embedded in the text create against the background of the very drab situation in the country, of which the 5,000 delegates are well informed?

Why, knowing his physical limitations, did he expose himself and the leadership of the Party to this disgrace; why make the mechanism of supreme power a laughingstock?

However, in the evening TV broadcast of *Vremya* the record was masterfully edited. The most ridiculous mangled words and phrases disappeared entirely. The “26th” Congress did not come up, and the whole tonality of the speech was better than in reality. The miracle of “technology”!

There are even more serious questions underneath. How can he remain in his post if he realizes his utter feebleness? And knowing that nobody crosses him or dares to utter a disagreement: just like under Stalin (though without the tragic consequences) his power is absolute and his word (no matter how ridiculous and incompetent it may be) is decisive and final!

In a word, we will soon follow Mao Zedong and repeat what happened there, having previously downright mocked them for it.

April 1, 1977

I was sick for a long time, but returned to work yesterday. I went through a heap of papers that piled up over the last week. In particular, I read the transcript of the first Brezhnev-Gromyko-Vance (U.S. Secretary of State) conversation.

When you read foreign press almost daily, you don't find anything new in such "reports." That is my first impression. The only secret aspect is the spirit of the conversation and the details, not the military ones and so forth, but the "personal" ones and the atmosphere.

First, Brezhnev set out the general positions for the American (I read them previously through the distribution [*no рассылке*]). It was word for word, with the only addition being an expression of sympathy on the crash of two airplanes in Santa Cruz [de Tenerife] (nearly 600 dead).

But Brezhnev and Gromyko were not giving Vance a chance to speak. I imagine the situation like this: since his positions were presented to us in advance, they did not have the patience to listen to them. On the contrary, they were very impatient to express their displeasure and disagreement. This was done in a rather rude manner, sometimes downright insulting to Carter. Vance endured all of this without a hint of protest. He only stressed after every "little joke" that he would like to finish presenting the positions he brought to the meeting.

Brezhnev kept getting worked up on the subject of "human rights," sometimes out of context to what was being discussed in the course of the "exchange of opinions."

In response to Vance's statement that the current President has more support from the majority of Americans than any previous president, Brezhnev interrupted him to tell a "tale" (he used that word) from Nasreddin Hodja, I think. "At an Eastern bazaar, someone shouted that pilaf was being given away for free at the other end of the bazaar. At first one, then two, then three people ran in that direction, then a whole crowd. Finally, the person who was shouting about the free pilaf believed it too, and ran after them. It's the same with your idea that the president expresses the will of the people..."

Vance did not even bat an eyelash. He asked to continue. He was interrupted again and again – "giving it to him" rather harshly about their interference in our internal affairs on human rights.

Nevertheless, judging from the results of the talks and the context (despite an obvious demonstration of indignation and rudeness) I did not get the impression that we refused to meet the Americans halfway on the truly important subject of strategic weapons because we were upset at Carter for Sakharov and Bukovsky.

I think they want to dupe us after all: by proposing a noticeable quantitative reduction of missiles, carriers, etc., that is calculated to make a lot of noise "worldwide," they in fact want to weaken our potential. They have the qualitative superiority (electronics-navigation, accuracy, plus "forward-based" missiles around the USSR) so a reduction in the number of missiles would put us in an obviously disadvantageous position. Not to mention that the Americans want to exclude the "cruise missiles" from this, which threatens us with tens of billions to create new defense systems in addition to the missile defense against ballistic missiles and aircraft.

Therefore, our intransigence and rudeness (which was also present at Gromyko's teleconference on March 31st) are objectively justified. But I don't get it, do the Americans really believe that we will resort to self-deception for the sake of their technology? Do they really believe that we won't make it without their capital and technology (which often sits and grows rusty, buried in the snow for years, after we purchase it for gold)?! Could they, like us, still believe in nuclear blackmail and want to use it to write us off from world politics?!

That said, they are playing many keys, especially the sly Brzezinski, who started the "Eurocommunism" game. Eurocommunism has become more dangerous to us (as an ideological power and hence to us as a whole) than the U.S. nuclear potential.

Today I read Edvard Kardelj's speech. He is smart. "Marxist thought in Western Europe has broken through barriers of dogmatism and... the ideology of anti-communism." We must understand that CPs really have integrated into Western society and are becoming a factor of its "revolutionary evolution" (this is my term, but Kardelj's). He adds: "The working class there faces (as an enemy) not only bourgeois reactionary forces, but also military blocs." In other words, us – the socialist system, the socialist community. The communist movement is turning from one bloc's weapon into a weapon of struggle against the socialist bloc. Carrillo expounded this thought recently, before Kardelj. Unfortunately, it reflects reality... Because now it is not just the social-democrat working class that is against us, but also the part of it that is represented by the communists.

Yesterday I called [Yuri] Zuyev to my office (he is the head of the sector on Romance language [*романских*] CPs). He just returned from Paris: he delivered the CC CPSU letter to the PCF. He gave me a detailed rundown of whom he met with and how it went. Kanapa, Plissonnier, Leroy. (By the way, the PCF along with the Socialist Party [PS] just had a major victory in the municipal elections, which Marchais did not fail to attribute to the XXII Congress line). Zuyev did not bring back an official response. But – we did not expect this – the PCF promised to discuss the letter at the CC, i.e. they are not planning to hide it, they are not afraid. The main point everyone made – from Kanapa to Leroy – "you must agree that there are serious disagreements between the PCF and the CPSU."

When this formula was first officially pronounced at the XXII Congress of the PCF, we were shocked in Moscow. We did not understand its deep and fundamental significance. It meant: "From now on we are fundamentally different from you, there cannot be ideological unity between us. And there cannot be normal relations until you (the CPSU) understand (just like you understood it in regard to Brandt, though it strongly strained the relationship) that the PCF and the CPSU are 'two very different things.' Henceforth you cannot demand from us the things you had 'the right' to demand for nearly 60 years by claiming that we are of the same essence within the framework of the ICM."

The very fact that we sent the letter (although its content is not about "their path to socialism" but only about their "anti-Sovietism" and their attempts to gain points by criticizing us) is the result of this lack of understanding from our side. We are still working from Ponomarev's formula: "It is incomprehensible! How can communists allow themselves such a

thing!” Well, they can! The Yugoslavs did it (though when they did, it “was not the era” when we could have understood them), then the Chinese did it (it was easier to understand them, because they are “the East,” the mysterious “East.”). And now, finally, our brothers, from the core of the ICM... it turns out they can do it too!!

We are finding fault with the details. For example, in the letter we ridicule Marchais’ thesis that “Freedom is indivisible!” Indeed, demagogically and from the point of view of any serious theory similar to Marxism – it is pure absurdity. But the important thing is not the essence of the formula but its purpose. And the purpose of this formula is to be different and distance themselves from us, to be completely unlike us! They don’t give a damn about theory! It’s even better for them that this thesis does not fit into any “general theory.”

I read [Boris] Pilnyak’s *The Hungry Year* [Голодный год] [sic].⁴ It made an impression on me... He brought up the things I’ve thought about hundreds of times before, about Russia and the Revolution, about where we started, where we are going, and why. And of course, it is strong artistically. He did not create a school in literature, but he left a powerful mark in (real!) Soviet prose.

April 2, 1977

Zagladin sent a chapter from the big new work of the American author Schapiro⁵ to the deputies. The book is on the CPSU, the chapter is about the role of the CC International Department. Overall it is one tall tale on top of another, even though Schapiro is their leading Sovietologist and Kremlinologist. The role of the Department and Ponomarev are exaggerated beyond belief, to the point that we supposedly create all foreign policy initiatives, the MFA walks mutely below us, we select all the foreign relations cadres, and ultimately they “tremble” before us as opposed to anyone else. Ponomarev’s role in the CPSU leadership is also unbelievably inflated and completely far-fetched. Although from the point of view of “scientific logic” – i.e. B.N.’s biography – they think it cannot be otherwise. They really don’t get us!

However, there are some interesting observations. All Ponomarev’s public speeches are carefully analyzed. They are used to trace the evolution of Moscow’s international strategy, in particular its line to adapt Communist Parties and the ICM, as well as various “democratic movements,” to Moscow’s needs and main foreign policy objectives at any given moment. The CPSU’s tactics, designed to keep the ICM under its influence (“the struggle for unity”). This part also has a great deal of simplification, conjectures and conclusions that are overly logical. But in some parts we do see a broken reflection of the “evolution of realities.”

Zagladin’s role as first deputy is noted. The author uses Zagladin’s articles to expose our “strategy and tactics.” I would say their view of his place in the International Department corresponds to reality. Ulyanovsky is mentioned, which once again shows that “over there” they have no idea about the real operation and state of affairs of our department.

⁴ The novel is called *The Naked Year* [Голый год]. (Trans.)

⁵ Most likely Leonard Schapiro, a British Sovietologist, whose work *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* was published in 1960 and revised in 1970. (Trans.)

Neither Shaposhnikov nor I are mentioned, even though we have a direct bearing on everything they inferred from B.N.'s texts. I have to admit, this "got to me." Yes! Even here, "appearance" is more important than "substance." For example, Ulyanovsky does not do anything for the department and has no significance here, but he appears almost monthly in *Pravda* – either as the author of below the fold articles (empty, shameless twaddle) or as a participant (together with some CC Secretary) in conversation with some American or Asian [politician]. As for Zagladin, he manages to write despite his enormous workload. This is talent, or rather a superhuman ability to work. By the way, his writing on the ICM is much bolder, and therefore interesting, than what I can do in Ponomarev's articles and reports. Naturally!

April 10, 1977

It looks like I will be going to the FRG and Switzerland next week (for 3-4 days) to talk with [Herbert] Mies and [Jean] Vincent about "Eurocommunism" and the significance the CPSU attaches, in these conditions, to the meeting about the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* the parties will be holding in Prague.

Fidel Castro was in Moscow. From the transcript, it is clear he had nothing to do with the uprising in Katanga (Zaire). On the contrary, he was upset that the Angolans did not inform him in advance, because "they had to know about it." Brezhnev started the conversation on this subject, clearly with the intention to probe whether this is the Cubans' doing. Brezhnev agreed that "we should not get involved in any way." In the meantime, everyone from the Americans to the Chinese is making a fuss about our and the Cubans' intervention. Mobutu [Sese Seko] even broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

All of April Brezhnev was on the TV screen and in the newspapers with Vance, then with Castro, then with Arafat. Podgorny travelled all over Black Africa. Kosygin – with the Finns (he went there), then with the Turks. The people are watching and wondering: are things so good at home that these old men can afford to spend their last bit of strength to deal with... well, alright, Vance is understandable, it is ultimately a question of life and death. But with Arafat?

Who is this Arafat and all these Arabs (by the way, Assad is coming in a week)? Why do the Soviet people need them? What do we need over there? Why are we spending so much time on them, and probably money? Of course, the trolleybus and metro passenger is used to it. It is not a sensitive issue for him, even though he grumbles. But the authority and prestige of our leadership keeps falling. People's indifference and mocking contempt for all this fuss has become an everyday phenomenon of mass psychology. It is some kind of absurd logic of dementia, supported by the precise and feverish work of the apparatus – precisely in this direction. The propaganda and party-state apparatus. And I have a direct relationship to this disastrous logic.

I am sitting here, reading Akhmatova and... choking up. She never moved me before. Then again, maybe I never read her seriously. However, it is symptomatic that the intelligent youth, coming back from the war (and those who grew up during the war) "pounced" on Akhmatova and Pasternak (I remember their astonishing evening in the Fall of 1946, in the

Communist Hall of the Moscow State University on Mokhovaya Street) – poets, who were only “conditionally” called Soviet before the war.

April 23, 1977

On April 14th Rykin and I left for the FRG. We arrived at Frankfurt am Main late at night, the only people meeting us were an Aeroflot employee and a comrade from the Hessian DKP, formerly an active crypto-Communist (the embassy staff has to get permission to travel beyond 40km from Bonn).

The road to Dusseldorf. We were told that we would first stop by the house of a CC secretary, Karl-Heinz Schroeder (I know him well and for a long time). A villa with a large plot of land, swimming pool, garage, etc. Inside – like in the best movies about the beautiful life in the West.

I told Karl-Heinz about the purpose of our visit. Then we sped off to Dusseldorf.

We went to the DKP administration. Manfred Kapluck (PB member) – the “elector” [«курфюрст»] for the entire party in the Ruhr. A fanatical party member with a steely glance and a thin, barely noticeable smile that almost never comes off. They say he is the most capable party leader, but he drinks. Schroeder was also present, Martha Buschmann and others. I essentially did not interfere in the conversation: Rykin was conducting his “business” on inter-party relations (money).

Then Schroeder put us in his car and drove to the apartment of Herbert Mies, the chairman of the Party. He lives alone. His wife and daughter are in the USSR, studying. The apartment is quite... It is furnished and maintained at the expense of the party, i.e. at the expense of the SED.

We sat down in the living room, Mies turned on the radio (against bugs), and at length thanked the CPSU for its trust. They already have our letter to the French CP. I outlined the CC CPSU's positions on Eurocommunism more fully. I told him about the PCF's reply, about the conversation at the CC with [Dolores] Ibarruri (before she left) and about the outcomes of talks with Vance in Moscow. However, after two hours of my outpourings, Mies suggested we sit down at the table. I tried to maneuver, thinking how to continue. But Mies started talking and couldn't be stopped.

He started by saying that the French are pressuring and courting him. There are voices in his own party saying why not follow the PCF and PCI, since the benefits are so obvious. Then he delved into an interesting topic, but he seemed embarrassed the whole time. The topic was: the objective reasons why the DKP cannot and “has no right to” lean towards Eurocommunism.

“Firstly, because the German ruling class is not like the French or Italian. It is stronger and harsher. It has aggressive tendencies and its nationalism is more dangerous for others. We must always remember what it brought to the world in the past.

“Secondly, we are representing the socialist part of Germany here. You know what our prospects are... However, we are an indicator of the state of world affairs. If and when our ruling

class resorts to fascist methods to suppress Communists, it would mean we are on the brink of war.

“For these reasons, we cannot “integrate” into the system, as the French and Italians are counting on doing. Most importantly, of course, it is because we are internationalists.”

He is more of a tribune demagogue than a political worker, but with a strong character. And he behaves with our people, the Soviets, without a hint of sycophancy. When he plays up to us politically, he covers it (fairly convincingly) with devotion to principles. So it was this time – he did not pretend to be terribly interested in what we brought him. He listened without “straining” himself, and it was clear that he already knows what to do with Eurocommunism. We do not really need to teach him.

Mies said openly (I wish Ponomarev would hear these kinds of conversations, but they never say anything like this to him, and he is not interested himself): the German worker lives very well here. The German ruling class cannot afford to lower the workers’ quality of life to a level comparable to the GDR.

I asked: the German bourgeoisie manages to keep a considerable piece for itself – greater than in England, France, and even the U.S. (comparatively). How does it manage to feed both the wolves and the sheep?

Mies’ response was so muddled that I cannot reproduce it.

I am reading Zimyanin’s spirited, “passionate” report on Lenin’s 107th anniversary. Loyalty to Lenin signifies a revolutionary. Distance and distortion of Lenin – a sign of revisionism. General rules that are valid now, for everyone. But what does this give the ICM? What is he talking about, exactly? How is this loyalty supposed to be expressed, and to what? To the dictatorship of the proletariat? In that case the PCF, PCI, CPGB, PCE and many others are total revisionists. Or is it in something else? But what? Communists in the West will read *Pravda* and wonder: what does the CPSU want, what does it mean? Because it still won’t say specifically what theoretical positions it finds acceptable and unacceptable. Or does it only care about the general formula of loyalty to Leninism, i.e. the abstractly ideological side of things; not the essence of the revolutionary, i.e. necessarily theoretically specific approach to reality, the only thing that provides practical effectiveness to communists? I’m afraid that Western communists will see only one thing behind the general loud declarations of this report – a call to level with classroom theory that is taught in Soviet universities.

This is a futile position in the present day. In my opinion, the only possible position is to intercept (“rebuff”) the anti-Sovietism of Marchais & Co., and hold serious, calm discussions (open and closed) on the issues of Leninism – the modern strategy of our day.

In the morning of the 18th, Monday, I was flying to Switzerland, with Yakukhin this time. With the same mission. I was a little nervous because I already knew the lineup they appointed for the meeting: Vincent, their chairman of the party, and four PB members, CC secretaries – [Andre] Muret (Lausanne), [Armand] Magnin (Geneva), [Jakob] Lechleiter (Zurich) and Hofer (Basil).

From 10 a.m. and almost until 6 p.m. we had a “discussion.” They were cautious. I already felt (based on information from our embassy) that they saw me as a messenger who came to deliver a reproach from Moscow about their recent Plenum, where they wrote that they “do not agree with administrative measures in the fight against ideas.”

They planned out their tactics: show with documents in hand that they did not borrow anything from the French, they came up with “their own way” 20-25 years ago; that they are independent and emancipated.

When they understood that I did not come to reproach them but to talk about what to do together in the face of the PCF and PCI’s positions, they clammed up. One after another they made declarations: “We can explain all aspects of our policy to you or anyone else, but we are not responsible for others. We do not want to be ‘either accountants (hinting at: collecting quotes against the CPSU), or judges.’ We do not share the concept that “freedom is indivisible,” but we expressed our disagreement with administrative measures against beliefs.”

Vincent told me that he appeared on television recently to speak about human rights in Switzerland. “You know, I received 60 phone calls while I was in the studio. All of them on the subject of – what is it like in the USSR? One Bulgarian immigrant said something along the lines of: it’s good for you, Monsieur Vincent, to sit in a comfortable studio and expose the human rights shortcomings in your country! But if you tried to do the same in my Bulgaria...”

And more along those lines. Muret said, “Why do you forbid abstract art exhibitions? What is the danger?”

They talked about the “quality of Soviet propaganda exports,” which are unsuitable for consumption “here” and no one takes it.

I was sick of hearing all this. Firstly, because I’m tired of it. Secondly, because communists, even if they do not sympathize and agree with us, have to show some understanding that we cannot and will not do otherwise. If they want to respect the Soviet Union’s role – such as it is – they have to adapt to this or at least take it into account. Otherwise, what’s the point of the communist movement?

However, I’m increasingly doubtful that the Swiss and others need us. Of course, these old men are counting on (or already receiving) a pension from us, they also receive assistance annually. But they do not need us for anything else. Our moral authority for the working class, not to mention other segments of the population, as a revolutionary force and an example to follow is reduced to zero. Our foreign affairs and “successes” have the opposite effect on the Western public. Communists can no longer appeal to the masses from the position of fraternity with the CPSU. In the eyes of these masses we are a superpower at best. Our heroic past and sacrifices against fascism are history. And then, ultimately, we were defending ourselves! Churchill said this, and 30 dynamic years have passed since then. We are maintaining historical continuity artificially (in school, propaganda, literature – all of our Soviet culture). For them, this history is the field of “experts” and a part of the intelligentsia, who have their own “historical continuity” (that has to do with their homeland).

I was listening to the Swiss and thinking: is the ICM turning into Comrade Ponomarev's departmental business before our eyes? Is it being kept alive by trips like mine, not to mention events like the Berlin conference, which we created entirely ourselves (and which then turned against us)?!

Here in Geneva (like in other similar instances), I sincerely "got worked up" – told them about the absurdity and danger of representing the spiritual and ideological life, and in general the entire character of the life of Soviet people, like they do it "here." I told them about the enormous stream of literature, high class literature too, the innumerable variety of acute and great problems that are raised and worked on and discussed by more than just the intelligentsia. About the unquenchable thirst for knowledge, the incredible demand for spiritual values – above any other country in the world. About the scale and complexity of our society, the content and philosophical wealth, the diversity of that thing called "an individual." I tried to provide examples.

In a word, I wanted to show them that they have no idea about the [world] they judge with such ease and aplomb, basing their views on bitter and petty "dissidents." Or rather, I urged them, communists, not to add material to paint the image created by anti-Soviets.

I saw that it was "having an effect"… For example, Hofer started to argue that young people in the West are politically literate now, with a decent cultural background, and they are unhappy with the way you write your own history (hinting at suppressing information about Trotsky, which the embassy people told me about in advance). I replied with a parable: of course, we do not have the resources to satisfy all the tastes of the Western youth who are interested in us. But those who are studying us specifically, especially from the CPs, should know that over the past 20 years, after the XX Congress, we have published thousands of books, archival documents, entire document series, tens of thousands of research articles, collections, transcripts of congresses, conferences, CPSU Plenums… Nothing is suppressed there, everything is presented as it was. Be our guests. But even such a "renowned" specialist like Ellenstein did not bother to familiarize himself with this material. Superficiality in these matters leads a communist into anti-Soviet company, even if he is not an anti-Soviet at heart. It is inevitable because of the environment, including the bourgeois literary and "Kremlinological" [elements].

They essentially had nothing to respond with. But that is not the problem. All of these arguments are valid and relevant when there is a "communist conscience," in other words, a sincere desire to know and understand us, to be our friends.

But the thing that created the International Communist Movement, what sustained it as a unified whole – [the wish] "to do it like Russia" – has disappeared forever not only from objective life, but from communists' consciousness, even ones most loyal to us. In this case, why do they need to know us? Only to fight off bourgeois anti-Soviets? Perhaps. But this is not a vital need, since now they firmly know: "they will take their own path," or none at all. Berlinguer posed this dilemma sharply and openly: the ruling class very much wants for us to take the Soviet way, because by now it is sufficiently strong and smart, and it understands that for us this is the surest way to fail.

We finished around 6 p.m. Vincent concluded in such a way as to “remove the need” for me to speak again. But I still asked for the floor. And “explained” for another 20 minutes.

Vincent walked Yakukhin and me to the consulate. Along the way, I tried to tell him about Ibarruri, what she said about Carrillo at the Central Committee. He rushed to respond that she told him the same a long time ago. Once again, he does not want to be “informed by us,” he does not want to engage, he not only does not want to pry, but even to know about “other people’s affairs.” But he is a great master at talking about nothing.

It was drizzling. Vincent showed us Geneva. He was tired by the time we got to the consulate. I asked for a car to drive him home. But for his 72 years, he is quite active.

April 30, 1977

Today I met B.N. at Vnukovo-2 airport. He returned from Prague, where 75 communist parties met to discuss the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. His speech in *Pravda* took up almost half a page. His toast at Husak’s reception. Large selection of speeches by others.

In a word, B.N. once again forced a notable political event out of nothing, a mini international communist meeting. It has zero significance in terms of real impact on the ICM. But it is significant in terms of symbolism, which, as a matter of fact, is the thing that gives the ICM a flicker of life. The bourgeois propaganda will finish the job by organizing large commentary with feigned fears about Moscow’s intentions, which will only strengthen impressions of this “event.”

There was a Politburo at the end of April. The draft Constitution was discussed (it will be brought up at the Plenum on May 24). B.N. has been working on this project for two years, if not more. Even Krasin worked on it at the Gorky Dacha. Now B.N. has been appointed as head of the working group to prepare the draft. He must again see this as his finest hour...

However, it will be almost impossible to prepare a sensible draft in the three weeks we have left. I read the PB members’ comments, including Leonid Ilyich’s. There are a lot of them, some even with suggestions for paragraphs (here the advisers really did some work. Possibly whole departments...). Even what Brezhnev said – and he had the most political comments – shows that there is still a lot of work to do. B.N. clearly underestimates this, even though he understands: today he went to the CC directly from the airport, to put together his “team,” which was at the ready.

Apparently, all the innovations of the draft have already been scrapped: for example, the right for every individual to choose his or her nationality, regardless of “biological” origin... Autonomy of universities... rights for Soviets of People’s Deputies, etc.

Now B.N. is going to run us ragged in these two-three weeks.

May 7, 1977

The first work week of May was chaotic and finished downright depressingly. On Thursday, the PB had a “concomitant” and “spontaneous” discussion of problems of the ICM,

connected to the discussion of outcomes of the Prague *PPS* meeting and... unexpectedly for me – the letter from the CC CPSU to the CP of Great Britain. I wrote that letter (together with the sectors) on B.N.’s “orders,” before my trip to the FRG. He was inspired by the “success” of the letter to the PCF... However, Suslov had doubts about it already at the Secretariat. Although he did not reject it, he suggested to postpone mailing it (“we will agree on a date later”). I think he brought the letter to the Politburo to kill it completely.

Brezhnev said: “Aren’t we writing too many letters to communist parties?” Andropov found fault with the interpretation of the word “dissident,” saying that we are not imprisoning and exiling dissidents (people who think differently), but criminals. Suslov again suggested to “review the date.” Though in general, this letter is polite, unlike the letter to the French. There aren’t even any reproaches (and hints) at the leadership of the CPGB, only a “slight” jab at *Morning Star*...

So, it would seem, there is one line (do not quarrel! Do not pick a fight!). Very well. I would be the last to disagree with this. I had objected to B.N., arguing that we should not “write [the letter].” However, I was reprimanded for being too liberal...

But what happened later totally contradicts what was said in connection to the letter to the CPGB.

B.N. gathered me, Zagladin, and Brutents and in a very muddled way told us what took place. He was very upset. He did not identify who said what, except for two instances. It’s also unclear who started it. But it began the usual way (like a conversation between two random passengers on a bus): “We need to do something about that Eurocommunism!” “It is getting out of hand!” “We pay them as if nothing happened, we give them our national funds. We should close the cashbox, stop giving them anything. Let them flounder.” “Yes, yes.” “We should have done it long ago,” Kapitonov agreed (but with whom?).

Gromyko joined in: “Please. (!) They want to get into the government! Who is going to let them! It is a joke.”

Someone objected, “But should we interfere with their struggle for power?!”

“We aren’t rebuking them enough in our press. We practically aren’t doing anything against this revisionism and opportunism. We are letting them get away with everything...”

“Yes” – I think this was Suslov – “We should order for a long-term line to be developed to deal with CPs prone to Eurocommunism.”

They settled on that. No one remembered that they had approved such a line themselves by a special PB resolution on September 8, 1976, “On the outcomes of the Berlin conference.”

So what?

I’ll tell you what! First of all, of course it is upsetting that all our work (the department’s and Ponomarev’s) is “invisible” – so much energy, nerves, ideas, words and paper, not to

mention professional and personal time, including literally sleepless nights – and all of this, it turns out, is “tears the world will never see.”

Secondly – the most distressing – is that our top leadership does not even know that it has a “line” with regard to Eurocommunism. The level of discussion of this problem, to which we give “our hearts’ best efforts,” truly does not rise above armchair politicians. It’s too embarrassing to even bring up the level of competence and understanding the essence of the matter, what it all means and where it is going.

Then again, what can we expect and count on, when yesterday the TV program *Vremya* devoted 20 out of 30 minutes to meetings and high-level talks with the Abyssinian leader (even experts can’t pronounce his name). Everyone – Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, and others – everyone was occupied for three days with this visit. We don’t have any other more important matters to attend to!

The people are used to it, of course. But it’s terrible that Gromyko, along with the “generals” (Ustinov) are slipping in all this nonsense. It seems the General Secretary is no longer capable of separating the wheat from the chaff, and his close associates and even advisers do not dare to tell him (or at least hint) that nonsense is nonsense. It is nonsense in and of itself, not to mention the moral and political consequences for the leadership’s authority and “personal” [authority]...

May 13, 1977

May 9 – Victory Day. As usual, my front-line friend Kolya Varlamov and I walked around Moscow. As the years go by, there are fewer and fewer people with medals to be seen on this day. Afterwards, we stopped by my place, sat and reminisced. We bragged to each other, criticized some people.

At work after the holidays I concentrated on consolidating all the pieces for B.N.’s report (in June, in Prague) on the “CPSU’s theoretical contribution” to Marxism-Leninism over the last 60 years. It was reprinted today and came to 66 pages, while it needs to be 40. All the theory is from political conclusions, the origins of which is buried in the depths of all the apparatus groups ever. The “summa summarum,” as B.N. likes to say.

A harsh review of Carrillo’s “Eurocommunism and the State” is in the works.

Today on TV there was a 10-minute broadcast of how Suslov, Ponomarev, and Zagladin saw Dolores off as she flew home. M.A. read heartfelt words off a piece of paper. Ibarruri, without a piece of paper, promised to fight for the friendship between our parties.

Zagladin is meeting with Egon Bahr, the executive director of the SPD, the organizer of *Ostpolitik*, close to Brandt. A tenacious, cynical, unceremonious German mind. He says directly what he wants: for us not to interfere as the SPD matures. Namely, we should criticize it, thereby giving it a certificate of anti-communist reliability.

I once again was surprised to see for myself that Vadim gives much more interesting post-factum accounts of his talks with such people, than what happens in reality. He was dull in

the conversation with Bahr, shied away from a candid exchange, and made banal jokes and “demonstrations of friendship.” I felt I had to jump in to give the exchange sharpness and frankness. At first Bahr looked at me like, “Who is this?” (This was his first time seeing me, while he was acquainted with Vadim from the time Brezhnev visited the FRG). But later he would only look me in the eyes and spoke as if only with me. I could not stay till the end, I had a meeting scheduled with people presenting on “Eurocommunism.” I told Bahr about this when I was taking my leave. He immediately responded: “Oh, we are also concerned about this issue, like you. But it is more complex now than it was in 1968. It is the same as Dubcek. But you won’t be able to deal with it, like you did with Dubcek. Alas!”

Today I spent 4 hours with the Cubans from the CC International Department of the Cuban CP. Two of them were black, one creole. Smart and educated people (we were mostly talking about Guyana and the Caribbean affairs), and very much active in a revolutionary way. The Guevara element is still strong: no permission required to intervene in any place, especially “in their zone.”

May 15, 1977

Sunday. I visited the Museum of Oriental Art on Obukha St. There is an exhibition on Russian artists painting the Orient, from the late XIX – early XX century. It is obvious from the first glance that the subject is just an excuse. In reality, the exhibition is meant to show Kuznetsov, Lentulov, Mashkov, Kuprin, Goncharova, Volkov, and others. In addition to that, they came up with a wonderful idea: advertisements (commercial, industrial), posters, price tags, announcements of balls, price lists, etc. from the early XX century when the artists from “God’s Earth” [«*Mupa божия*»] got into this sphere. I enjoyed it tremendously. It is incredible and unexpected.

May 16, 1977

I had a bad day. I began perfecting Ponomarev’s report. Then the ciphered telegrams and other papers started coming in. Zagladin called: he finally deigned to work on the “Eurocommunism” note, and sent it back to me for review. But I didn’t have time to do it, because guys from our fraternal department came by and asked me to join them for a lunch with the Cubans, who postponed their departure until tomorrow.

This purely political lunch (they are revolutionaries, and former Cuban intelligence officers to boot – they cannot talk about anything else) lasted for about three hours. With cognac.

I finished reading the *In Their Wisdom* by C.P. Snow. Powerful British prose, but with greater wisdom than Galsworthy, because the country has become sad and tired.

May 21, 1977

S. Carrillo’s book *Eurocommunism and the State*. A mix of Berlinguer and Garaudy, plus some things from himself. But I think his analysis is correct, overall. The decisive instruments of preserving capitalism are the ideological apparatus and the army. To overcome capitalism, it is necessary to infiltrate them (through a difficult process of democratization of all aspects of life in

the country) and engage them on the side of anti-capitalist forces. It is foolish to count on the victory of socialism (even “democratic”) when the army is against you. The only way this would happen is through a crisis and collapse of the army, which is only possible as the result of a colonial war (like in Portugal). But we are done with colonies. Or as the result of any other war, which in Europe would mean a world war, i.e. the end of all politics and civilization as we know it.

In a word, Carrillo is the [Karl] Kautsky of our time. He is just as much against the CPSU (current leadership) as Kautsky was against Lenin.

He could, of course, have done without dotting all the “i”s – without describing his thoughts on “Eurocommunism,” without offensive hints and direct assessments of the CPSU, without disparaging everything the CPSU has done since Lenin.

Ninety five percent of the book is devoted to the strategy of revolution in the conditions of Western Europe, the problems that concern every communist there. Not everyone will immediately notice the anti-Soviet veins in the text, especially since this indirect format is now common in the West.

This is why our protest against the book, even though it is aimed at “exposing” anti-Soviet and divisive (for the ICM) aspect of the book (which is stated explicitly), will be received as an ideological condemnation of theoretical, strategic, and tactical pursuits of Western European communists. A dogmatic, hegemonic intention to reduce their entire line to the common Short Course denominator.

The Politburo gave orders to prepare such an article. It was made in Zuyev’s sector, under Zagladin’s supervision. Yesterday the deputies discussed it in B.N.’s office. I was surprised by his concern that the article will be received precisely in the above-mentioned sense. Vadim and I later used this to edit some things.

Shaposhnikov expressed a legitimate idea, though it was too late (after I set out my doubts on the basis of having read the book, as opposed to the abstract prepared by the KGB, which basically contained hand-picked anti-Soviet pieces) – maybe instead of the book, we should speak out about Carrillo’s interview, where his anti-Sovietism is more open and visible, and not covered up by the needs of the realistic struggle for socialism in Western Europe?

B.N. waived his arms, “The question was discussed, PB members are outraged and asking how long we are going to take it,” and so on.

By the way, why is the KGB reporting about such things to the Politburo, instead of us (the CC International Department)?

Yesterday, Zagladin and I submitted the note (as ordered – on our long-term line in the ICM) to Ponomarev. How long will it stay on his desk? Will it ever go further?

The same with the note on Social Democracy. We presented our report on the conversation with E. Bahr to him... He probably won’t send it around the PB either. He won’t dare.

I also submitted to him the first draft of his speech in Prague, “On the CPSU’s theoretical contribution to Marxism-Leninism over 60 years.” This will spend a long time on his desk.

Anyway, these days all he worries about is the Constitution, and in reality, the thing Zagladin indicated yesterday without words when he touched his hands to his shoulders, i.e. “epaulettes” – whether Ponomarev will be made a PB member at the Plenum opening on May 24th...

May 22, 1977

Last night I tried to read the draft Constitution, it was sent to members of the Plenum with an accompanying facsimile from Brezhnev and a request to report comments to the CC Secretariat. On Friday Zagladin told me that he already did – he sent 26 sentences to Chernenko. I won’t do it, it wouldn’t be loyal to Ponomarev.

I delved into the text. Everything it contains of formal value was already present in the Stalin version. The new things – about “freedoms,” “human rights,” even on “the right to exit” and live anywhere in the USSR – is for our current campaign in the West. An attempt to deceive. In reality, such things only complicate matters. Wouldn’t it be more honest to just say: this is who we are, we are going to stay this way, and don’t expect that we will introduce all kinds of Western freedoms here?

The attempt to define “developed socialism” (which was, essentially, the excuse for why we need a new Constitution) is amateurish, stylistically helpless, and at times downright cheap. The entire preamble is disgusting: the empty twaddle of people who forgot how to write normally, in a language that regular people can understand. All of this is dishonest... One only has to compare it with “page 13” of the *Literaturka* paper from May 18th (it is now specifically devoted to customer service) to see how this preamble has zero contact with reality.

Brezhnev called B.N. when we (the deputies) were discussing B.N.’s article against Carrillo. B.N. spoke with him for a long time on the phone. They were discussing the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia (two “Marxist-Leninist regimes,” and both great friends of the USSR!). Brezhnev was upset, he asked whether or not he should receive either of their ambassadors. B.N. advised him against personally “getting into this mess.”

I was thinking about something else. Lately, Brezhnev’s appearances on TV have been of him receiving various statesmen. Judging by his appearance, he has very little strength left. It’s unlikely that he can get to the heart of problems or events right now. He sees his role (influencing the course of events) in “receiving or not receiving” someone. The rest is done by the mass media and other aides. The fact of the meeting matters, not the content. But in this case, isn’t the role of Gromyko and advisers becoming too great, since they essentially determine who will be received, and what will be said?!

May 24, 1977

The Plenum of the Central Committee. Brezhnev was energetic and trim. His report on the Constitution was businesslike and clear, without Bovin-style literary embellishments. The

first applause was (in the text) in response to the following: “After the Constitution of 1936, we all know that repressions took place, violations of the law and principles of Lenin’s democracy – in contradiction to the newly adopted Constitution. The Party has condemned all of this and it must never happen again.”

The debate. A young and spirited secretary of the Donetsk *obkom* was the first to speak – he proposed to unite the posts of General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and hand them both to Brezhnev. Of course, all the others – eight speakers (following a text written in advance) supported him and “developed” the idea. Shcherbitsky spoke on this subject particularly clearly and straightforwardly, as he always does. One of the secretaries from Tashkent, who everyone thought was a little dumb and primitive, added: “... and to release Cde. Podgorny from his post...” There was a hubbub in the auditorium. Everyone thought it was excessively rude, since everything was clear anyway. But, it turns out, it was necessary (and planned) to formulate a Plenum resolution.

Podgorny was red in the face, pathetic, applauding his own funeral.

Suslov, who presided, read out the draft resolution. First – about appointing Brezhnev as Chairman of the Presidium. Ovations and so on. Then – about relieving Podgorny from this post and... (another surprise)... from PB membership. An unpleasant scene takes place: Podgorny stands up, starts collecting his papers, and says something to Suslov. The latter makes a dismissive gesture and says (the microphone is right under his nose!) something like: “it’s ok, you can sit here a little longer.”

Then there was a vote. The draft becomes a resolution. Podgorny again stands up and mumbles something to Suslov. It seems Suslov at first thought that Podgorny wanted to leave the auditorium entirely and at first made a negative gesture, then points down, implying: go, sit over there, where everyone else is sitting.

Scene: Brezhnev descends to the podium to say thank you, Podgorny descends after him down into the auditorium and, ironically, sits next to Katushev (who a few minutes later would also be relieved of his position as Secretary of the CC). Brezhnev says that he will faithfully serve the Party... and not a word about Podgorny.

I understand, everyone understands: our former “president” is a nonentity and an layman in politics, he did not accomplish anything and could not, even though he grumbled against Brezhnev’s elevation, but not because of some principles. He wanted to be at least one out of three, so some of the glory would fall to him.

But there are basic laws of humanity. There is the moral and political side: the authority of this position and any other. If the “president” can be knocked down in a second, and without the slightest explanation of the reasons (it could at least have been “due to poor health”), then any other position becomes shaky – a function of personal sympathy or antipathy at the top. Today you are quite the somebody, and tomorrow you are nobody. This is our great and mighty Russian democracy – it started with Ivan the Terrible and was cemented by Peter the Great. Everyone was equal before him as before God: marshals, ministers, deputies, secretaries, etc.

Therefore, once again, nothing fell to B.N. Even though everyone, starting with Brezhnev, praised the draft Constitution. Of course, Ponomarev was not mentioned. Probably nobody outside the apparatus knows that he is the “main force” here and put the most energy into it.

In all fairness, it's time: he deserves it and has served for it in the full sense of the word.

Suslov made an announcement about the anthem [of the Soviet Union], listed over a dozen poets and as many composers who worked on it and consulted for over 10 years. He described what was outdated: “Be true to the people, thus Stalin has reared us, Inspired us to labor and Valorus Deed;” about German invaders and that we will win freedom for all through battle (something like that, I don't remember exactly; Suslov said these passages can be “misunderstood” today).

We stood to listen to the tape: a chorus and orchestra sang and played. It is more solemn-ecclesiastical-melodic, the same melody.

In 4 hours of work, so many events that will go down in history!

May 28, 1977

The week of my birthday. Turning 56! People from our department took turns congratulating me. One with whiskey, another with whiskey, and... Suspiciously, B.N. congratulated me too.

In the evening we happened to be having a Party meeting at which Vadim gave a report on the outcomes of Prague-1 and the Plenum. He led the meeting in a light and clear manner, he was a little worked up.

Ponomarev refused to meet with [Tony] Chater (member of the CPGB, editor of *Morning Star*). I already noted that in April, B.N. came up with the idea to send the CPGB leadership a letter similar to the French one. But our PB had a reserved reaction. It accepted it “in principle,” but left the date to be determined. I suggested to use Chater’s visit (at *Pravda*’s invitation) to speak to him and convey the essence of the letter (without revealing our intentions), to see what will happen next. My secret intention was to “wrap up” the letter this way for good. Chater traveled for 10 days in Uzbekistan and Armenia, yesterday he returned to Moscow and B.N. (together with me, according to the CC’s decision) was supposed to receive him. But he refused, suggesting that Afanasyev (editor-in-chief of *Pravda*) and I carry out the whole operation ourselves.

B.N. is going through another “slump” on the subject of: you work and work, you don’t spare yourself, and they not only don’t make you a PB member, they don’t even mention that it was all Ponomarev’s work on the Constitution! In a word, he is having a “let everything go to hell!” moment. This has happened dozens of times and will keep happening until the end of his political career.

So. We received Chater with Afanasyev (plus Dzhavad, Lagutin, Ovchinnikov) in *Pravda*’s editorial office. He is a former chemistry professor at Leeds University, a typical

intelligent liberal Englishman. Afanasyev is primitive and uncouth (even though he is the author of a dozen books, a professor, doctor of sciences, correspondent member, journalist, the editor of a newspaper with a readership of 11 million, etc.). He lacks not only European culture, but also political instinct (which is inexcusable). B.N. also considers “pressure,” exerting pressure, as the purpose of such conversations, but his vast experience and natural intelligence allow him, usually, to push the right pedals at the right time. Afanasyev, on the other hand, is no good for international (at least) politics (I’m convinced of it once again). He managed to “casually” touch on the “Czechoslovak question” and provoke Chater to give an entire lecture on the fact that parliamentary struggle is also class struggle. Afanasyev caused offense, which is quite dangerous in this kind of situation: Chater was forced to give a rebuff against “accusations of anti-Sovietism.”

I couldn’t wait for our editor to leave for an hour to attend an editorial board. But I intervened before he left. Chater sensed that before him was a person who knew how to handle “Eurocommunists” (we hadn’t met before). I pushed the same ideas as Afanasyev, but I provided facts (from their own experience) that made him flustered, he started babbling. He did not expect that we know the details of everything they do regarding “human rights in the USSR.” But I didn’t back him into a corner... and I “helped” him to recover, by switching to broad class generalizations and by saying that since they demand we recognize and understand their particular characteristics and difficulties – kindly reciprocate.

I also stumped him with the idea that we need to be accepted the way we are, instead of trying to transform us into an “open society,” which is hopeless.

Then we went to the House of Journalists for dinner. Toasts at dinner. In a word, we let Chater know that everything is much more complicated, and we are not such simpletons and not the kind of people you would imagine from the words of Bukovsky and Plyushch.

The dinner was friendly in a true sense, frank, cheerful, self-critical (from our side, which Chater really did not expect – sharp and critical assessments of our own affairs!).

It seemed to me that he left wavering on “Eurocommunism” (the anti-Soviet part of it). In any case, he has plenty food for thought to share with McLennan, Woddis & Co.

May 31, 1977

Today at B.N.’s request I wrote a speech for Suslov based on the CC Plenum’s decision to inaugurate Leonid Ilyich as the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In other words, B.N. wants to show his efforts here too. I wrote a beautiful speech, but of course B.N. will edit it in his style.

The fuss with preparing materials for a meeting with Gus Hall, the most capricious and presumptuous of all the CP leaders (it’s funny to watch). But Brezhnev always agrees to receive him, “without a peep”...

On Sunday, there was an article in *Pravda*: “Black Magic on Taganka,” about “Master and Margarita.” The article is intelligent, even elegant, with compliments – but it is a thrashing.

[The author] accurately notes Lyubimov's political intent, his vulgarity, his talent, and everything else.

June 5, 1977

Yesterday, Ponomarev and I met Gus Hall. Today on Sparrow Hills I spent four hours telling him about "Eurocommunism." The plan is that I enlighten him on all the details, then he speaks with Suslov and B.N. at the CC, and then they bring him to Brezhnev.

I wonder if these three "contacts" will sing the same tune in terms of interpreting our line and the line we want from him.

The draft of the Constitution has been published. Even though Bovin called my comments nonsense, he ended up including 75 percent of them. I'm sure no one else insisted that he should. Especially since he probably steamrolled the team, as always. Then again, maybe my comments coincided with others that carried more weight.

June 11, 1977

The Suslov-Ponomarev-Gus Hall and Brezhnev-Gus Hall meetings took place. I was at the first one. Brezhnev told B.N. ahead of time that he will only talk about Carter and related subjects. "Everything else – Marchais and so forth – discuss your business without me." I warned Gus about this. And we carried it out...

The evening before, B.N. told me with frustration, "Brezhnev doesn't like the memo. He asked why is it written in this manner: on this issue, one could say...; in response to this, one could inform... (i.e. it is composed following our "classic model"). It should be direct, the way he will speak." I objected that Mostovets, head of sector, got chewed out by Aleksandrov last time (in 1974!) when he tried to do exactly that – write it in the first person – "Why are you speaking for Brezhnev – I, I, I? Doesn't he know what to say himself?" To this, B.N. reasonably replied that "it was a long time ago!" and I should have asked him, not Mostovets.

To be honest, I wasn't happy with this format myself, in the beginning. I told Mostovets that in my experience, direct speech is better. But he convinced me not to bother with Aleksandrov again, that he can change it himself if he wants to...

B.N. said: "It's a 'difficult situation' right now, and in general, you know..." In other words, he made it clear that Brezhnev is again in a state where all he can do is read what's written in big letters.

I sat down and rewrote everything in the first person, adapting to Aleksandrov's "vigorous" style. In addition, I included at his insistence a sharp assessment of Carter's just-published report to the U.S Congressional Commission on compliance (by the Soviet Union) with the Helsinki Accords. Aleksandrov called the report "rude." I included it in the memo, and Brezhnev said it.

At Suslov's. M.A. greeted Hall for a long time, the entire time laughing a little nervous laugh (he started doing this a few years ago; it happens especially when he is in a good mood).

Then he started speaking (without notes). In general, he sketched out roughly the same concept as I described to G. Hall in detail on Sparrow Hills. He spoke almost exclusively about Eurocommunism. B.N. jumped in too and gave a twenty-minute speech, with pressure against revisionism and how we are fighting against the reformist tendency specifically. Tellingly, Suslov interrupted B.N. twice, emphasizing that “they (i.e. Western CPs) can choose their struggle, the path to socialism, themselves. This is their business. We do not want to interfere. We are having comradely discussions with them.” The second time he interrupted B.N. with a reminder that when the two of them were talking with Plissonier, “I told him that already at the XX Congress we, i.e. the CPSU, said that we are for a peaceful path, including a parliamentary path.”

Meanwhile, B.N. is eager as always to teach and instruct, though in practical politics he is more guided by common sense and for now calls to speak out only against the anti-Soviet aspects of Eurocommunism.

Gus Hall expressed complete agreement with the CPSU’s “balanced” line, and said that the U.S. Communist Party must act “in unison,” not like a partisan in the ICM (later, when we were leaving the CC, he jokingly thanked me for “preparing” him for this conversation). Although, judging by his report at the CC Plenum in early June (which Morris showed us) – there he held a somewhat different position: to openly lambast in defense of the CPSU.

We talked for a little over two hours, and at 5p.m. they had to meet with Brezhnev.

When I was saying goodbye, Suslov asked, “Aren’t you going to be there?” I said, “What for? There will be a lot of people... Mikhailov will be there, he is a consultant and speaks English.” His reaction was ambiguous. Later B.N. invited me (with Suslov’s consent), but in a way that felt like he was asking me to refuse. Which I did. And I did the right thing. As it turned out later, Brezhnev didn’t even invite Aleksandrov... I would have had to hang about in the hallway and then clear out.

B.N. and Mikhailov later told me that everything worked like clockwork. L.I. read the memo (which Aleksandrov lightly edited) in two parts, letting Hall speak in between. The latter was clear and brief: Carter will soon come to grief and take a more realistic position.

There is a large photo in *Pravda* and on *Vremya* on TV... Embraces and so on. The communique went out the way we prepared it. I haven’t seen any responses yet.

June 12, 1977

The USSR State Anthem and the CC CPSU’s response to the Communist Party of Japan’s open letter on the Kuril Islands were published today. [The response] is foolish, unproductive and will not appeal to anyone but chauvinists. Ulyanovsky and Kovalenko’s work comes through in every line, crude, slovenly work.

Brutents went to Mexico for the Party Congress. The CP there is also finding “its own way,” Latin American Eurocommunism. He was in Washington and New York for a few days in transit. Both in Mexico and in the U.S., he met with many journalists and diplomats from “our

neighbors" (KGB residents). The general impression from conversations with them – they, our people abroad, live in an atmosphere where "they don't like us!" "They don't like us, Tolya! Everyone – from the far left to the far right..." Some of our people talk openly about this constant feeling that arises from everyday trifles, and from more conscious political observations.

Indeed, there is no denying it. This is increasingly felt in Europe and in socialist countries. Alas! There are many reasons...

But it was very unpleasant to hear it from the lips of an "eyewitness," even if it doesn't come as a surprise to me.

When I told him about the Plenum and how Podgorny was removed, his Armenian temper flared and he started repeating to me across the table in a theatrical whisper, "Tolya! Everything is disintegrating! Total disintegration! It is everywhere – big and small! Senile degeneration is coming like a hopeless gray cloud."

This also was unpleasant for me to hear. Then I realized it's because I, a Great Russian, heard it from a foreigner. He is the same as them, so to speak, with his judgements!

June 13, 1977

I just re-read *Kholstomer* – Tovstonogov brought the premiere [to Moscow]. The theatergoers are drooling. So I "prepared myself" to see it. Lev Nikolayevich [Tolstoy] wrote it powerfully and with triple subtexts. A little terrifying.

The CC organized a visit to the exemplary Tamanskaya division in Alabino. I got to fire a machine gun and a handgun. The escort officer said that I scored "nearly excellent" with the machine gun: from short bursts (total of 20 cartridges) the targets did not fall twice. With the handgun I think I had the best result of the group, 26 out of the possible 30 (25 is considered "excellent"). It was nice to "relive a bit of the past."

June 18, 1977

A week of "euphoria" over the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet taking his post. The Supreme Soviet session was nothing but applause and standing ovations. Suslov's speech... (two half-phrases were all that was left of my contribution to it). Brezhnev's acceptance speech: "The will of the motherland, the will of the Party... even though it will be difficult."

Brutents – hysterical in the "dark room" next to my office: "How can we mock a great people so blatantly and coarsely, to put on shows that even half-civilized Latin American countries now consider inappropriate." And so on. I was laughing. What can we do!?

The first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet under new chairmanship was being broadcast on TV all evening yesterday. A painful "reading" of the text in big letters, without understanding what he is saying, thinned-out by long pauses between the words in a phrase, unbalanced accents, pathetic attempts to give intonation with out of place gestures...

Members of the Presidium are sitting and writing down every word like schoolchildren, even though tomorrow the entire speech will be in the newspapers in corrected literary form.

Towards the end, the reader-speaker was faltering completely. When he finished, it was like he dragged a wagon up a mountain.

The Ukrainian, Lithuanian and other members started to speak, singing praises and prompting thunderous applause... And this is a session of the working (!) supreme body! Not like the sessions of the Supreme Soviet, which are a mass performance and people are long used to it.

Is even elementary common sense disappearing up there at the top?! We discussed what we saw with our consultants. Doesn't the basic feeling of self-respect (self-preservation) tell them that keeping bodies such as the CC Plenum, the sessions of the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet closed makes it possible to preserve at least the mythology of power in people's minds? Let them think that at least here a serious conversation is taking place, instead of empty talk and hallelujahs. Can they really not understand it? Can't the KGB report that Homeric laughter is sweeping across the country and there is total indifference to all these theatrical performances that replace real governing and demonstrate the total impotence of our leading actor.

Or maybe the cynical and loutish Lapin and his television crowd are deliberately exposing [Brezhnev] to ridicule? After all, only a good director could come up with this: after Brezhnev finished speaking, others took over. He is sitting with an absent expression, obviously not hearing anything, and apparently struggling to cope with the heaviness that spilled over him after the grueling strain. From time to time he mindlessly looks at people bringing papers to him and utters something (we can hear the unintelligible sound because he didn't think to turn off his microphone, and others don't dare to make the suggestion). He is given "little texts" and he reads them in the "right" place (it's marked), then "concludes" the debate by reading off a paper prepared two days ago by advisers.

And all of this happens before the eyes of a great nation, which is astonished but has given up a long time ago.

The General Secretary-President is now only capable of perceiving the significance of the very fact of his speech or appearance somewhere, his conversation or meeting with whomever – not the content of these state actions. The same goes for state and party papers, which he no longer signs himself: Chernenko has long had the monopoly on the facsimile of Brezhnev's signature.

The content of Brezhnev's conversations, as well as whom and when he would receive, was determined by the all-powerful members of the Politburo – Suslov, Ustinov, Andropov, Gromyko, and advisers, mainly Aleksandrov.

Brezhnev has to go to France soon after his "elevation to the rank." Do they really expect that the French won't notice they are dealing with a "dummy of an eagle" (as David Samoilov once aptly named Konstantin Fedin in his role as head of the Writer's Union)?!

On Thursday and Friday I went to Tovstonogov's [plays]. An American play, *The Effect of Gamma Rays on Man-in-the-Moon Marigolds* and *Faratyev's Fantasies* (by a certain Sokolova) with Yursky in the leading role. Terrific acting. I do not remember being so impressed by the actors since the days of pre-war Moscow Academic Art Theater.

It so happened that I watched two plays in a row (from American and Soviet life), in which the situations, the subject matter, and even the arrangement of characters (a mother with two daughters) are similar. You could see (especially since the form was perfect) what a huge difference there is in spirituality between the two nations, societies, and countries. How great and incomparable our country, and incredibly abundant with talent.

By the way, Tovstonogov demonstrates the viability of classical theater. He doesn't need Lyubimov's props like sounds, good music, noise, buffoonery, punkish remarks and little tricks that aim to create the impression of cheap political bravery (look at me, so to speak, I'm not afraid of the Ministry of Culture and various other authorities!).

June 20, 1977

The euphoria continues. On the TV – departure to Paris, arrival in Paris. Kisses in Vnukovo – with some yes, with others below rank, no. For a time, they started to go out of practice in the protocol...

Zagladin is always visible in the background, along with Aleksandrov and Blatov. From a layman's perspective – Giscard is elegant, confident, and relaxed, while our leader is tense and cautious. The mask of an old and worn out man, who carries his burden with great difficulty and who seems to just want to get to Château de Rambouillet and take shelter in his designated rooms.

Giscard impudently says de Gaulle-style banalities, but with all the political meaning he needs. Our guy is standing there and, it seems, not comprehending anything. Because he will have to speak now... without a paper! He started getting confused, not one correct phrase, the joke about Parisian women sounds ridiculous, it just didn't work – some part was left out. Our poor viewer cannot see any political meaning besides "we have to work on issues..." However, in the newspapers everything will be in perfect order, i.e. the official text.

Yesterday morning I was seeing off Gus Hall. Before that, all of Saturday night, we were on Sparrow Hills – conversation and toasts. I squeezed everything I could out of myself to downplay the impression that nobody cared about Gus Hall anymore after his meeting at the top. B.N. felt unwell and refused to even see him off at the airport. He did not call once after he returned from Riga. That's nothing! He didn't even once ask me how things are going [with Gus Hall]. So I had to make up for it, saving our internationalist reputation. I told him about G. Marchais' response to Brezhnev's offer to meet in Paris to "exchange information on the outcomes of the meetings with Giscard d'Estaing."

Kanapa replied through the ambassador: The Politburo discussed and came to the conclusion that a meeting would be inexpedient. The reasons:

1. You, the CPSU, tried to split our party by sending us the letter. You tried to overthrow the current leadership of the PCF.
2. You blatantly interfered in our internal affairs by sending your opinion before the May Plenum, at which we determined our position regarding France's nuclear weapons.
3. Your comrades from the CC are conducting subversive work against the PCF in fraternal parties. (On this point B.N. slyly asked Zagladin: "Are they talking about you and Chernyaev here – your trips to Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, the FRG?" To which Zagladin replied: as for me, that's exactly what I'm doing!)

I told Gus Hall about a lot of other things. I concocted (in Suslov's name) some flattering assessments of the significance of his visit for Soviet-American relations and the ICM. It was skillful and subtle. At the time, I even felt good about it. Now I feel disgusted.

Today Brutents talked about the problem of the CC's International Department slowly becoming superfluous! Indeed, with such attitudes towards "our work"...

K. Simonov – a two-volume war diary. The reason that Demichev pulped two issues of *Novy Mir* under Tvardovsky, but I managed to read the review copy. There were some powerful things in there. I wonder if they survived.

June 25, 1977

Zagladin's 50th anniversary. Order of Lenin. But, if Heroes [of Socialist Labor] are being given left and right, he did earn this order. B.N. was jealous and displeased. He grumbled to me one on one, though he did say, "We are the ones who presented it this way." He criticized the overly laudatory and enthusiastic speech. Asked me who wrote it. I couldn't tell him, because I didn't know myself.

On the day of Zagladin's birthday, B.N. gathered a third of the Department in his office and, carefully choosing his words, congratulated Vadim. Vadim gave a moving "response," saying that he, whose parents are dead, sees B.N. as a father figure and considers him his teacher.

We decided it would be inappropriate to give the rest of the speeches in Ponomarev's office and moved to Zagladin's. There I gave an impromptu "beautiful" speech, even though no one asked me to. In the evening, we wanted to get drunk at the office, but I offered my apartment. Vadim agreed. Now I'm thinking, how sincere was I in my pretty and original speeches? I think I was one hundred percent sincere. In all three aspects of Zagladin, which Aleksandrov "laid out" in his toast, he deserves respect: as an already prominent politician, as a writer in the Headquarters, i.e. for the General Secretary, where real policies are formed, and as a private person. Zagladin is an uncommon figure on our elite-political horizon. Moreover, I have a personal liking for him. What I don't like is his attitude towards people, his indiscrimination in these relations. I don't dislike him. However, I would not want to be like him in any way, except one – to make decent reports for any audience in half an hour.

July 2, 1977

I was in Prague from June 21 – July 1. At the theoretical conference, where B.N. read our “Some Questions of the CPSU’s Theoretical Work Over Sixty Years.” Sixty-seven communist parties, 10 parties from the “third world.” Sixty-seven delegations gave speeches.

An insider who is absorbed by routine work might not notice anything: they gather and say things that have been said a thousand times before. There are snippets of real life (though by far not everyone has them) in the form of information about their home countries.

But you only need to reflect a little on the nature of the spectacle to see how senseless it is. These gatherings are organized to show by the very fact of their occurrence that the ICM still exists as an international phenomenon. However, these gatherings are doomed to be defensive actions against those who think that the ICM is interfering with the activities of the parties at home, and against those who are simply tired of this protracted game of “great power.”

One Italian (author of *History of the PCI*) tried to be original and approach the Soviet experience critically and creatively. However, firstly, there was no originality, since everything he (and the PCI as a whole – “Eurocommunists”) say on this subject is the many times forgotten and newly revived “ideas” of Kautsky-Trotky, and first “dissidents” like F. Raskolnikov, anti-Soviets from the 1930-50-60-70s. Secondly, because everyone understood they are playing a game, and it was unpleasant and offensive when one of them started showing off and acting like he doesn’t want to participate.

Seventy percent of the conference was empty talk, and school-level at that, especially from people who recently completed the Lenin School in Moscow and hadn’t been in their countries for a very long time. But there were some curious and striking lines of thinking, on a purely intellectual level, too.

The main thing is that this event, aside from the aforementioned ideological demonstration, cannot give anyone anything in terms of advancing the real policies of communists even one step forward.

Prague is almost unchanged in its core “historical” and familiar features. Except it is all dug up because of the metro, which has been under construction for many years. It’s not just the metro, there is also the need to restore housing while preserving the traditional look of the streets... However, Praguers still blame the Soviet Union, which, you see, “had to build a metro here...”

There are almost no Soviets left on the PPS editorial board from my old friends, and the Czechs – a lot of them came there 20 years ago and look as if time has stopped...

Zarodov (editor-in-chief) successfully bustles about, but due to the “logic” he constantly finds himself at odds with Ponomarev’s tactics. For example, he invited Egyptian communists but B.N. said they cannot have the floor because Brezhnev recently received [Ismail] Fahmy...

Bilyak (member of the CC KSC [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]). He came to our “villa” a few times, displaying closeness in general and to Ponomarev in particular. He even took us to the countryside – to the Botanical Gardens and a restaurant where he sang Slovak songs till

1 a.m., danced and told risqué jokes. Even B.N. was surprised, “I didn’t expect he could be like this...” This man usually looks sullen, and even spiteful. He is very well liked among our top leadership, but Zarodov and I think that he is a major scumbag, and he only “loves” us to stay afloat and get to the top.

The evening at the restaurant. Ponomarev-Bilyak duets. Hilarious. A feeling of hopeless and insurmountable, oppressing vulgarity and tactlessness.

Bogush (head of the Socialist countries sector) was seeing us off at the airport and told us about three problems that are undermining Czechoslovakia right now.

1. The split in the working class. Factory workers are putting in honest 7-hour days. But the service sector has long surpassed them in numbers. Here you have corruption, theft, defamation, outright deception and work on the side. As a result, the service sector earns at a minimum 1.5-2 times as much as factory workers, and some many times more. Everyone sees it. Factory workers are writing to say: let’s discuss this. We don’t want this to be broadcast in the newspapers for all the world to see, but let’s do it in a Party way, amongst ourselves. This won’t do...” But there is no reaction.
2. The nationalities question. The Slovaks have become completely brazen. They are now richer and better off, and they have control over all the key places in the Republic, in Prague. We, Czechs, are in favor of Slovaks working in the central government bodies. But we are against Slovak politicians having two apartments – in Prague and Bratislava. They come here for a day or two, give orders, and go back home. Everyone also sees and “hates” this!
3. Youth. In the 10 years since 1968 there have been 10 graduating classes in schools and universities. These students were taught by “people of 1968.” We couldn’t drive them out then because it would mean closing down schools and universities. So they taught: without provocations, without drawing attention to themselves, they taught students to be nationalists and anti-Soviets, they taught the values of Western democracy, etc. Plus the daily impact (radio, TV) of propaganda of the Western lifestyle! As a result, youth has left the Party. This is not “our” youth. The main feature of their individual psychology is anti-Sovietism.

There is an organized underground movement. We have evidence. It is not that small, if you take into account the half-million expelled from the KSC in 1969. Together with their children, relatives, friends and acquaintances, they make up a considerable percentage of Czechoslovakia’s population of 14 million, and perhaps the most active part of the population.

In Zarodov’s estimation (he whispered a lot of different bits of information into my ear), huge forces of discontent have ripened in society – passive, grumbling, hating, mocking à la Schweik.⁶ It won’t erupt in an “uprising,” but it could create a situation that no one will know how to deal with: a situation of a socio-political impasse. Zarodov believes that people “at the top” understand this very well. This is how he explains the subordination of all policies to one goal – to save every krone in the state budget, to keep the economy “at level,” and, to put it

⁶ Reference to *The Good Soldier Schweik*, by Jaroslav Hašek. (Trans.)

bluntly, to pour lard on society's sickness. As long as this is the case, the discontent will not have a dangerous outcome.

They do indeed live affluently. The store shelves are bursting. Their goods are much better than ours, though noticeably behind the West. But the contrast in variety and quality between us and the Czechs is much greater than the Czechs and the FRG, for example.

Their villages have become incredibly rich. The same head of sector Bogush told me that he recently visited his native land (North Moravia). He said there are families who earn 70,000 kron per month (7,000 rubles). Their houses are now real villas with two garages, color TVs, the best household appliances and the trendiest furniture. This is no longer an exceptional phenomenon, it is becoming typical in the most prosperous agricultural areas.

Bogush talked about the totally shoddy work of our embassy. He does not expect anything from Matskevich (ambassador). He says everyone knows that he got a good sinecure. His wife keeps saying that Brezhnev told him, "Bring me a map and point your finger wherever you'd like to go as an ambassador, and you'll go there."

Matskevich demonstratively neglects his basic duties. He is either getting [medical] treatment or he is hunting. The latter is the talk of the town. "Here we say: The Ambassador came to get acquainted with... Czechoslovakia's countryside" (not with Czechoslovakia).

The problem is, Bogush says, that we don't have objective information in Moscow. The lower rank embassy staff... They also don't know the situation, or they consciously close their eyes. And what can they know, if they only communicate with protocol people. The same Fominov (Party communications adviser), even though he is from your CC, he hasn't once invited a worker to his home, or a party activist. He doesn't have any connections or acquaintances in the public sphere. Because he is saving his money, because he is indifferent, and he is living an easy and comfortable life here. He boasted that he would like to spend another five years in Prague. Of course, he is interested in making sure everything is calm, not to offend anyone, to avoid scandal and escalation...

Zarodov told me that he, Zarodov, has vast contacts in Prague's various circles. People come to him to complain, "inform," pass on all sorts of intimate affairs, gossip. He said, "I wrote a couple times about the behind-the-scenes, sharp, angry, petty struggle at the top of the KSC and the government. But Matskevich detains my telegrams. He has no right to do that. But if I start to make noise, he will quickly demolish me. Why should I stick my neck out?!"

This is probably it for the main details on Prague.

July 10, 1977

At work – Zagladin and Shaposhnikov went on vacation. There is a stream of papers, a revolving door for "things to sign." And most importantly – delegations. On Friday, a conversation with [Roger] Dafflon, a PB member from Geneva. He is an old acquaintance, from the time of my trip to Switzerland with Shelepin in 1964. I don't have to hide things or be

diplomatic with him. Still, I was totally exhausted after two hours. Next week I have the Italians, French, and Belgians.

B.N. presented to the Politburo on the outcomes of Prague. An overview article for *Kommunist* is in the works.

Before Zagladin's vacation, B.N. gathered the deputies. Again: what to do with Eurocommunism. We came to the conclusion that we should not exacerbate it. The second article on Carrillo came out (in *Novoe Vremya*), and that's it. By the way, I liked it better than the first one: it clearly outlines that we are not against the PCI, and in general not against any Communist Party policy. We are against Carrillo's anti-Sovietism. If we have equal rights, then we have the right to respond to years of attacks on us.

In general, B.N. sees that "the process can't be stopped." And that it is not about reasoning or substance. Nobody wants to hear our arguments (I talked about this at the meeting). The point is, they don't want to associate communism (other communist parties) with the CPSU.

Essentially, in broad historical terms, we have a repeat of Bernsteiniada.⁷ This analogy is all the more relevant because capitalism is clearly entering a new era, as it was at the turn of the century. Perhaps, if we preserve ourselves in the world, and keep the world from nuclear war, the Bernsteiniada will have a better outcome this time. We shall see! However, I probably won't get to see it. My fate is tied to Ponomarev – to hang on to the coattails of whatever we can save in "our" ICM, i.e. trifles.

June 12, 1977

Conversation with Lechleiter, a member of the Swiss Party of Labour Politburo, from Zurich. For two hours I talked about the bankruptcy of "Eurocommunism," about our right to speak out against Carrillo, about the fact that it's time for us, the CPSU, to begin to stand up for equality and independence of our party in the ICM. He seemed to agree but cautiously, and he didn't have much to say. Indeed, it is hard to disagree with our logic. Still, they don't want to openly support us, even people like Lechleiter – he is a quiet, reasonable man, who is completely dependent on us (as is his whole party), and he expects a pension from us when he retires. But in his mumbling you seem to hear – you do your thing, and we will do our thing.

We have already received a letter with information about the meeting of Suslov-Ponomarev-Pajetta-Bufalini-Macaluso. By the way, Suslov gave an excellent speech at this meeting. If suddenly they decided to leak it to the bourgeois mass media, it would be tremendously beneficial. I'm imagining, for example, this speech in the *New York Times*, where we say what we really think about "Eurocommunism," internationalism, the parties' right to independence, etc.

I am stupefied by the flow of papers and other routine work. Fortunately, B.N. took on the conversation with French secretaries of the federations (akin to our regional committee

⁷ A reference to the political theorist Eduard Bernstein. (Trans.)

secretaries), and asked Zagladin to meet with two delegations of the PCI (luckily, he is in Usovo, at his dacha).

July 16, 1977

A hard week. Against the background of the primary work: the completion of the article for *Kommunist* on the outcomes of the Prague conference – wracking my brain. Everyone must be “reflected,” cannot forget anyone “noteworthy,” have to create a sense of objectivity so it is clear that the majority praised us, but in their own Marxist-Leninist interests and in the name of internationalism. [The conference] cannot look like a discussion of Ponomarev’s “report” (his speech is equal to others, though it is more equal because he got five times the amount of time as anyone else). The main ideas of Ponomarev’s speech must be reflected through quotes in other speeches. And even the Italian Spriano has to be “reflected”: to give a positive quote from him, and later hint that he proposed to master the experience of October by delving deeper into the essence of the “cult of Stalin,” which is absurd, so to speak, because the most important thing is the positive, victorious experience. And so forth.

A 30-page overview has been sent to the journal.

Editing B.N.’s article (a condensed version of his Prague speech) for *PPS*. Pyshkov suggested to include something on the CPSU’s contribution to the development of the “peaceful path of revolution.” Indeed, why not? After all, the XX Congress came up with it! Now all these PCF, PCI, CPGB are shoving their original paths into our faces, forgetting who spoke about it first. (To be fair, I have to mention that we later made maximum efforts to hush up this discovery of ours). B.N. hesitated, “It is a very important matter,” (probably partially because it is a reminder of Khrushchev, and the fact that the peaceful path became the source for reformism, and some other things). However, political vanity would not let him rest. He agreed, and we inserted a paragraph on this point.

Letter to Plissonnier, hinting that we are not upset with Marchais for refusing to meet with Brezhnev in Paris, and it would be good to organize something similar to what we are doing with the Italians.

Letters to a vast number of CPs, explaining why we spoke against Carrillo and how the mass media and Eurocommunists are misinterpreting us. This took a great deal of work, because Zuev, head of the sector, seems to be completely exhausted, and the consultant Pertsov, who is good at daily briefings, is terrible at writing, so I had to do it myself.

B.N. had already sent the draft to the CC when he raised an alarm (his Comintern soul gives him no peace), saying that we should add at the end that they (the CPs) should publicly condemn Carrillo. It took a long time to talk him out of it: God forbid this leaks, and we are sending it to almost 50 parties, they will again shout to the whole world about “Moscow’s directives,” nostalgia for the “center,” intrigues, and so on. He agreed.

Outcomes of the Dartmouth conference in Jurmala: Arbatov and Zhukov would not get off me, and so on.

Plus, yesterday I was at Silvestrov's funeral. My first eulogy. Grief and a meeting with eternity. Completely drained by the end of the day.

The day before yesterday I saw for the first time Bertolucci's festival film *1900*. Italy through the lens of the "class struggle" from the beginning of the century to the arrival of fascism (the 1st episode). In some parts it is powerful, but with showing off that is typical for Italians. And, of course, sex, which is why we did not buy this obviously pro-Soviet revolutionary movie (with "Italian Bolsheviks" of the 1920s and others, with *Vive Staline!* 1945).

About my meeting with Stukalin. He is the chairman of the Press Committee, the Minister of all books published in the Soviet Union, member of the CC, a deputy, etc., etc. He used to be deputy editor of *Pravda*, and in general is an intelligent person, not a hard-nosed bureaucrat. A soft and balanced person. We've known each other for a few years. He also knows that I am not an outdated apparatchik and not a career official with the Central Committee.

He called me, saying that he wants to stop by. "We are preparing an album ('by decision') for the participants of the November 6 meeting. I would like to consult with you on some of the more important political moments."

Alright. He came over. So, what are the political moments [he wanted to consult about]? A group portrait of socialist country leaders with Brezhnev in the Crimea. "Over here," Boris Ivanovich says, "Katushev stood behind Kadar. Now we removed him, you see, the surface of the photo is even a little damaged. I think this is the right thing to do. I spoke with Cde. Rusakov and he fully supports this."

The same procedure was done with the photo from the Berlin conference: they left Brezhnev and Ponomarev, and Zhilin and Zagladin in the background. I started expressing some concern but he insisted that there is no other way to do it.

We got to the end of the deluxe edition. "You may not have noticed," Boris Ivanovich said, "we didn't include any photographs where other (!) representatives of Party and state leadership would be shown separately, unlike the album for the 50th anniversary of October. Only once Comrade Kosygin participates in a conversation with the Laotians together with Brezhnev. And M.A. Suslov, you must have noticed, is at the podium when he makes the proposal to elect Comrade Brezhnev as the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet."

That's all there is to our politics! And our propaganda, too!

July 17, 1977

Today I'm having a day of "Eurocommunism." I read up on everything I've put off for two weeks, materials written in Europe and America about our articles against Carrillo. It's very mixed, but the essence seems to come through. I'll try to summarize: the French and Italians (Carrillo is another matter) want to take advantage of the confrontation between us and America to sneak into power. To this end, they want to lull the class enemy and the petty-bourgeois masses (the overwhelming majority of which is, alas, anti-Soviet) into believing that they have

nothing in common with the Soviet system. People may trust them, however, not because of their anti-Sovietism, but because they look like an alternative to the rather deplorable state of capitalist society.

In addition to the Eurocommunist texts, all day I read Lenin, including *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*. If you ignore the historical specifics, he is still right and very relevant in his way of thinking and internal logic. And what brilliance of thought and phrase! Sometimes I would jump up and run around the room, chuckling with delight.

By the way, today I read in *Le Monde* exactly what I had feared and anticipated: that the French will see who they are dealing with... “a dummy of an eagle.” There was a note in bold type, i.e. marked as something important. Giscard shared his impressions about Brezhnev with someone (it turns out Vance had spoken to him on this subject before). He got the impression that Brezhnev is incapable of holding an in-depth conversation and in general can’t talk for more than an hour. Both of their meetings were cut by half. The General Secretary’s health is in decline. Giscard suggested that Brezhnev may not last until the end of the year. I wonder, does anyone here read anything like this?

July 21, 1977

Today I spent all day with Stanishev (head of a department in the Bulgarian Communist Party). He came to get instructions, since Kanapa is coming to Bulgaria with a letter from G. Marchais to Zhivkov.

B.N. volunteered to talk with him (because Zhivkov will later go to the Crimea and may tell L[eonid]. I[lyich]. how well Ponomarev helped him to fight against Eurocommunism).

B.N. becomes extremely tiring, he repeats his Short Course nonsense three times over while referring to the conversation he (and Suslov) had with the Italians. In reality, the conversation was totally different. Then he himself suggested to Stanishev to read the transcript. Either he is making his own policy, different from Suslov’s, this way, or he really perceives the essence of the conversation differently than it was reflected in the transcript.

He predominantly talked about what reformists the Italians are, how they’ve forgotten about socialism, etc. There wasn’t anything like that in Suslov’s conversation. On the contrary, Suslov emphasized that, “it is up to you to choose your policies, your path”...

Later (after Stanishev read about the Finns, the PCF, the PCI, Carrillo, and the Swedes) I tried to steer him “back” to Suslov’s path. I don’t know if he noticed the discrepancy between Ponomarev’s rantings and the texts he read, and my presentation of our line in the ICM.

In the morning in B.N.’s office: Zuyev, Pertsov, and I. About Spain. A police way of thinking and acting (however, so dumb that these actions have no chance of being realized). Amaya, Ibarruri’s daughter, has returned to Moscow. So, we should persuade her to “implant” into the Western press (but so people wouldn’t notice that it is “from us”) how poorly Carrillo treats La Pasionaria. He isolated her and so on. We should get in touch with the Garcia group and one other breakaway CP and give them the 50,000 they are requesting for the struggle against

Carrillo. But it can't look like it's coming "from us," let the GDR transfer this money. We should write articles for Spain, not against Carrillo directly, but so everyone would see that they are against him. (This is when nobody read even the articles "directly against Carrillo" in *Novoe Vremya*, people were content with just the summary from the news agencies!)

Pertsov should go to Portugal and from there persuade "Intersindical" (trade unions) to influence Spain. Labor committees – against Carrillo. Senile Comintern-police nonsense.

On Tuesday I was at the CC Secretariat. The topic of discussion was the non-black-earth zone. It turns out nothing is being done there. They chose the Minister of Agricultural Construction as the whipping boy. He pitifully babbled that he doesn't have this and that, he is not receiving this, that is getting cut. But nobody wanted to listen.

They "chewed him out" to show a critical approach, but didn't promise him a kopeck in funds.

A discussion of the work of the CPSU Moscow Regional Committee for the development of the textile industry (as it turns out, it produces 40 percent of the USSR's goods). Konotop (secretary of the Moscow regional committee) gave a totally empty speech – off subject, about the Constitution, about the election of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, about the care of the Party, etc. But during the discussion he started snapping back: 30 percent of the spinning equipment and 50 percent of the weaving equipment started their working lives before the Revolution; we don't have modern dyes; we are 8,000 workers short; new machinery is five times more expensive, but we have to buy them with the funds we got based on old prices. Funds for consumer services are being cut. And... more along these lines.

Even though this guy did not get chewed out, he still didn't get a kopeck. But the Secretariat demanded to "raise," "improve," and so on.

In both cases orders were given to draw up "detailed resolutions" with publication in the press. Even though it's clear that these resolutions don't change anything. Thus, even discussions at the CC Secretariat are in the best-case scenario subordinated to propaganda, talk, the appearance of activity, but not actual activity.

July 30, 1977

There was a meeting with [Alfredo] Reichlin, a member of the PCI's Politburo and director of *L'Unità*. There was a draft letter to the Communist Party of Spain. There was Grigoriev's trip to "Jurmala" to see Axen – "Once again our Cinderella (Ibarruri) is in trouble and needs to be rescued..."

Publication, on my initiative, of Berecz' article from *Népszabadság* in *Pravda*, on Eurocommunism, i.e. a demonstration of the fact that in the nuances in the socialist community (Bulgarians, Czechs, and others) the CPSU chooses the Hungarians. This is very useful after our move with Carrillo.

Brezhnev's conversation with Kadar in the Crimea, where he (Brezhnev) spoke about Eurocommunism in the Hungarian style: we should study the work of our fraternal parties in the

West (assign this to the International Departments), and select what is interesting and new, in other words – the search for the right policy... Polemics is the last resort. We have to bring together and unite the ICM. We have to tell them more about us, they do not know us very well. Calmly discuss problems...

By the way, B.N.'s conversation with [William] Kashtan – the Jewish problem was at the center (we are being distorted, B.N. said, in reality we are good with Jews). Even a mangy sheep's good for a little wool. Unfortunately, we won't even get that. Kashtan doesn't really have a party, hasn't had one in a while. And he's lying about its "activities."

August 3, 1977

The KPD came out with an initiative to have all participant parties of the Berlin Conference sign a statement against the neutron bomb. Yesterday there was a telegram from Falin (ambassador in Bonn). But I already knew about it: a week ago I got a call from the GDR embassy for approval. In the eyes of the German adviser I represent the CC, of course. I said that I am for it.

When B.N. received the telegram, he declared that the KPD is "disloyal" (they should have warned us in advance). I told him about my conversation with the embassy of the GDR, but he pretended he didn't hear: God forbid someone finds out that it was "coordinated" with some Chernyaev, and that he spoke on behalf of the CC! Ponomarev himself is in favor of the initiative, but the MFA is against it – there you have it, so called "interests of the state!" [The MFA] already managed to sway Kirilenko.

However, after B.N. tested my resolve on Brutents and the sector deputies, all of whom expressed "unequivocal" support, he got to work: called Suslov in the Crimea, called Blatov, and convinced Kirilenko.

In the evening, we got a message that 16 parties already "signed," including the GDR and Bulgaria (!). The Hungarians and Czechs called me and waited for our decision.

It has to be done by the 6th, because the DKP wants to announce it on Hiroshima Day. But Blatov (an MFA man at heart) will have a hard time getting to the General Secretary with this trifling. There are memos for a conversation with Zhivkov and Ceausescu coming up. It might fall through, for the same line of reasoning the MFA used – not to provoke the Americans. That would be a scandal!

August 7, 1977

We, the CPSU, agreed to sign the DKP's appeal. Brezhnev did not object, Suslov and Kirilenko joined. We told Dusseldorf, but there was a hitch: the Italians suddenly started to drag their feet, saying that "all the secretaries are out in the regions"... It's obvious that they have no use for this initiative: it goes against their position "between" the USSR and the US. The Japanese refused to sign it. The Spaniards (Carrillo) joined without a sound, but the French, of course, could not help but make corrections (absolutely insignificant ones, but now there is a

French contribution and their pride is satisfied). Long story short, it did not happen in time for the 6th – Hiroshima Day. Now it will be published on Monday.

What has happened to our beautiful ICM, as Mao would say!!

It is fortunate that the text came to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs after it already became a “decision of the Central Committee.” When Ponomarev made me (pending publication) coordinate it with the MFA post festum [sic], I heard from Kornienko (who discussed it with Kuznetsov, as Gromyko is on vacation, otherwise it would have been shot down!) whining along these lines: why are we calling it a barbarian weapon when we may need to manufacture it ourselves against the Chinese. If they invade our territory, what are we going to do? Plus, we do not include the neutron bomb as a type of nuclear weapon in our talks with the Americans. What is going on, they will say. Why are you making such an incompetent racket? And so on.

I did not try very hard to justify myself. It’s pointless for the MFA to go against the CC’s decision. I thought to myself: if we can’t join the CPs of other countries on an issue like this one (against the neutron bomb), which is clear to any normal person (although not people working for the MFA), then we really should close up our little “communist shop.”

I recently had an asthma attack. Feeling sick made me reflect on things. By the way, it is noticeable that my diary does not have a lot of soul-searching, but consists exclusively of facts of my daily life, and the people who are close to me, unlike even the diary I kept at the front, when, it would seem, I was facing truly important life events but my diary was full of all kinds of “worries” ...

Maybe this is because I do not want to dig deep and look inward. The politics I am involved in have no future. It is a decline, the degeneration of the ICM and so forth. And, it seems, the point of my work is to delay or disguise this process as much as I can.

September 2, 1977

Jurmala, [santorium] “Amber.” The public. Like at trade union resorts. From the provinces. They are at the beach wearing ties, decoration ribbons, and even various medals: in full dress, since going to a resort is serious business and not everyone gets this honor. Dance floors outside of the buildings in the evenings. How ecstatically people dance away their rightful vacations there!

The Jews. They make up 70-80 percent of the free tourists who come without vouchers. And in general, Jurmala is predominantly Jewish. In Moscow you perceive them as separate “individuals,” who are integrated into the general Moscow crowd and the metropolitan population. Here, you almost physically sense that they are a nation... like the Tajiks or Bashkirs. Or Armenians. All of their provincial manners and lingo look like real, “objective” national traits. Since there are many of them, they are the majority, they behave like they are at home – like in Gomel, Zhytomyr, or Odessa – without any complexes or impudence. They are natural, they are in their element. Yes, they are a nation and there’s no way around it. We should treat it the way we treat other nations. After all, any Russian or Ukrainian chauvinist may not necessarily like a Kazakh or Turkmen. He often turns his nose at them... However, he would not

allow himself to deprive them of their moral right to their identity, the way any anti-Semite does it in regard to Jews.

September 19, 1977

When you step away from the routine tasks, the damned “global” problems sweep over you again and again. The reason – another of Ponomarev’s vain ideas: an address to world nations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of October. As a cover, it would also be presented as an address to the Soviet people (although this is absolutely ridiculous, since there will also be Brezhnev’s report). Brutents (to whom B.N. assigned this) and I told him back in the summer that one address would be better. But no way! It’s not difficult to guess why: he wants to appear on the podium of the Kremlin Palace. If there is only one address, surely they will not ask him to read it!

So, Karen and I started to wrack our brains. Nothing came to mind. It is clear that we needed only pretty words rather than new ideas, as “no one would allow” new ideas because Ponomarev’s speech is not the place for them... But the problem is that pretty words (fresh ones) didn’t come to mind since all of them have been said a thousand times before. Everyone is sick of them and they only cause annoyance and mockery, at best – complete indifference.

This is because we have nothing to say to the world. It does not want to follow us, let alone imitate us. Generally speaking, there is nothing tragic about this. What is tragic is that we do not want to come to terms with it, because we have gone too far in our boasting and immorality. Yesterday I was going through my boxes with notes spanning 25 years, and came across an amazing passage from Lenin on the significance of what “we accomplished.” “If we act like a frog,” he writes at the end of a long passage on this topic, “if we huff and puff, we will be a worldwide laughingstock, we will be mere boasters” (Volume 38, pg. 180). Of course, over the last 60 years we have things to boast about. Nevertheless... Our boasting has grown in geometric progression over the decades (and with each new stage – from Stalin to Khrushchev, etc. – it acquired practically cosmic proportions), while our accomplishments are less than “arithmetic.” At the very least, all the sociological, principally important milestones we set for ourselves we never reach in time, or we reach them with such expenditure and delays compared to the West, that their psychological effect in the country and the world is devalued.

But that is not even the point. We indeed transformed tsarist Russia in just half a century in a way that nothing else could have ever changed it. But we pushed the world away and undermined our authority with our almost irrational drive (stemming from the very logic of a great power) to impose ourselves on others, to portray ourselves as better than everyone else, to bless everyone with our military and political presence and overall meaningless interference. This marred our great revolutionary past, something that used to cause sincere and exalting admiration of millions everywhere in the world... even if it was a mythological, primitive view.

Our boasting acquired the power of objective law. It cannot be stopped with a simple order or decision of the Central Committee, because we would need to immediately expose the screaming discrepancy between what is being done and how. For example, the reality of the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline in contrast to what is being shown on TV. We would

have to admit that certain shortcomings affect the lives of tens of millions of Soviet people, while “mass” achievements affect only a very small layer.

Anyway, to come back to the address to world nations. What are we going to tell them? They already know we don’t have anything to boast about. On top of that, the world has changed tremendously in 60 years, right now it is going through a real crisis on an all-encompassing scale. It is looking for answers, a way out. What do we have to offer that would be serious and truly based on science? We probably could offer something, if we weren’t prisoners of our boasting, if we weren’t trying to impose ourselves on others again and again under various pretenses...

To appeal to world peace, again? We do that every day as it is. And everyone understands by now that peace doesn’t depend on nations, but on the determination, responsibility, and honesty of those who have real and enormous power in their hands, as well as nuclear weapons. People are pretty sick and tired of these solemn appeals.

The same with “Eurocommunism.” We are recognized as a historical reality, an important one but not exemplary. But we keep fussing. Before his vacation, B.N. assigned us to write an article for *Pravda*: to show how imperialism is using “Eurocommunism.” After some ordeals (Korionov, Sheidin) it turned into Zhilin’s article in *Novoe Vremya*, which was ready a month and a half after the original assignment, and was published a week ago. Before I got sick I managed to catch [the following in TASS reports]: *L’Unita* gave a sharp rebuff, saying that it would be akin to them starting to judge Moscow’s politics based on what anti-Soviets write about it. It is silly, we do not deny that your policies are being misrepresented. However, it is symptomatic: *L’Unita* suggested that if we want to know about Eurocommunism, we should at least look at Buffalini’s latest interview.

In other words, they will not let us, on any occasion, portray Eurocommunism as a policy of imperialism and to deny them the right to be independent, and for Eurocommunism to be an original course, maybe even a movement.

We keep trying to bury our head in the sand. We are building Potemkin villages, inviting everyone to the 60th anniversary of October. We are anxious that they might “say something unsuitable,” and they will... Though the euphoria is gone. They won’t pick a fight. But they will repeat once again “from this high rostrum” that they are independent now and we shouldn’t interfere with them, it will not work anyway...

Boasting is destroying us, it is undermining our authority.

A week ago I read G. Kennan’s new book. He gives wise advice to his government – from a position of generally sound modern isolationism. Reading closely, it occurred to me that his recommendations also apply to us, since we are under the same “verdict” – we are a great power. To make less fuss and not stick our nose everywhere, to pay less attention to what people say and think about us, to concentrate on our own affairs...

On Sunday I was at the Manege for an exhibition of Russian artists – for the 60th anniversary... This comparison just occurred to me: in Jurmala I went to [play] tennis with a

wonderful young man, a coach, and we had this conversation. We were sitting on the bench and watching two pairs of amateurs, tourists, playing. Sometimes they would have pretty good reaction to the ball, would hit accurately into the opponent's court, and deliberately didn't send the ball out of the court. I pointed this out. The young man's response was very unexpected: "You know, this kind of game – the jabs, running around, accidental points – it will always remain an amateur game of people on holiday. It has no prospects, it can't develop, it will never rise to the level which we associate with the word 'tennis'..."

Looking at the exhibition at the Manege, I remembered the words of this intelligent professional. The paintings represented there are doomed to the same fate...

There are even a few exciting works, but in general, where you see something new – there is imitation, where you see realism – there is conservatism and mirroring, where you see social activism – there is deliberateness, affectation, demagoguery, and sometimes downright careerism. Against this background, the posters of the 1920s are winning. They are exhibited as a "retrospective." There you have true innovation, aspiration, dynamism, the capacity for growth even in the cases when there is still a touch of the distant "God's Earth" [*Mира Божия*] style, symbolism, and true political nature.

While I was sick, I reread Lenin's *On the Food Tax*. This little booklet contains all the wisdom, all the philosophy – the strategy and tactics of the modern revolution. And it was written in Russia. I read some other things from Lenin too. A stunning genius, unimaginable... And his language! We have completely forgotten how to speak and write like this. Only this kind of language is victorious in an era that stems from October.

October 1, 1977

I went back to work on the 28th after being sick. It turned out there was nothing urgent or significant happening there. B.N. was only asking after me because of his report at two conferences in November. He dismissed Zhilin's memos (although they are generally sensible), which he had assigned him on what to do with the PCF and the ICM: "He mostly explains where 'Eurocommunism' came from, and the things he suggests we are doing already." Ergo: Marxist-Leninist Ponomarev isn't interested in the causes of Eurocommunism, give him emergency (most likely police) measures to suppress it!

Lyubimov's 60th anniversary. He called and invited me. I went. He was given an Order of the Red Banner of Labor, and I hear he is going to get the title of People's Artist of the USSR. There were a lot of people – waves of glory and smugness. Lyubimov was very courteous with me. It was one of those situations when they say, "he didn't know where to seat me and how to treat me." This was all under the puzzled glances from people crowded in his office, like Plisetskaya, Shchedrin, Kapitsa, etc. Naturally, they had no idea who I was, they just knew that I wasn't an artist or a writer, and Lyubimov usually deals differently with "high level bureaucrats"!

I saw *Master and Margarita* one more time. The first act is powerful, the rest is still a farce that demonstrates the surprising combination of talent and poor taste in Lyubimov.

Then there was a skit and a banquet. They say it was a pretty good performance, featuring Gerdt, Paperny, and Vysotsky, with whom I exchanged a few words during the intermission. But I didn't stay.

October 9, 1977

A busy week. The CC Plenum was on the 3rd. Brezhnev announced that the PB recommends V.V. Kuznetsov as first deputy of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, i.e. under Brezhnev. Therefore, he would be a candidate member of the PB, as well. Then Brezhnev sorted his papers for a long time, and when he found the one he was looking for, he started saying that there is increasingly more work at the CC, so Chernenko needs to become a candidate member of the PB as well. (By the way, he said the same thing a year ago when he recommended Chernenko for CC Secretary). B.N. was once again passed over, despite the fact that he's been showing off with the Constitution for years now, clearly hoping that his "hour of triumph" will come. But no such luck! And it would be ridiculous to expect that the adoption of the Constitution would be tied to any one person's name.

The report at the Plenum on the constitutional committee's results and corrections was short and rather formal. It was agreed in advance not to open it for debate because whoever wanted to speak could do so at the session itself.

Be that as it may, all three of the General Secretary's speeches and the Constitution itself were very impressive. It is truly an ideological, political, and legal framework for the real advancement of our society. Another one is impossible and unnecessary. Now the important thing is to actually overcome the rigidity of the apparatus and cadres, to fill the Constitution with what is written there. Will we be able to? The age is wrong at all the decisive levels of government and power! Consequently, there is no chance for bravery, alertness of mind, or readiness to act according to the Constitution rather than with an eye towards bosses near and far, and various "colleagues" and neighbors who are in turn acting on the same principle. (It's like the applause at the session: sometimes it goes on for so long that you can feel an unutterable cry in the air, "when will it be over," "enough is enough," "ridiculous," "disgraceful," "stop already" ... 99 percent feel this way, but they keep applauding).

October 14, 1977

This week Zagladin came up with an unusual idea. He sent invitations to an "informal, honest, closed" meeting to the smartest and most free thinking individuals – Galkin, Burlatsky, Leibzon, Diligensky, Karyakin, Ardaev, Sobolev, Krasin, Gililov, Timofeyev, four of our consultants, three professors from Matkovsky, and some other less notable people. To talk about Eurocommunism. Zagladin, Zhilin, and I sat at the head of the table in a U-shaped seating arrangement. Zhilin gave an "expose." And it started. They did not say anything new, of course. But it felt like a conversation among trusted people from our department's group of consultants – as if they got drawn into a conversation in my office and got to talking without looking over their shoulder. The participants were very happy (and proud, of course, that they were chosen for such a confidential discussion). Everyone tried to show off. But besides the vanity fair there was also

serious brains, concern about the matter at hand, interest and knowledge of the subject – surprisingly, considering the limited information they can obtain legally.

They were also happy that their broad and calm approach to “Eurocommunism” was met with understanding and encouragement. Essentially, we were in agreement in our assessment of the central problem. Basically, our conclusions were: what can we do? We need to urgently raise our, the CPSU’s, authority in the theoretical field; we need to overcome the prejudice (though it is justified) that we are steeped in dogmatism and we use our yardstick for everything, and whatever it cannot measure we call revisionism, bias, etc.

We need major theoretical initiatives at the most authoritative level of the CPSU.

Indeed, the “Eurocommunist’s” theoretical base (if we are talking seriously) is very weak and helpless. Their claims to discoveries are ludicrous. Essentially it is not theory, it is politics, tactics, seizing the situation – all of which is covered up with theoretical babble to look important.

However, we are also not saying anything (on the issues where they are trying to say something “new”), and we haven’t offered anything besides a string of quotations, which may be powerful but they look like we are imposing our old experience. And so forth.

This lasted for six hours. It took place “on the premises” of the Lenin school, where Vadim is head of the department. It was truly a unique discussion, it probably would have been unthinkable even five years ago.

Ulyanovsky (one of B.N.’s deputies. He is one of those, as people darkly joke, who was at one time imprisoned and then needlessly released) accidentally heard about the meeting and told his “confidant” (who immediately reported it to Zagladin), “We should tell Suslov about this revisionist amusement!”

However, I am sure that he is very mistaken about today’s Suslov!

October 15, 1977

The other day I was by the metro on my way home from work and ran into Ziga (Sigmund) Schmidt (son of the famous academician and polar explorer, I know him from the History Faculty at the University [MGU]). He was standing and chatting with someone in a beret. He saw me, so I had to come over. His companion immediately said goodbye and left.

“Do you know who that was?”

“No idea.”

“Krasnopovertsev! The very one! The Secretary of the University Komsomol Committee in 1956, the leader of an underground group for the restoration of justice and Leninist norms after the XX Congress... You remember, Obushenkov from your department was there too, Eidelman, and about eight other people... They went to the people, to factories, to ZIS [Stalin car-making plant], they put up leaflets. There was a big stink about it. They were all sentenced to prison, Krasnopertsev got ten years...”

"I remember. But how did he end up here, where are you coming from with him right now?"

"We were at a meeting of the museum section of the Archaeological Commission. I was sitting there with Belyavsky. I already left the History Faculty when this all happened, and Belyavsky was a member of the Party bureau. He noticed him right away. And when he started to speak ("broadly, smartly, freely, with ideas and using good language"), Belyavsky prodded me and said, 'It's definitely him, Krasnopovertsev!' After the meeting, I came up and introduced myself. He is now head of the museum at the Moscow Metallurgical Plant *Serp i Molot* [Sickle and Hammer]. He served all ten years! I didn't get a chance to ask him about the rest, you showed up. It is possible he recognized you. You were teaching in the History Faculty then.

October 29, 1977

From the 19-21st I was in Warsaw. A meeting of international and ideological departments of nine socialist countries. Shakhnazarov, Nenashev, and I. The idea was to transform these meetings as much as possible into working events, free them from the gabfest a la Ponomarev. My speeches. Everyone was happy that the CPSU finally reached the conclusion that it is better to talk in a businesslike manner with comrades, instead of uttering propaganda at each other and enlightening everyone about the obvious.

Work is crazy right now. The stream of delegations is underway. I have about a dozen myself. Yesterday I met Kashtan. I can imagine his reaction when he learns that he won't get to speak at the Kremlin Palace. Then again, many others won't either.

I am the head of the press group that "edits" and issues for publication all speeches, greetings, and other communiqües for the 110-120 delegations (about 100 of them are ours) here for the celebration of the anniversary of October.

November 19, 1977

Yesterday I got back from England. A lot of interesting things happened over these days, even though it was exhausting. Since I didn't have even an hour to sit and write things down, a lot has faded in my mind. The aroma of spontaneity has evaporated. And facts, too. For example, the entire "incident" with Carrillo happened before my eyes (together with Zimyanin and Afanasyev, I was assigned to meet and accompany the Communist Party of Spain's delegation). I saw for myself what he looked like when he arrived and when he left, after he was not allowed to speak in the Kremlin. We, the International Department and B.N., were prepared to give him the floor! Now he went to the U.S., where he will speak and act as a strike-breaker at a university that is on strike. Carrillo really wants to enter Spain's history as the "great national figure" after Franco, and he doesn't care under what ideological and political banner it happens. He wants to belong in the West and for this he will trample on the ICM, while simultaneously exploiting his part in it and his role as an instrument of the Communist Party.

The incident with [Alec] Kitson (a Scottish trade union leader). He spoke in Krasnogorsk. He praised the USSR, and railed against unemployment in England... then he found himself practically fired from all his positions. In London he came to see me together with Jenny Little

(secretary in the Labour Party) at the embassy, confessed. Jenny got drunk, cried, tried to kiss me. We couldn't get them to leave for a long time (the boss was waiting). But that is a separate and long story. I once again felt the chasm between people who are close and personally sympathetic to each other – not only a political chasm, but also between “civilizations” and different national characteristics. Although it would seem we are all the same people outwardly – kind, intelligent, we understand everything.

The English trip to the Congress of Communist Parties has faded from memory already. But I will try to reproduce just the “program of the visit.”

We left on November 11th. In the morning we were already in Heathrow. Jack Woddis and the embassy were meeting us. Kunayev was a little perplexed... We got the same security from Scotland Yard as Ponomarev, with an armored “Rover” squad car. Directly to the CC CPGB. There we had a friendly talk with McLennan and McGahey.

November 12-15th – four days of the Congress. We spent 6-9 hours per day there, with one lunch break. It was interesting and sometimes exciting. Genuine enthusiasm and interest, frank debates and polemics, serious reasoning, passion that is not typical for the Brits. Though at times the passion was theatrical, oratory. Almost everyone is a skilled public speaker, from young workers to experienced politicians and orators. There was a real discussion, the kind from which you expect results – something that has long been absent from our meetings, especially public and party ones. Our generation of 25-30-year-olds doesn't even know what this kind of discussion looks like.

It seems the CPGB is an active and lively organization when it comes to “cadres,” it is no wonder it supplies highly respected people to the trade unions. But it will not be a large-scale party. Outside the walls of the Congress, it appears as a whole to live in the reflected light of “world communism.” Even though it does try to appear like something original through the efforts of people like Falber, Chater, and all its leaders.

The CPSU delegation, led by PB member Kunayev, was welcomed with open arms. They waited anxiously for us, afraid of criticism between the lines. But we showed an “open approach”: do whatever you like at home, accept any program, but support us in international affairs, in the sense of a “high appreciation for the CPSU’s role” and everything will be ok. We wish you everything you wish for yourself.

They needed a demonstration that we support them, the CPGB, and not the new rampantly pro-Soviet breakaway party of [Sid] French.

Episode with the resolution on the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution. One guy, a shaggy and high-strung student, tried to object... He was booed and shushed. McGahey had to deny him the right to speak. But when the time came for the vote – nine were against the resolution. Whistling, shouting “Shame!”

A beautiful Jewish woman, from whom everyone expected an anti-Soviet speech, did not say a word about us and triumphantly looked at me... I was sitting three meters away, directly in front of the podium.

The same guy who objected to the resolution on the 60th anniversary spoke in the debate on “pluralism,” and said: “You see, the Soviet Union does not have pluralism and therefore you have 10,000 ‘prisoners of conscience.’”

Judith Hunt (from the CP Israel delegation) at first pretended she did not see me from the presidium, but when we met during the break she rushed to kiss me.

Awkwardness with the security and staff accompanying Kunayev. Altogether there were twelve of us entering the hall. All the other parties had one person each. A total of seven. We looked especially colorful when this ratio of delegations appeared for lunch, which the leadership was giving for foreign guests.

On the 16th there was a visit to a farm. There was no bragging, in striking contrast to us when we give similar presentations with our inferiority complex. Meanwhile their achievements, which we heard during the presentation, would warrant seventeen Heroes of Socialist Labor over this period at home.

Agricultural equipment manufacturers advertised their goods, then took us to lunch at the Shakespeare Hotel on Stratford-upon-Avon.

The house where Shakespeare was born. The house he bought for his wife. By the way, over there they don’t even hint at the fact there are theories that Shakespeare never existed.

We drove through the Midlands – lovely country.

On the 17th – shopping. Oxford Street. Magnificent shops that make your head spin, enough to make an unprepared Moscow woman have a heart attack. There are a lot of people in the shops and they are buying, buying, buying... At one point we were sitting around a table and Kunayev dreamily said, “[They say] Crisis, crisis, but the shops are full and it looks like people have plenty of money!”

Brezhnev’s article came out in *PPS*. Zarodov’s guys prepared it, then Zagladin and Aleksandrov went over it. I hope the right people will read it (us) carefully, and I hope we will not forget the essence of what is written in that article. In other words, I hope it won’t have the same fate as the many smart and sensible phrases, ideas, and “statements” that are already fixed in Brezhnev’s collected works!

Yesterday at the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences – awarding an order to the journal *Voprosy istorii* [*Questions of History*]. The majority of the historians of our generation were there, including those of my generation and close to it. My God! What decrepit old things. I’m so glad that I left that environment and now I can mockingly look at this menagerie from the outside. Plus, I look twenty years younger than them...

December 4, 1977

On Friday, B.N. gathered his deputies to once again discuss what to do with Eurocommunism. Incidentally, Eurocommunism itself is pretty clear now – both theoretically and politically. Entire books are being published about it, not to mention articles and brochures.

For example, I recently read A. Kriegel's *Eurocommunism*. In-depth analysis of the causes, the substance, and where it might go.

Or – the conversation of the English historian Hobsbawm with representatives of *Rinascita*. By the way, I met with Hobsbawm sometime around 1954-55. He came to Moscow and was received at the rectorate of Moscow State University. All the “Anglicists” were invited... Could I imagine then, when I was talking to him about the English Revolution of the XVII century (he is an expert on it) that soon (in connection to the events in Hungary) he would become a dissident from the CPGB, then would leave it and come back. And now he is one of the theoreticians of Eurocommunism, but a skeptical one!

However, here nobody writes anything serious about it, even though we seem to worry about Eurocommunism more than anyone. And we cannot write about it. “I'll explain why,” as they say now in Moscow-intelligentsia jargon. Take for example the meeting at B.N.'s (and who if not the CC International Department is called upon to formulate such assessments?!). Ponomarev asked Zagladin to prepare, so Zagladin tried to give a comprehensive overview of “Eurocommunism”... B.N. immediately got bored: characteristic in such cases tapping on the table, unambiguous repeated glances at his watch. Vadim saw all of this but persisted, though he started rushing. Amazingly, even though I am completely in favor of taking an in-depth look at Eurocommunism and the ICM in general, and substantiating our policies, I felt awkward for Vadim: why is he pushing his theories like a schoolboy, since it is clearly not the right time and nobody (the boss) cares about it! The only thing they care about is how to shut up or discredit Carrillo, how to pacify Marchais so he doesn't sever ties with us completely, whom to send to Italy to “have a talk” with Berlinguer so he does not strike things like “Marxism-Leninism” and “proletarian internationalism” from the Party's constitution at the next Congress of the PCI. B.N. later talked about this himself. Only about this. There is not the slightest desire to penetrate into the essence of the matter, into the process that can be explained by deep currents and which is destroying the old ICM – it is impossible to save it in the format that B.N. has gotten used to over the last 60 years...

In other words, there is no policy (only criticism) and no theory of the ICM... Because there isn't even a hint of a desire to imagine what to do with the socialist revolution next, and what it has become.

B.N. (who is a kind of a tuning fork with a coefficient for awareness and knowledge) can be disarmingly naïve sometimes. For example, he said at this meeting with his deputies: “What else do they (the Eurocommunists) want?! We held such an international celebration. We gave them such a good reception. We said good things, that we wouldn't interfere with them... We adopted a Constitution with the broadest democratic rights... But they came back home and started again: giving all kinds of interviews and speaking against Leninism, against our democracy, against general laws. Once again there are anti-Soviet materials in their newspapers?! What do they want?!”

Ok, fine! What if Zagladin becomes head of our Department, even if he becomes the Secretary of the CC International Department – will anything change substantively? Then again, who knows, maybe it will change slowly...

Is there a spontaneous undercurrent in our society that will form something new, something that matures almost independently of people's congresses, conferences, Leonid Ilyich's greetings to collectives and their letters to him, all this official activity that even the participants themselves view as a tired but mandatory ritual (you can see it in their faces on the TV screen)? After all, society lives in the material conditions created by the regime, but it does not determine the long-term consequences. New houses, a hectic pace of life, the constant rush, concerns that our people did not know even 10 years ago, incomprehensible relationships between people at home – alienation, the absence of "close circles," household friends, the lack of interest even in very close people, the "fragmentation" of life when you can't remember the difference between one day and the next... A broad knowledge of life in Central Asia or Moldova from the TV and total ignorance about the lives of your next-door neighbors... An extremely fragmented society where true intimacy, openness, and interest happens only between a man and woman who love each other. Our society's unity is purely formal, held together by almost religious ties. Its stability comes from indifference and complete ignorance of the fact that something else exists, some other way of life.

December 14, 1977

Yesterday – the CC Plenum. Some confusion, people couldn't even immediately figure out whether to stand up and applaud... Brezhnev was not leading the procession of Politburo members. When Suslov was announcing those present, he said that Leonid Ilyich will not be attending. Nothing special, just fatigue brought on by the common cold. But he [Brezhnev] prepared his speech and it will be passed out during the break, so it can be taken into account during the debate. Therefore, the break would be 40 minutes.

The most interesting tidbit is that at the end of the plenum Suslov "came to an agreement" with participants to pretend that Brezhnev was at the Plenum – "he took part in the work of the Plenum..."

The newspapers had the phrase, "General Secretary Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev gave a big speech at the Plenum..." I don't know the purpose of this strange lie! It's hard to imagine that the information won't "leak"... Five hundred members of the Plenum, and the next day there was a session of the Supreme Soviet at which he again did not show up... Tomorrow the whole world will find out, he is supposed to meet with Brandt, who will be passing through Moscow on the way to Tokyo for a conference of the Socialist International. But even if he meets with Brandt, that's not the point. The point is this petty lie – to our entire Party, to the country, to the world. Without an obvious, good reason. This is a bad symptom of both contempt (we can get away with anything!) and cult-mythology (how can we have a Plenum if Brezhnev isn't there!).

About the Plenum itself. Baibakov's report (chairman of the State Planning Committee). I haven't heard such an anxious and harsh assessment of the economic situation even in his always

somewhat “pessimistic” speeches. The situation is bad. Worse than you would imagine, and worse than before.

Against the background of his report, Garbuzov’s praise in the following report “addressed to [Brezhnev]” and about the enthusiasm and upswing in connection with the Constitution and the 60th anniversary of October sounded like stupid irony. There was even a stir in the auditorium. The debates also mostly consisted of glorification and only some people said the same thing as Baibakov, in the context of their local and branch specifics.

What is the solution? In Leonid Ilych’s “speech” there were the same “conclusions,” “appeals,” and “directions” that he now periodically announces (starting at the XXIV Congress, when they sounded fresh!) in all his economic and other speeches.

Our pathetic attempts (on the scale of a consultants’ group and deputies) to “master” Eurocommunism and make a decision – to get approval for some kind of policy – came to naught. B.N. does not want this, and Suslov probably does not either. Others don’t want to know any substance, just as long as Marchais & Co. don’t talk badly us... Certainty brings with it obligations; while things are uncertain we can maneuver indefinitely.

Brutents told me about Kirilenko’s “approach” to the problem of “Eurocommunism.” He was just in Angola and Plissonnier with the PCF delegation was there too. They know each other, Kirilenko was at the XXII Congress of the PCF. One day Kirilenko asks: “Gaston, how long will we keep walking around and smiling? Maybe it’s time to talk?”

Gaston: “As we already said, we are for it. But there are disagreements between our parties.”

Kirilenko: “So what? Maybe we should look for the tallest tower here, climb on it and shout from the top to all the world that we have disagreements? Maybe we could do this from the Eiffel Tower and the Ostankino Tower? Is that what you want? Why? What disagreements will we shout about?”

Gaston: “We told you...”

Kirilenko: “Come on! Stop fooling around. And tell your people in Paris. For three years now you don’t want to talk with us, you turn up your nose. Fine, we won’t be the worse for it... Remember this and tell your people: we can do this for another three and thirty years, we might not notice at all that ‘you are treating us badly.’ We will see what this will do to you...”

December 25, 1977

From December 15-18th I was in Budapest with Shakhnazarov, Nenashev, and Sorokin (he is a new head of sector in a CC Department). We were assigned to prepare a meeting of CC Secretaries of socialist countries, which will be held at the end of February (actually two meetings: one will be open – on coordination “against imperialist propaganda,” the second will be closed – a comprehensive look at “Eurocommunism”).

Rather lively comradely debates. We quickly agreed on the main agenda. Then the most interesting part happened in the International Department of the MSzMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party]: [Janos] Berecz, [Gyula] Horn, Varga.

Berecz was irritated and aggressive:

- 1) "You want to have a frank conversation about "Eurocommunism"? Do you know that we don't have a general consensus about it even amongst ourselves (i.e. Bulgarians, Czechs, and everyone in "The Six")? This kind of frankness might expose the disagreements between the socialist countries!" In response I started to assure him that if there is no unity in "The Six" on these questions (if there isn't), it's most likely because they are not informed about each other's positions.
- 2) "You want to coordinate in connection to the 10th anniversary of events in Czechoslovakia... How can we participate in this if we disagree with the Czechs' approach? They are telling me that they, i.e. the Czechs, are going to celebrate this 10th anniversary as a great victory of socialism! What victory?! What are they talking about? It is a disaster, a tragedy! We also had a 20th anniversary of 1956, but we did not make noise about it as if it was a victory and so on. We are ready to share our experience with the Czechs on how to diffuse and downplay such things, instead of provoking excitement and hubbub worldwide... But they don't want to listen to us."

Shakhnazarov responded to this, assuring them that we, the CC CPSU, also do not think "this" needs to be portrayed as a victory... (I thought to myself: from your lips [to God's ear]...). The Hungarians took note, but I don't think they believed it very much.

- 3) Berecz reprimanded us for not supporting them as coordinators on social-democracy. "Do you not trust us in this delicate ideological question?" I assured him and so on... In reality I just didn't get around to it during this busy anniversary year.

Then we were received by two CC Secretaries: Denes and Dury. We kind of "reported" to them together with our Hungarian colleagues on the work we did and the issues. Dury told us about their latest Plenum. "On January 1st we will raise prices again by 4-5 percent. The people are used to it and there is no unrest. We do it so it essentially matches the growth of real income. Everyone is happy. Everyone is confident that every year gets better and better. The country is calm. There is universal trust in the party..."

Indeed. Budapest before Christmas. The shops are full of people and... goods. The variety and quality, and the style of selling and advertising is closer to Paris and London, and way ahead of Warsaw, Moscow, not to mention Sofia.

The products they have you can't even find in the "privileged" section of GUM in Moscow. For example, there are plenty of sheepskin coats, leather coats of any style, huge variety of women's clothing and shoes. In a word, I looked at it and did not feel a big difference

between Budapest and London. (I unexpectedly bought myself a leather coat – a dream from my youth).

We watched the film *The Witness* there, based on the process of Laszlo Rajk. It turns out it was released in 1969, but not allowed in theaters, although all of Hungary saw it in the provincial club theaters. Essentially it is similar to the film *The Trial* [Приговор] by the Czech director London [sic].⁸ *The Witness* is a satire on the cult of personality played by Hungarians. It is excellently made, some parts had me falling off my chair from laughing.

However – politically? What claims can we make about it openly? Nothing, really. They recently celebrated the director's 60th anniversary. He is a national celebrity. And this movie was allowed in one of the largest cinemas in Budapest.

At work. A new burst of commotion in connection with Kanapa's lecture appearing in *La Nouvelle Critique*, and Marchais' book *Let's Be Frank*. Kanapa's piece presents a balanced, not sensational, not rude (against us) concept of "Eurocommunism." Ponomarev does not want to admit this and keeps imposing an approach according to which "these two" sold out to the CIA.

At a meeting of deputies and in a private conversation with B.N. I insisted that serious things should be taken seriously, that attacks will do no good. However, it is not just B.N. After Chervonenko's telegram from Paris, it's clear B.N. got a call from the top and was asked what he is doing and how much longer are we going to tolerate it??!

As much as he fumed, we, the deputies, nevertheless insisted on a solid approach. Zagladin and I put together a note to the CC, where we balanced a program of "calm actions," and recommended not to touch Kanapa or Marchais personally until after the parliamentary elections in France.

For a whole week I worked on a brochure for Ponomarev, "Is Marxism-Leninism outdated?" It's a strange feeling: you know for a fact that this is all conservative-defensive nonsense and it does not have any significance, even if Ponomarev keeps some of the liberties I wrote into the text. However, constructing the text, despite my convictions, I got carried away by the debate.

I saw the film *Till Eulenspiegel* at the movie theater "October." There's lots of tall tales in it, but as a whole the movie is not bad and has some ideas, for example – where the ideological struggle can lead us, and about the fatigue and meaning of power.

Postscript to 1977

⁸ The 1970 film is called *The Confession* and is based on a book by Artur London, a Czech politician who was a co-defendant in the Slánský Trial in 1951. He wrote a book called *The Confession* about his experiences. (Trans.)

Reflecting on the year 1977, you distinguish two points of its official history – the Constitution and the 60th anniversary of the Revolution.

A big lie was connected to the former. The commotion around the drafting of the Constitution and the attempts by “intelligent apparatchiks” together with selected scholars to democratically ennoble the core Soviet law somehow obscured its key aspect – “Article 6,” which turned the aforesaid attempts into demagoguery that was normal for our way of life. Meanwhile, as we know, when this article was repealed ten years later it “turned the key” to the rapid disintegration of the state.

The anniversary of October was a symbolic international event: it became very obvious that the USSR is still a power, but no longer a “leader” and example for imitation. The Soviet government tacitly acknowledged it (“in their hearts”) by largely disregarding the efforts of its own apparatus to save the “unity” of the ICM, as well as [ignoring] the ideological and political essence of “Eurocommunism.” One could generalize the mood at the very top of the Soviet superpower as, “As long as our ‘friends’ don’t openly criticize the USSR and CPSU, we don’t care what they do!”

Increasing numbers of our “fraternal parties” more and more openly denied the CPSU the right to impose policies, ideology, and in general to “teach” them what to do and how to do it. Our ideological, “foundational” authority had practically fallen to zero. Our only attraction was in being a “world power,” and... money, “a payroll to support [the fraternal parties’] existence.”

This “volume” contains new evidence of Brezhnev’s sincere wish for peace and his increasing illness – physical, mental, and as a statesman. The public demonstration of this illness testified not only to the worthlessness, cowardice, and stupidity of propaganda and political “departments,” but also the country’s increasingly disastrous downward movement.

The fact that a “troika” of Politburo members – Ustinov, Gromyko, Andropov – brazenly picked up the functions of power was further evidence of this process. They were still held in check by Suslov, who was growing “weaker,” but the levers of “real politics” were in their hands.

This volume contains a great deal of observations related to the author’s travels abroad. The discussions that took place there, contacts with many people, provide materials on the international atmosphere of the day; the problems the “Cold War” was putting ever more sharply before the present and future of the international community. Among these people – Communists, Social Democrats, Laborites, real friends and “friends” in quotation marks, in socialist countries and others – the author met smart and honest people who were genuinely concerned about “where we are going and how;” but also hardened politicians, cynics and opportunists, stupid selfish dogmatists and simply primitive people who were accidental players on the political stage.

The author’s contacts with the spiritual life of society did not bring anything new in 1977.



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The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1978

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Translated by Anna Melyakova

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

1978

January 14, 1978

I was in “Sosny” from December 25th-January 1st. Every day I forced myself to go skiing, swimming, to play tennis. I did all this almost without pleasure, but to fulfill my duty to my body and to take care of my “appearance” as a key part of “human dignity.”¹

I think Leonid Ilyich has become completely senile. He has only made one appearance in over a month – he presented awards to Suslov, Demichev, Rashidov and others. He looks like he is totally falling apart.

Nevertheless, it was announced in the West that he will finally visit the FRG in February, and we are starting to get moving with papers... But what will it be if it actually takes place... Already a year ago in France everybody noticed that he “isn’t quite there”! It is shameful that Soviet people are put in a similar position as the Chinese the year before Mao’s death.

In the newspapers today: “Letter of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and the CC of the Komsomol on socialist competition in 1978.” It is an address, an appeal... to work. It is uncharacteristically self-critical and frank. There is a glimpse of the depth of chaos, ineptitude, indifference, stagnation, and the absence of any real incentives to improve the situation. Only appeals and exhortations.

At work. The struggle against Eurocommunism continues. On December 27th, the CC passed a resolution based on our paper, authorizing the plan we proposed. Our new initiative was provoked by Kanapa (lectures on the ICM published in *Nouvelle Critique*) and Marchais’ book *Let’s Be Frank*. Essentially it presents a more balanced platform of Eurocommunism than Carrillo’s. B.N. must have gotten an order from above and was in a frenzy. However, when the plan was approved at the Secretariat, the reaction to the International Department’s plan was “rather calm and even restrained”... As if to say, there is no way around it now.

We published the article against Azcarate in the No. 3 issue of *Novoye Vremya* and already got a slap from the *L’Unita* and the Yugoslavs.

Kozlov and I completed something that was the embodiment of an old dream of B.N.’s – to create (for him) a brochure on the subject “Is Marxism-Leninism Obsolete?” It even came out sounding relevant and political. But if we dig deeper, this is all just a pathetic verbal retort to those (the ICM) who want to finally, completely break from us, to finish with the old Leninist-Stalinist-Ponomarevist ICM and call it quits with any dogmas and “principles.” They want to do what they want to do, without looking over their shoulder at anyone (especially not at us). Our attempts to reign in the collapse are only accelerating the process of the collapse. By our own hand we are making it more pronounced.

¹ All words and phrases in quotation marks are similarly emphasized with quotation marks in the original. [Trans.]

² Carrillo is talking about thousands of Spaniards who were sent to the USSR (many as children) during the civil war of 1936-39. [Author’s note]

³ Unbeknownst to Ponomarev, Zagladin published an article about Cohen’s book *L’URSS et nous* in which he let the Eurocommunists have it. This was just after Berlinguer had visited Moscow and hugged Brezhnev. Zagladin is not a

Last Saturday we had a class reunion. The last one was in 1968. Everyone reported on what's happened to him/her over the last 40 years, since our school graduation. It was all too ordinary, boring, and foreign to me. I think aside from L. Bezymensky and L. Lungina (Markovich) I have nothing in common with them, from the point of view of understanding each other and having an interest in each other. There is nothing there, and can't be.

January 21, 1978

I am taking part in preparations of the parliamentary delegation to the US, headed by Ponomarev. This has once again submerged me in the atmosphere of our impotence (ideological and economic) and the propaganda sham.

However, there are some bright spots: Marshal Ogarkov and top KGB official Bobkov, who advised the delegation. Their calm and intelligent reactions to "imperialist attacks" give confidence that we are on the right path with our disarmament policy (strategic negotiations in the U.S.) and dissident affairs.

By the way, they are both smart, intelligent, and qualified individuals. And this, too, is calming and reassuring. But they are our "defense redoubts," while on the front line – in the competition with the outside world, in state-of-the-art progress, in solving urgent problems in our economy and society – what do we have there? How will it work? Where are we and what can we do at our current level of organization, leadership, and ideological state (more precisely – the state of decline and disintegration)?!

My conversation with Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Vice President of the Soviet-American Economic Council, V.N. Sushkov (again in the line of preparing Ponomarev's delegation). This guy is also smart and competent, a person with character who deeply understands his work and tasks, a high-level manager. He is also a relentless cynic, of course, because every day he faces our clumsiness, inadequacy, and inability to keep up with the requirements of the "struggle against American imperialism." The major monopolistic giants are in this Council (like General Motors)... "I am on friendly terms with them," Sushkov says. "They tell me, 'Our government does not give you credits and restricts the national banks from doing so as well. But we have just as much money. We are ready to give you whatever credits you need. Name at least a dozen products that you could trade with us. Even if they will not make it to the U.S. or Western European markets... that is not important. We have connections all around the world. We have basically 'compulsory' markets in the 'third world.' We can sell anything there. But give us the goods...'"

"And so," Sushkov continues, "I came back to Moscow and started knocking on the doors of various Ministries. Nobody has any goods for export. We do not have enough for the domestic market as it is. And I'm burning in this Soviet-American Council."

Or: we signed a wide range of production sharing contracts [*компенсационных контрактов*] with major companies for facilities to produce goods we desperately need, including ones related to the military. The companies started developing documentation and invested tens of millions of dollars into these contracts. Suddenly it turned out, when we adjusted

the numbers for our 10th Five-Year-Plan, that we have to either freeze these facilities, or postpone them until the 11th Five-Year-Plan. It was a scandal. As the result we will pay more in penalties than if we had started construction. But we do not have the manpower, the materials, or other funds to start these construction sites for which we made the abovementioned contracts.

They see all of this. Then we get upset when their mass media writes about our economic stagnation, the failure of a planned economy, about unsolvable problems.

Their cynicism: multinational corporations that are members of the Soviet-American Council organize “positive results” of opinion polls in the U.S. – in favor of the development of Soviet-American economic relations... They pay good money for all those Gallup polls to get the results they need.

January 22, 1978

I sent off the Ponomarev delegation to America.

Then I went through Vnukovo directly to Uspenka. I finished watching the 12th episode of the multipart film *Eternal Call* [«Вечный зов»]. It's a good movie. Yesterday, on Karyakin's recommendation, I read an article by a certain Semenova in the *Prometheus* anthology, about “the philosopher Fedorov,” an amazing *starets* [*wise man*], contemporary of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. He is the “creator” of the idea of resurrection (scientific!) of all previously living people. He argues that this resurrection is the meaning of life and the purpose of space exploration. Of course, *Eternal Call* does not correspond with this idea, but another one of Fedorov's accompanying ideas – that Russia's fate is to be the first to unite people and nations on a vast territory for a single purpose – to “save mankind,” the purpose of its existence.

The movie presents a spatial view of Russia's greatness and uniqueness: thousands of kilometers from Moscow people are united by one idea – to save Moscow – for one and all, the core and secret meaning of the life – 1941.

January 27, 1978

B.N. is in America. *Pravda* writes about him and publishes his speeches daily. Not every Politburo member (except the General Secretary) gets such treatment! But he managed it...

A scandal regarding the fall of our satellite “Kosmos-954” over Canada. The satellite had a nuclear (power) reactor on board.

It's quiet at work. A rehearsal for what it would be like if we did not have B.N.'s incessant activity, and consequently a bunch of “theoretical” pointless writing. This must be how 75 percent of the Department live their entire life... I am reading and thinking a great deal, mainly about “Eurocommunism” as a theoretically helpless (which will be its tragedy in the future, when the time comes for practical application) but politically insurmountable phenomenon. It is undermining our standing, our socialist face (at the current stage). And there is nothing we can do to stop it. Later on, we will be in a strong position again, but it will be qualitatively different.

February 4, 1978

Yesterday B.N. and the parliamentary delegation returned from the United States. It turned out that the delegation's visit went almost unnoticed in the United States, save for a brief broadcast on TV of B.N.'s meeting with Carter and an excerpt of the press conference. Not a single newspaper mentioned that such an "event" is taking place, except for two spiteful commentaries (couple paragraphs) about the press conference on the issues of "Jews" and "human rights."

Zagladin told me about his trip to Budapest and Prague. They are moving farther and farther apart: the frenzy of the Czechs and the daredevil leniency of the Hungarians. The latter recently allowed duty-free imports of goods from 30 developing countries – a clear violation of the "convention" of the "new economic order"... They agreed to the most favored nation status offered by the U.S. Gromyko and Rusakov decided this is also a violation of solidarity and made a proposal at the Politburo to give them a dressing-down through the ambassador. Following the ridiculous protocol, Balmashnov (Ponomarev's assistant) asked me to sign this note (to say there are no comments). I refused to sign it. He will report to B.N., but I think the latter will not bother to find out why I did that.

February 10, 1978

I spent the whole week at Serebryannyi Bor, 16. A new theoretical dacha, which serves as a hotel for foreign communist delegations when it is not being used as a retreat to write Party texts.

We put together B.N.'s main speech for Budapest (around 30 pages) and seven "small speeches" (on the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the new international economic order, the south of Africa, the World Trade Union Congress, the Havana Youth Festival, and Latin America). Even though I brought Zhilin and four consultants there, we didn't make much progress. People are tired, they are sick of this meaningless speechwriting. Then there is laziness and a careless attitude fueled by the fact that official reputations in the apparatus are not based on merit, but on B.N.'s whims. He consciously encourages anonymity to make his speeches look like "orders from the Party." He listens to rumors and to several informers. There is the political incompetence of most of the Department's employees. They are quick to throw together an information note, though they are not always well done. But if you ask them to put policy in there – that's solely my and the consultants' responsibility, not to mention turning an information note into a text that is easy to pronounce and would not be embarrassing to give to Ponomarev, who can tell a good product from a bad one. Every year his importance in his own eyes grows more and more and he demands increasingly higher quality, while at the same time he is proportionally losing the ability to think logically and articulately express whatever crosses his mind.

They say the PB yesterday passed a resolution to once again create a Department of Foreign Policy Propaganda...

February 26, 1978

I am going to Budapest today. Once again it will be ideological-didactic babble. All my objections that “this has been said already at previous meetings of this kind” and that “Zimyanin will be talking about this” (before only B.N. made a speech) were rejected. In a word, I had to come up with a new version in two days... Once again I had to go over the “minor speeches.”

Shakhnazarov managed to get a speech for Rusakov on the New Economic Order and wrote it in the spirit of infringement on the Soviet people, who don’t get to eat enough meat while Black Africans keep getting all kinds of aid.

He also prepared speeches for Rusakov that look like an outright reprimand for the Hungarians, the Poles, and others: why are they engaging with the West in economic relations and listening to the Chinese’ overtures against us. These speeches are for closed sessions, in which we will discuss “Eurocommunism”...

It is shallow and foolish when so-called party intelligentsia supports and formulates such “great power” attitudes and empty fears for the “hegemony” (that is to say, if we cannot organize a good living standard for our people, we won’t let you do it either). I do not exclude the possibility that this group of people instigates [these trends] as well.

All of last week passed in euphoria (the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Army) on the occasion of Brezhnev being awarded the Order of Victory. When he was recently awarded the rank of General, then Marshal, everyone thought these were the Pillars of Hercules, it could go no further. He was dressed up in a uniform. All day on TV you would see either the act of presenting the award, or the ceremonial meeting in the Palace of Congresses, where a good part of Ustinov’s report was dedicated to L.I. and ovations. In the closing ceremony of the concert that followed, the presentation of the award was projected on a huge screen on stage. The same week, Brezhnev was on TV multiple times in connection with Assad’s visit. And speeches, speeches, speeches... given with terrible stammering, for all the people to see. The people both sympathize with him and laugh at him, some are even furious with his inner circle for not wanting to “stop him.”

I wrote one of those speeches for the session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, at which Ponomarev presented on his visit to the United States. It was uttered word for word, and for three days now, according to the radio and newspapers, it is regarded all over the world as yet another contribution!

Zagladin told me how he wrote a response speech for the Order of Victory award and a toast for Assad’s visit. By the way, in connection with the former, L.I. called Zagladin himself. Brezhnev asked, “Do you think all of this is appropriate?” Zagladin said he replied, “You are putting me in an awkward position.” Of course only Brezhnev knows what Vadim actually said.

Not just taxi drivers but even the personal drivers of the Central Committee are laughing at all of this. Some are politely expressing their opinions (in the form of rhetorical questions, such as whether this violates the charter of the Order of Victory).

It feels like we are living in an atmosphere of dense senility... and total contempt for the opinion of the people.

One more creature has been awarded for its merits – Zamyatin (director of TASS). He was made head of a department. A department was “invented” for him on the fly, unexpectedly for all members of the PB. I heard a telephone call between B.N. and Suslov on this subject, the day after the PB where Brezhnev suggested to create a Department of International Information and Foreign Propaganda and appoint Zamyatin as its head. This is a reward for helping to eliminate, by means of propaganda, the “triumvirate” (Podgorny, Brezhnev, Kosygin) and turning the “triumvirate” into a single leader (he boasted about this to me himself at the beach in “Yantar”) and for the screenplay “The Life of a Communist.”

When they find out about this Department in the West, they will have all kinds of theories about Moscow’s new plans. In reality, it is the same operation as appointing Chernenko as candidate member of the Politburo, or replacing Katushev with Rusakov.

I am finishing an amazing diary-novel *Insomnia* by Aleksandr Kron, published in *Novy Mir*. I didn’t get around to it when it first came out and all of Moscow was talking about it. A high-class psychological portrait of the Soviet Moscow way of life.

March 4, 1978

From February 26 to March 2 – Budapest. A meeting of Central Committee Secretaries from ten socialist countries. We expected some animation from the Romanians, and we got it. The same questions, at first glance the same approaches and concerns (for example, the arms race). But everything with a double bottom.

They boasted about abolishing censorship and solving the nationalities question, even though it is all pure demagogery and hypocrisy: in this sphere they are doing worse than everyone else. In public, the guys (from departments of the apparatus of the CC CP of Romania) accompanying the delegation mindlessly stuck to their guns, without explanations or arguments. When we pressed them outside of meetings, questioning their intellectual personal worth, they laughingly admitted not sharing the views, but they have a “directive”!

B.N. was bustling with activity and again exhausted us with his initiatives: at one point he decided to say the closing paragraphs, even though nobody asked him to do it; then he wanted to give the final statement (as another presiding one), even though it seemed quite inappropriate; then he wanted us to prepare a response speech for him at Kadar’s reception; then he got the idea to give *Pravda* an interview on the outcomes of the meeting. Every time his colleagues – Rusakov and Zimyanin – looked bewildered, rumbled, but he didn’t let anything stop him and always got his way.

The closed session on “Eurocommunism” (without the Romanians and Vietnamese) – the “secret departure” from the Gellert Hotel to visit a party school... across town at 150 km/h, accompanied by police cars with sirens and through the hedgerows of dumbfounded Budapesters.

B.N. was first again: Zagladin and Kozlov prepared his text. The Hungarians and Bulgarians were close to us... Though Zagladin and I did accept all the comments (on our text)

from the Hungarians (Beretz passed them on to us). Our concept was closer to the middle between the Hungarians and the Bulgarians.

Axen surprised everyone by giving an awfully trite speech: imperialism—the Socialist International, Brandt—Brzezinski, verbiage about the CPSU and Brezhnev, the 60th Anniversary of October (this at a closed work meeting!). The Pole – zero. The Mongolian, wisely understanding his place, managed in three minutes. The Cuban made a verbose speech on the topic “this is not right”: “The highest form of internationalism is when one nation sheds blood for the interests of another. Meanwhile, the Romanians did not allow us even to express solidarity with the cause of revolutionary Ethiopia. How will we (i.e. the delegation) explain this in Havana?! Che Guevara (!) said that the mobility and fighting efficiency of a partisan detachment is determined by its weakest and most irresponsible fighter. So do we have to be at Ceausescu’s level? Why do we even need meetings where communists cannot speak openly.” And so forth.

However, Bil’ak (member of the CC CP of Czechoslovakia) was the highlight of the meeting: “Boris Nikolayevich explained to us here that you all will be going to the Congress of Communist Parties in Spain... Carillo and the Western propaganda are calling us puppets, the henchmen of invaders, they say we do not represent our people, etc. Therefore we (the Czechoslovaks) were not invited there. Don’t you think that by going, you indirectly join in this characteristic of Carillo & Co.? We cannot object to your decision, but think about us. Why are we to blame for accepting your internationalist help?!”

The question has been raised. Of course there were no conclusions made at the meeting, because at these kinds of meetings problems don’t get discussed, just stated.

The Cuban question also remained unanswered.

In general, a strange situation is developing. Right now, in connection with the 10th anniversary of the events [of Prague Spring], the whole world is picking on and walking all over the Czechs. We are keeping quiet, and other socialist countries even more so. It is not relevant for us, and we don’t want to “stir it up”... In the meantime, “spontaneously” a climate of contempt is forming within the parties of our fraternal countries towards people like Bil’ak and the majority of the Czech leadership. Not just for “more general” reasons, but also because they are all pathetic, dull, stupid, bitter, etc. I felt in Bil’ak’s words that they, the Czechs, understand the position they are now in among the people who made them who they are.

I was going through my bookshelves and came across my article in issue No. 5 of “Modern and Contemporary History” for 1961. I wrote it at the insistence of the late Academician Guber, who was then chief editor and was grooming me for the position of deputy. At the time I had just come back from Prague. I remember I ran into the late Yerusalimsky on the street, and he told me in his typical lightly sarcastic manner, “They say your article has doubled the circulation of the magazine.” Sevastyanov (now a prominent figure in the Institute of History), who, I have to say, was a bootlicker (I had just started at the CC), said: “I reread every page several times, because there are more thoughts than phrases.” I remembered all of this. By the way, back then I was not very experienced in “putting together texts.” I reread it right now. It

is indeed daringly written. Most importantly – whole volumes of scientific literature that have appeared since then have not added anything new to the thoughts and conclusions that are packed so tightly in there. Even today's Eurocommunists in general (from the point of view of analyzing new conditions for revolution in their countries) have not said anything new: the essay already said everything in strikingly accurate (and brave for that time) form. Nowadays I probably could not write like that, I would not have the resolve.

March 8, 1978

The day before yesterday, a helicopter exploded over Libya, carrying [Werner] Lamberz (a member of the PB SED) and Paul Markowski (the head of the SED's International Department), whom I had known for 15 years. He was a Silesian, cheerful, smart, clever, open to us, very politically capable (he was fluent in five European languages), and with a blunt German cheerfulness. He was a friend to many of us in the CC International Departments. I last saw him in January, when he came with Axen to discuss the Budapest meeting. I knew Lamberz less. He was the youngest member of their PB. But the acuteness of the news is amplified by the fact that I shook his hand just four days ago in the Gellert Hotel.

B.N. had warned Lamberz in Budapest, "Don't fly there so often, it is not safe, they will manage without you." They were in Libya en route to Ethiopia, where the SED is "closely engaged," mainly by helping to create a "Marxist-Leninist Party."

The incident with Krivoguz at the CC CPSU Academy of Social Sciences... "Comintern and socialist democracy" at the seminar in Halle, followed by a "denunciation" [«телега»] at the level of Brezhnev-Honecker. It started the process of expulsion from the Academy of Social Sciences and a party reprimand. A fool is a fool. Even Krasin (his head of department) admitted it. There is no salvation. But what about those Fritzes! In due course they installed Bovin, then "removed" Ryzhenko (rector of the Academy of Social Sciences), who is drinking heavily now. And now Krivoguz! Maybe they've lost their mind from the "Spiegel" manifesto, and because they have no way out except running forward (even further into the "consumer society" and, consequently, into the embrace of the FRG) they are trying to present themselves to Moscow as ultra-orthodox and ideologically "loyal"?

March 16, 1978

I had a talk with Pertsov. Volodya Pertsov is an adviser in our Department. He has been studying Spain for many years, he knows it inside out, as they say. His gives captivating depictions of the customs and habits in Spain's different provinces, about its artists and writers, its cities and cathedrals, about Francoists and Communists... He loves that country and they love him there. He personally knows hundreds, if not thousands of Spaniards of all different views and backgrounds. He widely uses the Spaniards' special attitude towards us, the Soviets, that was born out of our romantic, ardent, sincere solidarity with the Republicans during the civil war of 1936-1939. He is friends with Carillo, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain (as well as with Dolores Ibarruri, the Chairman of the Party, national hero).

He just came back from another trip to Spain, and conveyed to me his conversation with Santiago [Carillo]. He preceded it with the remark, “You cannot write this in a ciphered telegram from there – they will not understand and on top of it you could get hell for it.”

“In the Soviet Union you are wrong to consider me anti-Soviet,” said Carillo. ‘If I were anti-Soviet, I would have quite a lot to say and write about you: I have thousands of eyes and ears in the USSR, I know everything about you, and not just what’s happening in Moscow...² ... Things are going badly for you, and getting worse and worse. You do not want to discuss this even internally, amongst yourselves... So I wrote a book (*Eurocommunism and the State*). I wrote it, you might say, amateurishly, I did not have a lot of time and I do not have any real education in theory. But the book is dictated by our needs and tasks that have come to a head. And what did you do? You foolishly criticized the book, and once again called me anti-Soviet to boot! You have a huge number of academicians, qualified people, entire institutes. Why not debate me, why not show me my weak points in earnest, prove that I am wrong, give your answers to the questions raised in the book? You are not doing that. You are not doing it because you are afraid of a real discussion, you do not want it. Just like you do not want and cannot seriously discuss your internal problems...

“And in general, Volodya,” Carillo continued, ‘It is impossible for a country like yours – great, powerful, with such a past, with such significance for all humanity – to be ruled by frail old men, who are incapable of anything anymore. You had Katushev as a possibility, but even he got thrown out! You will bring your country to a point when you will start to have “Polish,” “Hungarian,” and “Czech” events. That would be a catastrophe. Not just for you... but for all of us! That is why we cannot and will not be silent. If you do not want to deal with your problems and look truth in the eyes – with full and correct knowledge of the matter, in a Leninist way – then we are obligated, even if we are unskillful and unqualified, to rub your nose in it, to try to raise your alarm.

“Berlinguer thinks the same. But he is an Italian, he is gentle and more diplomatic with you. We, Spaniards, are simpler and more straightforward, so we ended up being labeled as anti-Soviets by you. I will confess that at our meeting in Madrid (I – Marchais – Berlinguer) we discussed what I just told you. All three of us were of the same opinion.”

March 18, 1978

It is boring at work. This feeling spreads very quickly (by some unknown means) to the brain part of the Department when we stop receiving impulses from B.N. His ideas are sometimes absurd (old-mannish, in the Comintern spirit) but they force us to come up with ideas, play with words, debate, create the appearance of intense creative activity, for which the energy conversion efficiency on the subject of the ICM is almost equal to zero.

These impulses stop coming in at times when he, Ponomarev, gets “smacked on the noggin” at the top. Or due to some circumstance, a chance conversation, discussion at the

² Carillo is talking about thousands of Spaniards who were sent to the USSR (many as children) during the civil war of 1936-39. [Author’s note]

Secretariat, the PB, of something directly related to our work. He realizes – alas! for a short time – that all his irrepressible energy, as well as the energy of some other people (if it appears) – is nothing but a hassle. Nobody can appreciate it, nobody needs it. Moreover, people regard it as a desire to put himself forward, to be center stage.

I think that Zamyatin's promotion (who has already taken a large chunk of B.N.'s domain in the "struggle against imperialism") affected the old man. Indeed, despite his outstanding political vitality and activity, he is 73 years old.

In a word, I think he has been low since Budapest. Immediately all our life switched to routine work. And we have less and less routine daily work, since we have less and less use for the communist and national liberation movements.

March 19, 1978

In the morning I read Duverger's article in *Le Monde* about what the PCF will do if the left wins today.

At the same time, I was reading a brochure by [György] Lukács written in 1924, soon after Lenin's death. I don't think I've seen such a clear and profound exposition of the essence of Leninism. As if it was created now, taking into account everything that happened with us and with others, everything that lead to Eurocommunism.

I was given this brochure to read by B.P. Likhachev from *Kommunist*. He wants to suggest to print excerpts from this work in the issue of the magazine dedicated to Lenin. He already discussed it with the Hungarians. Our side might not like it though... it is Lukács after all... in 1956 and 1968 he did not behave in the best manner.

March 25, 1978

For a few days we have been puzzling over whether to congratulate the French with the elections or not. Zuyev (head of the sector) immediately took a decisive position: there is nothing to congratulate them with because they are not talking about the victory. They are fighting amongst themselves (with the Socialist Party of France), and besides, they are printing pages in *L'Humanité* on a daily basis, knocking us for stripping Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya of their citizenship. I also decided for myself right away – not to congratulate (imagining Kanapa's expression, him thinking they can spit in our face and we will still maintain the appearance of "proletarian internationalism."). B.N. agreed (we talked with him three times about it) but did not want to take the responsibility. He told us to write our argumentation to Chervonenko (ambassador) and urge him not to insist. The latter kept sending telegrams and demanding in his Ukrainian manner. At that point we ignored his ciphered telegrams.

B.N.'s reasoning is solid: unless we report it to the CC, nobody at the top gives a damn about the French. Because they could care less about the elections, same as about a lot of other things. If we do report, there will be uncertainty, debates. Time is passing. The French themselves have "moved on to regular business."

B.N. worried remotely (from the Crimea) about the visit of a group of American congressmen. They are coming as tourists, but they want meetings with Brezhnev, Gromyko, Ustinov, Ogarkov, etc. Shitikov (member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium) and Kornienko (now the First Deputy at the MFA, he quickly mastered his boss's boorish manner) decided not to "kiss ass" (this was Shitikov's expression in a conversation with our head of the American sector Mostovets). They even did not want to send our deputies to meet the Americans at the airport, not to mention accompany them to Leningrad and Kiev. Arbatov complained to me, I complained to B.N. He was furious. I dictated to Shitikov what needs to be done and how. He reluctantly complied. Kornienko's response to me regarding the CC Secretary's [Ponomarev's] "corrections": "I consider it completely unnecessary and wrong, but since I see no special political (!) reasons to object, I will not overturn it..." That's how he talks about a CC Secretary's instructions! I raised my voice. But that is not the point. Gromyko's entourage feels so protected that even the highest echelon of the Party leadership is nothing to them.

I had a conversation on a similar subject with Zdorov (head of the engineering department) about sending the new minister (Belyak) to England to study feed production machinery. I was one of the people who had to sign off on this trip, and I know, I've seen it personally, that dozens of our high-ranking officials go there, look, promise, then leave. In a month or two another batch comes and leaves with the same promises. At first the Brits were surprised, then they got angry. The other day, one of [David] Owen's (Foreign Secretary) deputies was instructing a "Great Britain-USSR" delegation, which was preparing to go to Moscow, and directed them to proceed from the assumption that the "Wilson-Brezhnev" documents signed in 1975 can be considered a "dead letter."

So: since this Belyak is planning to go to the same place Kunayev and I went in November, I expressed my concerns. Zdorov, whom I've known for 20 years, told me: "You know, Anatoly Sergeyevich, quit trying so hard. It was always like this and it will continue. Not just in England. Are you aware where this newly-baked Belyak came from, a minister without a department? No? Well I am! And I don't advise you to stick your nose in it..." He "came from" the man "Himself"...

April 1, 1978

This week's claim to fame was my first time speaking at the CC Secretariat on the subject of Esperanto. The subject fell through, because after my (barely intelligible) speech and Chebrikov's (KGB) very detailed speech, Kruglova (SSOD) got up and said that "the issue was not discussed with her and she does not agree with the proposal to create an Esperanto association within her department"...

In general, everyone is fed up and few people can force themselves to really take things seriously. Because the most important work for the country is not being done. And no one wants to just jerk off.

Leonid Ilyich is taking the train across Siberia and the Far East. Maybe it really is to scare the insolent Chinese ("the foolish Khazars"), or maybe to give the appearance of doing "the most important work for the country." In addition to Ustinov, Brezhnev is accompanied by

Zamyatin, who is supplying television, radio, and newspapers with texts that materialize the cult – or rather a repetition of the Khrushchev cult, but this time in absolutely farcical form. Judging from Zamyatin's reports, Brezhnev in Kirov, Tyumen, Novosibirsk at regional committee meetings “expresses instructions” (wording from a newspaper): that in the spring it is necessary to sow well, that machinery must be prepared ahead of time, etc. Then first secretaries thank him for the valuable advice. (But... the irony is that if these first secretaries don't already know that it is necessary “to sow well,” they should have been fired long ago...)

A new cult expression sprang up today (in Krasnoyarsk): “This is my mandate to you” [«Это вам мой наказ»] – Leonid Ilyich said to residents of the city.

Three-quarters of the TV program *Vremya* is taken up by this trip.

It seems like all the Pillars of Hercules of political vulgarity have long been passed, but every new issue of the newspaper brings proof of the existence of inexhaustible reserves in this department.

In the meantime, what are other people worried about? Brutents told me: in a communique about Kirilenko's conversation with the Lebanese, he ordered the name to be used not one time but twice. This is a first time for this type of document (i.e. it does not matter the context, the important thing is to mention the name two times!). Karen thinks it will become the norm now.

April 16, 1978

Yesterday I spent the whole day working on Ponomarev's report for Helsinki (a conference of the Socialist International on disarmament, where one American and one person from our side were invited. The U.S. is sending Leonard – deputy representative to the United Nations, an ambassador at large. We are sending Ponomarev – a candidate member of the PB, CC Secretary, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee, etc.). It is really an unprecedented event – a representative of the CPSU leadership at the Socialist International! But a lot of it, as always with us, is just to show off. B.N. wants to show off on the world political stage, like Gromyko. Shaposhnikov got busy and together with Zagladin offered this idea (to go to Helsinki) to B.N. He assigned them to work it out with Suslov. The latter agreed without really taking a closer look. A Politburo decision was the result.

But as it turned out, this conference is taking place (B.N.'s speech will be on the 24th) the day before Brezhnev's speech at the Komsomol Congress, where he will announce unilateral sensational things regarding arms reductions. It is also three weeks before Gromyko's speech at the UN special session on disarmament, and ten days before Brezhnev's visit to the FRG, where they will once again be talking about this...

B.N. cannot even hint at what will take place at the Kremlin Palace on the 25th. So the day after he says his propaganda babbles about the Mont Blanc of armaments and the monstrosity of the arms race, the whole world will be talking about Brezhnev's initiatives and Ponomarev will look like a greenhorn in front of the shrewd social-democrat politicians.

Gromyko also will not let him say what he would like to say, because he wants the material to look innovative at the UN General Assembly. As the result, we (the consultants responsible for composing Ponomarev's speech) are wrecking our brains (under Ponomarev's supervision) to come up with something special.

On Tuesday B.N. convened almost the entire group of consultants and deputies. He dictated (with a stenographer recording) almost 18 pages of text. All of it consisted either of intimidation about the American (!) arms race, or verbal-ideological "proof" that we are good guys and people should not be afraid of us, or quixotic, naïve proposals to work together with the social democrats. I repeat, all of this is for hardened politicians, the majority of whom are anti-Soviets and anticommunists.

We essentially had to rewrite the text. The previous version was more sensible – the arguments were less trivial and it wasn't as shrill.

Arbatov, who was brought on board to write this text as an "external adviser," is aghast at Ponomarev's demagogic. But we are used to it and there is no way around it. Sometimes the verbiage even comes out beautifully.

On top of all this, Blatov is bugging me about Brezhnev's interview for *Vorwärts*. I've given him four versions already. He keeps summoning me... and every time it is hellish torture: the things he insisted on in the previous version turn out to be completely unnecessary; the things I edited according to his comments in paragraphs he already accepted turn out to have been "preferable" in the previous versions...

The conversation goes as follows: for two minutes he mumbles (nothing specific, he doubts everything, even the things he suggests himself. If you show any doubt, he immediately rejects it). For five minutes he talks on one of his numerous phones. As the result, "work" on a single paragraph can last an hour or more.

But most importantly – what is he preoccupied with! His table is covered in ciphered telegrams. The phone calls he gets appear to be from Galya (his confidante and stenographer) who persistently remains near L.I. and calls from the dacha (Zavidovo, I gathered). Blatov immediately dictates a few things to her (what he deems most essential) – minimum minimorum [sic] from just a few telegrams. To report... if she gets a chance... For example, he told her, dictating slowly: Stoph (Prime Minister of the GDR) is reporting in secret from Honecker and his other colleagues that the SED Politburo made a decision (without him, Stoph) to propose to the CPSU to do away with preferred pricing for the stay of our troops in the GDR, to raise prices for uranium ore that is supplied by the "Bismuth" plant to the USSR...

Or: in a conversation with Katushev, Zhivkov makes a dramatic appeal to save Bulgaria from financial bankruptcy. He says that in order to pay off the debts to the West, Bulgarians need to increase their annual export by 33 percent. That is unthinkable. He says he knows his Soviet comrades are getting the impression that the Bulgarian leadership cannot cope with its obligations, it is ruining the economy, etc. Let that be as it may. But whether it happens with or

without them – they are ready to leave (!) – the multi-billion-dollar debt remains, and Bulgaria needs help.

How many of these issues come across his desk every day! They are wrapped up in ciphered telegrams, and maybe a hundredth of them get reported. They contain issues of historic significance, the fate of the commonwealth and so forth. But if you watch the TV, for example, Brezhnev presents awards to cosmonauts and it is dumbfounding: he looks like he does not understand even what he is talking about, he cannot hear the words coming out of his mouth, much less make colossally important policy decisions.

All of Moscow is saying (even in the trolleybuses) that his trip to Siberia and the Far East is nothing but bluff for the TV.

One detail really got me worried, it came up inadvertently in conversation with Blatov. I already know there will be an important discussion on disarmament at the Komsomol Congress and the interview will take place afterwards, so I asked Blatov how to approach it. Blatov started to mumble that a text was sent to the PB a few days ago, but there has not been any reaction yet. “It contains important proposals, it is not clear how they will be received...”

What is happening? Since when are there doubts that anyone would not support a proposal in a text that comes from Brezhnev himself??

And then I realized: it means the situation has reached a point where Aleksandrov, who is the main author of the text, did not even have an opportunity to read it out loud to the speaker himself, as he usually does. It is possible that the speaker does not really know what exactly he ordered to be sent to the Politburo for the Komsomol Congress.

If this is the case, it means the dementia is entering the final stage. And it is no longer “personal” at all. It is society’s problem.

Yesterday at 6pm together with Arbatov and others we were meeting Egon Bahr in Sheremetyevo – on the eve of Brezhnev’s visit to the FRG. Officially, Bahr is here for the “scientific-theoretical part” but in reality he is here to show everyone that the SPD and he personally know how to arrange a deal with us...

April 29, 1978

Looks like I will be coming along on Brezhnev’s trip to the FRG. This is because Zagladin (it’s his country and party, and he went last time, in 1973) happened to be in Spain at a congress of the CPI from April 16th. Before that, Vadim was either sick or traveling in Belgium and Switzerland. Aleksandrov made a comment to B.N.: your Zagladin is either sick or abroad. Irritation about this played a part in choosing me.

This puts me in an awkward position with Vadim, plus I do not really want to go: I do not like to participate in such grandiose affairs where you feel above your station, humbled.

The work with Blatov is exhausting. He is fiercely punctual and responsible, and he is an unbelievably slow thinker (which does not mean he is not intelligent, quite the opposite). He

turns every word inside out... And his gestures when he is looking for the right expression – as if he is conducting an orchestra of his own thoughts and his slowly churning gray matter.

The main idea of all the materials (conversation with Schmidt, Brandt, Shelley Strauss, Kohl, Mies, Genscher...), interviews for newspapers and television – is to pull West Germany towards us, so it chooses us as its No. 1 partner, not the U.S. Then we can consider the world “made,” at least until the year 2000, until China becomes a superpower. Plus, closeness with the FRG is the most reliable thing from an economic standpoint. All of Eastern Europe would be “between us two.”

I think we sincerely want to be friends with this “most terrible enemy” of ours. And this is right. But... we do not want to, and cannot, pay for this closeness and “preference,” in essence. And their price is high: to recognize the unity of the German nation.

They see our “game” and they are afraid of it, although something is attracting them too. They understand that the only way for them to realize their great-power tendencies is in alliance with us. With America – never. There are forces at play here that surpass even economic competition.

Yesterday it became evident that they started moving away from the Declaration for 2001, which Bahr negotiated here. They added human rights, West Berlin, a hint at the Horn of Africa, and so forth to their “counter draft” – things that signal this initiative is getting derailed.

We shall see... There were big ambitions for the visit, but now it looks like it is waning.

The XVIII Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League took place. It was dedicated entirely to Brezhnev. The apologia is spreading at a rate unseen even in Stalin’s times, and at a very banal, vulgar level for the XX Century.

After *The Small Land* there is now *Rebirth* – about Denpropetrovsk after the war (in issue No. 5 of *Novy Mir*, today the central newspapers started printing it too). There are ideological conferences happening around the country, led by first secretaries of republics and cities. The conferences are about the study of these works, about developing various patriotic and communist sensibilities (including modesty) in the Soviet people on the basis of these books.

As for the military initiatives that were supposed to appear in Brezhnev’s speech at the Komsomol Congress, the most important aspects were cut out: the withdrawal of the army units and 1,000 tanks from Czechoslovakia and the GDR, the delineation of borders with China along the mid-channel of the rivers. Once again all we have left are appeals and assurances, including that we will not produce a neutron bomb if the U.S. does not. To this Carter replied that the Soviet Union does not need a neutron bomb because it is designed to combat superiority in tanks. So we only exposed ourselves with that statement.

They say the “unilateral” initiative did not pass Gromyko and Suslov. Apparently Ustinov was “for” it. More importantly, it means the draft formally sent out by the General Secretary (everyone knows that assistants are not allowed to do it) was edited “along the way.”

The text that was approved at the Politburo in Brezhnev's presence was the substituted one, and he did not realize that he "sent out" a completely different text.

Ponomarev's Helsinki's Mont Blanc brought forth a mouse. He did manage to make some noise, but the cunning social-democrat leaders once again saw that if you give him an inch, he'll take a mile. So, they politely let him know that it will not work. *Pravda* published deafeningly victorious reports from Helsinki, B.N. sent optimistic telegrams. In the meantime from Bonn we received a message that Bahr protested to Falin (ambassador): Ponomarev's proposals were unexpected for us, they are making us look like we are leaning towards the "united red front," which the right wing will seize on and we will be forced to publicly distance ourselves from the CPSU.

Upon reading this, Blatov and I added some calming tones to the memo for L.I.'s meeting with Brandt.

May 8, 1978

I ended up going to the FRG as a part of the group accompanying Brezhnev after all.

Brezhnev and his main circle lived in the Castle Gymnich – 35km from Bonn, the rest (including me) in Castle Gracht, 10km from Gymnich.

My role consisted of making sure the inconsequential (though mandatory) meeting with the leaders of the German Communist Party took place more or less smoothly and in a manner least offensive to them, the modest Cinderellas in this undertaking. I managed it: firstly, I successfully insisted that I should go to Cologne for the meeting of the DKP in honor of the visit. It was not even mentioned to Brezhnev. Falin was very hesitant but Blatov reluctantly agreed. Around 2,000 people gathered there. It would have been completely inappropriate not to have at least someone attend the only public event in honor of the visit. How much effort and goodwill went into once again demonstrating their "loyalty," even though it is detrimental to their standing in the eyes of the overwhelmingly philistine public. It might have gone completely unnoticed... Brezhnev, for example, did not notice the nearly 200 people with banners and flags that greeted him near the airport. They were all communists! We did not report to him about the meeting either, and even if we had, he would not have absorbed any of it.

So, I imitated his personal attention to the DKP, same as Aleksandrov and Blatov imitated for the duration of the talks that it was actually Brezhnev himself who was conducting the negotiations, even though sometimes it put them in rather awkward situations. Right in front of the Germans they had to "on the fly" edit the memo that the General Secretary was only capable of reading (and even that he did clumsily).

At the meeting I only greeted the audience when they introduced me. Later I had a long conversation with Mies at a restaurant. He was using me to practice his speech for the meeting in Gymnich. Then we greeted artists of the Arkhangelsk ensemble who came to the restaurant, they had performed after the meeting for the same audience, in honor of the visit. I thanked them for doing an outstanding job carrying out "the Party assignment" and noted that they were promoting the same policies as Brezhnev, in their own way.

This interaction, as well as the concert itself and the contact it provided with the Germans was quite touching. It made me think about our two nations.

Later, I was able to arrange for a reception with Brezhnev and members of the Central Committees from both sides (seven people, by the way). That is how it was presented in the communique. That said, the initiative came from Aleksandrov, and I think he made it happen (and passed it through Brezhnev) not for the sake of the DKP, and definitely not "for me," but because he needed the ministers (members of the CC) to make an appearance in the media so he would show up not as an adviser, but as a candidate member to the CC.

I warned Mies when we were in Cologne not to expect a substantive conversation. The meeting with Brezhnev would only be a demonstration and would have to be brief.

In the morning of May 6th I came out to the courtyard in front of the castle to meet them... But they were not there. I had planned to take them into an adjoining room so they would not meet face to face with Strauss, whom Brezhnev was receiving immediately before Mies & Co. from the DKP!

It turned out they were not allowed to pass through the gates at the end of the alley... I soon found out why. Brezhnev had come outside to see Strauss off! Nobody had received such an honor before. The group of us standing there literally gasped. But it did not end there. Brezhnev, to the sound of the guard clicking their rifles, went down the steps together with Strauss and walked him to the car. A pack of photographers and reporters was buzzing around them. Indeed, it was an unbelievable sensation. Nobody could have imagined anything like it.

We stepped aside. Brezhnev said long and "warm" goodbyes to Strauss (the "pro-fascist," as our press has been calling him for a decade) and then went back inside. Strauss immediately, standing next to the car, started giving interviews left and right.

I later asked Aleksandrov: "Was that accidental or supreme wisdom?!" He gave me a sarcastic look and said, "Leonid Ilyich just wanted to get some fresh air before meeting with communists!"

Within the scope of my personal goal to please the communists, the meeting went as well as possible (considering the General Secretary's condition and his attitude to this additional strain). Brezhnev read our four-page memo, to which I managed to add a line thanking the communists for the meeting in Cologne and the hundreds welcoming him "along the journey."

Before reading the memo, Brezhnev tried to joke by calling on everyone to smoke... It did not really work out. Not everyone understood the joke.

Mies presented his thoughts, in a less coherent manner than he had to me in Cologne. He tried to imbue his speech with more enthusiasm but without going overboard on loyalty, so the authorities and the Eurocommunists would not have something to latch on to. Suddenly, he brought up an unexpected topic: he started to praise Brezhnev for sending a representative of the CPSU to the conference of the Socialist International in Helsinki. He expressed how important it

was that we entered the socialist-democratic platform, that we are engaging the socialist-democrats in certain matters, etc.

Brezhnev did not know what he was talking about and looked around, then loudly asked Aleksandrov, “Who is this?!?” (i.e. who went to Helsinki?) Andrey replied: “Ponomarev.” There was no reaction.

So, we exchanged “speeches” and the matter seemed to be coming to an end. But Andrey decided to “liven it up.” Since Mies touched on the subject of social-democracy, he (Aleksandrov) slipped a page to Brezhnev and the latter immediately started reading it out loud. The next second I understood it was the memo for the meeting with Brandt...

Brezhnev finished reading it and paused... The Germans were completely confused: nobody could understand why this was said. Then Andrey jumped in himself and said in German (simultaneously translating for Brezhnev): “These are the words Leonid Ilyich said to Brandt yesterday!” (The gist of it was – if you do not want to cooperate with your communists, you do not have to, but why persecute them. It only plays to the reactionary forces.)

It was yet another objective indicator of the fact that Leonid Ilyich, to put it mildly, is not very aware of what he is saying or what is happening at any given moment. I think the incident with Strauss was the result of him slipping from under the control of his advisers.

Later I observed this numerous times, to my horror, although I expected something like this.

It was especially embarrassing to experience all of this during the closing remarks with Schmidt before signing and during the signing itself. The Germans foresaw and, apparently, knew about the “limited capabilities.” I won’t even mention the newspapers and TV programs, they spent most of their time looking for the relevant moments in his behavior, the slightest manifestations of his physical infirmity: on the airplane ramp, when getting up from the couch, during receptions when he would look around in confusion, etc.

Schmidt behaved magnificently (I specifically watched him). At the reception I was seated just a couple meters away from him and Brezhnev and could see everything that was happening. But, first and last, about Schmidt’s speech at this dinner. A German hasn’t spoken like this about Germany and Russia in a hundred years. Schmidt eclipsed everything Brandt said in his time (during this visit, Brandt ended up in the background, and I heard he behaved poorly during a conversation with Brezhnev: he harped on about “North-South” and annoyed his interlocutor terribly!).

Back to Schmidt – there was not a single smile or facial expression to betray that he “sees everything” and understands that Brezhnev is nothing but a prominent figure who is moving in a certain direction by inertia and the efforts of his advisers and Gromyko. He behaved respectfully (though not obsequiously), and this respect was not so much for the “great power” as for Brezhnev’s old age and seniority. I think his self-control betrayed him only once: when publishers brought books to Brezhnev (his “Biography” published by Simon & Schuster) so he could present them to Schmidt, Scheel and others... And Brezhnev started signing them. Slowly,

slowly he wrote out his name. For a moment, in the Chancellor's big green eyes, behind the glasses flashed irony and sympathy, closer to pity and forbearance. The irony was not only about how Brezhnev played his role, but also about how he was forced to perform it: Falin had approached him earlier and whispered something in his ear. Then the publishers approached with the books (when they got the signal!). Brezhnev once again did not understand why they were there. Falin bent down to Brezhnev's ear again and started explaining loudly (hard of hearing), and extended his arm. Only then the "process" slowly started. And all of this had been reviewed and "agreed upon" with Brezhnev back in Moscow and again in Gymnich.

The same story with Wehner and Mishnyak. A mistake was made at the very beginning, back in Moscow: no plans were made to receive the chairmen of the ruling coalition factions in the Bundestag, unlike Kohl and Strauss, the chairmen of the two oppositional-reactionary parties. When the mistake was discovered, it was decided to make up for it by "bringing them" to Brezhnev "after the meal" and after Scheel and Schmidt's departure. I happened to be by the door as they were leaving. Brezhnev walked the president and chancellor to their car and then the protocol officers started dragging him back inside so he could shake hands with Wehner and Mishnyak. But Brezhnev was asking. "What for, what am I going to do there? Why do I have to go back?" They barely managed to persuade him, even though just ten minutes prior Falin had whispered all these details to him, and then approached Wehner (who was sitting next to me) and told him where to wait...

The worst of it was at the closing remarks before the signing. Schmidt, in an elegant manner and smoking his pipe, said a few words and suggested that the ministers should first "report" on their negotiations. Gromyko executed his part very well – weightily, clearly, only the essence, with assessments and definitions in a very friendly tone, without a paper under his nose. Genscher was markedly weaker, he tried to nickel-and-dime us. Then the opposite – on economic matters, our Tikhonov (Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) turned out to be primitive and muddled, especially compared to Graf Lambsdorff (Minister of Economics) who spoke after him.

Then Schmidt (here he made a mistake, he could have foreseen that it would put us in an awkward position) suggested to Brezhnev: "Mr. General Secretary, how should we proceed? We can call the press right now and both give our remarks with assessments of the outcome, or we can first speak without the press, and then go down to them and make statements after the signing."

Brezhnev was clearly confused and said, "Whatever you prefer..." He did not have a "memo" for this situation.

Schmidt: "Then I suggest we speak here first... Would you, Mr. General Secretary, like to speak first?"

Brezhnev: "I would like to hear your assessment."

Schmidt: "Very well." And he started speaking freely, giving an assessment that we did not foresee in Moscow. He was much more positive than we anticipated. He finished, it was

Brezhnev's turn. There was a memo in front of Brezhnev that Blatov and I prepared back in Moscow, and we wrote it in a rush because this whole agenda item was decided just before departure. But this memo was prepared for the public appearance at the signing, in front of journalists!

While Schmidt was discussing the abovementioned procedural questions directly with Brezhnev I could see Blatov fidgeting in his chair in horror, and Aleksandrov, who was sitting on Brezhnev's other side, dashing between Blatov and his seat. But it was impossible to fix anything at that point.

Brezhnev energetically started to read the materials that were meant for the press. By the way, it did not sound bad, a match for Schmidt. However, we were terrified about something else: what would he say to the press?!

I saw Aleksandrov feverishly writing something. When Brezhnev finished, Aleksandrov jumped up, handed it to him, and started explaining loudly (otherwise you don't get through). Brezhnev studied the note – Andrey's scribbly handwriting! I, too, cringed with embarrassment and inner panic, even though it seemingly did not concern me "personally."

Andrey composed a memo for the press "on the fly." A few phrases. He tried to convince Brezhnev to memorize it, so he would not have to take out the paper and read it in front of the reporters.

Later, when we went downstairs to the tables for the official signing, the tables across the room, arranged in tiers, were packed like sardines with hundreds of photographers and various correspondents...

Brezhnev said the "memo"… consisting of three phrases, and he did not finish a single one of them (he forgot the endings). He could not finish his "speech" at all, he just gestured with his hands. People saw this in Moscow on TV!

Then we flew to Hamburg. Boeing 707.

May 21, 1978

On May 8th first Blatov, then B.N. notified me that together with the MFA I will have to urgently prepare a draft PB resolution on the outcome of the visit. In the morning of the 9th, Victory Day, I sat down to write the text. There was not a soul at the MFA, of course. I think I only found Kovalyev the next day. He said, "The CC always prepares these kinds of drafts..."

I composed the text in about an hour and a half. It went through the MFA, B.N., and Suslov, and almost without any edits was passed by the PB and published in the newspapers. Although there was one significant edit: Suslov replaced the word "historic" with "important political" visit!!! He commented to Ponomarev – "There is a visit to Czechoslovakia coming up, is it also going to be historic???" The day before yesterday he seemed to be reproaching B.N. over the fact that we always use both titles – "General Secretary" and "Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet." Even when talking about purely Party matters. It is not necessary. It should be corrected... B.N. was pleased, of course, and tried to "explain" that all

around the country there are currently discussions of *The Small Land* and *Rebirth*. But Suslov did not accept the explanations. And what's the connection? There is a connection, however. B.N. probably wanted to say that the glorification has gone so far that using just one of the titles won't change anything!

May 10-11th – frantic finishing of materials for the congress of the Swiss Party of Labour (communist). On the 12th our delegation, headed by Kapitonov, flew on a special plane to Geneva.

The congress is quite “Eurocommunist,” only without anti-Soviet provocations (it would not be beneficial for them: we still pay quite well, including for the congress itself). The Swiss Party of Labor will keep following the Italians and French. I did not find anything new or surprising there.

I was, however, dumbfounded by the level of incompetence of our head of delegation. What competence can we even speak of? He is simply intellectually drab, nondescript, ignorant, and on top of everything a very stupid person. He never managed to grasp what was going on. He was genuinely surprised by the cool reception he got on the podium when he read his speech and presented a gift to the congress – a large, encrusted portrait of Lenin. (On this account the sharp-witted Muret, member of the Politburo of the Swiss Party of Labor, said to me, “Are you hoping to stop the renunciation of Leninism with this portrait?”) Kapitonov especially could not fathom why not only was there no standing ovation when he conveyed personal greetings from the General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium... etc. There was not a single clap to be heard. When he got back to his seat after the speech, he kept pestering me – why did this happen...

The degree to which he mispronounced the names of Swiss leaders, with whom he worked the entire week, was embarrassing. He mangled them so badly that even the language barrier could not conceal it from the Swiss.

After I wrote the ciphered cable report to the CC on the outcomes of the congress, he agonized over my “analysis” (about 70 percent truthful and critical), syllable by syllable. He obviously did not like it, but he could not “articulate” what exactly did not suit him. The ambassador helped him out when he furiously intervened after taking the criticism of the Swiss Party of Labor as a personal affront. (He was saying he’s been in Switzerland for only six months and how is it possible things were ok before but got worse when the new ambassador arrived). He was instilling a similar idea in the CC Secretary: it is unthinkable that a “bad” congress could take place when the Soviet Union sent such a delegation, with such a head of delegation. It cannot possibly be bad. The Swiss Party of Labor immediately became better when it got such a delegation for its congress. They won’t understand in Moscow how it could be otherwise.

Kapitonov latched on to this and decidedly rejected my text, despite my fierce resistance and arguments, including: when we get back to Moscow and read in the newspapers that the new General Secretary of the Swiss Party of Labor Magnin protested over the trial of the dissident Orlov, how is that going to make us look? It had no effect. As the result, the ciphered cable was very whitewashed, practically false.

This is dangerous not just because lies (misinformation) do not lead to anything good at such political levels. It is dangerous because we are dragging out, nurturing the illusion in ourselves and our friends, that the CPSU is capable of stopping the “Eurocommunism” process, that nothing is really happening, that the ICM remains “ours.” However, when I spoke to B.N. about it in Moscow, I did not get any support from him. But for another reason – he says if things are going badly all over the place they will say Ponomarev’s department is falling apart.

Kapitonov and his closest circle – the assistant, doctor, adjutant, guards and interpreter – lived at the UN residence, with Zoya Vasilievna Mironova (our representative at the UN Headquarters). She convinced Kapitonov to give a speech. He agreed and invited me to take on the international part of the conversation. But he changed his mind the next day. As the result he spoke alone in front of our highly qualified diplomats. A whole hour of dreadful incoherence, monstrously primitive. An entire fifteen minutes was devoted to “Brezhnev personally”...

It was extremely embarrassing. I looked at people’s faces (since I was sitting in the presidium): a mix of expressions of official respect, surprise, and ridicule.

Yesterday, on Saturday, already in Moscow, I went to the CC because of some texts Kapitonov was demanding for his report to the PB.

However, when I was there I got a call from Aleksandrov. Communists are being executed in Iraq. They are asking for Brezhnev’s intervention. So I started composing a paper on this subject, without being fully plugged into all these Arab affairs.

I dictated some ideas on how to consolidate and develop the results of Brezhnev’s visit to the FRG.

Lev Bezymensky [stopped by] with a heap of West German newspapers following the visit. Mostly about Leonid Ilyich’s illness.

The dissident Orlov has been sentenced to seven years. There is a pandemonium over it all around the world. *L’Humanite* and *Morning Star* already came forward with decisive and vicious condemnation of our action. B.N. started fussing – we must refute and explain. But he feels the futility of this. He tells me, “These courts (!) should have asked the CC how to proceed. Now they went after him to the full extent and we have to face the consequences in the ICM and the world community! Strange!”

The Orlov affair has been happening for a year and we’ve known about campaign in the West on this issue for a long time too. It would not be difficult to guess for certain people what results it would have for us...

May 27, 1978

This week we are fending off statements from “fraternal parties” about the trial of Orlov. We composed appeals to conscience for the Great Britain CP, Belgian CP, signed a letter to *L’Humanite*. Italians and Swiss are next in line... B.N. invited me to his office, paced the room – what to do with the ICM? He is especially concerned about the French. There is an

uncontrollable stream of “renunciations” of the CPSU, the disappearance and extermination of love for the homeland of communism.

June 4, 1978

Beautifully written (putting them to shame) reprimands for the Belgian CP passed the CC (on the Orlov case). But a dressing-down for *L'Humanite* did not pass through Suslov. Bogolyubov called me (deputy in the General Department) and said (these people are always happy when the superiors do not approve someone's text) in the form of a reprimand: “Mikhail Andreyevich ordered to archive this paper of yours. What are you doing, anyway – giving notations, lecturing, reprimanding. Look at what's happening in the ICM! Marchais is in a rage, and what are you doing?” And so forth. The blabber of a man who fundamentally does not know anything at all.

I asked him: “Is this the opinion of M.A.?”

“Yes, of course.”

“Can I pass it on to Ponomarev?”

“Yes, of course...”

So, Suslov stopped our rebuke of *L'Humanite*. And that is very good. But will it teach Ponomarev anything?!

I thought to myself: what if this is not just a manifestation of fatigue and indifference, but of real political wisdom?! What if we (the CC, Suslov) are truly starting to understand the new realities and the worthlessness of our previous relationship with the ICM?!

However, even if Suslov thinks so (which would mean a lot already) he cannot do everything at once.

It was a slight to B.N., of course. But he recovered quickly. And... despite my objections, including in written form, he made me write a protest in response to the letter to Brezhnev from the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party (with demands to release Orlov). He ran to Suslov with it. It seems the latter did not want to give him a refusal to his face. He kept the paper. B.N. rushed to inform me that M.A. “voted for it.” However, we found out an hour later that Suslov put the letter to the Secretariat, for Tuesday.

Brutents explained all of this as follows: Suslov does not have to “distinguish” himself before his superiors... While B.N. has to constantly run around, showing that he is “taking all measures” to organize the mess in his department. Suslov can afford to proceed from the substance of the matter. Ponomarev, on the other hand, has to constantly look over his shoulder, which makes him lose sight of the essence of things, the sound political sense.

June 11, 1978

Meeting with O'Riordan, who was on vacation here. I explained to him the entire international situation. The main thing: how to interpret the NATO session in Washington – as

the end of the “former détente” or maybe the U.S. is turning sharply toward anti-Sovietism for internal reasons. I also explained everything about the PCF, PCI, the Spanish congress, etc.

Generally speaking, there is a problem: is there really a turnaround, or are they simply drawing a “global” conclusion from the experience of détente, or rather from their offensive on us on the basis of détente. In fact, together with the communists, they managed not only to shake but to destroy the “image of the Soviet Union” as a major positive and progressive force. This image emerged during the war, and was reinforced under Khrushchev and for a while during the early 1970s (the “Peace Program”). Now they want to switch to a “suppression” attack, and they want to do it together with the Chinese, adopting the ideological literature of the Chinese against us.

Judging by the reports from the session of the General Assembly, Gromyko and his MFA don’t think that anything special is going on. Indeed, the general situation does not seem threatening if you judge by the Europeans, who are pretty tired of the Americans and now have a big opportunity to turn up their nose.

However, for now it is still the Americans who are shaping the “major policies” with us. But our relations with them are getting worse and worse.

B.N., with his propagandistic mindset, started sounding the alarm. In our circle at first. But he did not stop there. He got through to Brezhnev and “alarmed” him. The latter assigned him to prepare a “little text” to say at the PB, where Gromyko’s report on his meetings and the UN General Assembly in New York overall was supposed to be discussed.

B.N. called me and asked to edit the materials he prepared for Brezhnev. There were some of his own ideas that he expressed at the meeting with deputies and some of our ideas: that the Warsaw Pact should make a statement on the NATO session, that Ogarkov should give an interview, that we should send a letter to the U.S. Congress and the parliaments of Western Europe, that we should appeal to the communist parties and the Socialist International.

B.N. was glowing when he returned from the Politburo. “Everything worked out.” Gromyko’s “self-assured” calmness was checked. Apparently, Brezhnev said that we cannot “passively” react to what is happening, and supposedly he presented everything B.N. suggested. I’m not sure. It will be clear when the text of the speech comes out in a couple days.

There is an exhibition of Glazunov at the Manege, second week now. What is happening there! I haven’t been yet. People say you have to get in line before daybreak. One of the Central Committee drivers told me about it in detail. He did not understand a lot about it, but he was very intrigued and enthusiastic. I heard a great deal from other people too. In general, regular people are going there in droves, not just connoisseurs and regulars. Glazunov is like a counterpart for Yevtushenko, only in painting. It is a fascinating phenomenon of our modern life: hunting for books (the black market is enormous), for unorthodox music, overcrowding at all galleries exhibiting anything with even a hint of originality, etc. Is it a search for spirituality? A reaction to the emptiness and trite grandiosity of the official sphere, which now does not even raise

people's curiosity. People brush it off with jokes – they do not struggle against it, they just brush it off.

June 25, 1978

Pravda published an article – “On the Current Policy of the U.S. Administration.” The noise continues, but now from our side, because the Americans started a “rollback” (through Vance and Carter himself). Their attack on us – it was an “internal” affair. If Gromyko’s line had prevailed, our reaction accordingly would have been at the level of Yuri Zhukov. However, Ponomarev’s alarmist line took over temporarily. And the day before yesterday there was a message from TASS on the situation in Africa. But B.N. was barely able to push through the letter to fraternal parties. The Secretariat was skeptical, forced [us] to cut the text... B.N. managed to at least partially gain the upper hand through his audacity: the letter has been reduced by more than a third. Now our letter to Brandt, which Veber and I composed, is out of the question.

A delegation from the DKP was here (Mies, Schroeder, Weiss). The official meeting took place in the building of the CC Secretariat. Suslov did not come to the meeting. (B.N. had earlier told me, “He gets tired, he cannot do it...”) B.N., Dolgikh, and I were present. Mies presented a rather interesting analysis of West German society, especially about the “spiritual crisis”: “There will not be war, but unemployment resulting from the Scientific-Technological Revolution and pollution of the environment is making the young people question – where are we going? What will happen to us? What will happen to our children?”

B.N. responded with his usual rubbish, his trite *idées fixes*, which I’ve been listening to (and every time like it’s a new discovery) for decades now. It was embarrassing to sit there and listen to him. He reminded me of a little drab assistant from the Department: you call him over to tell you about a situation in “his party” and he starts to mumble about when the party was founded, how many members it has, and what the last election results were. Ultimately you’ve wasted your time, because it turns out you know and understand more about the subject than this expert-specialist, who gets a decent monthly wage to work on nothing but this subject.

It was very boring for the Germans to listen to something like that at this level. But for the first time we had an interesting discussion “in the waiting room,” without our superiors. Alas! They are “good” and will be quiet about it, they might not even “analyze” amongst themselves such meetings at the CC. As for others, who are prone to “Eurocommunism,” they are only becoming increasingly convinced (after this sort of contact) of the CPSU’s theoretical and general intellectual impotence, its inability to comprehend the enormity and complexity of what is happening, to penetrate the core concerns of Western Communists.

July 2, 1978

I saw the Glazunov exhibit. It was disappointing, even compared to my expectations (I had a more or less adequate idea about it based on what others told me). The “philosophy” – Solzhenitsyn on canvas. And in strikingly frank form. The artist is one of those people who do not wish to be difficult to understand. At the center of the exhibit is “The Return of the Prodigal

Son.” Honestly, I did not expect that anti-Soviet sentiment could be demonstrated like this, in the center of Moscow, with thousands of people attending. The execution of the paintings is vulgar, poster-style, using techniques that are hackneyed in the West, but here they seem new and shocking to our inexperienced public. There are, however, some pieces with artistic merit (still within the framework of the same philosophy – “what has the Soviet regime done to beautiful Russia!”) For example, “To your health!” [«За ваше здоровье!»], “The Blizzard” [«Мемель»], “The Horse” [«Лошадь»], and the weaker but brash pieces “The Staircase” [«Лестница»], “A Portrait of our Elevator Operator” [«Портрет нашей лифтерии»].

Anyway, the “epic” and “historical-iconographic” Rus’ (all the Ivans the Terrible, Godunovs, murdered tsareviches, Prince Igor’ and numerous Rublevs) is incredibly vulgar both in execution and “informational value.” The “idea” here is the same: these are simply illustrations for “program” pictures.

The “famous” portraits are all done the same way, with the same “Glazunov-style” eyes. Illustrations for Dostoyevsky, Leskov, Melnikov-Pechersky – they are all secondary or even tertiary. In general, you walk around the rooms (there are 400 paintings, after all) and you can’t shake the feeling that you’ve seen all this before, many times – this manner, these images, these subjects, and even the range of topics covered.

On the whole, he gave a big slap in the face to the Ministry of Culture, which washed its hands and was forced to admit publicly that everything is allowed here, short of walking out into the street and yelling “I am against the Soviet regime!” or making abstract art (which, incidentally, is absolutely harmless, because nobody understands it, but it shocks such “virgins” as Popov (Deputy Minister of Culture) and others like him, because Stalin forbade everything of the sort).

Glazunov totally evened the score with Popov for not letting him exhibit his “[The Mystery of the] XX Century” [«XX век»] on Kuznetsy Most.

I’m personally not against exhibitions, they should show whatever they want. But I am against *Pravda* publishing a generally laudatory article about Glazunov’s exhibit (obviously pretending that nothing is happening and clogging people’s minds with their absurd interpretations of the artist’s intentions) and stopping the real discussion in other newspapers, and not just newspapers. However, this is a more common problem. Yesterday I read a small article in *Novy Mir* about the relationship between Pushkin and Chaadayev. It cites Aleksandr Sergeyevich: there is no public opinion in Russia, he says. Depending on what you consider to be public opinion today, maybe it exists, but how is it treated! You would think, at least in the artistic sphere we could talk openly. The case with Glazunov is precisely one of those times when for the sake of Helsinki the authorities are consciously covering up something vulgar (turning a deaf ear). More than that, they are expressing solidarity with it, which throws the “public” into total confusion.

Crowds of thousands of people continue to stand by the Manege, day and night. When I was there (on one of the exhibit’s “days off,” a large group of teachers – members of the All Union Congress, plus a group of about 200 people from the Council of Ministers were allowed to

visit) – these provincial teachers moved from painting to painting with square eyes. They dutifully wanted to believe what they saw (since it is officially allowed and appreciated by *Pravda!*) but they were utterly perplexed.

However, it will be even worse if it gets to the top (for example, someone like Andrey Mikhailovich stops by the Manege...) And the heads will start rolling. Helsinki won't stop them.

July 9, 1978

It was a substantial week. The CC Plenum on agriculture took place. It had been in the works for a long time, about 5-7 years. It was impressive. I think to a great extent thanks to Karlov (the Head of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee) – a strong, calm, “from the plow,” intelligent and brave guy. He is not a handsome man, but has expressive, serious and kind eyes.

A novelty: two-three days prior to the Plenum, members were given two thick volumes (a compilation of the latest CC resolutions on agriculture and a compilation of statistics). Brezhnev's report was about 20 minutes – it was essentially a summary of a detailed written report that was handed out at the same time. It was quite candid. You start to understand the deep currents of the process after listening to the speeches. Along with the standard, checkmark “reports-oaths,” there were some very strong speeches that evidence the fact that our oblast committee leaders are truly cadres capable of doing great things. Some of them reminded me of the people during the war who transported all our industry to the East, organized military production from scratch and surpassed the Germans in weapons power. I especially remembered Gorbachev (Stavropol), Ignatov (Voronezh), and one woman – a secretary of a rural district committee from the Volgograd region...

The most acute problem, as I understood it, is the fact that the “transition of agriculture to an industrial basis,” i.e. increased mechanization and chemicalization and so forth, led to a huge transfer of the major resources that went into agriculture after the March 1965 Plenum back to industry.

Staggering figures were given, when collective farms, state farms, the regions, and entire branches of agriculture of a given oblast would yield twice or three times as much as the Plan, would exceed the Plan by 30-40 percent, but every year they became increasingly less profitable and ended their annual balances with huge deficits and fell in ever greater debt to the state. Because a new tractor, for example, is about 15-20 percent more productive, but costs twice as much.

The situation is the same with centralized transportation, fertilizers, and other such “services” provided to the rural agricultural areas by industry, or, more simply, by mechanized units that do not directly belong to the collective farms.

A new “Scissors Crisis” has developed. Moreover, the incomes of those who “service” agriculture are not impacted by crop failure due to natural disasters, any calamities, or anything else. They increase profits year after year. And the collective farms have less and less means to pay for all of this.

Aside from material consequences, there are also moral consequences to all of this – these were rarely talked about without a glance over one's shoulder. Everyone welcomed an increase in purchase prices starting on January 1, 1979. Many demanded to do it immediately, in July, so the prices would increase on September 1st, i.e. for the current harvest. But Suslov deemed these proposals as “insignificant” and to the cheers of the apparatus swamp, which is far from any agriculture or conscience, voted for the draft resolution as a whole.

Anyway, I am only in favor of giving an explanation to members of the Plenum: why this or that is impossible. It is not so difficult to explain: metal, coal, oil, chemicals are becoming more expensive, etc. But against this background the opportunism and clumsiness of those who use “objective” reasons to simply rob the agricultural sector would be more obvious.

Now, from a distance of several days, in the atmosphere I exist in day by day (international affairs), one can see more clearly the main reason why these wonderful people who work in the field, who are truly our “golden fund,” still have not been able to literally flood the country with food and such – because of military expenses and the colossal unproductive expenditures at every level of the bureaucracy.

July 14, 1978

All of the West is going crazy over Sharansky and Ginzburg. From Carter to the French communists, who for the first time took their protest against us “to the street” and participated in a mass anti-Soviet demonstration together with Zionists, Trotskyites, fascists, socialists, and various democratic and anti-democratic organizations. Their slogans were: “Hitler-USSR,” “Down with the Anti-Semitic State,” “New Nazism,” etc.

Today I talked with Bert Ramelson, an old Jew from Vinnitsa who has been living in England since 1913 and was a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain until their last congress. He is our faithful friend, he is wise and always has all the answers. His conclusion was, “I can still understand you, I can put myself in your shoes. But I can no longer convince a regular working guy here in England. However, same as the regular working guy, I do not understand: if you are certain that you are right when you put dissenters in prison, then why do you not allow foreign journalists into the courts? If you do not let them in, the West will never believe you...”

Ramelson, same as Turf (Deputy Chairman of the Communist Party of Belgium) with whom Zagladin and I talked two weeks ago, spoke about the worst part of it: “The reality is that the majority of our population has an anti-Soviet outlook. The new generations do not know and did not experience your great historic achievements. The intensive and smart propaganda, using powerful modern tools, has created an unpleasant image of your country in the eyes of the middle-aged and young generations. They are not even bothered by a comparison of your country to Hitler’s Germany. That is why anti-Sovietism is easily taking on such an all-encompassing, universal character following your persecution of dissidents. There are no arguments you can make that could change anything. Your former prestige and revolutionary charisma among the youth, your heroism in the war against fascism – all this has long been swept away, it has become ancient history. It does not reach people and cannot stop anything. An insurmountable barrier has been created and there is no going back. Their reasoning is: yes, we

may not have it so great under capitalism. But it is worse, much worse in the USSR, and God forbid we should have what they have.”

I read a strong and original article by Aleksandr Pankov in *Novy Mir* Issue No. 6 – “about love” in Soviet literature of the last two-three years.

From my recent reading: “The South American Option” [«Южноамериканский вариант»] by S. Zalygin in *Nash Sovremennik* (Nos. 1-2, 1973), K. Vorobyov’s “And Now Enters the Giant” [«Вот пришел великан»] in English, S. Krutilin’s “Pustoshel” [«Пустошель»] in *Druzhba Narodov*, F. Iskander’s “Sea Scorpion” [«Морской скорпион»] in *Nash Sovremennik* (Nos. 7-8, 1976), V. Tendryakov’s “Eclipse” [«Затмение»] in *Druzhba Narodov*, M. Roshchin’s “Recollection” [«Воспоминание»] in *Novy Mir* (Nos. 5-6, 1977).

Right now, I am reading Semyonov, “Street Lights” [«Уличные фонари»]. Our modern prose is at a very high professional level!..

Reading this literature – prose that is overall top-class – again and again leads me to think about the ever-growing distance between politics and the everyday flow of life in our country. It’s not just that there isn’t a single mention of “the party and government,” “the building of communism,” “enthusiasm for labor,” or even the role of the authorities in general. These concepts are not just absent in the literal sense. They are totally absent. There are no events from daily political life; people’s lives are not connected to these events, which [in real life] are constantly present in the press, on the radio, on TV, at meetings, etc. It’s just like in Chekhov and Kuprin’s times: the government was “somewhere” doing “some kind” of politics, the history of the country was somehow forming, but literature was separate from it. It occupied itself with people’s inner lives and “interpersonal,” as we would now say, relationships. It turns out these relationships and inner lives are now very far away from politics and “official” life in general.

So, no matter what they say in the West about the Party controlling the spiritual sphere, whatever our information media might write, the literary process (and artistic process in general) is forming again according to its eternal laws, and overall spontaneously. Everyone is used to it by now, even the authorities that are supposed to “direct” it. Now they just tolerate it and make sure there is no blatant anti-Sovietism.

Things are slow at work. Yesterday I met with Kashtan (General Secretary of the CP of Canada). He acts high and mighty, but he doesn’t have a party or a policy. He was on vacation for a month and a half, first in Bulgaria, then in Romania (same as he did here last year – with his large family, three generations of Jewish-anti-Soviets). Now he spent a week with us (but already sans family), then he will go to Vietnam. Kulyshev (a referent) and I put together a big fact sheet on his party. B.N. did not read it. Unnecessary frustration. He does not need a CP in Canada, he needs a “loyal voice” in the ICM. We know what Kashtan’s colleagues are saying about him: he just needs to “survive” by getting money from the CPSU, of which he hasn’t once shared a kopek with any party organization of his party. But that is all just by the way.

On a more serious note – we sent Professor Koval’ (Deputy Director of the Institute of International Labor Movement) to the “Communist University of London,” at the invitation of

the CPGB. The day before yesterday he told us in detail about this, in his view, anticomunist and anti-Soviet university. In general, it is a confirmation of what I already wrote about: they do not recognize us as a socialist country. And they do not think the CPSU is a communist party. There is an atmosphere of open hatred and hostility toward everything Soviet. The proposal to organize a public international trial of Soviet leadership for the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia was met with thunderous applause. Our “dissidents” are being portrayed as a handful of revolutionary intellectuals who, like in Lenin’s times in the late XIX and early XX centuries, are cut off from the people, which is why “it is so easy to imprison them.” Their idea is that they need to help the dissidents to “bring (as Lenin taught!) their ideas to the masses,” help them to obtain the support of the Soviet people (this is the CPGB’s internationalist duty), so later the question of “changing the USSR’s bureaucratic regime” can be raised in earnest. And so forth.

Depressing situation.

August 31, 1978

Woddis and Costello (two members of the CPGB) were in Moscow.

The scenario was as follows: Costello came earlier (he had been on vacation in Bulgaria) and Dzhavad told him, in his own name, what Koval’ had said about the London University. Costello stayed up, waiting for Woddis, and at night they locked themselves in a hotel room and discussed the situation. In the morning Woddis announced that he won’t go to any CC and won’t speak to any Ponomarev without meeting with Chernyaev first. I expected this. They rushed to me. Woddis was completely wound-up, pale, “If you think I am an anti-Soviet, then I have no business being here. I will leave immediately...” and more along those lines. I started off with all kinds of flattering statements. I said we know him in the Soviet Union, not just “in general,” but personally. We translate his books, we meet whenever he wants, and ask his advice on the ICM. Members of our leadership have known him for a long time and hold him in high regard, etc. But... here are the facts. Professor Koval’ had no apparent reason to make false accusations against you. We could not believe our ears. However, if you say that it did not happen, then so much the better. Let’s stop there. The most important thing is that you personally resolutely dismiss what you supposedly said at the meeting of the London University.

He calmed down a little. I told B.N. all of this, of course. He was pleased: we provoked them to “declare their love” for us. He decided not to touch any of “this” in his conversation. He really handled the matter “wisely.” He talked about the responsibility for détente, the Chinese threat, the great problems of the revolutionary process, etc. Woddis was glowing. He also got into global topics, and among them his refrain about China was curious: what shall we do with China? What can we do? What do you, the CPSU, suggest? I watched Woddis and periodically he glanced at me and I physically sensed his fear that any moment, any moment now Ponomarev would mention the London University and Woddis’ attitude towards dissidents... But B.N. made no mention of it.

All ended well. However, despite the “agreement” of positions on all international issues, the Brits refused to send out a communique (a modest, minimal one). They said it would look

like a joint political statement, and they weren't authorized to make one. Then again, the question of the communique was also discussed at our level, not B.N.'s.

Then we had lunch on Plotnikov street. It lasted almost three hours, we drank. Dzhavad and I laid out everything we thought about "Eurocommunism"=anti-Sovietism and the behavior of our brothers – the British Communists.

I was quite warmed-up by the time I said my concluding words: if communists have not completely abandoned scientific socialism yet, then is it really so difficult to understand that we (the USSR) are the way we are, the way history created us. This is our specific character, which they cherish so much at home. They are ready to close their eyes to the specific character of the Chinese, with their thousands of publicly executed people, but they do not want to recognize our specific character. We also need to be accepted the way we are. If they do not want to accept us – it is the end of the Communist Movement. It is nothing without us. And with the end of the ICM end the roles of the communist parties in "any specific country." So when you yield to anti-Sovietism out of moral considerations, you are signing a death warrant for your party.

They did not have a leg to stand on. They mumbled things that were not worthy of political figures.

So: they, like many other Western CPs, are afraid of a complete break with the CPSU because they understand the abovementioned points. But they do not want to identify with the CPSU, they do not want to be in the same moral-ideological company. This shocks them.

It shocks them because they are no longer representing the working class, which could care less about all these dissidents. They now represent that very middle class, which integrates public opinion and the workers. They represent the very category that is called "the public" in the West.

By the end they both kept saying: on this visit we once again became convinced that there are problems between us (the CPSU and the CPGB) and they will persist – since you are sticking to your positions and build illusions about the true attitude towards you of the Western working class.

Later (already in Jurmala), I kept thinking about the "outcomes of this meeting." And again, I came to my old conclusion: that right now we could really use a good dose of isolationism from the ICM, and from the "revolutionary movement" in all those Africas. The most tactically correct thing to do would be to let them know that we are sending them all to hell. Actually, this applies to international politics in general. The atmosphere would change radically in 5-10 years. The anti-Sovietism is fueled by the fact that we are sticking our nose everywhere, and often interfere by useless (or very outdated) means. They are afraid of us, they do not trust us and they will not, until we "retreat into ourselves" and devote all our energy internally. This would be the best thing we could do right now for progress in the world, including to preserve peace.

We ought to scorn those who rail against us instead of being offended and angry. The latter is unworthy of a great nation.

It seems we might be starting to see clearly on this subject, judging by our, TASS', reaction to Huo Guofeng's embraces with Ceausescu and Tito, which I read about in *Pravda* only when I got to Jurmala.

September 3, 1978

Who are we under Brezhnev? I thought about it for a long time in Jurmala. I will try to put it into words.

So: I, Zagladin & Co. – we are apparatchiks of the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era, i.e. people who are unable to come up with any new ideas. Khrushchev's ideas turned out to be illusions or pipe dreams. Under Brezhnev we have no ideas at all: just adaptation, slow and difficult adaptation to the changing domestic and international reality. However, this may be the highest wisdom for a period of such uncertainty that you cannot even call it a transitional period. Our society is not pregnant with anything new, conception hasn't even occurred yet. We are barely able to solve current issues. And life is developing in terms of depth, but not distance. The prospects seem to be purely quantitative: more and better quality. Nobody is trying anymore to figure out what is beyond that.

“Depth” means more complexity and at the same time a release from the bonds and norms of the past in human relationships, a rapid spiritual growth – with simultaneous moral and cultural impoverishment of a large segment of the population. The extreme expression of the latter process is drunkenness (on an unprecedented scale in Russia) and hooliganism. And less conspicuous but even more widespread – the socio-political indifference, and public cynicism among the youth.

We can observe the “depth” in the real blossoming of our literature, especially prose. And in some truly outstanding films. In the irrepressible interest in reading, which has been happening for a few years now and at times resembles some kind of social hysteria. Moreover, it applies not only to the professional and intelligentsia sections of the population.

But I digress. Yes, we are not carriers (and not generators) of new ideas. For two reasons: society does not need such ideas; and we have been taught too well, we know that new ideas are simply revamped or well-forgotten old ones. The Eurocommunists, on the other hand, have a weak education and superficial knowledge of history, of Marx and Lenin. We know it all inside out. When they enthusiastically create all kinds of “new” theories we just laugh. We studied all these things in our university days. And we are certain that all these “new” theories (if we talk about the ICM, for example) are nothing but a repetition (sometimes verbally coinciding) of Bernstein, Kautsky and others like them who contributed nothing of substance and served only for the survival of opportunistic pragmatism.

However, we see something else, too. Behind these theories there is a policy of distancing from us, from the CPSU, from the Soviet Union. Besides the initial foolishness present in this intention, it is evident they want something new. But they do not see what this new thing could be. And we definitely cannot help them on this score – not with experience, or

our own perspective, or new ideas, which we also do not have because our life does not provide resources for them.

Recently I read *The Next 200 Years* by Herman Kahn, W. Brown, and Martel. Realistic futurology. No interceptions... on the basis of budding or already existing possibilities. It is optimistic (they reject the idea of the end of the world due to lack of energy sources, raw materials, food, or due to pollution, etc.). But it is bleak. They admit it themselves. Evidently the prospect is not to lose the ability to develop in "depth." There is great danger though: removing tension in material well-being can eliminate the need for spiritual development.

Time and again I find myself dumbfounded by the thought that I do not understand anything about the simplest things. I do not see the point of a basic newspaper text, I do not understand the meaning of well-known, popular words and phrases in connection with the realities they are supposed to denote. This happens more and more often when I'm reading ordinary political texts. Today I experienced this when I was reading Suslov's speech at the opening of the new CC CPSU Academy of Social Sciences. It scares me. What kind of political person are you, if the meaning of the symbolism of political texts is disappearing in your consciousness?!

This is partly due, it seems, to the fact that these political texts are deteriorating and by now mean something quite different from what they meant when the Soviet political dictionary was forming. They are becoming a ritual "Our Father" ... in which the only important thing is faithfulness to the canon, the (real) meaning of which has also long been forgotten... But what if I am the only one who is "forgetting" the meaning? What if the main cause of this is that I'm getting old?!

September 30, 1978

I haven't written almost all of September. I came back to work on the 5th and immediately had to do two big things – transform the draft of Ponomarev's report (for Sofia) into a readable format, and quickly get ready myself for the trip to Belgium.

From September 12-19th I was in Belgium with a delegation headed by Voss (First Secretary of the CC CP of Latvia) at a meeting with the Belgian Socialist Party.

The strongest impression: we met with people of all levels – from the chairmen [sic] of the Belgian Socialist Party and ministers to municipal officials and rank-and-file functionaries – nobody reproached us for dissidents. Meanwhile, the leaders of the Communist Party, with whom we had a two-hour conversation at their Politburo, once again raised this issue as an obstacle to cooperation with the CPSU, referencing public opinion and the country's working class. The Belgian Socialist Party has 250 thousand members and the Communist Party of Belgium barely 9 thousand. In a word, I was convinced once again that the dissident issue is an organized weapon of struggle against us – any struggle, both imperialist and communist. The majority of regular people and the truly national forces in capitalist countries couldn't care less about this issue.

One more general impression from interacting with socialists and communists. The former are busy with work, they are a solid, “irreversible” power, natural and ineradicable in its home. The latter are an afterthought, they fuss, develop hang-ups, act important, flaunt their independence, and all the while nobody needs them. And they have nothing to do. One episode from the embassy reception stuck in my mind: a group of PB members from the Communist Party of Belgium having a discussion like armchair politicians about world politics, about German unification (a threat!), etc.

Maybe Ponomarev is right for caring only about the PCF, PCI, PCE... because they are reality. The rest in the ICM (perhaps with the exception of Japan and India) are lifeless little groups, which have torn off the umbilical cord – Moscow – and are living out their last generation.

Three conversations in the Bureau of the Belgian Socialist Party (including their agitprop), a day in Antwerp, a day in Waremme and Nieu. Negotiations in the ministries of labor and economy.

Sunday trip to Amsterdam... However, less impressive than the one in 1972, when we were there with Gorbachev (from Stavropol).

I ended up not going to Australia for the Congress of the Socialist Party of Australia [SPA] because of the Belgium trip. Ponomarev strongly opposed it because the report in Sofia was coming up. There was a lot of discussion after the first draft, which of course he rejected, after his vacation and before the trip to Afghanistan (he went there with a secret mission – to warn Taraki that if he keeps slaughtering people who made the revolution, we will turn away from him. Already people are pointing fingers to blame us for the mass repressions. People's anger is turning towards Soviet specialists, whom Taraki invited by the hundreds).

Ponomarev's ideological plan is tied to “rebuffing” Cohen & others' book *L'URSS et nous* [The USSR and Us] (it just came out in Paris, approved by the PB PCF and will be used as the basis of the pre-Congress discussions at the PCF). After all, the main idea of the Sofia conference is to show that real socialism is good, while keeping in mind that our former best friends no longer consider it good, at least not good enough to associate themselves with it and oppose it to the abovementioned (in Belgium) Western public. For us, the executors of the idea, the task is almost like squaring the circle: everything written by our academics, political writers, and career politicians no longer works. That means we have to come up with something special and talk about it in such a way to at least get them to listen.

I am reading Cohen's book *L'URSS et nous*. The book is weaker than Giuseppe Boffa's on the history of the USSR... but it is not anti-Soviet libel, it approaches the understanding of us (and the idea of us) that overall is not that different from what we started to think and write about ourselves after the XX Congress and during the XXII Congress. But unlike the latter, we are no longer able to stop and reverse what is happening in the heads and books of our “friends.” So, we have to adapt to what they think of us and who they think we are. We have to adapt in the broadest sense of the word, not just in the “ideological struggle in the world arena.” For – though we are a major reality ourselves, which allows us to impose certain ideas about us, this cannot

continue for much longer. Other realities are growing around us, which we cannot adapt to ourselves with our old methods.

October 8, 1978

Rasul Gamzatov as head of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies to Canada. He was drinking heavily. The hosts were in utter shock when at a reception in Montreal he moved close to the wife of the Deputy Chairman of the CP of Canada Walsh and said, "My queen, marry me, leave him... I am not handsome, but I am rich. You will have a good life." He fell to his knees and crawled over to start kissing her feet.

He did the same thing with an old woman – the wife of *Pravda* correspondent Bragin at a reception in Ottawa.

The only speech he was capable of making at a meeting in Toronto was reduced to him saying that when he gets back to Moscow he will ask to become a member of the USSR-Canada Society. The kicker is that all of Canada long knows that he, Rasul Gamzatov, has been the chairman of this society for many years.

In Vancouver at a meeting with Slavic studies students he could not remember a single line from his poems. And so forth.

Maybe it's true what Boris Slutsky once told me: "Gamzatov is a completely inflated figure. He was made by the "translators" – Kozlovsky, Grebnev" ... It seems very believable.

Meeting with G. Tovstonogov before his trip to the U.S. as the head of a group of our prominent directors. I "explained" to him how to behave if the conversation touches on politics, especially human rights and Jews. I think we clicked. Mostly I advised him to just be himself. I said it's the best game plan.

He told me about an episode that happened recently with the Maly Drama Theater in Leningrad. They were performing Drutse's play about L.N. Tolstoy. At one point, a character says, "The Russian man is a coward" ... This was the last performance of the tour, the entire Leningrad governing elite, headed by Romanov, was present. This was after a triumphant two weeks of performances with "dithyrambic" press.

There was movement in the box after the aforementioned phrase. When the second act began, Romanov stood up in his "royal box" and flung to the stunned hall and the actors on stage, "No! The Russian man is a not a coward! That's right!" loudly moved the chairs and left theater.

What happened!

Of course, all the flowers and words, all the honors planned for the end of the tour were cancelled.

Tovstonogov laughed, saying this episode will go down in the history of world theater.

As it became known later, Romanov ordered to “investigate” the incident. By the way, the person who said the phrase from Lev Nikolayevich was none other than Igor’ Ilyinsky.

October 29, 1978

The breaks in my diary are becoming longer and more frequent. I’m losing the urge to write. Maybe because I don’t want to repeat myself, and my thoughts are all the same. Come to think of it, the facts (mostly) are the same too. For example, Brezhnev is openly being called “the great leader of the Party and the people” at the 60th anniversary of the Komsomol. And he sits there – on the TV screen – pathetically and stupidly smiling, apparently not understanding what is happening. He looks around at his colleagues in the Presidium and claps when he is being extolled and glorified – if they are applauding then that’s what he will do too. It is obvious to everyone that he does not understand what he is reading off a paper, which was dictated by Aleksandrov from a crib of the corresponding organization.

And in general – festivities, celebrations, “personal” congratulations to one, another, to entire organizations, undertakings, conferences, and awards, awards, awards...

I was in Prague from October 23-27th. A working meeting of deputy directors of CC departments of socialist countries within the framework of the annual meeting of CC secretaries. I went with four other people.

I was the head so I had to speak a great deal, even though I insisted this time that they “divide up” so each member of the delegation would talk about his own sphere.

At the closed meeting (without Romanians and Vietnamese) I talked about Berlinguer’s visit and the importance we attach to the Sofia conference on real socialism.

They took us to a new town near Prague, in the Melnik district – Neratovice – which grew from a large chemical plant. They are building a lot and well: a sports complex and hall, swimming pool, club, housing. Everything is modern. They are well-off and well-fed. They have 86 kg of meat per capita per year. The most in the world. Stefanek (deputy head of the International Department) said that their PB is discussing the possibility of increasing meat consumption by 1.5 kg per year. But their Ministry of Health came out against it – it would be harmful to the health of the nation... While in Poland they recently introduced a rationing system for meat and sugar! There is integration for you. Our meat per capita is 56 kg. And even that is probably just in theory.

I read I. Grekova’s “The Department” in *Novy Mir*. She is talented... she is paving the way in stylistics, though many are mastering it now. When the plot and even characters of the story or novel are not the driving force but merely the grid used by the author to organize her thoughts and aphorisms. To keep it from appearing monotonous, these thoughts are uttered by different characters.

That’s not what I meant to write about though. Once again, I am convinced of the phenomenon I wrote about earlier: our literature, same as many other forms of art, is breaking

free from the dictate of politics (or rather, politicians) and acquiring its own logic – critical and independent reflection of reality.

The week before leaving for Prague I put a lot of nerves and skill into Ponomarev's text for Sofia. I rewrote (to my heart's content) 90 percent of the text so that I started to like it myself. We discussed it. B.N. noticed some merits. But then he went back to his rubbish, like a broken record – “new” ideas about the struggle for peace, which have been published at least five times in his previous reports and articles.

However, I noticed from his intrusions into the text that he does not tolerate even technically objective mentions of Gromyko's accomplishments in détente. We have known this for a long time. But what specifically can we write about SALT-2 and all the twists and turns without mentioning Gromyko's meetings with Carter and Vance? I'm also noticing that Ponomarev is increasingly trying to minimize mentioning Brezhnev. I think this explains his constant desire to show our struggle for peace starting with the Decree on Peace, rather than over the last 10-15 years, especially connected to our latest campaigns.

October 30, 1978

I quote the following from today's issue of *Pravda*, from yet another trite article by Yu. Zhukov, who is using (unchecked) *Pravda* as his personal cookbook for half-baked considerations on a variety of subjects.

Here's the problem. The Parisian magazine *Le Point* asked itself the question: “Are we currently at the origins of New thinking?” The entire issue, which was well advertised, was devoted to answering this question. The magazine wrote that they involved “all editorial departments” and the columnist Pierre Billard summarized the work done for this issue.

Here are some quotes [from Zhukov's article]: “The French feel that ideologies are bursting,” “a great shuffle” is taking place and “everywhere as a manifestation of common sense the taste for the practice and art of the possible is reviving...” “Our convoluted era, our convulsive society seem to be moving to the grave. Voices are singing from all sides that we are living by the last fires of the era of decline... Perhaps! But what if we are, on the contrary, meeting the dawn of a new era, entering a new stage in the development of human thought? What if this is a turning point when mankind, tired of speeches, theories, lies, crimes, wars, tyranny, genocide that have been cultivated by three thousand years of the cult of man and three hundred years of the cult of reason, is crossing out its mistakes, restructuring its language and redesigning its thinking in a new way? Convulsions or a renewal? It still remains to be seen...

“It seems on the other side of traditional ideological boundaries new thinking is forming, without taboos (restrictions) and without prejudice”... It is possible to outline the main directions of this new thinking, which is making a path for itself. Tomorrow may be disappointment, but today is oppressive. Well... we are left with the past, which we have to win over and preserve once again... This return to the past, this search for roots takes on quite a variety of forms, starting with the publication of numerous recollections and testimonies about the past and ending

with a true invasion of books, films, magazines, television programs dedicated to history. This, of course, does not happen by accident...

New thinking stipulates the rejection of “politics” and must be accompanied by a return to the religious principles in social life.

Yuri Zhukov, the “golden pen of *Pravda*” filled with garbage, really put on some ideological cancan with these ideas. But I thank him for the interesting quotes.

Yesterday I read an abstract of an essay by a currently famous Trotskyist Mandel. A quite Leninist concept of the impending revolution in the West. He believes that right now (not in 1917, or 1920, or 1945, or even 1968) the West is able to repeat the pattern of the Soviet revolution. With an emphasis on the role of the Soviets, dual power first and then the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In any case, as they say: if we continue to build relations with the revolutionary forces of the West on an ideological basis (and we cannot get rid of this) then the only company for us are the modern ultra-educated and intelligent Trotskyists.

B.N. told me today: we need to think... we are always afraid of a split in the PCF, PCI, the ICM... But maybe such a split would actually be advantageous for us... for our interests?!

I do not think that either scenario is “advantageous” for us. Both parties are indifferent to us. Herein lies the horror of our isolation – we are a “military superpower” and nothing else.

November 6, 1978

I read Anatoly Rybakov’s *Heavy Sand*. It is an event, considering our Jewish problem. He is essentially rehabilitating what we achieved before the war in the elimination of anti-Semitism and the creation of an internationalist atmosphere in society. He is reminding us about it persistently and “impudently.” Without any hints (unworthy of a great artist) just by facts alone he is reproaching us for “what we have now.”

It was an emotional read. I got teary-eyed twice. This has been inside me for a long time – at first fear, and then hatred for anti-Semitism. I remember when I was a young kid, a pioneer at “Koreshok” (a factory in Maryina roshcha district – I could see it from our windows, it was always smoking and stunk of non-ferrous metal fumes). Around 1930, maybe 1932-33... I was watching a movie at the factory club. A silent film. “Cain and Artem,” based on Gorky. It really got to me. This was before the time when my best friends became Lika Gordon, Eysa Cherikover, Lilya Markovich, Dez’ka Kaufman (the great poet David Samoilov). Lika’s friend Nora (by the way, later she was a partisan together with Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya) was madly in love with me – a black eyed, narrow-faced beauty from a super-intellectual Moscow family. She would come to my apartment building late at night, accompanied by Lika, and throw little stones into my second story window. There were no phones back then... But I avoided her, I was shy. “I did not reciprocate her feelings.”

Anyway, before all that happened, before “Gorky Pilot School No. 1,” there was this movie.

The film impressed upon me an ineradicable feeling: Russians are big, strong, and kind. That is how they must be in relation to the weak and offended. They offended the Jews for a long time, not the Russians themselves, or rather not all of them – but someone on their behalf. And the bad among them. (I remember with what disgust and pain I reacted to my parents' joking or ironic "manifestations," as people say nowadays, of anti-Jewish (I wouldn't say anti-Semitic) sentiments!)

The Russians are big. It is their duty to protect the Jews, to compensate with their large-heartedness and pliability for the offenses the Jews have suffered for so long.

I was struck by episodes in the street, when a simple Russian guy would stand up for a Jew, sometimes even with his fists. I remember an episode from Fedin's *Brothers* (though I do not remember anything else from that novel) when a Russian worker, a Bolshevik, ran into the street with a revolver and tried to stop the pogromers alone, risking his life.

I will always remember the words of a sapper, a Jew from my regiment, who had been clearing a passage for our attack and was blown up on a mine. I came up to him, bent down... He looked at me, or rather past me, at the sky, and said: "There you have it, Comrade Captain, you had one brave Jew in your regiment and now even he is... done for." That was in March of 1945. Just before the end of the war.

And now this novel. Of course, the fact that it was allowed for publication means something in this bacchanalia of emigration, hatred, injustice towards Jews at every step. When they are not hired for good jobs, when they are not allowed into universities... when the powerful machine of Zionism is active in America and Israel and is permeated with a visceral anti-Sovietism.

However, I don't think this is the swallow that is the harbinger of spring. [Allowing the publication of the book] is just an action either to avoid yet another mini-scandal at the international level, or the opposite – to cover up our real policies towards the Jews. We (who are – we?) probably regret going this far. And I think after the XX Congress it might have been possible to make sure Israel did not turn into our mortal enemy. It would not have been easy... but we could have done it.

And we should not have taken the 1967 war personally... Our concern about the Arabs was a bad bet. It gave us nothing but a hassle, diplomatic defeats, and wasted millions.

Returning to Rybakov, I can say that he did a good, honest deed. He said the right word, which can help us to someday get out from our "anti-Jewish" situation and restore our good name – of a great and calm nation, a big and large-hearted defender of the weak and offended. And most importantly – it could help to revive the atmosphere of internationalism in public morality. It so happened that historically, the latter is impossible to achieve without ending anti-Semitism.

November 13, 1978

I am tired today, but I have to write – things are just too awful.

B.N. gathered deputies of the Supreme Soviet with whom we will be receiving American senators, headed by Ribicoff, the day after tomorrow. The most senior experts were invited, including the Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov. He straightforwardly described how we are playing hardball with the Americans over how many missiles to allow on one bomber: 25 or 30. To encode or not to encode all the parameters of missile test launches, etc.

Arbatov described all of it in one phrase – “f***ing posturing, while...” He said it as he walked into my office after the meeting was over, to get it off his chest...

Brezhnev refuses to meet with the American senators. However, on the same days as their visit he will be talking with the Ethiopian Mengistu. This is not even a question of what's more important – to have Ethiopia at our side or to have an agreement with the United States on limiting strategic weapons (i.e. at least some easing of the arms race that is mangling our economy, and not just the economy). The problem is that by refusing to receive the Americans while embracing Mengistu at the same time, we are giving such a slap in the face of the Americans that the prospect of a treaty instantly moves far, far away.

Yura and I were discussing why this is happening. I gave my “hypothesis”: because Smolenskaya-Sennaya (the MFA) is more powerful than Staraya Square (Gromyko vs. Ponomarev)... But it is impossible that Gromyko “doesn't understand.”

“However, besides Gromyko there is also your neighbor on the right (I am hinting at Ogarkov, who at B.N.'s meeting was sitting next to Arbatov).”

“Yes, that's true. But I still think something else is going on here,” he points at his heart and adds, “my gut tells me that Gromyko is posturing at the SALT negotiations to make sure Brezhnev does not go to the U.S. Right now, Gromyko and others do not want to “show” him, that is why the meeting with senators was cancelled.”

“Is it very bad?”

“Yes. We were invited on Thursday (Arbatov and others are currently working at Serebryannyi Bor, preparing Brezhnev's speech on the economy for the upcoming CC Plenum on November 28). He is very bad. He can still read off a paper. But if there is a Q&A session, then... Though I could have prepared Ribicoff not to get into a discussion...”

“And how are things at Serebryannyi Bor? (I reminded him of his phrase ‘f***ing posturing, while...’).”

“Things are bad. And nobody wants to openly look the facts in the face. They do not want to know anything. Everything is fine. Everything is wonderful. Nothing but successes and achievements. Suslov did not even allow our calculations at the PB, not to mention the Plenum. But look at what is happening...”

“On meat. Rostov-on-Don: after deductions for nurseries, kindergartens, restaurants, etc. the retail sales for meat come to 1.5 kilograms per person per year! There are better areas, but the amount does not go above 7 kilograms per person annually anywhere.”

“We feed about 100 million tons of wheat to cattle. But because we do it without appropriate feed additives, 40 percent of it is wasted. And we import a lot of wheat from the United States.

“There are 120 billion rubles in savings accounts, plus about 40 billion rubles people stash under their mattresses [*в кубышках*]. The mass of commodities covers about 40 percent of that. How is this mass calculated? By the cost of goods! But a considerable part of it is never purchased, it remains on the shelves.

“One way out of the situation continues to be the increase of prices for goods of “narrow” consumption – gold, crystal, cars, etc. As the result, the rich get richer (because gold that is bought today becomes even more expensive tomorrow, same with cars and other such goods). The prosperity gap is growing, as well as discontent and irritation. Most importantly, these price increases haven’t had any impact on our finances in the last few years. They did not improve anything. Moreover, during the last Five-Year Plan prices overall were lowered by 840 million rubles, but over the last two years of the current Five-Year Plan, prices have increased by 1,400 million rubles. Everyone felt it.

“If the first increase in oil production by 120 million tons required an investment of 17 billion rubles, a further production increase by 120 million tons already required an investment of 28 billion rubles, and the upcoming increase in production by just 40 million tons will require an investment of 48 billion rubles.

“In 1982 the labor force will add just 300 thousand people due to population growth, and most of that will be in Central Asia.

“For the last 5-6 years there have been numerous discussions of the fact that we need to improve quality and effectiveness. But there is no progress. A mechanism has not been found to solve this problem.

“We need a radical restructuring of our entire system; we need to get rid of the planners and get new people; we need money, at least as much as SALT-2 would cost. But as you can see, we are ‘f***ing posturing’ over how many missiles to put on one aircraft, as if otherwise the U.S. would go to war against us tomorrow.”

November 18, 1978

What came of the incident with Zagladin?³ B.N. told me that Suslov called him. The pretext was not Zagladin’s article but the fact that just prior B.N. had again, for the third time, despite the CC Secretariat’s summer decision to “postpone,” forced *Pravda* to set in type the article written on his orders – “What do monopolies want from Eurocommunism?” B.N. imposed the page proofs on Suslov, so he could read them over the holidays and “return to the question of publication.”

³ Unbeknownst to Ponomarev, Zagladin published an article about Cohen’s book *L’URSS et nous* in which he let the Eurocommunists have it. This was just after Berlinguer had visited Moscow and hugged Brezhnev. Zagladin is not a man from the street, he is an insider. Everyone understood that embraces with Berlinguer were a hypocritical façade, and in reality the CC CPSU shares Zagladin’s point of view. [Author’s note]

M.A. said: "You see what a storm Zagladin's few phrases caused, and you want a whole article! Anyway, how did this happen? Did you (Ponomarev) approve this article? Why are such things published without the CC's knowledge?"

B.N. said to me, "I did not want to get Zagladin in too much trouble." (I never figured out what he actually replied to Suslov.) "However, he really played a dirty trick on 'us' (?!)."

As I understood it, the dirty trick was not the fact that Zagladin railed against the Eurocommunists, but that he got in the way and made it impossible to publish Ponomarev's treasured article.

Thank God for it! It's a blessing in disguise!

As for Ponomarev not wanting to get Vadim in too much trouble, it seems it is more important to him to appear as master of his domain (how could it happen that without his knowledge his first deputy published crucial things in the central organ of the CC!) than as a man who allowed excessive criticism of opportunists.

Yesterday we had a report-and-election Party conference of the entire CC apparatus. It was ceremonious and disgustingly bureaucratized. The CC Secretaries headed by Suslov came to hear the report and attend the meeting until the first break. The auditorium greeted them standing up, like school children at the entrance of a teacher. When the candidacies for the Presidium were being listed, every time a Secretary's name was announced it was accompanied by applause (top-down, from Suslov to Rusakov). Later, when the list got to the "as well as" part, i.e. members of the Presidium like us, naturally there was no more applause.

Every mention of Brezhnev in the report, or in a speech, even in a passing phrase, was marked by applause.

The report itself consisted mainly of general propaganda talk about the country's affairs in general. Nevertheless, there were some interesting data in the debates.

Yastrebov (head of the Department of Heavy Industry): we produce 795 million tons of coal, 575 million tons of oil. Western Siberia provides 90 percent of the country's energy resources. Out of 250 million rubles allocated for housing construction and social needs in Western Siberia, only 34 million rubles have been utilized.

Bochkov (head of the Department of Light Industry): the state lost 11.2 billion rubles on the markdown of goods.

Simonov: train cars spend 1/5 of their time in motion, and 4/5 standing idle. Railroads have been extended 15 percent over the last 20 years, while freight turnover increased 4 times. Incomplete construction of the railroads – 90 billion rubles.

Anyway, everything was coordinated and "figured out" ahead of time – how many members from each department would go to the Presidium, who goes to the editorial commission (for some as compensation). The draft of the resolution was printed and bound and was distributed to all the delegates five minutes after the editorial commission was elected. Who was

assigned to announce something (this is an honor too), who was elected to the new membership of the Party Committee (two-three people changed out of seventeen).

In short, it was a circus parade, ceremonial, and deliberately, openly formal. It clearly has the purpose of demonstrating the overwhelming authority of party membership (over each individual). Tellingly, neither A.M. Aleksandrov, nor other high-ranking officials in the apparatus allowed themselves to ignore this meeting. The abovementioned A.M. kept running off but coming back: during this time Brezhnev was meeting with American senators, a meeting that he, Andrey, persuaded the General Secretary to take.

Then again, there is something to that – in this now almost irrational power of party membership – something from the Bolshevik tradition (although the content has radically changed: these kinds of meetings, like all our party organization under the Central Committee, do not have any real significance for our cause).

November 19, 1978

Yesterday on TV there was a concert from Ostankino, featuring Mironov, a film and theater actor (Moscow Satire Theater), the son of Mironova and Menaker. He is extraordinarily talented. He is versatile and smart at communicating with the public. He is physical and fluid, like a dancer on ice or a ballet dancer. But that's not the point, the point is the content. And the content is defiantly rebellious, especially in the first, serious part of the concert. Quotes from Ostrovsky, Saltykov-Shchedrin, Beaumarchais, from Mayakovskiy's "Bedbug." The quotes are selected in such a way that they are no longer a subtext but direct text against the seemingly unshakeable rules of our cultural-ideological and every other kind of order. For example, from Ostrovsky: young people should not lose hope to be honest, and maybe they will see a better future. From Gogol: there is a Khlestakov in every one of us, but he is dangerous only in the atmosphere of general fear. From Beaumarchais: you can write about anything, so long as you do not touch the political foundations of the state and certain people, under the supervision of three censors. And more along those lines. It is significant that this is being broadcast to an audience of many millions: our censors are also increasingly inclined to turn a blind eye to everything but political foundations and the key players.

I also recently read an interesting article in *Literaturka* (approximately along the same lines). It said that moral issues are raised more fully and sharply in the stream of contemporary Soviet prose. Good versus bad (in intentions, actions, behavior, character traits). But, the article says, what's completely disappeared in the depictions of good people is why they are good, in the name of what, what "big" social ideas they represent, what "big" purpose they are fighting for, ultimately! In other words, they are talking about precisely the phenomenon I think I wrote about here earlier: "the building of communism," "the leading role of the party," and all the slogans that one encounters daily, morning till night, in propaganda and political literature are completely absent in fiction.

Last night I read in Blok's diary (in connection with his work for the state commission investigating the activities of royal dignitaries) – 1917:

“The old Russian regime was split into responsible and irresponsible factions. The former was responsible only to the latter, not to the people.

“This order required people to be faithful (faith in anointing), courageous (no ambivalence) and honest (the axioms of morality). With Russia’s overwhelming development in depth and width, the order required one more quality, even more imperiously – genius.”

Incredible! And the thing is, right now it is the same, down to the last word, if we replace “anointing” with “party membership” and faith in the party’s exceptional calling to lead the people to the ideals of communism.

He goes on: “The power holders in Russia have not had these qualities in a long time. The elite degenerated and corrupted the lower classes. This went on for many years.” The words of a genius!

November 25, 1978

The meeting of the PCC (Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact) took place. The Declaration ended up being unexpectedly (for me) tough: class terminology, formulas from the “cold war” days – about imperialist aggressors, revanchists, etc. In a word, such terminology has almost disappeared from our official diplomatic vocabulary (newspapers). What about the proposals? A compilation of everything we put forward over the last two years.

On Kulikov’s (Marshal) suggestion a closed document was adopted on improving cooperation in the military sphere. Ceausescu refused to sign it. I was told that he took the floor several times on this subject, trying to postpone it, “to move it to the working level,” “discuss it one more time,” etc. But each time other members (Husak, Kadar especially) drove him into a corner by saying: if you don’t want to sign it, you don’t have to. Nobody is forcing you and compliance is not mandatory for non-signing parties.

Ceausescu did not applaud at the end, and people say when he was riding in the car afterwards he cursed everyone and everything in Romanian, called them brownnoses and cursed his advisers for not stopping him and letting him sign the Declaration, which is good only to wipe one’s ass with. (By the way, ironically, the Romanians were the ones who insisted on using tougher language on imperialism. They were probably doing it with the expectation of putting us in an awkward position with the U.S. or creating a confrontation with “soft” countries like Hungary and thereby derailing the whole document. Instead, we went ahead and accepted their edits right away).

The Romanians flatly refused to mention in the Declaration solidarity with Vietnam (against China) and about Camp David.

I received the Minister of Culture and Deputy Chairman of the Party (ruling) of Jamaica – Bertram. A tall black man, with an Oxford diploma and so forth. He brought with him the ambassador and Prime Minister Manley’s secretary. He came to establish inter-party relations, among other things. He made many requests – to help them with ideological education of cadres (“although we are not Marxists-Leninists, we are not communists!”) with education and

culture... He was especially concerned about our views on two communist parties (a few dozen members in each) that appeared in Jamaica.

My false position. We organized his visit – the International Department, after I visited their Congress with our delegation. Formally, his visit was through the Ministry of Culture and he was received by Demichev, Lapin, Khatuntsev, etc. When he came to the CC he was suitably reverent – like he was at the very top. He raised all the questions, including the construction of an embassy, and the fact that our MFA is delaying inviting Manley (there have been two requests already), etc. But what can we, the International Department and B.N., do here? We will be embarrassed to even “remind” MFA officials about this, not to mention to Gromyko. Our opinion is worthless in this matter.

Today I read Arbatov’s interview in the *International Herald Tribune*. They are presenting him to the Western reader as something between Vance and Brzezinski. A politician, the main source of information for Brezhnev, an instrument of camouflage for Moscow’s true intentions.

He handled it skillfully. The other day he dropped by my office and told me he is going to the FRG with his wife. The program is – Schmidt, Wischnewski, Brandt, Bahr, Apel, etc. He told me how difficult it was to “balance on a log” for five hours. And the risk, he said, the risk!

However, he did not say anything special [in the interview]. The weight of this interview is only from the weight of his “persona” and “position,” not from the substance of what he said. But still, he did well! He really is doing important work, but not at all how the Americans imagine it.

November 26, 1978

Yesterday at tennis on Mokhovaya Street I ran into Romanov from Leningrad (we were in Chile together in 1972, met with Allende. Back then he wasn’t a PB member yet and was quite a democrat). Even though in the following years, after he became a PB member, he completely ignored me, this time he stopped and struck up a conversation like we are old buddies.

- How’s life?
- The usual. Working!
- Did you work on the PCC?
- No, that’s our fraternal department.
- Ohhh... How are things in Iran?
- ?? – I moved my head as if I could not hear because of street noise.
- What’s going to happen in Iran? – he almost shouted.
- I don’t know. The Americans will probably overthrow him. He does not suit them anymore...
- I see. Come visit us (in Leningrad).
- Thank you.

... All of this took place in front of the guards and adjutants, who were standing in the distance, shifting from foot to foot.

I keep running into him. During the last Plenum when he was also in Moscow, I ran into him on Granovsky Street (going to the cafeteria). But that time he pretended not to see me.

Maybe he will be the “First”! Anything is possible in Russia!

Yesterday I started to complain again about the bacchanalia over [Brezhnev’s] *Virgin Lands* (at a conference with reports by first secretaries of regional committees and Central Committees of the republics, recollections by the heroes of *Virgin Lands*, letters from readers and youth, studying it in school, in the Komsomol and party organizations... and in all the mass media, morning till night). It was one thing in the 1930s, when we had childlike naivete as a society and were rather ignorant in general. Back then we still believed in all of that (about our Father) – for the sake of our big and bright idea... But now! When nobody believes in anything anymore, when people are shrewd and know what’s what and why (for whom!) these things are done... One only has to look at the faces in the room where the General Secretary’s works are being praised (on the TV) to be convinced what people are thinking...

They think we decided to humor the old man before his end, let him revel in his importance and irreplaceability, his kindness and the immensity of what he did for the people. This is how we are expressing, essentially, epitaphic gratitude.

Maybe so. But somehow I do not really believe it... We never do these kinds of things “so deliberately.” It is more likely to be bad inertia created in memorable times, which in turn created likeminded people. Now they are guided by only one thing – do whatever it takes to keep their seats. They created a “fear of God” for themselves and at this point there is no specific person to embody it, but this fear is somewhere among us, and nobody dares to be the first to say – what are we doing?!

And absolutely nobody cares about its corrupting effects, and what harm it is doing to the living forces of society.

December 3, 1978

An important week. But I didn’t get a chance to even touch the diary.

The CC Plenum was on November 27th. The plan for 1979 was discussed. Again, the pessimistic Baibakov and the optimistic Garbuzov. Brezhnev spoke after them. Some distressing but circular facts and all the same conclusions: let’s keep at it and work hard. Nothing decisive. In the meantime, things are bad, judging by everything Arbatov told me. He had been working at Serebryannyi Bor on the preparation of the Plenum. Things are bad with metals, bad with fuel – oil, coal... Bad with roads and especially railroads.

And the situation with meat is absolutely dismal. And there is no way out in sight.

Organizational matters:

Chernenko! He is moving up with cosmic speed. Right away he took a spot in the Presidium between Brezhnev and Kirilenko.

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich – First Secretary from Stavropol was made CC Secretary for Agriculture (replacing Kulakov)... This is a good candidate. A few years ago, I went to Belgium with him. We got along. He is smart, brave, extraordinary. He sees everything. He is concerned and devoted to his work. He is not an official. He can speak from the heart. I remember he charmed the Belgians. It's a good thing that such a man was promoted. Morgan (First Secretary of the Poltava region) told us later that Brezhnev called the new Secretary over and said just one thing to him: "Take care of meat. This is your main priority. This is why we elected you."

Shevardnadze and Tikhonov became candidate members of the PB. Mazurov – the scene of expulsion from the PB was oppressive for everyone. But before the Plenum closed, Brezhnev suddenly said a few words of gratitude to him "for his work in the PB" and the auditorium went wild. Ten minutes of thunderous applause... I think not only out of a sense of justice, but also thinking about themselves: you work and work, and then you are kicked out without even a kind word...

I am reading Kasvinov's sensational book *Twenty-Three Steps Down* about Nicholas II. At the same time, I resumed daily reading of Hertzen. Together, this creates such an associative mix that it's sending shivers down my spine: nothing is changing in Russia, in the very core of its national existence. Minor, mundane daily analogies and details are simply dumbfounding and... depressing.

December 10, 1978

An article was published in *Le Monde* on December 2nd by two French communists. They demand "total" exposure of the USSR as a "superpower" dominated by chauvinism and anti-Semitism, a superpower that drowned Hungary in blood and strangled Czechoslovakia, a superpower that has no democracy, only the dictatorship of the party which calls itself "communist." [The authors say] it is inappropriate to call the USSR and other socialist countries "socialist." When the term "socialist" is used to describe a country, it is invariably given in quotation marks.

December 11, 1978

An article (page proofs) in *Kommunist* by a certain I. Andreyev for the 100th anniversary of *Anti-Dühring* (compilation "The Round Table" on historical materialism, *Kommunist* No. 17). Just five years ago, Party membership would have been revoked for such liberties. They boil down to a heavy demand for a "creative approach" to everything, including historical materialism, because supposedly it has not been developed in a long time and it is not a sum of stiff categories... In general, if you read everything that is being published right now on so-called questions of theory, you can find many articles like this one, and they are at a decent literary level. Their point is in defending the right (and even the obligation) for creative evolution of theories and various social sciences. But that is just the first step (which is mostly being looked past) from the stiff canon – from ideological dogma to theoretical exploration of realities. A gingerly permission to engage in theory, and not just burn incense and faithfully bow to "the theory of Marx-Engels-Lenin." We will see what happens when "Young Turks" from

universities and other places take this permission seriously and begin to develop historical materialism in earnest.

I am reading and reading Kasvinov's *Twenty-Three Steps Down* about Nicholas II. The subtext is present all the time. Sometimes I just want to burst out laughing... over how the dignitaries and Duma members allowed themselves to speak with the autocrat, long before abdication. For example, when they advised him not to assume supreme command of the army in the summer of 1915. Today, no one would allow himself something like that, in any way, either in tone or in substance, say, on the occasion of our "autocrat" being named Marshal or awarded the Order of Victory.

December 16, 1978

On Thursday I was unexpectedly summoned to the Politburo. The issue of publishing an article against the book *L'URSS et nous* was under discussion, among others.

Brezhnev presided.

The first item on the agenda were the outcomes of talks with Saddam Hussein – the second man in Iraq. But that's not the point...

My main impressions:

- The General Secretary's total incapacity, he often does not understand, cannot grasp the essence of the matter at hand;
- The competence and mental clarity of the other old men from the Areopagus (Kosygin, Ustinov, Suslov);
- Petitionary, but persistent and interested (not indifferent) nature of the participants' speeches. These people can sometimes influence the outcome of the discussion, although on all issues the decisions are prepared in advance and "agreed upon" with the General Secretary;
- The enormous and dangerous role of assistants, especially Aleksandrov, who is very subjective, categorial, self-assured, and now he's lost all sense of moderation in an atmosphere of indisputability.

When opening each new agenda item, Brezhnev reads "his" opinion from a piece of paper prepared by Aleksandrov. His speech is tongue-tied, unclear – it gives the impression that he does not understand what he is reading. The decision on the issue is predetermined in this opinion note. However, fortunately, there are exceptions because Brezhnev's opinion is followed by free discussion, without papers (although with a departmental tinge). The General Secretary clearly does not follow the discussion, and then helplessly asks (this happened several times): "So, what are we deciding?" At moments like these, Bogolyubov (deputy of the General Department, Chernenko's deputy) runs over and slips something to him, evidently an articulated summary – the "decision." It must be said that the General Secretary does not insist on his original opinion, which is laid out in Aleksandrov's paper. He easily agrees with the decision formulated after the discussion. This is his natural wisdom. But nonetheless. These "arguments"

come up only as a last resort, only if Aleksandrov's paper goes far beyond the bounds of the reasonable or possible, or if it crosses the "interests" of some big department.

So, Saddam Hussein.

From Aleksandrov's fortunately very short paper, one could understand that Brezhnev spoke sharply about the repression of Communists. But it seems nothing followed Hussein's "clarifications." He emphasized Hussein's statement: whatever situation develops, even a military situation, we (Iraq) will always be with you (USSR). (Although it is not clear what this means. I think it is the usual eastern cunning to draw more out of us). Overall: Brezhnev's relations with Iraq are developing normally.

Then Kosygin spoke about his meeting with Hussein in Moscow. His presentation was clear and simple, with logic, assessments, and the necessary accents. It seems he really let Hussein have it for the repressions against the Communists. Hussein started to make excuses that the Communists are not being persecuted because they are communists but because they work in the army. Kosygin told him firmly, Comintern-style: you should meet with the leadership of the Communist Party instead of going through mediators. After all, you have a "patriotic," or whatever you call it, common front – so agree on order and let everyone observe it. If you continue to torture people, we will not look on indifferently. Be advised!

Kosygin got the impression that Hussein did not come with a specific list of requests. The questions Hussein raised were not as pushy as the Syrians, for example. The Syrians say: if you don't give us this and that, then relations between us as a whole will be called into question...

Ustinov agreed overall that the Iraqis behaved less impudently than the Syrians but outlined some details that are very characteristic for both. For example, they say, "Give us the newest T-72 tanks, and not just a few of them but 500! We don't need the 'old ones.' Give us a missile like the American 'Pershing' (surface-to-surface, 800km)." "We don't have one like it," Ustinov tells Hussein, "We only have a nuclear missile of that type." "You have it," the Iraqis respond, "We will adapt it to a nonnuclear warhead ourselves." "And that's how we negotiated," Ustinov said.

Or: "Give us the latest 8-inch howitzer" ("How do they even know about it?" Ustinov mused) "I tell them – we do not have one." "You do," the Iraqis object. And so forth.

Ustinov's description aroused indignation. Voices called out for a tougher approach.

However, Gromyko and Andropov urged everyone to take into account that if we refuse to give them anything, especially the Syrians, they will break away from us. And they really will not take "junk." Here Brezhnev said, "We have to give them something but emphasize that 'we are not giving this for offensive uses.' I said this to Hussein."

An interesting debate unfolded between Kosygin and Ustinov on another issue – training construction personnel in vocational and trade schools. The project included some benefits to attract young people to this industry, which is so necessary right now – including a 2-year deferment of military service after graduation. Ustinov spoke categorically against this (unlike

the others, when he speaks he always gets up and goes to the chairman's table, saying every time "so it will be easier to hear").

"With the demographic situation (the birth rate in 1960-61), who will then serve in the army, in the internal troops?" Ustinov appealed to Kosygin.

Kosygin calmly but firmly objected, "I am not suggesting we should exempt them from military service completely. But if we take them out of the profession for two-three years right after they finish school, they in effect lose that profession and we have to teach them all over again. Let them work for two years, then go to the army, possibly to the special construction units and so on."

Ustinov: "And who will serve during these two years, who will fill the contingent of troops? We are not talking about increasing [the number of troops], just maintaining the current level."

Kosygin: "And who will work? Who will fulfill the Plans? Who will build in the non-chernozem zone, where we are not meeting Plans precisely because there are not enough people for the construction projects?"

Solomentsev supported Kosygin. It was evident that many sympathize with him. The new Secretary Gorbachev ran up to Brezhnev and showed him something in a folder. You could hear he was saying "collective farm construction" ...

Andropov took Ustinov's side.

The new PB member Chernenko joined in, saying, "Let the Council of Ministers find resources for conscription into the army through 'redistribution.' Then we can meet each other halfway."

At this point Brezhnev again said (although he already read off a paper at the beginning that the project is important and should be approved): "So what are we deciding?"

The decision was to return the project to the Council of Ministers for revision.

Neither Suslov nor Kirilenko uttered a single word during this stormy discussion.

Our issue – the book *L'URSS et nous*. Brezhnev reads off that [the article] is important and well prepared. But it should be published in the journal *Kommunist*.

(I saw that coming. Deputy of the sector Zuyev warned me that Aleksandrov called him the day before and praised the article very much but said that he will firmly insist on publishing the article in *Kommunist* as well as in *Novoye Vremya*. My first impulse was to call Aleksandrov and explain why B.N. and the Department chose *Novoye Vremya* and not another outlet. But I immediately stopped myself – it would just lead to another heated conversation with him, but the result would be the same.

(Meanwhile, B.N. discussed this question with us many times. We considered it from every angle. We initially preferred *Kommunist*, but ultimately decided to go with *Novoye Vremya*

– not only because circulation would be easier and “more natural” in France and abroad in general. Mainly, [we chose *Novoye Vremya*] for political reasons. *Novoye Vremya* already established itself as a magazine that comments on “Eurocommunism”... with opinion pieces. Of course, the whole world understands who is behind it. Still, it is not a CC organ, and the things it publishes could be the official line, or personal opinions, or warning shots for which the CC can indirectly “apologize.”

(In short, if necessary, the CC can always maneuver to take advantage of any opportunity to improve relations with a party that is offended by *Novoye Vremya*. This happened with the CP of Spain, with Carillo. But if a CC organ knocks a party like that, i.e. from the major caliber gun – if it does not lead to a break, then in any case it is an action that would be difficult to use for “strengthening friendship.”

(Aleksandrov either does not sense these subtleties, or he couldn’t care less about them. To him it seemed “more important” to publish in *Kommunist*, and he wrote that in Brezhnev’s paper.)

Suslov signed a note on this matter together with B.N., i.e. he brought this question to the CC and agreed that we should publish in *Novoye Vremya*. I think he heard this “differing opinion” for the first time. He did not object. I think if Ponomarev had been at this Politburo (he is in Sofia) he would have tried to oppose it. Suslov suddenly argued that we should publish it simultaneously in *Kommunist* and *Novoye Vremya*.

Many voices immediately supported him: yes, yes, yes. It should be published in both places, so not only the PCF leadership sees it, but others like them too. So it was decided. Brezhnev agreed – at least he made a sign that this question is closed, and Bogolyubov right away read the amended draft. (In the original, submitted by Suslov and B.N., it was just *Novoye Vremya*. Now they added *Kommunist* in front of it.)

And here – a musical moment – Brezhnev had not finished reading the paper prepared by Aleksandrov and when the noise subsided and everyone already decided that the issue was resolved and we were moving on to the next question, Brezhnev suddenly continued: “This does not mean the same material cannot be published in *Novoye Vremya*...”

The audience was respectfully silent, but one person did not understand what was going on and said, “I thought we already resolved that one...”

But that’s just an aside... Whereas the fact that Aleksandrov spoiled our tactical plan, that is serious. Now the French will get terribly pissed off at us. And our relationship will spiral down once again. Meanwhile, precisely in the last few weeks there have been signs that Marchais & Co. are making an effort to restrain themselves regarding us: his conversation with Chervonenko (unprecedented in atmosphere for the last 3-4 years), his speech in Vitry on December 9th at a meeting of the PCF CC with intelligentsia.

There we have it.

I’m going to Vnukovo-2 to meet Ponomarev arriving from Sofia.

Postscript to 1978

The year did not bring anything new. The economic collapse continued. Looking back two decades later, it is even more surprising that everyone saw what was happening – from district committees to regional committees to the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. But nobody knew or offered a way out – a real solution that could be called political. Even the experts tasked with “analyzing” the situation and writing speeches for the top leadership. This meant that the Marxist-Leninist theory (in its Stalinist format, we haven’t had another one since the times of NEP) which was the foundation for ideology and economic management, which made abuse of the population “legitimate,” and at one time even fueled “the enthusiasm of the masses” – was completely bankrupt.

The mid-level cadres (district committee leaders) were growing impatient. There were some “strong guys” among them who were ready to “move mountains” at least within the limits of their competence. They appealed to common sense, to a recognition of local capabilities. But the “system” and ideology made it impossible to bring their experience and abilities to fruition.

This was superimposed with the completely lifeless state of the top leadership. It assumed an ugly, grotesque character in the person of the “chief” – the General Secretary and quasi-president. There was no longer any policy worthy of the name – neither foreign, nor domestic. There was the protective fuss of Andropov’s department over dissidents and the “exodus” of Jews, which was used as a bargaining chip in relations with the United States. (Andropov turned this into a career path that took him to the very top). There were arguments with Eurocommunists, who increasingly this year refused to recognize the USSR as a “socialist country.” There was inertia of formal, “diplomatic” peacefulness, connected to Brezhnev’s widely known determination to prevent a world war (more on that in the previous “volume”). No one could encroach on Brezhnev’s will, though in 1978 it was more of a mythical element. Later, at the end of *perestroika*, it became clear that the prerogatives and official authority of the General Secretary of the CC CPSU was the last redoubt of the Soviet system. This conviction was always present in the CPSU, even if it was not conscious.

Brezhnev’s visit to the FRG impressively demonstrated the senility of Soviet leadership. The description of this spectacle is the most amusing and the most depressing page in the records of 1978.

Nevertheless (and again, from the hindsight of the present day), in the turmoil and often absurdity of what happened during that visit one can see the signs of the normalization of Soviet-Russian-German relations. The “Eastern policy” that Schmidt and Brandt smartly and delicately imposed on the Soviet Union showed its effectiveness. Our leaders, again by inertia, counting on trade and economic benefits and closing their eyes to the consequences, welcomed it (it ended up benefiting both nations, as well as Europe and the world).

This “volume” is full of international contacts. The author’s impressions from these trips, as well as their actual content, are interesting even from a purely human point of view – mutual understanding trumped ideological taboos and conventionalities.

The volume contains many sketches of everyday life and cultural events. The conclusion: mass consciousness was increasingly alienated from the regime and the existing order. The irreversible break of spiritual life (literature, art, the private life of the intellectual part of society) from ideology and anything officially imposed became more and more clearly marked.

Not a single honest and more or less reasonable person could refute the fact that the Soviet Party power was becoming discredited.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1979

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Translated by Anna Melyakova

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

1979

January 5, 1979

I was in “Sosny” from December 27th- January 3rd (35km from Moscow). However, this year I only got to ski three times. Unprecedented cold temperatures descended at the end of the year – up to -45C. Reportedly, the last time this happened was in 1842. Sections of Moscow are without electricity or heat. Some people say the power stations are out of order. Some say a train with coal arrived to the power station (by the Kievsky Railway Terminal) but it was 50 percent waste, and the management sent it back. Some say that 75 percent of the natural gas intended for Moscow has been used up by cities “along the way,” as they are also hit with terrible cold. In many buildings the temperature did not rise above 12C. For two days there was no bread in bakeries, and no milk.

In the meantime, Comrade Promyslov (mayor of the city) has been relaxing and celebrating the New Year at “Sosny” without a care in the world. I watched him there...

Burlatsky was there with his Irochka. I can’t imagine how an intellectual can live with such an absolutely empty, affected, thoroughly artificial and primitive but pretentious woman... Then again, he is also just a provincial parvenu, despite the fact that he’s the author of numerous books on sociology and even one fictionalized historical “dialogue” with Michelangelo. He imposed his company on me all the time, invited me to visit. The main theme was that I should recommend him, Burlatsky, as an adviser or a correspondent for a position in Paris.

I asked him: what about the language?

“I’ll learn it in six months!”

What can I say?! Then for a long, long time he talked about his abilities and merits. It looks like his Irochka is demanding that lifestyle and shopping.

And now back to work.

Gus Hall’s letter to the Chinese. It was reprinted in *Pravda*, and before that he sent it to us for a consultation. Now the task is to disseminate it throughout the world.

The letter to the Italians. Our response to their program theses for the Congress. It is actually a very informative and creative document, possibly the only realistic program for communists in a country with state monopoly capitalism... But why do they need to criticize us while they’re at it? Whether their commentary on our “path” and our socialism is true or not, they could have done without it right now... It is a nod to fashion (a terrible fashion for us – to demonstrate disappointment in Soviet society).

B.N. initiated yet another article on “democratic socialism” (which will fall on poor Veber’s and my shoulders). It will follow the same principle: let’s beat up on an easy target to send a signal to the tough one. He is thinking about Eurocommunists, but he will criticize Social Democrats. (“I’ve written all this in articles ten years ago and thirty years ago,” he said... Hilarious!) In my ineradicable intelligentsia manner, I tried to resist, saying that nobody can

really define what “democratic socialism” is nowadays. The Social Democrats themselves deny having any theory; they boast of being pragmatists. We will criticize them and they will laugh... In Vancouver at the Socialist International Congress they never even mentioned having a “general theory.” And so forth.

This is all boring... A defensive position – that’s the extent of our theory. Then again, when the Eurocommunists borrow from Social Democrats, they do not really know what “democratic socialism” is either. Same as we no longer know what “Marxism-Leninism” is, and only flip through Marx and Engels to pull quotes to suit the occasion...

By the way, some dissidents are truly studying Marx-Engels-Lenin. For example, I am reading a book by Rudolf Bahro, *The Alternative*. He is a German, an East German, who was imprisoned last year, for this book in particular. Meanwhile, he has a truly theoretically powerful mind and he is a scholar the likes of which we probably have not seen since the days of our classics. In comparison with this book, all the outstanding Sovietologists, not to mention the authors of *L'URSS et nous* [The USSR and Us], Carillo and others like him – are mere boys, kindergarten.

B.N. is going to the GDR in a few days at Honecker’s invitation. He assigned Kozlov to make a summary of this book by Bahro. Alexey is baffled. We talked... I advised him to be as objective as possible and to push B.N. to push Honecker to release Bahro... After all, we did not imprison our Roy Medvedev, even though his books are also being published abroad and widely used by anti-Soviets.

Iran is going through a “Revolution of 1905,” a powerful development of mass popular struggle... Next door to us. And what did we, Marxist-Leninists, know about it? Did anyone in the Soviet Union have a clue about what would happen there, a scholar or politician?! What is all our science and theory “at the service of politics” worth! As the result, we have the “authoritative” opinion of the Head of the CC International Information Department, broadcast on television throughout the entire Union: these events are the result of CIA intrigues, the Americans wanted to scare the Shah a bit as he was becoming less obedient... Zamyatin even wrote a note to the CC, suggesting to “follow a line of supporting stability in Iran” (i.e. the Shah!). Suslov and Kirilenko already scribbled “Agreed” on the note. Fortunately, events unfolded quicker than the pace of paperwork turnaround in the CC apparatus... they overwhelmed this “Zamyatin line.”

January 17, 1979

B.N. started the new year by picking up the pace of his various projects, designed to “make the communist movement do what it was destined to do by fate and by its great founding fathers” (as I put it today in my “speech” for his 74th birthday).

He convened a group of consultants. Presented them with challenges. I burst out with reproaches at this meeting: Iran has been undergoing a revolution for a year now, and we pretend that we do not see anything. Meanwhile, it is the consultants’ duty to give these kinds of assessments to the Central Committee... B.N. ignored my attack. (The next day he said the PB

adopted a resolution to create a CC committee – based on Brezhnev's note – on Iran). Now he is engrossed in the Iranian revolution, though he would have none of it when I brought it up.

January 28, 1979

From January 25-27th I was in Berlin with Ponomarev. At Honecker's personal invitation. Talks on all the conceivable international issues – from Zimbabwe to the PCF and PCI. But everything was somehow noncommittal. From B.N. – a mix of propaganda platitudes with police information about individuals and the weapons supply chain. From Honecker – generally the same, but on a grander scale. At the same time it was unclear whether he really needed the consultations with B.N. or if it was a formality (for the CPSU) before his visit to Africa (the Germans know the situation there as well as we do). He listened to B.N.'s inarticulate speeches politely, but apparently with indifference.

On the morning of the 27th, before departing, we visited the museum of "revolutionary art." German Expressionism from 1917-1933. It made a huge impression on me. And I felt embarrassed by B.N. His reaction upon seeing all this art that is so obviously unlike realism in the Soviet sense was to behave facetiously, as if to convey to our "high-level" companions: "we realize that this is all unintelligible nonsense, but if your intelligentsia finds something in it, then why not, we can take a look at it."

February 17, 1979

B.N. was gone all week – he went to appear before the voters. Kalinin, Novgorod, Pskov. I ended up taking part in preparing his speeches, although he clearly did not want to bother me this time. I started objecting about one point, but he replied: "Right now in Tver' they probably have neither meat, nor butter, nor even milk now... We have to say something to cheer them up: that capitalism is going through a crisis, unemployment, inflation (?!)..." And he laughed grimly.

March 3, 1979

From February 23-March 2nd I was in England and Ireland. A Congress of the Communist Party of Ireland in Belfast.

The destruction is like a war zone. Especially, and almost exclusively, in the proletarian districts. Patrols in armored cars, with rifles pointed at pedestrians. Constant searches – when entering the hotel, when attempting to go to the city center (fences with gates where every person is searched). There is some shooting. During the days we were there, from the 23-26th, there were two people killed and one British soldier went mad and shot two more people, then he was shot...

My interview for North-Irish television.

The Congress – the shabbiness and insignificance of their work. It is unclear what motivates them: for some it's inertia (nowhere else to go), for some it's habit, and for some it's enthusiasm. The Congress took place in the reception hall of the hotel "Midland." One hundred people.

I was the first to speak. I thought my speech was “beautiful” and relevant, but it seems I did not take into account that they do not represent a homogenous national organization. Not all of them were impressed by the national accent (the greatness of the nation) the same way as, say, it impressed West Germans (my speech there at the conference on Thälmann three years ago).

Volodia Janku from Czechoslovakia gave an effective speech.

Old man Pittman (from the CP of the U.S.) spoke for half an hour about the “special relationship” between the U.S. and Ireland.

The Cuban spoke about himself... The rest were boring, including the Frenchman Jacques Denis.

O’Riordan forbade us to walk around the city. So, all we had was hotel-Congress-and back in the car with him. But Andrew Barr did take us around Belfast once, after the Congress.

Some characters from the Congress: a red-haired girl (27 years old), Yvonne Sheehan. An American of Irish descent, a former nun, a former student of the Lenin School in Moscow, now – a doctor of Philosophy in Dublin. She is fairly attractive, endearing in her directness of a West European woman. She spoke several times. She speaks well, beautifully and instructively, sincerely. Her main idea is that everything is outdated: our ideas, our analyses, our conclusions. We need to rethink everything and present it at a high level, it needs to be imaginative and captivating...

After her first speech, she sat in the front row, directly across from me, and kept crying. Various people tried to comfort her. O’Riordan ignored her emotions. Later, at the hotel, he and I got to talking about her. He condescendingly despises such intellectuals...

Overall, this is probably how the Bolshevik congresses took place at the turn of the century, somewhere in London, Stockholm, etc. Scanty, poor, jointly with other events, several dozen people, lodgings with fellow emigres living in the city where the congress was taking place...

Flight from Belfast to London. More searches and very strict stewardesses.

It was cozy in London thanks to Yekimenko (an adviser at the embassy) – an amazingly kind person. Thanks to him, for the first time ever I had a chance to make optimal use of my time in London.

The National Gallery. I was there on my own. It was a communion. I spent a quarter of an hour just by Gainsborough’s Mrs. Sarah Siddons. I came back to her a few times over my two hours there. There are many exciting things, yet here in London, the most exciting are the English themselves: Gainsborough, Lawrence, Reynolds, Constable, Turner... Though there are surprisingly few of them there.

The Albert-Victoria Museum.

The Museum of Natural History.

The Tower...

Meeting with Carlsson, the Secretary-General of the Socialist International. I used the opportunity to grill him on Vietnam. Our KGB resident who organized the meeting was very impressed. Carlsson was helpless. In order not to look like an idiot, he said various reasonable and obvious things “on his own behalf,” but as a politician and the person responsible for the Socialist International, he spouted the usual Western vulgarity.

My impressions from the meeting convinced me once again that we are entering a time when Westerners are afraid to engage with us, they are afraid of a frank conversation, because their arguments about the “Soviet threat” are kicking the bucket, “human rights” are getting old, and it is ridiculous and not serious to build the international order around it.

This is also why the Labor Party avoided meeting me (and not because they are embarrassed to get tainted by us, like they were last year). Even though Kitson, when he was in Moscow a month ago, firmly promised me a meeting with Hayward and Lestor. Even though Jenny Little called the embassy and asked when I would be in London. But they got scared to “get in touch” (they sensed that I would use the Chinese to press them on all counts).

The meeting with the CPGB left me with a sad impression.

So – McLennan and Woddis. We sat down in the same room where a year ago he received Kunayev’s delegation for the Party Congress.

He opened with, “So, what do you have to discuss with us?” Clearly letting me know that “they” do not have anything for us. Luckily, the night before there was a telegram from Moscow (circulated among the fraternal parties) to help in holding the World Peace Council in Helsinki on the issue of PRC-Vietnam. I started with this “assignment.” We talked about Vietnam. They have the right position in general, even though when their representative in Belfast spoke about war between the two socialist countries he was “scuffed” (as in by feet on the floor – an Irish expression of disapproval).

McLennan picked up the phone and called Ramelson, our “old friend” and a member of the Presidium of the VMS [*Президиума ВМС*], who said that it was the first he heard of this initiative, but he would look into it.

We talked about Ireland. I told them my impression of both the Congress and the situation there. We agreed with each other.

On Vietnam, they both criticized the Chinese and used the word “aggression.” They claimed that the Labour Unions are starting to move away from the position of “both sides are to blame”... They expressed concern over how things will develop with China.

We moved on to inter-Party relations. McLennan mostly avoided responding to my initiatives, but on the main issue he said, “But most likely Comrade Brezhnev will again (!) be very busy.” In other words, he made it clear that if he did not get a meeting with Brezhnev, he would not come to Moscow.

I wanted to flatter them, so I asked for their advice: what should we do when it comes to the Labour Party. The question was unexpected, but they quickly rallied and one after the other started saying things along these lines:

- You (the CPSU, the USSR) should stop treating England as a third-rate power, putting it last after Schmidt and Giscard;
- You should get Callahan to come to Moscow;
- At the minimum, Callahan should make a detailed statement on détente (he has not done it so far, though even Carter has);
- You should use the mass media, both your and British, to tone down the topic of the “Soviet threat”; make sure that this year’s inevitable elections to Parliament do not take place with anti-Soviet overtones...

I thanked them (and in the morning reported all this to Moscow, though this kind of meddling in subjects outside the scope of my responsibilities will probably be not too well-received there).

Woddis took his leave, he had some business to attend to. I took advantage of his departure and outlined to McLennan, rather harshly, “our opinion” on what the CPGB press writes about Leninism, the crisis in the ICM, CPSU history, Stalinism, etc.

He watched me with a haughty smile. Then he said: “I do not personally agree with everything the CPGB press writes. But we – the executive committee – will not restrict freedom of discussion. We do not interfere at all, unless it comes to questions that are contrary to the principle of ‘fraternal relations’ with the CPSU.”

I asked him where is the line beyond which this principle is violated. After all, the whole point is that we have drastically different ideas about this line.

“Yes,” he said, “it is difficult to determine.”

I objected (taking into account the difference in our positions and the national character: he is a General Secretary and a Brit); I said that since they must discuss everything, they should at least give us the opportunity to set forth our arguments, especially when we are the subject at hand – the CPSU, the USSR, etc.

When I started talking about the fate of the Party “with such an approach to ideology,” the unity of the ICM, he put a stop to the subject rather decisively, saying, “We have significant disagreements on these issues and we could have a special discussion about them...” (apparently, not on my level). However, he recognized the usefulness of meetings like the one this summer when Woddis and Costello came to Moscow.

That ended our hour-and-a-half-long conversation.

Again I admired the greatness of London. It is truly not just a city but a Metropolitan [sic]: taste, wealth, greatness, reverence for everything that has happened in this country.

The television shows all kinds of Brits, the majority of them look like people from Tambov or Smolensk. The entertainment shows are full of nonsense, actually similar to German ones (all sorts of tricks with running and losing your pants, sticking your face in cake, etc.). I expected more intelligence and imagination in such things from the Brits.

Due to the condensed presentation of things in TASS, especially the white papers and ciphered telegrams, at home we think that their newspapers, television, and radio produce nothing but anti-Soviet materials. The reality is completely different: during my seven days there I did not see anti-Soviet materials even once on TV, and even in the newspapers there was no outright anti-Sovietism. Rather, there is a dangerous indifference to us as a society, nation, and culture. Plus, a fear that we could make an awkward turn in the world that would make it necessary to break some expensive dishes, and they would have to participate. In all other regards, they couldn't care less about us, including the dissidents. The only people who concern themselves with dissidents are the ones whose position necessitates it.

Their stores are full of wonderful things. Again and again I get frustrated for us, and for myself in particular, because at home, consumer goods are still a social, economic, political, moral-ethical, and neuropsychological problem.

March 9, 1979

From a micro-social point of view, my life philosophy is wrong. In a conditional and established society, all "elite" people play at life. The game has rules. In this milieu, people usually ask each other – how do you do? "Are you writing anything?" It does not matter what or why, the important thing is that you are taking part in this conventional game, since you are an intelligent civil servant. Nobody questions the content and internal significance of this occupation. I "do not write." I don't want to force myself. Although in contradiction with this position, I enthusiastically work on texts for Ponomarev. They have the same purpose – it's a game, but someone else's game! He never doubts the fact that he has to make a show of activity, since he occupies such a position.

For example, he stirred up a flurry of activity in connection with the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. He made us write "letters to fraternal parties" and explain to them as if they were children, to call upon them, and so on. He used his puppet Chandra (from India, he is the Chairman of the World Peace Council) to organize a meeting [“ходка”] (as Shaposhnikov puts it) of fighters for peace in Helsinki. For three days they proclaimed anathema and Ponomarev – through Zagladin and me – corrected the noise they were making "in accordance with the rapidly changing situation" in Vietnam. I think he understands that he has been pushed aside by Gromyko, Suslov, and Brezhnev to the sidelines of real politics. But he is keeping his chin up. And he keeps going full throttle within the scope of his jurisdiction.

So, there it is. His entire life he skillfully played his game. And he fell just a tad short of the ultimate prize – the Politburo membership.

Zagladin is playing too, though at a higher intellectual level. Unlike B.N., Zagladin is using his own intellect, abilities, will, and time, without exploiting anybody else (when Ponomarev was Zagladin's age, he already long had other people writing for him).

Yesterday I watched the first couple episodes of "The Unknown War" by Roman Karmen and an American. It is a twenty-episode documentary, created to inform modern Americans on who really won the war. Again, the same emotions – anyone who was in the war is chronically ill with it. I then picked up a book about the North-West front and went through pages describing the battles and movements in which I participated. It is as if it happened to someone else, not me. As chance would have it, at the cinema ticket booth I bumped into an acquaintance from 1947-48.

"You haven't changed at all," she said. "Are you keeping yourself preserved in a tin can or something? We are all getting fat, deformed, and you... as if it hasn't been 30 years. I read in *Pravda* that you just got back from Ireland..." and she started chattering.

In reality, I changed a great deal inside. Now I know that everything passes and in general nothing is really worth worrying about, and especially nothing is worth fearing. But in those days, I was very afraid of life's conventionalities. Then again, in those days they played immeasurably greater roles in people's fates.

I did not see Brezhnev on the podium for the elections. People say he was in worse shape, if it is even possible – to be "worse." His speech was slurred, his face was swollen, and so forth.

Following the official part, there was a concert at the Bolshoi Theater on the occasion of March 8th, and it was dedicated solely to Brezhnev. It was about his childhood, his family, his *Minor Land*, and *Virgin Lands*. If there was something "extraneous," it was a song by a Kazakh woman (because L.I. cultivated virgin lands in Kazakhstan) and a song by a Moldovan woman (because L.I. was CC Secretary in Moldova).

Who is doing this, and why? Why do they humiliate the old man this way, and taint (in advance) people's memory of him? Who benefits from this? Could it really be that "His Grey Majesty" is directing all of this, to later "expose" him once again?

March 17, 1979

Of the more significant events this week – Trapeznikov was once again blocked at the elections to the Academy of Sciences. Over the last three-four months, the majority of candidates' hustle on this matter has been particularly cynical and disgusting. But the main efforts among the inactive echelon were undertaken to push through Trapeznikov. Well ahead of time, "big press" was organized for his volume ("On Sharp Turns"), which is a classic embodiment of the insolence, ignorance, aggressiveness and vulgarity of neo-Stalinism. All sorts of hangers-on voluntarily ass-kissed; serious organs of the press "could not refuse;" and so forth. Diligent work was carried out by his office – the CC Department of Science, as well as by vice-president Fedoseyev at the Academy of Sciences and other subordinates and apparatus under his influence. They made sure that 100 percent of the Department of Historical Sciences would vote in favor of Trapeznikov.

So, the time came for the assembly of the Academy of Sciences: 138 votes “in favor” and 73 “against.” He was short four votes of the required norm (142 votes).

Old man Kapitsa commented in the hallway, for everyone to hear: “What a fool. He was made a corresponding member two years ago, he should have been happy and stayed put – after all, he didn’t deserve even that title. Instead, he tried to become an academician. One should have some modesty...”

In the West they will probably write that it is a form of opposition to power from the only democratic institution in the USSR. But I am sure this is not the case. It is simply an expression of the attitude towards this “figure,” and partially, of course, an expression of the academic circles’ attitude toward Stalinism.

People are saying that “in the course of preparations,” president Aleksandrov was summoned somewhere “to the top” regarding Trapeznikov. This is possible. However, he did not deliver, as one can see.

Do these lessons serve no purpose? Will this sergeant-major keep sitting as a Voltaire for our Academy and all scholarship in general? Most likely that is what will happen. But such outstanding luminaries “got in” as the “good guy” Primakov (author of one journalistic book but the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies) and the scoundrel Iskanderov (as a corresponding member) and others like them.

March 18, 1979

On the 29th I will be going to the XXIII Congress of the CP of Belgium. I am reading their materials, some of them for the second time, for example Renard’s report on internationalism (for the January 1978 Plenum). The report, as well as the 60-page draft of the political resolution, and other short materials – it all testifies to the great intellectual potential of the party, its deep “theoretical significance.” It is greater than the Italians’. I think something like this cannot be in vain. It will play a role one day, just as Lenin’s intellectual superiority over all others played a role when the time came.

In *Novy Mir* Issue No. 3 there is an article comparing Einstein (100th anniversary) with Dostoyevsky.

March 24, 1979

I read the *Notes of Empress Catherine II*. I got the idea from Herzen. I was barely able to get a copy – got it through an interlibrary loan from the Historical Library. They say there are only two copies left in Moscow.

It left a huge impression on me:

- This is high-level literature (after all, this was before Karamzin, not to mention Pushkin);

- It is an amazing depiction of that era, especially who ruled Russia and how, when it was moving full-steam into great-power status (Peter III, Elizabeth);
- Incredible depiction of everyday life;
- And, of course, Catherine II herself is truly magnificent human material, one of the giants of her century on an all-European scale, even though her *Notes* are limited to a period of time even before Elizabeth's death.

There is nothing pornographic in the *Notes*, as one might assume from Herzen's reviews. However, she does not hide and admits (though very "delicately," indirectly) her unbridled sexuality... and does not fault herself for it. On the contrary, she considers hypocrites the people who think, feel, and submit to their inclinations in private but speak and judge differently in public.

I read Azcarate's interview (he's a member of the leadership of Spain's CP) in the March issue of *Encounter* (a London magazine). He made everything clear about anti-Soviet communism. My god! How much he hates us! He is sputtering furiously... More proof that a heretic is worse than any arch-enemy. Alas! To a lesser extent, though not always, it is the same Ellenstein (author of the book *L'URSS et nous*)¹ and some of my Brits – many modern Western communists, or rather their leaders at various levels, have the same attitude towards us.

Zarodov is expected to be named Director of the Institute of History (replacing Narochnitskiy, who was forced out at the general meeting of the Academy of Sciences). But who then will head the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism (PPS)*? I suggested to Ponomarev to move things towards closing down the journal. Its number is up, nobody needs it, nobody reads it, it irritates a lot of people – some for ideological reasons, others because of the expenses associated with it, which are fruitless. Maybe it should be turned into a commercial agency = commercial publishing house, as Gus Hall suggested on numerous occasions. I said all this to B.N. His response was: "We will think it over and discuss it." We should push in this direction. I think Zagladin agrees.

Oh, and regarding the Institute of History. B.N. told me that Sen'ka Khromov is intended for the directorship. But he would be a new Trapeznikov!

Ponomarev is just delightful. When I told him about Zarodov (on behalf of Fedoseyev and Timofeyev, they nudged me and Zagladin about this after the meeting on the IV volume of the *International Labor Movement*) he replied: "What are you talking about! Is Zarodov director material? What kind of scholar is he? He had a couple books written for him... and that's it!"

As if Comrade Ponomarev writes his books himself! What is this? Senility? Or following the principle "Gods may do what cattle may not?" Or "childish debauchery" and naïve cynicism that are akin to his very nature, his sincere belief that "this is how it should be"?

¹ Francis Cohen is credited as the author of *L'URSS et nous* in Chernyaev's diary from 1978. The authors are: Alexandre Adler, Francis Cohen, Maurice Décaillot, Claude Frioux, Léon Robel [Trans.]

Ponomarev, due to age-related verbal incontinence and mounting veneration for “his past,” sometimes produces incredible things. When discussing volume IV, he suddenly told Fedoseyev, Zhukov, and us the following:

After World War II, capitalism was in greater shock than after the First World War, and opportunities for revolution in the West were also much greater, especially since communist parties had not only weapons, but also their own army, which formed from the Resistance. I (i.e. he, B.N.) told Togliatti and Thorez in these neighboring offices (he gestured around the room) “Go to Stalin, come to an agreement, it’s time to act...” They went, Togliatti first, then Thorez. Later they both told me: “Stalin does not want to look for trouble right now, he is against calls to seize power, he does not want to risk starting a new war – this time with the Americans...” And they submitted, they went back home and got to work on rebuilding the economies of Italy and France, both as Deputy Prime Ministers. We missed that chance. After all, B.N. added, hinting at Stalin, when it was really time to “fear” the war and to be vigilant against Hitler, then... (what then?). But at this opportune moment he got scared of the Americans, who would not have dared to fight against us then... And he hinted: Stalin raised the gauntlet of the Cold War and led it himself because he was furious at being betrayed once again (like he was by Hitler in 1941). He stopped the revolution, acted as an honest partner, met the West halfway. What he got in return was anti-Sovietism and expulsion of Communists from governments.

Of course, having told this story, B.N. did not recall that in his public speeches he repeatedly exposed anticomunists and imperialistic propaganda for claiming that communists followed (and obeyed) the Soviet Union’s foreign policy back then and in general (before the emergence of “Eurocommunism”).

Today I read F. Claudin’s *Eurocommunism and Socialism*, from 1977. The book has made it around the world in several editions. It presents the most consistent justification of Eurocommunism and criticizes its followers for being inconsistent. Claudin himself was a comrade of Carrillo, who expelled him from the PCE in 1964 for anti-Sovietism and “Euro-Communist” ideas, which Carrillo himself embraced only after Czechoslovakia ’68. The book is even more anti-Soviet than Azcarate’s interview, but it is calmly rational (not hysterical) and aside from anti-Sovietism it contains a lot of serious thoughts about the future of socialism and the ICM.

In general though, when you consume this kind of material every day, it “poisons” your system. For example, yesterday I studied Diligensky’s article, which he prepared following my initiative for Khavinson’s journal. In contrast to *Novoye Vremya*, this is anti-Carrillo, but not regarding his anti-Sovietism. It is about the real problems of revolution that he raises in his book *Eurocommunism and the State*. It is a serious and thorough article. Convincing, too. But after reading Claudin today, I saw that he criticizes Carrillo and Eurocommunists for the same things – for their illusions, their utopianism, legalism, social-democratism and reformism (roughly speaking). However, he believes and tries to prove that the future of socialism in Western Europe is hopeless if the USSR remains what it is today. Eurocommunism is a way out of yet another crisis of capitalism (a way out that leads to socialism), but it will turn into a fresh impetus for capitalism, similarly to what happened after the October Revolution, which did not lead to

socialism anywhere (including in socialist countries) because the revolution was defeated in the West. According to Claudin's theory, victory is only possible this time if Eurocommunism is combined with "renewal forces" in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The "concurrence" in Diligensky and Claudin means that it is possible to have the right reasoning without including (and in Claudin's case even denying) the USSR as a revolutionary factor...

March 27, 1979

I received the Ambassador of Jamaica "Comrade Benjamin Clare." He is a handsome mulatto, very elegant despite the party uniform jacket he was wearing because they are also building socialism right now. In ten days, their leader is coming to Moscow, the Prime Minister and Chairman of the Party Manley. Clare gave me a letter for Brezhnev and for a long time explained the international situation and their full agreement with us. He also talked about socialist internationalism, because he needs me to support their requests – to build an alumina refinery, give them oil, provide them with a 50-million-dollar credit for raw materials and industrial goods. "This would be Leninist practical internationalism"...

In response, I spoke beautiful words about their road to socialism, and promised to "report" everything.

Yesterday in B.N.'s office Zagladin and I were discussing the plan for a meeting of CC Secretaries in Berlin. Over and over – to subordinate everything to the anti-war struggle. Even our (indirect) exposure of the Eurocommunists' opportunism should be done from this angle. Search for approaches to China... look for "our guys" there. We will not solve the problem with intimidation, confrontation, and Sinophobia. That would only bring us closer to war. War with China is a realistic prospect, because the Americans do not have troops to fight us with: they will not be able to deploy millions of soldiers across the ocean, and Germans, French and others are not a serious prospect nowadays. Their only real bet is to do it using the Chinese!

Non-alignment... If we (?) do not uphold an anti-imperialist direction there, it will turn into a reserve for imperialism. This is how he taught us. And there is something to that. [Ponomarev] has an ability to reduce everything to "Soviet interests" (like Lenin, according to Gorky, ultimately reduced everything to class struggle).

April 8, 1979

From March 29-April 4 I was in Belgium. The Congress of the Belgian CP. Solovyov was the head of the CPSU delegation, he is the Secretary of the Leningrad city committee.

To Brussels by car in the evening. Above us there was a density of lights, all roads, not just the highways, are illuminated by street lights. They shine with a yellow light that we only have in downtown Moscow. This is their energy crisis... and the capitalist principle to pay for everything on a case-by-case basis!

The Congress was at the “House of Eight Clocks” [в «Доме восьми часов»]. Disregard for foreign delegations and of course no special treatment for the CPSU. General Secretary Van Geyt did not even approach our delegation in the auditorium.

We barely had a chance to hand over the greeting from the CC, which was so thoroughly thought-out and carefully approved, to the head of the International Department (he did not want to take it until the end of the Congress, no time!). I doubt anybody read it. There was definitely no time or place to present the “gift from the CC” to the Congress and give our delegation’s greetings. I physically handed the gift to Van Geyt during a lunch for some members of the PB with foreign delegations, already after the Congress.

These delegations were a kind of international decoration: they were present only at the opening and closing ceremonies of the Congress. All the real work – discussions of document drafts – was moved to committees that were closed to “outsiders.”

The Politburo of the Belgian CP, newly elected at the Congress, did come to the embassy like in the good old days. Gradually, we got into laid-back, “comradely” chatter about whatever came to mind. The “European Parliament” turned into a serious topic. We do not even remotely understand their concerns in this regard. In general, we are behind – not Inozemtsev’s institute, but politically in assessing the realities of the powerful internationalization of capital – the economy of capitalism that Lenin foresaw. Nowadays there are virtually no national capitalist economies...

B.N. caught on to this several months ago. Now we are preparing a note for the CC, so we have at least some platform (our own) regarding the European Parliament and their current state of integration in general.

We went to Antwerp, had a chance to stop by the famous cathedral with the Rubens’ triptych. Then the port, meeting with workers of the oil refinery who are still on strike. The oil refinery was closed by Brezhnev’s “friend” Hammer. It’s been closed for six months. When they were employed, they got 25 thousand francs per month. Now on unemployment they are getting 20 thousand francs per month, without paying taxes or deductions. It is quite possible to live and strike! It’s a comedy! Hammer abandoned the plant – do whatever you want with it.

On Monday, April 2nd, I met with socialists in their Central Committee. Almost their entire “top” was there: Van Eynde, Van Miert, Leonard, Radu, Teddy, and some others. Solovyov did not go to meet with them. He said, “The CC did not instruct me to work with socialists.” My interlocutors talked a mile a minute about whatever came to mind. Again, the conversation eventually came to the European Parliament. I barely had time to throw in some comments – on China, the arms race, the Middle East, the significance of the relationship between the CPSU and Belgian Socialist Party... The atmosphere is better than with communists. The socialists are not afraid of being suspected of receiving orders from Moscow. Therefore, everything was straightforward, friendly, natural, though without any substance for political consequences. My French did not fail me. I think if I lived “in its midst” for a month, I would become quite fluent.

April 15, 1979

Once again about Diligensky's article, written against Carrillo on instructions from B.N. I gave it to Lesha Kozlov (a consultant in our Department). He got mad, and, blushing over his "revisionism," started to argue: "This means we condemn any theoretical pursuit of communist parties; whatever they might come up with we call it revisionism. At the very least, we do not see anything new in it." I tried to explain to him that there is nothing theoretically new in Eurocommunism. Social democrats from Bernstein to Kreisky and others had all these ideas, and presented them with better execution. The new factor in Eurocommunism is the communists' readiness to abandon their birthright (Leninism) and to try out the experience Social Democrats have gathered since 1917. To try to integrate into a capitalist system that has changed a great deal in the last 60 years. Thereby, they want to justify their existence, which for most communist parties turned into stagnation long ago.

Quite a different matter is whether a revolution could ever take place under the modern conditions of state monopoly capitalism. If not, then there is no need for orthodox communist parties. But while we (the CPSU) maintain that a revolution will take place, naturally we cannot agree with the social-democratization of communist parties.

I met with the Jamaicans again. Manley asked Kosygin that his comrades – Bertram, Heaven, Clare, and [Manley's] wife Beverley (who, it seems, is running the show in the Party) – be received at the CC International Department. Kosygin called Suslov, Suslov called Zagladin and we had the meeting. (By the way, this Beverley is a very elegant mulatta, quite sexy and smart).

Despite all of their Oxford education (they are far from the African revolutionary democrats) they are very genuine. It seems they really want to build their socialism and they are interested in everything. They want to learn from our experience without following it to the letter: how to accept membership into the ruling party, how the apparatus works, how to organize elections, how to conduct propaganda, etc.

Kosygin later reported to the PB about the talks and this meeting we had, he praised Zagladin and me.

Following B.N.'s orders from the south, I keep "improving" an article on how the ICM is a good thing. He is planning to arrange with Suslov to get it published for May 1st.

April 19, 1979

CC Plenum. It was announced who would be elected at the Supreme Soviet session and for what positions. As always, CC members showed up to the Sverdlovsky Hall one-and-a-half to two hours ahead of time (there were barely enough seats for everybody). A few minutes before the start, the auditorium fell silent in oppressive anticipation: will the General Secretary Himself be there or not. He was sick since the end of March, we found out about it because Giscard D'Estaing's visit had to be postponed.

He came out... Prolonged applause. But the oppressive atmosphere remained in the auditorium – from the General Secretary's complete, obvious, striking physical and mental helplessness. He could barely tie words together. He tried to perk up and make jokes during Suslov's speech but it came out nonsensical and awkward. Against the background of this power – which is completely empty inside but exorbitantly absolute on the outside – the nature of the highest party organ as nothing but a stamping tool was even more pronounced. This includes nominating candidates to all government bodies and for ministerial positions – all the same people. They should have replaced one of them, just for fun. The average age is probably about 70.

April 22, 1979

Session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to approve the Soviet-Afghan treaty. Brezhnev was presiding. The entire world knows what condition he is in; he did not even show up to the Lenin celebrations on April 21st. Any schoolboy would understand there is no need to convince the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on this issue. But no! Brezhnev spoke for five minutes, Gromyko for three, but our Ponomarev spoke for half an hour. As always, he was certain that whatever he says is of enormous "international importance." People were not just surprised, they were irritated, especially as they looked at the languishing chairman. Leaving the auditorium, one guy said loudly to those around him, "That old fool thinks he is smarter than everybody and we would not know what to do without his lecturing – to adopt the treaty or keep thinking it over."

May 12, 1979

From April 30-May 4th I was in West Berlin. The official reason was to participate in the Communists' May celebrations, the real reason was to attend numerous meetings with Communists at various levels to show that the CPSU still respects the United Socialist Party of West Berlin (our "fraternal" party, communist), that we stand with it despite its major defeat in the March 18th city elections.

I stayed in the "Hamburg" hotel. Impressions from "the wall" (Berlin Wall). When you walk through it, in just a few seconds you are transported to a different world, you feel it in your skin.

The May demonstration. Quite the fun crowd there: trade unions, anarchists, Maoists, Trotskyists. Their main slogan is "A 35-hour work week." Fairly massive seven columns. Seventy thousand total. A rally at Kennedy Square. Trade union bosses and other such leaders on stage. There was a lot of anti-Soviet and anti-GDR sentiment in their speeches. A lot of foreign workers – Turks, Greeks, Yugoslavs, Italians... They look better than Muscovites do on a holiday. Already there are 200 thousand of them in a city of two million. Feminists had a special platform. I heard they live in special high-rise apartment buildings where men are not allowed.

Communist celebration in the "People's House." A mix of hippie attitudes with communist ideology that is serious in the German way. On the stage there were episodes from the Peasant War of the 16th century. Primitive at the level of our fifth-grade amateur school

performances. But it is presented with incredible enthusiasm. I saw a subtext in this play – the “German idea” – all Germans share one history, therefore in their minds there is a feeling of impermanence and inconceivability of permanently maintaining this ridiculous construct of West Berlin. Whomever you talk to this idea slips through.

The monstrous roar of jazz and almost pornographic moves of half-dressed young dancers made it very difficult to have a conversation.

On May 2nd there was a meeting with the leadership of the Party – Horst Schmitt and others. A clear analysis of the situation: exemplary modern production at the level of the latest achievements of the Scientific and Technological Revolution. High wages – higher than in the FRG, plus an additional eight percent for everyone from the FRG’s budget. Full economic integration with West Germany, but at the same time unemployment, especially among youth (but not foreigners), which breeds leftist extremism. There are seven communist parties in the city alone, and the “Alternatives” movement. Prosperity combined with hopelessness and terrifying boredom in everyday life. Drugs, porn, various other types of entertainment no longer help, even in the presence of genetic German discipline.

In the evening in the Administration there was a meeting with ordinary factory-worker communists. I wanted to bow to these fellows for their unselfishness, courage, and ideological commitment. They are working in an environment that is hostile and smothered in prosperity, they have no hope either for personal career growth or for achieving the Party’s ultimate goals (as one of them put it: to attain socialism in a city that is surrounded by a socialist “wall”). Almost everybody who shared a personal story goes through a similar cycle: he hides his communist affiliation, earns the trust and support of most of his “colleagues” (this is how they refer to other workers on the shop floor at their factory), gets elected to the workers’ council and the trade union leadership, gets promoted higher and higher, and then... a provocation, usually from a social democrat, and a lightning-fast slide down. Even though everyone already knew that he is a communist, the harassment starts when it is announced officially: he is kicked out of everywhere, up to being fired from the factory. And even his closest friends turn away, sincerely beginning to consider him an agent of the GDR, a provocateur, a liar, a deceiver, a corrupt individual.

The next day – the Reichstag. The grounds around it have been beautified. Inside there is a permanent exhibit on the history of Germany from the end of the XVIII century to the present day. It is very smartly done. Conceptually, the exhibition is social democratic. There are dozens of buses with tourists from the FRG and foreigners. And schoolchildren, schoolchildren, schoolchildren – with special notebooks in which they write down (and then read out loud in front of the “white wall”) their own answers to “questions about German history.” The answers suggest themselves – if, for example, Marx and Engels, who are so revered by the communists, fought for a united Germany a hundred years ago, why shouldn’t we do it now?!

The exhibit does not aim to arouse sympathy towards Hitlerism. But the causes for the war are presented with the help of photos and quotes from Stalin and Hitler along the lines of:

two tyrants and dictators could not divvy up what belongs to whom, and as the result the Germans experienced a terrible tragedy.

The monument to the Soviet Soldier near the Brandenburg Gate and two tanks on pedestals (the tomb of soldiers killed during the capture of the Reichstag) has been turned into a symbol of communism's isolation in the world, the contempt and hatred for everything that is east of the "Wall," which is nearby, along with crosses for those shot while trying to escape from East Berlin.

May 13, 1979

Some more about Berlin.

After lunch we drove to Spandau. This is something like the Maryina Roshcha district of Moscow – a huge industrial area, proletarian, where people say "I'm going into the city" if they go downtown from Spandau. There are jokes about it, too: "Berlin is somewhere on the outskirts of Spandau." It has the strongest regional organization of the United Socialist Party of West Berlin. They received us at their district committee – around 100 people – with remarkable hospitality. They gave the prepared greetings, then [spoke] one after another, as if reporting to us, without a hint of subservience, sincerely, not on someone's orders. A young teacher was especially memorable, she was beautiful, refined and delicate. She was very nervous. Again, the same scenario as I heard the previous evening: the whole district knows that she is a communist, all her superiors know. And yet, she advanced to a position of deputy head of the district organization (our equivalent). She is loved and respected everywhere. But the moment there is a public protest mentioning the "professional ban [*Berufsverbot*]" law (it applies in West Berlin the same as in the FRG) she will be persecuted and brought down in a matter of days.

In the evening, already in East ("our") Berlin, Herbert Häber drove us to his house. He is a head of a CC department in the SED (he is also in charge of the international department, same as Winkelmann, heir to Paul Markowski, but a different one – only for West Germany and West Berlin). It was a long drive to the outskirts of the city, a neighborhood with new buildings. I expected that living conditions would be incomparably higher than those of officials at a similar level back home. However, what he showed us surpassed expectations: a two-story house with a garden, guest rooms, bedrooms, offices, a cellar, facilities, garage, nurseries, etc. There are TVs and all kinds of sound equipment everywhere. The interior décor is fine, and I (having a similar-level position in the CC CPSU) would not even dare to dream about anything like it. We had a nice and delicious visit. His wife and son (a tenth-grader) joined us. We almost did not talk about politics.

Ponomarev barely asked about my trip. He summoned me and right away started to comment on the text of his speech at the economic conference at Inozemtsev's Institute, and on May 7th he already had to leave for Paris for the XXII Congress of the PCF.

I was at the CC Secretariat on the 8th and Politburo on the 10th. The Secretariat discussed a letter prepared by our Department, from the CC CPSU to the CC of the Communist Party of Finland regarding their rapid slide into revisionism – a "Finnish-style historical compromise."

Aalto's article and discussion in the party, especially after their defeat in the parliamentary elections. Our letter is frank, and even going by the standards of CPSU-SKP relations, it is an unceremonious interference in the affairs of a fraternal party... I gave explanations.

The Politburo discussed the outcomes of Giscard d'Estaing's visit. The discussion lasted no more than three minutes and the visit was considered to be very positive. I read the transcripts of the talks and saw that L.I. only read two texts. Kosygin and Gromyko led the entire conversation. Brezhnev only made one remark about the "gray zone" (a reciprocal non-placement of weapons on both sides of the border between the two "camps" in Europe), and even that Gromyko quietly disavowed later.

Brezhnev recently made a few appearances on television. He personally awarded some generals (for May 9th) and his own son, who is a deputy minister of trade, with the Order of the October Revolution. That made a special impression. It's all Moscow is talking about.

Victory Day. With Kolya Varlamov. Nostalgia for our wartime youth combined with a feeling of uneasiness in front of today's youth for imposing our criteria on them, our way of feeling and thinking. This only causes them to feel irony towards us, if not downright resistance and contempt. Especially since this is done through official politics and propaganda in an atmosphere when, it turns out, the 18th army (i.e. Brezhnev at *Minor Land*) played the decisive role in our victory!

May 19, 1979

Once again at the CC Secretariat.

I was in the picture twice. Once regarding the twinning of cities: SSOD [Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts] suggested to choose 10 from the 56 requests. I questioned Vologda and Velikiye Luki as partners for two Swedish cities earlier, back in the Department. And I was right to question them. Suslov and others strongly criticized that "comrades are not thinking" about what we will show in those cities and what there is to boast to the Swedes. Vologda barely made it. I only remember Velikiye Luki from the war, and all it had was dugouts. It was struck off the list.

May 20, 1979

I am concerned about B.N.'s speech tomorrow on the STR at Inozemtsev's, with the participation of Western communists. I'm more concerned than he is himself. He is preoccupied with something else, namely – in Paris, Plyushch filed a lawsuit against him for mentioning his name at a conference in Sofia in a list of people who cooperate with foreign intelligence. The journal *L'étude Soviétique*, which reprinted the speech, is threatened with a fine of \$10,000 and paying to publish a refutation and an apology in 10 newspapers. Chervonenko sent this "episode" into broad circulation, thereby making B.N. even more outraged. B.N. tried to pounce on me, too: why did I include something like that. But, texts in hand, I quickly proved to him that the phrase mentioning Plyushch was neither in the draft, nor in the text that was sent to the PB, nor even in the text he read in Sofia (the stenographer noted the changes he made as he was giving the speech and I have that copy). The phrase with Plyushch appeared for the first time in the

Bulgarian stencil copy after the speech was given. B.N. can feel it is his own fault, he is trying to find people to blame among those who reviewed the page proofs before publication. It could have been me...

But that is not the point. All the printed texts in all languages contain this phrase. And that is a legitimate basis for a libel suit. It is impossible to prove that Plyushch is a spy, especially post factum. After all, he was not even tried... He went straight from the mental hospital to Paris.

B.N. is worried how his superiors will react to this. It is obvious how they will react: "He appears in the press three times a month, the devil knows what they write for him and he delivers it all and even publishes it in the most authoritative print media. He is an 'authority' on all issues – from disarmament, the Comintern, and Social Democracy to the STR and the crisis of capitalism, not to mention real socialism, etc."

His academic-theoretical productivity has long been annoying Brezhnev, Suslov, Kirilenko, practically everybody.

I already said more than once: we, the people worn out by his "oeuvre," cannot understand why he needs it. It is obvious that it has the opposite effect on his career. From the point of view of theory and access to Marxist-Leninist thought?! Contributions there can only be announced from the top, not "introduced."

The other day I was a guest of one intelligentsia family. Again, I found myself at the crossroads of a philistine-intellectual debate – why there is no meat and why, for example, Estonians, who produce 180 kilograms per capita in their republic, have to feed the Uzbeks and themselves remain without meat?

I enjoyed Glushkova's article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. She sharply ridiculed the "moral critique" of contemporary Soviet poetry, and recalled Pushkin's famous lines about the "moral": it is, so to speak, "quite another thing." She said it is time to step away from this drivel (this pathetic fashion) and judge poetry by the laws of culture and historicism rather than by the "criteria of morality," to which every person attaches his own capricious meaning.

June 9, 1979

Practically every day B.N. gives birth to some kind of initiative. For example, to send a note to Brandt in connection with the European elections. But from whom? Who can address Brandt besides Brezhnev? And Brezhnev, who hasn't even heard about the European elections, probably has nothing better to do! I usually "ignore" such initiatives, but sometimes B.N., with his tenacious memory, reads some ciphered telegram and remembers... and then he reminds me, too...

June 21, 1979

Over the last few days the "Carter kiss" (with Brezhnev) happened in Vienna... And we are already in a time crunch preparing Ponomarev's texts for the Berlin meeting of CC

Secretaries. In light of “the kiss” our class approach and unmasking American imperialism does not look very appropriate.

I’ll go wring my brains to try to combine the two things.

When last Friday Ponomarev made me and Zagladin prepare a draft Politburo resolution on the outcomes of the Vienna Brezhnev-Carter summit, I was inwardly exasperated. Where is he sticking his nose again? We, the Department, had nothing to do with the negotiations.

But once again I underestimated Ponomarev, who knows how to use the corridors of power. Many times in similar circumstances he managed to push through “his own” solutions... Of course, through Suslov. Suslov, he said, read the text and approved it without amendments.

He also told us about what L.I. reported at the PB. Ponomarev’s account was boring and muddled. I caught a few points that are important right now on a practical level for the preparation of the meeting of Secretaries in Berlin: do not portray the summit in Vienna as our victory; do not insist that it is particularly advantageous for us; do not scold Carter but also do not praise him, do not interfere in his attempts to get it ratified. We need it. We will survive if it does not happen, but we will have to fork out a lot more.

However, Carter’s career is over. Though he apparently would really like to remain president for longer, and he does not hide it.

Attempts to pressure us (spying from Turkey’s territory – by airplane; on the Middle East – to accept the new timeframe for UN forces in Sinai; to support the plan to regulate the situation in southern Africa) did not succeed. Carter was firmly told that it is pointless to expect anything from us on these issues.

Particular emphasis (which is viewed as an achievement) on the fact that both announced that they will not seek superiority. However, when Carter returned home, he openly said in a speech before Congress that America is stronger and will remain stronger. And his Powell had figures in hand to publicly demonstrate that this is the case: on missiles, and planes, and submarines, and economic potential, in which together with the allies they surpass us threefold!!! And so forth.

June 23, 1979

I am at home.

Where is Russia going, after all?

Soon, the prices for luxury goods will go up: cars, furniture, furs, gold... Following the laws of eternal political economy, this will immediately affect the people who buy onions, turnips, dill, cucumbers, potatoes at the market. And then following the laws of inflation it will be reflected in the prices of consumer goods.

The guys from the Department of Planning-Finance Agencies say these kinds of “measures” never produce the desired effect: for two-three months the budget revenue increases,

then things go back to “normal,” but corruption, cynicism, and embezzlement grow. For example, if a store used to take a 10 percent kickback of the total cost of a furniture set, now the kickback is 100 percent of the cost.

The same guys are also saying there is a stream of letters from the regions, increasingly demanding and threatening. For example, “Do not think the Russian people have endless patience...” More and more often, they are seriously (not anonymously) demanding to have ration books introduced for meat, milk, grains.

It looks like the harvest this year will be very bad. We can expect a disaster.

Seriously, does a great nation and great country have to endure such economic shame for so long (and there is no end in sight) so its leader can talk “on equal footing” with Carter?! Nobody believes anymore that anyone wants to attack us, or “conquer” us, or subjugate, defeat, etc. Why, then, do we need this military power which turned into a terrible obstacle to all our development? The interests of our people are sacrificed to this military power. But at the end of the XX century such glory is ridiculous. It is no wonder that today’s youth (unlike our generations) could not care less about this glory, and sometimes about the “Motherland” itself.

As could be expected, after attending the Politburo, B.N. realized that we need to go back to the first version of the Berlin report, focus on promoting SALT-II and tone down the class analysis of the long-term trends in the struggle against imperialism. Yesterday he made comments precisely to that effect on a draft that was made in strict accordance to his instructions from a week ago. He was unhappy with the emphasis on “long-term problems.” And – it never ceases to amaze me – he acted as if he was not the one who gave us the framework and dictation, as if he was not the one who blasted the previous version for “superficiality, because its main parts were dedicated to SALT-II.”

However, I did not fail to remind him politely... But it’s like water off a duck’s back.

From the perspective of “the good of the cause” it is better, of course. Plus, I am tired of his theoretician airs.

June 30, 1979

The week went by in a haze: the usual finish before Ponomarev’s action. On Monday we leave for Berlin. In my job of political writing, my hunch is almost always right. Ponomarev, with his Comintern-propaganda approach to politics, from the very beginning was pushing us in the wrong direction. We resisted, but the “difference in our weight categories” quickly puts a limit to our protests. The same thing here: B.N.’s vision essentially boiled down to the idea that nothing will change, despite SALT-II and all that. The race will continue, imperialism will keep preparing for war, everything will keep moving along the path predetermined by class struggle. Therefore, in Berlin we have to sound the alarm, expose, mobilize, and so on.

We were all sure that after Vienna he would have to lower his tone. That is exactly what happened. Now he is surprised how the text could still have things like – “By propaganda we

will strive to influence the government and Congress in the spirit of SALT-II ratification"... God forbid there is a leak!

Yesterday the last redoubt fell: "MX" (the new most powerful American missile). For more than two months, there has not been a "conversation" on preparations for Berlin where he did not demand to expose "this plan of Carter's." "What is going on! With one hand he, Carter, is for SALT, and with the other he is creating a new, almost uncontrollable threat to us, he is encouraging the race, etc.!"

Reluctantly, cursing under our breath, we first wrote five pages about the "MX," then cut it down to three, then one, then, after Zimyanin's remarks – down to one paragraph. Yesterday we received a rough, unmarked "remark" from Gromyko: it is wrong to raise this issue. "MX" does not fall under SALT-II, and overall it is not fitting to deal with such matters at "such a forum." When I showed it to B.N., he turned red in the face and said, "Well, let us accept this," and struck out his last attack on the "MX."

My attempt to speak with B.N. about corruption in ministerial circles failed. One after another, cases of bribery, nepotism, theft of state property worth millions of rubles are coming to light (at the level of deputy ministers).

And now there will be a price increase starting on July 1st. So much for SALT-II!

Viktor Afanasyev's article in *Pravda* about his trip to Japan. It seems to be a new style by which Viktor (from the height of his position as *Pravda*'s editor-in-chief) is demonstrating how to carry out the CC resolution on ideology. He showed a model of capitalism that we should learn from. He explained (plainly, without the air of exposing the exploitative system) why the Japanese increased their industrial production twenty-fold over the last thirty years. He described modern-day Japan. And a lesson for us – not as a subtext, not through hints, but straightforwardly: this is how one has to work, this is how one has to organize labor, this is how to use resources, etc.

July 8, 1979

From July 2-6th I was in Berlin. A meeting (the sixth) of CC Secretaries of socialist countries. There is a mini-logic of events, but there is also their place in shaping the course of main events. From the perspective of big politics, my observations are as follows: "Our friends are tired of us." Primarily, they are tired of us creating a situation on a global scale that is supposedly necessary for us and for them. We do this through our position towards the West, the Chinese, etc. It is not that they (the ruling communist parties) are in principle against our foreign policy. No. But they are sick of playing the role of the choir, they have "their own affairs," and they grew tired of spending their energy on political empty talk.

As for the ideological-political coordination (these meetings are largely held for this purpose), the Bulgarian Dmitriy Stanishev² once expressed our friends' attitude towards this (not at a meeting, of course, but in a bar): "What coordination are you talking about?.. People need to be fed, clothed, and have living conditions on par with the FRG, for example. Then you won't need any ideological coordination. But you interfere. For example, you always complain that we take loans from the West, that we are getting into debt. But what are we supposed to do? You are not giving us those loans, and you cannot. This stuff – he tugs at Zagladin's shirt – we make better quality than you do, and you sell shirts like these for foreign currency in "Berezka" in Moscow. So, what can we expect? In the meantime, our people are asking us why we cannot live the same or better than West Germans or Austrians or Danes, who come by tens of thousands to our Gold Coast? Not millionaires, mind you, but workers just like us!"

That's the whole story! Our German "friends" did not like that we made our European policy with the FRG, going over the head of the GDR. In the meantime, we made them, the East Germans, shout against the FRG. While we actively developed economic relations with West Germany, we kept thrusting Bonn's "treachery" under the GDR's nose and tried to prohibit or at least hold them back from developing economic relations with the FRG. Despite our prohibitions, this development already turned into the FRG's economic expansion. Regular people welcomed it, and the GDR leadership did not see any other alternative. When Axen, a member of the SED PB, was speaking at the aforementioned meeting, he wanted to please us and ritually railed against the FRG and especially their social democracy. Behind the scenes he was indignant that Ponomarev did not do the same!

The Hungarians were not happy that in our coordination we acted like there is unity between the policies of Vietnam-Laos (especially ideology) and Hungary, and the USSR as well. "Listen," Lakos³ told me, "do you really think that it is one policy? What the Vietnamese said here would have been appropriate 15 years ago, and even then, it would have been jarring. And now? Why are we being duplicitous, why such hypocritical meetings? Is it not dangerous to the policy itself? After all, no one said even a word to make the Vietnamese doubt that they have universal support for their point of view!"

And, of course, everyone was outraged because we are forcing 10 parties to fuss with Romanians at these meetings, just so they join the joint communique. But when a Czech, Vietnamese, and a Pole tried to make some minor editorial corrections, we brought all possible means into play, right up to conversations at the level of CC Secretaries, so they "do not insist," do not rock the boat that is about to tip over.

Naturally, our friends drew the conclusion that the more you act up with the CPSU, the more they reckon with you!

² A CC Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, he was very close to us, the International Department workers. He was a man who trusted the CC CPSU enormously. He was long aware and understood what was happening in his own country under Zhivkov's leadership. [Author's note]

³ [Sandor] Lakos at the time was the director of a Party-Ideological Institute under the CC MSZMP (similar to our Institute of Marxism-Leninism). I got to know him when I worked for the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.

The Romanians themselves, their tactics and policies, not to mention personal behavior, won nobody's sympathies. People "did not want to understand" why we fuss with them so much. The Soviet Union needed a show of unity and the rest had to suffer the Romanians' vulgarities and sacrifice their dignity for this.

Our "friends" are tired of the CPSU's double game in the communist movement in connection with Eurocommunism. During the abovementioned Berlin meeting we conducted yet another secret meeting of CC Secretaries (without Romanians).

Here is how it went. SED Politburo member Hager chaired the meeting. Ponomarev spoke first, presented his assessments as if they were shared by all those present. He finished.

Hager: "Who would like to speak?" Silence. It lasts a few minutes. The Cuban, probably trying to save the situation, speaks for a long time about preparations for the conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana. In other words, completely off topic.

Hager asks again: "Who would like to take the floor?"

Silence again. Then Rusakov takes the floor, even though he was scheduled to be the last to speak. He talks about our relationship with the Romanians, Yugoslavs, and Koreans.

Hager... and silence again. Then the German thanks the speakers (i.e. Ponomarev, the Cuban, and Rusakov) and wishes everyone a good night. At all six previous such meetings, starting in 1973, we had this kind of closed session. I was present at all six of them. But there was never anything like this! It looked like a silent obstruction. Like a protest on their knees or flipping the finger behind their back. Our friends-allies no longer wanted to listen to directives, they allowed themselves to "disagree" with the method of formulating policy, especially policy that was "made" without them. They are now defiant, they do not want to accept the CPSU's policies as the general policy of the socialist community as a whole.

Ponomarev was shocked. I later tried to talk to him about it, but he avoided the conversation. He knew how to act: the CPSU cannot fail at anything, which means everything was fine here too. In any case, we should not make noise even if something was not quite right.

On the small-scale, everything really was ok. At the open meeting everyone took a turn speaking, some delegations even spoke two or three times, making it look like a "lively discussion." In reality they did not even listen to each other. There were receptions, conversations amongst themselves, all kinds of other communication. The second echelon (experts and advisers) lived in a Party hotel and spent their evenings at the bar: jazz, dancing, and frank conversations over wine and beer.

There were 28 people from the Soviet side. The other delegations were sizable as well, about the same number of people. I heard that in total there were at least 200 foreign participants.

So, everything was impressive and in line with expectations.

July 13, 1979

It was a busy week: draft for PB on the outcomes of Berlin and a cheat sheet for B.N.'s speech at the PB.

Evaluation of the 11th volume of "History of the CPSU" (1946-1964) – B.N. asked me to conduct the final edit before submitting it to the publisher. I looked over these 600-plus pages. Boring and hypocritical. The people who lived through this time and who remember it can reconstruct this deeply dramatic period of our history from the jargon formulas and external reference points. But a "new" reader will not get anything from this volume, and he won't have the patience to get through this fluff.

I wrote a very vitriolic review. Zaitsev said that B.N. used it widely in front of the 32-member group of authors.

July 19, 1979

Today I spoke at the Politburo for the first time. Only right now, at home, I "realized" the significance of this event. When I was walking back from the Kremlin and then resumed editing the memo for the upcoming talks on Tuesday with a delegation from the FRG (Gremetz), when I reported to our sector on the outcomes, somehow I did not think much of it: just work. And, in reality, that is what it is. But out of 15 million Soviet communists not many get to even attend the Politburo, much less speak there.

The PB was discussing the issue of the ongoing demolition of Iraq's Communist Party by the Ba'athists – Saddam Hussein, who just became president. Our Department was offered to publish an abbreviated text of the May address to Iraq's CP on this matter, and a "cautious article in *Pravda*." To send to communists who went to the mountains to join the Kurds "blankets and pillows," but not weapons, two radio stations, etc.

Kirilenko was the chairman and asked me to say a few words. I explained why we are suggesting this and how "in our opinion" events in Iraq will develop with the arrival of Hussein: in any case, for the Communists things will get even worse.

Nevertheless, A.P. proposed to wait, so this reprimand from us does not become the first public act towards the new president. He said we should try one more time to appeal to his reason. After that we can make a public statement. I did not quite understand whether the initiative to send "blankets and pillows" was supported or not. I did the right thing [not to push this point] because why waste time on trifles when the policy is outlined.

B.N. is in Afghanistan. He is coming back tomorrow.

Giving an award to Kashtan, the General Secretary of Canada's CP. A disgusting business: on Plotnikov street I had to give a speech about him – a toast. In the presence of his comrades, PB members. To talk about the non-existent achievements of the leader of a non-existent party, and moreover – a dubious character.

Ambassador Alexander Yakovlev was sitting next to me. He was transferred to Canada seven years ago from his post of Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department because he was not ready to organize the Brezhnev cult in the media. As soon as I finished my artfully labored

speech, he whispered in my ear: “He is the shiftest character of all the Canadians I’ve dealt with.”

Good thing I had the sense to advise Vasiliy Vasilievich Kuznetsov – Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet (after the award in the Kremlin) to remove from his speech (from the text for publication) the words “loyal Leninist.”

... The CC Secretariat adopted amendments to the rules of conduct for Soviet people abroad. On the one hand it has a loud preamble about carrying the truth about our Soviet homeland and so forth, on the other hand it essentially prohibits any contact with the natives.

July 27, 1979

Gremetz (PCF CC Secretary) arrived. On July 24 and 25 we had talks at the CC CPSU, with the participation of Ponomarev, Chernyaev, and Gremetz. *Pravda* wrote about this: “The conversations, which took place in a friendly, frank atmosphere, covered a wide range of political and economic issues of today’s international situation, including in Europe. Particular attention was given to questions of disarmament and the need to strengthen action against the arms race in order to reinforce détente.”

“The participants of the meeting presented the views of their Parties on the questions of democracy and socialism.

“Representatives of the CPSU and the PCF believe the exchange of views was useful and constructive, and expressed the joint desire of both parties to continue developing relations and cooperation.”

For those who understand, such a communique (the first since 1971) says a lot. It seems the PCF needs us. They understood that they will not survive if they are “against us” (although not with us), and they’ll never be the ruling party anyway... Though Gremetz did not insist on including a mention of our differences in the communique, I had to offer the penultimate paragraph as a compromise to avoid their wording, which had a written allusion to our differences, not just a semantic one.

Gremetz himself is a simple guy and really wants to live up to his post, so he accurately conveys Georges’ (Marchais) resolutions and statements, but does not get wound up and does not escalate. His range and scope do not compare to Kanapa’s, who had his own politics alongside the politics of the Party.

Cartesian clarity has degenerated in our French friends (due to weak personal intellectual potential and education) into simplistic revisionist dogmatism. Their whole policy boils down to one simple goal: “everything for the Party, everything in the name of the Party.” At one time, Thorez managed to get them on the track of – Party for the nation. Now they are returning to pre-Thorez times, but with a claim to creative development of Marxism.

Having a serious discussion with them is a waste of time. They do not know how to substantiate their premises.

Examples:

1) Shift to the right in Europe. It must not be repeated too often, because such insistence on a shift to the right benefits the Social Democrats. And that is bad! (There is no beast scarier than Social Democrats right now, whether it's Mitterrand, Brandt, or anyone else.)

So, it does not matter if there really is a shift to the right and how real politics should react to it. The important thing is not to give Social Democrats a chance.

B.N. asks him: "Is Strauss better than Schmidt?"

Gremetz: "I don't know, I don't know. I do not want to give an unequivocal answer. Schmidt does well for monopolies and such." In other words, the same old song – the worse, the better. Therefore, any kind of cooperation with Social Democrats (on any issues – détente, the arms race, etc.) is out of the question, including in the European Parliament. "There we will only express our Party's point of view."

2) "The main disagreement between us," Gremetz says pompously, "is, as we stated during our Congress, that you do not understand (underestimate) the universality of the democratic component and its significance under socialism. It is not about dissidents, that is a trifle. It is about a global theoretical disagreement."

We ask him: "How is our lack of understanding manifested?"

In response we get unintelligible phrases, and then: "You take administrative measures when you should be fighting through political means."

B.N. catches him: "So the issue is dissidents after all? You would like us to allow anti-Soviets to go on Red Square and yell whatever they want, allow them to create anti-Soviet groups, etc. Is that right?"

Again, we get generalized phrases in response, but he did not come back to the idea that dissidents are a trifle, a detail.

How can you have a discussion with such theoreticians?

At the same time, they repeatedly declared they have no intention of teaching anyone, and they uphold the right of anyone to have a personal opinion on any issue. But apropos, they protested after Mauroy (Socialist leader) visited Moscow last year (for the twinning of cities Kharkov-Lille) and said on a French TV program that the CPSU shares the Socialist Party's assessment of the parliamentary elections in France.

B.N. immediately called Mauroy's statement a lie. But that is not quite true. I was present at the confidential meeting between Mauroy and Zagladin and heard with my own ears how Vadim strongly hinted that we do not share the assessments made by communists on the outcomes of those key elections...

But that is not the point. The point is that our French friends, with all their demagogic talk about equality, bar the thought that the CPSU, for example, could have a different opinion from the PCF on any French issue.

B.N. spent around six hours talking with them over two days. The rest of the time was on me. Many times the conversation jumped to Catholics, the Pope in Poland and in general. Here, as in other questions, their scope is very shallow. For this specialist on Catholics (Gremetz for a long time led this subject in the CC PCF), the Pope is just a realist, and his visit to Poland is a great achievement in terms of cooperation between the church and the socialist state. My attempts to take this subject deeper into the philosophical-ideological sphere, or even just political (but with perspective), only led to monotonous and arrogant repetition of the same general phrases.

B.N. came up with yet another lesson for the West: he wants to “write” an article stating that revolution in the modern world is not “the hand of Moscow” but an objective process. Just as soon as he says this, Brzezinski & Co. will immediately realize this and anti-Sovietism will suffer another blow.

He advised Kozlov and me to read his articles and reports published at such-and-such a time, or not published but we can get them from Balmashnov. “I,” he said, “worked on this issue long before Brezhnev said it in Vienna. You should read those materials, they already contain most of the things we need for this one.”

The funny part is that Leshka (Kozlov) and I were the ones who wrote most of those articles and reports for him. What is this? Contempt for us, senility, self-conceit, or total moral perversion on the basis of the bureaucratization of his mind and soul?!

This happens so often that I do not even want to complain anymore.

August 4, 1979

This last week was very difficult.

On Tuesday there was a meeting of the CC Secretariat. Shaken, I listened to a discussion about the ministries’ failure to carry out PB resolutions on the production of equipment to facilitate and replace manual labor. Head of the Department Frolov said we are 60 percent behind capitalist countries on replacing manual labor. He declared that the ministers showed a lack of discipline. Then the ministers came to the table: Antonov (Radio engineering), Novoselov, Polyakov, and someone else. Also, Deputy Chairman of Gosplan Isaev.

I once already wrote about Antonov and others like him. These are Soviet managers who are competent, knowledgeable, fluent in their subject, and clearly people with character and brains. Even though they were summoned for a dressing down, it did not look like any of them were afraid. Their position was *a la* Mayakovsky: “Here is my pen, comrades, try writing yourselves!”

Antonov started out by saying that yes, he is guilty, he came up short. But then: “I am reproached for not meeting the objectives on the production of forklifts. This is true. Indeed, I

did not put into operation (this many) new plants and did not retrofit (this many) old ones. I did not do this because half of the Bulgarian forklifts we imported and half of the ones I manufactured are standing idle. There are no accumulators for them. And we do not have accumulators because there is no lead, and Gosplan withdrew the funds to build a new accumulator plant, because we would not have the raw materials to make the product. And so forth."

Novoselov started off another way. "Do you think," he said, "we, white-haired and distinguished, enjoy standing here like boys and listening to these words?! No... You, Andrei Pavlovich (Kirilenko), said that we have been warned six times. But over these years, Gosplan reduced appropriations for civil construction through my Ministry six times as well. First by 12 percent, then 15, 20, and finally by 38 percent. How was I supposed to retrofit and build new factories?"

Polyakov (automotive engineering) spoke in the same spirit. Isaev tried to blame the ministers but acknowledged that he did not allocate sufficient funds through 1978. Now he promised to catch up.

But most importantly – Kirilenko's helplessness. He kept calling his assistant and kept throwing numbers at the ministers. These numbers were supposed to show that they have not done anything over the last seven years. But they immediately politely refuted the accusations by presenting irrefutable facts. The accusations against Polyakov turned into an embarrassment: he turned a deaf ear to them and it seemed from the outside that he was blatantly ignoring them by not responding to the grave questions. Finally, his patience ran out and he politely explained: "Andrei Pavlovich, you are talking about something else, it is not under my department. I produce motor cars with internal combustion engines..." A minute of silence...

But again, this is not the main thing. The main thing is that the CC could not come up with any specific plan to fix the situation – no redistribution of funds, no new funds, nothing. CC Secretaries, except for Gorbachev who said something sensible about how much agricultural products we are losing because we do not have loading and unloading facilities, were silent (not our B.N. though): they are ideologists or foreign affairs specialists, or organizational workers who do not really deal with economic issues.

Kirilenko spoke most of the time (and more than once). But he moralized: oh, this is so bad, you are communists after all, responsible comrades, you are smart and knowledgeable. The CC appointed you, you were given a task, and what did you do? One cannot have such an attitude towards a PB resolution, it is bad! You were not given the funds or had reduced appropriations, what's the big deal! You stopped trying and used it as an excuse to do nothing. This is because this is not your main line of work, and you did not want to work for someone else. And so forth.

It was embarrassing and barbaric! There was nothing in the chairman's inarticulate tirades except old-fashioned "Let's go, let's go!" and "Communists are not afraid of any difficulties!"

I happened to be sitting near these ministers. They sat there, listened, smirked, exchanged scornful remarks, or even just phrases: "What was the need to gather us here? If I may say so, what is the use of this kind of discussion at the Central Committee? Is this not discreditation? There is nothing we can do if they keep planning like this. They can remove us, but it will not change anything..."

I left completely crushed. Don't they know better than to put on such Party spectacles if there are neither material resources, nor the ability or determination to solve issues in a businesslike manner?

This is one event from my week.

On Monday we received Kashtan at B.N.'s. The usual chatter: as always, he told us platitudes about the situation in Canada and nothing about himself or his Party.

B.N. consulted with me before the meeting and decided to give Kashtan a dressing down this time: "How is it that you are talking about a crisis, unemployment, inflation, pressure from the Americans – but your Party keeps dwindling? At the last parliamentary elections, you got even fewer votes than before (by the way, Kashtan himself got only 193 votes). And what is this story with Biging, whom you expelled..." Kashtan was completely lost and could not find anything to say, started confusing numbers and why workers were not joining the party. The meeting ended in a state of upheaval. When we left the office, Kashtan said to me, "I would like to continue the discussion with you."

On Wednesday we continued it on Plotnikov street. However, just as during his previous visits, it came down to him pulling out a piece of paper and carefully making notes during lunch. He asked me about theoretical questions of the ICM, about possible election strategies, about all the things he will need for his report at the upcoming November congress of the Party – to look informed and up to speed.

The next day at B.N.'s we met with Florakis (General Secretary of the CP of Greece). He is a completely different story. In a few years he created a strong party. Now he showed up to lay the groundwork for Prime Minister Karamanlis's visit to Moscow (for the first time in the history of USSR-Greece relations). He traveled by sea to Yalta. But, first of all, neither Brezhnev (who is in Yalta right now), nor even Chernenko (who was at the last Congress of the Communist Party of Greece [KKE]) received him in Crimea. They did not even respond. Once again, B.N. had to stand in. He agreed to meet with Florakis in Moscow. Of course, the latter has no idea about how things work around here, that nobody will seriously listen to B.N. when he brings Florakis's considerations to the "highest level."

Here is what he brought: Karamanlis, even though he is an anti-communist, does not want to be under the Americans' heel. So, he is looking for support from the USSR. However, he needs tangible results from the visit, he cannot return to Athens with nothing but nice words. He expects to receive agreements to build an alumina refinery in Greece, to supply gas, electricity (even modest amounts), oil, and expansion of goods exchange.

The only thing B.N. could tell him was – we'll report it! And immediately he “confidentially” added: “A week or two before the visit you should send a telegram through our ambassador with all this information.” I don't know whether Florakis guessed, but the point of this operation is that an adviser or Gromyko might report the telegram to Brezhnev. It is more problematic for B.N. to report his conversation with Florakis, much less to take some specific measures.

However, our practices are not the only problem. The fact is, if Americans found themselves in our position, they would give Karamanlis everything he wants and more without hesitation. But we have nothing to give. The only thing we have left is “moral capital” – you can't do much with it, and it is withering away.

Yesterday I received at the CC (alone this time) ten Spanish communists – scientists who traveled around the country. These conversations are very difficult: I cannot look like a trivial apologist or I would lose their trust and the overall result of this contact with the PCE would be rather negative. At the same time, I have to present our issues, concerns, and affairs in a serious, critical manner but on a cheerfully optimistic note. This is easy for me in international affairs. But when it comes to domestic – it is very difficult. I spent the whole night before the meeting coming up with what to say.

Pertsov (assistant who specializes in Spain) told me after they left that I charmed them utterly and most of their conversation during lunch was about me.

Then I had a two-and-a-half-hour lunch with O'Riordan, who is going on holiday to Lithuania with his “Soviet wife,” his former interpreter here. I pitched him the idea of holding a communist conference of Catholic countries on the Pope's policies (in connection with his visit to Poland). He liked it. He had a less enthusiastic reaction to the idea of a communist conference against anti-communism.

Of course, his Party is as significant as Kashtan's. But at least he is an intelligent person, he is interesting to talk with. He shares his own thoughts, instead of just fishing for yours, like Kashtan does.

On top of this I have all my daily work. Dozens of large papers – notes for the CC, all sorts of proposals, hundreds of telegrams and many of them need responses. Every day, there are dozens of on-the-fly questions from sectors and consultants. And B.N.'s assignments are getting funneled to one person, again. The flow of information, not to mention TASS, is deafening. But to ignore it would mean to fall behind instantly, and I would feel unsure about my responses to memos and calls.

As the result, in the evenings sometimes I would feel dizzy. When I walked home, it felt like part of my body was atrophied.

August 12, 1979

Physical fatigue is increasingly making itself felt. I feel progressively worn out by the measured monotony of life: 9-10-hour work days, sometimes work in the evenings, “foreign

friends," communists who like to arrive on Saturdays and Sundays and meet with the likes of us on those days as well. By the way, last week I received Gasperoni and Barulli, the Chairman and General Secretary of the Communist Party of San Marino. They came to ask for oil (60 thousand tons), otherwise the Italians will overthrow their government, which is the only one in the capitalist world that includes communists, through an energy blockade.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade was ready to give them this modicum (we give the Italians seven million tons). I knew that, so it was easy to make a show of the CC accommodating them, even though B.N. warned me not to get involved in "this business."

He is getting pushed around more and more, and he is becoming more careful, especially when it comes to financial matters. Even Kornienko (that impudent Ukrainian who works from under Gromyko's cover) allowed himself to go against B.N., resulting in B.N.'s amendment (actually mine) being rejected. The amendment had been to strike out from the draft legislation on foreign nationals in the USSR a phrase on restricting their movement "to safeguard the morality" of our citizens. It is absolute nonsense – it makes it look like an immoral foreigner can live in Moscow, for example, but not in Novosibirsk. However, it was rejected... so once again we are exposing ourselves to anti-Soviet eruptions. Clearly, the irrational need for security is stronger than any argument. But most importantly, [we see that] some deputy minister can openly knock out a CC Secretary and this behavior is encouraged because Gromyko "has access" and is a friend.

I'm undertaking the full edition of Chaadayev (for the first time in my life reading it in its entirety), published by Gershenson in 1913-14. Chaadayev was never "integrally" published in the Soviet Union.

The other day I read A. Besançon *The Intellectual Origins of Leninism*. Of course, we, Russians, will always perceive Lenin differently and more emotionally. But the West and practically the entire world, including the new generation of communists, already perceives him as Besançon does, or close. They are predisposed to perceive him this way, and the further he recedes into history, the more "permissible" this perception becomes, even for people who are not anti-communists.

By the way, Chaadayev believed that Lenin was the necessary factor in Russian history for the Russian people to attain the qualities of a civilized nation.

August 16, 1979

I keep coming back to Besançon in my mind. How perceptively he saw us! We cannot see ourselves this way, and if anyone does see it, it doesn't matter – as proved by Besançon.

Gogol on Pushkin... it's the first time I had a chance to read it. In general, only as I get older do I begin to comprehend Gogol's greatness.

Yesterday on my way home from the clinic I noticed signs of Brezhnev's return from Crimea. Police every 100 meters and so on. Extremely embarrassing against the background of everything else.

September 10, 1979

I am leaving for Jamaica in an hour. I read the transcript of the Brezhnev-Berlinguer conversation. They were pleased with each other. The only thing they did not agree on was China...

Of course, the consultants did a poor job on materials for Jamaica. It turns out I was assigned to lead the trade and economic negotiations with Grenada's Prime Minister Bishop. They also had a revolution last spring.

On Saturday I watched a film based on G. Markov's novel *Father and Son*, about Siberia in the 1920s. It is weak from a cinematographic standpoint, but the material is powerful. The message that comes through, maybe without the creators' intention, is that 1917 would have perished without "the year 1929." There would have been a Restoration.

I lead the CPSU delegation to Jamaica. The conference of the ruling People's National Party [PNP] (which is a member of the Socialist International, by the way) addressed topical issues of domestic and foreign policy. There were members of trade unions and representatives of socialist and communist parties of many countries.

October 14, 1979

A month has gone by. I've traveled to the other end of the world. I will try to recall some details of the trip.

We left Moscow for Montreal in the morning on September 10th. Eleven-hour flight to Montreal. I read some Finnish novel in *Inostrannaya Literatura* [Foreign Literature], played chess, looked over materials for Jamaica.

The airport [in Montreal] – modern luxury. It is designed for 50 million passengers per year, but only a third of the capacity is utilized, running at a loss.

Ambassador Yakovlev, who met us at the airport, complained to me that Moscow, Demichev and others, doesn't want to bring him back home. They haven't forgiven him for his article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* [Literary Gazette]. He is languishing, begged me to assist...

The Congress of the People's National Party was supposed to open in the morning on the 12th, but started only in the evening. Many of the delegates, of whom there were over two thousand, could not arrive due to the flood caused by the hurricane. The flood washed out the roads. Plus, at a time like this, the most active segment – the "leading cadres" – have to be together with the people.

Our appearance at the sport palace...

Common prayer. The pastor's sermon.

Sékou Touré (the Marxist dictator of Guinea) driving practically onto the podium in his car. He came with an official visit. His hour-long speech at the Congress: demagoguery, racism in reverse. Manley's speech in response. My first impression of Manley (now his portrait is

standing behind the glass of my bookshelf) – an outstanding, larger-than-life persona. One of those who make history. On top of that he is handsome, an orator, charming...

The British parliamentary manner of conducting discussion... Women make up two-thirds of the delegates. Very active.

Dancing, bursts of enthusiasm, hymns, etc. Instead of our usual applause during the Congress.

You can see through the Congress what's happening in the country. It really reminded me of our country in the first years after the revolution (as I imagine it, of course): a highbrow intellectual elite of the Party and state (with British, Canadian, and American universities in their past; work in journalism and law, etc.) One after the other, the people [in Jamaica] make a much greater impression than our European "Eurocommunists" both in their political outlook and their way of thinking. They far surpass pretentious Europeans in the degree of understanding of their historical mission. That's on the one hand. On the other hand – the semi-literate masses, full of revolutionary enthusiasm, devoted to the idea of "their own socialism," hating imperialism...

The election of the General Secretary – Duncan. He is a black Jew. His ascent to this post... Left-right in the Party.

Manley, who towers above everyone while remaining easygoing, calm, confident, elegant... He makes a magnetic impression on the delegates (and female delegates especially). But he is not a Negro leader like the likes of Sékou Touré. He more resembles Fidel Castro, but he surpasses Castro intellectually and as an orator. There is something Bolshevik-British to him, if you can imagine such a mix. His mother is an Englishwoman, a world-famous sculptor. His father is a mulatto, the founder of the PNP in 1938 and now one of the "fathers of the nation."

Manley received our delegation together with the ambassador. We talked for two hours, despite the fact that the Congress was bustling 20 meters away from us, electing the governing bodies. Not a hint of airs and graces over his significance. Superb (truly!) Marxist analysis of the world situation and a deeply realistic approach to their national problems. And tactful, "with understanding," sub textual appeal to us for... not even for help – for solidarity.

A month has gone by and I am still charmed by this man. God forbid he has the same fate as Allende!

I knew Allende personally, too... He was weaker than Manley in all respects. Manley is a statesman while Allende was a political activist, though in a positive sense of the word: he was a demagogue-romantic favoring socialism.

Manley's speech at the closing of the Congress is the highest example of modern oratory art at the world standard. The audience raved. His "dialogue" from the podium with the U.S. ambassador (who was in the audience) was something!

October 21, 1979

Weeks are flying by... A little more on Jamaica.

A meeting with the leadership of the PNP: Bertram, Beverley, Manley... all from the same elite.

Interparty connections: they asked us to send tape recorders, loudspeakers, portable typewriters and other propaganda equipment. They asked for 60 sets – one per each region. (When we got back to Moscow, we only managed to send them 10...)

The question about pepper. Our merchants all of a sudden refused to buy it (even though it has been a traditional item for which we pay cash, because it is strategic). They did this right after Manley's visit, too, after all kinds of embraces and beautiful words about solidarity. Moreover, they purchased pepper from neighboring Mexico (as we found out in Moscow) because the Mexicans sold it for 20 percent cheaper. So much for the “big brother” internationalism. I had a heated conversation about this with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, they promised to take it into consideration next year. I wonder if it will happen?

Reception for foreign guests at the palace, on the occasion of the end of the conference. Manley. He came up to me before others and we continued the conversation we started at the official meeting with him. I carefully expressed my enthusiasm. Then Beverley joined us (she is a very elegant mulatta, they say she was a finalist in a beauty pageant. Her level and manners would make any Parisian intellectual look like an amateur). But we had an even more open and friendly conversation with her after the rally on the occasion of the Cuban school opening in the suburbs of Kingston. By the way, that was an impressive sight. A huge gathering of people and the entire Congress was present, it was taken there by bus.

Our daily breakfasts and lunches at the hotel, buffet and so on. The room where I stayed had air conditioning and a view of the ministry of foreign affairs (which was always empty) and some banks and companies. These buildings were shown in the propaganda slides at the Congress as symbols of imperialism and neocolonialism (as an illustration for the masses). And so they are.

The conference ended on September 16th, the next day in the evening the ambassador took us to Montego Bay by car, across the entire country from South to North, to the resort zone. Along the way – tropical, barefooted poverty. At first, I thought the “chicken coops” made out of a hodgepodge of materials that we saw along the way were some kind of temporary shelters (like our garden plots). But it turned out this is the normal type of housing for local villagers (though it is no better on the outskirts of Kingston). We drove past the buildings of Canadian-Jamaican bauxite mining companies... A massive red lake – production waste that destroys everything around it: forest, grass, wildlife, fish. It poisons groundwater and pollutes the atmosphere, etc. Nobody knows what to do with this blood-brown deadly stagnant lake, and it keeps getting bigger.

In the morning we returned to Kingston by the same road, again in the rain. Colonial-type estates (like in the movies) with the corresponding houses on hilltops. With colonnades, porticos, turrets... The pastures are fenced, like in Scotland, with low stone walls... In the middle of each 4-5-hectare square there is a single huge tree, probably an Elm...

The main conclusion is that we should take this country seriously (I doubt anyone in Moscow paid attention to this, except Ponomarev, who “nicely” called my impressions overly enthusiastic, but left the political findings without comment. Anyway, what can he do!).

Duncan arrived a few minutes before our departure for the airport. We got into one car and became friends over the thirty-minute ride. It was endearing to watch him at the airport: a mass of people with suitcases and such, crowded because flights were disrupted by the hurricane. In his corduroy jeans, with a shirt unbuttoned down to the navel, a shy Jewish smile framed by a skipper’s beard and African curly hair, Duncan did not act like a big authority. But people immediately started approaching him: some just to say hello, some to pat him on the shoulder, some for a brief chat... Airport personnel started running around us (though unlike our situation, of course nobody warned them about a delegation from the Soviet Union). They carry themselves in a comradely way, at the same time demonstrating respect for their Party leader...

We hugged by the ramp. As we were saying our farewells, I told Duncan – as the embassy staff stared in astonishment – that I am bringing a photograph of Manley with me and that I would hang it up at home. I was speaking sincerely and I did what I said I would...

We took off right above the water and this time arrived in New York in four hours, on time.

The staff of our UN mission gave us a nice reception. They took us to a historic hotel in Manhattan and brought along a whole box of homemade food, including pirozhki baked by their wives. All of this was enough for us for the two days in New York... Thereby we were able to save some money and I even managed to buy a leather jacket for \$100 on “Yashkin-street.” (By the way, an episode there: “Mama, they wanna [хочут] a denim suit!” This is across the street in Odessa jargon. “Let them come here,” the mother in heavy make up replies. This whole neighborhood speaks in Jewish-Russian dialect, and many of them speak proper Moscow Russian. These Russian Jews emigrated over the last 9-10 years and set up businesses here. They treat Soviets like good customers. Our sailors often buy all their goods in one visit... They have no nostalgia but no hatred either. They are easygoing and even friendly with us. But our people treat them with familiarity and contempt, looking down on them. Still, Soviets mostly buy from them in New York, because their wares are 30-50 percent cheaper.)

The following day we spent with Communists. Gus Hall was in Moscow, getting medical treatment. Henry Winston was in charge in the meantime. He is the Chairman of the Communist Party, a blind African American with whom I have long-standing friendly relations: he visits Moscow twice a year.

The headquarters of the U.S. Communist Party. They recently bought a large high-rise building; it also houses the printing house, bookstore, meeting rooms, and so forth.

They convened the Politburo for my sake: “discussion.” The entire editorial staff (around 100 people), the core of the New York organization (around 200-250 people). Because of this, I was talking the entire day (in the evening there was also dinner at a restaurant). I felt tired after Jamaica and was afraid that I could not handle the strain. However, when the time came to “keep

up appearances,” the energy came from somewhere. At times I would approach the podium or get up from my seat without knowing how I would begin, but suddenly words and arguments would appear... I got constant applause during the meeting with the core group – this was their reaction to my responses and arguments, even though initially the audience was apprehensive. After all, this took place in the days after the story with Vlasova was resolved and Godunov defected. Kozlovs defected just before we arrived in New York, too. The conversation covered everything: from these Bolshoi Theater performers (“why did they run away” and “why do people run from the USSR” in general) to nuclear energy, to the position of women in the Soviet Union, to China, SALT-2, and so on. I usually started off by speaking for 20-30 minutes, followed by Q&A. The questions were in the Western manner, when the questioner gives a broad overview of his opinions and asks for a response to all his thoughts...

Winston, Helen Winter, Jackson – all PB members said that my visit was an important event because American communists for the first time had an opportunity to easily talk and debate, share their doubts and questions with a live Soviet communist, “directly from the CC CPSU.” In a word, the visit ended with hugs all around.

The next day N.A. Mitin (a UN official, secretary of the Soviet mission Party organization) and his friends took it upon themselves to show us around New York City. The power and simplicity of skyscraper America, especially the 107-storey new business center on the East River.

Harlem is downright 1942 Stalingrad. It looks just like it. You wouldn’t believe it if you didn’t see it with your own eyes. The UN building. What it looks like inside, the spirit and order of work – how much this costs “the world community” and what it produces!

By the way, they received me as a very important person, despite the fact that Gromyko was in New York at the same time (at the UN General Assembly) and that I was only passing through and nobody was under any obligation to meet with me. And despite the fact that I came to New York to meet with communists and the staff of the Soviet New York mission do not communicate with them (they are not allowed to). Maybe they are just good people, or maybe I underestimate how I am, or my position is, perceived “from the outside.” So, this was my discovery of America.

I returned to Moscow and the next day was already meeting Woddis and Ashton, the official delegation from the CPGB, at Sheremetyevo Airport. Conversation with B.N. Later they expressed to me that they were upset with B.N. for his mentoring tone, for interrupting, for not being interested in the essence of the matter. [They said] there was no real “discussion,” it was a waste of time. They thanked me for the numerous meetings with experts on all subjects – our advisers on southern Africa, the Middle East, Kampuchea, Iran, Afghanistan, Japan, etc. In our final conversation I spent a long time convincing them that everything was fine. Hugging at the airport, the short Woddis said in a conciliatory tone, “The important thing is for us to fight a common enemy, not each other.” Which is what we set out to prove! As for their hurt feelings, they were not so much upset by Ponomarev’s behavior as by the fact that he laid out before them our view of the anti-Soviet writings in all of Great Britain’s communist press. I did not make

excuses for Ponomarev. On the contrary, I added on a bunch more facts, including about the activities of Buschel, their correspondent in Moscow. But I did it in a humorous style.

Then we had to urgently prepare a speech for B.N. for the ideological (All-Union) meeting. We got it done in a week. He put a lot into that text himself... I hear B.N.'s speech made an impression, especially in contrast to Suslov's report, which was an overview of the fulfillment of CC resolutions on ideology for six months and was written in the worst traditions of our propaganda.

Naturally, *Pravda* printed only 9-10 pages out of Ponomarev's 20-page speech. I carefully reformulated all the parts that our communist friends and the bourgeois press could latch onto. And then, like a bolt from the blue...a TASS correspondent released (officially!) for the foreign press one paragraph of B.N.'s speech that exposed the whole mystery (it says: "As the result of CPSU's fundamental and flexible policy, "the Eurocommunist leadership of the corresponding parties started to change its positions in a positive direction" and so forth). Awful! This scandal broke on the 18th, Thursday. On Friday Zagladin and I composed an embellished text for the part of B.N.'s speech that talked about the ICM, to present it to the French, Italians, and Spaniards as the real thing. The TASS version would be presented as a misrepresentation.

...Gremetz already protested to Chervonenko in Paris; Rome and Madrid demanded explanations. *L'Humanite* and *L'Unita* fired their first shots at us. The whole thing is in motion. And all of this right before the Marchais-Brezhnev meeting: Gremetz and Fiterman were in Moscow on October 9-10 to prepare for it. "With a great deal of effort" they coordinated with Ponomarev and Zagladin the draft of the joint declaration for the summit. And now we have this little surprise.

The correspondent turned out to be someone by the name of Avelev, TASS deputy editor-in-chief for information abroad. Either he is a total political imbecile, or he is an instigator. In either case, he violated all the basic standards (when he did not coordinate such an action with anyone).

Then again, the Marchais-Brezhnev meeting might not take place. L.I. returned from Berlin (where he went on the occasion of the GDR's 30th anniversary – a disarmament initiative, unilateral measures for the first time...) in a very bad state, and since then has not been active... He did not meet with Assad or anyone else. In Berlin, too, he struggled to read his initiatives. The people who listened to him in Russian probably could not understand him. The translated version was another matter.

October 28, 1979

The incident with the leaked paragraph from Ponomarev's speech at the ideological meeting had an unexpected outcome. Instead of being outraged, the French Communist Party used this story as a pretext to assert its thesis that disagreements exist between the CPSU and the PCF and it's a good thing that neither side is hiding it. The Italians used this as evidence of the power of Eurocommunism: Moscow has to reckon with it if they are discussing it at such a forum.

B.N. again took up the article on “the hand of Moscow.” He wants an article on this subject and that’s that. Last weekend he wrote something himself – about the two lines of the revolutionary process in theory and policy. He read it to Kozlov and me... He thinks that this “thought” immediately raises this question to a major scale... My God! I just cannot understand: is this senile graphomania, or does he really believe that he will not be forgotten the day after the end of his service in the CC, that he will remain in “the Party’s memory” as a theoretician? Or is this just the usual vanity of a normal bureaucrat?

Unexpectedly for the whole world, BBC, French, and West German television let out a story that Brezhnev is completely nonfunctional (after his Berlin trip). He met, “held talks,” and saw off the South Yemeni leader Abdul Ismail, who came to Moscow. The people who saw this performance in person are pretty depressed. The rest saw it on television and are just as depressed. He is completely falling apart... Why, why? Why are they showing him...

As luck would have it, Kosygin, Suslov, Kirilenko, and Chernenko all got sick at the same time...

November 20, 1979

I was in West Germany from November 5-12th.

In Berlin with Axen at the Central Committee of the SED, with Häber at the Party hotel. Discussions on how best to stir up the West with Brezhnev’s initiatives, to try to postpone NATO’s decision to supplement armaments because of our SS-20.

Häber, head of a CC Department on West German affairs, is a symbol of the fact that the idea of German unity remains real and vital for our fraternal East Germans. Häber not only controls Mies’es German Communist Party, but also all the levers of the common German cause... Somehow this does not occur to us. He was surprised when I asked him whether they would protest against holding a congress of West German Social Democrats in West Berlin.

We took the bus to the Tegel airport in West Berlin and flew from there to Frankfurt am Main.

I gave speeches three times a day. Even lunches and the like turned into political acts. I was brutally tired, the first night in Frankfurt at the school for working youth I almost fainted...

I talked about whatever was relevant for the occasion, but the main idea was that Germans cannot allow war to be waged against us from their territory again... That would destroy everything. Everyone agrees with this, and nobody believes that it could happen. The leadership of the Communist Party of Germany does not believe it either. Mies, with his Fuhrer-like arrogance, expounded his election platform (which plays into the hands of Strauss), and spoke about the NATO plan with an air of finality. My “sour” reaction (instead of the enthusiasm he anticipated in response to his “iron party logic”) alarmed him. He was glum later, too, at the official meeting.

The country is beautiful – a balanced combination of incredible industrial power with careful maintenance and beautiful nature. It was my first time traveling through the Rhine Valley

(although it's my fifth time in the FRG): from Düsseldorf, through Cologne, Bonn, Koblenz, to Heine's *Lorelei*, then towards the German Wine Road to Pfalz. It was a colorful, golden autumn. It turns out there are five times more vineyards in Pfalz alone than in all of Georgia.

My main impression, which is still weighing me down: we have fallen terribly behind capitalism. And there is nothing left to justify this gap (at least in America "blacks are being lynched"), we have no social or economic advantage to show. After all, Germany was also wiped off the face of the earth. Now their salary is 2500-3000 marks (even considering the exchange rate, this is more than 1000 rubles). Their workers have six weeks of vacation. Their "iron battalions of the proletariat" (Ponomarev's favorite phrase, a quote from Lenin) get in their personal cars to drive to work in the morning and home in the evening – every third German has a car. Their roads are so well maintained that you can drive at 160km/h with a full cup in the car and not spill a drop. They have no center-province separation – just as they do not have "country roads" and minor roads, so there is no difference between villages and cities in terms of welfare or comfort.

This is awfully frustrating, and for now I do not know what to make of it.

Yesterday I read Brezhnev's speech at the PB (before the upcoming CC Plenum on the economic situation and planning for 1980). I was amazed at how frank it is. But I was even more alarmed: the situation is dire. He does not hesitate to use expressions such as "state of emergency" (transportation), "alarming" (food supply). Really, everything: energy, metals, construction, machine building, meat and dairy, fruits and vegetables, etc. We keep talking about quality and efficiency, but we have not made a breakthrough. We raise the same old issues, and they are still there. And so forth.

In the text of the Plenum speech (which I also read today) all of this is presented in lighter form and as always against the background of "successes" ... though the responsible ministers are "called out by name" ... But what of it?!

December 2, 1979

The Plenum took place, session of the Supreme Soviet. Brezhnev spoke more or less clearly. But the text was significantly "smoothed out." Even Baibakov's looked sharper. The debates did not reflect the acuteness; the concern and anxiety were concealed. Everything was published, with the exception of a few phrases related mainly to the mess at compensatory construction sites and the stockpiles of imported goods (including grain) in our ports. From what I hear, people don't really read this stuff. No one is interested in these words after which nothing happens. However, propaganda again moved to its usual tone: "to new achievements..." Again, everything will go on as usual.

The people's oversight law was adopted. Tikhonov was sent to report on it at the Supreme Soviet session. The West is writing about him as if he will be the next Premier after Kosygin (who is ill and has not been making appearances). He tediously spoke for over an hour... Even readers like myself cannot get through his entire report, same as the text of the law

itself (which takes up two pages in *Pravda*). It is very doubtful that this law will have any effect in restoring order.

Arbatov spent about three months in Serebryannyi Bor, fighting to make any kind of progress (in the team preparing Brezhnev's speech). The day after the Plenum he was admitted to the hospital with a heart attack... Symbolic!

I saw Bianca (the wife of an Italian communist with whom I worked in Prague at the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*). She is here exhibiting machinery for the production of plastic goods at the new pavilion at Krasnaya Presnya. She dragged me to meet the businessmen and communists (who are on the staff of the Italian exhibition teams). They were all over me about how they were treated in Sheremetyevo airport – at customs they were stripped naked and even had fingers stuck up their rectums. They railed about the solicitation from local workers who are sent to them for unloading and installation. They do not take a step without demanding ten, twenty, twenty-five rubles and... half a liter. Otherwise they just sit there smoking, or wander around the pavilion, and there is no way to reign them in. They jumped on me with all their Italian expressiveness, especially the communists (the businessmen tried to hold back): this is what you call socialism! This is the Soviet working class! This is the country of Lenin! It's not our first time here, it's our twelfth time taking part in various events of this kind, and it's always the same thing. They come with a foreman whose chest is studded with medals for labor valor, then behave like the lowest lumpen, like beggars, with no scruples over what anyone might think. They don't care about what we might say back home in Italy about them and Soviet workers in general. Shameful!

I laughed it off, fought back as best I could, and seriously advised them to write to the party committee, the "Ballbearing" committee in this case. It's terrible, especially in parallel to the Plenum and the Supreme Soviet session.

A commission from *Le Monde* – to give them an article on Stalin in connection with his 100th anniversary. B.N. wanted to do it himself, but Suslov "did not advise it." So, Ponomarev ordered us to sign the article with the name of Academician Mintz. He, of course, agreed. But at the last moment B.N. almost added "on top": a) that nobody in the USSR cares about Stalin; b) that the cult and everything connected to it did not last long, around 10 years; c) that legitimacy and collective leadership reigned before and after. And some other things along those lines.

I wrote a mocking commentary on these "contributions," corrected them as I saw fit, and passed them to B.N. through Balmashnov. B.N. grumbled but agreed.

We continue to battle with NATO over the decision that's coming up in 10 days to install the Pershing-II and cruise missiles. Although it is clear to everyone that it's a lost cause. Gromyko said in a TV interview in Bonn, "If that happens, the basis for negotiations will be destroyed." But we will have to continue the negotiations, keep "racing" forward.

December 7, 1979

On Monday I'm flying to Hungary for a conference of twenty-nine European communist parties on questions of social democracy. I did a shoddy job preparing, although this topic is very

acute right now because of American missiles and the upcoming NATO session. There is a big upheaval among the social democrats, we helped bring it about... But we haven't taken one decisive step that would cause total stupor "over there": we are receiving hints, requests, questions and suggestions from everyone that the USSR should freeze the production and deployment of SS-20s for the duration of the negotiations, if we want negotiations to happen before NATO's decision.

Our Department carefully bombarded first Ponomarev, then others in the PB to take this step. Finally, we worked up the nerve and wrote a note with the text of a possible TASS announcement on the subject. Aleksandrov and Blatov delayed and edited it for a long time. But they supported the idea. The edited text came back to us so we could officially submit it to the CC. B.N. called Suslov, but the latter said that we could not do it without Gromyko. But Gromyko is in Berlin at the meeting of foreign ministers of Warsaw Pact countries. He is teaching Honecker, gauleiter-style, not to succumb to Schmidt's advances.

There are just three days left before the NATO session. And Gromyko does not really want to, maybe Ustinov does not either...

The day before yesterday I spent two and a half hours talking with Jagan, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Guyana. I was talking him out of raising a rebellion against Burnham, whose government we (officially) consider a progressive, anti-imperialist regime, and Jagan we consider a fascist.

Today I visited Gus Hall in Barvikha. In person he does not come off as a major figure. But when you read his speeches, there is a sense of magnitude... who writes for him?

The "Socialist project" of the Socialist Party of France – for the 1980 Congress. By the way, they portray the USSR not as a socialist but as a police state.

December 21, 1979

From December 10-15th I was in Hungary. In Tihany.

I gave a speech, participated in discussion. There really was a discussion, unlike at many other conferences. Once again, I felt like a politician, a representative of my Party. It was my job to protect its prestige through my ability to present myself and represent "its" opinions as creative, free, and realistic. The Hungarians were wonderful – both as organizers and intellectually, in terms of political tact. Janos Berecz and his team.

An episode with the Spaniard, who brought a protest from the Executive Committee of his CP: we do not need such conferences because they create the impression that communist parties do not make their own policies but follow directives... (He got a lashing from the Eurocommunists, first and foremost from the Swede and Frenchman). Everyone saw how artificial this whole Eurocommunist construction is – that we do not need any collective forms, not even an exchange of opinions. The fear of "the center," of Moscow's dictate, fear for their independence, fear that we could impose something on them from the center – these fears are disappearing.

On the plane from Budapest I was flying with a delegation of our agricultural workers, who visited Hungary to “share experience.” All of them were from Ukraine (heads of departments, secretaries of regional committees) led by the head of sector and CC Agricultural Department Kovalenko, whom I do not know. These workers struck up a conversation with me and opened up. At first, they glanced over their shoulders at the “head” and were nervous, but then got more comfortable. Luckily, the noise of the engines made it impossible for Kovalenko to hear everything. The main subject: “We only talk about initiative, but what initiative can there be when we are completely dependent on one person – the First Secretary. Suppose I take a risk, I experiment. Suppose I do not get immediate results. But the First always wants everything at once. Or he might not like something along the way. Then I go bust. And there is no mechanism that could evaluate my initiative objectively: the district committee plenum, the regional committee plenum, any other collective body – none of them will make a peep if the First says that something is bad.

“So, the bootlickers and fools thrive while the cause suffers. Make a wrong move and they could slap you with ideology, too, saying you encourage kulak and possessory tendencies. As the result, the country has a meat shortage.

“We looked at Hungary: they did not depart from principles, from Lenin, but managed to combine personal interest with public interest, with the interest of the state. They judge people by their actions, without foolishness and empty talk. By results. And Hungary has meat. What about us? Are we so stupid, or uneducated, that we cannot do even better? Are we not loyal? Are we not embarrassed when students, teachers, workers, and soldiers are sent to work at collective farms?

“No! Anatoly Sergeyevich, the country would have had meat a long time ago, and everything else, if we were really given the opportunity to show the initiative that is clamored about in all the newspapers and on television.”

I was impressed by these people. Indeed, I have heard others like them even at CC Plenums, though they had to express themselves more carefully, of course.

We will see how the Conference of European Communist Parties on Disarmament and Détente will go. Marchais came up with it and it is planned for February. But our Tihany became the *de facto* step onto new ground of contemporary internationalism (even though B.N. and the CC agreed to it because I called it a theoretical seminar in my note). Rakhmanin told me that Rusakov was mad after reading an announcement in *Pravda* from which it followed that it was not a seminar at all, but a political meeting.

Khavinson is pressing me to give him an article on Lenin for the Lenin issue (of the journal *World Economy and Politics*). I dragged my feet, but in vain: I do not have the strength and energy to write an article commensurate to my knowledge, my convictions, and my confidence in Lenin’s relevance. There is neither the incentive, nor the ability. I am too tired to do something truly serious. Maybe the only thing I really have left is to put together articles for Ponomarev, and even those from drafts prepared by the consultants.

Today there is an article in *Pravda* on Stalin's 100th anniversary. Balanced. I had a conversation with Ponomarev about it, he "shared" how it passed "at the top."

December 23, 1979

I asked B.N. if he had read the article on Stalin that was prepared for *Kommunist*. "No." He lowered his voice and moved away from his desk and the phones (I always find it endearing how by habit from Stalin's times he is instinctively afraid of bugs) and said: "How many times this article was reworked, everyone is talking about the balance of positive and negative in Stalin, but essentially they are pushing entirely towards the positive. Even that Dolgikh... he told me himself how in 1941 soldiers came to the Moscow front without rifles. And now he spoke out against a phrase on Stalin's mistake in defining the timeframe of the war, a harmless phrase compared to everything else Stalin did. And others are like Dolgikh too. Of course, you cannot change them at the top. But here we could have said something... I do not understand what they want: he committed so many crimes, killed so many people, ruined so much..." (B.N. cursed, which rarely happens) "And here you are, the article paints the picture with too much black! It's that Kapitonov stinking everything up there... that petty schemer. Plotting. He was already trying to create a little group in the Secretariat under Katushev... Oh, it's not good!" And so forth.

I could not get a word in during this convoluted speech, full of interjections and hints. I did not understand everything in the literal sense. But the general point, it seems, is that not only do we have reigning incompetence and senile impotence, there is also nostalgia for Stalinist times... And B.N. is bitter that he is not given the chance to reach his full potential.

By the way, he knows a great deal about Stalin due to his work on the history of the Party. He knows things that others wouldn't even think to wonder about. But the hatred he has for Stalin feels partially personal. I do not know why... He is not one of the "intelligentsia"... And none of his relatives were imprisoned or executed.

I once again picked up Isaac Deutscher's *Stalin* (on the occasion of the 100th anniversary), I have it in French. The final chapter: "The dialectic of victory" has a lot of thoughts – on the "revolution in one part of the world" (parallels with Napoleon on the Rhineland, Italy, Belgium, Poland, etc.); on the purpose of the Iron Curtain that was brought down after the war; about the fact that Stalin legalized lies as official ideology when he called the 1930s socialism; about the fear of "the Decembrists" – the officer corps that was the only force with enough moral authority to potentially oppose Stalin's regime; and about the fact that Zhukov's name disappeared from propaganda already in 1946, and in the *Pravda* article on the third anniversary of the capture of Berlin, Zhukov was not even mentioned in the list of Stalin's generals who participated in that operation.

Novy Mir published the novel *The Limit of the Possible* by Iosif Gerasimov, another talented Jew who succeeded in showing our wartime (the home front) and post-war heroic history without bowing to any myths and dogmas, in the spirit of patriotism unclouded by demagoguery.

December 30, 1979

Our troops entered Afghanistan. They brought Karmal Babrak with them, deposed Amin (“the bloody dog”). Babrak assumed all the necessary posts, gave all the necessary speeches, including one in which he said that he invited the Soviet Army, released political prisoners, and promised everything to everyone. In a word, in line with expectations.

From Carter, to Khomeini, to *L'Unita*, everyone is furiously condemning the occupation, intervention, interference in the internal affairs of a small and weak country. “Russian imperialism” and the like. By the power of the mighty mass media, the rest of the world has turned against us. The détente capital we accumulated after Brezhnev’s Berlin speech in connection with the December session of NATO is shot to hell. All the “democratic” and “peace-loving” forces that were lined up to support our peace policy are discouraged. All that communists and our unwavering friends in general can do is rebut comments about “Soviet aggression,” nobody will listen to campaigns against American missiles. All those in the “third world” who were planning to or already set course for socialism now can only think about how not to tie themselves up with us *a la* Afghanistan, because they have a clear demonstration of what it can lead to. And we provoked all the imperialists and NATO members to get even tougher by confirming the “correctness” of the hawks, who always argued that the only way to speak with us is from a position of power, using the language of power... And so forth.

The question is – who needed this? The Afghan people? – Possibly. Amin would probably have turned the country into a second Kampuchea. But did we really commit an act that will be positioned alongside Finland 1939 and Czechoslovakia 1968 in international public consciousness just for the sake of revolutionary philanthropy and humanitarianism? The argument (which was also present in the CC letter to the Party) that we need to secure the border is simply ludicrous. For decades Afghanistan had a reactionary regime and the Brits were in charge there like they owned the place. Until the mid-1930s – through the almost open border – Afghanistan inspired the Basmachi movement, moved contraband, etc. And now, with our current power, what danger could they present to us, even if the Americans did get a hold over Amin!

The Soviet people do not need it at all. What they need is meat, consumer goods, and more order!

Who made it happen?

The next day after Taraki’s murder, Aleksandrov told Brutents that we should send troops. (Remember, in 1968 he was the first to tell me about it in Zavidovo). Of course, he was one of the ringleaders. With Leonid Ilyich’s current mental and physical state, the influence of this assistant could have been decisive. Especially because L.I. could not forgive Amin for killing Taraki the day after the publication of a large fraternal communique and the Brezhnev-Taraki meeting in Moscow.

Of course, our “neighbors” (i.e. the KGB)... But I wonder – on their own initiative, or were the KGB guys merely the organizers of relevant information.

I am not sure that Gromyko was an active supporter... or Suslov. The rest, including our Ponomarev (who was clearly at a loss) – do not count. Which means this plot was brewed somewhere “under the radar”...

The decision to send troops was made three weeks ago. Assault forces started moving close to Kabul a week before the coup, at the request of Amin himself (!), who must have decided that he could not stay in power otherwise (!). However, he did not take into account that the troops were being sent for the exact opposite purpose. Now an entire division is moving across the border, and it will take them a whole week (crossing the mountains) to reach Kabul (apropos the question of “border security”!).

This is how policy is made in the name of the Party and the people. And nobody objected – not members of the Politburo, not the PB Secretaries, of course not the republics, not even the apparatus. I think there hasn’t been a period in Russian history, even under Stalin, when such important actions were taken without even a hint of coordination, counsel, discussion, weighing of options – even in a very small circle. Nowadays everyone is a pawn that is ready in advance to quietly and meekly recognize the “rightness and necessity” of any decision emanating from one person. And this one person might not have come up with the decision himself (this is most likely the case in the current situation!).

No, comrades, we have entered into a period of senility at the ruling top that is very dangerous for our country. They are not capable of assessing who is doing what and why. These are not even desperate blind flings from the realization of the hopeless situation in our society; these are just senseless inertial impulses of a decrepit organism that has lost its bearing. These impulses are born in the dark corners of political dysfunction, in an atmosphere of complete atrophy of responsibility that has turned into an organic disease.

What about us, poor sinners? Yesterday Brutents and I were already writing drafts for Babrak: a statement against the imperialist slander campaign in connection with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and a letter to communist parties calling for solidarity (i.e. so they do not protest, as the Italians already did). This is once again Ponomarev’s initiative. He quickly regrouped, and as always, he’s hustling more than anyone. He wants to earn some points even here: who knows, maybe fortune will smile on him and he will be rewarded with membership in the Politburo!

Postscript to 1979

In terms of content, this year was a continuation of the previous one. The same farce with keeping the demented Brezhnev afloat as the supreme leader. The same feelings of shame about our economy and living standards (especially in comparison with the West, where the author often found himself during this year). The same feeling of hopelessness that anything can be fixed in the conditions of the ossified system and the worthlessness of the top leadership. The same pointless bickering with the Eurocommunists, when we ourselves did not know what we wanted from them, what our political goal was: whether we wanted to return the communist movement to the old order, or if we wanted to ensure that we would not be shamed and scolded, or if we wanted to defend our theoretical (and ideological) rightness... But none of those options were possible. We were deceiving ourselves and trying to deceive others. Most likely we were active because we could not just sit and pretend that nothing was happening around us. We, the workers of the International Department, would not have been allowed to do this by our bosses or by the “orthodox” fraternal parties.

We also kept busy at work because once there is an ideology and its objects including the ICM and foreign propaganda, they all must be “covered” – that’s why the corresponding bodies and institutions exist (and are paid for).

In this “volume” there are many impressions from foreign trips (England, Ireland, Belgium, GDR, West Berlin, FRG, Jamaica, New York, Budapest), descriptions and thoughts about the various meetings with all kinds of people. All of this is performed as a matter of routine, bleak and hopeless, but it is interesting as a “chronicle of the times”... I think not only for me.

However, the day-to-day official (and social) existence in the vicinity of power that was dragging a great country who-knows-where suddenly broke through at the end of the year with the attack on Afghanistan. But more on that in the next and subsequent “volumes.”



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The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1980

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Translated by Anna Melyakova

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1980

January 1, 1980

The year was crazy. It was hectic at work. It exposed a great deal about the overall situation (in the sense that things are getting worse both domestically and internationally). In all respects it fell short of expectations. Judging by what I see around me and things I hear, people were bidding a gloomy farewell to the year that passed, and saying a gloomy hello to the new year. Stores are empty and over the last few days even stamps and envelopes have disappeared: I personally witnessed a scene at the Central Telegraph on this matter – “sabotage,” “inadequacy,” “whoever allowed this to happen should have his head taken off” and so forth.

January 28, 1980

I haven't written for a month. And what a month! It's like at the front: when you are in battle, you don't have time to write. And after the battle, you don't want to write about it, you want to write about something “lofty,” about Moscow...

The devil knows what is happening in the world. The whole world condemned and cursed us: in the UN – 104 delegations voted against us and only 17 with us. Hypocrisy? Yes, of course. But we threw a good litmus test – and hatred (or, at best, dislike) towards us came to the surface everywhere. We were condemned by governments and parliaments, all kinds of committees and individual politicians, parties and trade unions. Even some “fraternal” ones like the PCI, PCE, CPGB, the Japanese, Belgians, Swedes. For aggression, for violating all international norms, for occupation, for undermining détente, for provoking an arms race, for encroaching on the Muslim world, non-alignment, and sources of oil that all of the West and Japan depend on, etc., etc.

Yes, of course. Now nobody can tell whether it would have been a second Chile or not (by the way, we came up with this argument at the International Department – Brezhnev's responses for *Pravda* were mostly written by us: Brutents, Yermovsky plus Tolya Kovalyov, the deputy foreign minister). Then again, it was already worse than Chile over there even before December 27th, long before Amin. It was already there under Taraki. Now, indeed, the executions and massacres have stopped... but for this we sacrificed the remnants of socialism's prestige and all of détente. Of course, Brezhnev could not forgive Amin for overthrowing and killing Taraki the day after his embrace with Brezhnev in the Kremlin. Somebody used this... but I don't understand, what for? Or was it simply out of stupidity, a poor calculation. Or maybe a Beria-style provocation?! One Western commentator wrote, “It is either a terrible miscalculation or a terrible calculation.” I'm afraid it's not even close to the latter. It was simple Russian rudeness in the person who ultimately made the decision: how dare they go against me, I'll show them what happens when you don't take me into consideration!

The scary part is that the final = sole decision was made by someone who is completely senile. (Although it was prepared by other people). A week ago, he was shown on TV: receiving the mandate for elections to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet – the first candidate of the people. It was a terrifying sight.

How about “his” responses to *Pravda*. The initiative came from B.N. and Gromyko (which confirms that the MFA is not the initiator of Afghanistan). Both of them, each in his own way, are now working up “crazy energy” to reduce the consequences, talk our way out of the situation, keep whomever we can, etc. I witnessed and partially participated in urgently preparing a text. The initial version, beautifully written by Kovalyev, was rejected by the “Afghanistan commission” (Suslov, Zimyanin, B.N., Andropov, Gromyko) for being too soft. Brutents was brought on. He used the text from the “letter to fraternal parties” that we wrote the day before and hadn’t had time to present to the CC... The members of the aforementioned commission signed off on the “responses” and Suslov (the final signature) ordered to deliver them to Chernenko (the only person who sees Brezhnev in person, along with the stenographer Galya Goroshina). Chernenko seemed to take it “upstairs,” but they were in a rush to go hunting in Zavidovo (it was Friday) and the reading did not take place (“He” does not read anything himself anymore, except for short public speeches. Texts are read aloud to him, and only the ones that someone deems necessary within the “sparing regimen” he is on to avoid worrying him).

Zagladin and I had to observe this procedure first-hand, because B.N. sent us to Suslov’s reception room to intercept the text and take it to Chernenko and use it as an excuse to convince Chernenko to award Ponomarev a second Hero [of Socialist Labor] on the occasion of his 75th birthday. However, Suslov sent his assistant with the text, and Vadim and I were left in the reception room empty handed. We had to go to Chernenko “without a pretext.” He is democratic, plus he knows us closely from joint trips to fraternal congresses. He heard us out and promised to pass it on, firmly promised. But not a Hero, more likely an Order of the October Revolution (and so it happened). While we were with him, we found out from his phone conversations how “the responses” would move forward.

The story of how B.N. asked me to push the idea of a second Hero is a whole separate subject. I will tell it later...

Let’s come back to Afghanistan. All our (Department) work is happening “under the banner” of this event. We are tying ourselves in knots, wrecking our brains, even though it is clear that nothing can be fixed. Another reference point has been added to the history of socialism.

Carter took away 17 million tons of grain (flour and pasta immediately disappeared in Moscow), banned other exports, closed all negotiations and visits, demanded to cancel the Olympics (today the American NOC agreed with Carter’s view... Now what will the IOC say?). Thatcher did the same to us. Portugal forbade us to fish in its 200-mile zone; the U.S. did the same by lowering our catch quota from 450,000 tons to 75,000 tons. Canada and Australia did the same. Almost all Western countries (except France) reduced the level and scope of various exchanges and visits. Planned tours and exhibitions have been cancelled (the Hermitage in the U.S., the Bolshoi in Norway, etc.). Australia closed its ports to our Antarctic vessels. Yesterday, we were censured by the Islamic Conference (i.e. all Muslim countries except Syria, Libya, Algeria and Afghanistan itself) taking place in Islamabad. We’ve been condemned by the European Parliament, social-democratic parties, labor union centers. New Zealand expelled our Ambassador Sofinsky, accusing him of transferring money to the Socialist Unity Party of New

Zealand (our friends). One could hardly have imagined what is happening in the press, on television and radio. They are reproaching and trampling on us in the most shameless way.

Banks have closed our lines of credit. I had a casual conversation with Ivanov, the deputy chairman of Gosbank. He said that not only American, but other banks too, are either completely refusing to give us loans to pay off previous debts (which is how we have been managing for many years), or hiking up interest by almost 30 percent.

They say Tikhonov, who is standing in for Kosygin, had a meeting on this subject. It was reported to the CC. The situation is such that we will have to refuse to pay our previous loans. That is essentially a bankruptcy announcement, and all that it implies...

In the meanwhile (the famous Chekhovian “meanwhile,” “what is this mean... while?” he would ask), the economic situation seems to be awful. I was assigned to speak at a party meeting with a report on the outcomes of the November Plenum. I had to carefully study some materials. My report turned out “critical and harsh.” But that is not the point... We did not have to wait long for confirmations. Last Tuesday, the CC Secretariat discussed the issue of “Theft on Transport.” I practically shuddered from shame and horror... The CC committee worked for three months under Kapitonov’s chairmanship. And here is what they reported at the Secretariat:

- In two years, the number of thefts doubled; the value of stolen goods quadrupled;
- Forty percent of the thieves are railway workers;
- Sixty percent of the thieves are water transport workers;
- Nine-eleven thousand cars are accumulating in Brest because we cannot deliver them to international buyers in this “disassembled” state;
- Twenty five percent of tractors and agricultural machines arrive stripped of equipment;
- Thirty percent of Zhiguli vehicles were returned to VAZ after they were delivered to consumers half disassembled;
- Every day, 14 billion rubles-worth of cargo is left unguarded;
- Guards exist, there are 69,000 of them, but these are pensioners or the people with disabilities, who work for 80-90 rubles per month;
- Annually, losses to theft amount to many billions of rubles;
- Seven times more meat is being stolen than two years ago, five times more fish.

The Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs reported that in 1970, four thousand thieves were caught on the railroad, in 1979 there were eleven thousand. These are only the ones who were caught. How many are there that weren’t? After all, trains stand for three days on the tracks without any supervision, even the driver leaves.

Poor Pavlovsky (minister) again repented, like he did at the Plenum. He asked for forty thousand more people for security. He did not get them...

The discussion (Kirilenko’s grumbling, Ponomarev’s moralizing in the spirit of 1920s Bolshevism – “How is this possible! It is a disgrace! Where are the party organizations, the trade unions, where are they looking...”) astonished everyone with its total helplessness.

[By the way, when B.N. was calling to “mobilize the masses to fight this outrage,” Lapin (chairman of TV-radio), a sarcastic old man, was sitting next to me and said rather loudly: “If we mobilize the masses, then trains will arrive completely empty!”]

This, beg your pardon, “question” is a concentrated reflection of the state of our society – economic, political, ideological, and moral.

Neither tsarist Russia nor any other civilized country has known anything like this.

And we are only talking about the railways. It’s everywhere else, too – newspapers are practically bursting with revelatory facts on how the state and its citizens are being robbed in all aspects of trade, services, health care, culture. Total depravity everywhere. Yesterday on the way home from the dacha I was in a car with an elderly taxi driver, and he complained the entire way: where are we headed? What is happening? How can this be? This has never happened before, what will happen to us? And so on. He mentioned dozens of everyday instances that he either witnessed himself or that were witnessed by his acquaintances...

How will Brezhnev go down in history now? His only asset was “peace, détente.” Now Afghanistan destroyed that.

I am rereading *War and Peace*. It is fantastically grand! From my current “height” I look at any phrase and genius practically seeps out of every turn and every figure and every “thing,” as the author himself put it. This greatness of the past is reassuring.

February 5, 1980

Afghanistan is like a sore that eats away at public consciousness and international life. Rumors are spreading that hospitals in Tashkent are crammed with our wounded boys; that everyday planes arrive with sealed caskets; that in the various departments sending specialists to Afghanistan there are constantly portraits framed in mourning black. Why? For what? For whom? B.N. recently let it slip to Karen: we cannot allow a second Sadat at our border. So what? Should our boys die for this, should we be shamed throughout the world, should anti-Sovietism’s hatred ruin the remnants of our socialist ideal, should even the appearance of respect for national interests collapse?!

B.N., who is fussing more than anyone to justify the Afghan action in the eyes of the international community, understands that it was a stupid mistake. Maybe in his heart he even considers it a crime. On Friday before leaving for a meeting with voters in Saratov, he said: “All of that is fine (talking about routine and important matters). The main thing is how to unravel the Afghan knot. Maybe like this?” He takes a sheet of paper from his desk, written by him. He reads: “The United States pledges not to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union withdraws troops...” He asks, “Will they agree?” I reply, “Gladly. But will our side agree...”

B.N.: That’s the thing!

It’s amazing – all more-or-less reasonable and decent people see that a great stupidity has been done... from all aspects. But who did it?

Le Monde writes: in Moscow they are starting to look for the culprit – whose idea was it? Who is the initiator?

I don't know what they mean by "look for." Nobody has said this out loud. But in the apparatus and in Moscow (not in the sense of the PB and Kremlin, but among the public) people are guessing about it. I'm guessing too. Of course, I repeat to myself: they played off Brezhnev's senile indignation with Amin – how dare he disobey and on top of that kill our "best friend." But who made this play? It doesn't seem to be Gromyko, and doesn't look like it was Ustinov either. Clearly not Suslov. There is only one option left – [the K]GB. So once again, as happened before, policy is being formed there.

Meanwhile, the pre-election anointment is in full swing, along with the most vulgar glorification of our senile chief. A big chunk of every speech praises the faithful Leninist, etc., etc. And on the TV and radio quotes of this praise is all you hear. Every day he is greeting or congratulating someone on their success, or the start of work (though he probably does not read his greetings even in the newspapers. But the Secretariat approves stacks of them every week).

On Saturday I visited the famous ophthalmologist Slava Fyodorov in the "Test Pilot" village near Iksha. His estate, beautiful wife, fantastic Russian food, horses, summer quarters, cellars with preserves and a workshop, and so on. He is a significant person outside of politics. Tremendous energy and talent. He presented me with skis.

We are preparing for "the Six" CC Secretaries of socialist countries. They are revolting on their knees over Afghanistan. The Hungarian PB – the majority is against curtailing ties with the U.S. and the FRG despite our demands. Only Kadar's authority prevented a scandal. The German PB headed by Honecker, despite Abrasimov's fierce pressure, refused to fully comply and only postponed the Honecker-Schmidt meeting instead of cancelling it as we demanded. The message: you did not consult with us when you started Afghanistan, and now you want us to sacrifice our real interests by breaking our contacts with the West for the sake of your stupidity and your "higher" interests which nobody understands. Hungary, for example, has 60 percent of its economy tied to the West (through export-import)...

Denes (CC Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) arrives tomorrow, "the Six" most likely around the 22nd.

February 9, 1980

I'm going through a very tough time morally. Everyone around me, if they do not ask me directly, the expression in their eyes is demanding an answer: "Whose idea was this? (Afghanistan) What for? Who is supposed to answer for this to the nation and to the world?" Fear is abating in the West: it is now clear to everyone that this is not the beginning of nuclear war, and likely not even a "remilitarization of the Rhineland." However, the anti-Soviet campaign remains at the same level. Even our best friends, who publicly politically supported (or did not object to) the Afghan action, do not dare to justify us "morally." If we hold a worldwide referendum, our prestige probably has never been lower than now – in all 62 years.

Most likely the General Secretary does not even know what is happening around us. Reports from Afghanistan are prepared for him to look as if there is nothing but “sheer normalization” happening. The information he gets from the West is probably at the level of *Pravda*, since he has long been on a “sparing regimen.” So, he does not realize what he has done... Then again, it is not just a matter of a lack and skimming of information, it is also his physiological incapacity to understand what is happening.

Sobakin (a consultant in our department) stopped by and told me: “I got a call from Kobysh (a consultant in Zamyatin’s department). ‘What are you doing?’ he said. ‘I’ve been on the phone for two days, calling all the newspapers and such, telling them not to use the phrase ‘the Carter doctrine.’” Meanwhile, Ponomarev’s election speech has paragraphs devoted to it... Understandably, I get the response, “Who knows better, you, Kobysh, or a CC Secretary?!” It turns out the General Secretary said in some conversation: ‘What doctrine? Can scum have a doctrine?!’”

The Hungarians visited (Denes is a dear man). Kadar asked for an urgent consultation. We demanded they cancel their MFA visit to Bonn and a parliamentary delegation to the U.S. And the majority of their PB spoke out against our demands. But Kadar... in a word, no need to explain. However, in exchange, the Hungarians asked to cancel the Warsaw Pact maneuvers that were planned there, especially in connection with the hype in Yugoslavia that Tito’s departure (his leg was recently amputated) could lead to a repeat of Afghanistan in Yugoslavia. All mass media shouted about this for a couple weeks, there were even government statements (England, the U.S., etc.) in support of SFRY. This is how far things have gone, as if to say: the Russians are capable of anything now!

So... Kadar urged us to “consider.” We honored his request (we would not have come up with this idea ourselves). Now Ceausescu is asking us to cancel maneuvers in Bulgaria (for the same reasons, “not to escalate”). He said this to Gromyko at a recent visit. Maybe we will cancel them here too, but again – it was not our idea!

In a word, senility is affecting the entire structure, the mechanism of top-level power, due to the senility of its leader and the average age of the rest of its leadership at nearly 75 years. It is becoming dangerous for the existence of our state, not just for its prestige. But there is no way out. By the way, I am reading a work by our runaway philosopher Zinoviev *Bright Future* (or *Yawning Heights*), published abroad. This work caused a stir about a year or year-and-a-half ago. It is insanely talented and monstrously anti-Soviet. The concept (hopelessness) reminds me of Rudolph Bahro’s *Alternative*. But the latter is German and serious, while the former is Russian and uncompromising and angrily cheerful. I even came up with a blasphemous analogy: if Bahro (for socialism) is like Marx, then Zinoviev is like Lenin (in terms of personality, mannerisms and the emotional revealing of the essence and exposing the corresponding social system).

I spiraled away from Denes’ es visit. Ponomarev and Rusakov led the conversation with him. I was an extra. B.N. in his usual style delivered propaganda speeches blaming imperialism for exacerbating tensions. This is despite the fact that Denes said the same thing first, and said it pretty well. Then followed “musical moments”: for example, if Denes said they are thinking of

cancelling a planned summer visit of the Premier to Bonn and Giscard's to Budapest, B.N. "picked it up" in the sense that he would say, "we completely agree with you (!), it would be good to forego."

Rusakov (who, by the way, is a pathetic type – petty, nervous, preoccupied only with avoiding getting slapped for something by the higher-ups) made a speech. He said that economic integration is especially necessary in the current situation, because all these deals with the West, joint ventures, loans, technologies – essentially, they increase dependency, foreign debt, etc. And this is a political issue. We need to rely on our shared resources, etc. In other words, the same thing Brezhnev has been saying for two years to his interlocutors in Crimea. But nothing has changed because we cannot offer anything to replace deals with the West. The Germans, the Hungarians, and the Czechs have told us numerous times that they would welcome the closest integration with us; the loans for Western technology and imports are a yoke for them. But: "Come on, Soviet comrades! Let's talk specifics! If you do not offer anything instead, we cannot give up our ties to the West. We cannot move towards an even further reduction in living standards, etc."

The day before, when Shishlin (a consultant in Rusakov's department) brought me notes that Rusakov later used for his speech, I told him: "It is shameless and hypocritical to reproach the Hungarians for something that is our own fault." Nevertheless, these things were said. Denes's reaction was: "Of course, of course. All the things we can provide for ourselves through integration we should do, and do as soon as possible. And the things we cannot, well, excuse me, but we have to go to the West." As if to say, it's up to you, the Soviets (this was implied).

February 12, 1980

I was at the CC Secretariat today. Again, as always, mainly Brezhnev's greetings to someone or awards, awards, endless awards. The joker Lapin, who always sits to my side or behind me, almost audibly comments: we talked at the Plenum about criticism and self-criticism, discipline, insistence on high standards, etc. but again we have heaps of medals, awards, and greetings.

Those sitting at the main table of the CC Secretariat "argued" whether to agree with a proposal to award some power plant for putting a unit in operation... Lapin: "Why stop there, they should get a greeting from Brezhnev and awards for each blade." Laughter all around him... And involuntarily, again and again you run into Zinoviev's "analysis."

By the way, issues of the Committee on Religion came up twice: Kuroyedov asked for new staff. The discussion revealed that in the USSR right now there are 6500 priests, 900 Catholic priests, and 300 mullahs (plus 2000 illegal ones). But every other deceased is buried with church rites and every fifth newborn is baptized.

The workload is unbelievable right now (Zagladin is in the hospital, Shaposhnikov on vacation, Ulyanovsky – there is no difference whether he is here or not). In addition to dozens of papers to sign, just today I had: a letter to Schmidt about the Olympics; response letter to

Mitterrand; response letter to Marchais, who objects to our contacts with Social Democrats; assessment of a text for B.N.'s Lenin presentation, which was composed in Serebryannyi Bor under Lukich's leadership – 50 pages of propaganda blabber; preparations for "the Six," which is scheduled for the 26th. And over a hundred ciphered telegrams from all parts of the world. Every fifth one requires at a minimum to give someone an assignment, ask about something, consult with someone, report to B.N., etc. I only have time to read the abbreviated ("secretarial") TASS nowadays.

February 29, 1980

Once again, I did not write for two weeks. I get home late, bone-tired, and with no desire to do anything. On one of the Saturdays I did manage to visit Arbatov in Barvikha. He has finally recovered from the heart attack. He is a rare man. The Russian and the Jewish are so intertwined in him that his weaknesses look like flaws, and his virtues make him a truly major figure... His story of wise reconciliation with the possibility of death.

We walked around the park in the dark for an hour and a half, every now and again stopping and expressing our surprise at what our higher ups have done. Once again, the fundamental question here is the same: Whose idea was it? Arbatov is inclined to think that it was Gromyko together with a mix of military men like "little Napoleon," Ogarkov, but not Ustinov, who, according to Arbatov, does not have a military man mindset and definitely is not a war-monger. Arbatov is defending Yu.V. (Andropov) in every possible way. He even says that the latter was "strongly opposed" and even said that it would be better to "lose Afghanistan." Doubtful. If this had been the case, the General Secretary would not have resolved to do it, despite all his emotions about Amin. Plus, we all know whose people brought Karmal from Czechoslovakia, who delivered him there and who "made" the coup. Not to mention they were the ones who "organized" the relevant information for Moscow, systematically arguing that there was no other way. While the military held on to Amin, who supposedly improved matters in the army and in general was a "strong person" capable of handling the situation.

Is it possible they are using Yurka, same as Bovin, to spread rumors that will be useful in the future?

Yurka also went through the possible candidates for the top post. Kosygin suffered a severe heart attack and isn't leaving right now only because he does not want to look like a deserter ("precedent"). Tikhonov is shit both as a person and as a professional, and screws things up even more than Kosygin. Ustinov was a good premier for a while, but he was sent down a different track. Romanov will not be allowed, plus he ruined his chances with his daughter's wedding in Tauride Palace and smashed dishes from the Hermitage collections... After this Suslov "gave him a talking to." Chernenko will be done the day after "He" leaves: this always happens to favorites... Even though he is not a bad guy, on his own. Suslov does not want to and cannot, even though in the current situation he plays a "positive role" by not letting the top fall apart totally... Kirilenko is out – both because he once offered to "help the man Himself" take a break from his duties, and because he and M.A. can't stand each other. In general, the average age at the PB is well over 70, only Romanov is less than 60 years old.

The only one left is Yu.A. But, he is a) sick, b) from “that establishment.” Shchelokov is dangerous, not on his own, but because he is the one in Moscow in control of the main armed forces: two NKVD divisions and the police. There is no garrison in Moscow, only academies and schools, which are unarmed. I expressed doubt: haven’t we grown out of the age when the fate of the country could depend on two divisions? Yurka laughed his sarcastic laugh laced with profanities.

The General Secretary was never the brightest intellect, although he was a good and well-intentioned person. Now he is completely senile. “I,” [Arbatov] said, “always compare him to my aunt. She had all the same symptoms, both external and internal (developing hostility, alienation, animosity even to people she used to be attached to, aloofness instead of her natural sociability, dislike of her former friends)... The Medical Encyclopedia accurately describes all the obvious symptoms, it is called “senile psychosis.” (He looks truly awful on TV, but they keep showing him over and over, and putting him with foreigners, to whom he reads Andryukha’s political verbosity syllable by syllable (i.e. texts prepared by his adviser Andrey Mikhailovich Aleksandrov-Agentov)).

What a tragedy for the country, for all of us?! What will we come to! The devil knows what!

March 1, 1980

Zagladin, who also spent two weeks in Barvikha and talked with various officials, said: “One guy who is informed in this sphere ‘tallied it up’ for me... he said the Americans deprived us of 10 million tons of grain. But that is also how much was lost during transportation of crops from one place to another. And an additional 10 million tons is ‘planned’ to rot and for theft.”

On the 26th we held “the Six” CC Secretaries from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It was a secret meeting, without the Romanians, to “compare notes” in the current situation. We prepared a text for B.N. to speak for approximately an hour and ten minutes. It included everything – an analysis of causes, Carter’s line, quasi-confidential information on Afghanistan (carefully concealing that our troops are involved in suppressing rebellion and fighting against “partisans”), what to do with Schmidt, how to deal with the Americans, what kind of policy to pursue with respect to the “nonaligned,” and of course about Marchais’ idea to hold a conference of European communist parties.

Of course, everyone agrees in the name of proletarian internationalism and unity. But they delicately hint that they cannot curtail relations with the West.

The integration that B.N. called for under pressure from Rusakov – sure. Only please replace the technologies from the West, replace the West’s role as a supplier of vital goods, and its role as a market for things that are a dime a dozen – then we are ready. In the meantime, “sorry.” Of course this was said very vaguely and between the lines. But...

Later, Werblan (a new member of the PZRP PB) said all of this openly in a one on one conversation with Ponomarev. So, they will “curtail” minor things in relations with the West, but

the important things they will continue as planned (government-level visits to the FRG, France, the U.S.; exhibits; trade and other exchanges; loans; grain purchases).

Of course, they absolutely do not need Afghanistan right now. Same as the Soviet people, really. The people are disparaging this incomprehensible internationalist action against the background of, figuratively speaking, the fact that there is “nothing to eat”... Even from cities like Gorky, there are “paratroopers” who come on tour buses to besiege Moscow. On the weekend it is impossible to come near grocery stores. These people haul away huge bags of whatever they can get their hands on – from butter to oranges. And it is a shame to think badly of them. How are they any worse than us, these people from Torzhok or Kaluga. More likely they are better, because they probably still produce something rather than just waste paper.

Political jokes are circulating in Moscow. One of them: two people come out of a lecture on international relations. One asks the other: “So, how did you understand our current policies?” “I understood it like this: we need to exchange Sakharov for the Persian Shah, then the Shah for hostages, and the hostages for American wheat.”

And more: “I think this is the situation – some shah had his leg amputated (a hint at Tito) and I think he was sent to Gorky, but it seems he will likely still participate in the Olympics.”

This is how the people, or at least the Moscow intelligentsia, feel about our high politics... what they think of it...

Incidentally, in this very situation, Suslov went on vacation, Gromyko went on vacation, Andropov has been on vacation for a while now. Brezhnev is also resting after an election speech and a meeting with Hammer. And that’s all there is to our politics.

It’s even more delightful at the Secretariat: 80 percent of the time and 90 percent of the issues “discussed” there are Brezhnev’s greetings to various collectives for overfulfillment, with awards of orders and titles. If some American spy got in there, he would probably be in a fix over what to report to the Center – neither the Kremlinologists nor his bosses would believe him, they would think he is tricking them or he lost his mind.

By the way, I find myself mentally projecting onto Zinoviev’s *Bright Future*. At the end he has a chapter called “Hymn to Moscow” – a great city, the center of the modern universe, which has everything, where corruption and major theft flourish, where you can watch any movie you like, read any book, where there are highbrow salons and filthy messes, where there is food that normal households (“those who don’t know how”) don’t even remember the names of, where there are luxurious women for every taste...

A city that could not care less, that can withstand anything, that can do everything. It will go like an icebreaker through everything, laughing dramatically at the leaders.

It is charming that at the end the author became sentimental over his support for communism.

March 3, 1980

The newspapers printed a list of elected deputies to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Look at Leonid Ilyich, he made his sonny a deputy too, so he does not have to travel far – in some district of Leningrad. First, he made him first deputy at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, then gave him an award himself. And now he is a deputy... I shuddered.

If a person can do something like this shamelessly, in front of the entire nation, even defiantly (especially the award), it means we can expect anything from him. Except, of course, something that would constitute a personal danger.

Karen Brutents was in the company of some nouveau riche. Among them was the USSR Deputy Minister of Finance. It turns out he knows more about Afghanistan than Karen himself, who “leads” this subject at the CC International Department. For example, he knows that when Amin was summoned to Taraki’s palace in early September (at the insistence and by a personal telephone call) it was not the Afghans who organized and carried out the shots at him, but our guards!

But that is not the main thing. After this deputy had something to drink, he said a bunch of interesting things about his own department. For example, recently it received an order (contrary to all the rules – to consult with the Ministry of Finance – where to get the money) to allocate an additional 23 billion rubles to support the armed forces. It seems Brezhnev’s statement in his election speech about additional benefits to war veterans is connected with this. However, the main reason: since the army is shooting, since we had to mobilize in the border districts in the South, since there are already widows and orphans because of Afghanistan – we need to put a stopper on it, butter them up, prevent – and there you go, 23 billion from the budget.

In the meantime, Gosplan planned 650 million tons of oil production by 1984. But people in the oil industry believe they can only get 625.5 million tons, which means that foreign currency export will essentially have to be stopped. Because we have precious metals in addition to oil, but they have been “depleted” over the last 10 years.

We are really feeling the effects of Carter’s measures. Regional committees are forbidden to “allow” the slaughter of cattle. But this will not increase the supply of meat: they will turn over starving, barely alive cattle... The norms have become ridiculous: for 1981, the planned meat per capita in Rostov-on-Don is... 2kg per year.

The situation is worse than during the War. Back then it was only necessary to supply the cities, now we have to supply the village too. There are demands and requests coming in from all over to introduce ration cards. It is impossible to do not just for political reasons, but also because there aren’t enough goods: we would have to give rationed amounts, but to everyone, not just Moscow selectively.

People are hoarding gold at unbelievable levels. Rings with precious stones that cost 15 thousand rubles are selling like hotcakes. People have no confidence in money. Same as in government: they are afraid of monetary reform. They buy up anything that passes as luxury items. It has become fashionable to buy paintings. Hundreds of artists are flourishing after

having eked out a miserable existence for decades. Nowadays they can throw some paint on a canvas and it sells immediately.

The state suffered heavy losses (14 billion rubles) with vodka. The decision was made to reduce the production of vodka after a poor harvest and the cutoff of American wheat imports. Here are the results. The New Year price increase only brought in 2 billion rubles.

The resolution on improving the economic mechanism is a very good one, of course. But our economy is not ready for it and won't be ready for at least five more years.

To come back to Carter's measures (i.e. the consequences of Afghanistan) – I don't know what some of our industries will do, for example Kastandov (chemical engineering), who planned everything with the expectation of receiving American technologies, machines and apparatuses. All their work will stop. Because the materials they were counting on, the ones they included in their construction projects and plans for supplying the national economy – we do not produce any of them. We had no plans to produce them, not to mention our capability to ensure the required level of quality.

Against this background, my communication with B.N. regarding the upcoming April 22nd presentation on Lenin and his current rants about dynamism, advantages, and achievements... have been nauseating. So far, I have no idea how we will bluff our way into creating something believable on an elementary level for him. Although, nobody cares about this right now!

Something else is important right now... Brezhnev was shown on TV again today – he was presented with the certificate of election as a deputy... And a month ago [he was on TV] for the presentation of a candidate's ID...

Handel on the radio. For some reason it moves me deeply right now, when I'm a thousand times farther from music than I was in my youth, when I was learning to play myself!

March 8, 1980

B.N.'s banal speech congratulating the women in our department. It sums him up – an ossified (bureaucracy-ridden) product of Bolshevik idealism of bygone times.

The editorial board of *Questions of History*. How much ineptitude there is in these people with scholarly diplomas! We were discussing an article for the upcoming World Congress of Historians (this summer in Bucharest). "A Meeting of Two Civilizations" – about the culture of Ancient Rus'. They started up some nonsense: "It's too much – any cultural monument you take, it's either Byzantine, or Eastern or Western influence. Where is the Russian influence?!" These are scholars of history! Showing concern about patriotism. Truly, it follows Zinoviev: ideology turns into ideological cynicism, and official morality turns into immorality. These people don't even know what they think themselves about the subject they are discussing.

I was very forward (couldn't restrain myself): don't worry about Russian heritage. On the contrary, we should be proud that such powerful and diverse influences cooked in the Russian pot and became symbols of "our" unique civilization.

I read the telegrams from our marshals and generals in Kabul. Their assessment of the situation is quite sensible. The subtext is: you started this mess and now we, the army, have to deal with it; we have to engage in completely inappropriate affairs that are not worthy of a great country's great army. The formulas they are providing are clearly standard and clearly ineffective. At the same time, the [K]GB line is sending dispatches in the spirit of "thunder of victory"...

The day before yesterday I was given for my signature a list of people to be decorated for Afghanistan (for the CC apparatus). The list is headed by Ulyanovsky! First the referent brought the list, then a head of a sector from Ulyanovsky's sphere. I burst out cursing and told him to "go somewhere." Here is a case of immorality that everyone takes as real public morality. And it is not just the reason for which they are awarded, but the fact that the person charged with leading this process is a cynical loafer and scoundrel, who even in this matter, which is entirely his job, managed to dump it completely on others.

Richard Kosolapov's article in *Pravda*, "The Life Position of Lenin" ... A strong article by an honest and decent person who is concerned about the collapse of moral principles of society and the state. The moral principles for which Lenin laid the foundation. A desperate call to use the moral potential left by Lenin, which is embedded in Leninism. We aren't using it well, he says. He writes about Lenin's stance on "bribes," too... 60 years later. Lenin once wrote about bribes, at the beginning of the NEP. Kosolapov believes that out of the three vices L.I. wrote about with anguish (communist conceit, illiteracy, and bribery), we completely got rid of only the second. Alas! (I understand Richard) Our illiteracy is worse now than it was then. Not actual illiteracy, but an even more dangerous kind: when we swear by Leninism but we don't even know it and don't want to know it. Which of our leaders has ever seriously studied Lenin? Which of them refers to him in his political practice? Who reads Lenin seriously? Or even the materials that our scholars develop "on the basis of Leninism"? Not to mention following Lenin in everyday morality and political morality, they do not want to hear about it! If anyone addresses such a claim to them, he is immediately branded as anti-Soviet.

March 13, 1980

Our group of consultants has now physically fallen apart, too. Four have sprained or broken legs. One had a heart attack, another a toothache, the third has the flu... Zhilin is among this company.

I told B.N. about the situation, he decided to joke about it: we should dissolve this group and get a new younger one. Brutents came over to complain about the consultant group. Let's go to Ponomarev, he said. I am ready to say everything to him myself (!). It's not ok to have some people do all the work, and the others slack off. I said to Brutents: Ponomarev will ask us – "What do you suggest?!" What are you ready to propose? People are tired and they don't care. And they have not developed the reflex (dedication to the job and a sense of duty) that you and I have. They never had it. Plus, the reluctance to keep learning, to be at the level of the information we have at the Department. And there is basic mediocrity, and so forth. And for what?

Brutents: You and I are similar to Ponomarev in that sense.

I: No. At least I'm not. I am fulfilling my duty and trying to do as well as I possibly can the tasks given to me, whether I agree with the essence of the matter or not. B.N., on the other hand, adjusts to others' opinions and acts as if he came up with it himself. Most importantly, he shows off his new initiatives even when nobody asks him to or even when others find his out of place activity annoying.

Brutents: He has some career considerations here, but you are right – sometimes his activity is detrimental to him. There is an element of irrational vanity from participating in big politics. Some of it is automatic because of his dedication to the job: somebody has to do it if the people who are supposed to aren't doing their jobs. So he calls Kabul, Tashkent, and squeezes all kinds of papers out of us... Meanwhile, in Moscow, primarily, he is starting to be associated with the Afghan affair. Why the hell does he need that!

Marchais again got excited about holding a conference of Communist Parties. He even set a date: April 28th, for a day and a half. The shuttling between Warsaw and Paris is underway. This morning an adviser from the Polish embassy brought me a draft of an address from the future conference to the men and women of Europe. A pacifist document: to get attention but without discussion. And so Georges can look like a man who can do anything, even things that Moscow cannot.

With Sobakin and Zuyev we added some "snot" to the draft – our remarks in the spirit of Ponomarev: to mention NATO and the U.S., to condemn the military hysteria, and not to forget all our past initiatives. B.N. approved it. He does not like this lean piece of paper, but he understands that the important thing is not yet another paper, which many will not even print, but the very fact of holding a conference of Communist Parties at such a moment. Plus, he wants to go to Paris, show off there.

Very late in the day I composed a telegram to Zagladin in Paris – a directive to work the French in the spirit of our amendments. Tomorrow the Pole is coming to see me. I will convey all of this to him, too. On Saturday the Poles are off to meet with Georges, then to Rome to persuade Berlinguer, who, by the way, completely bankrupted himself with his "soft strategy."

March 20, 1980

The "Leniniada" continues at work. And it started going downhill since last Saturday – trivialization of the text. When he (B.N.) saw what comes of his attempts to moralize up and down, appealing to the "moral potential of Leninism," he started to move back towards things he has to say. The usual process when creating his texts.

It takes a toll on my nerves. This time I made a scene over his usual manner of playing several pianos at once (in this case he made Pyshkov the arbiter of our text, because the latter participated in composing Suslov's articles for *Kommunist* and *Problems of Peace and Socialism*). I said this is not how people do things, he (Pyshkov) is my subordinate and respects me to boot, and he does not think, unlike you [Ponomarev], that I write worse than he does. That is why immediately after you, in secret from me, gave him this assignment, the first thing he did

was come to me. As the result, he is in an awkward position, I've lost any enthusiasm to work "on your report." [Ponomarev] made excuses... But really, our behavior was silly and petty on both sides, his and mine. We are in one stinking cart in which anything goes, there is no point trying to stay clean in it.

In the middle of the month there was a delegation from Jamaica led by the same General Secretary Duncan whom I admired when I was there. Here he made a pathetic and unpleasant impression. He came to solicit. If we don't give them what they ask – they, Manley and the government of the People's National Party, the progressive regime, will be toppled at the next parliamentary elections. The leader of the party hostile to them (Labor) went to the U.S. and upon returning announced on TV that he brought back 50 thousand dollars for the election campaign. It seems Duncan wanted to return from the USSR with the same.

However, our Ministry of Foreign Trade and State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations does not just give things away for free. But through the Party line, I, unexpectedly for myself (considering that B.N. doesn't think much of some Jamaica), managed to coax out 40 thousand dollars, and I think I'll be able to get 5 "Lada" cars (after negotiations Duncan asked to talk one-on-one with me and "laid it out" – 1 million U.S. dollars and eight cars, otherwise they will fail).

But this is after their departure. Of course, I could not promise anything definite to them while they were here. They left quite disappointed and gloomy. I was unpleasantly struck by the lack of basic moral and even formal-diplomatic culture from these black mulattos with diplomas from British and Canadian universities. They did not hide their disdain for us, the USSR, and the people working with them, after they realized that all they asked for isn't going to be brought to them on a platter.

It was their first time in the USSR. But they were not interested in Moscow in the slightest, even though they do not know anything about us. They did not want to see Moscow, did not ask about our life, our affairs and concerns.

At first, I was worried and even regretted that they were coming: I knew that we would give them almost nothing. But later, when I saw how they view us (like a big milking cow, they don't care about anything else), it ignited a contempt in me for this Jamaica and everything having to do with it.

Once again it convinced me that I'm right when Karen and I have our long-standing debates. The best policy regarding the outside world, including the "third world," is isolationism. Loudly tell them all to go to hell... and then let them beg us to deal with them. But at the same time, we cannot meddle in their affairs.

Afghanistan. Every day we are dumping enormous sums and material means into this "affair." We supply and provide them with everything. Their Minister of Foreign Affairs came to visit. He bluntly said that the treasury is empty and the state budget is sufficient only to maintain two ministries. The rest we are supposed to give to them. And we are giving it: tractors, cars, bread, radio stations, paper, money, not to mention the maintenance of our troops there, and I

think their troops too. There are practically no signs that the regime is getting stronger. It is hopeless in the sense of creating even a minimally viable political structure. Once our troops leave, Karmal will be gone in a couple days. In a word, we got into a terrible mess.

Whomever you talk to – people are more surprised than angry: how long can all of this go on? Meaning the Brezhnev regime. Mean political jokes are cropping up again.

Yesterday my friend Tolya Kutsenkov came over. We drank. Let off steam. I was surprised by a new trait in him: Russian *pochvennichestvo* [“native soil,” nativism], sadness for the Russian people, who are suffering from internationalism and who are pushed around by various “chuchmeks.” He talks about the opinions of different people (he travels a lot). The general “voice of the people” is – “We are tired of him!” (meaning Brezhnev). But nobody sees or can offer a solution.

I started reading Lenin. Once again – I am under the spell of his conviction and passion that turned his intellect into a powerful apparatus. Once again – I am in the grip of the rationalist class nature of his logic. He can be refuted by current events, but only if you select them at random and superficially. But his logic is irrefutable as a tool of the history of his time.

Simultaneously in front of me I have the myths of irrational national spirit. I am reading *Lunin* by Eidelman – a Jew, without whom we, Russian historians, would not know it so deeply and “directly.” I spoke with Kutsenkov, who reflects the *pochvennik* soul-searching of the thinking and conscientious Moscow intelligentsia. In the latest *Literaturka* [*Literaturnaya gazeta*] there is an interview with Rasputin (writer), who, it turns out, is fond of Karamzin’s *History of the Russian State* and Solovyov’s *History of Russia*. He considers them masterpieces of the nation’s self-understanding. And, by the way, he said: I believe that in 100 years Russians will remain Russian, Tatars will remain Tatar, French will be French, despite all the successes of internationalism. It is no coincidence that he called the Battle of Kulikovo and the Battle of Borodino (against the Tatars and the French) as sacred for Russians.

So once again we are splitting into Westernizers (Lenin) and Slavophiles. Or we are searching for a deeper meaning in both. But *pochvennichestvo* is not an idea. And Lenin’s idea has become trite through subsequent development and now daily turns into a mockery under the influence of Brezhnevism.

By the way, regarding *pochvennichestvo*. I got a volume of Lermontov. Started flipping through it. Once again, I was struck by his genius... At fifteen years old, he writes “The Turk’s Lament,” which in two verses conveys the essence of Russia for centuries to come. At twenty-three, he creates “Borodino,” which has been worn out in school performances, but which contains the entire philosophy and Russian spirit of *War and Peace*. And next to it is the unfathomable, both in form and content, “The Death of a Poet.” At twenty-six he writes the unparalleled work “The Hero of Our Time,” which essentially starts a new era in the development of prose around the world.

And I thought: Lermontov, Pushkin... They came three centuries later than Montaigne, whom I’m reading now with amazement, because he contains all the eternal and unchanging

wisdom of life, despite all the stormy cataclysms of history. Anyway: when we had Kurbksy, Peresvetov, and Ivan the Terrible himself (it turns out they wrote texts like our “consultants” do now), they already had Montaigne, Pascal, Bacon, Shakespeare, Erasmus, T. More, and so on. The distance is simply immeasurable. We started catching up to them under Catherine II. And by the middle of the XIX century we – if rated objectively – already passed them “in this sense.” Our poetry... great names. Pushkin was already above Byron. Tolstoy – above Balzac. It is blasphemy to even compare them. Herzen encompassed and surpassed all the philosophy and political science that existed until that point. In many respects, thanks to Russian common sense and realism, he is above Marx. If we follow this through to the end... if there weren’t Lenin, only overachiever students would know about Marx, he would be lost somewhere among hundreds of authors of various theories.

But that’s not my point. Russia caught up to the West in a few decades. (Later, after 1917, we had to catch up in the material-industrial sphere too, and we did it in a couple decades). We were able not only to understand all of their culture, but surpassed it. As in Blok: “We understand all – the sharp Gallic sense / And gloomy German genius.”

They, on the other hand, did not understand us. They still can’t properly translate Pushkin and Lermontov because they cannot understand things that surpass their own greatness.

They do not even recognize our right to be compared on equal terms. Then again, already Dostoyevsky wrote about the “inferiority complex” that was generated by the refusal to acknowledge that we have this right. This complex may have been one of the psychological factors leading us to periodically be tempted to force them to reckon with us, to recognize us.

Even on my narrow strip of earth – at work. Communicating with Western Communists: they are shallower, more superficial than we are – the people who work on ICM issues. In education and breadth of views, they cannot compete with any of our consultants. All their “theories” and political attempts are babble. And we see that, but we have to play along and not debunk them, as Lenin allowed himself to do. But they are the ones who look down on us. And they have reason, because the CPSU is represented by the likes of Shibayev, Kapitonov, etc. [The Western Communists] long ago figured out their level and essence, and they understood that it is this level that determines the political and ideological potential of the former Party of Lenin.

April 2, 1980

I’m sick. I’m sitting at home and getting a “test drive” of what would happen if I retired. Awful!!!

But I get texts brought to me – the Lenin report, the umpteenth version. I can’t say I hate fussing over this text again and again. It’s natural: it’s a hard-won product and you want it to look good.

The day before yesterday Leonid Ilyich was awarded the Lenin Prize in literature for *Minor Land*, *Rebirth*, and *Virgin Lands*. To everyone’s surprise he spoke energetically, did not distort words and phrases, did not mumble – as if he went back in time about five years. And it

was a decent speech. Someone in his circle got good at adjusting to his current state. Of course, the performance itself is shameful from the point of view of abstract public morality. Both because these works are being elevated to the level of Tolstoy and Lenin put together. And because the “meeting of the working people” of Moscow came from the same “list” of the public that gets invited to state receptions and so forth: the same familiar faces – ministers, committee officials, heads of CC departments, and so forth. The average age is about 65.

And primarily because it is yet another splash of beautiful and kind words and intentions, but in reality we are in total social stagnation and the beginning of decay (as before every big crisis, which can't seem to break out), the economy is stopped up, foreign policy is absurd and stupid (we are saved by Carter & Co.'s idiocy). And total uncertainty, loss of prospects. Our society, which was built as an ideological society, finds itself without ideology or a clear goal. At the same time, there isn't everyday well-being. The entire elite appears in the eyes of the people as money-grubbers – material and spiritual plunderers of the country, and, of course, of Lenin's moral and ideological heritage, which is brazenly violated by such performances.

I'm still reading Eidelman's *Lunin*. The book is full of subtexts, but not in a cheap way – all those “allusions” and “reminiscences”... Sometimes it is hard to believe that during that crisis era before “December 1825” people were thinking and going through something very similar to what the current Moscow intelligentsia, at least the Party intelligentsia, is worried about right now. Of course, this “coincidence” could be attributed to the author's skill. But he cites original documents, their own letters and journal entries by Lunin, Muravyov, Turgenev.

April 5, 1980

Kitson was here once again – the leader of the Transport and General Workers Union of Great Britain, a member of the executive committee of the Labour Party, “our friend.” He wanted to see me “on the Afghan question.” We talked for three and a half hours at the hotel on Plotnikov Lane. He brought more invectives against the embassy and in general against “us,” who don't know how to “defend ourselves.” I prepared all conceivable arguments on Afghanistan. But he did not want to listen to them: “You don't need to convince me, I understand everything, but I am ‘labeled’ as a ‘Soviet agent’ and a ‘traitor,’ and nobody will listen to me. And there is nobody from your side that we could listen to. The embassy is not doing anything. And if anyone does come, it is probably to buy ‘another pair of pants’ for himself.” He had been considerably “warmed up” by our trade unionists, so he “cursed and was blunt.” Almost every phrase contained a *fuck* [sic]. I was ironic, made jokes, tried to insert prepared arguments. As he sobered up, it became possible to get some concrete things out of him and come to an agreement:

- a) We will send capable guys to the congress of Scottish trade unions. An audience will be organized for them and they will be able to convey the Soviet point of view;
- b) In London he will try to organize trade union functionaries and the same guys will have a “discussion” with them, too;
- c) I will write a personal letter to Jenny Little (Secretary of the International Committee of the Labour Party's National Executive Committee, “a pretty bitch, but she knows

how to do her job and she's in love with you" – Kitson's words) and offer an unofficial discussion, either in London or Moscow, at "our" level (i.e. the apparatus).

Behind all the sincere things he said (and he truly has grown attached to us and is unselfishly concerned about how things are going in England, in Europe, and in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West) – alongside all this he "conveyed" the terrifying hatred they have for us over there. And not because of Afghanistan, which nobody really cares about on its own – Afghanistan is just another excuse, a good opportunity to openly demonstrate this hatred of the Soviet Union, of Russians. So, I left this conversation with a very bitter feeling.

April 13, 1980

I was moved by three stories by V. Kondratyev in *Znamya* No. 3. Last year Leva Bezymensky pointed me to this writer, who suddenly "cut his teeth" at the age of 60. I was struck by the deliberately simplified manner of presenting the war on a scale of a "two-kilometer map" (discussion of the early 60s). And now three stories in the same style.

I often wonder why "our" North-Western front (and the adjacent Rzhev-Volkhov) resulted in so much literature. The front is by far not the main one, without "decisive" battles on an "all-Union" scale, without masses of tanks... There are probably many reasons.

1. After the battle of Moscow, when Demyansk was surrounded and there was hope to inflict a second resounding defeat on the Germans, the units prepared "for Moscow" were thrown there – not cadres, but students, marines, in general with a large percentage of intelligentsia and "people from the capital."
2. Since it was the place where they expected a major battle after Moscow, the poets, writers, and the best journalists rushed there.
3. But the front "came to a halt." And practically did not move until 1944, when the general counterattack began. So, all these "forces" were stuck there, and even though they were mercilessly knocked out, some remained.
4. Specific character: isolation from the large home front due to impassability, mud in the spring and fall. Actually, it is not even impassable mud, it is simply a swamp – I remember horses would drown on the roads. Snow cover of five-six feet in the winter. Hence: constant hunger and everyone left to their own devices.
5. The lack of a solid front: the Germans in the villages and us in the forests and clearings. Deep infiltration into each other's territories, perfect conditions for scouts – "romanticism," the psychology of small battle groups, patrols, troops, ski battalions, etc. Sudden contacts with "peaceful life" – untouched by the years of war, rather rich villages of a few houses hidden away in the forests and swamps.

And much more...

Last week: my talks with Krzysztof Ostrowski (deputy head of the International Department of PZPR) on the preparation of the European Conference of Communist Parties in Paris. And a political-ideological dinner on Plotnikov Lane with Schroeder and Dumling (DKP). A big conversation "about life" with Germans! I got excited myself and brought Schroeder to

tears, too. But overall, it's hard, the German Communists are not with us (the CPSU) because of our ideology, but because they are in a hopeless position as long as they are Communists. The "national question" is present everywhere – from the slightest trifle in a conversation with them, to our communication with this Party in general.

May 4, 1980

The fourth day of holidays. It's a pity I did not record a lot of things here as they happened. From April 16-25th we practically did not budge from Serebryannyi Bor. I, Zagladin, Arbatov, Zhilin, Sobakin, Yermonsky, and stenographers. We were preparing the Paris meeting of Communist Parties. (Mostly B.N.'s speech)... He made us "build Mont Blancs" of invectives against imperialism, and, despite Yurka Arbatov's cursing, to channel everything in an alarmist tone: saying Europe is practically on the brink of war.

Zagladin participated in the work very indirectly: he looked through versions and shared some "considerations." He had no time at all, this time he showed truly Caesar-like class: in these few days he managed to go to Warsaw, hold talks with a Romanian who came with excuses (why they aren't going to Paris), give several interviews, including to the Hungarian *Népszabadság*, write articles about the Paris conference for *Pravda* and *Novoye Vremya*.

As for me, I did not make it to Paris. I didn't make it because I refused: B.N. offered twice, persistently (he wanted to thank me for the Lenin report and for the Paris materials). I refused because I don't like crowds, and there was practically nothing for me to do there... And B.N. stopped insisting. He must have decided that it was because of my ambition: since I was not included in the delegation, it would be below my dignity to go as accompanying personnel. But... this time it is not the case. I am just tired of everything.

It's a pity I did not write things down because the bustle over the Paris Conference was curious: the subject of China's return to the ICM (Berlinguer's visit to Beijing and the "rebellion" of local PCI organizations); the subject of Romanians and Yugoslavs, who seriously believe that we can pull an Afghanistan on them; the subject of the Dutch and even those who went to Paris (Luxembourg, Portugal...); partially the Brits, too. If it wasn't for the arrogance of the French and Georges' attitude: how is it possible, someone dared to refuse my invitation! If it wasn't the PCF organizing the conference, it would have been possible to convene 28 parties instead of 22.

The main topic, essentially, is Arbatov's topic.

May 5, 1980

Tito died yesterday. Jokes had started going around about how he couldn't die, he's been trying for nearly six months.

I'm on vacation: instead of Paris, I asked B.N. for the eight days left over from my previous vacation.

So – Arbatov's topic (the same as the May 1st one – my observations from the May 1st celebration). This again: what are we slowly coming to? What will happen to us, to our country?

A couple times we made it out for a walk. It turns out there are some lovely areas [around Serebryannyi Bor] that have retained a little of the appearance of old dachas on the outskirts of Moscow. Even though I've worked at this dacha five or six times, I never had a chance to peer behind the fence from the side of Moskva River. Yurka and I did some walking. By the way, he recently suffered a massive heart attack and now it's like he is renewed, he is more decisive, he is even more impudent in his opinions, but he is also more concerned with the question of "what will happen to us?" "How much longer can Russia be tormented and mocked?!" "You know, Tolya," he said, "It seems like I have everything. I don't want anything more, and I don't need it. But I still worry for the 'common cause,' I worry and get upset, sometimes I don't sleep at night. And it's bad for me to worry now, after the heart attack..."

"The decay is wild, worse than under the tsar, because we do not have the brace of the aristocracy, the concept of 'honor' (nobility, officers), that at least partially held the powerful in some kind of bounds. Look over there, I brought you here on purpose... What do you think they are building?"

I: "Some kind of top-class resort facility or a country villa to receive distinguished guests..."

He: "No! That's Shchelokov building a new palace for himself on the outskirts of Moscow (naturally, he already has a dacha). Of course, the construction crew consists of soldiers who were conscripted to serve their Motherland. He does whatever he wants. He shielded himself with the son-in-law and now no one can touch him."

I: "What son-in-law?"

He: "You don't know? You've probably seen a young lieutenant general at the CC Plenums. A handsome fellow... everyone is staring at him, practically pointing fingers. That's Brezhnev's son-in-law. Where did he come from? He was a provincial mediocre student. Then he was doing Komsomol work and was accepted into the Komsomol district committee. There, at some event or party he met that b... Brezhnev's daughter, who just happened to be in the process of divorcing her latest husband, the ninth or tenth one... And it took off from there. Soon he was in the Komsomol Central Committee. That's where Shchelokov noticed him. He took him as his deputy, and when Paputin committed suicide, he made him first deputy. He is already a member of the CC Auditing Commission, like you... Whatever he wants! They say he doesn't do anything. And Shchelokov doesn't need him to do anything and butt in. He wants him to live by the principle: enrich yourself however you can, steal whatever you want, etc.

"Patolichev (Minister of Foreign Trade) also shielded himself. But this one used his own son. He took that drunkard and thief as his deputy... Now he is the first deputy. But Patolichev has a cover for himself (though in the past he was a distinguished man, you could even say a Bolshevik) and does whatever he wants, maybe for the benefit of the country, I don't know... And he's already been awarded the Hero twice, too.

“While this thief steals [foreign] currency with no shame, and uses his ‘official position.’ Recently his daddy awarded him the highest honor... He did not shy away from doing it in front a TV screen.

“This is happening in the highest echelon. What’s happening below? You know the affair with ‘Ocean’ [store chain]. Now the whole world knows about it... Recently even the *New York Times* wrote in detail about it. And Ishkov was only sent into retirement, he remains a candidate member of the Central Committee.”

May 6, 1980

Arbatov sees Gromyko as the main evil (in foreign policy, including Afghanistan), though now he is more inclined to think that Andropov’s guys are involved too. They “fooled” him and others with false information and fearmongering. In Gromyko’s insolence he sees a certain line that stems from an interest in aggravating the situation.

The logic is approximately as follows: there will not be a war anyway, and we need to build up military power for many reasons, including to keep the Community in order. Some tension with the Americans is even useful, since it allows us to justify the shortage of foodstuffs, consumer goods, services, and so forth. Gromyko directly expressed this idea in a narrow circle (especially the last part, regarding our own citizens).

The noise around Afghanistan is not too bad either, especially now that the rebels are openly getting assistance from the U.S., Pakistan, China... This makes it possible to convince Brezhnev and others, who might have doubted that “there was no mistake,” that “we needed to bring in troops.”

Gromyko really is acting like a he has a monopoly on foreign policy. He confused everyone so much with the SS-20, that now it is quite clear that from the beginning “we” did not want negotiations on this subject, and no potential limits. During the period when SALT-II was on the upswing, he kept repeating in his speeches (and wrote into Brezhnev’s) that the “medium range” will be discussed within the framework of SALT-II. Then in a speech in Berlin (October ’79) Brezhnev said we are ready to discuss any weapons anywhere and anytime. Before the NATO session in December, Brezhnev and Gromyko stated that they are prepared to sit at the negotiating table on medium-range missiles at any moment. Then Gromyko, without even informing the Politburo, declared in an interview in Bonn (after the NATO session) that the basis of the negotiations had been undermined (at the same time, he undermined whatever chance societal forces in Western Europe had to wage a serious struggle against NATO decisions – because the constructive beginning of this struggle disappeared). Now, in April, when he met with Giscard d’Estaing, he came up with his own directives – on medium-range again only within the framework of SALT-III. The same idea is incorporated in the resolution of the upcoming session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (in mid-May). The goal of this deliberate meandering is to sabotage any negotiations on SS-20. Maybe short-sighted?

We are getting into a new round of the race, which will be much, much more expensive than the previous rounds, especially with the increasing collapse and mess in the economy. Or is

this really the last redoubt (military strength) that [our leadership] is counting on to live out their days in comfort and set up their children for years and years to come? And for the rest of us and the country – come what may.

One more example of highhandedness, though in the same vein. At the end of April, a week of French-Soviet friendship was scheduled in Paris. By tradition, Brezhnev was supposed to be taped for French TV. Of course, this speech had to be soothing, friendly, and peace-loving. So, Gromyko convinced Brezhnev not to make the speech. It was easy to do, because Brezhnev is in bad shape and it is physically hard for him. If you add “political counter arguments” on top of that, he gladly refused to do it.

May 24, 1980

I came across Nekrich's book written “over there” (he emigrated to Israel, i.e. the U.S., in 1976). A kaleidoscope of events from 1946-1976 – familiar people and conflicts, in many of them I either took part or observed from the sidelines (he even mentions me once). These Shakespearean times (though to a large extent post-Shakespearean) look shallow, and not just because the author is already operating through emigrant (anti-Soviet) logic, but also in substance. People were driven by petty feelings and impulses: animosity, careerism – or rather the desire to get a cushier spot regardless of morality and principles, at the expense of others. And especially stupidity, vanity... The book really upset me.

At work. I thought B.N. would calm down a little after the Paris meeting, in terms of his “vigorous initiative.” But I underestimated him once again. He didn't even thank me for Paris and the Lenin report. However, that's good, because I find these thanks embarrassing and unpleasant. As soon as I was back to work, he summoned me to assign me to write his article admonishing Berlinguer, who went to Beijing instead of Paris, equating these two blocs. According to the leader of the PCI – NATO is good and the Warsaw Pact is bad.

Actually, speaking seriously, the position of the Italians has lately clarified their strategy. Now they not only do not want Leninism, they don't want the International Communist Movement, either. Pajetta put it quite figuratively: those who have missiles and those who do not cannot sit at the same table. Their “new internationalism” is also becoming clearer: unite with whoever they can in the fight to save mankind, to replace the two superpowers, which have shown that they cannot correctly analyze the situation and, most importantly, cannot behave appropriately (one in Iran, the other in Afghanistan). I'm paraphrasing Berlinguer's interview after he came back from Beijing.

We keep trying to shame them, appealing to logic and the ideology of the ICM. But they do not believe us and are convinced that we are acting solely out of imperial (state) interests. In order for them to sit on the fence (between the U.S. and the USSR) they need something more than their own originality and dissent; they need support from someone with real power. That is why they turned to China. And in general, they agree with their (Chinese) assessment of the world situation.

The Paris meeting raised hopes for the possibility of a new world Conference. Many (from the small and medium-sized CPs: U.S., India, Israel, Canada...) are asking us: why is Europe allowed to convene with some members, but the rest of us cannot... Especially since in percentage terms, there would be fewer absences than in Paris. It would seem the logic is obvious. It would seem, in light of Berlinguer's strategy, we should mobilize the entire ICM, rely on our loyal reserves. But this idea got no "enthusiasm" from Suslov when Vilner expressed it in a conversation with him.

They, our faithful friends, who, by the way, are no longer cozying up to us and instead are telling it like it is – they don't know that our "policy considerations" come down to the fact that our leaders are physically unable to tolerate the kind of strain that a Conference would require. Of course, we could prepare and read one beautiful speech. But our friends want more than just a performance, they want serious discussions, a conversation... Everything has changed so much!

June 9, 1980

At work everything again fell on me. B.N. hustled and Suslov assigned us to prepare a draft resolution on the international question for the upcoming CC Plenum on June 23.

Yermonsky put something together according to the plan Zagladin and I talked through after receiving the assignment from B.N. Yesterday, Sunday, after dacha, I worked on this text to make it into a resolution-document. After it was retyped, I walked around the room and was pleased with myself. Look at me, a master of the high Party style!

Apropos – Zagladin, the day after the conversation mentioned above, again flew to France and then Holland – for the Party Congress. I was also planning to go, but it was not to be!

There was also an article for B.N. on the two blocs (against Italians: the other day a journalist asked what would the PCI do if the Soviet Union attacks Italy, and Berlinguer himself, not Napolitano this time, responded that he would be fighting on the frontlines to defend his Motherland's independence). This time B.N. decided to "be nice" (saying that the consultants are tired) and assign the projects to scholars. He picked the most experienced, eminent, and gifted ones: Bykov, Diligensky, and Tomashevsky from Inozemtsev's Institute. I warned him. Fine, I said. But I ask you to please read their version as-is, without our edits. He grinned. I brazenly continued: "This will be an experiment, Boris Nikolayevich. All these years you do not believe that scholars give us junk that goes into the waste basket, and everything that eventually goes into the finished product – all of it is done here, by the consultants and with these hands." He gave them a week, and when he read their materials, he cursed obscenely. I laughed and talked him out of summoning them – nothing worthwhile would come of it anyway. I reassured him too, saying that I assigned Sokolov to write the text a long time ago. And this text is pretty decent. Here, read it. And even though he can't stand Sokolov, he took it. Today he had to admit that "the foundation is there." I asked him to summon Sokolov and say the same to him. He did it, though through gritted teeth. My work on the Sokolov version consisted of planning it, outlining the sum of questions, discussing the approach and conclusions, and editing it

thoroughly. I wrote a few pages myself, including the conclusion = “Yet another lesson by Ponomarev on the danger of likening the two blocs.”

The only fun in this was that I think I “taught Ponomarev a lesson.” But it’s all like water off a duck’s back...

On Saturday I played tennis on Petrovka with Andrey Grachev, a remarkably nice person from Zamyatin’s Department. For the first time this year on a clay court. Petrovka has an extraordinary atmosphere – something mysteriously nostalgic, reminiscent of movies about sports and entertainment from 1914...

I read *Hello, Afinogen* by Afanasyev (they say he is a student of Trifonov). A crazy talented book, even though you can feel the author’s inexperience in the composition and some plot moves. The handbook on literature (and art) is one thing, but life and literature about life are increasingly separate from it. They do not connect anywhere. There is no guiding role of the Party, no official ideology (unless it is presented mockingly)...

The same Zinoviev, except without rudeness and all kinds of open stupidity against the authorities.

Sizov called – Chairman of the Auditing Commission that I am a member of. He called me a while back, about two months ago, and said that he expects me to write the introductory pages for his report for the XXVI Congress of the CPSU. I made excuses at the time, said that after the PCC and the Paris meeting, the international situation will become clearer, we will formulate our assessments, etc. He grumbled, but did not argue. At the time, he couldn’t tell whether I was playing games to avoid working for him, or if I was truly taking the task too seriously. Now, when the Plenum is approaching where a decision will be made on holding the Congress in February, his patience ran out. And he told me pretty clearly: “Quit fooling around, who cares about the international situation and so forth. I need the content to be about L.I. Brezhnev, his great work, his historic report ‘which we just heard (almost a year before it is given!), and which gives a deep Marxist-Leninist analysis of the situation and outlines inspirational tasks’...”

“No problem then,” I said, “If that’s the case, tell me when you want it, Gennadiy Fedorovich, and the text will be ready...”

He thought about it, was silent for a moment, and: “Have it ready next week.”

June 21, 1980

Tomorrow will begin the withdrawal of “some military units” from Afghanistan, “whose presence is no longer dictated by the situation” (the last part in quotes is supposed to be the formula for the TASS report from Kabul to include in the letter to our fraternal parties).

By the way, it will begin at a time when the West has been shouting for two weeks about the concentration of rebels, about preparing for a frontal attack on Kabul, about the infiltration of partisans into the capital, about the mutual massacre between different Afghan groups and about

the near suicide attempt by Karmal himself, about the almost complete disorganization of power and the successful rebellion.

But that is not even the point! The waves of various Afghanistan-related campaigns in the West are just another confirmation of the fact that all of this is mind manipulation, which nevertheless has done its job again and again: inciting persistent and irreversible hatred and contempt for our country.

Here is the thing!

Early last week, in the course of one of our “ongoing” conversations, B.N. suddenly informed me: “How about your Arbatov... he went to his former boss and started arguing that we need to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.”

Half an hour later, when discussing another topic, I suggested to B.N. to agree with Dobrynin’s proposal to send Arbatov to a TV discussion in the U.S. He (B.N.) did not object, but remarked, “I don’t know how they’ll view it now!” (meaning “at the top”).

A couple days later at a meeting of deputies, B.N. suddenly (with six people present) mentioned this “action” by Arbatov, and with clear disapproval in his voice. He added: “And he (i.e. Arbatov’s old boss, Andropov when he was head of the CC Department) did not keep it to himself, he reported it...” (and B.N. moved his arms in a circle to let us know that it was in some higher circle, presumably at the Afghan commission, i.e. with Gromyko, Ustinov, and maybe even Suslov present). And he (Andropov) added: “This is the mood of the intelligentsia”... As if to say, Arbatov traveled in Italy, met with his “Dartmouth friends” there (this last bit B.N. might have added himself), and there you have it!

In any case, the way B.N. presented it in front of the deputies, it looked like Arbatov might be done for.

One “psychological” detail deserves attention here, concerning B.N. and many others like him. It turns out (from a conversation with Brutents, with whom B.N. also shared something about Arbatov) Arbatov went to B.N. even before going to Andropov, and talked about the same things. B.N. is sympathetic to the idea and kept repeating to us a phrase that was clearly not his own, “it costs us too dearly!” B.N. did not tell anyone (not even us, me) about “Arbatov’s position.” However, when this position went out into the open among his superiors and was met unfavorably, judging by how B.N. presented it and his impression (this is one more mystery), B.N. immediately changed “his” opinion, at least about Arbatov, and began to treat him as a someone who was written off. And it looks like he told us about it to warn against such “actions” or statements.

Suddenly, yesterday, he summons an urgent meeting of deputies and under total secrecy (not a word! to anybody!) gives us the above-mentioned news – about the withdrawal of units with heavy armaments, “they are no longer needed there.” Maybe he would not have told us, but “we need to work”: urgently write pointers to Soviet ambassadors, fraternal parties, socialist countries, etc.

Judging from his hints, the decision was made on Thursday at the Politburo at Brezhnev's suggestion, he read it from a paper (which means someone prepared the text). It was accompanied by a rather strange exchange of opinions... The first thing we asked B.N. after "carefully" listening to him – will this be published?

"No!"

"?? What is it for then?"

"This question was raised, but Gromyko sharply protested: they will say we are doing it under pressure..."

"Why are we doing it then? We aren't withdrawing all troops, not even the majority. It would seem the favorable noise from this action would be one of the main reasons to do it. Western leaders, including Carter, are meeting on June 23rd in Venice. They are sure to adopt a harsh resolution demanding a withdrawal. It will be worse, from the propaganda point of view, if the world does not find out before the 23rd that there is already a withdrawal."

"They said – no," B.N. cut us off. (But you could see he did not understand it himself and was surprised that people agreed with Gromyko)... It was proposed to send reporters (foreign) to Kabul, so they could give the information to the whole world from there.

"But," Zagladin rightly pointed out, "the units that will be withdrawn are far from Kabul and the reporters will not see anything themselves."

"Yes, you are right," B.N. replied...

Finally, I offered the following consideration in favor of publishing: the June 23rd CC Plenum. Might the West conclude (if we do not publish ahead of time) that the Plenum "corrected" the PB and demanded the withdrawal of troops.

The meeting ended on that note, we left with assignments to prepare urgent information for socialist countries, Soviet ambassadors, and some fraternal parties. However, just ten minutes later he called me and said that he talked with Suslov and they agreed to prepare information for the press – in the form of (?) a brief message for TASS reporters. I composed it and gave to B.N. I think he rushed off to get it approved at the top.

There is another foreign policy component here. Gromyko also rejected a suggestion (whose?) to inform Giscard d'Estaing, considering his courageous act – to meet with Brezhnev in Warsaw. Otherwise, Schmidt will take all the winnings when he comes to Moscow on June 30th. Schmidt does not hide the fact that he will raise the Afghan question, on the contrary, he is talking about it everywhere. He has been asking us for a long time through confidential channels to make a "gesture" – withdraw some unit from Afghanistan, preferably an airborne or a tank unit, or at least change their uniforms, to show the West that we have no intentions of advancing to the "warm seas" or capturing Middle Eastern oil...

The whole world will say that we prepared a present for Schmidt's visit, since he is coming to sign an extensive program of economic cooperation...

However, Gromyko, apparently, weighed everything and took command, taking away the “exorbitant power” [«непомерную силу»]…

Let's get back to the main question: who prepared Brezhnev for this initiative. Brutents is being vague, but he knows something... In any case, he is sure that Arbatov was “there, too”...

I offered another hypothesis: B.N. misunderstood Andropov's reaction to Arbatov's idea. Moreover, he (Andropov) went to Brezhnev himself and suggested to do this, maybe even referencing “the mood of the intelligentsia.” There may be another option: Arbatov did his thing, but the decision formed earlier, also in the depths of Andropov's department. This version is supported by the fact that the decision was made on Thursday, and on Sunday the units (and heavy units, at that) are already starting to move home – is that not too little time for tear-down (replacement with other, light units), etc.?

Whatever the case may be, Yurka proved once again that he is the real deal!

The rest is the same as always... I wrote and sent in an article “The Pact of Peace and the Pact of Aggression” – another opus for the collected works of Comrade Ponomarev.

We whacked Pajetta in the June 20 *Novoye Vremya* issue for his May interview in *Der Spiegel*.

We are writing a report for B.N. for “The Six” (European socialist countries – CC Secretaries, without Romania, secretly) on what to do with the WFTU and the communist movement after the Paris meeting. Mainly – how to view the position of Berlinguer-Beijing.

I wrote the introductory part for Sizov's report for the XXVI Congress of the CPSU. I took it to him myself. He read it in my presence... “I like it,” he said.

I wrote a memo on the communist movement for Rusakov, for his conversation with the Yugoslavs. He is going next week.

I sent the last chapters from Galkin & Co's book about the two reformisms – the bourgeois and the Social Democratic – to the “Mysl” Publishing House. I cleaned out a lot from there.

I was at the editorial board meeting of *Questions of History*. Spoke about five times.

June 22, 1980

On the way back from dacha I stopped by “Lesnye Dali” to visit Arbatov. He called me at work and in a voice that was half-questioning and half-affirmative, but definitely cryptic, said: “Good news... We should meet.”

We walked down the alleys (that place is even more of a bureaucratic clique, mostly from the MFA and other various types from the Council of Ministers). I told him what I knew of his affairs. He told me the things I only guessed about. He really went to Andropov. The latter was welcoming and encouraging. Advised Arbatov to seek an appointment with Brezhnev. Yurka cursed obscenely when he found out that Yu.V. (Andropov), firstly, “publicized” the fact that

Yurka visited him, and with the “mood of our intelligentsia” embellishment. And secondly, if B.N. read the situation correctly – Andropov was ready to rat out Yurka if the visit to L.I. had been unsuccessful.

It turns out that Yurka asked Zhukov, with whom he went to Pugwash in Italy, to take him along to see L.I. In a way, that is surprising to me – I did not expect such courage from that guy. Brezhnev was in good shape. It was only the three of them talking. They proposed not only the Afghanistan withdrawal, but a packet, including Vienna, i.e. SALT (not to argue over SS-20) and so forth. Brezhnev said: alright, write me a paper. They had the paper with them. (Later Blatov asked Yurka for it – a copy to make a memo for the Politburo).

Today *Pravda* already published a TASS report from Kabul, which I wrote by hand on Friday and gave to B.N. So, common sense prevailed – to publish. That means Suslov was sympathetic to this entire affair from the beginning, despite Gromyko, who was supported at the PB. And he managed to get the publication. Moreover, Yurka told me today that a notification about the withdrawal was sent to d’Estaing right away, also despite Gromyko...

June 28, 1980

I can’t manage to write about the CC Plenum (June 23).

Leonid Ilyich again was in good shape. He opened the Plenum without looking at a paper, without muddling words and mumbling... a miracle. Moscow is full of rumors about some Georgian woman who uses her hands – their warmth – to heal practically everything in sight. She has already been transferred to Moscow.

Gromyko’s report on the international situation – superficial, shallow, propagandistic. I would say his report exemplifies the role of the Plenum as a body that is not dignified even with frank information, not to mention decisions, directions, and so forth. The debate proceeds accordingly: praise for L.I. and a small account of one’s activities. Chakovsky’s speech was especially trite. He had no scruples (or maybe it was something else) about retelling his own article in *Pravda* in shrill-cliché tones (from two weeks ago: about bats that hang upside down, and see their environment accordingly, and so forth).

But “our” resolution was presented with authority. Brezhnev gave the floor to Suslov, who came down to the main podium and had a look that said – you can forget everything you just heard from the Minister’s mouth, listen here. And he ceremoniously read the text that, despite all the Ponomarization that was done to it after us, still sounded respectable, impressive. Especially against the background of Gromyko’s report.

Mythology works, after all: oh, how nice it was to hear your words and phrases presented by such a speaker, to such an audience, and for such a purpose – for history!

And one more episode from last week. Brezhnev awarded “a number of prominent state and Party leaders,” including B.N. – rather he was giving out medals. He said something about each of the awardees. Then, completely unexpectedly (considering that earlier I personally heard him talk about “the damned academician,” “who-cares-about-it scholar,” etc.), he announced to

the whole world that B.N. “combines the talent of a Party leader with [the role] of a prominent scholar who offers interesting Marxist-Leninist studies.” In other words, B.N.’s golden dream came true: he was recognized as “the theorist of our Party”…

By the way, in his reply, B.N. did not say a word about Brezhnev, unlike the others (Kunayev, Rashidov, Tikhonov, Rusakov) who primarily praised him. Later, in a conversation with me, he regretted it… he said “he was nervous and botched it.”

July 13, 1980

“The Six” is meeting in Budapest on July 15th. I’m not going, of course, even though I worked on it more than anyone.

Zhilin prepared a draft of Brezhnev’s Olympic toast to leaders of Communist Parties and revolutionary-democratic parties that will be in Moscow at the time. But it sounds like there will be no reception.

Olympic Moscow: long lines of bus convoys with guests from the republics, empty streets that have been cleared of private cars, too. And paired police patrols everywhere. For example, on our street, Kropotkinskaya, they are stationed at every 25 meters. Employees at enterprises and institutions are being told not to enter into conversations with strangers, not to gather in groups, especially crowds, to opt for above-ground transportation rather than metro, etc. There were rumors “among the people” that during the Olympics, Moscow will be flooded with foodstuffs and consumer goods. None of this is noticeable yet. And in the provinces – in the Urals, on the Volga, in Siberia, not to mention the north – stores are empty. In Riga (!) there isn’t even milk and cheese. And this is in Riga, which, by the way, is receiving the Order of the October Revolution right at this time. The Western press is full of articles about an unprecedented food crisis in our country and unrest in large factories (including Togliatti, Gorky, Kamaz). I think it was *The Guardian* that made the following conclusion from this: The Soviet worker hasn’t believed in Communism and other ideas for a long time now, but until recently he believed that life will improve from year to year (or at least in the foreseeable future). Now, if he loses faith in that, what then?!

At the same time, corruption continues to rage. I read another bulletin published by the organizational department of the CC and the Party Control Commission… The Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions – the profiteering in the sales of Zhiguli, Volga, Moskvich [cars] has reached immense proportions. And the people involved are workers of district committees, executive committees, city committees, heads of all kinds of business organizations and associations, i.e. the ones who can put themselves and their relatives at the front of the queue to buy cars from quotas for the region, city, etc. They make a ton of money on this. And the “consequences” are usually a reprimand or a severe reprimand… Only one (a deputy head of the Murmansk Propaganda Department) was expelled from the Party – he “worked” too boisterously in the public eye.

Yegorov kicked Loginov out of IMEL after 30 years of working there… for violating fire safety codes. Bovin came to see me about this. “It was revenge,” he said, “for his active attitude

to life.” The Soviet-Finnish film about granting Finland independence (together with Shatrov), the novel *February* (about the February Revolution), consulting on all kinds of Leniniana questions – developing it in “nontraditional” ways, the long friendship with Lyubimov. In other words, the kind of lifestyle where you get your salary from one place (the Institute), but you work and earn acclaim in other places. Naturally, this could not but inspire hatred among his milieu and Yegorov.

Bovin went to Zimyanin. The latter summoned Yegorov, but... Volodka did not get his job back. However, Zimyanin called Zagladin and asked to “find him a place somewhere.” I’m the one who found him a place – at the Lenin School.

July 19, 1980

Today is the opening of the Olympics. I was given a photo ID on a long chain, for the guest box. But for one person. I ended up having to find tickets to my favorite sports – swimming, athletics, volleyball...

Because there is so much stress and fuss about the Olympics, the event started to feel hollow even before it started. The fact that for the Soviet people it is a “Potemkin village,” and the fact that Moscow really has been turned into a big ghetto (as the Westernizers write), and the fact that everything is overorganized and even the IOC could not budge our bureaucracy from the best seats in the stands (not counting, of course, the legitimate government box).

In our “higher” spheres, the Olympics once again highlighted the fact that most things are done to cater to One man – and to disturb him as little as possible.

The reception for CP leaders who are coming for the Olympics – a reasonable comradely event with a very short toast by Leonid Ilyich, which we almost prepared – was cancelled under the pretext that “we decided not to mix sports and politics”! In reality, it was cancelled “not to overload” him.

It was even decided not to invite “our” guests (from communist parties) to the government reception for the IOC, so He would not be displeased: as if to say, “I did not want one reception, so they (there in Moscow, without me) came up with a replacement.” In other words, so it wouldn’t look “out of spite,” not to upset him and, God forbid, not to bring his anger down on yourself. And Kirilenko is the inveterate supervisor of all this, he is currently “in control.”

Receptions of some leaders (Marchais, Cunhal) with L.I. – essentially just ceremonial, but important for their big politics at home. Also cancelled. Cunhal was very upset. I met with him on Thursday, we were on Plotnikov Lane till midnight. An amazing man, a truly outstanding political leader of our time... He said, “I understand the situation, but I do not need a detailed conversation or a discussion with Brezhnev. I will get everything I need to navigate in international affairs and the affairs of the ICM from you, Ponomarev, Zagladin, and other comrades. And I will tell you everything you’d like to know about our affairs. All I need is a press release saying: ‘Brezhnev met with Cunhal!’ The Americans are bowing to me now, for the first time they invited me to an embassy reception for some American holiday; major figures

from the ruling camp – reactionaries – are trying to make contact with me; the cardinal came up to me for the first time for a friendly chat; for the first time after the revolution the Chinese appeared at our CC, they want to ‘exchange opinions’; the President consults with me all the time. The country is on the verge of parliamentary and presidential elections... the Party is growing, the Party is strong... And we may be just a little short of achieving major national success. This is why I need a meeting with Brezhnev.”

But what’s most important for us is “not to disturb” him! And after all that, anti-Soviets and anticomunists keep shouting about the “hand of Moscow,” that we are inspiring revolution everywhere, teaching everyone how to undermine foundations, etc.! If they only knew how things really are.

Kirilenko lashed out at Ponomarev for publishing a message (two lines) about Cunhal’s arrival in Moscow. “You are causing Him to have unpleasant emotions...” He wouldn’t have known about it and it would not have been a problem, and the fact that Cunhal asked for a meeting would have quickly been forgotten. In other words, it’s barbaric in the spirit of old Russian boyars.

For two days after returning from “the Six” in Budapest, all that Ponomarev, and, I think, the entire Politburo headed by Kirilenko, was concerned with were the seating arrangements at the opening of the Olympic games. You see, it is impossible for Zhivkov and Tsedenbal not to sit in the main box of the Politburo. On the other hand, what would Marchais and others like him say if they saw that those guys got seats, but they did not. And, of course, we have to avoid anything worrisome. Even having tea in the PB member break room together with CP leaders, even just some of them, is out of the question: “people will start talking,” “this and that,” “what to talk about,” etc.

An article by Sturua in *Literaturka* on the Watergate tapes. Americans: “Who is leading us!?”

On Tuesday I was at the Secretariat. Unpleasant feeling for me personally. Kirilenko took advantage of Ponomarev’s absence to lecture me in front of everyone – we need to save cash and cut the plan of relations with the Japanese Socialist Party by half. But he saw at the top of the page, “In Favor. Ponomarev.” What could I mutter in those conditions?

There was a discussion of the issue of robots and manipulators as the basis for production automation. It lasted over an hour; different ministers participated. Three hundred types of robots have been invented to date. We only have forty. The quality does not compare to the American and Japanese ones. We do not have a specialized production base to create them. Meanwhile, the addition to the labor force in the 1970s was 9 million people. In the 1980s it will be 1 million. The number of people engaged in manual labor in the 1970s did not decrease, it increased. The Head of the Machine Building Department Frolov reported that currently 800,000 machines are standing idle because there are no operators.

July 20, 1980

I read the manuscript of Anatoly Rybakov's new novel, *The Children of Arbat* – about the 1930s. For the first time, Stalin is presented as a literary figure, such as Napoleon or Alexander I in *War and Peace*, for example. A terrifying thing. I was in the grip of some kind of emotional panic as I was reading it. Most likely it will not be approved for publication. I hear Ananyev is fighting to publish it in his *Oktyabr'*. Rybakov wants to talk to me. I will advise him against rushing, not to scare them off right away.

July 26, 1980

On Sunday I met with McLennan and Halverson (Chairman of the CPGB). On Monday they met with B.N. On Tuesday I saw them off. We were pleased with each other. McLennan did not press us on Afghanistan, and his trump cards were few: he does not know what is really happening there. B.N. overwhelmed him with his "authoritative version." We talked a lot – about the Chinese, why the ruling class in England does not put forward "realists" like Schmidt, etc.

I was shocked when leaders of England's CP and leaders of the Swiss CP met in Sovietsky Hotel and did not recognize each other (even face to face). When I brought them over to the Finns, they pretended to know each other. So much for "international power." In the 1960's, this would have been unthinkable.

B.N. is fired up over yet another idea – to lead a delegation to the "Parliament for Peace" in Sofia (in September). So, I have to write yet another paper. By the way, speaking of papers. He instructed the Department's sectors to summarize the work each of them did in the period between the XXV and the XXVI Congresses. The consultant group too, of course. And you know what? Among everything else there is a six-page list naming just the brochures, articles, reports, speeches, and presentations by Ponomarev. No academic institute can boast such productivity. I showed it to Karen. He remarked sarcastically, "Imagine there was a 'well-wisher' who took this list and sent it to Kirilenko, for example, or Brezhnev... How Brezhnev manages to combine state party work with writing a literary volume per year – that is a different question of course. But how Ponomarev manages it, and who allowed him!..."

By the way, even though I took part in writing 95 percent of these papers, and many of them I predominantly wrote myself, I was surprised when I saw the list. So here is where all my energy goes! And what do I get in return? It is not even for the Party. Because if the "Party" found out the real state of affairs, it would appreciate my work as mentioned above.

Aleksandrov-Agentov called B.N., asking whom we'll send to work at the dacha to prepare the Report for the XXVI Congress. B.N. summoned me to consult. I suggested Veber – the most competent, skilled, educated, experienced, and conscientious of the consultants. B.N. deflected and almost started to "criticize" Veber in his usual manner. I got angry and contradicted him quite sharply. Because I was sure that he was guided not only by his personal antipathy towards Sashka, but also considerations about "what will they say" (!) – he has a strange last name, he might be Jewish, etc.

He named Pyshkov, whom he favors. He is clever, but rather mediocre and unlikely to come up with something new, plus he never had any serious knowledge. I didn't argue against Pyshkov.

The next day B.N. called me, saying that Aleksandrov is asking for specific names – whom are we sending. “For your information,” B.N. informed me, “I named Pyshkov and Brutents. Even though he works on the national liberation movement, he is well-rounded, he can work on anything...”

I interrupted: “Aleksandrov knows Karen very well and does not need references for him.”

Next week the group is leaving for Serebryannyi Bor, probably for six months, until Zavidovo begins.

I met with Gus Hall’s wife. His granddaughters are charming. These 13-14-year-old typical American girls look like they’re 20. I saw them in the Olympic pool, and then on Plotnikov Lane. With Elizabeth we talked about the possibility of Gus receiving an order for his 70th anniversary and my summer trip to the U.S. with Timofeyev’s academic delegation.

July 29, 1980

Volodya Vysotsky died. The bard of our time. He was born in 1941 [sic *41-го года*]. At night, without waking up.

I first met him sometime in 1966-67, I remember it was at someone’s home on Pushkinskaya Street, in a small old apartment. I heard him there for the first time. There were 5-6 of us... I think D. Samoilov was there. I was struck by his talent’s ability to resonate with someone from another generation, my generation. To capture the essence of a time that was not his own.

The funeral turned into a city-wide mass mourning – in the midst of the Olympics. The line to say goodbye started forming at night, from the Taganka Theater to the bridge, along the embankment, to the Rossiya Hotel. He was driven to the Vagankovo cemetery through a crowd. General Trushin himself was in charge of keeping order – he is the chief policeman of our capital. Fortunately, there are 34 thousand policemen from all over the Soviet Union in Moscow right now. The Secretary of Krasnopresnensky district committee Bugayev met them at the cemetery, at the head of a crowd of 10 thousand. He spoke at the grave himself. Telegrams of condolence were sent by Grishin and... Andropov. But in the newspapers, only *Vechernaya Moskva* [*Evening Moscow*] and *Sovetskaya Kultura* [*Soviet Culture*] published “boxes.” One intelligent old man in the crowd said: “Like Mayakovsky in 1930.” And I think that’s right. He was not really a dissident; he was talented, but not universally recognized. Some people “up there” even think he’s “not one of ours.” Even though everyone listens, admires, cries. In the crowd of 10 thousand by the cemetery there were dozens, if not hundreds, of tape players: Vysotsky was sent off to his own songs.

August 17, 1980

Over the course of this past week I was filling in for Ponomarev. He left me to prepare his reports for the “Parliament for Peace” in Sofia and the Berlin conference on the national liberation movement. And I still think he hopes to get a stronger foothold and higher place in the leadership with these “international scenarios” with him in the main role. But for some reason, he cannot understand that he is only damaging his “career.”

The very next day after his departure, an agitated Rusakov called: “I was told that Zhivkov’s mention of the ‘Parliament for Peace’ and Honecker’s of the Berlin conference during conversations in the Crimea made Him irritated. He asked what is this assemblage? Why doesn’t he know about it? Why are CC Secretaries always going somewhere and organizing something, etc.” By the way, they also “revealed” to Brezhnev that a CPSU delegation (i.e. Ponomarev) at the last meeting of “the Six” in Budapest in June threw out an idea for an international meeting of Communist Parties... Both of them (Zhivkov and Honecker) supported this idea. And Brezhnev said to them both that now is not the time, we have other things to do. We will think about it after our Congress...

When B.N. called from the south I told him about the irritation at the highest level... Dampened his spirits. But two days later he called and asked me to go to Chernenko (“since you know each other”) and talk about this...

Here is what happened among serious matters...

On Tuesday we received a note from Brezhnev on medium-range missiles. One page. The gist of it: the idea Brezhnev proposed to Schmidt is starting to fade. It is clear why the Americans would try to suppress it. But we cannot allow it. We put this idea forward not for propaganda, it is serious, and I demand that people take it seriously: namely, we should propose to the United States to officially begin negotiations, and if they sabotage it, we should publish this proposal. Turn to other NATO governments. Activate the public. And use propaganda to keep this idea at the forefront.

Kirilenko, who is currently leading the PB, sent this note to members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the Central Committee, and formed a committee consisting of Andropov, Zimyanin, Kornienko, Zamyatin, Ogarkov, Chernyaev. He tasked us to present a draft resolution based on Brezhnev’s note at the PB session on Thursday. Andropov had us meet twice in the “Walnut room” (that is in the Kremlin, between the premises of the Politburo and Brezhnev’s office). We put together and signed a draft for the PB: what is already stated in the note (to the U.S. and NATO). And for us, the International Department – a letter to Brandt, to some social-democratic parties, West European CPs, as well as a number of nongovernmental organizations, i.e. all kinds of international fighters pro and against.

On Thursday I was called to the PB. This question was the first on the agenda. Andropov reported “from the committee.” Naturally, it was approved...

Gromyko’s directives for the next UN General Assembly were also approved. Before that, Kirilenko asked me to give an assessment of the MFA draft. And to talk about it at the PB. Kornienko (First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) started to get on his high horse over one of

the comments. Kirilenko did not put him in his place because he himself had stated the comment inappropriately and he gave this Ukrainian from the MFA an opportunity to object to his “version” (about the connection between medium-range missiles and SALT-II). But on another issue – informing our fraternal states about the issues we are introducing at the UN General Assembly – he was “made to sit down,” and Andropov started it by referring to the fact that NATO members all coordinate and discuss in advance, while we keep our friends in the doghouse and do not inform them on what we are going to propose until the very start of the Assembly. Yet we demand their support.

Kornienko tried to refer to longstanding practice, and the fact that there might be a leak from the Poles, but he was shut up.

The PB session started with Kirilenko informing about Kosygin’s illness (second heart attack). And “on the advice of Brezhnev” Tikhonov was appointed to be the acting Premier.

August 19, 1980

There are protests in Poland: what Lenin would call a universal crisis of the regime.

Marchuk’s report on the Scientific and Technological Revolution for the next Five-Year-Plan. It is constructive, but judging by his analysis, we have such a backlog that it is very doubtful his ideas can be realized.

We are writing letters to Brandt, other socialist-democratic leaders, Communist Parties about medium-range missiles and Carter’s “new nuclear doctrine.”

Zhukov wrote a euphemistic article against Berlinguer (regarding his interview for *Corriere della Sera* and *The Washington Post*).

Dozens of big and small papers per day for the CC, today there was also the Secretariat with seven of our questions. Twice I made explanations: it did not help.

September 19, 1980

Exactly a month. Turns out this is a long time. I went to the FRG in the meanwhile.

This was just at the beginning of the “Polish events” and over in the FRG, Poland was the main topic of conversation (both on television and in newspapers). In fact, the events raised all conceivable political issues – from the theory of Marxism-Leninism, to real socialism, morality, the future, propaganda and ideology, international relations, nation and internationalism, Poles and Russians. And for us – all our sore spots. It’s no coincidence that in connection with the events we restarted jamming the Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, etc., for which we were formally, at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accused of violating Helsinki.

What about their substance?

Depends how you look at it. On the one hand, the Poles couldn’t care less how anyone looks at them. They are tired of living worse than others (Westerners), and they do not care where the system, the government which has been praising itself for everything for so many

years, will get what's necessary for the Poles to live like the Germans or Brits. If the Soviet Union organized a "1968" for them, they would have fought fiercely. These are no Schweiks. It would have turned into a bloody massacre worse than 1939, with consequences for millennia not only for the centuries-old Russian-Polish problem, but for the entire "revolutionary process." And surely, nothing but Irish-Maltese rags would be left of the ICM.

As far as I know, nobody over here considered repeating "Czechoslovakia." On the contrary, we gave them a loan that is quite substantial for us. And we did not publish it. But the Poles, of course, published about it, and the whole world published it. We can't even tell our people about their selfless internationalism...

The situation with food in our country is very bad. It is especially striking after the Olympics. The lines have gotten longer. But there are no potatoes, no cabbage, no onions, no carrots, no cheese. The sausage, as soon as it appears, is wiped off the shelves by out-of-towners, who have flooded the capital once again.

Yesterday, Gostev (Deputy Head of the Department of Planning and Finance) spoke at the meeting of the active lecturers-propagandists of the CC apparatus. He is an acrimonious, critical, vicious, furious man. He spoke mockingly and without looking back. We barely made 50 percent of the Plan. This year, the production of meat is decreasing every month. August was especially bad. When it comes to vegetables, don't expect anything even in Moscow. Soon there will be trouble with milk and dairy products. "So," he joked, "you, propagandists, take this into account and figure out what to do. As for how – Georgy Lukich (Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department – Smirnov) will tell you now."

This is at the level of the apparatus. Now at Brezhnev's level. Yesterday was a session of the Politburo. B.N. shared with me and Zagladin how it went. They discussed Poland. Brezhnev said (for some reason B.N. kept emphasizing that Brezhnev was speaking from a paper, a prepared text): "This is a new format for the advance of the class enemy (?), not like in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This is only the beginning. Things could get worse. We need to write a letter to other socialist countries and a letter to our most active core." As he put it, we will have to not "help Poland, but extricate it from it." Overall, everything is ambiguous and vague.

We have to make conclusions for our own work:

- Look at trade unions and make them active;
- Be sensitive and attentive to the needs and requests of workers;
- Fight against arrogant and bureaucratic attitude towards business affairs;
- Work on our shortcomings...

Following this there was a discussion of the draft plan for 1981. Tikhonov presented. Ponomarev told us about this "in a soothing tone." I had told him about Gostev's report beforehand, and he kept convincing me and Vadim that things are not as bad, that Tikhonov's report does not support Gostev's grim picture. Of course, we did not fulfil the Plan, but not by 50 percent. That would be catastrophic. We are short by 2-5 percent, and in some areas may be 13

percent. Brezhnev ordered not to cut housing construction. "Indeed," B.N. commented, "it is our only trump card now."

B.N. lamented that we have not had a real leader of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in a long time. Sounding like an old man, he reminisced about the power and authority factory committees had "in his day."

Then he moved on to other business. And that business is familiar, Ponomarev-style, propaganda work. We finished preparations for the "Parliament for Peace" in Sofia. We wrote a beautiful text for B.N., with which he will intimidate and urge to save the world from the nuclear threat... His concerns are: that nobody "at the top" finds fault; not to scare our own people (for this we are preparing two versions: one to give "over there," and another one for publication in *Pravda*); that it be at least 15 printed pages; that the "Novosti" Press Agency does a good job of getting it out to the world, etc.

Once again, I had to flex all my literary abilities and all my awareness of the latest trends "from over there" and "from above" to make it all in a tip-top shape. Again, I strained B.N.'s nerves and my own trying to prove that some of his so-called "ideas" are, if not harmful, laughable.

This work took up two weeks after my return from Germany. And since Zagladin was sick for 10 days, I again had to carry the whole Department (B.N. returned from the south only towards the middle of the month).

By the way, I persuaded Suslov to let B.N. head the delegation to the "Parliament for Peace."

And every day there were moments when I kept coming back to the leitmotif of my current existence: will I ever really live? Will my whole life consist of 10-hour workdays, when it is impossible to step away at all!

October 6, 1980

I was in England from September 26-October 3. Communists invited me, but I had a plan to get to the Labour Conference. It turned out to be far from ordinary: most importantly, they cancelled the practice (from 1907) of choosing a leader only from the parliamentary faction.

A conversation at the embassy about tactics: Communists invited us, but they do not really want to talk. Later, already in Blackpool (the Conference of the Labour Party was held there) Dick [sic] Costello said to someone: "For some reason, they (i.e. the CPSU delegation who came at the invitation of the Communists) really wanted to get to the Labour Conference. We arranged it for them... They don't need anything else from us."

In the afternoon we went to the Central Committee of the CPGB. The usual sorry sight. We were met by the same Bert Ramelson, a Vinnitsa Jew who left in 1913. Now he is not even a member of the executive committee, he's retired. It seems he was "filling in" for the late Woddis. A strange, noncommittal conversation, we vaguely agreed to talk with the CPGB leadership on October 1st, i.e. after returning from the Conference in Blackpool.

Dinner at the embassy. Kelan, Bykov (Gromyko's son-in-law). In general, London is a nest of children of "gifted parents." Suslov, head of a department at the MFA, once grumbled to me: "I've turned into some kind of agent of cronyism: M.A. Suslov's grandson, Gromyko's son-in-law, sons of three deputy heads of CC Departments – Kiselev's, Solovyov's, Shcherbakov's..."

On Sunday we drove to Blackpool. We wanted to take the train but it was very expensive for us. Stopped by Birmingham. Empty on Sunday. We walked around downtown. From the interchange you see a boundless sea of brick two-story houses and factory buildings.

Downtown Midland, which I studied in books 30 years ago, when I was writing my dissertation.

We arrived in Blackpool at around 2 p.m. A resort town, but a simple, proletarian resort. Fair atmosphere and crowds of people.

The owner of the hotel where we stopped is a Pole who was a pilot in the Royal Air Force during the war. The walls are covered with photos and paintings of airplanes.

Yekimenko (first secretary at the embassy) rushed to figure out our status: after all, we were not officially invited to the Conference, only as "guests" on the occasion of our being in London. The Czechs were not invited either, like us, also because of "human rights." As for us – it was specifically because of Sakharov and Afghanistan.

The National Executive Committee. Response to the Central Committee letter on medium-range missiles. And they changed their position on our "delegation": we were admitted like everyone else – as observers.

In the evening there was a reception at the transport workers union. Jenny Little even seemed beautiful, but she is too thin. She tried to sit me next to Callaghan, but he walked by me as if I were a lamp post. Her attempt, which was obviously out of place, embarrassed her. But then Atkinson and his wife immediately came over to our table (he is the Labour Party's national treasurer, he was recently in the USSR and was then persecuted for being "Moscow's man." Our side was genius, too! They pried an interview for *Izvestia* out of him, then of course edited it... and it went from there). He embraced me in front of everyone. Courage! He was again chosen to be treasurer by an overwhelming majority.

In the morning – walk to the Conference. The hall. Everything is different from us – the manner in which the meeting is conducted, the discussion, debates, resolutions from the floor – the framework of the Conference.

In the evening, there was the National Executive Committee's reception for foreign guests. I didn't go. Sent Yekimenko and Dzhavad. Reasons: a) I'm tired; b) I do not speak English well enough to communicate freely; c) they did not include us in the guest list distributed at the Conference, i.e. they were still discriminating, though *de facto* they treated us like everyone else.

Dzhavad brought details about the discussion of the CC letter to the Executive Committee, about Hayward's plans (the General Secretary of the Labour Party). He had a good conversation with Hayward overall. He rehearsed the international part of his speech for tomorrow, going off the meeting with the Yugoslav ambassador he had just had. The ambassador told him about the just-published memoir of a former Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow. There is a part about Khrushchev, his habit of choosing some ambassador at a reception as a whipping boy and saying to him what he wanted to say to others. He also remembered about the shoe at the UN, but he said he didn't have the right personality or the right leadership to allow himself such things. He joked, in a word.

Overall, though, same as the speech at the Conference the next day, it was mainly in our favor, or at least against Thatcher's militaristic hysteria. In the meantime, I was sitting at the hotel, glancing at the TV and recording my impressions and considerations for ciphered telegrams to Moscow that I would have to compose when I got back to London.

Speaking of TV shows: their entertainment programs are very vulgar and not funny at all. But the programs on technology, lifestyle, agriculture, other educational ones are at a high level and well-made. The international information is better than ours also. The documentary materials for this information simply do not compare. For example, you get complete visual representation of the Iran-Iraq war. They even report from the front lines.

On the sidelines of the Conference I ran into McLennan, the General Secretary of the CPGB. At this Conference he is just a nameless back row observer. He invited me to visit him on King Street (the CPGB's headquarters in London) between 3-4p.m. It was clear that he wasn't able to "get away" from us like Costello... It looks like for talks with us, McLennan "appointed" McKay (the new head of the PB) and once again Ramelson, who, though he's not a member of anything, essentially was in charge. Our talks came down to them asking me to give the CPSU's point of view and tell them "what they don't know" on the Labour Conference; on China; Poland; the Iran-Iraq War; the ICM. For two-and-a-half hours I spoke rather effusively on all these subjects, touching on others along the way. I picked the following method of "scoffing at them" for some of their positions, such as Poland: let's beat on an easy target to send a signal on the tough one.

Although I gave my best and was happy with myself, I felt foul after the "talks" were over: they, the Communists, mean nothing in England. They are on the sidelines; they are only observers in the labor movement and in general in the country's public life. That is why they worry about our dissidents, our democracy, Afghanistan, "Eurocommunism"... (By the way, they couldn't find a better time but right in the middle of the Labour Conference to publish Azcarate's (one of the leaders of Spain's CP) article on "Eurocommunism" in *Marxism Today*. Who cares about it in England? What is all this lifeless fuss for?).

After that, I went to the embassy to write a ciphered telegram to Moscow about the Labourists, even though the Conference had just entered its boisterous stage that day.

In the evening, Kelin and Sozin (party bureau secretary) hosted dinner in the "Rasputin" restaurant, paid for by the People's Bank (Soviet). We were the focus of attention and clearly

inspired the orchestra. They were playing one Russian song after another, nonstop. There was music of White emigres and NEP tunes and songs, but also many Soviet ones, the best tunes. Their performance deserves the highest praise. There was almost no attack of bogus stereotypes. At the guitar – a gypsy, at the piano – a young Russian woman. They sang in Russian (he sang with gypsy charm), almost without an accent. They did it for us with such enthusiasm that it was touching. Once again, I had the feeling that inspired Mayakovsky to write a poem about “The Soviet Passport.” We hold mystery and power for “them.” We attract them, they are curious, and it is strange and unclear what else can be expected from these Russians.

In the morning of the day before our departure, I again was writing a ciphered telegram, this time about the meeting with McKay and Ramelson. At 10 a.m. I had an official meeting with Bernt Carlsson, the General Secretary of the Socialist International: exchanging minutes of last year's Moscow meeting of the CC CPSU delegation and the Socialist International working group.

October 11, 1980

In the afternoon, at 3 p.m., a meeting with McLennan, again on King Street. This time, mostly he spoke. About the Labour Conference. He said, “I left the conference (where, by the way, he looked lost, miserable, an outsider) with a mixed sense of satisfaction and sadness. It's good that there was a shift to the left in the Labour Party, it's good that there are such resolutions on peace and détente. On the other hand, I once again saw that no one wants to know or acknowledge us (the Communist Party). We know many Labourists, they know us, we are acquainted and communicate. Our people are in the trade unions, they make an impact. But nobody recognizes us as a party. We do not exist as a worthy political force. We feel like observers in the Labour movement.”

He is right. Later, after returning to Moscow, Zagladin and I discussed this subject. He was building yet another one of his lecture schemes. I said: No, Vadim, things are clearly moving to a new alignment – to final confirmation of social-democratic parties as an integral part of the mechanism of modern capitalist society. The large communist parties like the PCF, PCI, JCP are already advancing to these positions. Ultimately, they will comprise a more-or-less homogenous political force on the international stage. At the same time, the process of the disappearance of small communist parties will accelerate, or they will lose any political significance at home and on the international arena.

I spoke with Gordon [McLennan] for two hours. He complained that after Woddis' es death he has no one left to rely on.

At the same time, he gave a very mature, objective, deep assessment of the processes taking place in the Labour movement.

I returned to the embassy after the meeting. Again, sat down to write a ciphered telegram to Moscow.

In the morning – Heathrow with Kelin, Yekimenko, and Maslennikov (*Pravda* correspondent).

And on the 4th, it was back to the routine, on the outskirts of actual world events. First thing in the morning I was at the CC Secretariat (awarding Gus Hall – Suslov), again preparing for B.N.’s departure for the Berlin conference, reports, texts...

I plunged into information on Poland, about their VI Plenum. Kania’s report and debates. Events that are sending shockwaves through socialism. So far, our reaction has been to issue a CC resolution prohibiting the distribution in the USSR of *Trybuna Ludu* and other Polish newspapers and magazines. Indeed, now they openly, sharply, honestly speak about things that are present in the USSR in even greater and more acute form... Precisely about what led Poland to such a crisis. But because we are Russia, we can stay in such a crisis and idiocy for decades. I am sure that considering the sparing regimen of our Chief, and others too, no one in our leadership read Kania’s full report, not to mention the transcript of the Plenum that was transmitted through the white-page TASS under the heading “Top Secret.” I think even B.N. hasn’t had the time, he is busy with little papers from all over the world. And what do they need it for? Nobody here has any plans to change anything. We worry about one thing only – to preserve the health, well-being, peace of mind and other greater goods of the General Secretary and a few other people around him – this is truly (like in ancient times) the highest state interest. Everything is subordinated to it: from the extraction of coal and oil, to signing an agreement with Syria.

Editorial board of *Questions of History*. Calm discussions. They still listen to me. I can’t tell whether it’s because of me, or my position.

Suslov ordered B.N. to reduce the number of foreign delegations at the Congress, because we cannot overstrain Leonid Ilyich. And overall – the Congress will now be 5 days, instead of 9 (like the XXV). So, it turns out, the Congress is for Leonid Ilyich, not for the country or the Party. And at such a moment. Poland, Afghanistan, missiles – the race that is leading to disaster (firstly economic)! It is some kind of criminal madness, and a madness that is routine, ordinary, quiet!

October 18, 1980

I just saw Ponomarev off to Rome for the funeral of L. Longo. From there he will go directly to Berlin for a conference on the national liberation movement, which I ended up having to prepare anyway, despite the fact that there are now three “Third World” deputies.

Brezhnev is hugging either Assad-of-Syria or Karmal-of-Kabul. Newspapers and TV are brimming with this, meanwhile the situation (economic) in our country is no better than in Poland. The crisis is growing there. Yesterday I read the “Solidarity” trade union’s appeal, which we received through our military, to the people of Poland and all peoples. There is a distinctively new, anti-Soviet note: it’s time for us, the Poles, to stop paying the internationalist bills that come from the East – Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Kampuchea... If they need it, they can pay... It’s time to stop suffering from the shame brought on Poland by 1939 and 1944...

On top of that, they again are making economic demands that exceed economic possibilities tenfold. The people behind Wałęsa are not making direct claims to power, but they

are moving things towards economic chaos, so that the current government would leave on its own. They are promising to respond to force with force. Meanwhile, manufacturing is down, workers are standing at their machines engaged in discussions, trust is not being restored, and the first thing “Solidarity” demands in the appeal is to legalize official political opposition.

Our people know almost nothing of what is happening in Poland. They will find out when we send our tanks there. And that is not out of the question, if the current leadership cedes or begins to cede power to “Solidarity.”

I’m still reading Boffa on the history of the CPSU after the war. Everyone knows everything about us! It’s all been written (despite the fact that we are carefully hiding our archives and the things we know and see). Those who wanted to have read everything already. So why are we huffing and puffing! Our traditional position – “if we do not acknowledge it, it does not exist or should not exist” – hasn’t persuaded anyone in a long time. Our moral-ideological prestige is below any conceivable level. It keeps falling due to our lies. We keep lying to our people, to ourselves, to all other peoples and parties. And whatever does not fit the lies, we consider anti-Soviet, enemy machinations, or revisionism.

Even such a generally superficial fact, this Berlin conference – our leadership really couldn’t care less about it. It was only our little intrigue, at B.N.’s instigation, to get to Honecker through Ambassador Ott so he would call Brezhnev upon finding out that Ponomarev is not being allowed to go to Berlin. Only this petty game made it possible for B.N. to go. But that’s not the point. The report we worked on for three months... Yet another “teachings of Ponomarev” consisting of eight points, this time on what a country of socialist orientation is... This cheap propagandist cliché cannot be projected even onto the “best” such country.

This is not even the most dangerous or the deepest lie that we serve.

Yes, Poland could become a stumbling block for all post-war socialism.

October 21, 1980

The CC Plenum will begin in three hours. On Sunday I met with Bovin. He is “rehabilitating” from something at the Herzen Sanatorium, and before that he spent about a month at the hospital. And even before that, he spent nearly the entire summer at the “dacha” in Volynskoe-2. As usual, he was there with academicians Arbatov, Inozemtsev, and adviser Tsukanov, preparing the “internal” part of the Report for the XXVI Congress. In September they were transferred to work on Brezhnev’s speech for today’s Plenum. The Plenum is primarily dedicated to the plan for 1981.

They were thinking of the events in Poland as they prepared the speech, and the nearly desperate situation in our own economy. (Bovin told me about his conversation with Baibakov as part of the prep work. The latter said: “I simply do not know what to do!”) Sashka was tight-lipped about the content of the “first draft”... But the gist of it was something like this: “Unlike in the past, I will not talk about everything, I will not give general assessments of our achievements. Let us first talk about the most important issue – the food shortages. How could it happen that we find ourselves in this situation. We had excellent policies outlined in the

September 1965 Plenum... But we essentially forgot about it and we are pumping huge sums into agriculture, while getting less and less in return." And so on, with specific data on agriculture, transport, and industry.

The three aforementioned guys (without Bovin) took this text on October 10th to Brezhnev for a read-through and commentary.

For the first time in the 13-15 years of "collaborative work" the text was flatly rejected. Moreover, L.I. said four times that it irritated him, and twice called it damaging. Nevertheless, our General Secretary's usual tactic is to get "collegial" support – he sent it to some PB members and some Secretaries, phoning them ahead of time. (One can imagine what reaction they would have – he told everyone about his irritation). However, a few people he wasn't able to reach for whatever reason: Gromyko, Ustinov, and Kapitonov. These guys sent back rave reviews, praising it to the skies, as they say. For example, Gromyko: "This is a truly Party approach, a Leninist approach. How well and powerfully you raise the main issues. Indeed, how long can we endure such a situation. Look at America: over there, California alone feeds the entire country with fruit and vegetables. And here... Why cannot Moldavia and Georgia, for example, fulfill this role." And so forth. Kapitonov expatiated about the depth of the Marxist-Leninist analysis, well-deserved sharpness, etc. Ustinov fully approved "the approach," albeit calmly. These are the people who "didn't know the text caused irritation." As for those who knew – Suslov, Andropov, Tikhonov – they blasted it mercilessly. Suslov carefully crossed out all the openly critical places, i.e. the ones not balanced out with achievements. In the list of words: "bureaucracy, boorishness, conceit" he crossed out "boorishness." Andropov, in addition to crossing out parts of the text, filled it with Komsomol enthusiasm about grand achievements. Tikhonov hacked the text and took out anything that had to do with management, planning, organization of production.

As the result, as Inozemtsev put it today, "they cut off our balls"... [I must explain: the things I wrote on the previous page already include information I got from Inozemtsev and Arbatov at the Plenum. We arrive to the Plenum well in advance, to "reserve a seat." So, as soon as I sat down, Inozemtsev came up to me, dragged me behind a column of the magnificent Sverdlovsk Hall and started venting. Then Yura Arbatov came up to me, dragged me to the hallway and for half an hour related to me "how it was." By the way, in his "soldier's mannerism," he described Suslov's actions as follows: "Mikhail Andreyevich always knows where the balls are. No matter how you hide or cover them up, he sees them immediately and... snip, he cuts them off."]

Bovin especially railed against Andropov: "He must know everything! It can't be that they are lying to him, too! To such an extent! Or does he not understand where it will lead us?! Unthinkable! When I recover, I'll ask for an appointment and I'll throw him a tantrum."

Arbatov is swearing at Tikhonov, and Bovin is too: a slug, ass-licker, scum. All he thinks about is how to "live out" his time in his position. Total mediocrity. As for Party spirit, ideas, or concern about 260 million and... that's never been anywhere near him. Kosygin is ill, subjected, he hasn't been capable of any independent action or initiative in a long time. But at least he knows the economy, he is competent, he sees the danger and, maybe by inertia, still he cares

about “the interests of the state,” not just his own butt cushion. But the former – he is just a bastard, a schemer, senile trash. Brezhnev despises him too, even though has practically made him the “second-in-command” (Arbatov). Then again (Bovin), Brezhnev despises everyone, he doesn’t take anyone into account, even his Chernenko. The only person he respects is Suslov (the ideological Rebbe) who must have won the General Secretary’s undivided trust through his clever politics of endless awards and praises. There is also Kosygin, whom he doesn’t respect but fears somewhat: after all, he has been a member of the Politburo since Stalin’s times, a Stalin-era people’s commissar. Plus he has some kind of “authority among the people,” possibly also from those times.

Inozemtsev says the plan that will be discussed today (for 1981) and the Five-Year-Plan are total shams. Nothing is balanced. The situation in key sectors is hopelessly bad. Nobody wants to see it, or rather they don’t want people to notice that they see it. Look: how many discussions have there been about a tractor fleet and combined harvester-threshers, at numerous Plenums. Even if timidly, we keep talking about it. And what of it? Baibakov cannot give funds for modernization. In the meantime, our best “Niva” harvester has a grain loss of two hundred kilograms per hectare, compared with average American machines.

Or: around the world, nobody manufactures trucks with gasoline engines anymore. Our “GAZ” and “ZiL” trucks will remain on gasoline even for the 11th five-year period. We are losing 25 million tons of oil per year because of this. Just the amount that, if we exported it, would give us enough funds to flood the entire country with Western consumer goods. We need 2 billion rubles to convert these two plants to diesel engines. But Baibakov does not have that either.

Brezhnev put forward a food program. Essentially it is not a program but a directive, a promise to feed the people with meat, and milk, and vegetables, and fruit. Of course, everyone supported it, but in essence the speech was sugarcoated. There is a striking difference even with the June Plenum. In June there was anxiety, concern, there was a stern tone towards departments, there was sharpness. Now it all disappeared. Has the situation changed for the better? Has there been a break in the clouds? Not at all. It’s just that since then, Brezhnev and others got scared of self-criticism, and Poland scared them completely: why appear as a larger-scale Poland in the eyes of the whole world! We’ve had enough for our time! Russia won’t collapse in five-six years, so why thump our chest, why attempt risky changes?! And the people will endure – they have no other options anyway, plus, “they aren’t hungry” (this last bit, by the way, Brezhnev himself said to Arbatov).

October 25, 1980

The Plenum is over. The session of the Supreme Soviet has passed. A feeling of bewilderment, bitterness, anger. And although Bovin probably wasn’t just boasting when he told me that he tried to keep the critical “spirit” the academicians incorporated in Brezhnev’s Plenum address, it was still more upbeat than the one at the June Plenum. This makes it look like there was a significant improvement over these four months. But in reality, it is the opposite. Though the Western mass media and our observers “on the other side” are saying that if you read

carefully, you will see in almost every paragraph an admission that things are bad. However, everyone has the right impression: there is no plan to get out of this situation.

Against the backdrop of Poland and everywhere else, including us and the GDR, Hungary is probably the only country where a solution has been found. There, they admitted long ago that socialism following the “model” and track set in the 1950-60s would lead to a dead end. So, little by little they started to look for a new model. It is working already, at the very least it is not disgracing the country.

Our reaction, even to Poland, is unequivocal: counter-revolution, revisionism, the instigators should be put in jail and everything would be settled. Ponomarev, inspired by Honecker’s reception, became a sponsor of summoning a closed meeting of “the Six” at the level of General Secretaries to discuss the situation in Poland (with Kania’s participation). However, as B.N. indignantly informed me, at the PB, Rusakov opposed it: are we arranging a flogging for Kania? What can we offer him right now? So, this idea was postponed... until the outcomes of Kania’s visit to Moscow. I asked Ponomarev directly: what do you mean? Our troops?

“No, nobody is talking about that. But the Poles have to take it upon themselves... their army needs to speak up. And in general – if Jaruzelski (Commander of the Polish Army) was made First Secretary, he would quickly restore order. They’ve gotten too soft. Wałęsa makes speeches in Krakow, says the devil knows what, and nobody pushes back. They could have prepared five-six good communists, so they would knock him back from the same podium.”

Then he started reminiscing how in 1922, he and his friends in the Party cell at the textile factory rebuffed the troublemakers who were trying to provoke a strike.

I asked him: “What rebuff could they give, if Wałęsa is urging people to work and says that it is necessary to seize cars and dachas from those who got them illegally? What is there to say?”

B.N. looked at me suspiciously and changed the subject.

Glorification of Brezhnev was in full-force at the Plenum. Everyone began with frothy enthusiasm about Leonid Ilyich’s speech – the deepest Marxist-Leninist document, a plan of action for the entire historical period, permeated with Leninist wisdom and a scientific approach, genuine Party-spirit and so forth; it inspires, elevates, we now have a real Leninist strategy. Everyone thanked “our Leonid Ilyich,” everyone committed to him personally to fulfill the tasks he assigned. The glorification reached its moronic climax in Brezhnev’s own speech at the conclusion of the Supreme Soviet session, when he took the podium to replace Kosygin with Tikhonov. He twice referred to himself using the full titles, in connection with outgoing Kosygin’s expressed confidence that a Party rallied around and led by Brezhnev will achieve new successes.

By the way, no one expressed gratitude to Kosygin, not Brezhnev himself, nor the chair (Ruben, Latvian), not on behalf of... And I thought to myself, wouldn’t it be good if some delegate, a combine operator or a lathe operator, would stand up and propose: “The Supreme Soviet of the USSR expresses gratitude to Alexey Nikolaevich Kosygin for the many years of

honest work"… followed by the usual clichés on such an occasion. What would happen to that combine operator for such an initiative? Nothing. "They can't send you further than the front lines (i.e. the combine or a lathe)." But nobody thought of it, or didn't dare. Such is our public morality.

When Brezhnev announced Tikhonov, it was as if something snapped in the room, like a quiet "oh!" swept through the audience. Behind me were some fellows, workers, delegates from the Altai region. I heard one of them loudly whispering to the other, "They couldn't find anyone younger!"

The delegates and members of the CC are agitated. During a break in the session, when delegates usually go to have a snack, two men at my table were talking: a Turkmen secretary and a second secretary from Tambov. The Tambov man says, "It's embarrassing that we cannot feed the country. If I were given free reign, I could feed my region and there would be something left for the rest of the country, too. For example: every year we give a certain amount of meat to the national reserve and every year, in the spring, we ask the national reserve to give us a certain amount of meat. And they give it to us, sometimes more, sometime less, but they do. Firstly, there are losses during transportation back and forth. Secondly, transportation costs money. And thirdly, the people have no incentive since they know that everything, or almost everything, they produce they must give away. As the result, we don't have meat, you don't have meat (he pointed at me as a representative of the capital and central government). But the national reserve can report through the Central Statistics Administration that they collected such-and-such an amount compared to last year, and so forth.

The Tambov secretary continued: we have a powerful thermal power station near Tambov, it gives a lot of heat and water. I've been asking the ministry and the CC for years to allow us to build greenhouses near the station. I could flood Tambov with vegetables. No, they say, it's impossible because we cannot find the manpower to build them. Even though I'm offering my own, and partially even my own materials. There is not enough manpower to build, once and for all, a facility that would provide more produce than the labor of the two hundred workers the thermal power station sends every year for two months to work on collective farms harvesting fruits and vegetables.

Overall, one would think: if we look past the Brezhnev glorification and really think about some of the numbers and facts brought by the Plenum participants, the subtext is obvious: "give us the freedom, give us a minimum of materials, and we will move mountains, we will feed the country." This idea came through quite clearly in some of the speeches.

November 1, 1980

There is a lull at work – in the sense that B.N. does not currently have ideas to write yet another theoretical paper. He doesn't have any because lately he has been publishing twice a month. And he himself can feel that it's too much – it could cause displeasure at the top.

Karen (Brutents) was laughing the other day while visiting me. "When B.N. is speaking in private with some third-world leader, he often remembers his youth, asks about the work of

the army, warns against any illusions about ‘peaceful paths.’ In a word, he is a big revolutionary. But when things get heated somewhere and it comes to armed struggle, his only reaction is to come out with an essay.”

It was precisely thanks to such an approach that we lost Jamaica yesterday. How hard I insisted, asked, persuaded to give it real aid. B.N. was dismissive, even laughed about it. I rang the phones off the hook at various departments, clearly exceeding my authority, but all I got was five passenger cars for Manley’s party. From B.N. – forty thousand rubles as inter-party assistance. Meanwhile, the CIA worked on Manley’s opponents daily, along with millions injected in the form of weapons, food, and so on.

It is pointless to look for logic. We pour several million into Afghanistan daily, and daily we pay with the blood of our soldiers. What for – nobody can explain. Meanwhile, numerous “points” would need minimal support from us, in completely “honorable” form, to give us political dividends and help our prestige.

As for Jamaica, I’m afraid that Manley’s fiasco in the elections yesterday will act as Chile 1973 for the entire Central American and Caribbean region.

It would appear that for the diary (the “future reader”) it would be interesting and important if I would simply write about the facts I learn every day. But I don’t want to write about that, plus I don’t have time to write out everything I learn daily. I don’t have the energy, either. I get tired. And I want to write about myself, about all sorts of worries and “thoughts.” They flicker and disappear. How many of them fly through my mind in one day! You can’t collect them in the evening. And the atmosphere at home isn’t always conducive. This confusing internal state has lasted for quite some time. I have no desire to read fiction. I enjoy studying Boffa or Carr more than Trifonov’s *The Old Man* (which is fashionable) and other pieces in magazines. It is likely more than just subjectivity, information overload at work, and a lack of faith in literature’s usefulness. There also seems to be a counter-process here: literature was always a powerful, ideological, and political locomotive of social development in Russia. Now it seems to be losing this quality. In part, because it is deprived of the possibility to take on the social problem as a whole, also because the problem our society faces (the dead end) is too big for literature to be able to help... even just to make sense of it.

Poland. Kania and Pinkowski visited. Met with Brezhnev. It’s not clear what actually took place. But the crisis there is growing and there is no end in sight. It is fundamental – a crisis of the leading role of the Party. The Party either lost its ability to use force and scare tactics, or it made the decision not to use them. But having done so, it became powerless to lead society. Therefore, it no longer has real, moral authority. It’s the same here. But we won’t repeat their experience because we will not refuse to use force. Tragedy is being postponed. It will strike when we decide that we are “losing” Poland. I wonder, did Kania make it clear to our side that there will not be a repeat of Czechoslovakia-68, even if he, Kania, does everything possible to help us in that direction.

It’s scary to think about what would happen if our side decides to take that step. And they might, because the person making the decisions does not have the necessary information (he

cannot even read what's at his fingertips) to assess the consequences. But even if he was physically capable of reading everything, he would hardly be able to comprehend the significance of his decisions and actions – because of dementia. However, someone near him really wants such a decision to be made. The day before yesterday, someone blew up Aeroflot offices in Warsaw. Who did it? There are suspicions “among the people” that it was the KGB. There is also a persistent rumor in Moscow that Masherov's accident was arranged. Absurdity. Philistine nonsense. However, what is the leadership worth, if it is suspected of such things, even by philistines.

The fact that all of socialism is going through (some kind!) of critical period is evidenced by the strike movement in the Soviet Union. Yes, yes, we can call it that. After the scandal at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant near Kiev, when Brezhnev shouted at the PB: “You are far from the working class! You drifted away!” Kapitonov and Dolgikh were assigned to study and report on negative phenomena of this kind. And on October 15 they presented a note to the CC. Here is the factual content.

Of late, there has been an increase in instances of work termination and other negative displays. The reasons: rate of pay, improper accrual and untimely payment of salaries (especially bonuses), poor working conditions, lack of attention to complaints.

Examples:

Nizhneisetsky metal work plant. In one workshop 100 people did not appear for work, in other – 57.

Alytus cotton mill in Lithuania. One hundred sixteen weavers refused to work.

Went on strike:

Ordzhonikidze Factory in Zlatoust.

Construction train No. 15 in the Chelyabinsk region.

Workshops and shifts at the Uman Pilot Plant for Agricultural Engineering.

Zdolbunovsky Mechanical Plant in Ukraine.

Children's clothing factory in Ashgabat.

Tartu Agricultural Equipment Plant.

Karachaevsky Condenser Plant of Stavropol region.

Separator plant in Makhachkala.

Kopeysk Machine Building Plant.

Yemanzhelinsk Auto Enterprise of Chelyabinsk region.

Aluminum casting workshop at a factory in Togliatti.

Due to nondelivery of raw material to the Voroshilovgrad diesel locomotive plant, the rolling shop was stopped from September 3-10th. The Vasilievsky refrigerator factory near Kiev was stopped for nearly two months for the same reason.

A particular cause of dissatisfaction is the failure to comply with obligations and activities recorded in collective agreements. In 1979, 500,000 such points were not fulfilled. Half of them relates to wages, 21 percent – health and safety, 14 percent – housing and living conditions.

Overtime and weekend work. In the coal industry, for example, most holidays are work days. In the mines of the Kemerovo region, miners worked 26-28 out of 30 holidays over 7 months.

Another reason is the collective responsibility for the state of labor discipline. Brigades, shifts, workshops are forced to assume the obligation: if one person makes a violation – everyone loses their bonuses. At the Nizhnedneprovsk Pipe Rolling Plant, 600 workers who did their jobs conscientiously were stripped of their bonuses because of a few violators.

In 1979 there were 300 “recorded strikes,” in which over 9 thousand people participated. In recent weeks, the number of such strikes is growing. Some of them are creating disastrous conditions for production. For example, at the “Severonickel” plant, workers did not remove metal from the electrolysis baths for three days.

This is what's happening. However, it is important that no “use of force conclusions” have been made. In general, the note's authors suggest to “improve,” “pay attention,” “show concern,” “organize morale building,” etc.

Even under Nikita this would have hardly been tolerated without the use of the relevant organs and troops.

But we have no real means to end the strikes, because we have neither meat, nor order, nor justice.

And *Pravda* produces articles nearly daily that make one's hair stand on end. For example, yesterday – about the restaurant service in long-distance trains.

December 9, 1980

From November 28-December 2 I was in Malta with Sharif (head of a sector in the International Department). December 2-5 in Rome. During a stop in Rome en route to Malta, I was invited to the Central Committee of the PCI. A conversation with Pajetta and Rubbi. Two main questions: 1) the earthquake in Italy; 2) Poland – they demanded to convey to Moscow the PCI leadership's resolution, warning that intervention is unacceptable. On the first point – it's a shame and a disgrace. All the newspapers are reporting: even in absolute numbers, the USSR's aid was less than Iceland's and Ireland's. My interlocutors outlined the four components of the recent crash of USSR's prestige in the eyes of Italian communists:

- Jewish emigration;

- Afghanistan;
- Poland;
- Earthquake.

The guys from the embassy who met us at the airport said they are embarrassed to speak Russian amongst themselves in the streets or in shops – they are immediately met with unkind looks or even insulting remarks.

The same day we flew to Malta.

In the evening, in Parliament at the Grandmaster's Palace, we waited for two hours while Prime Minister Mintoff finished his four-hour-long parliamentary speech. At eleven o'clock in the evening he received us together with Trigona (a leader in the Labour Party) and all the main ministers. I "made" our policy on the go towards an entire state (!), without asking anybody and having no directives and authorization.

In Rome I mostly enjoyed its greatness. There were several friendly heated discussions with Italian leaders.

Returning to Moscow, I was swamped with work and information. The PB passed a resolution based on my information from the meeting with Pajetta and Rubbi: assigned to draw up a letter scolding the PCI CC, so they stay out of Polish affairs.

I managed to scare B.N. about Italy's reaction to our pathetic aid to victims of the earthquake: the Italians are rubbing our nose in it – "You teach us about internationalism, but look how you behave!" He understood and took action to give them more money. We have one million for them (NB). The Americans gave 50 million.

December 19, 1980

It's Brezhnev's birthday today. National holiday. Yesterday I turned on the program "Vremya" and felt ill... I was hysterical while I masochistically watched the program, I exhausted my entire supply of curse words. The entire "top" was gathered as Suslov awarded him the Order of the October Revolution and said all kinds of words about Lenin, the Great October Revolution, concern for the welfare of the people, the entire people's love for him, the powerful development of the country and great achievements in building communism.

All this against the background of Poland; in a situation when in Kharkov, Rostov, etc., etc., people have to queue up at 6 a.m. to get a liter of milk; when in Chelyabinsk there is nothing to be had at all. When a CC Secretary sends a letter to oblast committees and all republics' CCs to "take every measure" to improve the situation with the supply of meat, because in most places the situation is disastrous and is being called political. When the other day Chernenko's note was sent out (by the decision of the CC Secretariat) about the appalling situation with household heating all around the country (hundreds of collective letters) because there is not enough coal and firewood. When paper machines at the largest mills stop or work at 60 percent capacity, because there is no raw material. When 60 percent of ships spend months off the harbor because there are no cars to unload into... not even for bread that was bought for gold, etc., etc.

So, this ugly, cynical performance in front of the whole nation. I do not know and cannot imagine a Soviet person who would not feel hatred, bitterness, rage while watching this scene, who would not be cursing... Today anyone you meet asks, "Did you see it yesterday!"

It seems our leaders made up their minds: "Fuck them all, let them say whatever they want, they won't do a thing against us!"

The day before yesterday the PB appointed several new deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers and several new ministers, sending the very ancient ones into retirement. All of them are Ukrainians, one (Bodul) is Moldovan. In connection with this I was somewhat surprised to learn that Tikhonov is Ukrainian too! Ukraine is steamrolling Russia...

Meanwhile, Moscow is filled with rumors that Kosygin has died. But it is not being announced, ostensibly so as not to spoil the birthday. All the people who share these news with each other are expressing their sadness, regret... It is a form of opposition, a form of expressing contempt for those who "did not let him finish his time at his post in peace."

The crisis in Poland has taken on an all-encompassing nature, everything is spilling into the open. What they are writing about themselves – about the Party leadership, about power, about the entire social and government system, about order and disorder – all of it (without exception) is the same here. But, as their academician Shchepansky correctly noted, the difference is that Poland in the 1970s essentially dismantled the repressive style (if not the apparatus), therefore they can no longer control the movement. In our country it was the opposite, it was consolidated to an extraordinary degree – precisely in the 1970s. So, nothing will happen here for now. But the strikes might become widespread.

December 26, 1980

I was at "Sosny" again, since December 20, on vacation. Dreary and slushy. It is zero degrees outside. I only went skiing twice. But I did explore the outer suburbs of Moscow.

The Istra River is beautiful, its banks are lined in trees like an alley... And the village is well-cared-for, there is a livestock complex nearby. When I was walking back, a group of men were walking home for lunch. Not a sober one among them. And the main thing that once again stunned me: a war memorial near the church – the standard figure of a woman with an olive (?) branch in her hands, a wall a little distance behind her with names of the fallen. I read them, crying (especially because there was nobody nearby, there is no people's trail through the snow!). One hundred fifty people. That's just from one village! An entire marching company. For some reason, in moments like these I always feel bitterness towards Brezhnev & Co. The connection is complex, I won't go into it here.

The next day I went in the opposite direction – towards Zvenigorod. I got as far as the village of Aksin'ino (5km beyond Nikolina Gora). The same story with the church: from a distance it looks grandiose and enticing, but when you come closer it is small and dilapidated, practically just a small chapel. Near the church there is again a "wall" with the names of the fallen, here there were 57 people, but the village is smaller too.

By the way, this resonated with my state of mind brought on by Bondarev's *The Choice* and Aitmatov's *The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years*. Very different pieces, but they reflect the new trend in our modern literature, which made its presence felt boldly. This trend is unshakable, and, I think, will not be intimidated: the insignificance of all this ceremonial fuss in top-level leadership when compared to the mystery of life and death of a simple person, with the meaning of his existence, with his natural and truly human ideas about good and evil, and about what a person needs and what he does not.

In this respect, the congress of writers of the RSFSR is also characteristic. There clearly emerged a system of values that is far from, and even internally opposed to, the official system of values. This is despite the fact that they are denoted by the same words: labor, homeland, honesty, responsibility, duty, truth, etc.

The things being published every month in literary journals have far surpassed (in depth, skill, and the critical acuteness of the subject matter) the things presented by dissidents and emigrants who left under the pretext that, don't you know, they don't have creative freedom here. In reality, they didn't have the guts, plus they wanted Western stuff and scandalous fame!

On that note, I recently read Rudnitskaya's article (for *Questions of History*) about *Kolokol* being published in French (1867-68). Once again, I marveled at Herzen's greatness. These pygmies – our dissidents – have no right to reference him. *Kolokol* in this (foreign) version came about because Herzen and Ogarev decisively disagreed with "Western democracy," which at that time took up the trend to vilify and trample (gathering all forces "against") Russia. *Kolokol* was called upon to tell "them," to fling it in their face: you are too insignificant to judge her, you are stupid for identifying Russia with its rulers.

My God! Is this really an "eternal problem"?!

Kosygin died. It was announced three days later, so as not to spoil Brezhnev's birthday (the old man got his revenge after all). But in Moscow, people found out about his death before it was announced. And the rumors started spreading: what kind of funeral will he have? Is it possible they will "wrap it up" like they did with Masherov? After all, he was removed from his post without even a thank you, only later they came to their senses and printed in the newspapers what did not happen in real life.

It seems there was a day of hesitation at the top. And then they did everything "first class," as if he passed away "on the job." Looks like they did not dare to do otherwise. They knew that Kosygin (though he did not quite deserve this reputation) was a symbol of modest authority, he considered himself to be in the service of the people, he didn't just talk about caring. Moreover, they must have realized that after turning the "birthday" into a national holiday, and again – with an order (every year it is either another Hero or an order), they can't mock the people's opinion regarding the deceased, who was respected... more than that: people secretly contrasted him to Brezhnev, considered him to be undeservedly pushed aside!

Postscript to 1980

In this “volume” the diary’s author makes his final verdict on the Brezhnev-Soviet regime – severe, merciless, implacable. The starting point of this verdict was the criminal venture in Afghanistan, which brought together all the vices, all the stupidity, and the social baseness of the regime.

The entries contain stunning depictions of the leadership’s and the General Secretary’s senility, their inability to either comprehend what was happening and where things were going, or to make decisions which would have at least a shred of common sense and a sense of responsibility towards the country.

The regime’s lies reached Homeric proportions. The economy was stagnant, collapsing, and disgraceful. The financial situation was awful, there were shortages of everything everywhere, empty shelves, queues to obtain the most essential items. Strikes, no longer a singular occurrence, began – an unthinkable thing in the USSR since the 1920s! Meanwhile, at the top, there was a disgusting and abhorrent endless bacchanalia of congratulations, awards, including of each other. Nearly every day the General Secretary was sending greetings to collectives, enterprises, institutions, regions, and persons for obviously fictitious successes.

In the fall, the “Poland problem” appeared. In Moscow it smelled like a repeat of “Prague-68.” The diary captures the moods in the Politburo, rumors, conversations, speculations and fears – “what will happen? How will we behave? Might we fall into a criminal path again?” The author and his colleagues reflect on the events in Poland on a big scale: after all, they revealed and exposed, much more sharply and more frankly than Prague Spring, the failure of the “socialist empire” – the socialist community, but also socialism as a whole – the system as it developed since the days of Stalin.

There are curious observations of the situation in the top leadership – not only the General Secretary’s advanced dementia, but the relations among the main personalities near him – those who used the General Secretary’s condition to make “their own politics.”

As always, the topic of international relations is present – from the perspective of the Soviet Union’s shameful and dangerous politics, and in connection with the Olympics in Moscow. A good amount of space is devoted to the author’s, who is a rather high-ranking Party official, attempts “in the line of duty” to embellish the image of “the Party and the homeland” from the position of “doublethink.”

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1985

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

Translated by Anna Melyakova

Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

January 4th, 1985.

I am falling behind the events. And they are bustling.

Before the New Year's I was distressed for Ponomarev:¹ Kosolapov asked for permission to print in *Communist* the conclusion we wrote for B.N. [Ponomarev] for the eight-volume *International Labor Movement*. In response, he received instructions from Zimyanin² to remove the footnote that it was the conclusion—let it, he says, be just an article... This is how Zimyanin now gives orders to B.N., being lower in rank than him! But something else is the most important—he reflects the “opinion” that it is not necessary to establish the connection (for many decades into the future) between Ponomarev and this fundamental publication in an official Party organ... That is, they are preparing our B.N. for the hearse. I think he will not survive the XXVII Congress; in any case not as CC [Central Committee] Secretary.

At work, almost every day brings evidence of his helplessness. His main concern right now is to vindicate at least something of his self-imagined “halo” of the creator of the third (1961) Party Program. In no way can he reconcile himself to the fact that life has torn “his creation” to pieces. He blames everything on the intrigues of either Gorbachev³ or Chernenko⁴; but mainly on “the curly one” (this is how he calls Chernenko’s assistant Pecheney); and also in part on Aleksandrov⁵ and Zagladin.⁶ He complains to me, seeking in me somebody to talk to, a sympathizer. But I, naturally, keep quiet. Now Chernenko’s article is published in No. 18 of *Communist*, written mostly by the same Pecheney. But to B.N., it is like a sickle across the balls, to use the language of Academician Arbatov.⁷

We wrote (on Ponomarev’s instructions) proposals to the CC “on the consolidation of the ICM [International Communist Movement]”—about the new Conference. Now he is going to marinate it, afraid to cause any irritation: do not bother [me], so to say, with your ICM, when we all have the forthcoming Congress on our minds.

... Such attitude towards our work (the work of the International Department) can be attributed to the gerontology and incompetence, the absence of a culture of politics, to [the absence of] Lenin’s sweeping approach. However—this is only in form. In essence, indeed, “our little business” with “consolidating the unity of the ICM” has become an anachronism. And, naturally, it arouses a healthy annoyance against the background of [some] real and difficult problems.

¹ Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev—Head of the Central Committee International Department, Chernyaev’s direct boss.

² Mikhail Vasilievich Zimyanin—member of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of ideological work

³ Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev—member of the Central Committee, future General Secretary.

⁴ Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko—General Secretary of the Communist Party, 1984-1985.

⁵ Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov—Chernenko’s Foreign Policy Assistant

⁶ Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin—member of the Central Committee International Department

⁷ Georgy A. Arbatov—Head of the Institute of U.S. and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences

Zagladin got sick before the New Year's. His articles show up every week (not a hyperbole) in one or another journal. He dresses commonplace banalities in decent, sometimes beautiful journalistic form and presents them as theoretical essays. Many people accept his compositions as such. But such pathological productivity triggers mockery among the majority of literary and politically competent people. In the department, people are beginning to understand that this [productivity], in particular, is also due to the fact that "work-wise" he does practically nothing, except for receiving delegations (which also became a distinctive sublimation of his graphomania).

Recently an anonymous letter about him was received from the Lenin International School... and also about Pankov, the Rector, as well. They are friends since the time of MGIMO,⁸ for over thirty years. It is alleged that Zagladin receives honoraria, that he does not complete his part-time hours (this is nonsense), and provides a "cover-up" for Pankov's extortion. He and his deputies manage to earn 1200 rubles per month each.

Gorbachev gave instructions: Ponomarev, Ligachev,⁹ and Zimyanin must investigate [the allegations] and report to the CC; thus the matter is set into action.

B.N. himself "drafted" a letter to Shaposhnikov, Rykin, and Toporikov, i.e. already started a premeditated disclosure (and discrediting of Zagladin) in a fairly broad circle. I found out about the letter from Rykin. And today B.N. ordered me to read the actual text.

I do not know whether this will harm Zagladin, but it will obviously harm Pankov on the eve of the Congress: now he will not be elected delegate. Ligachev, the keeper of party morals, will not allow it.

On the first of January I celebrated the New Year's with Plamis. [We] had a good discussion. He just returned from a tour of the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, and Singapore.

And I, in turn, talked profusely about Rybakov's novel *The Children of Arbat*, which had a heartfelt impact on me. This, indeed, is a novel of the century, a kind of an "artistic exploration" of an epoch, next to which the almost-genius *Virgin Lands*,¹⁰ devoted to the same years, turns into a provincial reference. And what a moral purification of society it would be if that book was allowed to be published!

January 7th, 1985.

⁸ Moscow State Institute of International Relations

⁹ Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev—member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, promoted by Gorbachev.

¹⁰ Leonid Brezhnev's book, which was mandatory reading in all educational institutions in the USSR

These are the kinds of passages that appear in *Pravda* (a certain Olga Kuchkina—an article about amateur theaters in Moscow)... And everybody pretends that such an interpretation of *Hamlet* can be associated with somebody else! Listen to this:

“In *Hamlet*, there are two accomplishments: the image of Hamlet and the image of the play as a whole. There is a rhythm of a well-adjusted mechanism, in which “something is rotten” only from the perspective of Hamlet’s heightened self-consciousness and world awareness—for the others, the habitual mechanism is still functioning normally. They weave intrigues and conspiracies; human dignity and life itself have no value. ‘He was a good man in the full sense of the word’—the father of prince Hamlet—and so he was removed; and now the love of power is triumphant, and personal and gain-seeking interests are skillfully presented as interests of the state.”

Arbatov reported: the Plenum on the Scientific and Technological Revolution (STR) had been cancelled, i.e. the question about the STR had been dropped. This is either because they do not want Gorbachev in the role of the speaker, punishing him for England, or because there is nothing to say or impossible to implement that which is said.

January 9th, 1985.

Today in “*Pravda*” about the results of the Gromyko-Schultz meeting in Geneva. Unexpectedly positive, especially for me, who knew what our man’s directives were, and what the Americans brought with them (according to their public statements and their press). [It would be great] if there was actually a shift!

And so all this Ponomarev-Shaposhnikov commotion with energizing the anti-war movement is being erased just like an annoying audiotape.

That is, if one looks at it from my corner. But on the whole, this is how it’s supposed to be, for it cannot be otherwise: there are no real contradictions, no deadly clashes of truly vital interests, as it was in 1914 or 1940-1. Evidently, they will not go to war solely for ideology at the end of the XX century, with the existence of nuclear weapons. Wars for ideology are fought in Vietnam, in Afghanistan, on distant peripheries of the “civilized world.”

Ponomarev still torments me with the (CPSU) Program. This irritates me, because when it was time to write the text, he didn’t even try to put me into the “working group,” but when he wants to patch up work badly done, he slips it to me “outside of the context” (i.e. do not touch adjacent paragraphs and pages). Out of spite, I do not miss a chance to stick his nose into the banal places: verbosity, repetition, cheap propagandist language, superficiality... and this was written by intelligent, educated, competent people. This is all because twenty people were writing this at once, and were constantly glancing back at different superiors: does it please—or displease them.

In a word, a text is born that will disappoint those, who are not indifferent, who still expect from the Party Program a fresh, new charge for thought and an object of pride for one's Party. Most likely there will be nothing to be proud of.

Yesterday the Secretariat of the CC [took place]. Three hours. The first issue under discussion was the work of the Embassy's Party committee, in this case of the FRG.

Then—the situation with shoe manufacturing. A splendid mess. But it was not this that "distressed" me—a usual thing! I sensed that Gorbachev is beginning to be sucked in by "the routine." Yesterday's discussion somehow reminded one of analogous ones under Kirilenko¹¹ (by its chaos and helplessness). Each Minister demonstrates with numbers that it could not have been otherwise with such maintenance, supplies, equipment, financing, etc. And that he could not and will not be able to do or recommend anything. And the Secretaries of the CC talked some, remonstrated some, criticized some, recorded good appeals and instructions in the resolution, but did not raise the issue in earnest, and it will not be resolved.

January 12th, 1985.

On Thursday, I was receiving the ex-captain of San Marino, who in September received me in her capacity as the head of the government at her medieval castle. Claudia Raccini, about thirty-six years old. Now she is just a member of the Communist Party PB [Politburo]. Accompanying her was Umberto Barruli, the ex-General Secretary of the CP. They came to try to get special terms from our commercial departments, in order to lower unemployment and to keep the CP in power. I promised to encourage our traders' internationalist communist spirit. [We] had dinner together. Chatted at ease. Barruli knows his way around in relations with us; but she [Raccini] was a little, it seems, discouraged by the "unconstrained attitude" of the Soviets (that is how Italians call citizens of the USSR too) in relations with foreigners.

I had a two-hour-long talk with Chervonenko. In his capacity as head of the department he is going on an inspection tour to the USA and Canada. I told him what the embassy workers were supposed to be doing there, but even that they are doing poorly (except for the missile-strategic range of problems).

Dobrynin¹² (ambassador to the US) was at B.N.'s; he has no habit of visiting me, I am a small fish for him. And he only visits Ponomarev because the latter invites him, and not because he, Dobrynin, needs it for work.

¹¹ Andrei Pavlovich Kirilenko—Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

¹² Anatoly Fedorovich Dobrynin—Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1962-1985

Bovin¹³ and Falin¹⁴ are not being re-elected as deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. Arbatov urged me to provide “moral support” to Sashka “in this difficult for him period.” I told him that I interceded for Bovin with Gorbachev, but the latter did not do anything. It could not have been otherwise. Bovin’s inclusion in the Party elite and as a member of the Revision Commission of the CC CPSU was one of the whims of Brezhnev’s favoritism. Under normal conditions, he is too extravagant for the nomenclature pack. As for Falin, he is a victim of some imprudence--in his words--which became known to Andropov¹⁵ “with consequences.”

And for me, it is time to start thinking about my “future.” There is less than a year before the Congress. I will not be left in the CC. Ponomarev himself, God willing, will remain there. Retire now, when the pension will be significantly higher?.. Or wait for the Congress? To stay at work after you have been “let go” from the CC—[would be] unpleasant, awkward. And for what? For the salary? I will not be able to accomplish much, and not because I cannot anymore, but because the time for “others” has come.

It is interesting, what impulse for life will remain [for me], especially if, finally, sex will disappear too?! Just curiosity? To read, go to exhibitions, watch movies and plays, write... But there will not be too much to write about!

January 13th, 1985.

Insomnia. Started to read. Came upon Vinokurov’s verses...

Well, I too grow older...

Afraid, that in this race of days

I, after all, am not becoming wiser,

But only simply colder.

Last night read the *Captain’s Daughter* again. What a delight! How compact and simple!

January 16th, 1985.

¹³ Alexander Bovin—Central Committee Consultant

¹⁴ Valentin Mikhailovich Falin—Candidate Member of the Central Committee, USSR Ambassador to FRG

¹⁵ Yury Vladimirovich Andropov, Chairman of the KGB, 1967-1982, USSR General Secretary, 1982-1984

For his 80th anniversary, Ponomarev was given the order of Lenin. But Dolgikh¹⁶ (CC Secretary) recently was given a second Star of the Hero for his 60th. Secretaries of obkoms [regional committees] as a group are given the second Star for 60 and 70 years. Against a background of such prolific kindness with honors B.N.'s case looks puzzling. He is upset. When I was with him today, he did not conceal his perturbation: "How will the Communist Movement take it? How will our fraternal states, which awarded me their highest orders, understand this? How will the peace-loving public react to this fact!?" He measures this distressing for him event on these scales.

I asked: "Do you not know how it was done?"

- No, I do not know anything. I was just at Gorbachev's for work matters. [I] Asked him. He stood up. Appeared moved, embraced me, and said: do not worry about anything, everything will be all right; I will come tomorrow to congratulate you myself. And then [he] informed me that he will not go to the Congress of the French Communist Party, although—Ponomarev comments,— he was eagerly awaited there, Plissionie and **Marchais** told our ambassador frankly that they want only him, Gorbachev; they are literally fascinaint [sic] with his visit to England. His visit would really support the Party in its present difficult state, etc. Gorbachev suggested Solomentsev¹⁷ instead of himself. [He] added that the General [Secretary] (Chernenko) did not want the Politburo session to take place without Gorbachev (he himself is ill, in the hospital).

One should, obviously, understand all this information reassuring for B.N. in the following way:

- a) He, Gorbachev, is not to blame that Ponomarev did not get a second Star.
- b) He himself [Gorbachev] (especially after England) is in a somewhat risky position of diminished trust: "do not go too far, know your place."

I sympathized with Ponomarev, agreed that many people will not understand [this], and that in general—this is not being friendly.

Really, even if he is being prepared for the "the hearse," why not give him a second Star before he goes—has this not become a commonplace phenomenon? Certainly, the question is not about real merits; on these criteria no one should accept Stars or decorations in the highest echelon of our leadership. The question is about elementary norms of relations in the "upper levels [of the government]," and about the

¹⁶ Vladimir Ivanovich Dolgikh—Candidate member of the Politburo, head of the General Department of the CC CPSU

¹⁷ Mikhail Sergeevich Solomentsev—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, Chairman of the Party Control Committee

simple observance of the “decorations table”, which has long ago become the deciding criterion.

For example, for her 50th birthday my secretary Tamara was given a certificate of honor from the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. But this is only because she is on the CC staff and works as the secretary of the deputy head [of the department]. There are millions of women like her in the Soviet Union, employed in similar and even more challenging positions, who receive flowers from their coworkers for their 50th birthday, and nothing more than that. In this context, Ponomarev, of course, deserved a second Star.

Is it possible that even after this he will still make noise, fuss, poke his nose where it does not belong, and act in a way that tires everyone, as though nothing had happened, passing all this as the fulfillment of [his] party obligations?

January 17th, 1985.

The department arranged a celebration for Ponomarev on the occasion of his 80th birthday. The hall was full. Rykin's (secretary of Party Bureau Department) introduction was somewhat vociferous and high-flown. Zagladin gave a wonderful speech, which touched everyone in earnest and Ponomarev as well. Then the head of the Latin-American sector, Hero of the Soviet Union Kudachkin, was given the platform. Then Svetlana Shadrina, who was considered the most charming of our ladies, presented flowers and read some poetry, stammering like a schoolgirl.

The atmosphere was sincere. Some shed a few tears (I sat in the Presidium and saw it myself). Our people on the whole are good, besides, the authority complex has not completely disappeared from the Russian soul.

I think that this virtuous celebration really lightened up B.N.'s bitterness over not receiving a second Star. Upon its conclusion, for the rest of the day, B.N. was visited and congratulated by universities, ministries, organizations, committees, individuals, etc.

I had lunch with the people from Ireland on Dimitrov Street. I opened up and talked about “realism” as our party's slogan of the day. And especially [talked] about the fact that we could have worked out some problems differently, for example the food problem.

We talked about the position of the Communist Party in Great Britain.

And once again, we started debating about the Labor Party, which recently sprung up in Ireland: here my friends have been betrayed by common sense, and even by simple logic...

January 22nd, 1985.

Today I was at the Secretariat. Ligachev reported on the course of the election campaign. In terms of organization, he says, everything is in order; but we were not able to get everything to be just practical, without showiness and formalities (and, indeed, what is shown on this subject on the television is repulsive to watch—just like the well-remembered Lyonya¹⁸ in his last days).

There was also a report about the state of the meat-and-milk industry. Three Ministers spoke, and Solomentsev from the Gosplan.¹⁹ Gorbachev conducted [the session], and summed it up: he likened our lagging behind western companies to the “cave age”—that was his concluding estimate to the ministers. At the meat-processing plants, women chop meat with axes, in order to prepare it for a marketable-package form.

Very bad... I cannot reconcile myself with people's indifference (my colleagues' at the CC) to work, for which they receive big money and other things. Admittedly, you may despise “this cause.” Perhaps it deserves to be despised because of its meaninglessness, unproductiveness, etc. But be honest. Leave, if you do not like it. But do not be a cynic, for that means that others must do your work for you—others, who get the same amount of money as you, that is, they do twice the work—for themselves and for you!

Take Sharif, my head of the England sector. Already for the fourth year in a row, he is sick three-quarters of each year!

January 23rd, 1985.

Did not see Ponomarev for two days after his birthday. Brutents,²⁰ who received the Chileans together with him today, saw him very confused... But he maintained his ridiculous advice-giving manner. The people came to explain why Pinochet must be forcefully overthrown. And he tells them: Lenin taught that rebellion is an art, but it is necessary to study the NEP [New Economic Policy] as well. It is an illusion that he is not becoming old. He is becoming intellectually decrepit, and his innate traits are becoming more pronounced. I cannot cast off [the image of] his pathetic description of how Gorbachev, responding to Ponomarev's question of why he was not given a second Star, stood up and embraced him. And our little B.N. almost cried, telling me about it. That is him, who started out despising Gorbachev, and considering himself better in all aspects. And now, with puppy-like gratitude, he mumbles how kind the latter was to him, asked him “not to worry about anything...” No, Ponomarev lacks that Bolshevik marrow, which

¹⁸ Nickname for Leonid Brezhnev

¹⁹ The State Planning Agency

²⁰ Karen Nersesovich Brutents—member of the CC CPSU International Department

is akin to the aristocratism of the Decembrists and the People's Will.²¹ He is petty, even though a direct heir of the Bolshevik cohort!

By the way, today he was slighted once again. It was unofficially communicated from the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that Gromyko²² named Shcherbitsky²³ as head of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation to the USA. And Ponomarev had so counted on it, had hoped so much! Five years ago he went to the USA in the same capacity, and for how many years after that he told everyone—our people and foreigners—about the people with whom he, “just like with you,” talked, what he suggested, and how he influenced them. Even now he still remembers by name all the senators, congressmen, governors, and others, with whom he met there, who had received him, etc. What a disappointment it will be! And a hint!

Could they be planning to send him into retirement at the next Plenum, in April?!

January 26th, 1985.

One more colleague died of a heart attack—Nikolai Borisovich Slepov, who worked on Israel. But work was going on as if nothing had happened. I am composing the international [affairs] sections for the CC Secretaries' election speeches, including the one for Gorbachev.

B.N. drew me to the Program again, despite the [initial] selection in favor of Zagladin. They finished up “at the dacha;” now he has to report his opinion to Gorbachev; so last night I was composing “his” opinion for him. However, I added that the collectivization should not be called “The Great Revolution” in the Program for decades into the future. It claimed too many innocent victims; and brought such material, economic, social, and other losses, that the ramifications are felt to this day. I don't know whether he will accept the addition. In his heart he agrees, but in his textbook, which has been published seven times, for the past twenty years he asserts that the collectivization was “the second great revolution!” And even if he “agrees,” will he dare to correct himself?

Shalaev (VCSPS [All-Union Central Labor Union Council]) insists on the resumption of the million-ruble transfer to English miners, even though Gorbachev told Thatcher: we have not and will not transfer. I made him go to the CC. I am in doubt myself, and that is how I composed the memo. Because our million is a drop in the bucket (less than the miner's week's spending), and [is given] in secret at that (so it does nothing for the internationalism); and if it comes to the surface, Maggie will drag the person, with whom she talked and whom she liked so much, through the mud. It is not

²¹ People's Will—a populist anarchist movement in Russia in the XIX century

²² Andrei Andreevich Gromyko—USSR Foreign Minister, 1957-1985

²³ Vladimir Vasilievich Shcherbitsky—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party

worth it. We shall see how the CC Secretaries and M.S. [Gorbachev] himself will treat this.

There are nine months left until the Congress. I must decide what to do with my life. The meaning in work is already lost; the ICM has no future: it is vanishing, the parties are falling apart one after another. Apparently it has exhausted itself historically; politically it is still holding on—supported by us. That means that the question of my work is now only the question of my private life.

January 30th, 1985.

Chernenko has been in the hospital for almost a month. The PB is meeting irregularly: he does not trust anyone else to conduct the meetings. The PCC [Political Consultative Committee] (of the Warsaw Pact countries) is delayed for an indefinite time. And what will happen with the election speech? After all, the elections in the RSFSR are on the 24th.

Today in the crowd by the elevator I asked Rakhmanin about the PCC. “What are you saying,” he replied, “it hasn’t got a chance. And the elections as well!” After some thought, he added: “What the devil—we have been knocking about for ten years now!” And that—almost out loud! And that—from Rakhmanin!

It seems like B.N. has really lost it after his 80th anniversary. He started to give out even before, but now you can see it “with the naked eye.”

He called me over the other day. Led me to the windowsills. They are heaping with addresses, telegrams, and letters on the account of his 80th anniversary. He tells me: “I am not their boss—that means that these are from the heart. They are sincerely expressing... But what should be done with all of this? Of course, I understand that the more you emphasize your importance the less you are liked. But nevertheless... somehow the hundreds of congratulations and evaluations that are in there it should be brought to attention!”

I offered only to “summarize and systemize.” Got three consultants working on it. They are mocking [him], but doing it. This might be all right, but some of his other actions are disgusting. The Bulgarian Ambassador wrote a letter requesting an interview for a movie about Dimitrov: “What do you remember as the strongest impression from meeting Dimitrov,” and such, in the personal sense.

And so I am assigned to formulate “Comrade Ponomarev’s personal impressions from working with Dimitrov,” (and I, in turn, assigned this to Kozlov and Rybakov).

At the same time, we are writing about the moral character of party members in the draft of the Program. And there is the formula [in it]: the higher the post, the stricter

the requirements for the communist's morals. Such an exploitation of the minds of other people, of subordinates who are on a party salary, is not considered immoral. In fact, it is the norm: the higher executives cannot say a word in public, or write a single line, on their own. The only exception right now is Gorbachev.

By the way, before the 40th anniversary [of WWII] I suddenly decided to find out whether any of the current members of the Politburo, candidates for membership, and the CC Secretaries fought in the war. Checked in a reference book (biographies of CC members). Not one of them had been at the front! Of course, what Brezhnev made of his time in the second echelon is also not right. Still...

I am reading Yesin's "The Imitator" in *Novy Mir*. Brilliantly executed, and excellent in the thoughts on contemporary bureaucratic intelligentsia, even though the piece is about artists = about the moral state of our present-day society.

Today, the fellows from the Polish sector (in the CC Socialist Countries Department), who clearly sympathize with me (sometimes bring Poles for chats with me), told me "whispering in the ear" that Ambartsumov's "revisionist" article was re-printed in Bulgaria and the GDR.

I am reading yet another volume of L.N. Tolstoy. Letters. Turns out he wrote them every day, in addition to diaries and material for the complete works!

February 5th, 1985.

I am again going meticulously through the Program's draft, preparing myself for the verbal skirmishes with the people who regard themselves as its chief authors—Pechenev and others: the fellows whom we, the International Department, "nursed to life," through the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* but did not manage to get them in time (i.e. to make them a part of the department).

Once again, even after the draft has been revised in accordance with the secretaries' suggestions and passed through the most thorough group editing, I [still] find absurdities, repetitions, and empty phrases and remove them from it.

As I already mentioned, last Saturday the secretaries approved the text again; but the "proprietors" of the final council—Pechenev and Stukalin, proposed alterations once more. Will they take Pyshkov and me into account at all, considering the whole irritable, vain commotion around our little B.N.?

I will go there (i.e. to the Gorky dacha) Thursday morning. Will see what happens. Most importantly, I must keep calm and not show too much interest.

February 11th, 1985.

For three days, from the 7th until the 9th, at Volynskoe -2. Stukalin, Pechenev, Pyshkov, Stepanov, Solodukhin, Pravotorov, and I were there. We were polishing up the CPSU Program after yet more suggestions from the CC Secretaries and before Gorbachev presents the text to Chernenko.

The main issues are:

1) To “globalize,” i.e. to eliminate the ICM’s popular tendency to fixate on national problems and missions; but also to prevent a relapse to the meaningless and non-productive talk of Program-61. The task virtually came down to borrowing a definition of the epoch: to the paragraph stating that the perfection of Soviet society is an international mission of the CPSU, and that the CPSU should bring up its members in the spirit of communism not only in Russia, but for all of the humanity.

2) Corrections in three aspects, as follows:

- the theory of Marxism-Leninism;
- common sense;
- Russian grammar.

3) A new conclusion (with the images of future communism), making sure that it is not too emotional.

An important detail: the addition on Latin America, which in the previous stages was virtually inserted into the ideology [section] of the “liberated” countries of Africa and Asia, due to an oversight by Brutents and Zagladin. I succeeded in making this correction, even though the text of “my” revision was not accepted.

I was the main source of observations, suggestions, and corrections... as an outsider. Pechenev, who was in charge, tried to be a good sport, but became irritated and sometimes started to object as soon as I opened my mouth.

I resolved from the start not to get worked up about it. I “argued” calmly, sometimes as if joking, and often found support among others. Then Pechenev gave in. Actually he considered me to be Ponomarev’s agent, and only slowly understood that I represented myself.

I truly consider it Pechenev’s merit that he was able to insist on the necessity of breaking Ponomarev’s vain conservatism, and making the text realistic and in general targeted domestically, rather than a precept to the IMC and a model for everyone...

Coming back from Saratov, B.N. tried to infiltrate the process, but he was too late: we really worked to finish up and deny him the opportunity of showing up at Volynskoe and then presenting the text in his name. And this is in his best interests: he is annoying people with his pretensions. His vanity is making him look ridiculous and foolish. One would think it is high time to realize that he will not be able to connect his name with the new edition of the Program. That is how it works out: even a smart man, but lacking an inner culture, genuine intelligence, and aristocratism, seems like a petty fool.

Solomentsev told me (about the Congress of the PCF [French Communist Party]) how at a meeting Marchais took him by one hand, and the Chinese representative by the other, and raised them, drawing thunderous applause. Solomentsev indignantly pointed out that our television, for some reason, cut that scene out. But when I told the story to Ponomarev, he said: they did the right thing [to cut it out]! Here is the unanimity of our leaders on the Chinese question for you!

Meanwhile, our delegation in Paris has “amicably” associated with the Chinese. And this virtually means the renewal of inter-party contacts.

February 15th, 1985.

D’ula Khorn, the head of HSWP’s [Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party] International Department, visited Zagladin and me. We talked for two hours. He really wants to be completely frank, and he really wants us to **openly** agree with him (because he believes that in our hearts we do agree). Maybe it is so, but he is thinking provincially, not politically, even though he is very intelligent. I hear that they want to transfer him to Hungary’s MFA. But not because he is a revisionist at heart, it is just that Sures and he feel cramped in one department (CC HSWP).

In the evening I had to entertain him at the restaurant Smena. There were prostitutes everywhere: around the place and inside. A most vulgar “program” [was performed] with a Russian folktale theme—a la russe [sic], as Zhilin accurately expressed it. Embarrassing. Abominable.

There was a meeting with B.N. about measures related to the Victory day. There are tons of measures, but what’s the use! We will not convince anybody of anything. The West is attacking Yalta—yet another channel of anti-Sovietism. [There was] an astute article by Korotich on anti-Sovietism in England. [There was] a report by the Ambassador from London about a televised meeting between seven of our schoolchildren with their peers from England and America. On average, especially in the area of intelligence, our children are by far more advanced than even the most civilized of their children. We are without prejudices; we submit to the conventions and rituals of a hierarchical society, but that does not penetrate essence of our humanity...

I was at Arbatov's. Downed half a liter. Discussed everyone. His [Arbatov's] chats with Gorbachev. The latter supposedly dislikes Zagladin. Does not sound believable. Facts?—He denounced Zagladin's new marriage and told Yakovlev about it. Arbatov proved to me that the initiator of Ponomarev's not receiving a second Star is Gromyko! Yurka is certain that Gromyko is striving for the [position of] General [Secretary]. The General [Secretary] himself is quite in a poor shape. How will he speak before the electorate? The congress Plenum is in April! Almost every day something is published to hide the [General Secretary's serious] condition: either "his" address to the people, or a foreword to "his" next publication, or greetings, or answers to correspondents' questions. I think he does not read them even after publication.

Arbatov showed me a memorandum he directed to Gorbachev. He contends that we **must wreck** the talks in Geneva (Gromyko-Schultz). I had not expected such naiveté from him. As if he knows what "State" considerations are guiding Gromyko's actions, who has once again demonstrated his range of power by decorating his first deputy Kornienko²⁴ as a Hero of Socialist Labor!!

And, in essence, it is absurd to leave the talks before they are started, when the whole world sees in them the only hope. The most important objective right now is to gain "victory" in the propaganda war; even though it does not alter anything in real politics = in the arms race, which is catastrophic for all, and for us before anybody else.

I am reading the *Public Reading about Peter the Great* by S. Soloviev. He was a historical thinker on great scale. And the reading is instructive too!

February 19th, 1985.

I went to the Gorky museum at the Shekhtel mansion on Kalachov Street. I had never been there, and imagined the interior from pictures. All together—Gorky plus Shekhtel plus the spirit of the epoch, and the fact that the museum was only opened in 1961 after the XX-XXII Congress of the CPSU—it is impressive. Having said that, how would Gorky's library look, with shelves on all the walls, 10,000 books—a good third of which belong in the special department for storage of confidential materials [*spetskhran*]! I walked around the rooms: the hall with the staircase that has appeared in all the architecture textbooks of the world; the dining room with a grand piano and a fireplace; the library with a round table and leather arm chairs of the old days; the study with Chinese things; the bedroom with furniture that Gorky did not like, but said not to bother about (i.e. not to change it). It is rich, in Rococo style.

²⁴ Georgy Markovich Kornienko—First Deputy Foreign Minister, head of the U.S. desk of the USSR Foreign Ministry

For all that, as I was walking around I could not get rid of the feeling that the first proletarian writer regarded himself quite highly; and, as in Sorrento, he was not ashamed to get from the poverty-ridden proletarian government a place fit for a billionaire! It is here that the articles were written: numerous, enough for five or six volumes, about proletarian art, the new culture, the decay of the West, etc. There is something ineradicably eternal in Mayakovsky's reproaches, Mayakovsky, who was only recognized as proletarian after his death, and not at the first congress of the Writers' Union.

I am going through different books, "for want of anything better to do:" Fitzgerald's *Letters, Notes, Journals*; Eidelmann—about Pushkin as a historian; Soloviev; Saltykov-Shchedrin *Loyal Speeches* (absolutely anti-Soviet stuff!); *Marxism 1929-1956*—a collection of different Marxologists; Voznesensky. Prose. Vinokurov's *She* (powerful verses, far from orthodoxy); a collection of modern English writers ("everyday life" as we would say. But maybe this is the final fate of any literature once everyone is well fed, and when the "world problems"—love, hunger, poverty, oppression, etc.—will be solved on a world-scale through computers, the Scientific and Technological Revolution, and the sex revolution).

Reading Fitzgerald, I once again catch myself thinking that I enjoy reading about writers, rather than their work, more and more: there are more ideas.

February 20th, 1985.

Yesterday I listened to Gromyko's speech before the electorate (RSFSR). Today I read his piece on Chernenko in *Pravda*. All the others seem to have guidelines on what to say about him (the General Secretary); I even suspect that an appropriate paragraph about him was approved by the Politburo. This one [Gromyko] however, was original in his word about the "inner and outward greatness of our General Secretary." What is this?

Is Gromyko using Chernenko's helplessness, narrow-mindedness, vanity, in order to secure a monopoly on foreign policy for himself? Perhaps this is even a test for the inheritance? Most likely that is the case. Arbatov, and others as well, are not ruling out that Gromyko is seriously coveting the first place. Can it really be that such a thing is possible here? And the others, the candidates who may possibly be true and earnest, will once again be waiting for their turn at advancement?

Yesterday I was going through my wartime notebooks. Many pages have simply worn away, to such an extent that it is only possible to decipher a few disconnected words. Those that for some reason remain legible are disgusting to read: I was too given to soul-searching; instead I should have simply noted down facts, episodes, last names, names of villages, etc.

The political views [I recorded] are relatively orthodox; was I afraid the notebooks might fall into strange hands? However, there are some comments that would have been a great risk in Stalinist times. After all, it was not without reason that I carried the notepads in my pockets, rather than the field bag.

Someday all this should probably be sorted out. Most likely no memoirs will come from them; but a narrative about me may be possible.

Many things change. However, the protective essence of politics is free only from the extreme, repressive forms. The essence remains.

I read *The Second Meeting*, Lakshin's book. He writes about Tvardovsky, regards him as a great, a classic. And truly, even Shauro & Co. will not object against this, as well as against the fact that this idea has become firmly established in people's consciousness. Yet, for his 60th anniversary Tvardovsky was decorated only with the Order of the Red Banner. And he was buried almost like Pushkin—just about secretly, so as not to stir too much emotion. But the mediocre writer and bootlicker Markov was given the [decoration of the] Hero twice, without much thought for the moral consequences, i.e. as to how the public will see it. And he is either keeping silent, or insolently laughing in his sleeve.

Lakshin has an essay on Mark Sheglov, who appeared in our literary criticism arena at the time of Ehrenburg's *Thaw*, before the XX Congress. This made me remember the following: there was some kind of a Party meeting, or maybe a conference on production in the Department of Science in the CC. It was then headed by Rumyantsev, the future chief of the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. His deputy was Tarasov, a huge, obtuse kind of man, with a pretty, dumb face. He spoke with a gurgling noise, as if something liquid was splashing in his mouth. His report was about culture. All I remember is a feeling of aversion at being in the company of these stranglers of the thaw: how he was reviling Mark Sheglov, with the then fresh, cosmopolitan, *Okhotnyi Ryad* fury!

I read the new chapters of Fazil Iskander's *Sandro of Chegem*, published by *tamizdat*.²⁵ There is an unpleasant sensation, one I did not get from the earlier chapters of Uncle Sandro: I think it comes from the apprehensive anti-Soviet sneer, published in a foreign country.

February 22nd, 1985.

I just read Natta's interview with *La Stampa*. He spoke openly and thoroughly—about the ICM, the “real socialism,” etc. In connection with this, I am thinking about the coming XXYII Congress' Program. The section on the Communist Movement... It was

²⁵ Term for Soviet writers' publications in the West; literally means “published over there”

written by Zagladin, twice approved by the [Central Committee] Secretaries, already much corrected at Volynskoe –2. But the essence remains. It is still as before, even the same as it was before the XX Congress. Only the wording changes, and even that not in everything: for example, we insist on the term “proletarian internationalism,” even though at the Berlin conference in 1976 we agreed to substitute it with “internationalist solidarity” (and for a while we used this term in print). The most important is in something else. Natta appeals to the reality, and in this sense rejects the interviewer’s “provocation.” who are you, the ICM, following nowadays—Lenin?—or are you returning to Kautsky?

Since the times of Andropov and under Chernenko, we are also for realism. However, we do not want to recognize that the Communist Movement, in our textbook definition of it, does not and will not exist. And everything else stems from this, namely: the soft, restrained language when it comes to the Communist Movement and to the problems with collaboration and solidarity—hoping that it will be possible to cajole and avoid provoking any severances, to achieve some kind of silent modus vivendi [sic] with everyone: with the PCI, and the Chinese; a sort of “communist ecumenism,” as the interviewer from *La Stampa* said, using an expression familiar to a Catholic.

And for what? Obviously, it is to maintain the semblance of the myth’s (the ICM’s) existence—and we, the CPSU, are, so to say, leading it! It is necessary for the worldwide ideological power. But, preserving the myth, we are supporting the existence—pathetic, sickly, impotent existence—of the multimillion fraternal parties, who are behind our back and who will continue to vegetate under the cover of the ICM’s international authority (and intimidation).

And had we “disbanded” the ICM, they would have to start acting. Of course, many would be finished. But others, the ones that still had some glimmer of energy, and where the conditions (of class struggle) were favorable, would be revived. Perhaps!.. And there would be a gain from the point of view of “world revolution.” However, we are thinking in terms of a worldwide ideological power, not in terms of a worldwide revolutionary movement.

Who is “we,” though? Who am I sinning against? I am certain that the same Gorbachev, Solomentsev, Vorotnikov, and Chernenko himself would reject such an approach if we, the International Department of the CC, had proposed and substantiated it. Certain? No, I am not certain. It is the other way around. First Andropov, then Gorbachev had demanded a **frank**, unembellished analysis of the ICM: “without the halleluiah-ness,” as Gorbachev had said. Ponomarev botched this assignment before, and he did it again this time. Again he got a prettified note out of me, which barely shows a trace of reality. He would pigeonhole even such a note. But he could not, the General Department insisted on the note being there—the bureaucratic control demanded a “closing” of the question. However... Gorbachev did not want to bring **such** a note up for discussion. He understood that no sense is to be had out of Ponomarev, as he suspected when he shared his impressions with Chernenko’s assistant Vol’sky in the summer.

And so we return to the familiar circle... Ponomarev regards the ICM as a secretary of an obkom regards his region. Comintern-ness is in his blood, as well as fear that he might be made to answer for his engagements in intentional deception, and upward distortions of results. A pretext for this might be the situation with Finland's Communist Party, which was driven to total breakdown exactly by Ponomarev, with the help of Shaposhnikov and reviews by Smirnov and Fedorov ("brigand brothers" as they are called now even by the rather dull orthodox head of their sector Razdorozhny). Ponomarev embittered SKP's leaders to such a degree, that they are indeed turning into an anti-Soviet crowd.

But let us get off the circle. This is how the matters stand: with intermissions, but for several months altogether, Zagladin sat at the theoretical dachas and composed corresponding sections for the new CPSU Program. Yes, Ponomarev was always looming over him. But already at the first discussion of the Program's draft at the PB Ponomarev was strongly rebuked, his place was made clear to him, his pretension to supervise the Program's preparation was invalidated. Why not use this? Especially since precisely at that time Zagladin had a frank talk with Gorbachev. Here he could have enlisted his support, come to an agreement on a new, brave approach to the ICM, one for which Gorbachev was ready and open. But Zagladin did not want to take a risk. After all, Ponomarev is still a CC Secretary, and could appeal against such liberties to the "shortsighted orthodoxy" of the Politburo's majority.

As a result, we, the International Department, are not doing anything meaningful, idling, and it serves us right that we are disliked at the MFA more and more, and that we are ordered around with our Ponomarev.

I read Tikhonov's²⁶ speech before the electorate in the newspaper. I noticed (this caught my attention at the USSR Supreme Soviet elections a year ago), that our leaders' speeches have begun (after Brezhnev) to differ from each other increasingly. Not in essence of course, but just as it's supposed to be in a normal, Leninist party: where everyone talks about one's own [subjects] in his own way, but still in the frame of the common course. It goes without saying, that they do not write their speeches themselves; but among their assistants and other persons "involved," there are, as a rule, sensible, and sometimes intelligent, people. And, ultimately, the product is accepted by the orator, who will not deliver the speech if he does not agree with the content.

Elections to the RSFSR [Supreme Soviet].

I looked through Akhromeev's²⁷ (the head of the Joint Staff) article in the *Communist*, written on the occasion of the Soviet Army Day. He remarks on Stalin's

²⁶ Nikolai Alexandrovich Tikhonov—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

²⁷ Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev—the Chief of the USSR General Staff, later Gorbachev's personal adviser

personal contributions to the war and to the victory. He puts Zhukov on the same level with Timoshenko, as the representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General Headquarters. Everything about the real cause of the 1941 defeats is muffled and obscure, as is the custom nowadays.

I remembered an episode that took place very recently. At the CC Secretariat, Ponomarev was charged with heading a committee on arranging public propaganda in relation to the 40th Victory-Day anniversary. He called together (about two weeks ago) some department heads, deputies, and others; Zagladin, Shaposhnikov, and I were there as well. Near the end of the meeting, Zamyatin again said out of place: "I saw... and some others present here did too, a documentary film *Victory*, about Potsdam, which was approved [for the anniversary]. Everything is accurate in the film, but in the end, the director's text struck me as offensive: Stalin was, he says, capricious, intolerant, and something else. Unfitting. Why is it necessary? It spoils the impression."

Kiselev, deputy head of the Socialist Countries Department and a well-known mastodon of Stalinism, echoed the sentiments. Stukalin (in charge of propaganda), wanted to keep quiet, but Zagladin, who was sitting opposite him, appealed to him and Stukalin ended up halfheartedly agreeing as well.

But Ponomarev reacted as follows: "I tell you! Capricious. You are jarred by it, offended. It does not jar you that before the war he ruined the bloom of the armed forces, and company commanders had to lead armies?! What did this cost the people? How many people perished because of this (only this one aspect!)?!"

The discussion ended with that.

... However, the review of the movie was preliminary, at the department level. They, of course, gave notices to the right people. Zamyatin decided to appeal to a CC Secretary for support, in case the question would be decided "at the top." He did not get any understanding from Ponomarev, how about others?..

February 23rd, 1985.

I read Chernenko's speech in a newspaper. The speech is very good; it was not for nothing that the best specialists in the field worked on it for two months. And involuntarily you begin to feel defiant: why do we need our leaders at all? Perhaps it really would be better if they played the parts of representative puppets, and the work was handed over to professionals? But it would have to somehow be in the open, without the stupidity, hypocrisy, and Pharisaism that makes everyone sick.

Yesterday, for example, there was a meeting of the electorate, but the Deputy candidate (i.e. General Secretary) was absent. Grishin²⁸ conducted the meeting. His speech is unctuous, servile. Then we observe the audience, where every other face, if not more, is familiar: the staff, the ministers, etc. Grishin gives a testimonial to the candidate, concluding with words about “personal modesty...” etc. No, the “love of authorities” (from Saltykov-Shchedrin) is ineradicable in Russia. Not the German-style love of authorities, but Russian-style, when in reality no one loves it, except for the literal idiots. Instead, a barely concealed social and political hypocrisy is thriving; the evil of which is in that it creates a huge gap between social consciousness and power, stripping it of any moral authority.

I re-watched (how many times already!) a documentary about the Leningrad blockade, from the 20-episode project *The Unknown War*. And once again (alongside with an emotional response) I had mixed feelings. After all, under Stalin, we ourselves had worked to forget and even trample the memory of the war. Stalin knew what he was doing, he played on the people’s natural impulse to turn away, “drift into forgetfulness,” to leave the wounds in peace. I remember how I myself rushed to take off the military uniform. I convinced my mother to make a silly jacket from a good soldier’s shirt. Of course, Stalin had another of his crafty plans in mind. But it was probably also a sign of the country’s healthy state of mind: it did not want to grieve over the fallen for too long, because one “must continue living.”

But now, many times already—under Brezhnev and after, we are galvanizing the memory of war. And this is most likely evidence of the decrepit state of the government, which must (consciously or not) exploit the memories of “greatness” in order to maintain the nation’s ideological and moral potential.

February 26th, 1985.

Schultz appeared in San Francisco, with another audaciously anti-Soviet speech. How B.N. panicked yesterday morning! “It is inconceivable, a new total crusade, a threat to all revolutions and all nations, we must do something immediately, they are completely impudent,” etc. in that vein.

Lisovolik, my American sector deputy, reported that there is already an order to rebuke [the speech] in *Literary Gazette* and in *Pravda*.

In Politburo today there was a distribution of the *Pravda* article: an abusive reprove with insulting epithets addressed at the US Secretary of State, with whom we are going to have to work at the talks regarding—no more, no less—whether humanity is to be or not to be (the talks are starting on March 12th).

²⁸ Victor Vasilievich Grishin—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, head of the Moscow Party Committee

Menshikov, our chief consultant on the USA, has stated that we cannot act in this manner; it amounts to a declaration of war. Lisovolik, on the other hand, is calling Menshikov's position capitulation; and suggested we remove only the most offensive, personal attacks, without changing the "conception" of the article = a rebuke. He maintains this is the only manner in which one can speak to them. I took the middle ground. I corrected the page-proofs and sent them to Ponomarev, who, by the way, on the one hand raised a panic in the morning, but on the other hand criticized me for leaving "rudely critical passages" in Shcherbitsky's speech drafts (in a day or two, Shcherbitsky is going to the USA as the head of the parliamentary delegation).

As soon as I sent off the text, Aleksandrov—"the Sparrow"—calls me. "Have you read it?"—Yes, I have. And off he went—along the same lines as Menshikov. Railed against Afanasiev (the chief editor of *Pravda*): who does not understand elementary things and composed a text as if we were on the verge of war and not talks with the USA, silly insults... What if something like this was written about Gromyko? I kept to myself, even though I should have answered him, that *Time* [sic] prints memoirs of the deserter Shevchenko, whose career had been nurtured by Gromyko and who was his protégé, and who now writes such things about our Minister that any of our insults of Schultz seem like light irony. He writes about Gromyko's extortions and bribes during visits to America (actually Yakovlev, when he was Ambassador to Canada, also told me about this). [Shevchenko also writes] about Gromyko's wife, who, when coming to the States, went to all the jewelry stores, markets, etc., buying up gold and jewelry at the expense of the government treasury, and gifts from the Embassy workers and trade representatives; about Gromyko's ignorance and his other qualities... But this is a propos [sic]. In a word, Aleksandrov—former assistant to Brezhnev, former assistant to Andropov, current assistant to the already non-existent Chernenko—was horrified by such an article and sought my support.

I replied that I tried to convince Ponomarev that Schultz's speech is just another anti-Soviet trick, and not any kind of "philosophy;" that it had quite a pragmatic purpose: to intimidate Nicaragua and to justify before the "Western democratic" allies Grenada-like policy towards this country; that we should not raise such a clamor over every one of such tricks; that our overly sensitive reaction will only please Schultz and the Americans, convincing them that this is the way to deal with us, since we react so nervously. I said that the best course of action for now is to shrug it off through some topical satire, through a contemptuous, deprecating retort: i.e. to conduct ourselves respectfully, and not show that they made us lose our temper. These arguments had no effect on B.N. He declared: "I do not agree with you." Aleksandrov did not agree either, finally saying that he is counting on me to "make my contribution and make sure the article does not appear in such a form."

I asked for the text to be returned, went through it once again and eased up some offensive and panicky strains. I wonder, what will B.N. say tomorrow? And in what form will the article finally appear?

Ponomarev's pretensions regarding the "theoretical conference" on the Victory, with the participation of foreign guests and with his report. What an illusionist! And what a steadfast sense of self-importance!

This Sunday, there is a worldwide sensation: Chernenko's voting on TV. Turns out, his hospital ward was "transformed" into an election center. A man half-dead. A mummy. I know from experience what suffering asthma can bring, making a person totally unable to function. This was when I was thirty-forty years old! And he is seventy-five! Meanwhile, he "appears" every day with addresses, replies, forewords, and memoranda!

The televised performance, of course, was staged with his consent. It had a reverse effect on people though. One thought was on everybody's lips (or in their heads): what the thirst for power must be like, if people sacrifice their self-esteem (if anyone has any left), their formal authority, and even their last remnants of vitality for it.

March 2nd, 1985.

I do not know how this happened, Ponomarev probably insisted on it, but I was included into the group preparing the CC summary report for the XXVII Congress. On Monday, Ligachev (he will head this group, and Zimyanin will head the group writing the political report, Zagladin is in that group) will assemble us and define how we are to live until August 15th—the deadline for the text.

Continuation about Schultz. The *Pravda* article actually was "calmed down" significantly; all my propositions were taken into account. But B.N. did assemble the deputies, and proceeded to scare them. He did not like my doubts or my skepticism. He assigned [deputies] to prepare a letter to fraternal parties and social democrats with "arguments" and appeals.

Yakovlev was present (the director of IMEMO [Institute of World Economy and International Relations], former Ambassador to Canada, and former deputy of the CC Propaganda Department). He was shown much consideration in the past year: [he was made] Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a corresponding member of USSR Academy of Sciences, member of the Program committee, etc. But, he is still maliciously-critically predisposed. He spoke briefly about the Program: we are not ready to compose a real Program. We will not act in accordance with it, and even if we include good propositions it will once again become a propagandist brochure for teaching to students. Again, no one will propose before each Plenum that we check the Program and ask ourselves: what about this line? Are we fulfilling its objectives?

[He] criticized the story with the "anti-Soviet group" at the university, which was unmasked and put in jail under Inozemtsev, the preceding director of the Institute [IMEMO]. Besides the fact that Andropov amnestied them, all the people involved have

been restored to the Party, all were given jobs. And, most importantly, according to his information, the whole affair was staged through a ploy with a stool pigeon, which was pointed at by some University employees—greenhorn intellectuals.

Moscow is full of anecdotes and laughter, and the Western press of terrible caricatures and articles, about Chernenko's illness... And, of course, they are “discussing” who will inherit, who has what chances: Gorbachev, Grishin, Gromyko, Romanov... Some are even discussing the possibility (as they are saying, you can expect anything from the Russians) that Chernenko is dead. And that is exactly why the Kasparov-Karpov [chess] match was stopped—to clear the Hall of Columns for the installation of the body.

Gromyko is quoted a great deal, and **Zamyatin** as well—praising the merits, contributions, and outstanding qualities of the General Secretary, which, *Expres* [sic] adds, will be forgotten before the candles by the casket burn out. Obviously, it is because of these rumors that the decision to show Chernenko was made. He has been on television twice—while voting at the so-called election center, and when he was presented with a Deputy of the RSFSR certificate; on the latter occasion he even tried to speak. It was a terrible show: people in Moscow regard these actions as a premeditated ideological diversion.

B.N. assembled all the deputies and staff of the Politburo on the occasion of another CC resolution on the campaign against alcoholism. He cited some numbers: four million are in compulsory treatment for alcoholism, hundreds of thousands of young people are in colonies and camps for crimes committed under the influence. Twenty-five percent of alcoholics are women.

As to the situation in our department, he spoke mostly about time, even though one of the direct causes for the Party bureau's assembly was the fact that the other day Zhilin stumbled into B.N.'s office completely drunk... Straight off, one could name ten to twelve people who habitually walk down the corridors drunk. And Shaposhnikov is among them; he, however, simply does not come to work after a drinking binge—a day, two, half a day, using his deputy standing... and the drinking binges take place no less frequently than two to three times a week.

March 8th, 1985.

On Monday Ligachev called together the group preparing the CC summary report for the XXYII Congress. He divided it into four subgroups: Razumov—the Party, Medvedev—ideology, Vol'sky—economic and social politics, Sharapov—international questions. I dared to ask, who would instruct Gromyko to give us materials on foreign policy. Ligachev was irritated: at first he promised to call Gromyko about it, but then changed his mind: get it yourself. I again reminded them that unlike the other departments represented in the first three subgroups, we, international affairs specialists, have a relationship with the Ministries that is essentially different: the MFA is not subject

to the authority of the CC International Department. This caused even greater irritation, though it also surprised those present: for many, such a situation was unexpected.

Later I spoke to Ponomarev about the same issue: we can, of course, in our subgroup write a report on the CPSU foreign policy during the interval between the Congresses, but this would be material for the MFA's mockery, and an excuse to discredit the International Department in the eyes of the same CC Secretaries even further: that our preparation of the materials is unqualified.

B.N. replied by saying that he would call Ligachev. And so it still remains unclear, who will assign the MFA to write a piece about foreign policy between the XXYI and the XXYII Congresses. One involuntarily remembers Suslov: he used to pick up the phone and say: "Comrade Gromyko, prepare such-and-such a material by such-and-such a date," and, without waiting for a reply, would replace the receiver! Today, no one at the CC can do anything of the sort: Chernenko gave complete control over foreign policy to Gromyko. And Gorbachev does not yet wield Suslov-like "power," he cannot make up his mind to do it...

Thus, on March 15th, we, the group preparing the report, as well as the group preparing the political report, will sit down at Volynskoe and begin... the deadline—August 15th.

On Tuesday, I was at the Secretariat, [and] once again observed with what defiance people regard Ponomarev. Other [participants] argue among themselves, get excited, disagree, raise objections, defend their positions several times over—Zimyanin especially is loud and people often disagree with him. But they are all friendly among themselves, this is discussion and arguments among comrades, they can put you in your place, but no one is offended.

But as soon as our B.N. opens his mouth, as if on cue, everyone is immediately on guard, with ironical smiles on their faces: what else will the old man utter?! And even when he talks sense, they reject his ideas lazily, without argument, and sometimes act as if he did not propose anything at all. He turns white, then red, in the face, stays silent, takes offense, but in a minute—it's like water off a duck's back: supreme training! And he tries again to get into the discussion and the same pattern repeats.

There was discussion of the CPSU Charter corrections. In the paragraph discussing the duties of each communist, B.N. proposed to remove the note that each [communist] must struggle for "the consolidation of the international communist and labor movements' unity." Not the entire phrase, but only the "labor" part. "Communist" is all right, but labor? Firstly, there is no unity, there is nothing to consolidate. Secondly, consolidated with whom? With the Christian trade unions, with the ones who vote for conservatives, with the American AFL—the inveterate anti-Soviets?..

Gorbachev replies: "But until now this was in the Charter and did not raise any questions from anyone?.." And moved on!

Incidentally, I am watching Gorbachev. At first I thought he was being careful, did not show himself too much, but was nevertheless working his “novelty,” under the cover of the old. Now it seems to me, that he has already become accustomed to the bureaucratic mechanism of leadership, and slips more and more often into the “automatism” that has been fine-tuned through the decades.

And what about Ponomarev?.. Had the authors of journals like *Problems of Communism* or other such articles, known about the CC International Department, and about our leadership mechanism in general; had known that the one whom they portray as “the Gray Cardinal,” as an omnipotent hand, which determines the work of the KGB, of the MFA, and of all the rest of the CPSU foreign policy activities—was only a minor official, who stayed “near the top” only by chance, that up there he was an old man held in contempt by everyone, whose opinion no one took into consideration, who made a fuss before us at the department about the necessity for new initiatives, etc., but was afraid to show himself at the Secretariat, not to mention the Politburo—for he might be snubbed again!

So we wrote the letter to the fraternal parties, to the Labor Movement and to the Social Democratic parties about Schultz’s speech in San Francisco. Turned out very expressive! Presented it to him. And he, who urged us on with this, placed it at the bottom of the pile of his numerous official papers! And certainly, as I said at the deputies’ meeting, everyone has long forgotten about this speech.

March 10th, 1985.

I am still reading *Loyal Speeches* by Shchedrin. I choke with laughter, and cannot stop marveling at the lasting power of the word under the pen of a genius.

March 11th, 1985.

Somber music at seven a.m. instead of the program *Opyat’ Dvadtsat’ Pyat’* put me on guard... And indeed, Chopin, once again, as more than once before, was the first informant of the Soviet people and of foreign countries of the fact that the USSR is facing a “change of epoch.” Chernenko died last night. Everyone saw it coming, sneered and sniggered at it, told anecdotes about how our leadership and propaganda, by demonstrating the complete vitality of the General Secretary on the screen, at elections and numerous statements, talks and interviews, made us the “land of fools.”

Zagladin, Aleksandrov, Lukyanov, and Medvedev were pulled out of their beds at night and summoned to the Kremlin, Gorbachev instructed them to prepare a draft of the speech for “the person, who will be elected General Secretary” by next morning. (I must

say that the work they came up with was not quite outstanding. But that is beside the point.)

Ponomarev assembled the deputies at 9:45 a.m. and was very surprised that everyone already knew.

At 14:00 it was announced on the radio.

The Plenum took place at five o'clock. Everyone stood up to honor [Chernenko]; Gorbachev said (without excess) the appropriate words. But there was not a drop of sadness or distress in the air, as if to say, you suffered, poor bloke, for accidentally landing in a position inappropriate for you... and made a pause in the acceleration that Andropov had almost given the country. A suppressed "satisfaction," if not joy, then reigned in the atmosphere—as if to say, the uncertainty has come to an end, and the time has come for Russia to have a real leader.

Gorbachev read the agenda: the election of General Secretary; and reported that the Politburo has entrusted comrade Gromyko with presenting the proposal regarding this question. Not Tikhonov, who shriveled and turned red in the face when this was announced, not Romanov, or Grishin, who, by the way, was assessed by the Western press as a candidate at the same level as Gorbachev and Gromyko.

The latter came to the podium and started to speak without notes, freestyle. When he named Gorbachev the hall exploded in an ovation, comparable to the one at Andropov's election (and nothing like the sour applause at Chernenko's). The ovation went in waves and did not abate for a long time.

Gromyko spoke in a way not customary at such occasions: he gave a testimonial (in a relaxed manner, not hackneyed) to the qualities of the "Politburo comrade" that were deemed necessary and sufficient to unanimously ("I emphasize this," he repeated) elect him.

I would like, he said, to convey to you, the Central Committee, the atmosphere in which we consider the candidacy of Mikhail Sergeevich. There were no doubts, complete unanimity. Why? [Because] he has a vast experience of party work, at the obkom level and here at the headquarters. He has really shown his worth. He has a profound and sharp mind, an ability to separate the essential from the minor. An analytical mind. He breaks down every question so as to see all its constituent parts. But he does not allow these parts to collect dust. He can generalize and draw conclusions. His adherence to principles makes him distinct. He is a man of principle and conviction. He can defend his point of view, even if somebody may not like it. And he states this point of view clearly, without beating about the bush. But [his views are] always in the name of the party policy, and for the realization of that policy. This is what is called the party approach—all evaluations made from the point of view of the party.

He is straightforward with people, and, if you are a true communist, you come away from him satisfied, even though he might have said something that was not to your liking. He knows how to find a common language with different people—for the sake of the cause. I will tell you, Gromyko continued, about my own area. Mikhail Sergeevich, as soon as he entered the Politburo, immediately drew attention to himself through his ability to see to the heart of the matter in that, which, seemingly, was not his area of expertise at all, with which he was unfamiliar (i.e. international relations). His evaluations indicated that he was not one of those who see in only two dimensions: black and white. He has shown that he can find the intermediate colors in order to reach the goal.

And one more thing. In the West, they are dreaming of finding cracks in our leadership, of setting members of our government at loggerheads... they are whispering, gossiping, slandering. But we will not give them the pleasure of seeing something like this. The election of Gorbachev is proof of the indestructible unanimity in our government.

Defense and vigilance are very important objectives for him. In today's state of affairs they are the holiest of the holy.

And one more thing. His erudition, drawn from his education and experience, is also very important. It will be very useful to him as a General Secretary. In a word, we have before us a statesman worthy of taking this post at such a crucial moment for this country.

Then there were more ovations.

Then the presiding Romanov gave the floor to Gorbachev. (His speech will be in the papers tomorrow). Then Gorbachev closed the Plenum, and invited all the people present, including the first secretaries of obkoms, who were at the Plenum but who were not yet (!) part of the CC, to the Hall of Columns to pay the last respects to Chernenko.

It remained mystery to me (and I think to many people)—why Gromyko? He seemed to have gradually laid down the program for the new General Secretary. But that is nothing. Most importantly, he was presented to the party as the **initiator** of Gorbachev's advancement. What did they want to say by this? Or—what did Gromyko want to get out of it, by organizing it so that he, and not the Prime Minister, and not one of the “party” (as opposed to the State) members of the Politburo, took this part? To strengthen his standing? To keep the monopoly on foreign policy that he secured under Chernenko? To test the waters for an “advancement”—for the post of Prime Minister or Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium? Or just to be an “elder colleague,” to patronize the young General Secretary... Maybe just for the sake of vanity?

Probably it is a combination of these incentives. But something must be the main factor.

However, I do not think that he will be able to live at Gorbachev's expense. He got the wrong guy for that!

According to much information, the people are happy that it was precisely Gorbachev. Even before Chernenko's death, people on the metro, in trolleybuses, in cafeterias, were not shy about clearly expressing such a "wish." People are tired of the social stagnation, of the demonstration of official stupidity, when a leader is turned into an honored puppet, through which, however, some people wield great influence on the course of events.

But... much is expected of Gorbachev, just as was once expected of Andropov. Will he have the courage to justify the expectations? He has great resources. The new personnel of the party apparatus and the real intelligentsia will support him. The Congress is just around the corner, which he can make the turning point in the country's history.

In a word, again, as at the beginning of the Andropov era, which in a report at a party meeting I called "the November [era]," I am "full of hope and anticipation."

The first tests will be:

- 1) the reshuffling of immediate personnel—assistants, the thief Bogolyubov – deputy of the General Department, some other people;
- 2) whether he will allow praising of his person... Gromyko has already pronounced the sacramental "outstanding statesman of the party?"
- 3) will he delay (as it happened with Andropov) with the major, socially-formative scale, reforms, or will he already at the April Plenum make himself known as a true innovator in the improvement of society?

March 13th, 1985.

When I was going home for lunch, half an hour after the ceremony on the Red Square, the flags of mourning were already being taken off the buildings on Lubyanka, off the Hall of the Union, etc. In the crowd of the CC members on the Red Square (the coffin had just been carried by), Gostev, who was standing nearby, said to me loudly: "He was at this post by some accident. But, you see, it was necessary for someone like him to have the post for a while... he seemed to be neutral. [We needed it] in order to look around. Even though everyone understood that he would not last long." Nobody turned around, even though many had clearly heard him. I assented.

In the crowd of members and candidate members to the CC, as they were gathered by the exit from the Hall of Columns half an hour before the coffin was to be carried out, the atmosphere was like in a market place: people laughing loudly, discussing

different issues, exchanging all kinds of “unrelated” remarks over each other’s heads, mockingly greeting each other, discussing whether it would be cold: since there is still an hour and a half to be spent outside. In a word, the “nationwide sorrow” has in no way touched the staff of the Central Committee.

Only foreigners took off their hats during the “peak moments” of the ceremony. And on the background of the relatively reserved eulogies—the tone set by Gorbachev at the Plenum and again in his speech from the Mausoleum—Fedoseev’s speech sounded silly and out of place, as he contended that Marxism-Leninism had lost a prominent theoretician, whose merits in this area were recognized by the Academy of Sciences with the Karl Marx Order, etc. He was the only one from the people close to Chernenko who did not “get his bearings.” Meanwhile, for some reason, it was precisely him, who was moved to the funeral committee and given the podium at the Mausoleum.

In a word, we have entered a new era. What will happen? And we need a “revolution from the top.” Nothing less. It will not work otherwise. Does Mikhail Sergeevich understand this?

March 14th, 1985.

Gorbachev had a marathon of meetings today—from Bush to Natta, there must be at least twenty, if not more. The Western press is brimming with praise and hopes: for the first time they will be working with a leader who has in no way been connected to either Stalinism or Brezhnevism!

Sukhodrev (interpreter for the General Secretaries, starting with Nikita) told me about the meeting with Thatcher. She, being acquainted with Gorbachev from 1984 (London, Chequers), fawned, charmed, engaged [him], and he answered with the same. It seems that this is how she “does politics,” and with the help of M.S. she wants to surpass all kinds of Kohls and Mitterands in world affairs, and maybe even the Reagans. And she likes to play in the feminine way precisely with Gorbachev.

Ponomarev was invited only to [the meeting with] Natta; the Arabs and other Africans (B.N.’s home turf) made do with Gromyko.

I was at B.N.’s talks with McLennan (General Secretary of Great Britain’s CP). B.N. agreed to berate him for Johnston’s article in *Marxism to day* [sic]. As a result, Gordon wanted to continue the talk with me. I stopped by his hotel in the evening. Conducted an edifying conversation about this “anti-Soviet” article: said that, since we are fraternal parties, we must observe some code of propriety. We are not against criticism, but not one-sided: what if we had written in the *Communist* something similar about your party, what would you say?! There was nothing he could say to that. And in general, he is no expert at debate, plus he has not completely parted (like the Italians have done) with the “principles of the ICM” in the traditional interpretation.

Out of all the communist parties, Gorbachev met only with the Italians. And even though B.N. did not object, he grumbled to us: saying, how is that—so many good (!) leaders have come, and we meet only with the Italians, the bad ones!

When I was coming from McLennan, I was called over to meet Natta: my friend Ruby had noticed me. We sat together for around fifteen minutes, talked. I was not acquainted with Natta, but apparently Ruby had described me as one of the few at the CC who think of the PCI “with understanding.”

March 16th, 1985.

From early in the morning yesterday I continued to “discipline” McLennan, trying to get a clear response from him, as to how he understands fraternal relations—does he recognize at all, unlike the PCI, the specific character of the relationship between parties? He got confused, said that he thought about that all the time himself, and that I had now arranged all these problems in a systematic way. But I continued to press on him: how can fraternal relations be combined with an ideological war, which you are virtually waging against us (the CPSU)?

I am sure that this is all in vain: he is too weak a leader to make internationalist sentiments prevail at the CPGB; even though the basic sense of justice is on our side: the CPSU has, in fact, recognized most of its major flaws and omissions, and has undertaken their correction, begun work towards the “improvement of socialism’s image.” The new leader has clearly stated that he came from the Andropov camp and that he would continue the work with greater energy, and maybe even with the help of truly radical changes and reforms. And you, the Eurocommunists and others like them, continue to say that this is an impossible task unless we introduce a second party and altogether accept the British system of parliamentary democracy, i.e. you “criticize constructively” on the basis of dissidents’ gossip and the work of Sovietologists, without a real understanding of the reality.

In this connection, I contrasted the Italian Giuseppe Boffa’s book on the history of the USSR to the writings in *Marxism to day* [sic]. There are many points, on which we disagree with his evaluations and conceptions, with his explanation of our history, but nevertheless we have carefully studied the book. Not only because it was written from a favorable perspective (in the selection of words and formulations), but also because it was done in earnest: the man worked in Moscow for ten years, knows the Russian language, knows the Soviet people, studied our history from our sources, etc. That is why there is much of instructive and truly constructive material in it.

With that I saw the General Secretary of Great Britain’s CP off; he has an extraordinary congress in mid May, where the minority of so-called “pro-Soviets” will be dealt the final blow.

I met with the Irishman O’Riordan. Here everything is simpler. Even though I am tired of the sectarian caprices (in relation to the Labor Party).

I am reading the renowned Mikhail Lifshits’ (now deceased) “The moral significance of the October Revolution” in the *Communist*. A brilliant essay. But only now there is the courage to publish it (from a personal archive). There is real “realism” there... and let us continue this way in everything. But, but, but... Are the “cadres” ready to perceive the Lenin-Shchedrin self-criticism as an instrument for a real renovation of our minds and public relations?

March 17th, 1985.

Everywhere people are happy and pleased that it is Gorbachev. The chauffeur, who drove me yesterday, told me with great enthusiasm how his fellows, the chauffeurs, are happy that we finally have a real leader. To lead our country, he tells me, one needs to be healthy as a horse, and that one (that is, Chernenko)—you could tell right away that he was a sickly one. In his place, I would have said: “Fellows! Spare me, I will not pull it through!”

If only Gorbachev would not succumb to the trumpery of “foreign policy activity.” Nikita started the tradition, Brezhnev pushed it to the level of parody, and Chernenko surpassed even that. Especially since these daily statements, interviews, addresses and answers do not achieve any real purpose, and do not carry any weight in politics. Let someone like Gromyko, or maybe the Minister of Defense Sokolov, appear with such statements...

There is a danger here... One seems to be in full view, it seems like it is for the sake of the most important, for the people. But the most important thing right now is to think—how to reform the country, and **where** to lead it.

Whom will M.S. appoint to head the Secretariat as his replacement? Grishin, Romanov? Or will he lead it himself until the Plenum, and then make Dolgikh and Ligachev members of the Politburo?

Much will depend on this. And not even on the action itself, but on the impression from that action—whether he will justify the universal happy expectations, or slip onto the beaten path and start spinning the well-adjusted bureaucratic machine. And the question of “comrades-in-arms,” of course: [if] Grishin and Romanov will be “representing” him, his image and the “capabilities” (the level) of the new leadership will be interpreted through them.

It is evening. In a week, history has erased Chernenko from its pages. Last Sunday at this hour he was still alive.

March 18th, 1985.

This is the first normal day of the “new era.” Nothing special at work. But there are good rumors: B.N. told me the following: the CC Secretaries got together on Friday—not a Secretariat, just to “exchange opinions.” Grishin and Zimyanin suggested holding obkom Plenums “about the March CC Plenum... to discuss the resolutions and the General Secretary’s directives.” Gorbachev responded derisively and definitively: “What Plenums? What for? We have too much to do to busy ourselves with meetings again. And what resolutions of the Plenum [do you propose to discuss]? That I was elected General Secretary? What’s to discuss there?” Ponomarev proudly told me, that as this point he loudly said: “That’s right!” thereby irritating Zimyanin.

This is a good sign. B.N. added that a similar episode took place after Andropov was elected General Secretary, only the initiator at the time was Kapitonov and the reply was abrupt and harsh: “I am not Brezhnev. I do not need this. And you, Ivan Vasilyevich, have many important matters to attend to, as do we all!”

It is curious that even before I was at Ponomarev’s I had heard a slightly different version of an episode from Zhilin: he was in some non-CC company on Sunday. Already legends are forming.

Reports from ambassadors are full of enthusiasm about Gorbachev. Okketo, a member of the PCI leadership, told our Ambassador: “Since the war, there has not yet been a moment when the West felt such a complete wave of goodwill towards the Soviet leadership, and Soviet Union as well!”

Besides all the favorable judgments of Gorbachev’s qualities and all kinds of high hopes, everybody—Kohl, Shultz, Mitterand, Thatcher, and people of this level, have noted that Gorbachev speaks “in a conversational style” (i.e. not reading from notes). For them (and for everybody!), this is a sign of intelligence, competency, of being well informed, knowing your subject, and of having ideas and convictions!

These hopes and expectations are too enthusiastic! And the mountain that must be shifted is enormous; the temptations to go down the beaten path are plenty; the problems that must be solved, as well as the obstacles already objectively pointed out, are countless!

I was at the Conservatory. Listened to the renowned Spivakov. Bach. It really does impress, only the faces in the choir are all—one sillier than the next, this hinders the listening. But the music made me tremble. I forgot that this was Spivakov and his renowned orchestra, and such. Probably this is the great level of the performance of the greats—when you forget who is playing. The oboe was magnificent, by the way, a very handsome young man...

March 21st, 1985.

The following is rumored as the explanation for why Gromyko presented Gorbachev at the Plenum. When Andropov died and the PB convened to elect the successor, Ustinov²⁹ was presiding. The story is that he and Gromyko had previously agreed to advance Gorbachev's candidacy, but as soon as the meeting began, Tikhonov asked for the floor, "for an introduction," and said: "I propose Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko!" The others, so as not to appear divided, agreed... But this time they had tried to "circumvent" Tikhonov.

It is said that Gorbachev prohibited putting up his portraits (in place of Chernenko's). He declined to greet a convention of the Friendship Societies in Vienna, somebody from the Council of Ministers was sent. "The resolutions of the March Plenum" rather than "directives of the General Secretary" are discussed in the press and at the obkom Plenums. He conducted the first session of the Secretariat after the General Secretary election himself. Gave a speech—mainly against showiness, bureaucracy, and meetings: we have to do our work, especially since February had no rise in production and the yearly plan (of the five-year-plan) is stalled again.

From Chernenko's assistants, he kept Aleksandrov and Sharapov: the first because he is indispensable at his post, and the second most likely because he is part of the Andropov legacy, and M.S. is honoring that. Pechenev was dismissed "with a fuss:" he was given the position of deputy editor of the journal *Political Self-Education*. Obviously, not only because M.S. has no plans to pose as another Marx or Engels, and does not need theoreticians like "curly [Pechenev]." But probably also for other reasons, he [Pechenev] most likely overdid things, it seems that way—he made himself out to be "a little Napoleon." First, assistant-coordinator Pribytkov was delegated as a deputy to the *Glavlit*. It is understandable: Gorbachev was not in any way indebted to Chernenko, and he has his own assistant-coordinator—Lushchikov. Vol'sky was returned to the position of first deputy of the Heavy Industry Department, from where he had once been taken by Andropov.

It was decided to return the date of the Congress to its regular date as indicated in the Charter—February 1986, in order to collect the harvest and finish up the plan rather than give speeches at conferences at the end of the current year.

There are rumors that the domestic (economic) sections of the new Program draft have already been returned for alterations: "so that we do not have propaganda presentation of what has already been said by Brezhnev and Chernenko about improvements" of everything possible, but propose real sweeping reforms. Can it really be so?! It's so good, that I find it hard to believe... even under Gorbachev!

²⁹ Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, USSR Defense Minister, 1976-1984

Ponomarev is in good spirits. It seems that Gorbachev was kind to him out of politeness. And his sacred wish—to become a Politburo member—has once again shown signs of life. He is really giving out (as they say—before your eyes), especially his memory, which has always been excellent. Now he confuses everything with everything.

Yesterday he called me over pretty late. Asked me to “think” by morning, give him a speech for the PB, where the plan was to discuss the results of Gorbachev’s meetings with foreign leaders. I composed three pages, but, considering the Gorbachev atmosphere, without the sighs and the epithets. I do not know what he really said there today, but it is unlikely that he took my suggestions.

I am very worried that the routine of international affairs will take hold of Gorbachev; and in the eyes of the people, who are tired of the window-dressing, and in the eyes of the world community, his image would begin to wear away, the hopes would tumble.

And, remembering what happened in Andropov’s first months, it is especially important not to delay with the key changes of staff... and to definitively show that he is prepared to introduce proper order a la [sic] Andropov, whom the people remembered primarily in this quality.

March 23rd, 1985.

All day long I have been editing the chapters about the ICM for the VIII volume. It’s going slowly. The “Western” sections are written by synthetic minds like Galkin, Diligensky, and some young ones. But the sections on socialism are turning out badly, since here every Ceausescu is high science, but specialists such as Ambartsumov are among the revisionists. Nevertheless, the twenty-ninth is the final deadline for submission to the printing-house.

Ponomarev, the chief editor, of course will not read the volume either before or after it comes out. He will only read the paragraphs that the orthodox pensioners or fraternal parties will read and protest...

What can one do? However, I think that the text we created is the maximum of what is not embarrassing to publish (for a thinking and informed person) in 1985.

B.N. told me yesterday that on Thursday at the PB it was decided to conduct the Congress “according to the Charter.” Chernenko’s idea to create two documents—a written report about the CC and a political report for the Congress—has also been revoked. There was a preliminary notice that the draft of the Program will require substantial additional work. And the draft will not be “handed out” for a pre-Congress discussion at the April Plenum.

Gorbachev called me yesterday morning and asked me for information about the Sorsa group (the committee of the Socialist International on disarmament), whom he was supposed to receive in an hour. Turned out I was in low water, because I had not been present at Ponomarev's meeting with that group, and did not even know who else of our people had been there. He spoke with me without a trace of "friendliness" that distinguished our rare previous contacts. Maybe he did this on purpose, so I would not begin "to take liberties" on these grounds. He spoke coldly, overbearingly, condescendingly.

I found Shaposhnikov, who was supposed to be well informed about this, asked him whether he had spoken with Gorbachev. From his first words I gathered that he was wasted, too drunk to make sense. He must have spent the night drinking with his Finnish "friend" Sorsa. I do not know whether Gorbachev noticed this... but it turned out that he gave detailed information to Aleksandrov, not Gorbachev.

In the evening, Aleksandrov told me that at the reception Gorbachev "successfully improvised" and made a great impression on the Social Democrats.

March 30th, 1985.

There are rumors going around Moscow that the General Secretary election at the PB was "not without a fight." I heard about this from Gililov (he is at the Lenin School and has many acquaintances among the "formers" in the nomenclature and of the resentful). Brutents also told me about this—during the entire time he was at Barvikha and talked with different obkom workers, including first secretaries. There does not seem to be such talk in our department. So: it is said that there "was an opinion" that Tikhonov should be made General Secretary, and Shcherbitsky should take Tikhonov's place. Grishin and Kunaev supported this idea. Thus, if Shcherbitsky (who, of course, wanted to be Prime Minister) had made it back from the USA in time for the deciding PB meeting, the scales would have been... etc.

Nevertheless, every cloud has a silver lining. If all of this really took place in some form, then the position of the current General Secretary is much stronger than it was, for example, with Andropov. In that situation, there was a trio that held him under its thumb: Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Ustinov. Now there is none of that: Gromyko pronounced before the whole world at the Plenum, that he has no claims. Thus, Tikhonov is written off. Kunaev and Shcherbitsky are not even in Moscow. So Gorbachev can act much more (almost absolutely) confidently and decisively, which is exactly what he is doing. He has cleaned up his personal staff, by reducing it by a third. He eliminated two sections of the CC; liquidated the proliferated committees in the Politburo: on China, Afghanistan, the Near East, counterpropaganda, Poland, and others, I cannot even remember them all.

He brought back the Andropov schedule for himself—works on Saturdays. He already gives assignments to Gromyko, and not simply a scrap of paper with his signature: he writes notes, explaining how he sees the question at hand. Time and again, when international policies are discussed, he includes Ponomarev along with Gromyko in his orders... I think it is not because he values Ponomarev so much, but so that they know at the MFA that there is the Central Committee and that it also deals with foreign affairs.

Yesterday Ponomarev finally discussed “the situation in the Communist Party of Finland,” which he had been planning to do for a long time. Actually, I had reminded him by reading a telegram about the outcome of their extraordinary Congress. The following people were assembled: the deputies, plus Balmashnov, Kutsoban, Zhilin, and Fedorov, a reviewing consultant on Finland. Shaposhnikov made a report. It was some kind of pitiful medley, including some totally irrelevant information, for example: that we can get support from the business circles for the overthrow of Aalto (General Secretary of the SKP), and so on. His “intellectual poverty,” as well as the disintegration of his person owing to alcohol, was brilliantly demonstrated. I took the podium right after him and made a devastating speech, the essence of which was: if in the past fifteen years “the CPSU has been consistently and firmly following the line based on principle toward the SKP,” but the state of affairs has grown worse through the years and is now coming to a virtual schism, so it is time we look at this line—how sound it is, and to what extent it is based on principle. And why do we have such a double standard: with the “Eurocommunists” we’ve found a modus vivendi [sic] and overlook [their] outrageous behavior, including blatant anti-Sovietism, of which there is not even a trace in the Finnish CP; but for the SKP’s little sins, which indicate a deviation from Lenin’s orthodoxy, we are heading for an overthrow of the party’s official leader? We are stirring up Sinisalo against him, in essence encouraging factionalism. For years, we have been told that Aalto was anti-Soviet and almost a CIA agent; but [where are] facts, quotes—there is not one, not once. No one can present even one anti-soviet statement comparable to what has been said by our best friend Marchais, as well as Berlinguer, Carrilio, the Japanese, etc. And in general, what are we afraid of? There are plenty of all kinds of “historical compromises,” “third ways,” “self-governing socialisms,” and such, in other (and many other) Parties with whom we are friendly. They say: Aalto will lead the party away... Where? To anti-Soviet positions? What is he, an idiot, a madman? In Finland, with its Social Democratic government, president, bourgeois parties, who are in favor of friendship with the USSR; with the people who get a direct benefit from proximity to the Soviet Union, in such a country it is impossible to have an anti-Soviet Communist Party. And whatever Aalto has in his soul (and we have done everything to make him our enemy), he is no fool and knows that if he declares himself as anti-Soviet, he would sign his death warrant as the party leader.

Yes, Saarinen could not withstand the test of our unmannerly interference; he betrayed the confidence of the CPSU-SKP relations. But there was an interference, and in what a rude, almost Gauleiter-like interference. And the whole world knows about it. Fraternal parties (including socialist countries) are looking sideways and chuckling, watching our “operations” toward an even more fraternal SKP.

I reminded [the people at the meeting] of the delegation headed by Romanov, who went to Finland last spring. Read, I said, the memorandum you prepared for him, which he, judging by the consequences, delivered there. I was horrified. Not one, even the most insignificant, party, like "my" Maltese or Irish parties, would tolerate being addressed in such a tone. But the Finns grumble and sometimes snap at us, but tolerate it. If we had tried such a tone with the Italians, Japanese, or the French, they would have raised hell about it.

I proposed the following conclusion: we must change our course of action, the bet on Sinisalo & Co. has exhausted itself, we should try to restore the trust of SKP leadership, to set up friendly, equal relations.

Later in the evening, when I stopped by B.N., the discussion about the Finns was brought up and I got worked up again, saying: "Either we save the party and our prestige, or we save two friends—Fedorov and Smirnov (reviewing consultants on Finland). We must end the setup through which they have for fifteen years monopolized information about the SKP and the evaluation of its position, thereby virtually controlling our line of action. It has come to the point where Shaposhnikov was not uncomfortable about reading the Ambassador's telegram on the outcomes of the SKP Congress to us, which was practically written by Fedorov before the Congress, even before he was sent to Finland. And this paper has been enciphered and went through the higher levels; it is now a political document. This is the kind of information we've been feeding to the PB for fifteen years, and we are ready to believe it ourselves!" B.N. shook his head.

At the deputies meeting I was supported by Zagladin, but in a roundabout way, with curtseys to Vitaliy (Shaposhnikov). Brutents supported me, but also with equivoques and reservations. Then he came to my office and said: "Tolya, that was bravely done! I just exchanged thoughts with Vadim Zagladin. He says, Tolya spoke with fortitude, etc." Kovalenko (one of the deputies) spoke against me, but displayed such ignorance in this subject that even Ponomarev laughed about it. Zhilin kept quiet. Kutsobin supported me indirectly, with one remark (later he called me and said that he agrees with me absolutely, but he felt uncomfortable saying anything because he is a specialist on India, like Kovalenko is on Japan). Shaposhnikov, of course, was infuriated, but he had nothing to say; and even if he does [have something to say], he really does not know how to.

Concluding the meeting, B.N. did not rebuff me, but neither did he support me. On the other hand, he did not support Shaposhnikov either. [Ponomarev] assigned him to prepare "proposals for steps to be taken" for the PB. It seems that it will come down to what it had been. However, I suspect that under Gorbachev, if he gets around to it, it will not continue this way for long; especially since Solomentsev, who was at Finns' Congress about a year and a half ago, expressed that he "could not understand and had doubts" about the way we are conducting our affairs there.

April 2nd, 1985.

The Western press is brimming with reports on the resumption (after Andropov) of the purging of the state-party apparatus of corruption, bribery, favoritism, venality, etc. It is true that many people are being removed, judging by the records from the Secretariat and the PB CC. However, in the resolutions there is rarely a mention of the fact that it is for abuse of power and such sins. Mostly the [stated] reason is—retirement.

There was another session of the CC Secretariat. Gorbachev was leading it again. He does not want to hand over this role to Romanov. And he is probably preparing Ligachev and Dolgikh for PB membership. You can judge by their boldness and activity that, together with the General Secretary, right now they comprise the core triangle in party leadership.

Brutents told me about his conversation with B.N. Said that he advised him to go straight to the General Secretary with the issue of the style of our relations with developing countries and fraternal parties. We cannot, he says, keep holding them on pauper's rations. Karen supposedly said that each step of Marshall Sokolov costs us hundreds of times more than all our aid to the ICM. And we should start seriously working on the Middle East before the Americans push us out of there.

I don't know whether he was as colorfully frank with B.N. as he told me...

April 3rd, 1985.

I am busy with the delegation of American senators, headed by Cohen. Nobody wants to receive them. All these democratic games are not for us, and we do not have the people for it. Yesterday, the Congress passed a resolution to increase the exchange of delegations and parliamentarians. Their every congressman is good for the job, but out of our entire Supreme Soviet we have, God willing, a dozen. Not to mention that their senators and congressmen have real influence on politics, but the people here merely applaud, and only some are capable of "explaining" our politics and of upholding a position in a debate.

April 4th, 1985.

I was told the following today: that the CC and *Pravda* receive literally a torrent of letters about Afghanistan, mostly from regions of Russia and from Siberia. Unlike before, there are very few anonymous anti-Soviet letters. Almost all of them are signed. The main message: why do we need this, and when will it end?! Women are writing, pitying the young men who are dying and suffering mentally there. They are writing that if "this is so necessary," then send volunteers, at least the commissioned, but not the recruits; because being there and doing what they must do mutilates their souls.

Soldiers are writing, sincerely and simply reporting that they do not understand “why we are here.” Officers, and even one General, who signed his name, are writing that they are unable to explain to their soldiers, subordinates, “why they are here;” and that only from the outside it can seem that they are “fulfilling the international duty,” but being there it is impossible to believe.

There were two letters from the crews of a tank and a helicopter. These are reproaching *Pravda* for writing untrue accounts: you recently described a battle in which Afghan warriors supposedly fought heroically, they say, but in reality—“we were the ones fighting and everything was completely different [from your report].”

Later we discussed this for a long time with Karen. He thinks that three people: Sokolov, Gromyko, and Chebrikov, must present the General Secretary with statistical calculations: what this war is costing us, and what the prospects are. It is obvious that there are no alternatives. We must pull out.

I objected: no one from that group will come forward with this voluntarily. There must be a resolute decision. The General Secretary assigned them to produce considerations “about the consequences, pluses and minuses” of our retreat, and in any case to make the decision to—withdraw!

Gorbachev should not delay this. I cannot imagine people in the USSR, who would be against it. Such an action would provide him with a moral and political platform, from which he could later move mountains. It would be equivalent to Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist report at the XX Congress. Not to mention the benefits the withdrawal would give us in foreign policy.

[There was] a wonderful conversation between Gorbachev and Raul Castro. I read the transcript. In all the important fields, “his” approach is one of freshness of understanding, broad and lively thought unrestrained by any cliché or dogma, real political realism... including in relation to Natta, the PCI, i.e. the ICM, and the Chinese. But alas! argued about Afghanistan—“we will not abandon our brothers in need” (??!)

April 6th, 1985.

On Thursday the PB again discussed alcoholism. Solomentsev was reporting. Nine million [people incapacitated with alcohol] have been collected on the streets. A million and a half are in compulsory treatment. Women constitute over a third of drunkards and alcoholics. Youth [constitute]—a half [of alcoholics]. But in the tsarist Russia, there were practically no women alcoholics, and no youth alcoholism. By the amount of alcohol consumed per capita, we have surpassed the pre-revolutionary Russia by two-and-a-half times. The straight loss is thirty billion rubles per year, and if we count the indirect consequences, then it is all of eighty billion [For example, the personnel of

the sobering-up stations alone numbers at 75,000 people. But nothing is achieved by their work]. Meanwhile, the profit from the sales of vodka is five billion [rubles].

Gorbachev said that we are not talking only about the major social problem of the present, but also about the biological state of our people, about the people's genetic future. And if we do not solve this problem, communism will be out of the question.

When Dementsov (deputy of the State Planning Committee) tried to "ask" for the vodka revenue clauses not to be repealed immediately, saying that it would be difficult to cover for it, Gorbachev derided him: you want to ride into communism on vodka!

Measures have been planned out: the manufacture of "*bormotukha* cheap fruit liquor]" is to be completely abolished; the amount vodka produced is to be sharply reduced; the fines for home-distilled vodka will be not one or two hundred rubles, but one thousand rubles on first incident. All the subsidiary restaurants by the raikoms [regional committee] and obkoms are to be liquidated—for the leadership. Banquets are to be prohibited for many occasions. The punishment for coming to work inebriated for leaders at all levels should be an immediate and relentless dismissal, up to the expulsion from the Party. And all such cases are to be published in the press.

However, many at the PB (the question was discussed for two hours) reminded each other, that in 1973 a no less stern resolution was passed. Something was done for a year or two, but then the situation became even worse: the consumption of alcohol has since doubled.

By the way, something was said about the CC staff and about the international affairs specialists, who "in the performance of official duty" must engage in this activity. A warning has been made.

But what are we to do, when deputy head Shaposhnikov—the Chancellor of the staff!—leads all the department's drunkards and sets almost daily records, at work as well!

In the evening I was unexpectedly summoned to work. Zimyanin did not like something in the document about the visit of the American Senators. I complied. He is a man with striking complexes, even with us, staff-members: all the time two principles are struggling within him—the desire to appear as a democrat (rather than a bureaucrat), and a suspicion whether his opinion is taken as something beyond any doubt. As a result, he always speaks with "a nervousness."

Kosolapov (chief editor of the journal *Communist*) asked me to read the lead article after the March Plenum and on the threshold of the Lenin days. He attacks commodity-money relations. I will object. This is all his orthodox—"creative" fantasies (he is, incidentally, also an adherent of the dictatorship of the proletariat). We shall see how he reacts. It is not the time to shun the New Economic Policy-Leninist approach, we do not have any other way to enter the world-standard level of labor productivity. And,

appealing to realism, one must be a realist, [one must] not glance back at the theoreticians, who by their own ideological nature cannot stop being scholastic propagandists.

April 7th, 1985.

For some reason, I remembered that B.N. referred to me [my report] at the deputies' conference, when he was telling about the PB meeting, at which the outcomes of Gorbachev's mid-March meetings with foreign leaders were discussed. But he mentioned only that I had given him a comment by Okketo (one of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party), saying that never since the war has the USSR been regarded so favorably as now, in connection with Gorbachev's election.

I am curious, what did in general B.N. used from my four-page draft for the talks with Okketo. For example, that the most important aspect in foreign relations for us right now is work in the West European direction. By the way, in his conversation with Raul Castro, Gorbachev strongly emphasized this thought. Understandably, this is not because B.N. "prompted" him; he adopted this thought as a result of his December visit to England. But... B.N. could have "hit the current." However, he does not feel the realities of politics. Unlike M.S., he is too weighed down with the old clichés and dogmas, dating almost from the times of Stalin.

April 11th, 1985.

Makaluso's address (through Kiesa) to Gorbachev: our (*L'Unita*) Beijing correspondent spoke about you with Xu Yaobin, we published this. Would you like to do the same? Gorbachev (through Aleksandrov) passed Makaluso's answer to me: I wouldn't like to, but what I said earlier about striving to improve Soviet-Chinese relations remains valid and we will undeviatingly continue [towards this goal].

My attempt to prevent the release of Rakhmanin's publication of the "*interkit*"³⁰ (conducted still under Chernenko) in the inner-party report was unsuccessful. Aleksandrov, saying "ask for something simpler," suggested warning Rusakov (that in tendency and tone such a publication differs from what has been publicly announced by the new General Secretary). It turned out Rusakov was out sick. I called Rakhmanin. He objected, saying that he does not see the "difference" and is not inclined to withdraw the material. I replied: my duty is to warn; you are the one who will be responsible for it...

I was at Arbatov's. He said that he still associates with Gorbachev often: writes notes, sometimes calls. [He says that] in the past two weeks he has "given him forty-one

³⁰ *Interkit* [is a compilation of] yearly collected meetings of the Warsaw pact Communist Parties CC International Departments' deputy heads (without the Romanians).

pages..." Saying that we need to show Americans more often that we will manage without them, but with Western Europe. And saying that [Gorbachev] should not appear too frequently with public announcements and initiatives—not to fall into the tracks of Brezhnev-Chernenko. And saying that we need to make up with the Chinese more energetically. And—that we should give two, if not all four, islands to the Japanese, because otherwise we will not get anywhere with them.

And—that we must cease with Afghanistan (supposedly Gorbachev replied that he is "thinking it over.") And—that we must, finally, stop treating socialist countries as satellites, and must set our relations on truly equal terms. And saying that we must give the collective farms open access to the market, and about much else.

For some reason, Arbatov believes that Gromyko will soon become chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; and that Katushev, for example, should be made Minister, and by no means Kornienko.

[Arbatov claims that] supposedly he, Arbatov, prompted the idea of Gorbachev's meeting with the "captains" of our industry and agriculture; not with five thousand of them at the Hall of Congresses, but with only about twenty of the most able and brave people, from whom one can obtain useful information. And that was how it was done.

At today's PB Gorbachev spoke very frankly about the sowing and storage of agricultural produce, as well as about order in the trading system. He concluded by promising the Ministers to take away their "feeding-place" (a special eatery on Granovskogo street), which hinders their witnessing (with the help of their wives) the real state of affairs in the supply and quality of produce.

He took away his assistants' "Chaikas," and returned them to "Volgas." And, people are saying, a similar fate will befall the first deputy heads of the CC departments.

Ambartsumov came to visit me. We have not seen each other, I believe, since that "incident."³¹ He brought a letter addressed to Gorbachev, in which he hints at Bugaev's (deputy chief editor of the *Communist*) incompetence and not being up to date. But he also virtually complains about Zimyanin. It is brilliant and irrefutable. I advised him to change the addressee, since Gorbachev will not deal with this, but Zimyanin will be vengeful. [I advised him] to send the letter either to Zimyanin himself, or to Kosolapov, who will show it to Bugaev: let him be furious for a while.

Ambartsumov is composed, says that he does not regret anything (neither do I); that Trukhanovsky lost courage, and if he had not "stripped" and repented, perhaps he

³¹ About three years ago in Italy he lost his passport for traveling abroad, I had to rescue him... and his Party membership card

would have been made an academician.³² Now it is too late for him; it is obvious (i.e. after Gorbachev's election) that he did a foolish thing, but it is too late.

Ponomarev called from the Crimea. Regrets that he is away: "such developments!" What are those?.. A joint Plenum of creative unions, to which everyone, led by Gorbachev, showed up, and he, Ponomarev, was not there! And that is the extent of his concern about the affair. Also... he is again raising the subject of a conference with Communist Parties invited for the 40th anniversary of Victory Day. He bade me to compose a telegram! It is ludicrous. On the other hand, it is somehow awkward to stick his nose into this vain folly—after all, he is going on eighty-one!

Yesterday I sent him a memo regarding a document for the CC about the situation with the CP in Finland, and what we should do. The memo turned out even a bit rough: I repeated everything that I said at the aforementioned deputies' conference at Ponomarev's. I concluded with the following words: we cannot allow the friendly attachments between Shaposhnikov, Fedorov, and Smirnov and their Finnish wards to be placed above the demands of real politics. And, finally, we should not be behaving in a way that will result in having us (the International Department) "set straight;" and under Gorbachev that will be inevitable, and soon.

B.N. called today, but not a word about this memo. But, it is possible that he has not received it. Balmashnov could have opened my envelope and secreted the note "until Shaposhnikov's return," to whom he will show it. He is capable of it—this little Judas Golovlev at the post of assistant to the CC CPSU Secretary!

At the PB meeting on April 11th Gorbachev announced the following statistics:

In the processing of goods, 50-60% of the work is done by manual labor.

The productivity of labor in the processing of agricultural produce is two and a half times lower than in the capitalist countries.

1300 milk, cheese-making, and butter production factories, 200 meat processing and packing plants, 103 canneries, 60 starch-treacle factories have been built without refuse clean-up cycle. As a result, there is enormous damage to the environment.

The weakest part [of produce processing] is storage. The existing storehouses for fruit, vegetables, and potatoes provide for 26% of the needed volume; and even those do not meet today's standards.

Out of the 11.2 million storage tanks, only one third has cooling systems and only 19% have ventilation systems.

³² we are discussing Ambartsumov's article, where he proposed returning to the NEP [new economic policy]. He presented the article to the journal *Questions of History*, where I was a member of the editing staff and turned out to be the only one arguing for its publication.

In the sugar industry, only 20% of beets are kept in appropriate storehouses.

Many regions do not have enough grain elevators. 140 meat processing and packaging plants do not have refrigerators, 42% are in pressing need of major repairs.

The demand for up-to-date machinery in the processing of agricultural produce is met only at 55%.

As a result of the abovementioned conditions, the losses of agricultural raw materials reach up to 25%.

In trade alone, in storage and transport daily losses amount to: 1 million tons of potatoes, around 1,300,000 of tons vegetables, 3-4 million tons of sugar beets.

100,000 tons of meat is lost in the preparation and transport of cattle.

8,000,000 tons of milk is fed to calves; 18,000,000 tons of skimmed milk and 6,500,000 tons of whey are used as cattle feed.

Up to 1,000,000 tons of fish spoils due to insufficient capacity in processing.

The food industry's demand for up-to-date packaging methods is covered at 50%. In industrial packaging it is 30%, and for fruit and vegetables only 10%. The lack of packaging leads to the spoiling of fruits and vegetables and to enormous losses.

Gorbachev concluded by saying that if workers of the co-operatives had a sufficient number of high-grade transportation vehicles, they would increase the purchase of produce from the population by 15-20%, i.e. by 1.5 billion rubles.

April 12th, 1985.

I read the transcript of Gorbachev's conversation with congressman O'Neal and his delegation. Brilliant. The conversation was vivid, potent, lively, and confident, with competency and conviction, and, as the Italians said in the old times and say still—a dialectical mind. And [Gorbachev has] a composed, cheerful (Nietzsche-style) ability to maintain the reputation of a great nation. He stupefied the Americans. Their replies to his arguments were childish prattle. Afterwards, in a talk with his journalists, O'Neal said that this is a man of talent and sincerity, a statesman on a world scale.

There is an article by Z. Dumange, a French landowner, multimillionaire, communist, about "his friend Mikhail!" Zagladin translated it and, it seems, sent it to the "object" of the enthusiasm.

Forty Jews from the USA and a New York rabbi, who was once saved by our forces from a Hitler concentration camp, would like to come to Moscow for the 40th Victory anniversary. It is interesting, what the USFS [union of soviet friendship societies with foreign countries] will think of it.

Two Jews from emissary Bronfman (president of VEK, a billionaire) are coming to Moscow and will have talks with our different committees. I called Bobkov (deputy chairman of the KGB), he is fine about it; but Arbatov is demanding orders from the CC to have talks with them... he is worried about being sullied by giving the “Jewish” preference.

Today I read a great deal on Gorbachev’s emergence in world politics, specifically, a transcript of a discussion between Sorsa committee (Social Democrats) and our delegation (Arbatov, Chervov, Primakov, and others). How much intellect and artfulness is put into this. But behind the scenes (and from the Social Democrats’ side even in the open) there is always a perplexed voice saying: what is going on is madness—the politicians of world powers and their allies are doing everything to ultimately, and in the near future, bring mankind to an end. Meanwhile, “you and I,” and the major politicians themselves, are all talking, talking, talking, convincing and believing each other (!) that we are for peace, for saving the world from nuclear war.

April 16th, 1985.

There is nothing interesting at work. Together with Zagladin we received two Dutch Social Democrats. Nice guys, tactful. But their main idea was: what would it be for you (the USSR) not to increase the number of SS-20 over 372? Then our government will not allow the Americans to install cruisers [cruise missiles]. In the military sense it is a trifle for you, but the political consequences for all of NATO are innumerable.

Really, what would it be for us?! Why do we need these SS-20s, aimed at Western Europe?! Their installation was as foolish as Khrushchev’s missiles in Cuba in 1962.

B.N. returned from his vacation, called together a deputies’ meeting. Told us about the Bulgarians’ resentful reaction to our announcement that we will no longer give them half a billion in “credit” for the development of vegetable-growing (in reality they used it inappropriately). Zhivkov is raging and has already nearly doubled the prices on exported fruits and vegetables.

April 18th, 1985.

Early in the morning, people from the MFA sent me a draft of Gorbachev’s message for the “meeting (of veterans) at Elba”—our and American veterans. He made a note: “No comment!” but asked Kovalev³³ to nevertheless run it by me. As it turned out, if it had been sent as it was, there would have been protest from the Romanians, the Greeks, not to mention the communist parties—our friends who were not mentioned at all.

³³ Anatoly Kovalev—First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Head of the First European Department

Yesterday Mikhail Sergeevich was in a proletarian area, at the Likhachev factory, in a school, a hospital, a store, in the apartment of a young family—he interacted with the masses. But they say that “Potemkin villages” were already arranged (beforehand).

There was a two-hour-long discussion at the PB today, as a result of Gorbachev’s meeting with industrial and agricultural specialists (there was a thorough account of the meeting in *Pravda*). Tikhonov showed some displeasure, saying that this impromptu disrupts everything that had been calculated for the plan of development up to the year 2000. However, Gorbachev politely deflected the reproach, and told the Ministers to “take into account” what had been said.

April 21st, 1985.

I read about August Stindberg [sic] [Strindberg] in **Block**. I became curious, took two of his plays from the CC library (“Field of Ashes” and “Miss Julie”—with his own extensive foreword on the essence of his contemporary theater). I read it. Excellent mastery of dramatic composition, it is effective despite the absolutely foreign and in general absurd for today’s reader material (the plot). It appears that all the Vakhtangov-Meyerhold, the Tairov and such innovators of modern theater go back to his [Strindberg’s] “theory” and practice. However, all our Zakharovs, Lubimovs, possibly, don’t have a clue about this. Who knows about Stindberg [sic] nowadays? He was never even published in the Soviet times.

For me, this reading was a flashback to one of the plaintively romantic moments of my youth, when I read Ibsen, Hamsun, Hauptmann, Kellermann. There was a strong air of them in Stindberg [sic].

April 23rd, 1985.

There was a CC Plenum: preparation for the Congress. Gorbachev was relaxed, confident, reserved, and sometimes made remarks. He spoke to the Plenum without constant reliance on a piece of paper.

The subject was organizational issues. This time no one had any idea what would happen. I met Arbatov and Bovin at the Savior Tower. Naturally, they asked me if I know anything. I did not, but speculated that Ligachev and Dolgikh would become PB members. Arbatov added Chebrikov, but rejected Dolgikh: saying that he is on very bad terms with Gorbachev, something came between them under Chernenko.

At the session Gorbachev took a notepad out of his pocket and proposed all at once: [promote] to the PB—Ligachev, Ryzhkov (!), Chebrikov; to candidate members—Marshal Sokolov; and RSFSR Minister of Agriculture Nikonov--as the Agricultural [Department] Secretary!

After the election, he asked the new PB members to come to the Presidium; he called up Ligachev and seated him close to himself, at the chairman’s place, and

Ligachev conducted the entire Plenum. It is clear to everyone that he [Ligachev] will conduct the Secretariat as well. And this is a month and a half since Chernenko's death—Gorbachev did not allow Romanov to conduct the Secretariat, but conducted it himself! (Why could Romanov have a claim at this post? Because he is the only one in the Secretariat, except for M.S., who is both in the PB and a CC Secretary)

Now he [Gorbachev] has an absolute superiority in the PB, with three quite loyal friends “against” (if they have the courage to do it) possible opponents: Tikhonov, Kunaev, Shcherbitsky, Romanov, Grishin.

Gorbachev's report was energetic on domestic policy, though with the same main ideas as at the March Plenum. But on foreign policy it was flat, ordinary, a standard report. Either he does not want to divert his attention to this “material” right now, or, (which would be worse) he has given everything over to Gromyko again. Arbatov, who was sitting next to me, was grumbling, saying: he did not accept anything from what “I submitted to him (upon his request).”

His “train of thought” can be seen from the report and from his remarks during the discussion: order (in the factories, stores, on the street, in the administration—in the widest sense of the word) and independence. In this last aspect he greatly supported the Estonian Secretary Vaino and Shevardnadze. Independence, willingness to take risks, resolution of problems on the spot, a kind of “autonomy” in the realization of strategy, a deep adaptation of the strategy for (local) resources and conditions.

In the address before the discussion, he said that the discussion should not be rushed through, that the potential (and experience) of “our body”—the Plenum—should unfold and exhibit the work and example of the highest party organ, etc.

But alas! The discussion did not rise to his expectations, even though afterward, in the conclusion (not prepared by the staff, rather read from the notes in his notepad) he said in the beginning: “the discussion was heading in the right direction and we should develop this style, this nature of Plenum work.”

The first speeches, by Shcherbitsky and especially Grishin, demonstrated utter inability to adjust to this new style. These were models of general phrases, empty words, which Grishin had himself condemned in vain. But, it seems, Gorbachev is inclined to tolerate this jerk, inveterate courtier and ass kisser, who is hated and despised by all of Moscow at the helm of Moscow.

However, there was no glorification of the General Secretary, even though everybody still rose and applauded when the Politburo went up to the Presidium... Even after the intermission. However, Gorbachev quickly “intercepted” [the applause] by resolutely sitting down.

The clever, smart, and talented Shevardnadze managed it after all: he said that for a long time there has not been such a reaction in the world to the events in the USSR, as

there was to the Gorbachev election. He quoted *The Washington Post* with praise addressed at the “new Soviet leader,” with an addition, saying: “for us, capitalists, this is only for the worse!” Shevardnadze added his own comment: they are afraid of “the joining of socialism and strong leadership.” And, apologizing, he specified: “I know that Mikhail Sergeevich does not like it when people say [praise] about him, but it is not me, the Americans are saying it!” Laughter in the hall.

Out of ten speeches, only three or four were more or less in Gorbachev’s style.

I do not think that a more or less clear conception has formed in Gorbachev’s mind of how he is going to bring the country to the level of world standards. Only fragments of a methodology can be felt, in particular: order, contractual discipline, fairly perceptible decentralization of administration and planning (which will be restricted only by strategy). Right now he is executing the replacement [of personnel], and he is inclined to do a real clean up of the party (which Shevardnadze openly called for). He is shattering the Brezhnev-era dogmas, conventions, the fetters of showiness, bureaucratic stagnancy, self-conceit, grabbing more than one deserves. In a word, he is breaking the norms of the monarchical restoration, which had so harmed the economy and morale under Brezhnev, and which had almost been revived under Chernenko.

(By the way, during the five hours of the Plenum Chernenko’s name had not been uttered once, as if he never existed!)

April 27th, 1985.

There was a party meeting yesterday, on the preparation for work with foreign delegations at the Victory Day celebrations. Up to ten delegations are coming. Shaposhnikov is reporting. He is quite pathetic after all. And he could not restrain himself from indirectly offending me, saying: in England (which I am supervising) the 40th anniversary is poorly celebrated. Everybody noticed this and he looked foolish.

In front of the hall, where the meeting took place there is a stand of veterans’ photos on display, paired pictures—how one looked during the war, and how one looks now. People say that I’ve changed the least. By the way, from our thirty veterans I had the highest rank during the war—captain.

In the morning I received a postcard from Felix (a school friend). [He] congratulates me with the Victory Day, reminisces on how we used to write to each other when I was on the North-West front and he was in Central Asia (he was deported from Moscow under suspicion that he is German, ([his last name is] Ziegel after all!). Yes, I remember that, as well as the fact that I never had a feeling of superiority, or scorn, or resentment (anger) towards my school friends because they were almost all on the home front, and I was in the war.

On these “victorious” days I am going through my scant war photographs. They are stirring [my emotions]. I was quite handsome. [I was] an officer even before the Red

Army commanders were called officers. And I was not even a full twenty-four by the end of the war.

Comrades from the party bureau, who organized the aforementioned photo stand [sic] of the veterans, came by to ask what post I held at the end of the war. I said: “Deputy chief of staff of an infantry regiment. Why do you ask?” “You see, Anatoly Sergeevich, we asked the same question of all the other veterans. We asked Kudachkin (he is a Hero of the Soviet Union) how old he was when, as senior lieutenant, he was in command of a battalion.—I was twenty-one,—he replies. We ask him: ‘Would you entrust a battalion to the command of a present-day twenty-one-year-old young man?’ And he replies: ‘Are you in your right mind?’”

Indeed, a strange change in generations [happened] since that time.

May 3rd, 1985.

Whatever I am doing, whomever I interact with, and whatever I talk about, one thought is present all the time: what am I in the Gorbachev sense? What am I capable of? Would I be professionally useful (in a task), if I were entrusted to conduct it [the task] Gorbachev-style? I am not sure of that. But I want to try, especially as Ponomarev is absolutely not the man for the job; Zagladin would not have the party spirit (courage, honesty, and readiness to take risks); Brutents would have enough intelligence, but not character—the Russian character is needed here... Well, and so forth.

It is interesting, what will become of our establishment (the Ponomarev establishment) at the Congress and afterwards?

May 5th, 1985.

Yesterday I read Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev (a reply to Gorbachev’s letter from March 24th). The text is cheekily and intelligently composed. His team is cynically championing their interests. But that is not the point; the point is that we look weak against the background of this letter, because Gorbachev is still going on the path beaten by Gromyko (and he is losing control of foreign policy).

We conducted ourselves not in the best way possible with the matter of Nicholson’s murder, and Reagan pinned us down on it.

Our involvement with [military] space exploration—the demands for the cessation of it as a condition for productivity in Geneva—was without foresight. And here as well they are nonplussing us. Gorbachev has now become engaged in this demand, and if he is to save Geneva he will have to go back on his (and not Gromyko’s) demand.

Reagan also caught us on a ridiculous suggestion about the unacceptability of “two languages” in mutual relations: one for propaganda and another for internal use, for

example, in correspondence between the President and the General Secretary. He parries: were you not always for an ideological fight?

In a word, it is not coming out very strong... All because here [in foreign affairs] it is even farther from a revolutionary approach than in domestic affairs... from the renunciation of the propagandist approach to politics. Also, the uncertainty about our international capabilities remains.

May 6th, 1985.

I read the report that Gorbachev will present at the Congressional Hall on May 8th. A very strong text, simply stirring in places and very carefully adjusted from the standpoint of politics as well as the standpoint of taste and style.

I wrote a memo to Ponomarev: "Very strong text." He calls me. He, of course, did not like my evaluation, since only he can have "strong texts," and if they are weaker than somebody's then the following people are at fault: the consultants, myself, the executors who realized his ideas and observations poorly. I foresaw such a reaction and wrote this on purpose—"for a gloating delight."

Ponomarev was also interested in something else: how Gorbachev's report will agree with his, B.N.'s, article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, which he pushed with such persistence and feeling self-importance. I reassured him, saying that they do not differ in ideas, but in the structure and the character of the text there are some substantial differences. I wanted to sting him here as well by saying that Gorbachev was more polite with Reagan and American imperialism, that he does not busy himself with predicting an inevitable victory of socialism in the entire world (I had suggested easing or even taking out all of this, but he ignored it). However, if I mentioned this he would have immediately made me "mark" the places that cause doubt. But I had to run to a date, so I kept quiet.

May 11th, 1985.

[About] meetings with international delegations: the English communists leave an oppressive impression. [They are] indifferent, occupied with their little affairs (to be sure, a truly "trade-union [sic]" mentality, strictly by Lenin). And no matter how I scoffed at Plotnikov all evening at the ceremonial dinner, trying to arouse in them some interest toward us, toward the newness of Gorbachev, even went into excessive self-criticism—their reaction was limp and shockingly primitive.

On the other hand, the complete opposite was Dennis Healy, the shadow minister-Laborite [sic], an old acquaintance, a major national and international figure. He was looking for contact, conversations; he joked, was sarcastic, took pictures (his hobby) with me, and with Arbatov and Zagladin, and "prepped" us on how to conduct affairs with Reagan in order to achieve something. Towards the end [of the evening] he assured me that the celebration of the 40th [Victory] anniversary (in England, and Europe, and here)

is proof of the fact that people can have an impact on their government. After the reception at the Kremlin he went to the Park of Culture, had a good look at our “public character,” was in rapture over his meetings with the most ordinary folk, who came up to him, touched the crosses on his chest (he served in the Navy), questioned him, told him about themselves (Viktor Kubekin was with him, the former advisor in London, from the KGB, a most intelligent fellow, and a handsome man).

At the airport, where I came to see him and Priscott (from the leadership of the Great Britain Communist Party) off, I found him writing an article for *The Observer* about the 40th anniversary in Moscow. I had to say goodbye to both of them at the same time and we sat in the guestroom with some cognac. I delivered all kinds of speeches, tried to joke, to egg them on. Healy spoke in response and towards the end suddenly remembered and blurted out, addressing Priscott, something like this: “I think, that **comrade** Priscott will not bear me a grudge for speaking for both of us and taking up all the time before the flight (the other nodded his head, with a pitiful and servile smile). Though, I beg your pardon, after the events in your party, which will soon end with the extraordinary Congress, perhaps I will not be able to call you comrade any more, I will have to use “*gospodin*” (mister!) [sic]”

Everybody laughed. But this was an excellent move against the CPGB’s descent into anti-sovietism.

At the reception I made acquaintance with Sharipo, a laborist [sic] from New Zealand. [She is] a lovely, sweet woman, first time in the USSR. She looks at everything with “charmed” eyes, even though she came from almost the most anticommunist, respectable, bourgeois country. We spoke “protocol-style,” but very nicely. I also tried to “charm” her. At the end of her visit she declared that her most important impression is that the Soviets are just as ordinary and normal people as everyone else. She went to Leningrad, embraced Tereshkova, will pay her a visit, to our other committees. And by the way, she was described to us not only as close to Houk, but also as an ardent Zionist³⁴ (even though she is Sharipo, she is not a Jewess but an Englishwoman).

The reception at the Kremlin was chaotic, and for me also a fuss. There were only two translators for my eleven delegations (and one of them was Kubekin, who was always with Healy). The majority of the accompanying delegations (members of our department) were not allowed to the reception. So, with a wineglass, I had to go from one to another, at intervals running across somebody who was not “my own” (people from Luxembourg, Germans, Filipinos, Italians, not to mention Moscow acquaintances)—and I had to say something “meaningful” to each. But, I think, I did not please everyone, including Winston—a blind African American—the chairman of the CPUSA.

And, finally, I was able to celebrate Victory Day with Kol’ka Varlamov, my friend from the front. We talked about Ligachev. When the Academy of Social Sciences offered him an honorarium for a lecture that he read (in the fall) before an audience, he

³⁴ Zionism and anti-sovietism were synonymous for me at the time

became furious. And he did not leave it “like this”—he forbade giving honoraria to members of the staff, who come there every now and then to give speeches. And he sternly put his wife in her place when she tried to take advantage of his official status.

We discussed Gorbachev—I am so enthusiastic about him that I am even willing to forgive him the mentioning of Stalin in the Victory Day speech. However, he should not have done it (I seemed to be the only one in the Kremlin Congressional Hall who was not clapping during the moment of the wildest applause at these words). Gorbachev (one can understand this) gave in to the momentum, to the common mood. He did not want to encourage the grumblers. But he should have defied [them]. [He should have] shown his character, let it be known that Stalin cannot be forgiven for that, which can have no forgiveness (for those twenty million people we lost in the war, especially in 1941).

May 15th, 1985.

I had a talk with Kashtan (General Secretary of Canada’s Communist Party) the other day; we had lunch at *Oktyabr’skaya*. The officially assigned P. Smol’sky, whom we recently sent to Canada as the head of a delegation, also tagged along. He is Ligachev’s arrogant deputy in the Party Organization Department and secretary of the party committee of the entire staff. I don’t know about what and how he talked with Kashtan and others in Canada and here in his capacity as assigned by the CC, but this time for the duration of two hours I had to talk alone. I do not mean this as a self-compliment, but, alas, only we, the international specialists, know how to speak with foreigners properly, i.e. how they need to be spoken to (!), even about our particularly internal affairs. But there are very few of us, and Ligachev and the Party Organization Department are imposing provincial obkom secretaries on us... it is lucky if it’s a smart one, otherwise... I have seen and endured a great deal from many [of those] in these past twenty years.

The Victory Day celebrations went by very well. And overseas as well: Reagan helped that. But the main reason was that we forced the West to react to our conception of the Victory. Reagan went into a counter-attack, and anti-Sovietism led him to the remembrance of the SS.

The Western press is beginning to think that Gromyko’s monopoly on foreign policy is continuing. Of course, we should let them feel the continuity, and we should work in Western Europe properly, before we start on Reagan. However, it is dangerous to drag out the Gromyko situation: people could become disillusioned in the capabilities (and intentions) of our new leader. Still, he continues to gain points (in the West as well) regarding the internal affairs.

Arbatov informed me today, that “you can congratulate yourself and everyone around: Bogolubov got the boot. Yesterday at the PB Lukyanov was made chief of the General Department of the CC.” Indeed, one can congratulate everyone—the entire apparatus; after the thief, gentry, and swine Pavlov, this one [Bogolubov] was second in rank (and in some places even higher), Brezhnev-Chernenko’s minion and watchdog, a Scrooge...

M.S. is doing everything persistently his own way. And he is not losing time, like Andropov did, even though he had much less of it.

May 17th, 1985.

Bogolubov really was dismissed at Wednesday's PB. And—[he was dismissed] without the customary in such cases “gratitude from the CC” for many years of service (recently for his 75th anniversary he received the Hero), and without setting him with a merit pension. People say that even though his removal was decided a long time ago, i.e. with Gorbachev's accession, the suddenness is explained by the fact that in connection with the 40th anniversary of Victory Day he obtained for himself an Order of the Patriotic War, in which he did not take part. [He did this] in the same way as a couple of years ago he forced the Academy of Social Sciences and VAK³⁵ confer a doctorate upon him, and earlier—became a recipient of the Lenin and State Awards, the same way he had a car without a license plate, etc. In a word, a swine, who should have been removed a long time ago...

So this is another sign of Gorbachev's cleansing wave... After all, this is the “main” department of the CC.

I am working on Latin America's “debts” and the danger of a currency and financial disaster (Gorbachev's assignment, which involves the following institutions: the Academy of Sciences, Gosplan, Minfin [the Ministry of Finances], Gosbank [the State Bank], Minvneshtorg [the Ministry of Foreign Trade], and others).

May 18th, 1985.

I forgot to note yesterday that Ligachev assembled all deputy chiefs of the staff. He gave us notice that the resolutions and decrees about alcoholism and hard drinking will be published tomorrow. (It seems we will soon be celebrating the 400th anniversary of the fight against drinking in Russia: begun by Boris Godunov.) He spoke very sternly, saying that twelve years ago we made an attempt, but at the same time we passed a resolution to increase vodka production and turned a blind eye to all kinds of scandalous behavior. “It will not be this way anymore! Will not be! The times have changed... (he paused)—as in all other respects...” We will fire people caught “in this” in twenty-four hours, regardless of either merits, or status (sitting next to me was Shaposhnikov, quite smashed, probably from yesterday's or last night's drinking bout).

[Ligachev] cited some statistics: 107,000 communists per year end up in sobering-up stations, and 370,000 members of the Young Communist League. Since 1950, the consumption of alcohol has quadrupled. Two-thirds of crimes are committed by intoxicated persons. The rise in crime is directly proportional to the rise in the consumption of alcohol. The life expectancy of men has gone down. Future generations

³⁵ All-Union Authors' Committee

are imperiled. The main cause for the rise in alcoholism is the rise in the production of alcoholic beverages (and not the “remnants” of capitalism).

Yesterday the orders and resolutions were published. They strike one with their frankness (without fear for “the image of real socialism.”) However, the measures [taken] are not draconic: mostly fines. But what can one get from drinkers?

May 20th, 1985.

The CPGB Congress is over. The “Eurocommunists” won, “our guys” were driven out. Either they are fools, or the [intelligence] agents really made an impact, or they are such vehement anti-Soviets that they have lost common sense. Because under the English conditions there is no space for a social-democratic (anti-Soviet) Communist Party, and especially now, when we’ve begun embracing with Kinnock and Healy. Their Congress virtually means a self-liquidation course. Formally, its substance is Eurocommunism, but the reality in their situation is something completely different... Particularly when Gorbachev is creating a different image of the Soviet Union as a world power and the fears of the Soviet threat are beginning to dissipate.

May 22nd, 1985.

I met Sures and his team, plus Nadya Barta, who retired from the post of Kadar’s assistant and interpreter. Right now Sures is Secretary of the CC HSWP (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party).

We had dinner at the hotel on Dimitrov street, for the first time under the “prohibition.” The Hungarians chuckled about it, and we made excuses; of course there is no toasting, and the conversation drifted to irrelevant topics. It is lucky that they are [our] old friends and we can talk frankly on any subject. They tell us: we were bringing you presents, wine sets as usual, but we decided to drink them ourselves on the plane, “so as not to violate [the new laws]...”

Lagutin has returned from the extraordinary Congress in Great Britain. The Eurocommunists have absolutely defeated the faithful, i.e. the people faithful to us. This is a demonstration of the fact that in countries like England there is no need for a Communist Party; the Communist Movement has become obsolete. And the Communists want to modify themselves into something totally new, to cut the umbilical cord, and even if they become a club, at least it should be a club with original ideas; one that is listened to. They do not need us, the CPSU; do not need us at all. They see in us neither a model, nor an example, ideal, brother, trusted friend, not even someone who would save them from a nuclear catastrophe. Alas! Many Communist Parties are on this path.

I read the record of B.N.’s conversation with Cervetti. Ponomarev is adjusting to Gorbachev’s approach to the ICM. He is even making excuses about the international Conference: why are you attacking us as if we were insisting on it, he says. Quite the opposite, others are reproaching us for resisting, sabotaging the idea [of the Conference].

And we really could not have insisted on it: look at our circumstances—we've lost three General Secretaries, we were preparing for the Victory anniversary, the Congress is just around the corner, do we have time for it?! Turns out that's how the matters stand!

Zagladin told me how B.N. reacted to my protest about the Finnish Communist Party: he told Shaposhnikov off in obscene language, saying that he does not understand anything and is ruining the whole matter.

Lagutin told me about how Clark, Kinnock's assistant, evaluates Maggie Thatcher: no one will bring her down and she is not inclined to turn the power over. Her only possible downfall is that she might not be able to endure it herself. Firstly, she has eye problems, but wants to read everything herself. Secondly, and most importantly, is the psychological stress: morning to night she plays the role of a great political figure with everyone—her friends, enemies, comrades-in-arms, ministers, foreigners, mass media [sic], and with herself. This is, of course, terribly difficult. She is devilishly smart, and in fact is a great actress, but she is not on stage, where regular actresses sometimes manage to live long. Clever!

People are literally dumbfounded with yesterday's television broadcast of Gorbachev's speech in Leningrad. All one hears is: "Did you see it?!" Finally, we have a leader who knows his subject, who is interested in his work, who through his language can express what he wants to convey to the people, who is not afraid to interact with them, who is truly not afraid to appear insufficiently grand; and he produces the impression of being a person who truly wants to move this load, which is stuck in the mud, to rouse people, to make them be themselves, to act with courage, to take risks, to rely on common sense, to think and to act. There is something of a Lenin-Kirov quality in him, bravery and competency, along with confidence in himself and in people, or, more precisely, in the fact that there are people, who can act the same way as he does.

May 23rd, 1985.

Yesterday, while I was working with Sures, there was a party meeting at the department. In the morning, with masochistic curiosity, I inquired about how it went. The red-tape artists all praised it (I am an authority figure for them after all). The department heads close to me appreciated some speeches, but were appalled by Ponomarev's report; everyone else was too. The report was dedicated to results of the year's work. Brutents described it in detail: it was crud that could have been presented under Brezhnev and Chernenko. There was nothing of the April Plenum, or of the Gorbachev style, or of the new atmosphere, or of the general expectations. It was an hour and a half of dispiriting nonsense. The old die-hard is not giving in. His position is: we shall see what comes from this new style. I think he cannot, is not able to, have a realistic look even at himself. And concerning this "time will tell" approach, I think he has too little time left for that.

I found a draft report for a theoretical conference on the ICM, which I prepared still under Andropov. It is a very critical and furious text, and it would have caused a

shock. I completely forgot about it. It's too much like an article; it will not work for reading out loud.

All of Moscow is cursing Lapin (chairman of the Radio and Television Committee) for not giving notice of Gorbachev's Leningrad broadcast. This is all people are talking about: hope and cheerfulness have sprung up.

May 28th, 1985.

All day yesterday I was studying the transcript of the Gromyko-Shultz, Howe, and Genscher talks in Geneva. If one forgets about the initial treachery of the Americans, then the arguments used by Shultz are more convincing to a normal Western person than our persistent repetition of arguments that we do not want to either subjugate, or conquer anyone, and that we do not plan to attack anyone, etc. No one believes these declarations, and the root of the Geneva deadlock is in this. Revolutionary approaches to talks are needed, identical to the one Gorbachev demonstrated in Leningrad.

I think since the times of Stalin there hasn't been such an occurrence: people racing to obtain a copy of a pamphlet with his [Gorbachev's] speech (one million copies printed). That's not one of Brezhnev's or Chernenko's compositions for you, which lay about in all the news-stalls from the moment they were issued until the death of "their authors."

Yes, this is the opening of a truly different stage in Soviet history. Probably something big will come out of it. Gorbachev does not seem to be one of those who stop a quarter of the way through, as it happened with Khrushchev, who became frightened by his own daring.

May 30th, 1985.

Yesterday morning I had a disgusting conversation with Ponomarev. Either the age is showing, or the narrow-mindedness of a dogmatist it too great, but he does not get it anymore, does not get that he will have to adapt himself to the new style, and in a way like never before: because for the first time in his almost sixty-year-long career, the question is about elimination of Stalinism from everything, not only from work matters but also from views and behavior.

I read a transcript of Gorbachev's meeting with Brandt. Our man appears much stronger. In particular, in the fact that we do not have a problem of seeing the German people as [one] nation. Gorbachev's handling of the material is strikingly skillful and crafty. Particularly [impressive was] the way he presented the issue of missile installations. I have become proud of the way our new leader represents our country and of the way he appears before such an inveterate world-class politician like Brandt.

May 31st, 1985.

Today Ponomarev was once again slighted, and once again it served him right. In the morning they brought a telegram from Dobrynin: eight hundred scientists, fifty-seven Nobel Prize winners among them, are addressing Gorbachev and Reagan with a petition to ban space weapons. B.N. assigns me to prepare a response draft to the letter. I go over to him and begin to explain that this is not a propaganda measure; that this should be dealt with by the Ministry of Defense and the MFA, because the scientists are proposing to shut down the Krasnoyarsk radar station [RLS]. When I began to insist, B.N. became angry, but I kept on: we cannot associate the lies about Krasnoyarsk (saying that this radar station has nothing to do with anti-missile defense) with the name of our new General Secretary. You, B.N. tells me, believe Arbatov, for whom everything that is here is bad, and everything that is in America is good. He'll finish badly with that! And I reply to B.N.: then why did Gromyko in Vienna, when Shultz and Howe asked him a direct question about the Krasnoyarsk RLS, avoid this subject as if the words "Krasnoyarsk RSL" were never uttered, as if there was no question. Even Gromyko does not want to connect his name with these lies, which will not stand for long. But for our little B.N., all this is nonsense. The most important thing is to fire one more propaganda shot.

I went to my office. And two hours later I was told that Gorbachev assigned Gromyko and Sokolov, not Ponomarev, to take care of this, about which I proceeded—not without an inner gloating—to report to him.

Today I read some information about the massive anti-Soviet "displays" in Prague, in connection with a hockey championship and a bicycle race under the slogan "peace-friendship." And this is against the background of Husak's recent "friendly visit" to Moscow. One Czech told me about a discussion at the CC CPC [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] on whether the victorious Czech team should be awarded decorations. Opinions differed, and this is what took place at the stadium: Moscow favorites Bilyak and Lenart (members of the CC CPC Presidium) stood up and walked out when the anti-Soviet rioting began, and Premier Stragal went to embrace the Czech players. At the CC Presidium, Husak resolved the question, saying that "in the present case" it was awkward to give awards in front of the Soviet comrades.

This is 1968 for us! We will be paying for it for a long time yet!.. If it will ever be possible to revive the atmosphere of 1945, when we were liberators rather than interventionists.

June 5th, 1985.

Dobrynin is again insisting on Senator La Garza's visit (he really took a liking to him). But the Supreme Soviet (Kuznetsov, Tolkunov, Vysotin) does not want anyone at all: "We do not need them (i.e. senators, congressmen). Moreover, they are violating reciprocity—they ask for invitations, but do not invite us."

And this is true, too: over there every congressman is at least some kind of politician, but here? Arbatov, Tolkunov, about five others and no more than that. All familiar faces that the Americans are growing tired of.

Berkov secretly sent a letter from Ottawa, where he is at a conference for human rights. He is complaining: the MFA people are afraid of the concept itself, they demand to discuss it behind closed doors, and Americans are laughing about it. Zagladin took it upon himself to “advance” the complaint through Aleksandrov and Vorotnikov, who was just in Canada as a RSFSR representative. I will follow the developments.

June 9th, 1985.

After Vorotnikov’s PB report on his trip to Canada, Gorbachev gave orders to finally start working on this matter and raise “our own banner of human rights.” Berkov’s letter also figured in the decision, in the context that our representatives, by hiding from the people at the conference, gave the matter over to the hands of the Americans, who are eagerly proceeding to exploit the theme of human rights.

Ponomarev got very angry that Zagladin and I got around him with this letter from Berkov, which went straight into the hands of the “Sparrow,” and from him to the General Secretary. But if we had gone to B.N. with this letter, he would not have dared to mention it, and would have forbidden us to do so.

Now I am composing a “realization plan” for Gorbachev’s order. But it turns out that exactly a year ago, on the initiative of the now liquidated PB Committee on Counterpropaganda (Gromyko), there was a CC decision about strengthening our assertiveness in the struggle with the West over human rights. It is the typical empty word composition of: “strengthen,” “increase,” “achieve,” “improve,” “broaden...” Naturally, it was forgotten, but if one asks now, they will be able to report that yes, we’ve strengthened, increased, etc.

A document came that was signed at the Gosplan, Minfin, Minvneshtorg, the GKES, etc., about the indebtedness of the third world to imperialism (a form of its pillage), Fidel Castro’s idée fixe, which has been taken up by Gorbachev. The matter turned out to be much more serious than material for propaganda and exposure of imperialistic pillage. The developing countries owe us twenty-six billion dollars. Also, the crisis, as everything under the present monopolistic State capitalism nowadays, is not catastrophic, and the West will work with the debtors to find a resolution. If we meddle in this fight we will receive the blows, as is always the case in such instances.

I am reading a book about Carlyle. I’ve been interested in him for a long time and more than once; I’ve read some of his works. And now I feel like I am interacting with myself—with myself, as I was when I read him before. I have a similar relationship with Nietzsche. But I cannot do the same with Tolstoy: all the time he turns into something new, something not mastered, and maybe even unnoticed in the past and not understood in youth.

It is interesting to now and then read and even look through books on the current social processes in the West, about the STR, unemployment, the changes in the social structure of society—there is very serious literature coming out. And reading these books,

whose authors are, as a rule, employees of the IMEMO [World Economy and International Relations Institute], of the IMRD [Institute of the World Labor Movement], you become distressed by the shortcomings of everything here: after all, all this output absolutely does not reach the political tops, has no influence on the forming of politics. Even Ponomarev, whose position requires him to know what is written about the mentioned subjects, has no idea about these works.

However, we shall see: at least about the matters regarding the STR—the day after tomorrow there will be a conference on this subject at the CC, with a report by Gorbachev. How will our lagging behind be accounted for, and what will be proposed in the case we catch up—how to avoid the consequences (the sharp increase in superfluous people)... Here our socialism will meet with Marx' Hic rhodus, His salta! [sic]

Yesterday I leafed through Byron's journal again. There is a scale of his personality in every line, even when it's about a trifle... but maybe it is magic and mythology that force us to perceive each word like that. Nevertheless, his prose, in clarity, precision, and brevity is on the level with Pushkin. I wonder, did Aleksandr Sergeevich read any of Byron's prose?

I took Dez'ka's (David Samoilov) volumes from the shelf. There are oceans of all kinds of feelings, personal in the first place, but in general too: he is a major poet and could have said meaningful things about our times... if he could?? He is ruining himself by drinking.

June 11th, 1985.

I am taking much trouble with the project on human rights. Ponomarev did not like the proposition to create a Soviet committee on human rights: "How is that? A committee on rights in the USSR? What, do we infringe on human rights?! No, no, I am against it."

I argued with him rather rudely. He irritates [me] more and more with his senile whims and follies. I have not achieved anything, distressed him, upset myself by my tactlessness in relation to the old man.

June 15th, 1985.

Yesterday I was at the CC Secretariat. For the first time, I saw how Ligachev conducts it. In general, he does it in the Gorbachev style, sharply and sensibly. The questions discussed were as follows:

- the laying-in of fodder. Looks like it's a big mess: because of the terrible spring and once again the lack of skills, indifference, and unwillingness to work. For example, they cut down clover and alfalfa when they are already beginning to wither so the gross output would be higher, but the quality of the fodder decreases by 30%;

- about trade. It's a completely dismal picture. Stores are turning into warehouses and at the same time there are always shortages. It is an antediluvian system. The trouble is in the absence of computer science, computers, and most importantly in that the manufacturer, and not the consumer, prevails. All this was discussed very sharply and with facts by Ryzhkov, Vorotnikov, Dolgikh and Ligachev. We must make a turnaround in trade especially because vodka and wine are being taken off the shelves, and the financial plan is under the danger of not being met;

- about the condition of housing and communal services in RSFSR. Very bad. The available housing is becoming obsolete; the poor quality of the new housing construction is now costing us billions in major repairs, in accidents in communications, in supplying networks. This has become a regular occurrence;

- about the abuse of living space. There was a note from the people's control committee. Ligachev was at a loss about how to react: for a year and a half we have been dealing severely with people, who were found to be abusing [living space policies], we expel them from the Party, dismiss them from work, but again and again, it's the same saunas, dacha-palaces at the government's expense, the same favoritism in apartment distribution, etc., etc.

There was another unpleasant conversation with Ponomarev. Velikhov and Arbatov sent a record of a conversation with one well-wishing American from Geneva. He says: you, the USSR, have to put concrete proposals on the table at Geneva. Let them be formulated in terms of renunciation of space weapons, but let them be concrete: the number of such-and-such missiles will be reduced by so much, this kind by so much, this is to be done with submarines, this should be done with this kind of airplane, something else is to be done with other kinds of airplanes, etc. etc. And this, the academicians are writing, is sensible. Because in Geneva we are having "philosophical" discussions that space weapons are bad, and the Americans argue that they are good, we are chewing over ancient joint initiatives, which have already become a topic for propaganda, rather than having a practical discussion among of experts.

I tried to join the Arbatov-Velikhov arguments, tried to explain them to Ponomarev. In response he said that I, obviously, do not follow our initiatives. My colleagues, he says, prepared a "summa summarum" (B.N.'s favorite word) of our initiatives for my trip to Spain. Have a look at it, he tells me. I told him that I read newspapers, and more than that, I read ciphered communications for the MFA, the GRU,³⁶ and the KGB, I am also familiar with PB resolutions, I've read transcripts of the Geneva sessions, and I know by heart our initiatives under Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev. But that is not what we are talking about right now. The question is about the fact that we must stop treading water, as the arms race is about to shoot out of control.

My venomous explanations made no impression on him. The essence of the question is of no interest to him at all anymore. Physically, gerontologically [sic], he

³⁶ Main Intelligence Department

cannot see into the heart of the matter, he does not have time left for this as his whole nervous system is working towards mere self-preservation in his seat. It seems that the winds of change are quite painful for him.

There are rumors about staff changes. It looks like Zamyatin is being sent to Vienna as Ambassador. His CC department (of International Information) is going to disappear altogether. Like a bolt from the blue—Stukalin is removed and will be sent to Budapest as Ambassador. These [people] are all Chernenko's staff. Sashka Yakovlev—who was returned, not without my help, from Canada, and made director of IMEMO, replacing the deceased Inozemtsev—will take his [Stukalin's] place in the CC Propaganda Department.

In hallways there is talk of what will happen at the nearest Plenum and at the Supreme Soviet session: Gromyko will become Chairman of the Supreme Soviet; Kornienko [will become] Minister of International Affairs; Vasily Vasilievich Kuznetsov will retire, his place as first deputy under Gromyko will be taken by Zimyanin; the premier Tikhonov will retire. It is said that Gorbachev will take upon himself the position of representative of the Council of Ministers. It looks like Dobrynin will be returned to Moscow, his place will be taken by Vorontsov from Paris, where he is Ambassador right now; Troyanovsky is assigned to London, to replace Popov.

There was a scene by the elevator: in the third entrance of our building there is a special elevator for CC Secretaries, it is next to the regular one. In the morning I was standing [there] waiting for the regular one. Rusakov (deputy of the Socialist Countries Department, a CC Secretary) comes to his elevator and calls me to come with him. We go. The elevator stops, we come out. Suddenly Rusakov puts his arm around my back and says: "Find me a good replacement!" Taken aback, I promise him. Who is in question? Rakhmanin? Shakhnazarov? The always-ill Kiselev? Smirnovsky, who is a nonentity from the start? Yes, I thought, the wind of change is blowing ever stronger around our International Department.

On Wednesday I met with Ziegel (a school friend) and his Klava. He was loose, cynical, philosophized peevishly. We got into an argument about why one should believe in God. I tell him: "You are a believer, I am a nonbeliever. What's the difference if we both seem to be honest men, and nine times out of ten (commandments) we both in general follow Christian morals? Even though I don't care that it is Christian." Either he was out of shape, even though we did not drink much, or he is putting on an act—messing around with this religiosity, but he did not give any worthwhile explanation. And it is impossible to convince a normal person about life after death anyway.

June 16th, 1985.

Felix (Ziegel) gave me a picture of our class (The first pilot Gorky school). I do not have this one, maybe it is mislaid somewhere, and maybe I never had one. The year is 1938. In the center [of the picture] is Petrakl (Petr Yakovlevich Dorf, our mathematics

instructor, our favorite teacher, who was our friend and taught to just be citizens, without the demagogic and the Stalin cult).

I am looking at the photograph and interesting “statistics” come to mind. We are twenty-six people, eight were added to [our class] already in tenth grade, i.e. in 1938, when we were moved to the new building, a standard one, in contrast to the former one, which was built by the renowned architect Zelenko in the Modern style in the beginning of the twentieth century. In her time, my mother went to school there [in that building].

So, until the tenth grade we were eighteen people (the norm in standard schools being thirty-forty). Among the twenty-six, there were thirteen Russians, including one girl with some Polish blood—Natasha Stankevich, the beauty and goddess of our class. The rest were Jewish, some half-Jewish. Such were the times. No one would have thought of making such calculations then. For me, and for everyone, there were no distinctions of who is of what nationality. From the twenty, I think, seven have died already. From the twelve boys no one was killed at the front. And only four of us were at the front: I, Dez'ka Kaufman (now the great poet David Samoilov), Levka Bezymensky, and Natasha Stankevich.

There is an exhibition of amateur painters’ works dedicated to the 40th Victory anniversary on the Krymskaya embankment. This was a foolish venture: it ruins people’s taste, lowers standards for professional art. Although some things can be touching... the badly written, but passionate squabbles on the pages of the visitors’ book.

The GDR artist Haisan was also there... the continuation of German expressionism of the nineteen-twenties, surrealism. The drawings show a lot of talent and are impressive. In the paintings, there is an excess of one technique. If there were three or four paintings of the kind they would be memorable, but when there is almost a hundred, spare me the trouble: a production line is evident here, which means a trade. The themes: the war, fascism, consequences.

June 20th, 1985.

Brutents told me a most interesting thing. Yesterday, while waiting together with Kornienko for an hour and a half in the reception room on the occasion of Gorbachev’s meeting with Assad, Kornienko suddenly opened up and told him the following (in response to the question whether anything is going to be done about Afghanistan).

The initiator of the intervention was... Gromyko, who was enthusiastically supported by Ustinov. Four people talked over the “project” of presenting Brezhnev with this, the people mentioned above plus Andropov and Ponomarev. Yu.V. [Andropov] was “evasive [sic],” he did not object, but talked about possible complications. Ponomarev also mentioned several doubts, but then adjusted quickly. A decisive objection came from the military people, who were assigned to prepare “their considerations [on the matter].” Ogarkov, Akhromeev, and Varennikov submitted a written report, in which they argued that it is impossible and inconceivable, first and foremost from the political standpoint.

But Ustinov summoned them, made them stand at attention, and reprimanded them on the subject: since when do military men undertake the job of deciding politics; ordered them “not to discuss [orders]” and to present a detailed plan of the operation.

Now, Kornienko (who told Brutents that he himself was always against [involvement in Afghanistan]) concluded, we received an assignment from the General Secretary to prepare a proposal “on resolving the Afghan question.”

This is confirmed from another source as well: I was at Arbatov’s on Tuesday, we talked about everything, and he told me again that almost every week he either meets with Gorbachev or speaks with him on the phone. Recently, he says, I (Arbatov) sent him another memo, in which I went over the major issues—from the meeting with Reagan (Yurka believes that we will not have anything to gain by it) to Afghanistan. When he received it, [Gorbachev] called and especially noted Afghanistan, and said that he “agrees.” What exactly Arbatov proposed is clear without explanation.

Besides, the day before, the Pakistani Ambassador visited Arbatov and “begged” him to take some action.

So, some progress will probably be made in this matter. This morning Yurka called and told me that on Wednesday at 8:30a.m. the phone rang: he was told to be at Gorbachev’s at 9:30a.m. He caught a taxi and appeared [on time before Gorbachev]. The talk was “good,” according to not only Arbatov, but also to Lukyanov... from Gorbachev’s words. Over the phone Yurka could only tell me that again the primary topic of the conversation was Afghanistan and that Gorbachev confirmed that this is a “paramount issue” for him.

Today at the Politburo a memo about the STR (from the results of a CC meeting) was discussed for two hours. Everyone spoke. In conclusion, Gorbachev said that the most important is in the fact that the intention, the idea, the purpose [of the STR] is not understood even by many Ministers. Their suggestions are attempts to go down the beaten path, using new slogans as a cover without radically changing anything either in the form of government or in the manner of operation.

But Zamyatin, who reported all this to me, supposedly felt a justificatory tone in the General Secretary [his speech], saying that: we must inform the people, that from our (i.e. his!) side this is not extremism, not leftism, not something artificial, not something subjectively imposed. The issue of a qualitative reformation on the basis of the STR arose a long time ago, it was raised already at the XXIV Congress (he even quoted Brezhnev), but for two entire five-year periods we’ve been treading water, despite the fact that life demanded decisive, revolutionary changes.

One cannot show weakness, even if there is grumbling. The more so, as “the people” are enthusiastic: today I read a selection of letters to the CC from all the ends of the USSR, with evaluations and “advice” on the General Secretary’s first actions. [This selection] was sent around the PB. It moves one a great deal. Tongues have been

loosened, people are writing frankly, strongly, without looking back, about the fact that only now can one speak of a real revival of the Lenin style in relations between the “leader and the people, the party.” And there is not a shadow of the affected cultist emotionality, nor groveling, nor glorification. People are unbosoming everything they stored up from the Brezhnev and Chernenko eras.

This must inspire M.S. However, there is also a danger of finding oneself isolated, as Lenin was in his last years. That is why one must boldly, even more boldly than now, cleanse and replace the staff. The majority of the old personnel will resist [the new changes], even if not out of selfish reasons, but because they cannot work otherwise. Ponomarev is the most glaring example of that.

I also found out from Kornienko that the MFA was assigned to prepare a note of agreement for the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting in Geneva. I am not sure that any strategic sense will come from it, but there will be the moral-political use: Gorbachev will “outdo,” and “intimidate” that cowboy-actor. And one way or the other it will become known to the whole world.

June 22nd, 1985.

By the way, among the letters to Gorbachev that I mentioned above, there are also some of this kind: as soon as you decorate yourself with an Order, they say, as soon as you make yourself laureate of some kind of award, your will in a moment lose all the authority, all the respect that the people feel for you right now!

Gremetz (Secretary of the French CC) summoned the Paris-based Ambassadors of socialist countries and forbade them to have any kind of relations with the PCF! I had to cancel a long-planned colloquium with French socialists, “on disarmament” at the scholarly level, since our consent was considered at the PCF PB and on behalf of Marchais, Gremetz made a protest to our embassy, threatening that otherwise he will cancel the meeting with Gorbachev (which is planned for August). They’re crazy with impudence! Thorez is probably turning in his grave!

June 26th, 1985.

Yesterday at the theoretical conference at the department I reported on the ICM in the zone of developed capitalism. I spoke for about an hour. I was frank and presented myself for what I am, although of course many questions (for which we do not have answers... real answers, I mean) were left untouched. To me it seemed that [the report] aroused interest and even moved people.

Today came a shower of responses. Larisa announced: “Anatoly Sergeevich, all the colleagues were amazed by your report, they say that this moment marks the beginning of a new approach to the Communist Movement in the CPSU.” Lisovolik said that the truth, in the end, is triumphant. Rykin was reserved (he seems to be glancing back at the partkom [party committee] representative, who limited himself to saying that I

made an unusual report), but, shaking my hand, said that the report was interesting. Brutents said that frankness and realism, which we have not heard from this tribune, won people over. There are many serious questions, he says, but we do not know what to do with them.

Speaking at the discussions today, Ivanitsky announced that the conference “continued” yesterday in the hallways, and this morning at breakfast, and in the work rooms, and in the cafeteria at lunch. Some, he says, are saying that Chernyaev dramatized the situation, “exaggerated it.” I do not think so. In our close circle it makes sense to speak only like this.

There were six speeches. All of them, excluding the presumptuous jerk Kudinov’s, were at a very high level, in my opinion sometimes surpassing the level of the report. There was a hidden polemic as well: the person reporting was biased toward objective reasons. But the majority spoke in the spirit of my tone, agreed with my formulation of the main questions. Our people are quite competent and in the majority of cases they have long ago overcome the dogmatic orthodoxy. In a word, I am pleased at the way everything went. But the ripples will go through the partkom and through the other departments, and through Ponomarev, who, of course, would not have liked my report, especially since it appears to be in almost defiant contrast to his report on the outcomes of the April Plenum at the party session at the end of May.

Aleksandrov taunted me a little (over the phone) for the material for Gorbachev’s talks with Trudeau (the former Prime Minister of Canada). Perhaps I deserved it, even though he obviously did it for personal enjoyment. Zagladin warned me that Gorbachev needs a collection of thoughts that he should say to the person, not written instructions to be read out [at the meeting]. I knew that the text, prepared in the American sector and finished up by me, was not the right thing. But what thoughts should we convey to Trudeau, who is God knows what nowadays—not the leader of a party, not the Prime Minister, just... a distinguished tourist, who had the good fortune of knowing Gorbachev in the old days. So we substituted thoughts with “pretty” phrases. It will be a lesson for the future!

June 29th, 1985.

I thought about all of last week: our theoretical conference took place, which excited everyone because we spoke frankly about that which is the main subject of our work, that for which we receive our salary at the CC, and that in which we are professionals. At work, however, we work with this main subject, i.e. the ICM, only about ten percent of the time, if not less. The rest is taken up with servicing Ponomarev’s pretensions at being “the theorist of our party.”

There was an article by Glazunov³⁷ (artist) in “Pravda.” He denounced the nineteen-twenties, including Pertrov-Vodkin, in almost the same way as it was done under Stalin. [This is] vulgar and foolish.

In issue No.6 of *Nash Sovremennik*, there is an insolent article on the state of drama by the *pochvennik* Lubomudrov. It’s written in the 1949-52 framework: all Jewish authors are bad, all Russian ones are good. He mixed Meyerhold with shit. He warned of the infringement on Russian classical literature by all kinds of stage interpreters of it ([interpreters] with Jewish last names, or “known to be Jewish”). So with all the almost uncontrollable “pluralism” in our newspapers, when such insolent things come up, everyone understands where it is coming from and who is encouraging it.

Some people think that someone is interested in estranging Gorbachev from the intelligentsia, while he is busy with economics and such. It is possible! It’s interesting how Yakovlev will act in this situation, if he will really be made head of the Propaganda Department.

Gorbachev makes appearances almost every day. It is true, they are **his** appearances, not ones written for him. But “the people” are beginning to grumble: they are too tired from the profuse speaking of the “preceding orators...” (that is how Bovin called the previous General Secretaries).

It is curious: I am “passionately” awaiting changes, in my heart I urge Gorbachev on—[do it] bolder, sooner. But for me personally the changes do not hold promise of anything good! The trampling and removal of Ponomarev will most likely mean my retirement. Nevertheless, I sincerely want these changes to take place, and I feel contempt for people who grumble about Gorbachev’s bravery, moreover when they do so in confidence and seek an ally in me.

July 1st, 1985.

I was at the Plenum, which lasted for half an hour. Gorbachev, without taking the podium, began to speak in a free manner, saying: tomorrow there will be a session of the Supreme Soviet, we will have to discuss questions about the session, including questions of organization. The first is about the head of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. You know that since 1977 this post was combined with the post of the CC General Secretary. Perhaps it was justified then. The times have changed now; separate organs have different tasks and responsibilities. The General Secretary must concentrate on the role and work of the party.

And, without any kind of transition, he suggested Gromyko as candidate to the head of Supreme Soviet post. [Gorbachev] characterized him with much reserve, did not repay Gromyko’s March Plenum speech, showing once again that the “personal” aspect does not matter to him. He only said that Andrey Andreyevich has been in the party for a

³⁷ Ilya Glazunov

long time, has always consistently followed the party line, is devoted to the principle of collective leadership... And that was all! He spoke neither of his mind, nor his knowledge and abilities.

He moved on to the Supreme Soviet tasks, and tasks of soviets in general; spoke about the need to raise the role of permanent Supreme Soviet committees, right there and then endowing them with the right to not only discuss the Ministries' work, but also to evaluate the Ministers' work, even to censure whether they are fit to occupy their posts.

He spoke of the Public Prosecutor's Office, whose "work leaves much to be desired;" [spoke] about the fact that the Public Prosecutor's Office must keep the law **for everybody**, and must stop the Ministries' and departments' practice of not only interpreting the laws to comply with their needs, but even correcting [the laws to fit their needs].

He named the candidates to the posts of committee chairmen and the deputy chairman to the chairman himself, by the way—without saying a word about his (Gromyko's) role in foreign policy. Everybody took notice of this.

Then [he spoke] about the [post of] Minister of Foreign Affairs. We, Gorbachev says, discussed this question thoroughly at the PB and propose comrade Shevardnadze for this post.

For us, the staff members, this was like a bolt from the blue.

As Ponomarev told me in terrible secrecy, this is what happened at the PB. Unexpectedly for all, Gorbachev named Shevardnadze, making the following comments: we do have major diplomats, who are worthy of being ministers, for example, Kornienko, Chervonenko, Dobrynin. At this point Gromyko interrupted and named Vorontsov, but the General Secretary gave him a sidelong glance and did not respond. The allotted work, he went on, must be directly in the hands of the party and that is why we must nominate a comrade from the party's leadership for this post. Ponomarev also added about Vorontsov: M.S., he says, "did not notice" this name because to give the MFA to Vorontsov, who is practically a relative of Gromyko's, would be to let everything remain as it is.

At the PB session [Gorbachev] gave a testimonial to Shevardnadze: he was able to manage a most difficult situation in Georgia, he is characterized by a sense of the new, by the courage and originality of his approaches.

The Plenum, of course, promoted Shevardnadze from candidate member to full membership of the PB.

I consider all this very indicative of the end of Gromyko's monopoly and the power of the MFA's staff over foreign policy.

Furthermore, Romanov was removed from the PB and dismissed from his CC Secretary post “in accordance with his request, due to declining health.” Gorbachev did not give any explanations as to whether there was any reason [for his removal] or whether it was just decided to get rid of the good-for-nothing swine.

Zaikov, the Leningrad obkom secretary, was elected CC Secretary. He will replace Romanov in dealing with the defense industry. Yeltsin, recently the secretary of the Sverdlosvk obkom, was appointed CC Secretary with a post in the CC apparatus—as deputy of the Construction and Capital Investment Department.

July 2nd, 1985.

It was nice to find out that my report at the theoretical conference was dubbed “the Leningrad speech” after Gorbachev’s speech on May 17th in the department.

July 5th, 1985.

I am exhausted with working on texts for Ponomarev and with the memo assigned by Gorbachev—“on human rights...” We have been composing and coordinating it with the departments for a month and a half.

- [The texts include] letters to Communist Parties about the underdeveloped countries’ debts. Yesterday B.N. raised the draft at the deputies meeting. There is discordance stemming from a lack of understanding. Even Zagladin mechanically proposed to send them to revolutionary democrats. But Brutents and I said stop [sic]: that would be like firing at ourselves, they owe us twenty-six billion. We want to write off debts only in respect to America & Co.

- [The texts include] instructions and other papers for a meeting with English parliamentarians (Kerkshaw). But this is all routine work.

There was, however, a “musical moment” as well, about which Ponomarev told with much pleasure at the same deputies meeting. Firstly [he enjoyed telling about it] because he does not like Rakhmanin. Secondly, for Zagladin’s edification, who publishes articles without Ponomarev’s knowledge pretty often.

And this is what happened: on July [sic] 21st *Pravda* published an article by “Vladimirov” on the socialist commonwealth; an edifying article and with obvious critical implications in relation to Hungary, GDR, not to mention Romania. It mentioned the “nationalistic movements,” and even “phobia of Russians,” and the “models” and “reforms,” and even “discipline,” not to mention the proletarian internationalism in its classic form!

The article was immediately noticed by the American, English, FRG, French, and Italian press. What, they say, could this mean? Are these Gorbachev’s true thoughts, or

opposition to Gorbachev? He allows himself reforms, but for his vassals—no way, [they must] toe the line. The feeling of bewilderment was felt also from Berlin and Budapest...

And so on Saturday (July [sic] 29th) Gorbachev said at the PB: what is this turning out to be! We say that the consolidation of the socialist commonwealth is our first priority, we display maximum resourcefulness and tact in order to consolidate this orientation, to eliminate misunderstandings, to strengthen the trust, etc.; and all of a sudden all this goes to nothing. I already had to come up with excuses—made up a pretext to call Kadar and Honecker, and among other things let them know that “this article does not reflect the opinion of the leadership.” That is how I have to extricate myself.

- Did you—M.S. asks Rusakov—know about this article, about the fact that it was being prepared in your department? Do you know that its author, “Vladimirov,” is your first deputy, CC member Rakhmanin??!

- No, replies Rusakov.

- And did you—M.S. addresses Zimyanin—know that the central CC organ—*Pravda*—was given such an article?

-No, replies another CC Secretary responsible for the press.

- And you—he says to Afanasiev—did you not understand what you were doing? Why didn’t you send this article around the PB, or at least around the secretaries?

The chief editor of *Pravda* mumbles something, referring to Rakhmanin’s go-ahead power and to the fact that he is first deputy of the Socialist Countries Department and that he should understand what he is doing.

- So, Gorbachev counters... Firstly, it is an absolute disgrace that the department deputy (Rusakov) does not know what is going on in his department. Secondly, why do we need such workers in the CC apparatus, who act as they wish on the most important political questions, and we have to clean the mess for them afterwards. Such behavior deserves immediate dismissal from the CC... However, since this is the first time (here M.S. wasn’t telling the truth... he cannot not know that Rakhmanin leads “his own” policy in, for example, issues with China—countering the CC and harming the state interests!) ... we will limit the measures to a strict warning.

I think if it was anyone else but Rakhmanin, he would have been dismissed immediately. Something, somebody is backing him...

Still, one thing is clear: now there is no chance for Oleg Borisovich of becoming not only a CC Secretary, which, judging by his actions, he clearly aimed to do, but even a department deputy instead of his ailing chief Rusakov.

Also the latter's appeal to me is clear now, when in the elevator he so intimately asked me to "find him a good replacement."

There is justice after all—the presumptuous have gone too far. The ideology stemming from our Great revolution, from Lenin, is still alive, despite the fact that it has been persecuted in every possible way, it has been drowned, twisted, and turned into its very opposite... It is alive in the pores of the party, of society... And it is bursting through at the breaks in its [the society's] development, the break we are living though right now.

At today's PB session Sashka Yakovlev was made deputy of the Propaganda Department. He revenged all his enemies... Demichev³⁸ especially lost out in this. He [Yakovlev] called me. Spoke of "collaboration," even asked for help during the first stages—he is being cunning, flattering, and generous because he is glad; however, I also did something to help justice triumph in his case.

But the work he is going to have to face is—oh, so difficult.

July 6th, 1985.

I played tennis for two hours in the morning. On the way home I stopped by a grocery store to get some vegetables. Everyone there, from the manager to the saleswomen, is drunk. The anti-alcoholism law is nothing for them. Try to fire them. Who are you going to find to replace them?

Another time I went to the grocery store on Gertzen Street. I stood in line for half an hour. The produce, even though locally grown, looks terrible. The women are having a row with the manager, but she is not to be trifled with, and besides, she is drunk.

July 11th, 1985.

Almost every day brings an overabundance of information that is very interesting for a political journal. But a whole "all-nighter" would be necessary to write everything down. For example, today Rykin (head of the German sector) got back from West Berlin and the GDR. He tells: Herbert Miss definitively turned up his nose at Honecker, he shouts: "Am I a party or GDR's puppet?"

Marchais is coming. Gorbachev will have to receive him, even though he is a useless animal. By supporting him, we are harming the party—he became a symbol of its breakdown in the eyes of the left, the right, and everyone, in his own party as well as in the ICM in general. Moreover, he is going to demand that Gorbachev reject Mitterand's invitation to visit. Gremetz is coming tomorrow, I will have to come to co-ordinate the communiqué with him. I can imagine it!..

There are new transcripts about the conclusion of the second round in Geneva. The Americans are easily duping the public. We, on the other hand, are repeating the

³⁸ Petr Demichev

same thing over and over again, which looks like a deadlock to everyone interested in the heart of the matter.

I speak more and more irritably and fretfully with Ponomarev. He even said: "It is difficult with you..." He proposes foolishness, counts on making an impression on the English parliamentarians. But they don't give a damn about him and his lectures; they now want Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. He makes me compose meaningless papers: memoranda for the English, concluding remarks for himself, etc. They will wipe themselves [with these papers], if they ever care to touch them. That's why I'm rebelling. He wants to appoint a "political commissioner" to the delegation. To the English, who keep even their embassy workers at a distance! All this is imitation of participation in big politics.

Peccioli (PCI Secretary) told Lun'kov (ambassador) a whole lot about raging anti-Sovietism in France and about the right's plans of making million-strong protesting sessions for Gorbachev when he comes to Paris. I suspect blackmail. Did the Italians and Marchais & Co. make an agreement to thwart Gorbachev's visit? The same Peccioli, who had expressed enthusiasm about Gorbachev's work, now reproaches the International Department and its leadership for calling Italian Communists opportunists through Lun'kov's mouth, even though they themselves "count it as their duty to make a point to their Soviet comrades about the lag, the retrogression, etc. of the Soviet society, and the negative consequences of this for the entire Communist Movement." Lun'kov, of course, is putting pressure on the International Department; maybe he is even making it up. There is something in that.

Ambassadors are already writing through "higher channels" about the washing-out of the working class under the STR. The Fedoseev-Trapeznikov campaign against me ten years ago comes to mind.

June 13th, 1985.

Gremetz has arrived. He met with Ponomarev. I showed him the draft of the communiqué (a review of the forthcoming Gorbachev-Marchais meeting). There is a list of questions on which the PCF disagrees with the CPSU. To my surprise B.N. did not object, and said: "Set it all down officially for us, we will think, and, maybe, will take it into account at the highest level."

However, I then had to "concretely" go through the text with Maxime. It's funny but annoying: instead of arguing for the major claims which he presented to Ponomarev and about which I, unlike him, did not keep quiet, he impudently stated the exact opposite of what he and Marchais had announced about a year or two ago when they warned us not to come into conflict with "revolutionary international solidarity" with our state interests. I mockingly presented all this to him, comparing what they said before with what they are saying now. We grappled over the Bonn meeting of "the Seven" in May 1985. He even said: either the CPSU will agree with their evaluation, or Marchais will not visit. We're so scared! I say to him: Maxime, do you understand what you're saying?

We agreed to this meeting with your General Secretary before Gorbachev's official visit to Paris solely for reasons of "international solidarity," even though right now we do not really need this [meeting]. He changed his tune, and we sat until seven in the evening and in general were pleased with each other, perhaps because I never tired of praising him.

There are writers' testimonials for The Children of Arbat. I would have written one myself. We must, must press for the publication of this book "in the name of moral health." I think I might slip the book to Yakovlev, in his new quality as deputy of the CC Propaganda Department. We will see what kind of an anti-Stalinist he will be, when he has to take the responsibility for it! I have a feeling that Gorbachev will allow the publication. It would be something like "the moral XX Congress"—to completely finish with Stalin.

Adzhubei called my consultant Kovalsky (they were acquainted before). He said that he wrote a letter to Gorbachev, saying that he is not being published, he has been in a spiritual exile for the past twenty years, etc. Four days later he received an answer from Gorbachev: it will not be like this anymore, write, get published, and work. Does this signify a new look at Khrushchev, a kind of rehabilitation of [Adzhubei]?

I am reading some information on the RSFSR. 200,000,000 square meters of housing are in need of urgent repairs or must be torn down. Barracks have not been liquidated yet. The water supply and sewage systems are overloaded; over 300 cities do not have them at all. Almost half the streets and passageways in Russian cities have no hard road surfacing.

July 15th, 1985.

The Communist commissioned an article from Gremetz, but when it was discussed at the editorial board it was rejected. The fact is that Gorbachev's visit to Paris is coming up, and Gremetz's article calls president Mitterand "a reactionary."

The final meeting with the English parliamentarians is tomorrow. My God, how much trouble there is with them! For them, this is the usual political talk, but I have to prepare memos for B.N. considering all the possible versions of discussion. And each [of the memos] must have a quote from Gorbachev. For him [Ponomarev], the Brezhnev-Chernenko style is continuing strong.

The play *Tevye the Milkman* by Sholom Aleichem is being shown on television. The fact that this is being shown worldwide, and the fact that Ulyanov is in the role of Tevye is a social event, progress; it is possible that we are really beginning to understand the Jewish problem. It is in the heart of Russia, you cannot put an end to it without breaking free of everything in the past. As a protagonist of one novel said about this: "We are not some kind of Germans!"

July 17th, 1985.

I read an astute article on the significance of history by Yuri Afanasiev (a historian, member of *The Communist* editorial board). A short time ago it would have been impossible to imagine such an intellectual discussion about history in a CC organ.

I did not go to a lunch at the FRG embassy on the occasion of Horst Ehmke's (deputy chairman of the Social Democrats faction in the Bundestag) arrival. I was promised a private conversation with him outdoors. I should have gone, since tomorrow I will have to talk with this Ehmke at an official meeting. So far I don't know what I'll talk about.

There are hundreds of ciphered memos, including memos about the end of the second round in Geneva: the chitchat is continuing, the same thing for fifteen to eighteen pages.

Reagan had a cancer removed from the rectum; the doctors announced that they weren't sure that there wasn't something left. Not only the Americans', but even my interest for the highest level talks has weakened somehow.

I gave Yakovlev *The Children of Arbat*. I wonder, what will it come to?

A working group has concentrated on the Party Program at the dacha at Volynskoe. The preparation of a "picture of the world" (the introductory section) is assigned to Afanasiev (chief editor of *Pravda*), Kosolapov, and Fedoseev. It's enough to make one's sides split! It's easy to guess what kind of picture they will present. It's a pity and a bore, since "for Gorbachev" they could have depicted a truly serious picture... framed in the philosophy of the new domestic and foreign policy.

August 9th, 1985.

B.N. called me back from my vacation (I was at Yurmala) to finish the CC summary report material for the XXYII Congress. At the Gorky dacha, I found four of my consultants and four fellows from the MFA, headed by Kovalev. They were supposed to finish preparing the basis for the foreign policy section [summary]. What my boys did, and what the MFA guys did is primitive and traditional. It was easy to cover for my guys, but with Kovalev's it is more difficult, especially since they were placed in an autonomous position in their section and formally I cannot impinge on their text. Unknown to Kovalev, I asked three of my consultants—Yermovsky, Sobakin, and Sokolov—to prepare our version. What the CC Socialist Countries Department prepared is something like that "Vladimirov" article that was subjected to annihilating criticism at the PB. [They presented] the socialist commonwealth as a besieged fortress, and the zeal of the section is to pipe all hands on deck before various imperialistic threats. There is emphasis on the consolidation and uniformity of thought and action. There is not a word on sovereignty and independence. There is equality only in the part on China, which is about five lines out of the fourteen pages. The whole text has a tone of lecturing and formulating tasks for the fraternal countries. Almost every phrase contains the words "must," "necessary," "ought to," "should," "requires," etc. Rakhmanin even ordered the

word “creative” (in the context of using Marxism-Leninism in the national conditions) to be thrown out.

Zagladin and I do not have the authority to correct it, but we agreed to send Ponomarev a word of our bewilderment regarding this section. Together with Vadim, we also decided to set forth our complaints about Kovalev’s section: the absence of new material, timidity about boldly stating the issues with Afghanistan, with Japan, with Israel, and even concerning England, not to mention the missile arms control. And there is no West-European direction as such. In a word, the text is written Brezhnev-style, not Gorbachev-style.

Zagladin told me about a hallway conversation at the CC apparatus: Rakhmanin is weaving intrigues against the International Department. He is saying that this is the nest of revisionism, [that] they are untying the hands of the social democrats, they have opened the doors to socialist countries for it [social democrats], they are undermining the Marxist-Leninist unity of the ICM, and they’ve created an ideological mess in their department. Etc.

August 13th, 1985.

B.N., who is on vacation in the Crimea, fell into panic upon receiving our texts. He addressed a polite memo to the three of us—Zagladin, me, and Kovalev, but over the phone he broke out cursing. I tried to interrupt him, in the sense that I said that it was his fault for thrusting the MFA people over us and for giving them the authority over the foreign policy section. Again, I said, you do not believe in your employees and expect genius from others. It could not have been otherwise. This is the result of MFA people’s slow, tedious, bureaucratic work; with an enormous loss of time, because Kovalev, in his soft, shy manner, with breathless politeness holds on to every phrase. So we had to either be rude, or compromise. You—I said to B.N.—are aware of his devotion to lacy words, in which only a terribly experienced person can detect some newness. To make a long story short, I said, working with Kovalyev threatens failure to fulfill the assignment. I promised to prepare my own version in two days and to send it to Crimea for him.

August 19th, 1985.

It became known that B.N., using the fact that Gorbachev is also on a holiday in the Crimea, tried to slip him our text. But M.S. said: “Don’t do that, let’s do it in the general order” (i.e. through the General Department).

All right... the deed is done. In our executor’s opinion—it’s not bad. The text will probably not come back to us, but will be given to a group that will be set up and most likely headed by Yakovlev. By the way, about Yakovlev: he is slowly rising above the others. Brutents was present at his first clash with Zimyanin. The latter started to tell him (something like a certain Lubomudrov’s article in *Nash Sovremennik* it seems) that the Jews (the critics) are attacking Russian literature and that this should be “fixed.” But Sashka objected: “Not only the Jews are attacking, and not the Russian authors, but the

pochvennik tendency, the modern reactionary Slavophilism.” The exchange of opinions ended with that. And then Zimyanin began calling Yakovlev on other occasions, which Sashka described like this: he’s fawning!

Brutents told another story as well, about what kinds of dachas some people have. His daughter and son in law met Primakov’s daughter and visited their dacha, in the Barvikha area. They came back shocked, they could not have imagined anything like it, and would not have believed it if they hadn’t seen it with their own eyes. A bungalow, villa, manor... they could not find the right word for it. Twelve rooms, everything in imitation oak, imported home appliances, not to mention the furniture, a Peugeot in the garage, a Zhiguli for the children... No salary, not even an academician’s and an institute director’s, would be enough for these unheard of riches. Should a representative of the party control commission, or even a raikom representative show up there, our Academician—Brutents concluded gloatingly—would right away become a candidate for expulsion from the party.

Meanwhile, he is a candidate for a transfer from the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies post to the post of Director of IMEMO—a position with much better prospects.

August 27th, 1985.

The results of the youth festival in Moscow were being discussed at the Politburo. Everyone spoke on the subject, including Chebrikov, who told that there had been a terrorist attempt: five Afghan nationals turned up among the delegates (from Paris). They wanted to arrange explosions in the metro and in the TSUM [central department store]. But, naturally, they were neutralized by “vigilant *chekists* [KGB officials].”

Gorbachev, although somewhat surprised by the nature of the discussion, derived some lessons from it:

- The importance of contacts between foreigners and the Soviet people for an accurate perception of us. We should not be afraid—let them come here as much as possible. Let them look, let them see what we are like in reality. We are not so bad.
- The contacts between the Americans, who after the festival took a trip down the Volga, and regular Soviet people have produced a better repealing of “the Soviet threat” than all our foreign propaganda. Propaganda that for so many years cannot convince the West that there is no Soviet threat is worthless.
- We have adopted a resolution on creating a satellite TV [sic] system “Moscow Global” for foreign countries. But what are we going to broadcast??
- We must learn to discuss, debate, to defend our ideas and convictions. We have forgotten how to do it. We must prepare specialists for it. MGIMO prepares a caste, not

specialists: people are eager to get in there in order to buy themselves stuff abroad, not in order to fight for our ideas.

- On making films about the festival: it is not enough to show the opening and closing [ceremonies]. This is nice, but it's a show. We have to show the discussions, and we must not be afraid to show it like it was: the arguments about Afghanistan, about Jews, about everything. We must get the people used to debating.

- Ideological work. It is a very difficult pursuit! This work should make people sweat, but our ideologists are in general idling.

- About youth. We've developed a user's attitude towards them: need someone to work in potato fields—send a youth group, need someone to sort vegetables at the warehouse—send another youth group, need someone to build a shed for free—again a group, etc. But we should entrust the youth with real participation in the political process. Then the infantilism will disappear, and culture will emerge—not bookish culture. A society that cannot prepare a replacement for itself is an immature society.

- About the leisure time for young people. Lectures are good; however, the substantial ideological work with youth usually ends with lectures. And the lectures mostly consist of dressing-down and exhortations. We have to put our thinking caps on and come up with interesting activities and interesting pastimes, which our youth would agree to and which they would organize themselves, thus educating themselves.

- The specialists will be the deciding factor. We must start to work seriously on preparing ideological specialists; and should place people who will be able to lead this most difficult work in appropriate positions.

This was all implied criticism of Zamyatin and Zimyanin. But also of Grishin, who, it seems, doesn't have much time left...

Gorbachev raised the question of supplying Moscow with fruit and vegetables, although it was not on the agenda. He called up Kozlov—the fruit and vegetable Minister—from his seat. He, as usual, began to shower us with numbers. Gorbachev called up Dementieva (second secretary of the Moscow City Committee—Grishin is on vacation); she talked profusely, contending that they are doing enormous work, etc.

Gorbachev let them take their seats. Then he put his hand on a pile of letters and said: everything that you've been saying is nonsense. Here, at the PB, you must say only the truth. And you, even if you are not consciously lying, simply do not know where the truth is, where to look for it. Here are letters from all ends of the capital. Even if this is about “isolated shortcomings in isolated places,” then you are still not doing your job well. We are discussing this question for the third time: once under Andropov, once under Chernenko, and now. So, let this be the third warning. If the situation does not improve, then other people will be dealing with this question.

People say that the stores already have everything, right up to eggplants.

I read in the Secretariat protocol about a “delay” of a military train going from Bataisk to Mari (Turkmenistan, on the border with Afghanistan). The men were drafted from the North Caucasus republics. [The conflict] began with arguments, then turned into the beating of Russian men while the officers, one and all, were habitually drunk (meanwhile, the train kept going and going for thousands of kilometers). It concluded with anti-Soviet screams and rows on religious grounds, among others. At Mari the train was surrounded by troops... with the appropriate consequences. What idiot came up with the idea of sending North Caucasus Muslims to the Afghani border! But not only this: in 1936-7 boys had to be taken off trains, they were bursting to fight in Spain. And now we virtually have a revolt by Soviet young men, who are being sent to carry out “international duty.” No, Mikhail Sergeevich! Something needs to be done with Afghanistan. This is a moral problem... Your explanations to Kunaev—I don’t know whether you told him everything or had something else on your mind—are not adequate to the seriousness of the situation.

Arbatov told me that the KGB has taken up the question of *The Children of Arbat*. His friend V. A. Kryuchkov asked him: they say your signature is under the collective appeal in favor of printing the novel? Arbatov, confused, answered: no. At this moment, Kryuchkov gave “a sigh of relief,” saying: “Thank God!” So, it seems, this is how the whole affair will be presented to Gorbachev. Zimyanin, at least, will really try for it. What about Yakovlev, to whom I sent the manuscript a month ago??..

August 29th, 1985.

Yesterday I finished and distributed to the deputies a thirty-nine page long memo on the Communist, Revolutionary-Democratic and Social-Democratic movements. This is the International Department’s report for the XXVII Congress.

I finished a memo to the CC on the 100th anniversary of May 1st celebrations.

[There is] information for Gorbachev about Rotschtein’s letter to him, about the situation in the Communist Party of Great Britain and about our line.

[There are] remarks on the October anniversary editorial for *The Communist*. I argued about the scholasticism a la [sic] Trapeznikov in portraying the experience of the CPSU and of the principles to which it supposedly always adhered ideally, which means also under Stalin, and under Brezhnev...

[There was] a talk with colleagues from *The Communist* about what should be done with the Gremetz article, which they commissioned but now do not want to keep some of its elements: the rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat (which the chief editor Kosolapov is in love with), the mentioning of Stalin, and the criticism of Mitterand.

Through reading different CC reports and telegrams I gathered a great deal of information, which must again and again be considered in what we are doing at the Gorky dacha.

I spoke with Ponomarev over the hot line about the fact that we should emphasize, but in a smart way, the West-European direction of our policy. He agreed, but today sent me such nonsense! It's about the revolutionary movement, and he wrote it himself. And this is for the social-democratic leaders, before whom he is going to speak in Vienna! He still wants to speak with them in the language of the "labor movement" to which we both belong; he's railing against imperialism, etc. But they do not want to relate to us on the platform of the labor movement, they do not consider themselves representatives of it, and they definitely do not want the CPSU to qualify them as such. In essence, they are representatives of the "realistically minded circles," and they speak with us as with a superpower, not as labor movement representatives. But all of this is above Ponomarev's level of comprehension, he is up in Dimitrov-Comintern clouds. And he is confusing all our work. He should just be a talking machine from the CPSU leadership, and not have a claim to "his own," which reeks with oppressive stagnancy and is only detrimental in the current situation.

I insisted that Bronfman (leader of the World Jewish Congress) be allowed into the USSR. This multimillionaire seems to want to "shift" the situation of enmity between the Jews and us... and to start with, [he wants to] prevent the anti-Gorbachev demonstrations during his visit in Paris.

I read PB materials, including [information] about civil aviation. It turns out we have over a hundred crashes per year, including very serious ones. This year already, accidents with just three planes have brought 459 deaths: [they were] due to technical problems, the backward work of the control tower; the [lack of] discipline, the drunkenness, the unqualified flight personnel.

The interview with Gorbachev prepared for *Time* is very impressive. One can sense the touch of Yurka Arbatov (he hinted to me that he was working on "a special assignment"). Against the background of this text—done in the characteristically Gorbachev style—our vain attempts at chasing rainbows at Gorky look pitiful.

I spoke with Yakovlev. He brought up *The Children of Arbat* himself. He said that he finished it, that he read it at night (he gave himself away)... and immediately began with distracting moves: said that there is a lot of sex, everyone is fucking all over the place, I don't remember, he says, that it was like that in our time (the 30s). I reminded him of *The Diary of Kostya Ryabtsev*, by Panteleimon Romanov, and expressed my surprise: is this really the most striking element that caught your attention?! He gave himself away once again when he began telling that in 1937 his father went through something similar to what Rybakov describes: at the time of the plan "of liquidation" of people in such and such positions (for example, each region had an order to liquidate so many kolkhoz leaders, so many village soviet leaders, etc.).

And, finally, the author presents the matter as if Stalin killed Kirov. But this question has not been cleared up! And then, isn't it early for us to examine Stalin's psychology (even in the form of artistic analysis??) In response I reminded him that fifty years after the Patriotic War Lev Nikolaevich also "spoke" on behalf of Aleksandr I, Kutuzov, and Napoleon, delving deeply into their psychology and not restricting himself by the fact that neither he nor anyone else can support through documents what exactly they were thinking and how they were reasoning.

That was our conversation. And I understood that Yakovlev will not be "for" the publication.

September 1st, 1985.

It was an interesting week at work. Firstly, there was the printed *Time* interview with Gorbachev, and, of about the same length, a conversation with three Americans. Once again the frankness and clarity of positions was striking: in foreign [policy] the position is—to live and let live (that is how we now understand peaceful coexistence), in domestic [policy] the position is—complete openness, the kind of "discussion" of our shortcomings, weaknesses, and lagging behind, which scares the West more than any boasting that we have been doing for so many decades. And all this is directly in the face of "the imperialistic den."

Last night Arbatov and I took a walk through the Arbat alleys. He told me [about the preparation of the interview]: at first the text of the responses was submitted for Shevardnadze's signature (which Yura considers to be "justified"), and Zimyanin's. He characterized this text with one word: "Crap!" Upon receiving the text, Gorbachev called Arbatov and Yakovlev, seated them separately and told them to read it and comment. They read it, and said, as Arbatov told me, another word with one voice: "Garbage!" In four days Yurka wrote another text, Yakovlev studied it, nipped at it, Boldin edited the middle sections a little. PB members made comments upon distribution; that's their method, as Arbatov, who is inclined to use barrack-style terminology, described it: "as soon as they see something they click with the scissors, and one testicle is gone!"... So each cuts off a testicle. But the essence, the spirit and the style, remain. And this, of course, is an event, at least in the ideological fight; if, of course, our ideologists will be able to not only understand it, but also to "reform." Because right now the trouble is not only in the resistance from the staff, who were brought up on post-Stalinism, but also in the fact that they do know how, do not have the ability, to work in the Gorbachev style.

On Friday Gorbachev called me, too. But it was for a less important reason: [he asked me] to think about the program for Raisa Maksimovna's stay in Geneva during his meeting with Reagan there. I thought about it, sent my "suggestions." And in general, he is taking the role of his wife seriously, besides the fact that he is by nature a family man and she suits him in every respect. And it is lucky for us that our leading man has an intelligent wife in an age when wives have begun to play a certain role in international life.

We, poor sinners, must once again reconstruct the text at the Gorky dacha—in accordance with the spirit and content of Gorbachev's interview. Our one difficulty is Ponomarev. He cannot accept the very spirit of Gorbachev's self-critical optimism, which is right now really becoming a factor in our influence on the outside world.

I am reading V. Rasputin's *The Fire*. He is among those of our most notable writers continuing the traditions of the Great Russian literature, who, in depicting characters and events, can artistically take out of context not only the leading role of the party, but its very existence, even the presence of the Soviet rule in our society.

September 7th, 1985.

Zagladin, snatching a moment in Gorbachev's talk with Marchais, asked M.S. whether he would mind if Ponomarev would lead the delegation to the Socialist International in Vienna. The other [Gorbachev] laughed and said: let him go, let's not disappoint him, just do not let him lecture, moralize, and try to convince them where they've already been long convinced! So the General Secretary has a very precise idea of the "essence" of our chief.

The Program draft was discussed (Ligachev led the discussion, CC Secretaries and the working group were present). There are curious divergences of opinion: for example, Dolgikh, following Afanasiev, is against writing about the lagging behind and the mistakes—in the 1930s, 1940s, under Nikita, and under Brezhnev. "It sounds like there was nothing but mistakes," he says. Zimyanin, apparently better sensing the mood at the top, did not join them, but called for moderation. And Ligachev said in conclusion that we must note the mistakes; and concerning the end of the 1970s and 1980s we must also talk about the reasons: the personnel selection, the decline in discipline and responsibility, the discrepancy between word and deed.

In general, the draft was complimented (except for Afanasiev, who said that the middle part is simply weak). It is bad that it was complimented. It does not live up to the expectations.

Gorbachev departed for Siberia: Nizhnevartovsk, Surgut, Tyumen, Tselinograd. Yesterday I watched his speech before the party activists in Tumen. He is doing a good job. His approach to the way a General Secretary should behave with people is different in essence. He participates in lively interaction, decides right away what may and should be said and how it should be said... His staff does not prepare it, the "orator" chooses what is more appropriate...

He has taken on oil and Siberia! All the best to him!

September 21st, 1985.

Gorbachev-scale documents are prepared in three to four days. But we (Ponomarev's people) are, under his leadership, fretting for months over some report that

is not worth more than an ironic smile from a serious politician. We want to instill the spirit of the times and the political common sense into him (Ponomarev), but he keeps leaning towards cheap propaganda.

The West is charmed and staggered by the emergence of such a leader here. They are enthusiastic, but also rather afraid. He is acting boldly. To the Americans he proposed (besides two moratoria) a considerable reduction in strategic and Euro missiles... instead of the Strategic Defense Initiative. They won't go for it, but we will be in the win: the stereotype of "the Soviet threat" is being torn down.

September 25th, 1985.

Our new major disarmament initiatives will be given to the Americans only on October 2, and on the 4th they will be proposed in Gorbachev's speech at the National Assembly in France.

Well, as usual, Ponomarev turned out to be "right." Shevardnadze's speech at the UN was published today, and in structure and content it reminds one very much of what B.N. is imposing on us with his anti-imperialistic obsession.

I signed a request (Drabkin's, from the Institute of General History) for a book called *Revolution in World History*. It's an original try. I am not sure that something will come of it. And I am sure that I cannot myself participate in this as much as I would want to: I want to, but can't, and not only because of a lack of time and laziness. Talent is needed here, in order to realize this (properly speaking, my) original, unusual project.

September 28th, 1985.

There was a discussion of the Program at the Politburo. The major idea that Ponomarev derived from it is that Gorbachev does not want to trample down the 1961 Program (for reasons of international prestige, the Lenin tradition of handling party documents with care, and because, after all, much has been done since then). This is the last consolation for B.N.

Among the interesting [events]—there was a reprimand for keeping information about nationalism and other inclinations in socialist countries in the Program. Gorbachev ordered to decidedly throw it out: this way we will fall out with all our friends. Of course, "they have something." But, he says, he just spoke with Kadar: he assures that 97% of the economy is in the socialist sector, and that the CC has complete control of the situation, "the fears are groundless." Why, he [Gorbachev] says, shouldn't we believe that?

He said that the Social Democrats are intercepting the initiative from the Communist Parties, and the latter are drifting toward social democracy. And [Gorbachev said] that the perspective of the Communists is not clear (in the draft). What did he mean to say by that?

October 7th, 1985.

Gorbachev's week in Paris: yet another try in Russia's centuries-long attempt to brotherly embrace Europe. And once again the response is irony, coldness, polite arrogance. This is again a Dostoevsky-Danilov-Blok type situation (Mitterand's mean and haughty face during the entire time of a joint press-conference with Gorbachev was the face of Europe in response to our cordiality). And once again, we are on the eve of a historic bitterness (especially if nothing comes from the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting, and most likely nothing will come of it).

However, something has been done to change people's ideas about us. Most importantly, we tried to be appealing to Europe, or rather tried to openly show Europe our good intentions; we are changing. I don't know whether Gorbachev is doing this consciously because he is a realist and wants to consider "the realities" in everything? Because if you read carefully everything he has said in the past six months, and especially in Paris, it is easy to discern a rejection of ideological intolerance. And this is a good start, if, of course, this is a start and not just diplomacy, "ideology for export," as my B.N. is convinced. Propaganda will not pick this up on its own: the ideas must be instilled into it. It is important that this "shift" be secured at the Congress. (I spoke with Arbatov on this subject; it's his job to satiate foreign policy texts with philosophical content). But we must first resolve the "Jewish question" and the issue of relations between the new (Gorbachev's) leadership and the intelligentsia, which he has not gotten around to yet.

October 15th, 1985.

There was a CC Plenum on the new wording of the Program, the Charter, the main directions through 2000. Gorbachev spoke about the unity and diversity of the world and about coexistence, which is a law (and not tactics) of development that we must submit to unconditionally.

There was an interesting moment—Demidenko's, the first secretary of Kazakhstan's Kustanai obkom, speech. He, as some of the "previous speakers," began to speak of the "Bolshevist style" of comrade Gorbachev, about the "Lenin approach," and about how we are "fortunate, to have such dynamic leadership," etc. Gorbachev was becoming annoyed when he was listening to the preceding speakers, and he was patient with it, but this time he could not stand it any longer: "Comrade Demidenko! We can understand why in the West there is talk about "the Gorbachev style," "Gorbachev's dynamism," "the character of the new leader," etc. It is accepted there and they need it. But why do we need this at the Plenum: Gorbachev, the style of Gorbachev? Why should we delve in this?"

Demidenko mumbled the rest of his speech in confusion. People applauded when he said the compliments, and exploded in an ovation when Gorbachev checked him. That means that everyone understands, but the momentum of the cult and of subservience is inexorable!

Well, bureaucracy and verbiage in solemn form is the image of today's thought. Thought and political culture do not exist. No one, except for Afanasiev, could speak intelligently about the Program content. Again the usual self-reports are presented—about achievements in one's republic, oblast, factory, etc. Just like under Brezhnev, Chernenko...

From the 8th to the 14th of October I was in Toulouse, France, at the Congress of the French Communist Party. By the way, there was not a word about the nuclear threat and the arms race. Then we are winding ourselves up. And people in Europe aren't thinking about it!

And "our friends?" At their conference at Nanter (on the same days) there was not a word about Gorbachev's visit to France. For the Communists to praise the visit is to praise Mitterand. Province! It is funny. Ridiculous. And we had thought, that from now on France would live only by this visit.

October 16th, 1985.

I read the transcript of Gorbachev's talk with Karmal, who was secretly called to Moscow on October 10. [The situation] is critical indeed: ten of our boys die every day. The people are disappointed and ask how long our troops will remain there. And when will the Afghans learn to defend themselves? The most important [issue] is that there is no popular base. Without that any kind of revolution has no chances. It is recommended to make a sharp turn back—to free capitalism, to the Afghani and Islamic values, to sharing the power with oppositional and even the currently hostile forces. This is a sharp turn! It was recommended to seek compromises even with rebel leaders, and, of course, with the emigrants.

Will Karmal agree to this, and most importantly—is he capable of this? Does he have sufficient control of the situation for the currently hostile forces to meet him halfway?

I met with Kashtan (General Secretary of Canada's CP). Walt and Bisel are with him. Returning from [a meeting with] Kim Il Song they made a special stop to meet with me. As usual, I enlightened them on all the issues: to be sure, their Congress is coming up early in November, they have to bring at least something home from Moscow. Kashtan acted like quite an important person, but he understands that he will not be allowed [to meet with anyone] above me.

Like the other CPs (including the PCI) he complained that right now the CPSU is on better terms with the socialists and social democrats than it is with fraternal parties.

It turns out that on Sunday, when I was still in Toulouse, people from Gorbachev called my house: he wanted to invite me to his dacha to watch films that Ermash and I selected for showing at Geneva. This is a lost opportunity to have a frank talk, among other things about what is to be done with the ICM.

There are terribly many things to do. I am left to finish up the International section of yet another CC summary report for the XXVII Congress (the deadline is 11.25). But the entire day I could not even start on it because there is a heap of routine work, hundreds of ciphered memos and other documents that I have to know, and calls, arrangements, orders. By the way, today I saw the CC (PB) resolution on the results of the Paris visit—it is [done] almost entirely on the basis of my draft.

October 17th, 1985.

I was at the Politburo today. There was a historical statement about Afghanistan. Gorbachev has finally made up his mind to put an end to it. [Gorbachev] outlined his talk with Karmal. He, Gorbachev said, was dumbfounded, in no way expected such a turn, was sure that we need Afghanistan more than he does, and was clearly expecting that we will be there for a long time, if not forever. That is why I had to express myself with the utmost clarity: by the summer of 1986 you will have to learn how to defend your revolution yourselves. We will help you for the time being, though not with soldiers but with aviation, artillery, equipment. If you want to survive you have to broaden the regime's social base, forget about socialism, share real power with the people who have real authority, including the leaders of bands and organizations that are now hostile towards you. Restore Islam to its rights, [restore] the people's customs, lean on the traditional authorities, find a way to make the people see what they are getting from the revolution. And turn the army into an army, stop with the Parchamist and Khalqist scuffle, raise the salaries of officers, mullahs, etc. Take care of private trade, you will not be able to establish a different economy for a long time yet. And so on in this vein.

He read several heart-rending letters, all of them not anonymous. There is a good deal of everything [in the letters]: international duty?! For what? Do the Afghans themselves want us to fulfill this duty? And is this duty worth the lives of our boys, who do not understand what they are fighting for?.. And why are you (the Soviet leadership) throwing recruits against professional killers and gangsters, who have been taught by the best foreign instructors and who are armed with the best weapons: ten of whom are capable of fighting against a whole brigade?! At least recruit volunteers or something...

Besides the letters filled with tears, mothers' grief over the dead and the crippled, heart-rending descriptions of funerals, there are letters of accusation: the Politburo made a mistake and it should be rectified, the sooner the better, because every day is taking lives.

By giving an account of this, Gorbachev was obviously forcing emotions, but he did not qualify the letters' evaluations, for example by saying whether it was a mistake or not. He concluded by saying: "With or without Karmal we will follow this line firmly, which must in a minimally short amount of time lead to our withdrawal from Afghanistan."

Marshal Sokolov took the floor twice, and it was obvious that he was ready to pull out of there and had no plans of giving Karmal any indulgences.

Gromyko took the floor, pronounced some amendments to the recommendations that are supposed to be handed over to Karmal in a day or two. One just had to see his colleagues', including Gorbachev's, ironic faces, they seemed to say: and why are you, jerk, now reasoning about it... you drew the country into such an affair, and now you would have us all responsible. I think Gorbachev will tell the people of this decision even before the Congress.

He called me in the evening, asked about France, where I just was. Just, he says, tell it frankly, do not embellish the situation after my (Gorbachev's) visit. He thoroughly "came down on" Zhora (Marchais) and Gremetz, and agreed with my evaluations.

I received the Hungarian Ambassador, explained to him everything about England on the eve of Kadar's visit there.

October 19th, 1985.

Yesterday I read materials prepared for Gorbachev for the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia, which is coming up on 11.22.85. There are new and brave approaches. It even seemed to me that the people who prepared this used our summary report draft for the CPSU Congress. Still, Gorbachev goes farther. For example, this is what is said about the ICM:

1) It [the ICM] is going through difficult times. Communist Parties will still have to interpret the process of the modern world and to work out a course that will respond to the present-day situation, and which will be capable to move the masses.

2) We should not dramatize the differences; we should not get offended when we are criticized. Often it turns out that we now have to admit to what we were criticized for, and to undertake the correction of what they pointed out to us. We should not expect to be only praised and people to have only enthusiasm for us.

3) An international conference of Communist Parties is not of importance in the present day. We must look for different forms and especially we must help Communist Parties by setting an example in the exploration of modern processes, i.e. by our scientific potential.

4) We must meet the objective difficulties of Communist Parties with understanding, and there are very many of them, just as there are many absolutely new problems. We must respect their independence.

In a word, this is the rejection of Ponomarevism and practically, although also indirectly, a censure of the practice for which many parties took a dislike to Ponomarev. It is the aversion to criteria in which Communist parties are judged on the basis of how readily and thoughtlessly they act as apologists for everything that happens in the USSR. This is a rejection of the instrumental-policing approach to the functions and fate of Communists.

Gorbachev got to the bottom of Ponomarev a long time ago. It is not without reason that all the time he ironically reminds us that we should not teach other communists how to live.

October 20th, 1985.

I read Zoshchenko's *Before the Sunrise*... In a manuscript, which Gulyga (a philosopher, author of books on Hegel, Kant, Herder, Schelling... husband of my old flame) gave me in the summer. But why is it a manuscript? This has been published, and it even says in the "Encyclopedic Dictionary" that Zoshchenko has such a work. And I remembered that I had read it sometime before. A deep work, extremely talented.

At the same time, I am reading about Saint-Just. I came across this thousand-page book in a bookstore in Montparnasse. I also bought Roger Debrais' *Europe Between Two Empires*. It turned out to be boring.

The publishing house Progress translated a book about Margaret Thatcher, written by one of her associates. Also boring. This is not what one wants to read about her, although before a trip to England I should read the boring books as well.

October 21st, 1985.

I am troubled by the fact that in the materials for the Party Congress Gorbachev's new thoughts are shrouded in such formulas that many people may not even notice the newness, this in particular concerns the propaganda. I checked these fears on my consultants—they should be quite the big intellectuals. It turned out that not many understand the new thoughts presented in old formulas.

October 23rd, 1985.

B.N. is correcting the draft of the CC summary report. Of course this is not the final correction, others will do it after him, people closer to Gorbachev. [Ponomarev has] an astonishing ability to debase phrases and to remove the appeal from the slightest thought. After all, only talented people can make up for the absence of culture from early childhood. But for the dull ones, no education later in life can make them intellectuals.

Yesterday I was at the CC Secretariat. The question of industrial injuries was discussed. There were two million cases in five years, 120,000 people remained disabled, 63,000 died. At the meeting, Ponomarev reasoned about the absence of objective reasons for industrial injuries under socialism! There was irony on people's faces. He is ridiculous, but will never be able to get it. Ligachev spoke of the ministers' lacking simple humanity: people are losing their lives... for the sake of the plan. And not one thought to call together at least a board of ministers to look into, for example, one of the specific cases of emergencies resulting in a fatality.

There are reports from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova about their plans for patching the hundred-million gaps in their budgets due to the reduction in wine manufacture. Ligachev told me of a conversation he had with “a good worker.” The latter told him (on the occasion of the kilometer-long lines for vodka): “They make people work—absolutely! But as far as giving a working man an opportunity to have a drink—here!” (he made a gesture to show that the people get nothing). It’s a problem!—concluded Egor Kuzmich.

November 3rd, 1985.

On October 27 “Pravda” wrote about the “Departure to London:” On the invitation of Great Britain’s Communist Party executive committee, the candidate to the CC CPSU and deputy head of the CC CPSU International Department A.S. Chernyaev and the CC CPSU International Department employee E.S. Lagutin departed from Moscow to London.

We landed at Heathrow on October 26th. Driving past Hyde Park we saw an anti-military demonstration, fairly large. One of the slogans was: “America, USSR, France, England—nuclear terrorists.” On the whole, judging by the posters, the demonstration was more anti-American than anti-Soviet.

We spent the next day, Sunday, at Windsor.

On October 28 we spent five hours at the Communist Party CC. *Pravda* correspondent Maslennikov was with us. The general conclusion from our discussions is the following: they understand everything, but are also absolutely incapable of acting; there is a complete absence of any kind of perspective of being a political power in the country. Their attitude toward me: trust, agitation, they perceive me almost like Gorbachev’s alter ego [sic]. We had lunch in a nearby tavern.

Then [we went to] the National gallery, once again the stunning Sarah Siddon [sic], I stood before her beauty for almost half an hour. And in general, a hall of the English greats: Gainsborough, Lawrence, Turner, Reynolds.

On October 29, Tuesday, again at the CC, but the talk was with the CPGB London organization. [We spoke] about the crisis in the party, about the minority opposition. In the evening, there was a meeting with functionaries from different London Party organizations. The main topic was racism (resulting from the influx of immigrants).

On October 30, Wednesday, with Maslennikov behind the wheel we drove to Cardiff. We had a meeting in a cafe with secretary of the Party organization of Wales. It was surprising: the party boss of an ultra-proletarian region is an artist who didn’t finish his studies, yesterday’s student.

In the management of the miners’ trade union is a trade union boss, quite drunk, who, looking directly at the party boss, met us with the words: “Who are you working

for, McLennan (the General Secretary), or for the *Morning Star* (a party organ in opposition to the CPGB leadership)?”

Awkwardness. I had to separate them and to set the conversation going. The miners’ dramatic problem right now is whether to recognize the defeat of the strike, the legal and moral aspect of the strike.

We had lunch with the editor of *Miner* [sic], a smart guy and with broad views. Kinnock (leader of the Labor Party) promised to advance him to the Parliament.

We went into the Rhondda valley. I remembered how in 1949-50 I wrote a dissertation on the topic of the miners’ struggle in the Rhondda valley. Could I have imagined then that I would find myself here! We visited the home of a municipal advisor, the former mayor of Rhondda. He is elderly, but energetic, smart, and busy. And there was another one, whom he invited to meet with us; by his looks he is quite feeble, and lame as well. But in conversation, he turned out to be one of those whom Lenin called intelligent workers. Towards evening we returned to Cardiff. There, a theoretical discussion at the home of a university professor was organized for us. The professor is a specialist on early French literature. We spoke about the fate of the working class under the STR, about the fall of the old coal industry, about the ICM crisis.

Very close to midnight, at the other end of Cardiff we met with veterans of the anti-war movement. There were many women, young leaders. I spoke about Gorbachev’s philosophy of international politics—for the present and the future. One girl, very pretty, wore me out with questions. Everyone is very concerned. It seems to be hopeless, but they continue to work, by the principle of “little steps.”

We drove back to London for two and a half hours at night. Maslennikov and I spoke about all kinds of things, he is real, smart, educated, sharp.

October 31, Thursday, was spent at the Parliament. Kinnock received me there. He spoke with me as if I know no less than Shevardnadze. And in general—during the entire trip I felt like a “highly significant person.” They took me seriously, like a plenipotentiary, an all-knowing CC CPSU representative. With Kinnock we spoke about the forthcoming highest-level conference in Geneva, about Thatcher, whom he called “little fool,” about the Strategic Defense Initiative, about England’s attitude towards Gorbachev. He spoke without haughtiness, even though it would seem like who am I and who is he—“the leader of Her Highness’ opposition!”

This is not the first time—when I am abroad—as a rule, but especially now under Gorbachev, I feel like an absolutely free person who can speak about anything without glancing back at any official directives.

They recommended that I visit the London National Bank. Penzin is the Moscow representative director there. He showed me his facilities there, told me a great deal, introduced some of the personnel. They are all English, but he has some of his own

people from Moscow with him as well. He spoke of the fact that he's been on this post for ten years now, and no one has run away or betrayed, even though there is temptation all around, big money everywhere, absolutely free connections. These people are making enormous millions of [hard] currency for the country.

November 1—after lunch I went to visit Rotshtein (he is a veteran of veterans of the Communist Party, a “Bolshevik,” the son a Lenin’s friend, whom the latter sometimes rocked on his knee). This is living history, but history, another confirmation of the fact that there is, and cannot be, any place for the Communists in the political life of England.

November 9th, 1985.

I was at the Kremlin reception—the first one without alcohol. There was still white and red [wine]. But, the buzz was not the same. People discussed the dresses of Gundareva and of Ignatenko’s wife. Kovalenko’s wife, a very pretty and attractive half-Japanese [was also present]. She mostly mixed with Arbatov: he is just back from China, and is euphoric; [she also spent time with him] because for him “everything is going well with Gorbachev;” they meet often, he writes him a great deal, Gorbachev warmly wished him happy holidays over the phone, complimented him (in relation to China) as “a smart and astute [member], whose work is useful” at the Politburo.

Arbatov was at Ponomarev’s. He says that the talk didn’t work out. “What do you need it for?” I ask him. “Oh, for no specific reason.” He says that Ponomarev asked him to put a word in for him with the General Secretary! He even felt sorry for him!!

Zagladin had time to whisper that Chebrikov soon will be in Grishin’s place—at the Moscow pre-Congress conference. It’s high time to kick out this scoundrel and dullard.

Ponomarev continues to act overly busy... Now his favorite topic is the meeting of socialist countries’ CC Secretaries (Bucharest, December). He called Zimyanin and Rusakov, plus me, Shakhnazarov, Yermonsky. Compared to Zimyanin and Rusakov, our B.N. seems quite a mental giant and a bright intellect. Rusakov is just senile; he cannot grasp the most basic things: we had to go through the day’s agenda three times. M.V. (Zimyanin, “Mikhvas” in general usage) is shaky, as if all the time he is sorting something with his hands, he interrupts everyone, might say one thing and then the complete opposite. Both Rusakov and Zimyanin are living out their last months at their posts, and, of course, they both are nervous. It is terrible that one of these characters is the chief ideologist, and the other is the chief coordinator of our relations with socialist countries.

By the way, Arbatov is already counting his strategic conquests: he gave rise to the General Secretary’s doubts about the military people, dampened his trust of the MFA people—Gromyko has been completely moved aside, no one takes his opinion into consideration anymore, even though on the protocol, the three names that appear all the

time are: Gorbachev, Gromyko, Ryzhkov... as it was at first after the October 1964 Plenum, after Khrushchev.

Incidentally, little by little a “rehabilitation” of Khrushchev is beginning. Abroad (I saw it myself) every now and then there are articles about him. Two weeks ago in the *International Panorama* on TV [sic] Bovin reminded of Khrushchev’s visit to Hearst’s farm in the USA, and showed his portrait, respectfully calling him Nikita Serveevich. And it seems Gorbachev is leaning toward restoring his [Khrushchev’s] good name. In the intelligentsia circles there is talk that all of Gorbachev’s ideas were already budding under Khrushchev, but due to his little education and the absurdity of his character, he was not able to carry them into action, and if he did then it was in some caricature form, and he rushed about, afraid of his own boldness.

Yakovlev, when I reminded him about *The Children of Arbat*, said in an offhand manner that Gorbachev (to whom he is very close right now) is decidedly against “cultism,” cuts off all whisperings about “maintaining authority,” “popularization,” etc. with which Brezhnev “started” and with all the resulting... And concerning *The Children of Arbat*, I only told him, he says, that there is such a novel, and under our ridiculous censorship it might end up in *tamizdat*, and besides, such censorship encourages people to stow away their work in a drawer. I did not get the point of his referring to the General Secretary... he must be afraid to fall from this sharp ascending rise of his... until he is sure how the very “essence” related to Rybakov’s book will be taken.

November 11th, 1985.

I talk with Yakovlev on the phone. He is restraining himself from displaying before me that he is already [part of] big leadership, a special confidant. He is uncomfortable with me, after all those ultra democratic and “sincere” conversations in the evening streets of Montreal, and after I did some things to help get him out of the Canadian exile. Nevertheless, [there is] a metallic ring is in his voice.

We were talking about giving him two consultants for the preparation of the foundation of Gorbachev’s TV interview when he returns from Geneva. I suggested Sobakin and Yermonsky. He rejected Menshikov... just like Arbatov, he does not like him, but—for a good reason.

Several hours later I remembered about Bovin—a very fitting author for an address to the people on such an occasion. Yakovlev called me, said that he thought about it too. But, firstly, my immediate boss (Zimyanin) cannot stand him. He is a minor figure of course and could be ignored (!!), but I don’t want to argue with him over this either!! And the second reason is Sashka (Bovin) himself: as soon as he exits the CC [building] after receiving such an assignment, all of Moscow will know that he is once again assigned to write an interview for the General Secretary!..

I told him: that’s true, he has hurt himself and let down other people with this many times. We decided that Yakovlev will not include him in the team that will be sent

to Volynskoe today; but later, when the guys prepare something, he will summon Bovin, and, having “talked with him,” will assign him to work on the text.

There is a great deal of all kinds of work, including the primary work that the Department is supposed to be doing right now—preparing the ICM, Social Democracy, and Revolutionary Democracy reviews for the Congress. Ponomarev “is not interested” in this, because he is afraid of these reviews: Gorbachev will not accept the hallelujah-ing and glossing, but he [Ponomarev] does not want to report the truth to the CC, thinking that it will be perceived as the result his, Ponomarev’s, poor work “on his object.” However, this is partly really so: if for the past ten to fifteen years people in the ICM had worked Gorbachev style, and not Ponomarev-Brezhnev style, the situation probably would be not as sad as it is right now.

November 12th, 1985.

I saw Gorbachev’s memo on how he plans to conduct affairs with Reagan in Geneva. Politburo, naturally, approved of it.

- Not to deviate from the positions advanced in Paris, plus the additions that were made for the third round in Geneva.

- Not to get worked up about regional problems, but also not to waive our right to “be in solidarity” with the “fighters for independence,” not to recognize the USA’s “vital interests” wherever they wish.

- To agree that this meeting is only the beginning of a greater and regular dialogue and in general “we need to know how to live together,” we are different, but we must learn to respect this difference.

- In a word, not to provoke Reagan in order not to intensify the threat, not to play up to the hawks.

I was at the Secretariat. The state of the engineering industry was discussed. It is rotten. Only twenty one percent of the machines are at the world standard, and that is “at a stretch.”

Another question is even more serious: the state of material resources for culture. The situation is thoroughly bad, even in Moscow. For example, there is the same number of theaters in the capital as there were in 1940, while the population has doubled. If every person in the Soviet Union would want to go to the theater, he will only be able to do it once every six years. The number of theaters around the Soviet Union has decreased by half since 1950: right now there are about six hundred.

The expenditure on education and science has been decreasing in relative numbers since 1960, even though it is growing a little in absolute numbers. And in

comparison with the USA's and England's expenditure on this, we are appallingly behind.

It was striking that first Zimyanin, and then Ligachev himself, attacked the "thesis," which for a long time was used to cover the cutting of resources for social-cultural needs, namely: defense! "We need it, of course! But we also need to put an end to this excuse, due to which we have brought matters to such a state."

November 16th, 1985.

At work there is the routine stuff and a flow of information, mainly about the meeting in Geneva. It seems like a joint communiqué is in the offing, a pretty amicable one. Most likely a "spirit of Geneva" will arise, which, of course, will not remove the material preparation for war, but it will relax the confrontation, i.e. will strengthen the will to reject war as political means. Peaceful coexistence Gorbachev style is, in contrast to what we had before (regardless of whatever we said and wrote, and however we swore that we are against war and strong-arm tactics)—is "to live and let live:" seriously, properly, no kidding, without attempts to cheat, without attempts to get around and be superior after all.

B.N. was telling me about the last PB and "complained" that there were too many questions about staff: and everyone was "retired," "retired..." In particular, five agricultural ministries were liquidated. In a word, every week there are more and more "formers", and there are only a few people of Ponomarev's age left.

He makes the following declaration about the thirty-page report I did on the ICM's work in the period between Congresses—"I have a seditious thought... Maybe we should not present this at all? Why should we attract attention? They will again say that the situation is "bad," and all of that will be implied criticism of us..." I fervently objected: "It is precisely the argument that the situation is bad, which speaks in favor of presenting it. In their majority, your colleagues (because they do not have time to carefully consider the essence [of the matter]) think about the ICM in categories they were once taught in the Higher Party School (HPS), and think that we can give orders there, and thus the situation depends only on whether we, i.e. Ponomarev and the department, work well or not. We need to, finally, explain that the ICM about which they learned at the HPS has not existed for a long time now, and that nothing depends on our work (except, of course, self-isolation, if we decide to openly call everyone revisionists). Your colleagues must, finally, see the reality and evaluate our work from that position."

November 17th, 1985.

Mit'ka and I walked in the frosty cold in the alleys behind B. Pigorovka.

When I returned, I occupied myself with Marx' favorite pastime—going through books. I leafed through a good deal of Tolstoy. "Following his suggestion" I jumped over to Pascal and Kant. In the multitude of themes that are natural during such a pastime, one

arose by chance—about fame, through which many, especially people who had recognized abilities (talent) in themselves, sought meaning in life. Pascal, Tolstoy, and Gogol are the extreme examples of the denial of “this concept.” However, they all found an alternative in faith. That is—they found no alternative to “spiritual lust” (as opposed to “bodily lust,” from the words of Tolstoy himself).

Nevertheless, Lev Nikolaevich, in a foreword to Maupassant, whom he at first condemned (almost from the position of “social realism”), and twenty years later approved of, enthusiastically wrote: “Only the love of a woman is worth living for...” Fame, wealth—what is this for when you cannot buy a woman’s love with them. This is the only alternative... even, it turns out, at 65.

November 20th, 1985.

The consultants and I are composing speeches “for the worker, male collective farm worker and female collective farm worker,” which they will present at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on the results of Geneva... We are composing it, without knowing the results... But, not only for the worker and farmer, but also for the first secretary of the Leningrad obkom Soloviev! We’ve splendidly prepared the staff of the top echelon, which cannot speak about the foreign policy of its party without the “learned Jews...” Even though Soloviev is taking the place of Kirov... even Zhdanov...

Ponomarev is as banal as usual. He tells me to prepare a report on the CPSU Program at the party meeting of the department. I reply: there is a limit to human strength. For the second week I am [working] alone, the other deputies are all in different places. There is a load of assignments, including from you, and routine work.

He says: This is necessary, Anatoly Sergeevich, necessary; take **my** report from the Academy of Sciences. Have you read it? (That is what the consultants and I wrote for him during the entire holiday season). Read it, read it, there is a great deal of important material there (either this is senility, or impudence, or naive shamelessness!).

I say: I cannot do it that way. You know that I do not like to speak in public, but if I have to, I speak in my own way. And I never use other people’s (!) texts.

He says: But of course... I myself never use other people’s texts (My God!), but sometimes it so happens that you have to, when there is no time. I advise you to take my text, Balmashnov has a copy.

I can imagine what I would look like if I read that text, or any one of his texts, even if I personally wrote it.

Aganbegyan spoke at our “Tuesday” (which is a regular reading, to which scholars and other well known people are invited by the Department). He described the economic situation, which is bad judging by all parameters.

At the CC Secretariat, the issues of material resources for culture were discussed for the second time in a row. It is just a woeful picture.

Alas! The platform from which Gorbachev started his movements is completely weak. God give him strength.

The talks in Geneva (Gorbachev-Reagan) are in progress. I wonder whether the consultants and I guessed right when we wrote (on Ligachev's and Ponomarev's assignment) the drafts for PB resolutions for Geneva outcomes (without knowing the outcomes)—one closed and one to be published? We shall see.

November 24th, 1985.

The spirit of Geneva, the symbol of Geneva. Gorbachev's interview is the source of a new understanding of the political world and of ourselves. Will we be able to take advantage of it?

A cardinal thing happened: the arms race is continuing, nothing has changed in military confrontation, but a turning point in international relations is taking shape. We are coming closer to acknowledging that no one will start a war; to understanding that we cannot keep provoking it either in the name of communism, or in the name of capitalism. Gorbachev has revived the hopes that have appeared after the XX Congress.

At the deputies conference B.N. told me about meeting Gorbachev in the airport. The latter told him in detail about what took place in Geneva. At first he saw the empty, lacking understanding, eyes of the president, who mumbled commonplace things from a piece of paper. Only towards the end of the second meeting was he able to establish a normal conversation. And in the end, Reagan finally opened up and even agreed to sign a joint declaration. Gorbachev also told him how Regan (the president's assistant) visited our guys and told of the enthusiasm about Gorbachev's actions, asked them to "keep on like this, pressure the president, persuade him, warm him up... for his own good."

November 30th, 1985.

B.N., as I've already written, is fussing terribly, in every possible way inserting himself in the big (Geneva) affair. It is true that he was right about the outcomes of Geneva: both our drafts went through almost without changes, notwithstanding the competition with the Geneva experts and with the MFA versions.

Yakovlev has been assigned to lead a work group under Gorbachev on the preparation of a draft report for the XXVII CPSU Congress. He has our October version handy, and asked the Department to give one consultant for the group. But no... B.N. is fussing about it too. He called me up and said that he spoke with Yakovlev, that he is prepared to give him Yermovsky, that goes without saying, he says, but he also promised to make another, updated, version. And right away he assigned me to prepare it in three days.

Arbatov came by. He was in Geneva as an expert. Gave thirty-seven interviews there, says that two teams came together there—wall to wall: the “doves” (Arbatov, Velikhov, Sagdeev) and the “hawks” (Zamyatin, Kornienko, General Chervov³⁹). Yakovlev was in the role of a balancer.

It became known from General Kobysh, who was also there, that Gorbachev reprimanded Kornienko and Chervov for picking at the text of the joint declaration, for arguing with the Americans on every point, for imposing all kinds of our wordings and almost frustrating the whole affair—which was the acceptance of the declaration (our initiative, by the way). This is supported by Yakovlev’s remarks, he told me over the phone: “What a jerk this Kornienko is, what a blockhead! I did not know him like this, I thought differently of him. But now I am afraid that the MFA might ruin the whole positive effect of Geneva for us.”

I assured Yakovlev that Kornienko is like this, and has always been like this, and that more than once I clashed with him on these grounds at the “theoretical” dachas. But he always had the upper hand, since he was under Gromyko’s patronage, under the MFA’s total monopoly over all our foreign policy.

In Prague, Gorbachev informed the Warsaw Pact leaders on the outcomes of Geneva. He, as well as Husak and Jaruzelsky, spoke in favor of changing the style of these kinds of meetings, believing that we must put an end to the situation in which an exchange of monologues takes place and in which everyone keeps on convincing each other of what we all are already long convinced.

Yesterday with B.N. and Rykin (deputy of the German sector) we went to Moscow’s sculptor studios. We were looking at the possible versions of Thälmann memorial statue. One is by the brothers Artamonov (that is the Moldavian mafia, headed by Luchinsky); the other by Krymov. Rykin and Herbert Miss are speaking in favor of the latter. I also pressured B.N. carefully in favor of Krymov. His Thälmann is in a sea cadet’s uniform. I think he’s good, but designed for an intellectual perception and a rather good knowledge of Thälmann’s biography. The passerby of the masses does not have to know it, the “image of the leader” is clearer to him. That’s what Ponomarev understood. But Krymov will have to work some more: his Thälmann is a young man, while he became “Führer” when he was already forty, and was imprisoned at forty-eight.

December 8th, 1985.

B.N. called us together before sending us to the Gorky dacha, where we are to produce a new version for the XXVII Congress. The boys were saying some smart things. Ponomarev [was saying] his usual banalities, very far from the “Gorbachev spirit.” I did not get wound up. I thought it was useless: we will do what we can to make it maximally in the Gorbachev style, and then let him change it as he wants.

³⁹ General Nikolai Chervov—Head of the Treaty and Legal Department of the Defense Ministry

And that's what we did. We worked with enthusiasm. I presented the text to him on Wednesday evening, and on Thursday he summoned me to Moscow and showed how he corrected [the draft]. I carefully looked through his alterations, came over to him and said impudently: "Boris Nikolaevich, it is striking that you have knocked out with about ninety-five percent precision all the places that were directly taken from Gorbachev, and not only ideas, but unquoted phrases, terms, concepts, even specific words that he likes to use..."

- But I didn't do it on purpose!

- Of course, - I reassured him.

I went to my office and was thinking to myself: that's the thing, that you did not do it on purpose. You, to be sure, did not read Gorbachev carefully, and so you remember neither his words, nor phrases; you do not accept his innovation, his really principally new politics, which is the only thing that can save us from war. You do not believe that he will be able to achieve anything in either the foreign arena or domestically. That is why you can so unerringly knock out everything Gorbachev-like from our text. All your life you kept adjusting to circumstances, that is why you survived under all the regimes. But this time you do not have enough gray matter to understand what's going on, to realistically evaluate how your colleagues, and Gorbachev, perceive you, the people who decide whether you will be in this place in the future. You have not learned even from Gromyko's experience, who was politely and honorably pushed out of real politics not only because he is old, but because his policies, which he almost completely larded over for ten years, have collapsed.

Instead of finally taking up your work—the ICM—before the Congress, you poke your nose in other people's work and only cause irritation, which becomes contempt. You were not even ashamed to impose yourself on Yakovlev for the work group at Volynskoe.

Returning to Gorbachev, I tried to pretty blatantly restore a maximum of Gorbachev's style in the text. I did not achieve much.

... One episode from the argument about the "new thinking."

- What thinking,—B.N. exclaimed—We have the right thinking. Let the Americans change their thinking.

I show him Gorbachev's text, where in black and white it says what he means when he speaks of **our** new thinking.

- I don't know, I don't know. He said that in Paris, in Geneva—for them, for the West!

- Does that mean that you think this is just demagogic?

- One needs to know how to conduct the fight... (??)

Or about the idea that only through the improvement and changing of our own society can we win the competition with imperialism.

B.N.: "Are you talking about peaceful coexistence? I wrote about that in the materials for the XIX Party Congress. What's new in that?"

I: "What is new is that the idea now sounds quite differently. Stalin also said that he is for a world without war. Nobody believed him, but people were ready to believe Khrushchev. For almost twenty years, Brezhnev talked profusely about peaceful coexistence. He spoke at the Peace Congress, responded to the calls of different peace-loving powers, received numerous peace-loving delegations and swore to his peaceable intentions. But nobody believed him. But everyone believed Gorbachev right away, because he brought together the word and the deed."

B.N.: "What do you find to be wrong about our policies? That we explored outer space? That we created intercontinental missiles? Are you against power, which is the only thing imperialism takes into consideration?"

In the end, the text was sent in Ponomarev's interpretation. I called Yermonsky at Volynskoe and told him about these discussions.

This is what I am worried about in this affair: the point is not in the text, which will be written without us, and not any worse. The point is that it is shameful and disappointing to appear an idiot just when something real is taking place. For how many years under Brezhnev we, the international specialists, were the liberals, even revisionists. We insisted on the freedom and originality of thought, and sometimes even of action (in relation to fraternal parties, the Social Democratic and other movements, and the West in general). That is—we wanted, waited, and strove to bring closer that, which began under Gorbachev. And now we turn into conservatives and blockheads... thanks to Ponomarev.

December 14th, 1985.

There is a freedom in the press that was inconceivable a year, or even six months ago—in the newspapers, magazines, and already on television (by the way, today it was announced that Lapin was dismissed).

For over a month a discussion around an article called "Truth and Half-truth" by a certain Karpova is printed in the *Literary Gazette*. Two years ago, the minimal consequences for this would be dismissal from the Party and the Writer's Union. And what reserves open up: of intelligence, culture, professional writing, and the Russian language itself! Take for example the leading article in *Soviet Russia* from December 10, which gives instructions to Russian writers before their Congress...

That means an explosion of courage [to search] for truth has taken place, and can now be stopped only by imprisoning people...

There was a call from one of the Party Organization Department sector deputies.

- Anatoly Sergeevich, there is a decision for the all deputies of the CC apparatus to participate in oblast and major city pre-Congress conferences.

I: You probably have some kind of assignment—who, where, when?

He: Yes, I will send it to you.

I: Are all the deputies of our department considered, or only specific people?

He: Everyone except Zagladin. He is going by a different assignment, since he is going to be elected delegate to the Congress and to the CC body.

I: Thank you!

Thus, I, candidate to the CC, will not be promoted to full membership, and that means the time has come to decide—to leave before the Congress with a three hundred ruble pension, or to wait, and, in a year, having been in the position of one pushed back, to be “let go” with two hundred rubles.

December 23rd, 1985.

I just got back from Malta, where I headed the CPSU delegation to meet with the Communists and Laborites, who are in power there right now. On the way back I visited Rome.

Today is a day of rejoicing for all of Moscow: Grishin has finally been dismissed. He is replaced by Yeltsin.

Yesterday B.N. moved me as far away as possible from the telephones and told me in a half-whisper: “the first” (he showed his on his fingers, did not pronounce the name) demanded that Menshikov never set foot in the CC apparatus again. His conversation with Americans in a restaurant was recorded. He said that he, Menshikov, is the core of the brain trust that supplies Gorbachev with all the major ideas. B.N. charged me with job placement for Menshikov (who, incidentally, is his own protégé, his pet). But, when I find a job for him, I cannot explain the reasons [why he is changing jobs]. He suggested, maybe Arbatov’s institute? But how would that be,—I objected—when Arbatov considers him to be the scum of scum.

December 28th, 1985.

Razumov, first deputy of the *Party Organization Department* called and said that “I [Chernayev] was being sent” to Tambov to a regional party conference. That is where

the elections to the Congress will take place. And yesterday the first secretary of the Tambov obkom called. He said that I would be the “chief party worker from Moscow” there, and will have to speak. What might that mean? At any rate, it is a “different matter” than what was mentioned above on this topic.

I visited Arbatov at Barvikha. He is there on prophylactic treatment after a micro heart attack. We walked around the paths, talked. Gorbachev sent him a draft of the New Year’s address to the Americans. I saw your corrections in the text, he says, the ones you told me about. The text is fairly dry; it was prepared at Shevardnadze’s. I told Arbatov that the day before, an article was circulated around the PB with a rebuttal to the Americans on regional problems. I had to alter it drastically: it was written loudly, even shrilly, as if there was no Geneva. It seems the minister is still under the charm of cheap journalism.

Yurka [Arbatov] boasted that he incited doctor Laun (“The Doctors for Peace Movement”) to press on Gorbachev during the meeting for the latter not to revoke the January 1st moratorium on nuclear explosions. I read a transcript of this meeting. Laun was, really, persistently and even blatantly persuading Gorbachev not to do it: all the energy of your new policies of the past six months will be smeared, people will again stop believing you. It seemed to me that Gorbachev began to hesitate.

In addition, Dobrynin also grew bolder: yesterday he sent a telegram from Washington with the same idea. I think the moratorium will be extended after all, even though just a month ago there was a PB resolution (a confirmed letter to Reagan) about the resumption of explosions and about the propaganda “to justify it.”

Belyaev (Shauro’s deputy, deputy of the CC Culture Department), the one who was explaining to Rybakov what his *The Children of Arbat* meant, was moved to the post of the editor of the *Soviet Culture* three days after Grishin’s dismissal. In that way, he was taken out of the “literary process.” Shauro himself is in the hospital, and people are saying that he will not come back to work from there. His first deputy Tumanova is on the verge of retirement. In a word, a complete dispersal of this ideological sub-center, which, incidentally, was one of the persecutors of Lyubimov’s theater on Taganka.

By the way, there I met Vasiliy Romanovich Sitnikov (a person of high rank in the KGB; who was Andropov’s advisor; criticized the Taganka, and at the same time shielded it from Grishin, Shauro & Co.). He is a handsome, jovial, educated man. Recently he told me the following: Gromyko is a world-scale thief. He and his wife collected tributes from all the embassies and trade representatives for position appointments. Gromyko knew that Andropov knew everything about him, and when the latter became General Secretary, he really toned down. But Chebrikov, who replaced Andropov, also knows everything. Gromyko provided himself with an honorary burial (when the time comes) by getting his bearings on Gorbachev in time, and appeared as his “godfather.” But he knows that Gorbachev also knows everything now.

* * *

Thus, the year 1985—looking back 17 years later.

Now it is recognized by almost everyone as a threshold in the history of the country and the world.

All major dates are relative; they appear that way especially when later people find out the details of the events related to them. For example, that's how October 25th (November 7th) 1917 in Petrograd appears.

Many will agree that in the XX century the years 1985 and 1917 are comparable in the scale (not in the character) of their consequences.

The author of the journal entries presented in this volume, as others like him, who were close to the highest leadership, wanted and was waiting for greater changes; he understood their necessity and already had grounds for connecting them with Gorbachev. Nevertheless, not one of these people could even remotely imagine that his election as CC CPSU General Secretary on March 11, 1985 (true events of Gorbachev's election are carefully reproduced in the journal, disproving the conjectures about other versions and opponents), and, a month later, his speech at the April CC Plenum would be the beginning of such immense and tragic changes in the fate of the country and the world. Gorbachev himself, as he later admitted more than once, had not imagined that having opened just a little door, he would provoke such a torrent that would break down the entire, seemingly everlasting and indestructible, Soviet dam.

The magic words “perestroika” and “glasnost” had not yet been uttered in 1985. At least, they had not yet become the symbols of the initiated reforms. And, no cardinal reforms that would strongly affect society had been undertaken, if one doesn't consider the start on the campaign against alcoholism, which once again (in history) demonstrated that good intentions, once they become government policy, often bring more evil than some criminal plan. A justified and even necessary measure, once included in the context of big politics, turned out to be a fatal mistake.

But something extremely important was accomplished this year—the **style of politics** was changed.

When the CC members, colleagues, the press, and people abroad took notice of his new style, Gorbachev became angry: he thought that “style” is something superficial, unworthy of his intentions; he was afraid that with such evaluations he would appear ambitious, someone who tried to be original in order to look different from the people he replaced. And he was mistaken.

In a rigidly bureaucratic society, which had become stiff in rules and dogmas, where people grew accustomed to servility and hierarchical laws as behavioral norms, where the fear for saying a word too many was mixed with one's blood, where the saying “I am the boss—you an idiot, you're the boss—I'm an idiot” virtually defined people's relations at work and in life... and other such things that demeaned a person's dignity and

offended his common sense—in such a society people were stunned by a demonstrative rejection of all of this coming from the very top.

Gorbachev would go into the street and begin a discussion (!) with the first group he came across... this had not happened since the 1920s.

He spoke in his own words, did not read from a piece of paper, did not use formal language worked out in nomenclature apparatuses.

He prohibited hanging his portraits and carrying them at demonstrations.

Sharply and with scorn, he stopped the familiar glorification.

The new General Secretary threw aside the “grand” manners of “the leader,” the unapproachable divinity; he completely liquidated this pernicious legacy of a tsarist instinct, rooted in centuries. He appeared before the people as a person who seemed to be “like everyone else,” but... a real leader, whom the people wanted, whom they had missed for a long time.

Gorbachev put an end to political repressions (even though he did not right away finish off with the consequences of past repressions). He removed fear from the social and political atmosphere.

He made it so that at the Politburo, at the CC, at the Plenums, at meetings—problems were really discussed, rather than being obediently “approved” regardless whether you agree or not...

He encouraged and required each person to say what he thought, “to tell it like it is.” And he checked the people who by habit or out of subservience checked those who dared to speak their mind. He allowed criticizing leadership publicly... and of increasingly higher and higher rank.

Gorbachev presented his wife to the world as his life companion (in clear defiance of the shameful status of leader’s wives as household accessories, impermissible for presenting to the public).

All this was **style**, even though it was done unintentionally, not for the sake of style, but by the inner motives of his nature, and “for the sake of the liberation of the minds,” as he said. And all this is the year 1985.

In the strictly political sense, the year is marked by, obviously, staff changes, mainly in the highest echelon. Gorbachev disposed of some figures (alas! Not right away and not of all of those, who should have been disposed of!). But he did this not because they were not ready to serve the new “first,” the more so not because of some ideological reasons; but by reason of their worthlessness, incompetence, ignorance, their “accidental” assignment to high posts (the products of Brezhnev’s, Chernenko’s favoritism); or

because they discredited themselves glaringly at their posts, giving rise to well deserved contempt in their circles and in society.

From the start, Gorbachev conceived the idea to include “the human factor” into the reform process: to arouse energy, initiative, and enthusiasm in people. From the point of view of political science, which emerged later, that meant giving society a natural flow, to inspire it to “self-propel.” But society had been long unaccustomed to living without orders and without the petrified forms of its organization. Gorbachev’s error is understandable—it came from an innately democratic nature. The times were hard for all of us, and it was hardly possible to understand (all the more, to agree!) that a “natural” progress of society cannot serve to “perfect” and “improve” the system (of “advanced socialism”), of which everyone was so tired, and under which life was so bad.

Also obvious was the new General Secretary’s stress on raising (and renovating) the role of the party. By the momentum of the very essence of the Soviet regime, he expected to make the CPSU a vanguard and a motor for reforms... As Khrushchev in his time, but with different motives, opposed the party to the “statesman” Malenkov, the party that under Stalin had been in disregard and was monitored by the NKVD-KGB. Insight came to Gorbachev with a big (and fatal!) delay.

1985 was a year of the exposure (and comprehension) of the real situation in the country and the world. Data came into the country’s government’s command (and people were less and less ashamed to talk about it), which in essence gave evidence of a real crisis in all aspects of life. The launching platform for deep reforms appeared quite unsteady, and in some places dilapidated.

The Politburo and the CC Secretariat took, as they say, measures, but for a while they still came down to the traditional “increase,” “demand,” “order,” “elevate the discipline,” “set an example;” they appealed to conscience and conscientiousness, to the Communist duty, etc.

The intensive emergence into the international arena with the new foreign policy was dictated first of all by the grave state of the country’s economy. We had to urgently change the West’s attitude toward the Soviet Union, had to put an end to the confrontation, the arms race, shake off the unbearable burden of the STR (the reader may notice in the journal materials that already in this first year of the perestroika, discontent with the pressure and voracity of the STR is beginning to show through in the speeches of some Politburo members and CC Secretaries, which would have been blasphemous and punishable a short while before), and, possibly, to establish more effective external economic links. It is also the result (and, probably, chiefly) of a personal factor—Gorbachev’s moral aversion to a nuclear threat to all humanity.

The changes are emphasized here. But precisely as a result of the “style,” and by no means because of more and already troubling disarmament and declarative Moscow initiatives, which were also present.

Gorbachev's appearance, behavior, ability to conduct a dialogue, to convince, to reason to the point instead of getting off with banalities that set one's teeth on edge, gave the public and Western leaders hope for finally ending the cold war.

I suppose the reader noticed the prominent part that the International Communist Movement occupies in this year's materials. That is explained, of course, by the author's place of work. But the subjects that he touches upon also are significant for that period's political process.

Firstly, the most important character of these episodes is B.N. Ponomarev. He was, by his character and intellectual baggage, by far not the worst in the top echelon of the Soviet ruling stratum, in the so-called elite. But he is a typical figure among the statesmen with whom Gorbachev had to begin perestroika, not only in Moscow but on the level of the entire party and State. And not all of them had such advisors, which due to specific circumstances were with Ponomarev and tried to somehow correct his behavior and to act in the Gorbachev style.

Secondly, the journal's international Communist themes show a very important aspect, a matter of principle in the position of the Soviet Union. **Objectively**, and rapidly so, it was ceasing to be an ideological stronghold. ... It lost all historical perspectives, because for a long time already the ICM had not been a real factor in world development. Only the momentum kept it moving, and that was disappearing before our eyes. By the same momentum, the CPSU continued to pose as the ICM's leading power. But the real leadership, embodied by Gorbachev and his then closest colleagues, did this more and more reluctantly, as if paying tribute to the "international duty" inherited from Lenin and the October. At the same time (despite the endeavors of Ponomarev and others like him), they tried to do away with the Comintern methods of relating to the "fraternal parties." One could more and more distinctly sense the lack of information on the Communist Movement in the leadership and the CPSU ranks. And it was more and more frankly said that it is time to get rid of the burden (including the financial burden) of being the "older brother."

For practical [purposes], especially for the new foreign policy, it had become unnecessary and even harmful. Communist Parties could no longer be an instrument of not only USSR's foreign policy, but even of propaganda in its defense. By this time, they were disappointed in the Soviet Union as the "leading light of the future." Nevertheless, Gorbachev tried to make them "simply disinterested friends."

On some level the same was true for the "national liberation movement," this is especially strikingly evident in the Afghan problem.

Thirdly, the episodes related to the CC International Department's work debunk the West's deep and inveterate delusion (one partly cultivated by the CIA and such organizations for Cold War purposes), that precisely here was the center of Moscow's subversive activities, that Ponomarev was the "Gray Cardinal," who commanded the

secret service (the KGB), and the MFA, and other foreign policy organs, and in general determined all of the USSR's foreign policy.

Fourthly, the role and position of "speechwriters" [sic] in the CPSU system of leading the country shows quite clearly: when policies were worked out and presented mostly through the preparation of speeches for the major heads, who were capable of neither thinking, nor (as a rule) writing competently. These "staffers," together with some intellectuals "from the side," while composing speeches for other people, tried to infuse elements of common sense into policies. Incidentally, since on the inside and the outside they were perceived to be CC representatives (!), by their behavior, erudition, and thought that was not always orthodox, they made it seem *urbu et orbi* [sic]--since such people exist close to the very "top," then everything is not hopeless in this country, and there is some human resource for Gorbachev's innovation.

Such was this year 1985, mainly "**a year of style**" that changed the atmosphere in the country and partially outside. Now it is remembered, at least by those who back them enthusiastically rushed into Gorbachev's politics, in a kind of romantic halo.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1986

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At the department¹ everyone wished each other to celebrate the New Year 1987 “in the same positions.” And it is true, at the last session of the CC (Central Committee) Secretariat on December 30th, five people were replaced: heads of CC departments, obkom [Oblast Committee] secretaries, heads of executive committees. The *Politizdat*² director Belyaev was confirmed as editor of *Soviet Culture*. [Yegor] Ligachev³ addressed him as one would address a person, who is getting promoted and entrusted with a very crucial position. He said something like this: we hope that you will make the newspaper truly an organ of the Central Committee, that you won’t squander your time on petty matters, but will carry out state and party policies... In other words, culture and its most important control lever were entrusted to a Stalinist pain-in-the neck dullard. What is that supposed to mean?

Menshikov’s case is also shocking to me. It is clear that he is a bastard in general. I was never favorably disposed to him; he was tacked on [to our team] without my approval. I had to treat him roughly to make sure no extraterritoriality and privileges were allowed in relation to other consultants, and even in relation to me (which could have been done through [Vadim] Zagladin,⁴ with whom they are dear friends). I resisted the proposition of him becoming head of the sector after Mostovets: [Boris] Ponomarev⁵ tried to persuade me and to pressure me, and only some unfavorable rumor about Menshikov that reached B.N. [Ponomarev] at that moment helped me to prevent him from getting that post. And more in that vein. But that’s not what I wanted to mention. I wanted to mention the indifference with which everyone met his banishment: as if it is just routine, as if everything that he has done over these 2-3 years—and he knew how to do his work—should be crossed out and forgotten. That’s the value of our work.

Renewal of the staff continues and speeds up before the Congress.⁶ Zagladin told me that [Andrei] Aleksandrov⁷ is planning to leave. He already spoke about it with Gorbachev. He did not try to persuade him to stay. Aleksandrov explained to Vadim [Zagladin] that “since he will not make the team” (i.e. he will not be elected to the CC), he does not feel comfortable staying...” and all of a sudden B.N. spoke about this with me. “Did you hear?” he says.

– I heard! – I was surprised by his reaction. He was all confused and tense, stepped away from the telephones again and started saying: How could that be! He (i.e. Aleksandrov) has such experience, such knowledge, he is so intelligent and educated,

¹ International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU

² Political publishing agency

³ Yegor Ligachev, Politburo member, and number two person in the party hierarchy in the early period of perestroika. Was brought by Andropov from Siberia as one of promising politicians.

⁴ Vadim Zagladin—Deputy Head of the International Department of the CC CPSU

⁵ Boris Ponomarev—Head of the International Department of the CC CPSU

⁶ XXVII Congress of the CPSU

⁷ Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov—Brezhnev’s foreign policy aid, who continued in this position under Gorbachev, and was replaced by Chernyaev in March 1986

how could it be that all these qualities are not needed? You know, —B.N. went on—I was told that it is because he wants to get benefits and a large pension, which he would not have if he retired from a position other than that of the General Secretary's adviser. What, is he so poor? Or so materialistic?

— You know, B.N. — I said — it is indeed difficult to make it on the 200 rubles of the regular pension.

— Really?!

— Yes, — I said.

This entire conversation was on Ponomarev's side a conversation about himself. It is not without reason that he also asked how old Aleksandrov was (68). He was very worried about the consequences of the Congress for "himself." He arouses burning contempt in me—all his life he was one of those people who believed that it is not "him for the revolution, but the revolution for him" (a quote from Lenin, recently recalled by Ligachev in a speech in Baku). He is incapable of appreciating Gorbachev's role; he cannot acknowledge either his talent at statesmanship or his policies, since Gorbachev for him is absolute evil. He, Gorbachev, not only ends Ponomarev's career, which has run for over half a century (under all the regimes), but crosses out and sends into oblivion all his "collected works" (which were not written by him), all his pretensions at appearing as the "theoretician of our Leninist party." He is not even allowing him to play Kuusinen's role (under Khrushchev).

A curious detail in this context: Cervetti and Ciaromonte—members of the Italian Communist Party Politburo—are in Moscow right now. They are on a holiday, but are also supposed to prepare [Alessandro] Natta's⁸ visit and meeting with Gorbachev. Gorbachev asked Zagladin how things were going "with this:" drafts of summary statements, communiqués, problems, remarks on their program theses (for their Congress in March). Zagladin answered that everything was being prepared. Well, what I'm getting at is: Gorbachev said that he would not meet with them, but Ligachev would, so to give him everything that was necessary. Zagladin asked him: Ligachev will meet with them alone? Gorbachev: yes, alone, i.e. without Ponomarev... !!!

So that's that. And it makes sense. M.S. knows that it is exactly Ponomarev who "demanded his ideological rights" and told the Italians how to live and work in their own home. He is exactly the reason why the relations between the PCI [Italian Communist Party] and the CPSU were coming to a nearly complete breach.

He knows that the Italians despise Ponomarev and want nothing to do with him. That is why it would be just absurd to "let out" Ponomarev on the Italians now, when they come to Moscow to prepare a meeting between two General Secretaries; a meeting, which should become the starting point of a new era not only in relations with the PCI,

⁸ Alessandro Natta—General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party

but possibly with all of ICM [International Communist movement]. [“Letting out” Ponomarev] would mean showing them that we have not forgotten the “weight of the past,” and that in essence we are not planning to change anything. So the option with “Ligachev alone” is not only the attitude toward Ponomarev personally, it is a change of course.

But for B.N. it will be a dreadful message. (Zagladin, by the way, is undecided about whether he should tell Ponomarev that he is being factored out of the very work that he claimed as his greatest merit before the Party... or should he find out from Ligachev or somebody else?... Technically, Zagladin is his immediate subordinate and cannot conceal such matters from him...)

Today in the program “Vremya”⁹ there was an exchange of addresses by Reagan and Gorbachev to the Soviet and American people, respectively. The idea is American, but M.S. [Gorbachev] did not hesitate for a second... At any rate, Hitler, for example, would not be allowed to address the Soviet people even in 1940. So here is an example of the change in political mindset that is also expected of the people.

January 6th, 1986.

And so B.N. was left out [of the meeting] with Cervetti and Ciaromonte. Ligachev received them.

By the way, Ciaromonte asked Ligachev’s opinion about Yevtushenko’s speech at the RSFSR Writers’ Congress (about which Western propaganda is buzzing). Ligachev was very professional in his answer, saying: I do not see anything reprehensible in it, although I probably would have spoken differently about those matters. The most important is how Yevtushenko spoke; it was in the spirit of the present day policies and the atmosphere that we want to create in life. The only thing I would not have said, were I in his place, is that the theme of Stalin is “taboo” here. We, Ligachev said, have lived through it, suffered through it, rethought it, and turned the page over for good. Right now we have a huge load of important new work and concerns, and we have no need to raise the past and heat up passions that would distract us from daily problems.

From this I reach the conclusion that *The Children of Arbat*¹⁰ will never see the light of day. Bikinin confirmed this (he is now [Alexander] Yakovlev’s¹¹ deputy, the latter gave him my copy to read). I asked him why (and he is a very progressive, unorthodox, smart guy). He replied that right now it cannot be published.

⁹ Main TV evening news program

¹⁰ Anatoly Rybakov, *The Children of Arbat*—book about growing up in Stalin’s times, which was published only in 1987 and instantly became a national phenomenon because of its candid description of the Stalinist regime and political persecution.

¹¹ Alexander Yakovlev—member of Central Committee, who was elevated by Gorbachev, and later became his most influential supporter and new thinker.

- Is that your opinion, or the “official” one?
- It’s mine and general. I’ll tell you when I come over.

January 7th, 1986.

Menshikov came over, spent an hour here. He kept trying to figure out (from memory) what it was that he said and where, that got him driven out like that. I sympathized and kept quiet. “I’m sorry that I came to complain,” he said, “But there is nobody else to go to. I tried Zagladin, since we’ve been best friends for 30 years. But he said: I’ve told you everything there was to tell, and we have nothing more to talk about. Sorry, I have pressing matters to attend to.” And Menshikov started crying.

Such is Zagladin. It’s hideous... Even though in Zagladin’s place, Menshikov would have probably done the same thing...

Then for an hour more I endured Boris Likhachev’s lamentations over the phone. He is being cast out of *The Communist* by [Richard] Kosolapov.¹² But I cannot defend him because he’s a scatterbrain and a blabbermouth, a talker and an inveterate liar to boot. I told him to go to Zimyanin, but only if there is something serious regarding Kosolapov, because otherwise it would be ridiculous. There is “discontent” about Kosolapov brewing at the top. Ponomarev recounted that M.S. had supposedly spoken in the circle of [Central Committee] members and candidates about the fact that social sciences and philosophy are too bookish. “They write their dissertations, but do not participate in the real events that the Party is submerged in. *The Communist*, for example, is headed by a CC member, but we see no pay-offs. You, Mikhail Vasilievich (Zimyanin), promised to work on this, but haven’t done anything yet...”

January 12th, 1986.

The night of the 9th [I took a train] from Paveletsky [terminal] to Tambov, [going to] an oblast-wide pre-Congress party conference. I got back today at 5:30 in the morning, also by train. The party conference itself was on Friday and Saturday. The report was on the boring side, too factual, too charged, and too intentionally self-critical. On the other hand, there were debates. Gorbachev’s initiative has liberated people. Of course, they had prepared notes and haven’t yet learned to speak without relying on a piece of paper, but it is already very different from what I heard 5 years ago in Ryazan. Courage broke through, and the desire to change, to acknowledge, and readiness to put an end to the disgraceful practices—personal as well as public. And many things were simply at the level of real intelligent discussion, with analysis and ideas, and all this was

¹² Richard Kosolapov—editor of main party journal *The Communist*.

done without looking back at what this or that superior might say (or think). People spoke from the heart, and not for the sake of witticisms, not to parade bravery and frankness. That's how quickly Gorbachev's era is beginning to show. And what people! Communists... the name of communist is revived, people are beginning to value it... A dairywoman... she has everything: achievements, milk yields, extra yields, fame, etc. And she spoke of school reforms and about how she is teaching children on her farm to combine learning with labor... and how that should be done... or she "generalizes experience," herself a young country girl. In general among the presenters, the women appeared stronger, more sincere, and pert.

I understood that I had to speak. I was seated next to the chairman. I was in the first place everywhere; it was evident to everybody that I was the "principal person" (despite the fact that there were ministers and others from Moscow in the delegation). By the way, I did not get the sense that I would be the "principal person" when Razumov (first deputy of the Party Organizational Department) called me and said, "You're being sent to Tambov." But, it seems Podolsky was told that I'm not only deputy head of the Department, but also a candidate CC member, and was sent foremost in this capacity. So when the chairman called me to speak, the mention of my "regalia" caused a stir, since I was, in fact, the only person "from the CC staff" among the 800 conference participants.

I was nervous the night before my presentation (though nervous doesn't even begin to describe it). I could not decide what I should talk about, a foreign affairs man amidst these people, who are concerned with life-related, practical, concrete matters, and who are speaking in such a new, qualified way about their work. In the evening I mentally sketched at least some "connection" to what has already been said on this stage.

But as always, even from the days on the front, when you are completely engaged in the work and there is no way back, a cool calmness sets in, all the nerves quiet down and you assume full control of yourself, with ease and outward confidence. I had planned to speak for about 12-15 minutes, ended up speaking for 22. [The audience] listened in complete stillness. But this is not very revealing, because a provincial public is well wishing and grateful. A surer indicator is my personal feeling that a "contact with the audience" appeared immediately and lasted until the end.

Then was the oblast committee Plenum. Since the oblast party leadership "disappeared" upon the closing of the conference and I turned out to be the most senior (from the CC!), I lead the Plenum on [Yuri] Afanasiev's¹³ prompting. Podolsky was elected, some secretaries, bureau members. And once again [I performed] like a regular, as if this type of thing is habitual for me... But if I hadn't spoken at the conference, I wouldn't have had such "impudence" in me—there was no moral right for me to "determine" the leadership for a 100,000 member party organization.¹⁴

¹³ Yuri Afanasiev--liberal thinker and later head of the Humanities University in Moscow.

¹⁴ Anatoly Chernyaev was elected as representative to the XXVII CPSU Congress as representative of the Tambov oblast party organization.

Lev Mikhailovich (second secretary) almost organized a trip to Michurinsk (right after the conference), to visit the Michurin and A. Gerasimov museum, and to take the train to Moscow from there. I liked the idea, but during one of the breaks he came up to me and said: “the first [secretary] wants to go with you, I have to stand to attention.” I responded by declining the whole trip, not only because it would have been interesting for me to go with Lev Mikhailovich, and boring and strained with Yevgeny Mikhailovich (the first secretary), but also because what kind of a persona am I, that I should be accompanied by the first secretary, especially after such intense days! And I did not succumb to Podolsky’s subsequent persuasions. But he didn’t leave me alone to just walk about Tambov in the remaining hours before the train (and how I wanted to, together just with Leva Onikov)! I had to walk around with the first [secretary]... we strolled down streets, went into some shops, came out to the quay of Una. It is beautiful, well-kept. [We passed] by the mansion of the merchant Aseev—supplier of cloth for overcoats for His Imperial Majesty’s army...

Then was the train. Almost completely empty sleeping car. Long conversations with Onikov—about the party’s past, the reasons for disgraceful practices, about the “decline” of the Russian bases in the “pan-Soviet” party (second secretaries, not quite right...), about B.N. and his “party history,” about Stalin, Yakovlev, our colleagues, and about what will happen to the CC staff after the Congress, about the “logic” of staff changes, etc. etc. He is very interesting, very well informed, and thinks deeply, this Russified ideological Armenian.

January 13th, 1986.

The most permanent impression of Tambov was that it’s very uncomfortable being in the position of the “big leadership from Moscow.” Especially since I sincerely considered all those people—the delegates, party members, obkom secretaries—to be more significant and useful than I am. They are working, they have a real pursuit. And I, elevated to the high levels of the hierarchy by the long arm of coincidence and “apparatus logic,” am in general an amateur, moreover not of the right profile to lead a 100,000 member organization.

Only after the speech, that is—after having done something for them, did I feel that I had some “right” to be in the position, in which I found myself, namely—senior in the party hierarchy.

January 18th, 1986.

Gorbachev’s statement. It seems he really decided to end the arms race **at all costs**. He is going for that very “risk,” in which he has boldly recognized the absence of risk, because no one will attack us even if we disarm totally. And in order to revive the

country and set it on a steady track, it is necessary to free it from the burden of the arms race, which is depleting more than just economics.

My God! How lucky we are that in the PB there was a man—Andropov—who showed some truly “authoritative” wisdom, who discovered Gorbachev and pulled him out of the provinces!.. And him personally: while there are, I think, 95 regions and oblasts in the USSR. And then he stuck him to Brezhnev!

If Andropov hadn’t found Gorbachev, who would we be left with? The pretenders for [Konstantin] Chernenko’s place were: [Viktor] Grishin, [Grigory] Romanov, and [Andrei] Gromyko.¹⁵ One can imagine what kind of a fate would have been waiting for Russia if any one of them had taken lead, especially after Chernenko. It’s terrible to imagine!..

But we’ve got a rare leader: a very smart man, educated, “alive,” honest, with ideas and imagination. And he is brave. Myths and taboos (including ideological prejudices) are nothing to him. He will get over any kind of those.

Yet, there is still the staff problem. The turnover [of staff] is almost total. At every Secretariat and Politburo dozens [of members are being changed]. But who takes their place? Is there any assurance that they are capable of implementing Gorbachev’s policies, and in the manner of Gorbachev? (It’s not even a matter of wishing to do it, but the ability!) Some examples are showing that—alas!—they are not.

During the week, which swept me off my feet and quickly drove out the Tambov mindset, some things took place.

Gorbachev’s interview for *L’Humanite*. A dozen questions, ranging from “is there a new October Revolution in the USSR right now” to the treatment of Jews: we, French communists need this (“we can understand!”) to fight anti-sovietism at home.

And again B.N. was excluded from this. M.S. assigned [Mikhail] Zimyanin¹⁶ to prepare material for the interview. B.N. started to object, said he would call, but he didn’t. Zimyanin asked me to settle it with Ponomarev somehow: you, he says, know how to do that with your “even temper” and “self-control” (!)... He flattered me.

I didn’t say anything to B.N., but my heart was bleeding. And it started bleeding even more when I saw the drafts that the interview preparation group composed. What squalor! There’s not a trace of the Gorbachev tone. And these are people from the economics department (where they theoretically should understand the “new strategy”).

¹⁵ Politburo members who were seen as possible contenders for the position of General Secretary after Chernenko’s death. Viktor Grishin—First Secretary of the Moscow City Party organization, Grigory Romanov—First Secretary of Leningrad Oblast party organization, Andrei Gromyko—Soviet Foreign Minister.

¹⁶ Conservative Secretary of the Central Committee, was removed by Gorbachev in January 1987.

They are from Zamyatin's department, where they theoretically should know how to write about the new strategy of peace by the year 2000.

It is astounding. Whatever one may say, but despite, or maybe because of, Ponomarev, our "school of composition" is incomparably better. And there are more thinking and intellectually responsible people here than in other departments.

But, we are not in charge. I wrote (or re-wrote) about relations between the CPSU and the PCF [French Communist Party], about anti-sovietism in the context of Soviet-French relations, about Afghanistan, and about the revolutionary nature of the planned socio-economic improvements. I don't know whether it will be possible to incorporate it. And I don't want to officially make contact, so Zimyanin cannot present the matter as if our department also took part in composing it. Kozlov and Gusekov [participating] in the preparatory group is one thing, but deputy head is another!

Yesterday was Ponomarev's 81st birthday. Since Zagladin is at a Congress in Turkmenia, I had to speak (in the company of select individuals). I spoke nicely (afterwards everyone congratulated me: "at my best," "content and form"), but beforehand I felt quite uncomfortable because hypocrisy was unavoidable. The value of his merits and fine qualities, the ones that he has, is canceled out by his other character traits, but you can't speak about that. He was moved. Again he recalled his Bolshevik youth, but also took notice of my run over the new era. [He said that] we, the Department (and implying him personally) do not need to break ourselves in order to fit into the new working style. And this is probably true: [at our Department] criticism was never driven out; we valued our personal opinions rather than being yes-men; we had great freedom of speech in discussion; initiative was always encouraged although almost never realized. However, if one considers the content of our work, then it's the exact opposite: realism in estimating our "object" was present only in discussions, B.N. did not allow it up to the official level. Hallelujah-ness and "glazing of reality" still predominates here. Accordingly, the nature of [our] work in the ICM: it has long ago become sluggishly anachronistic, totally removed from reality. In all of this the main fault rests on Ponomarev, who does not want to witness the breakdown of the "empire," which since his Komsomol days he's considered to be at the forefront of progress.

Now about the most important episode, that can seriously change my life. On January 14th Yurka Arbatov¹⁷ showed up at my office. It was a work-related visit before his departure to India for the Palme Commission. But instead of reading papers and listening to me, he started a strange conversation. "You know," he says, "The day before yesterday Sashka Yakovlev went 'South' (to Gorbachev, who is there preparing his political report for the Congress). We had gotten into a conversation about Aleksandrov's retirement." (General Secretary's adviser, with whom, by the way, I had yet another squabble yesterday about the texts of letters to the PCF, the social democrats and revolutionary democrats in relation to Gorbachev's statement about nuclear disarmament.) So I tell him," Arbatov goes on, "tell M.S. that he will not find a better

¹⁷ Georgy Arbatov, Director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

replacement than Chernyaev... he knows foreign affairs, knows them from the CC's point of view, he's honest, smart, experienced. Sashka agreed. I don't know whether he already spoke with M.S... But mind you, don't even think about declining: you'll land both me and him in some shit."

About the same time the phone rang. It was Yakovlev. He is already back in Moscow. Says that M.S. asked that I personally look over the ICM section of his report, and let him know what I think was needed there. Of course I said that I was ready to do it. And then he adds: I probably messed up your life...

So Arbatov's jabber turned out to be true. I tried to tell him, Arbatov, why--I'm not the right man. He waved his arms. "Are you in your right mind? If the General Secretary, and what a General Secretary—Gorbachev!—offered me to be a reviewer (not an adviser!) for him, I would jump at it without second thought. And not because of profit or the status, but to help him in the great work that he has begun. Don't you want to help him? And he really needs intelligent advice, fresh ideas..."

When Arbatov left, I started thinking. The only thing that makes me think "for" it, is that it is impossible to decline. That would be indecent exactly along the lines of Arbatov's reasoning.

Everything else is against it: even though he likes me, Gorbachev doesn't really know me. I will immediately disappoint him by lacking the energy that he needs right now, and that he is counting on me to have. In "technical" aspects I will be in sharp contrast with the retired Aleksandrov, who could read ten ciphered memos, the same number of other papers, and then clearly and conclusively report the most important information to the "chief," and from memory, no papers. And I don't have the character to associate on an equal level with the MFA, the KGB, and the other international departments, and to stand up for what in their propositions would not "appeal" to me, i.e. to lead a permanent serious polemics with them.

And then, I'm tired. I am 65, I want a steady life, more rest and more time for myself, books, exhibitions, theater, the Conservatory, for the loved ones and other women. The bustling position of an adviser does not suit me, not to mention that I don't want to lose that (quite considerable) level of independence that I have in my position (however, that's under Ponomarev, what will come after him is difficult to surmise). I don't want to leave this environment—the Department where I am known, respected, where the relations are natural, where you know how to behave in any situation.

So that is that! Again, except for a feeling of duty and, why not say it—a feeling of vanity, I'm not longing to be "there..."

January 26th, 1986.

One lady I know told me about all the reshuffling: about Grishin, and about Dementieva, and about Pastukhov—that he is [being sent as] ambassador to Denmark, and about Zakharov—who is [being made] second secretary of the Moscow City Committee. We in the CC apparatus find out about all the reshuffling from the Secretariat protocols (i.e. a week later), while Moscow finds out ahead of time.

Zagladin tells me that a doctor came to visit them yesterday (she is their “personal [doctor]”—a family friend, was even at their wedding) and told them that the doctors of Ponomarev, [Vasily] Kuznetsov, [Mikhail] Zimyanin, [Konstantin] Rusakov, and [Ivan] Kapitonov had been given notice that soon they would be transferred to the “second division.” I asked him, what is a “second division?” “That,” Zagladin says, “is where you and I are.” I am amazed! Either Kremlevka¹⁸ superiors “figured it out” ahead of time, or they already know about the decision to retire the abovementioned, which will be made in the near future (and can be made only at the level of Gorbachev)!

... However, these are “trifles” in comparison to Moscow’s January 24 citywide conference. Yeltsin’s report on the symptomatic character reflecting the depth and scale of change can be placed at the rank of the XX Congress about the cult. Which is to say, it is now a real return to Lenin “norms” and order in party life and work ([judging by] the spirit, the words, the approach). The whole world is now trying to get *Moskovskaya Pravda* (in which the report was published)...

In the spirit of the times, but also partially from hard hypocrisy, is that Grishin has been put in the conference presidium (since he is still a PB member)... Of course he is a worthless individual, and from here [stem] all his faults and defects. He is a product of the Brezhnevada... even though he’s not passive, not one of the “what could one have done” (when one was given orders!)... Nevertheless, there is talk around Moscow that two stars should be stripped from him.

Yesterday I met with Iskra and her husband, the well-known philosopher Gulyga. I am always amazed: here are people from highbrow intelligentsia, Iskra is also a party activist on a regional scale—she was a delegate at a regional (Sevastopol’) party conference. I concede: they are among the people who do not believe (the people Yeltsin spoke about), those who lost faith. Alright. But how can one remain indifferent to the new leadership’s very determination for change?! Iskra didn’t even read Yeltsin: Gulyga summarized it to her from “Pravda!” And once again they started saying that [Mikhail] Zoshchenko’s work still cannot be published in full. So it seems they’re waiting: when full publication is authorized, then the change will really have come! That’s the scale on which the intelligentsia is measuring what’s going on!!

Ponomarev’s “isolation” is more and more distinctly felt at the Department. He is removed even from matters that are directly related to the Department. It seems [these changes] are reaching the “outside world” as well. Lunkov is coming down hard on him and Zagladin from Rome. In almost every ciphered note he retells the opinions of PCI

¹⁸ Special hospital and medical service department for Central Committee members.

leaders (or maybe he is taking it from what's been said before). It's pretty much—"they are all delighted by Gorbachev and the changes we are undergoing. Only in the International Department's leadership nothing is changing, the Brezhnevites have a firm seat there and could care less about the changes. They're acting as if Cominform was still here." Ciaromonte supposedly said: "What can we do! It worked out like this over the decades that a mere mention of the CC International Department has the same effect on our members as a red rag on a bull. But do not think," he goes on, "that this transfers to the current CC leadership. Not at all. We are very enthusiastic about it and expect much from it..."

The Italians are now openly naming Zagladin as the leader of our intrigue with Cossuta.¹⁹ It seems that they have exposed their connections, including the financing of the publications Cossuta patronized. I told Vadim about it and grumbled to Ponomarev too, saying that these methods won't yield anything, we'll only set up Cossuta and disclose ourselves. These are not the times to fold the fraternal parties into a pro-soviet sheep pen with such methods. But alas! Our Ponomarev cannot imagine our communist movement in any other form, and that's why his career is over (and not only because he is 81).

I am still reading Pikul's *The Favorite*. Reading slowly. It's very educational and you believe that our history was made just this way... with consequences even for the present times. And his Catherine is quite enticing... I am once again amazed at the assimilating power of the Russian nation. She would not have become The Great if she had not forced herself to become Russian. And she made herself Russian, and did it sincerely, with pleasure, irreversibly, and not only out of ambition; it was partially by the natural law of repulsion from her former nationality... I cannot imagine her on the English or French throne, although it is Western Europe!

January 29th, 1986.

One can sense that our department (Ponomarev) is being factored out more and more. Gorbachev purposely arranged not to invite Ponomarev to the talks with Natta. Zagladin was present, but officially (in print) he wasn't named as a participant (he is only present in the photo and TV [sic]).

I saw the text of Gorbachev's speech at the dinner in honor of Natta. The text is very strong, in the Gorbachev style. I read the transcript of the first day (internal questions, but relations between the CPSU-PCI and international affairs were also touched upon). It is a definite turn around in our dealing with the ICM, a completely new

¹⁹ Cossuta was a member of the PCI leadership who for many years lead the pro-CPSU oppositional group in the party.

course and style of relations with communist parties. The argument about “eurocommunism,” which comrade Ponomarev has been fighting for the past 10 years, is now added to the “petty” phenomenon category (a term from Gorbachev’s speech). It decidedly needs to be stopped so it does not hinder the solidary actions of fraternal parties.

In the one-on-one talk, Natta delicately raised the question of “our support” of Cossuta. And in effect he received a statement from M.S. that that was “unacceptable:” the relations are only with the leadership, General Secretary with General Secretary—open and with a level of confidence. Internal party affairs are internal party affairs. (Consequently, the Shaposhnikov-Ponomarev option with the Finns is also defunct, I think).

Ponomarev expressed his “displeasure” to me in passing. “With Natta for 8 hours! 8 hours! For what? Who needs that? What’s the use?!” Thereby he places himself in the “out of bounds” position.

Last week Yermovsky brought me the foreign relations section of the Congress political report from Yakovlev (in Volynskoe). It was great. I corrected some things, wrote some.

He, Yakovlev, has become conceited and stuck up. A new “center of power” has formed: Yakovlev, [Georgy] Razumovsky, [Vadim] Medvedev, [Anatoly] Lukyanov. They are near the General [Secretary]. They sway personal destinies and direct policy.

However, the day before yesterday a group headed by Slezko (Ligachev’s former assistant, now Yakovlev’s first deputy; the former ideological secretary of the Tomsk obkom) was sent to the Gorky dacha in order to finish up a draft of the Program²⁰ based on the four-million remarks and suggestions that turned up as the result of the nationwide discussion of the “new edition.” At the same time, there’s a rumor that the Program will be “moved up” (i.e. will not be adopted at the Congress)? Really? On the other hand, why not? Discussion has shown that there are so many suggestions for amendment and improvement, that it would be better to postpone it for now... Perhaps for a special Plenum, not until the next Congress! And it would be right, because in its present state it does not meet the “April Plenum strategy.”

I am deeply convinced that Ponomarev will not “live past” the Congress. What will happen? Zagladin told me about his conversation with Gorbachev after the first day of talks with Natta. He says Gorbachev sat down, crossed his arms, and asked sarcastically: “Well? Shall we liquidate the communist movement, or rebuild it?” He answered Zagladin’s obvious answer with the question: “What is the main problem, how should we rebuild it?”

²⁰ The Communist Party Program

Zagladin supposedly replied (and if he did, he was right): “first and foremost, we must have a line that the CPSU hasn’t had for many years. And we must accept the parties’ equality in practice.” Gorbachev took this up, but said: “we will not develop a line in time for tomorrow’s talks. However, this is your work (i.e. of the international department), so think, propose. I will say something about this at the Congress.”

I would very much like to speak with Gorbachev “on these subjects...” Speak frankly about how and why we have been helping to drive the ICM to a dead end for 20 plus years.

February 1st, 1986.

Yesterday around five Gorbachev called and offered me to become his adviser. I said that it was of course a big honor, but are you sure that I am the right person for such a job?

– I, he said, am sure. – thus leaving me to decide whether I am sure myself.

– I don’t consider it a promotion, for me it is an increase in responsibility and duty. And, of course, it is interesting to participate first-hand in the new work that you have begun.

– But you won’t be alone... You have probably noticed that Yakovlev is near me a lot these days...

– I noticed. I’ve known him for a long time... I understand that I wouldn’t be alone. However, I’m a poor organizer.

– It’s alright, we’ll figure it out. I liked you for a long time now... from our first trip to Belgium together, do you remember? (Of course! It was 1972, who would have thought that that trip would turn out like that for me!) I like your party spirit (?), your erudition, your composure during critical moments (what did he have in mind?). Well, what do you say?

– One does not refuse such offers, Mikhail Sergeyevich!

– That’s right. How’s your health?

– I’m an athletic person, but the years are telling.

– Well, that’s alright! As soon as I deal with some matters... Lerua (PCF Politburo member, editor of *L’Humanite*) is supposed to visit, I’ll have to give him an interview. Afterwards I will introduce a proposal about you...

Actually, I remembered that he started the conversation from something else.

- What are you doing right now?
- Routine work... Today I read the transcript of your talks with Natta.
- And how was it?
- It was a turning-point event.
- It would be good, if not only the Italians understood that.
- Yes... especially not the Italians.

(I am sure that we both had Ponomarev in mind first and foremost). Gorbachev, of course, didn't know how that very morning B.N. informed his deputies on the outcomes of talks with Natta, and how he directed the composition of a letter about this meeting to select fraternal parties. It followed from this "information," which presented the heart of the matter as totally opposite from what it was, that he, Ponomarev, really did not understand anything. He not only cannot, but he does not want to understand.

His main idea was to convey to the recipients that disagreements were still present and that nothing had really happened. He even "didn't notice" that the argument about Eurocommunism has been delegated to the category of "petty matters." Instinctively he has guessed that he could not evaluate the meeting negatively, and for the telephones (which, he is sure, are bugged) he even said that Gorbachev's speech at the dinner was "based on Marxism-Leninism." However, his main concern was not to give the impression to the fraternal parties that we will remain in fraternal relations with them if they criticize and disagree with the CPSU. Etc., etc.

When I told my secretary that I'm being made the General Secretary's adviser, she started crying. For me and for herself. And this is the right reaction. I don't know what this work will be like, but can only guess judging by previous observations of Aleksandrov. I have a feeling I won't manage it, at least I won't be able to at the level that is necessary for Gorbachev right now. But I will try, and it will shorten my life by several years. My personal life will be reduced to a trifling small size, and freedom will remain only in memories. Only now can I really appreciate the huge freedom I had under Ponomarev, even though for work the results were minimal from this freedom and independence.

Last night I saw a play by Tovstonogov Jr., called "Sholom Alejhem St., 40" at the Stanislavsky theater. This is an event in our social life. It is evidence of the enormous changes taking place. Moreover, it is real high art, which moves you, brings tears, catches you by the throat.

The theater was overcrowded, but, alas, mainly (95%) by Jewish people, while the people who really need to see it (and feel the guilt) are the Russians. They created this terrible problem, of which we will not be free for decades. The play should be televised

so millions could see it and grasp that the “situation” with the Jewish question is changing: since the times of Mikhoels it had been impossible even to imagine anything like this shown legally on the stage or anywhere else...

February 2nd, 1986.

This morning I was carefully reading *Literaturka*²¹: the continuation of discussion on the social and political qualities of prose, a column about anonymous letters, an article about the understanding of our literature in the West—turns out there are people who want to understand it and therefore should not be “repelled”—this is easiest of all. [There was also discussion] about our art of translation—against Anninsky.

Arbatov came to visit... then we went for a walk. He asked me how I reacted to Gorbachev’s proposition. He knows that he called me. Yurka assured me that everything would be great. And I [assured] him that everything would be bad, that routine work with ciphered telegrams would wear me out.

He told me how the interview for *L’Humanite* was prepared. M.S. called him, asked him to come over saying that what Zagladin and Aleksandrov gave him was boring, banal, impossible. Yurka reworked it in one night. It is better, much better, than what I saw in the version before Zagladin [worked on it]. The passage about the XX Congress is especially important, it is positive. But some things (which I myself wrote earlier) about Afghanistan, about the ICM, about relations between the CPSU and PCF are gone, and that’s regretful. I don’t know at which stage [they were taken out].

Arbatov said that anonymous letters addressed to M.S. are coming from military people, with threats to deal with him like with Khrushchev if he goes on being in favor of disarmament. Lukyanov reported this, but he shouldn’t have, because it is all nonsense. No one can organize a revolt, no military men.

Yurka also “taught” me not to succumb to intimidation from the SDI²² and [space] shuttles: both will die out on their own.

February 3rd, 1986.

Gorbachev called today, just as Shaposhnikov was sitting in my office.

— Hello! I just spoke with Ponomarev. I told him that I’m taking you into my team. And I already signed the draft resolution, sent it around the Politburo.

²¹ *Literaturnaya Gazeta*—a central newspaper devoted to literature and cultural life

²² Strategic Defense Initiative

— Thank you... — and I'm silent. He's also silent, waiting to hear what else I'll say... —Thank you for the trust... — Silence again...

— Are you hesitating?

— No... But as I already said, will I be able to manage? Are you sure?

— I am sure.

— But I have to take care of my work here...

— You have two days. And then start.

[Yevgeny] Shaposhnikov, who was sitting opposite me, guessed that the conversation concerned some kind of assignment. But when I told him what the matter was, he twitched. He even jumped up. As [Karen] Brutents later diagnosed it, many will be warped by this "triumph of justice."

And, of course, it went around the Department. In the evening Zagladin already called, Aleksandrov informed him that there is a resolution to replace him with me. Zagladin perkily congratulated me and expressed his hope that now we will finally have an opportunity to do what we have planned to do.

Ponomarev sent for me. He was flustered. Tried to present the matter almost as if it happened on his recommendation. But I didn't let him talk at random and told him exactly how it happened.

I must not dawdle. I must make a final effort and try to calmly do what I can. They can't send me "farther than the front." The only thing I am afraid of is that I won't meet Gorbachev's expectations and plans. And I do not know what he wants from me...

Tomorrow I will have to clear out my stuff that has accumulated here over 20 years.

February 22nd, 1986.

I haven't written for the last two weeks. During this time a transition from the kingdom of relative freedom to the kingdom of absolute necessity took place. Every day, including Saturday, there is an enormous flow of information. And if there, in the Department, I could skim a lot of it—there would be no political consequences from that, except possible trouble with B.N.—here I have to notice everything, and if I miss something, then more than just a "talk" with the General Secretary could result from it.

But not even that is what oppresses me, but the uncertainty of rights and responsibilities, up to the point of not knowing what to take to him and what to put into the general file.

A talk, an “explanation,” never took place. I was immediately thrown into the work: a talk with [Edward] Kennedy... (and a newspaper photo, by which all the people who know me started to “figure out” what happened with me).

After the first Politburo (and I must be present at every one now) he called together some people: Yakovlev, Lukyanov, Medvedev, [Valery] Boldin, Smirnov, and me. He shared his reaction to the four-hour long discussion of his draft Congress political report (the document equal to the entire XX Congress combined, in the amount of energy and mastery it contains). He also said that we will go to Zavidovo for a week to get away and finish it up. But in the evening I had Kennedy, at night I processed the talk transcript, where M.S. once again showed his manner to persuade, defend, prove...

And the next day he summoned me to his rendezvous with [Viktor] Chebrikov and [Eduard] Shevardnadze and said: “I wanted to appoint you to work on the report, but now you will have to work on this, you’ll find out in a minute...” The matter at hand was a TV interview, in which we would convey to the West some of our responses and “forward shifts” on the missile matters in the form of responses to the Soviet audience. The idea came up while [Gorbachev was] under the effect of talks with Kennedy. (We want to say that we do not link the euro-rockets and the SDI, that we are prepared to remove tactical missiles from the GDR and CSSR in the first round, what we understand inspections as “fundamental,” and in general, what does America want from us). The MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] people made a trial model. Boring. I did not trust myself, so called up Arbatov, who has made [projects] for *Time* and *L'Humanite*; he knows the tastes. We wrote 20 pages together in a day. I sent it off. In the morning it came back: “There is nothing to present here. Our people will not understand it. Disconnected,” etc. The first pancake... [is always lumpy] Maybe it was because I placed so much confidence in the self-assured Arbatov? (Even though Yakovlev warned me that more than once he’s been made to “clear out” Aratovisms from texts).

(By the way, Kennedy said to Zagladin: your Arbatov is like our Kissinger). I worked it over in a day... But I did not get a response to this version. It turns out Yakovlev hinted to him that it is inopportune right now. Actually I said the same thing with Shevardnadze and Chebrikov, but they did not understand me. M.S. hesitated: the interview would be too close to the Congress and his report, it may slacken the reaction. He came out to the Politburo with this question. And everybody agreed that it shouldn’t be done. However, he assigned the MFA staff to “add” some of the material from this interview to the political report.

Thus, I did not make it to Zavidovo. But, as my colleagues instructed me, I wrote him notes on what I considered to be in my “competence” out of the stream of material coming through.

For example, in the report on strategic relations with the FRG I proposed to consider the “problem of reunification,” which cannot be avoided since it is a strategy (I don’t know what came out of it). I suggested not to publicly congratulate Yemen’s new leadership... This came through, but maybe it would have been done without my “prompting.” I proposed to write an article on the “regional crises—against ‘neoglobalism.’” (He agreed).

In one issue already I seriously intervened in policy: I stopped Congress invitations for the Finland Communist Party and for the Sinisalo people. This could have slipped through the Secretariat in a package with other additional parties, but I had the “right” of control.

M.S. reacted to it. He called me (Ligachev was in his office), and read my memo out loud. They said something. Then he told me: “We will bring this question to the Politburo, prepare the material.” Naturally, Ligachev ordered that B.N. also get the material. He presented it (through Shaposhnikov) as such: again, saying that Aalto was anti-soviet and a revisionist, that he was fracturing the party, that the “minority” has become the majority, etc. In a word, they copied it from Sinisalo’s letter, which the Department received recently.

I wrote the same things as I have written many times at the Department, on which I insisted and about which I argued with Ponomarev, and even warned him in the summer that if he kept insisting, he’ll run into trouble.

It would be simply foolish to continue with the Sinisalo business in the Finnish CP after the talk with Natta, from which B.N. did not understand anything despite his good nose, after M.S.’s remarks about Cossuta, and after what he included in his political report (about equality and non-interference).

All the PB members and CC Secretaries had B.N.’s (Shaposhnikov’s) papers. More than that, they have grown used to the idea that Aalto is anti-soviet and must be finished off... Shaposhnikov was invited to the PB (seemingly at B.N.’s request, which turned out to be another one of his mistakes). In the “dressing-room” he ran into Lev Zaikov, who, being a Leningrad secretary, has more than once followed the “Shapo line” under the leadership of Shaposhnikov in Leningrad and Helsinki. Zaikov promptly promised Shapo [shnikov] to continue to “smash the revisionists.”

Shaposhnikov (we met in the stairwell) was sure that the moment has come when his dearest dream will be fulfilled and Aalto will be dealt the death blow. Frankly, I was not sure how it would end. I was nervous, especially since M.S. hinted that I might have to present a supplementary report. But Gorbachev showed tact towards me and towards B.N.—he did not destroy him with my hands.

He gave Shaposhnikov such a pogrom, and in reality Ponomarev as well... (therein lies the mistake: if Shaposhnikov was not there, M.S. would have been tactful with the old man, but in the presence of Shaposhnikov made him the whipping boy).

The main idea was that the times when we gave orders to fraternal parties as we would to Obkoms and republican CCs have ended. If we disagree in something, we will uphold our ideas, not excommunicate, ignore, or interfere in their affairs.

Shaposhnikov, impudent, jumped up and started trying to prove something. M.S. told him: "Sit down. If needed, you will be called upon..." B.N. was pathetic and right away started adjusting, hedging, justifying himself. It's terrible! (I am once again convinced: absence of intellectuality equals absence of human dignity).

But even before that, around the 14th, when I, after all, decided to visit B.N., he started asking me to put in a word for him with M.S., so that he was finally made a Politburo member! I kept a polite silence, while he was "proving" to me that he understood international politics better than Chebrikov and Shevardnadze... Who are they? Greenhorns. He mentioned that he always "took the right line" in relation to China, etc.

Therefore, I made a fool of myself with my natural supposition that he was worried whether he would stay on the wagon at all. Turns out he was concerned with something entirely different—whether he would get promoted!

Meanwhile I already knew that he would be retired (Lukyanov hinted at that), and the "activity of his wife and the entire family" in moving up through family channels has already caused discontent. And then Sashka Yakovlev, motioning in the direction of M.S., said outright: "it has been decided to keep him in the CC as an old Comintern man," but retired!

B.N. already speaks with me ingratiatingly... Yet another chameleon change. It is repulsive and pitiful. He sent me a piece of boar that he killed while hunting. He has been doing this for many years. But now he's judging everyone by his own standard.

[Alexander] Bovin²³ came to visit me. This is really a drama. For his entire political career he had been waiting for the time to come, which has come now. And right at this time he has been pushed back, exactly under Gorbachev. He blames everything on Yakovlev. He has two motives:

first of all, it turns out that Bovin was involved in sending Yakovlev to Canada. Yakovlev once said to Bovin and Arbatov: why are you working so hard for Brezhnev, do you want to turn this ignorance into a cult?! And only yesterday Bovin himself admitted that he "brought it" (that statement) to notice;

secondly, the Jewish self-importance: "next to me (Bovin!), Sashka (Yakovlev) will pale before the General Secretary's eyes!"

²³ Brezhnev's speechwriter, famous Soviet journalist, and then the first Soviet Ambassador to Israel

He brought me his talented essays (on positioning propaganda, on Nicaragua, on “the meaning of life” (as understood by) Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and...)

He says he was not asking for anything. But he came to ask... I can understand. And someday I will go to M.S. on his behalf. But he will not make it to the Congress, and will get the boot from the Revisions Committee, where Brezhnev, having forgiven him, placed him. It’s a pity. It looks like Arbatov gave up on Bovin when he found out that he was “not liked” by Gorbachev.

We had a farewell party for Aleksandrov. Present were three of his secretariat girls and two helpers-colleagues who really did not like him. And that was all! And what a farewell I would have had from my Department, if I had agreed to a party! They are still “sobbing” about it, as they all say, no matter whom you ask. Only now did I sense that I was “loved” in the Department.

This is lyricism... And the work—I don’t understand yet. I’ve identified directions for myself:

- disarmament
- Soviet-American affairs
- the ICM
- regional crises
- the Jewish question
- the idea of “Soviet national security”

I have no idea how am I going to follow them.

The most significant [concern] right now is the terrible nervous overload and the absence of any kind of time for myself.

June 7th, 1986.

I am not writing only because I have no strength left after a 14-16 hour workday. I’m also not writing because it is difficult to comprehend it all and to set it in writing. In my position, the only thing to write about is him—the one who dared to raise Russia and to make it rear up (who has the plans for it), a post-Stalinist and post-Brezhnevist Russia.

A mini-Lenin has come... in the form that Mayakovsky described him. Seemingly a simple, normal person, with all the traits characteristic of an intelligent, normal,

sensible and practical person. And at the same time, all these traits are raised several levels in comparison to a normal, regular “comrade.”

And if one starts from the top, from Lenin, he has all the qualities characteristic of Lenin, only they are all on a lower level. And the coordination of these qualities, their “complexity,” is also like Lenin’s.

In a word, one should write about him every day, since I see him and hear him almost every day. He is incredibly frank, sometimes he shocks with his “confidence;” you get scared by it—why does he suddenly burden you with the responsibility of his innermost [thoughts]?

It is my moral duty to write about him... It is most likely more important than conscientiously doing my official responsibilities for him—he could do without me. But if I do not write about him, it will be a great loss for history... even if he does not make it with the great work he has set out to accomplish.

And I should write down right away when he speaks one on one, when he leads political discussions, when he openly discusses something in closed circles, and, of course, when he leads the Politburo: it is a great wealth of mind, character, awareness, knowledge, precision in the ability to understand the essence of the matter, decisive rejection of anything even resembling demagogic attempts to cover anything with ideology, especially lack of talent and inability to work.

In a day he goes through a colossal amount of information. I cannot understand how he manages to do it. And this information is used, in processed form it rushes forth as deduction, analysis, conclusions, decisions, disagreements or support of somebody...

95% of time and energy is spent on internal affairs... even though it seems to be the other way around if one judges by newspapers and TV [sic]. (By the way, the laymen are already grumbling about this).

I must not be lazy (Lord give me the strength!), especially at the Politburo I need to take notes and reproduce it in the evening, or maybe even right away at work... And of course I need to record what he says to me or in my presence. And at least make a list of matters about which I had to speak with him. Much wears away so only the impression is left, but the actual canvas—his thoughts, especially their form and context—disappears.

So let me begin... I have a couple of sheets on the table here. They have been lying here for a month. They are notes. For example, the advisers decided to get together and stop by his office at the end of the day to congratulate him with May 1st. He sat us down and thought out loud for two hours. What can I coax out from these notes?

What saved the country (under Brezhnev)? “Oil + vodka + people’s patience.”

The bureaucratization of the party machinery, especially since 1975. Everything is cluttered up, it's decaying, you can't tell what's where, why, and for what... It's a total mess—especially in thinking about the individual (the disappearance of social policies).

By the way, the right things were always said (take any of Brezhnev's speeches). But what was done... Nothing was done at all! Only for yourself!

We need to generalize the common experience, since "people are the makers of history," as we say all over the place. And democracy! Nothing will save us if we do not open up as democracy. Lenin was absolutely right. We need to search for forms of it and learn from the people, stop with the sermons and the cries of the know-all, who know everything and know only how to teach.

"Power" is the most profitable work right now. That is why everyone is eager to get to power, and once they get there they become little independent princes.

About the CPSU history textbook... here I intervened and criticized Ponomarev's style, the textbooks that completely draw even students away from our history. I said that we should invite five intelligent people, not professors or even specialists, to a dacha and give them a year's time. Have everything at their disposal, even the archives. The sovietologists abroad have already written about everything, using the Trotsky archives among other things, as well as our own newspapers, books, journals... There are hundreds of books on CPSU history. Let them write a bestseller. The CC will then review it...

At that time he did not say anything about it. But two weeks ago at the Politburo at an opportune moment he gave a heated speech in the same vein, and right away assigned Yakovlev and (alas!) Zimyanin to organize a competition for a concise CPSU history textbook...

...The leftist forces in the USA and Western Europe were defeated by technology and productivity of labor. He wins who has the higher productivity. Lenin said that, and for a long time we were hiding from this truth. Life is above any ideology.

One will not be able to keep a hold on to the third world if one does not bind it with technology. Which is what they (the West) are doing.

And we will not even keep a hold on the socialist countries if we do not bind them to us with technology.

A struggle is going on. A real struggle for the Congress. The resistance is enormous and varied. There was an article "Against the trend" in the "Pravda" from June 27. The question is being decided "either or." Either we fulfill what we planned and how we planned it, or we fail with socialism.

This is the content (of the notes) of only one of his conversations with his advisers.

How much I have lost over these months by not noting it down. But for the first two months I lived like in a shock. Only now, it seems, I have gotten adjusted to him.

June 22nd, 1986.

It's been 45 years since the beginning of the war. I should write down sometime what that day was like... I remember it as if it were yesterday, down to the little details.

Before the Writers' Congress. Everybody around here, including Yakovlev "himself," is surprised that the "[Georgy]Markov course" is being kept despite the fact that, one would think, he is a symbol of Brezhnev's time in Soviet literature. In 1985 alone, he published his gray imitations with 27 publishing houses. He has 14 billion rubles on his savings-bank book. He is the center of attraction for swindlers and mediocrities, "a two-times Hero of Socialist Labor"—in this case it is a stigma, not a merit. But he is Ligachev's "childhood friend" (either from their youth, or from work, or because they're both from Siberia). And even though Ligachev knows Markov abuses this, and that everybody has been talking about nepotism and favoritism, and that Ligachev's prestige is soiled by it, he persistently keeps him there. Yakovlev told me that he had had a conversation about it with Gorbachev, but he "does not want to quarrel with Yegor Kuzmitch [Ligachev] because of this." But this is only the introduction. The actual story is the following.

A week ago we received a dispatch—pre-Congress information under Chebrikov's signature. It talked about the Western secret services influencing Soviet writers, the ones who in the past allowed deviation from class nature, who doubted the rightness of collectivization and national policies (weren't they the "cosmopolites"), who disagreed with literary policies, etc. In a word, the writers subject to oppositional and revisionist mindsets are now... (Which is totally incomprehensible, for what is to be understood as opposition and revisionism? In relation to whom, Gorbachev? To the April line, which all these "oppositionists" have been waiting for and for so many years tried to help bring it about in any way they could?)

Names were named: [Anatoly] Rybakov, [Anatoly] Pristavkin, [Boris] Mozhaev, [Mikhail] Roshchin, [Andrei] Zubov, [Bulat] Okudzhava²⁴... and several other less known ones.

In a word, it was a denunciation... from a previous era, from the 1930-50s, as if nothing was changing in the country.

I went to Yakovlev and asked him how one is supposed to understand this. And what does it mean that M.S. ordered this information to be sent around the PB and the Secretariat, and asked Ligachev and Yakovlev to speak with him personally.

²⁴ Prominent liberal cultural figures

Yakovlev said he spoke with him. “And what?” Yakovlev said he was angry and frank. He said that we have already forced 15-20 talented writers to run away abroad. Do we want more to go? And in general, what kind of methods are these? M.S. listened to him, but Yakovlev did not say how he reacted. But, he says, it seems he heeded the words, and told him to go and say the same thing to Ligachev. He did, was of course more careful, but did not meet with understanding. The only thing Ligachev did not like was that the KGB is still dealing with literature. Why the KGB?! For how much longer? This is the CC’s prerogative. I don’t know, Aleksandr Nikolaevich says, but it seems M.S. is planning to have a talk with Chebrikov.

A day after this, Gorbachev’s meeting with 30 writers took place. I have not seen the transcript yet, but A.N. told me what happened there. He said he was especially glad, simply happy, to witness Anatoly Ivanov’s speech—he is one of the Black Hundred, a dinosaur, a member of the “back to the soil” movement. From the first words he began to “strip” and appeared completely exposed. His main idea was that something like the CC resolution “on the journal *Ogonek* and *Leningrad*” should be made. Then there would be order.

I, A.N. said, saw how M.S.’s jaw fell. But he reacted indirectly. [Mikhail] Shatrov²⁵ spoke against Ivanov, and M.S. supported Shatrov.

What will happen at the Writers’ Congress?

The day after speaking with Yakovlev, I did the following.

About ten days before “the described events,” Boris Mozhaev came to visit me (he is a well known writer, a village-writer). For a long time he made me laugh by his stories of what’s going on at their Congress. He is angry, venomous, a master of imitation, a real verbal acrobat, and simply made me almost die of laughter at his portrayal of Markov and Karpov (the literary generals). They’ve been using their power in the Writers’ Union to delay Mozhaev’s new novel (“Muzhiki i babi [peasant men and peasant women],” part 2) for two years. He took apart Alekseev, and everyone who makes commonplace literature—“the secretary novels.” He left the foreword to “Muzhiki i babi” with me, as well as a review of VASKHNIL²⁶ academician [Vladimir] Tikhonov’s novel. The novel deals with the events of 1929-30, with collectivization, which dealt a fatal blow to agriculture and to socialism.

He also left me his 110-page article on the present-day Soviet literature, in which he scathes the vulgar writers and the literary bosses.

He asked me to report and show all this to Gorbachev. I did not do it right away then, but after Chebrikov’s note and conversation with Yakovlev I could no longer keep

²⁵ Prominent playwright, author of *Onward, Onward, Onward*—a radical play about Lenin, which was staged in Moscow in 1987.

²⁶ All-Union Academy of Agriculture

Mozhaev's requests to myself. I added my note [to the material], saying that these are the kinds of people who show up in the department of opposition and anti-sovietism. If this is really the case, then it is difficult to understand the April line in all the other respects as well.

Gorbachev read my note and kept all the materials. I wonder what will this come to. It is reassuring that M.S. could not come round after Ivanov's speech and called Yakovlev several times, asking where such people are coming from, these people are wood lice.

Yakovlev thinks that Gorbachev was put on guard by the fact that the KGB chairman presented his note to the General Secretary and was sure that this position of his would meet with understanding and support.

December 3, 1986.

Yakovlev, whom I congratulated on his birthday, told me: "Yesterday I was speaking with the General Secretary about this and that, about literature, different obstacles, we were preparing his meeting with theater people. Then he suddenly started speaking about you (that is, about me). What a 100% direct hit we got, he says. What a guy. Remember when we were looking for somebody to replace Aleksandrov? And we found him, no one could be better. Staggering capacity for work, and he says what he thinks, does not try to adjust, does not adulate."

"And then," Yakovlev says, "he even 'slandered' you: 'he's smart' he says! What luck!"

Thanks, I told him. If, of course, you didn't make it up.

— Upon my word! I swear. Of course I agreed with him, especially since I was your sponsor.

What is startling is something else... that I was not very stirred by this. Even though not everyone or every day happens to get this kind of an evaluation from the CC CPSU General Secretary.

I must be very tired. And I have grown up. Even praise does not move me much—the meaning of life is not in it. But where is it?

However, he speaks about himself with the words from the song "if there was only a motherland..." Truly. There is a revolution going on: one has only to glance at the newspapers and journals every day.

And if one could hear what he says at the PB and in closed circles!

December 7th, 1986.

I want to write and I am afraid to do it, because no matter how much I try to write there will not be enough time to even outline what happens every day around M.S. Before my eyes he is growing into a major figure in our history.

I see him every day candidly, with all of the ordinary nuances of his nature, his behavior, his educational level—but all of this in no way lowers the greatness of this man in my “intelligentsia” (snobbish) eyes.

I record in detail what he says, how he leads the PB. When I retire I will be able to recreate it... of course, with the loss of a living sensation of it. However, much of what happens one on one with him or with a third person, especially if it's Yakovlev, I naturally cannot write down in his presence...

Much that is distinctive comes through in his talks with foreigners (like the day before yesterday, for example, with the Norwegian lady Brundtland)... or in my one on one contacts with him (which happen late at the night, for the most part), during the visit to India in his part of the presidential palace. This gets lost because there is no chance to record it... you leave him with some kind of an assignment that you have to work on immediately instead of writing down your impressions.

Nevertheless, history will not forgive me if I do not leave for posterity my testimony about this person, even if subjective, for only I (and maybe Yakovlev also) see him in the frank and open state.

From what I did not record in the last several days:

- talk with Kovalev in my presence, about the meeting with theater figures;
- my talk with him about Dobrynin and the International Department... and his phone call yesterday. He already spoke with him and referred to me, but assures me that he was not offended.
- How he protects Raisa Maksimovna! He did not send her the note from *Le Monde* about how she looks abroad.
- Talk about Aksyonov, the cosmonaut who came to me to complain that our SDI is not at all asymmetric.

The last Politburo... About India.

This Politburo will go down in history... not because of India, but because of the prices for sausage. We almost had a fight because Ligachev spoke from the “populist” position in defense of the poor.

And he offended M.S. quite badly, because M.S. understands well that perestroika will not happen if we keep strictly to the norms of a “social” state, i.e. wage-leveling.

Ligachev spoke in the name of the people who are used to living parasitically off the state, even not working at all. Although all the retired, the poor, the disabled, the failures, the students, etc. are in this group as well.

The argument was rough, and only Ryzhkov supported M.S. strongly and directly. Vorotnikov, Solomentsev, and indirectly even Shevarnadze inclined towards Yeg. K. [Ligachev]

I have never seen M.S. so furious (and so upset) at a PB before. “I see my role as the General Secretary—if it’s going this way—in taking down this question, closing the discussion, and assigning the Council of Ministers to examine the question once again. Otherwise we would get to blows here. As it is now, we are on the verge of a rift.”

And what happens in newspapers and journals?

Voznesensky reinstated Khodasevitch in *Ogonek* and Nabokov in *Noviy Mir*.¹ A certain Lev Voskresensky published in *Moskovskie Novosti* [*Moscow news*] on November 30 a reply to the Englishman—what is the difference between perestroika and the New Economic Policy. And he wrote in black and white that the New Economic Policy was repealed too soon, and science still needs to figure out what the consequences of that were. In every issue of the thick journals there is something like this, or something is forthcoming.

December 8th, 1986.

Today I summarized three meetings between Gorbachev and the smaller NATO people—Shluter, Lubbers, Brundtland. M.S.’ conclusion: who believes in the Soviet threat? People are holding on to NATO not because they are afraid of us, but because they are afraid of the US.

I had to re-write Gorbachev’s talk with Brundtland for the MFA people: everything seems all right but so sterilized that his characteristic expressions, thought nuances, and humor were gone.

I dictated an assignment to Krasin (a consultant) to prepare ideas for the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution on the main issue: perestroika and the fate of world development, pluralization [sic] rather than unification of the revolution.

Dunaev came over. He described the prospects of Japan and our relations with them.

Shevardnadze called and promised to give me the material for Nadjibullah's visit, but only tomorrow. I asked him to clear up the issue of the line of the China-India border in our atlases. He wants to send [Yevgeny] Primakov as ambassador to India, he praised him and compared him to Lunacharsky.

Gorbachev declined *Spiegel* an interview, again because of Kohl, who compared him to Goebbels. My persuasions did not outweigh the opinions of Dobrynin and Shevardnadze.

Zagladin keeps wanting to prove to me that Dobrynin is not in the right place. Instead of helping him, which he should as his first deputy, he is scheming against him.

December 10th, 1986.

Kutsenkov visited me yesterday (my old friend, a major ideologist). He brought a survey of a heap of newspapers from India. We should not build any illusions, he says. No euphoria. Right now everything is "in the formative stage," even the emotions!

Kokoshin visited (Arbatov's deputy). Brought a note: "America's perspectives."

It is scholarly but there is not enough courage (or analysis) to say what we should expect from America and how to behave in the future. In a word, it is not PB material yet.

I spoke with Dobrynin about M.S.' idea to create something like a National Security Council under the PB. He keeps thinking about how it functions in his America, and says that it would not work for us. What will work for us? I think if we decide to create it, then it should be done with the participation of Arbatov, Falin, Vorontsov, Kovalev, Kryuchkov, and maybe some people from among the major economists—specialists in Western [economy], even though we do not have "Varg" anymore and Mileykovsky is small... And some smart fellows from the SCST and SCER [should be involved]. Some people from the International Department: Zagladin, consultants, Lisovolik (he worked in America).

Dobrynin wants to talk to me about the department (he's under the effect of a talk M.S. had with him). Zagladin is snobbishly offended and wants to "prove" that Dobrynin does not understand anything. He himself spent all of fall abroad on four assignments and has been out sick for a month. He called me, promised to "talk" about Dobrynin. I should not agree to this talk; I should not give Dobrynin reason to think that I am intriguing against him. I really do not want to butter up Dobrynin, I want to help him.

Dobrynin offered Brutents to go as ambassador to India. Brutents panicked: why did Dobrynin make such an offer? Although in general he wouldn't mind it! But he called Shevardnadze and he said that he will be nominating Primakov.

There are materials for Najibullah's visit. I disliked and rejected (at lunch) the speech and re-wrote it, but for M.S.' talks everything is intelligible, smart, only... made with a twist at what Shevardnadze said at the PB: it is time to stop seeing Afghanistan as an occupied and confined country. It is an independent state... and [should be regarded] only this way!

But there is excess in the promised economic aid... we will be left shirtless ourselves, not to mention that the "new Afghanistan" will appear in 100 years.

And some more details: we should tell Najibullah to act without glancing back at the [Soviet] advisers, and to tell us how many and which ones he needs, the rest we will remove at once. I will suggest this to M.S.

On Monday M.S. will receive Hart (American Senator) and the ambassador of England. The department and the MFA started fussing about who will present the materials to M.S., since I'm not there they are just afraid to do it. Here it is, that very funnel [sic] that, I think, the *Sunday Times* [sic] wrote about me.

I've paid off a loan from 1952! Remembered those days, the university.

December 11th, 1986.

A Politburo day that I did not attend, I'm sick. Finished the material for M.S.' one on one talk with Najibullah. Then [finished] the material for his meeting with the English ambassador. Then [I wrote] all kinds of notes explaining what I changed in the material prepared by the Afghan committee. And there were constant calls from Dobrynin, Vorontsov, from the reception room, from Lukyanov, etc.

Falin [sent me] his thoughts on personnel policies for the Plenum (M.S. gave this "assignment" to write to him personally on what every person thinks, without being cautious about anything). So some people send the material directly to him, and some do it through me. They write and say such things, for which they would have been expelled from the party within 24 hours about a year and a half ago...

Something similar [was done] a month ago at Yakovlev's request, when he was disappointed by what the Party Organization Department prepared (about personnel) for the Plenum. I collected "opinions" about personnel from Kozlov, Weber, Yermovsky (the department consultants). They were even more angry and frank than Falin.

On the whole, we are crawling into a new stage of Soviet history. Today I looked through many journals and newspapers of the past months, through *Literaturka* [*Literturnaya Gazeta*] and Lavrov's report on creating a Theater Union!

One feature... Today in *Pravda* there is an article on the 130th anniversary of Plekhanov. Not a word about opportunism or revisionism... A tragedy of a great figure. Indeed! How the Stalinists must be feeling now, and all the people who learned from the *Concise Course* and the Ponomarev textbook.

A revolution is in progress. But it is still slow, because the fired scoundrels get a considerable pension and the opportunity to "stink up." A revolution deals differently with the former leaders. But then it would not be a Gorbachev's revolution.

December 13th, 1986.

I am lonely at heart. I am even frightened to go on vacation... as if I am losing time and there is so little of it left. There is a feeling that now vacation is not a way to restore strength. It cannot be restored anymore. It would be better if it wasn't a total vacation, but just a month of a "free schedule..." And not to go anywhere. And that nobody would be at home.

M.S. said to Dobrynin... to all PB members after meeting with the Yugoslavs: "That's it! I've had enough of foreign affairs. And you Eduard, and you Dobrynin, quiet down please. I am tired of it. Every day I take a folder with me and study it till 2 a.m. That's it! I am switching to the internal front. And we need to prepare for the Plenum. As soon as I receive Hart and the English."

And my leave time is just at this time. Once again: since it's a vacation I'd rather get loose and get away somewhere, not sit in a sanatorium.

Al. Beck's *The New Appointment* is a strong work. We are beginning to restore history... at a time when the youth is already not very interested in our past. Here is the breach in the link between generations.

December 14th, 1986.

Shatrov's speech at the Theater Congress in the Kremlin (M.S. was present). I thought: an irreversible process has started in ideology. Only Yezhov or Beria could stop it. And M.S. is acting wisely by clearly encouraging it, by letting people like Shatrov, [Yevgeny] Yevtushenko, and others know—go ahead while the going is good. And for now he himself is refraining from openly adding Stalin and Stalinism [to the ideology change]. Maybe this is why he does not stop Ligachev and his conservatism, so the

torrent does not burst too strongly—if it did, we would all have to switch to the superstructure,²⁷ while right now the most important is economics.

So let the ideology work through self-financing for a year or so. Let that “little bit” that he asked me to convey to Boffe, keep working in history for a while yet, until Gorbachev himself makes a statement about the New Economic Policy, collectivization, and Stalin.

December 15th, 1986.

I was at M.S.’ meeting with senator Hart, who came with his daughter. M.S. was at his best. He depicted a model of an ideal modern president, who, if he appeared, could really demonstrate “the greatness of America.” He argued about illusionism, romanticism, and the other [traits] ascribed to him. The stability of the world is, by the way, holding on this illusionism right now.

He invited the daughter to see what the Soviet Union is like in reality—to travel around and see. She replied: I will help my father in the presidential campaign and will take advantage of your invitation only after 1988! That’s how it is!

M.S.’ meeting with the English ambassador. The guy brought a message from Thatcher, an impudent one. M.S. [summarized it]: “She gave a thrashing to me and Reagan” for a perfunctory approach in Reykjavik. But realism, madam, is a dead end. It was proven in Geneva. Got very mad and quite undiplomatically “portaged” the ambassador. He promised to report everything. M.S.: “I know why I spoke!”

He is not going to Zavidovo. He said that he did not have anything to go with yet. That means the 130 pages that Yakovlev brought him on Saturday are not at the right level yet.

Today I am already formally on vacation, but I spent half of the day at work. I said goodbye to the papers. Especially significant are Arbatov’s ciphered telegrams from the United States.

Alas! The efficiency coefficient of this type of information for our policy and propaganda even under Gorbachev does not exceed that of the locomotive.

Yesterday I spent half the day on foreigners’ letters to Gorbachev. While we were in the south, my second room got crammed with them. There are all kinds of letters: requests for interviews, requests for autographs on books, postcards and photos. Some ask him to write articles for journals and newspapers. There are a ton of requests for meetings. There are requests to release the dissidents that are still imprisoned.

²⁷ In Marxist terminology, the upper “structure” [*nadstroika*] of the socio-political formation, consisting of culture, education, religion and ideology.

A belated (the PB members already voted “for” it) page-proof came across my desk, for an article called “L.I. Brezhnev. For the 80th anniversary of his birthday.” I was shocked. I called my stenographer and dictated my indignant conclusion, then called the reception room and asked to immediately deliver it to Gorbachev. He read it in the evening and called me, told me to pass the note to another adviser Lushchikov, who supervised this article. With displeasure, Lushchikov let me know that I was poking my nose into other people’s affairs. He said it had been voted on, and that the material is already at *Pravda*. But I insisted alluding to the fact that now they were not [just] my remarks but the General Secretary’s.

Vlasov (Albert Ivanovich, deputy head of the Information Department) came over. He said that the PB chose a poor time to declare the repeal of the moratorium on nuclear explosions. I agreed and right away wrote a note to Gorbachev, saying that rather than on December 18th, it would be better do it at the beginning of January, after the New Years and Christmas. He sent my note around the PB, but Shevardnadze and Dobrynin persuaded me over. Eduard Amvrosievich calls me and says: it doesn’t really matter now, we’ve notified the G6, the socialist countries, and the communist parties... And the advantages? What advantages, when there are only drawbacks to this decision of ours! No matter how to you try to prove otherwise...

– That’s true too! I agreed.

Postscript for 1986

In the beginning of this year (early February) the author of these notes became Gorbachev’s foreign policy adviser. His observations of Gorbachev’s behavior, manners, and actions acquired the character of a live, everyday personal and official contact.

Attention is drawn to Gorbachev’s phenomenal frankness in evaluating the situation and in signaling his intentions. Gorbachev expresses brave ideas that were shocking to the people around him; many of these ideas never were realized. He is relentless in criticizing what we had and how things are done.

Gorbachev encourages the “unwinding” of glasnost, but he still sees it as the party’s tool for carrying out transformations, not as “free speech” that operates by its own logic.

He resolutely stops Ponomarev’s (in essence the Comintern’s) way of practicing relations with foreign communist parties and the communist movement in general. But he is still certain that when liberated from the CPSU’s guardianship and completely

independent, the foreign communist parties will be able to get a fresh breath and in that quality still keep a future.

In other words, he does not break with the presentation of the USSR as an “ideological power,” but he has gotten very far in establishing principally new relations with the West, and in forming foreign policy he absolutely excludes the ideological component—confrontation and incompatibility. The term “**new thinking**” has not been used yet, but in principle it is already “working.”

He is more and more concerned about securing personnel for the transformation. However, so far he has no doubt that the CPSU can and must become its leading and propelling power. With all his dislike of idolatry and dogmatism, Gorbachev continues to solemnly believe that appeals to Lenin and “Lenin’s approach” can serve not only as a moral, but also as a practically effective lever for the realization of his plans.

This year the cohort of the “founding fathers” of perestroika (Ligachev, Ryzhkov, Vorotnikov...) was still working in accord, with the leading team of Gorbachev-Yakovlev.

In this “volume,” as in the others, there are many of the author’s personal concerns and thoughts. He found himself in a new position, a more influential but less independent one; [he is] much more responsibility-laden and very overworked.

The illusions about “opening prospects” for his “socialist motherland” are still solid in his eyes. His conformism is explained and excused by his proximity to Gorbachev and the hopes for success in his work. So far the hopes have not collided with his intellectual doubts too strongly.

If we try to give a formula to Gorbachev’s evolution in 1986, it might be the following: exceptional courage in words and evaluation of problems, and caution in actions.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1987

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

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January 10, 1987

I was on vacation from [December] 19 till January 8 at the “Rus” sanatorium near Ruza. There was skiing, tennis. But it’s boring. I even wanted to bolt from there. But I stayed and in general did not regret it.

I read a great deal: newspapers, journals; I was able to follow the “train of thought” of the present-day press. It is truly a grand phenomenon. Like Lenin, M.S. [Gorbachev] understood that he also needs to start his revolution from an *Iskra* [Spark]¹. Full independence of the press. And people are really writing what they are thinking without glancing over their shoulder or being afraid of anybody... all this, of course, within the limits of their writing abilities and journalistic talent. Incidentally, a whole heap of journalistic talent has sprung up like mushrooms after good showers. Where did all this come from!..

And there is a storm [шквал] in literature, film, and theater... By the way, right now with the first issues of the year’s journals the change is becoming evident. The vices, failures, the outrages have been named; every day there are plenty of them in the newspapers. But what should literature do? Before, it timidly tried to name these things in its bravest works. Now everything has been named. The trial by truth took place last year: Astafiev’s *Pechal’niy Detektiv* [The Sad Detective Story], Rasputin’s *Pozhar* [The Fire], Aitmatov’s *Plakha* [The Scaffold], Bykov’s *Koster* [The Bonfire], Bely’s *Vse Vpered!* [Everything is Ahead]... etc. And what are literature, film, and theater supposed to do now?

One idea is clearly visible when the year is regarded in retrospect: dig deep and show who is to blame. What was the real cause of [what happened in] the 60s, 70s, and early 80s?

People are writing openly about this. The critics and publicists are calling for it. Nobody raises any objections. This means everything will happen as Gorbachev said, as he says right now in a narrow circle: “We’ve failed socialism, nothing is left of it...”

It seems he will dot many an “i” at the forthcoming Plenum, where he will give a four-hour report. People say that not only the events in Kazakhstan, but also the nationalistic eruptions in Ukraine—i.e. [Vladimir] Shcherbitsky’s fate—will be “present” [in Gorbachev’s report].

Meanwhile: G.L. Smirnov is now director of IMEL [Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin] (replacing Yegorov)... He is not the right man for the job. Even though he is an honest man, he does not have the strength, innovation, and knowledge to make this establishment into the headquarters of theory. But, he is a friend of [Alexander]

¹ *Iskra* (the Spark) was a newspaper Lenin formed in 1903 to promote his revolutionary ideas and organize his followers.

Yakovlev. [Yakovlev] “made” him one of Gorbachev’s advisers, and he fixed him with this “warm” position, while the position is actually on fire.

Rakhmanin is going to be the rector of the MLSH [Mezhdunarodnaia Leninskaia Shkola, International Lenin School].² It is clear that considering today’s policy regarding socialist countries and China he should have been removed long ago. But not to the International (Lenin) School—to the communists! Supposedly [Vadim] Zagladin (and [Anatoly] Dobrynin, from Zagladin’s words) objected to this, but [Yegor] Ligachev explained to them that the man needed to be placed somewhere while he is still a CC member, etc. And that’s that. This is in relation to the “personnel policies” issue.

The International Department is not happy with Dobrynin. They say his New Year’s greetings were “insulting.” In a word, the department cannot adjust to him, and he cannot adapt himself to the department. They won’t accomplish much together, I guess.

January 18, 1987

I worked on Saturday. M.S. came back from Zavidovo with a report for the Plenum. I read it. I also read a selection of letters about the Plenum—personnel policies.

M.S. called me and asked what I thought of the report. I told him that it was stronger and more significant than the XXII Congress. “I also think so,” Gorbachev said.

(He asked me what I was doing at the dacha, we talked about skiing.) “Can you ski?” [Gorbachev asked]. He’s a southerner—for him it is necessary to “know” how to ski.

Then I reported my thoughts about the forthcoming meeting with the Americans (Kissinger & Co.) and about the speech at the forum for humanitarian issues (in mid-February)—Gorbachev wants our conception of “human rights” to be drawn up.

I’m reading [Daniil] Granin’s *Zubr* [The Bison].

June 6, 1987

² Oleg Rakhmanin, a conservative first deputy head of the Central Committee socialist countries department, published an article in Pravda on June 21, 1985, in which he tried to undermine Gorbachev’s new policy toward the allies and criticized independent developments in those countries as nationalist. Gorbachev criticized the article at the Politburo and made the decision then to remove him from his position. The eventual removal took place only in January 1987.

It is a crime that I've neglected the diary. I've already sworn in here several times that it must be almost entirely about Gorbachev. He has brought about a great era in our country. And he himself is growing and becoming a truly exceptional figure in all of Russia's history. But do I have what it takes (the ability) to reflect it properly? At least to put down an outline? After all, nobody else is doing it.

Gorbachev's book is in the works now (after my insistence—in response to proposals from two American publishing houses Harper & Row and Simon & Schuster). Yakovlev and Dobrynin wanted to respond with yet another collection of his speeches. I suggested putting together a book of records from M.S.' conversations with foreigners and my notes from when I was present at his narrow circle PB [Politburo] conversations. He liked the idea. For a month and a half we (myself, Shishlin, Ambartsumov, Weber, Kozlov) sat at the Gorky dacha putting together such a volume, systematized by theme—from his natural and brave speech. He read parts of it, got very interested. But it is clear that he has reservations as well: how will his colleagues take it? After all, these are not collectively presented ideas and words (even though they are his thoughts). This is his ideology and style of perestroika. Here one can see his personality, character, style, traits, his secret intentions, his readiness to really go far—he doesn't even know himself where and how far. But he “feels” that it will be (and has to be) a totally different socialism from the one that was advertised for 60 years and which has entered the society's genotype.

Recently he said to me that we would “come back” to this book and told me to give it to [Ivan] Frolov to read. (He believes in him and shows him friendliness and respect... But I think he is overestimating Frolov's abilities. Frolov's relentless anti-Brezhnevism wins one over).

I can't describe in detail right now everything that has happened over these months. But at least as an overview...

May 29. Late evening. Vnukovo-2. Gorbachev greets everyone. Smiles. His eyes are fierce. He closed himself in the “special room” with the PB members and CC secretaries. Then the secretaries and candidates came out. For another half an hour [he spoke] only with the members. He exited looking jokingly menacing. He barked out to us (the advisers): tomorrow at 11 o'clock at the Politburo.

On May 30 at the Politburo [Alexander] Koldunov³ and [Sergey] Sokolov⁴ were removed (for the FRG [Mathias] Rust's airplane landing by the St. Basil's Cathedral).

While this was going on I was sitting in my office and writing him a note about the shame and disgrace, about the fact that in such cases the military ministers in

³ Alexander Koldunov—Head of Air Defenses of USSR Armed Forces

⁴ Sergey Sokolov—USSR Defense Minister

“bourgeois democracies” resign, and that we need yet another, the fourth since the times of Peter I, fundamental “military reform.”

In the evening: over the phone from his dacha he told me how everything went at the PB. He began by saying that in such cases the entire leadership and the military council including its chairman should resign. That’s fine—[they] embarrassed the country, humiliated the people... But let everyone—here and in the West—know where our power is; that it is in the political leadership, in the Politburo. Now the wailers who said that the military is in opposition to Gorbachev, that it is about to overthrow him, that all he does was to keep glancing over his shoulder at the military—these wailers will have to quiet down. He said all this furiously and spoke for a long time, with many pauses. It was clear that he wanted to let some steam out.

On June 2 [Gorbachev had] a meeting with the Doctors’ Movement (the Moscow congress, Laun & Co.). He charmed everyone once again. And there are always new aspects of thoughts in his impromptu speeches. He told [us] with interest how together with Yakovlev he talked with the most important people at this congress, about evaluations that they gave him “personally.”

To me he said (in response to my question): don’t go too much... to the press... about the talk... Everyone laughed. Yakovlev commented: you received the most typical orders. And M.S. himself is laughing.

A day after the PB, when he suddenly decided to receive Tiwari (from Gandhi). Dobrynin and I sat together in his office, waiting for this Tiwari. “You—he addressed Dobrynin—tell Anatoly what the Australian doctor says about me in regard to my meeting with Laun & Co... The doctor made a surprising observation... “I,” he says (and he said this at the press conference, as well), “watched Gorbachev during the meeting as a ‘doctor observes a patient.’”

While Dobrynin was telling me this, I observed M.S.... There is not a shadow of conceit in him, as if it’s not even him we were speaking about... he already sees himself as an instrument of *perestroika*... at least when he reads the Western press’ compliments about him.

June 4—PB. [Gorbachev] decided the date for the Plenum. He said that soon he would go away to prepare for it. He will only chair the meeting on Monday. He’s thought of something again. He invited academicians, some party workers. I don’t even know what it is about.

Yakovlev stopped by in the evening. He brought a flyer that black hundredists⁵ from “Pamyat”⁶ [Memory] are distributing around Moscow. It is called “Stop

⁵ Originally a conservative movement in the beginning of the 20th century that supported the Russian tsar and fought against the revolutionary movements.

Yakovlev!,” who is portrayed as the head of Zionism-Masonry, as the main threat to all the Russian sacred things. He paced around my office for a long time. I tried to convince him to just shrug it off and not tell M.S. that he is worried about it. But it turns out that he [Gorbachev] has already responded to it (and said to Yakovlev): “Do you think this is directed against you (Yakovlev)? No. This is against me (Gorbachev).” And he is right.

Yakovlev almost had tears in his eyes when he told me how hard it was for him right now. After all, this scum has Ligachev’s and [Vitaly] Vorotnikov’s direct support. He suspects that the flyer was not made without [Viktor] Chebrikov’s assistance. I thought this to be inconceivable. Yakovlev said: “I am a Russian bumpkin [muzhik], a peasant from Yaroslavl⁶, but anti-Semitism, or any kind of nationalism is physically disgusting to me... it makes me sick. Not even to mention state interests, if the Russian chauvinism is aroused right now, it would cause such a storm in the provinces, such nationalism, that all our “empire” would begin to crack.”

Yesterday I sent [Aleksandr] Askol’dov’s (director of the film “The Commissar” [Komissar]) letter to M.S., as well as the letter written by three other people: Borshchagovskiy, Shtein, and Zorin. They are asking for his intervention. Yakovlev, to whom Askol’dov already wrote, was not able to get past the MC [Moscow Committee] and the CPC [Committee of Party Control]. I decided to include Gorbachev in the process, tempting him by saying that the film is worth seeing. It’s powerful. And what actors! But they are letting the author rot “because of prejudices” (anti-Semitism) and esprit de corps. Plus the indifference. Ligachev, who saw the film and said, “I will not allow it,” is behind this. Then again, he said the same thing about *The Children of the Arbat* [Deti Arbata]. But the novel is being printed. He was against sending *The Repentance* [Pokaianie] to Cannes. But the film went and got a prize.

I composed a “frame” for the international section for the 70th anniversary of the October. Gave it to Frolov (M.S. assigned him to lead this topic). So far it is only a “denial” of Stalinism in our international history. Will it go through?.. I’ll have to work some more.

In the *Novy mir* article “Advance Payments and Debts” [Avansy i dolgi] [Nikolai] Shmelev reveals the essence of what we have done with the country and says that indeed we still have very far to go. The orthodox have already made their stand. In the “dressing-room” [предбанник] of the PB I walked up to Frolov and [Viktor] Afanasiev. They were speaking about the article... I expressed my enthusiasm. Then Ivan [Frolov] told me that I shocked *Pravda*’s chief editor: this kind of an evaluation from you, while I (Afanasiev) heard differently. What’s a poor peasant to do?.. I think that Shmelev’s article also will not be to Ligachev-Vorotnikov’s liking.

⁶ Reactionary informal movement and later non-governmental organization established to protect Russian heritage.

I asked M.S. whether he has read it already. He said not yet, but Frolov already put it on his desk.

Shmelev is also the author of a deep and sweet novel called *The Pashkov House* [Pashkov dom]—it is as if it was written about the 50s of my life, university, Leninka⁷...

There is a foul article in “Pravda” called “Historicism of Thought”... formulating the orthodoxy’s methods of fighting against perestroika.

And Volkogonov (deputy of Lizachev—chief of the Soviet Army’s Policy Control) writes notes to Frolov: against pacifism in the “new thinking.”

June 12, 1989

About “Pamyat’.” The PB discussed a note that Gorbachev assigned to Ligachev, Chebrikov, and Yakovlev to prepare. Here as well he rose above all of them. Actually he had not intended to broaden the discussion. But [Nikolai] Ryzhkov started it smartly, and [Vladimir] Dolgikh, [Eduard] Shevardnadze, Ligachev, and Vorotnikov joined in, while [Andrey] Gromyko used the opportunity to add Burlatsky’s TV show (“From one cabinet” [Iz odnogo kabineta]). M.S. gave a whole conception of the *glasnost* process in relation to this, and an evaluation of what we have right now. I made a record and sent it to him. And I left a copy for myself.

On Shmelev’s article. Arbatov keeps calling, he’s afraid that he’ll get in trouble because of it. The article has the logic of tar [логика дегтя]: the justification of the necessity of unemployment. A politician cannot accept that if he wants the masses to support *perestroika*.

And that is why he said about [Sergey] Zalygin (editor of *Novy Mir*): I respect him, but if Sergey Pavlovich wants to offer us capitalism instead of socialism we do not need that kind of an editor. However he objected to removing editors. He reminded everyone of Anatoly Ivanov’s proposal at the meeting with writers (we should have a new resolution on *Zvezda* [Star] and *Leningrad* journals). We would give the wrong signal, he said.

When Ligachev complained that he already spoke with Zalygin four times and would like to get something done so he would not have to speak with him a fifth time, M.S. laughed and said: “Remember how the Chinese gave the 391st serious warning...”

Gromyko made a vile attack on [Fyodor] Burlatsky. He did it in the old style, as he used to do when he was Chairman of the PB Committee on Foreign Policy

⁷ Lenin’s Library, now the Russian State Library—the biggest library in the USSR, the old building of which was called the Pashkov House.

Propaganda under [Konstantin] Chernenko. [Back then] he only had to name the author or columnist and that person immediately disappeared from the pages of journals and from the screen. This time nobody responded except Shevardnadze, who very emotionally said some sharp words to this dotard, taking Burlatsky directly under his protection and condemning the very approach Gromyko used, the very method of such “criticism.”

Today I wrote to M.S. my “impressions” of this trick that Gromyko pulled. And assuming that M.S. did not see the broadcast himself I described to him the way it really happened, and not how Gromyko lied about it. In any case, M.S. despises him deeply. [Gorbachev] sinks more and more of [Gromyko’s] silly “initiatives” in international issues, and sometimes he just ignores them, as if Gromyko did not say anything. The latter sits and grows red in the face, and then... “surfaces” once again.

I wrote both parts of the international section’s preliminary theses for the 70th anniversary of the October [Revolution]. Spoke with Frolov. He liked it and gave it to his two “boys” (Latsis and one other one), who prepare his “work” in this sphere. He puts me on guard. He scorns [Aleksandr] Bovin’s, Zagladin’s, [Georgy] Arbatov’s, and Burlatsky’s immodesty and conceit, but at the same time he is conceited about his modesty. By his essence he is not an intellectual, even though he is a Corresponding Member [of the Academy of Sciences] and a scholar. As a result I do not believe that he is honest. I am open with him. I do not hide my opinions... But Karyakin, who was his bosom-friend, warns me that this man is a professional traitor. I also do not believe him because he still respects [Pyotr] Demichev,⁸ he thinks that Demichev is progressive, while one can see with the naked eye that the man was and is a riff-raff and a nonentity.

I asked Galkin to visit me today. I asked him to look at my “theses” and to “put them in order” if he agrees with the conception in general.

M.S. retired to Volynskoe-2 with Yakovlev. They are preparing the Plenum report, which is compared in significance with 1921 and 1929...

June 14, 1987

I was at the CC for only six hours.

It was clear that M.S. read my proposal to meet with Rust (to tell him: “What have you done, you milksop [сопляк]?”) since he sent Rust’s parents’ letters around the PB. But he did not call me—neither about this nor about anything else, including my mention that his “book” we are planning needs the impulse that he promised.

⁸ Pyotr Demichev—conservative Candidate Member of the Politburo, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He was sent into retirement in October 1988.

It seems like [Uliy] Kvitsinsky (Ambassador to the FRG) has thrown him off course by making a fuss about Reagan “at the Wall” and the commotion the GDR youth raised over the rock music on the other side of the Brandenburg gate. Sometimes M.S. is prone to momentary bursts of emotion (at individual instances), but this is not reflected in the [policy] line. He restrains himself... then admits that emotions are not for politics. Sometimes he even checked me when I suggested snapping at something from the West.

[Ilya] Erenburg’s concluding chapters (*People, Years, Life* [Ludi, gody, zhizn’]) have been published in three issues of *Ogonek*. He describes the Khrushchev years. And we all look like such idiots—out society fixated on dogmas, fears, suspicions, hate. A terrible lack of political culture combined with a unique spiritual wealth of almost everyone privy to the intellectual milieu. Truly... Stalin and Stalinism have profoundly broken our people. But what’s happening right now shows that [the people] remain healthy and free “inside,” in the inmost recesses of their spirituality and souls: as soon as *glasnost* provided some breathing space everything rushed to the surface. And now it could only be stopped by recessions [рецессиями].

But I already mentioned that at the PB while discussing “Pamyat” nobody offered to suppress them... Some (Ryzhkov, Ligachev) even specifically said that under no circumstances would they be in favor of suppressing them, even though “something needs to be done” with the leaders of “Pamyat” as well as the “Shmelevs,” who offer unemployment. But God forbid we frustrate, stop, or cross democracy and *glasnost*. M.S. made the following conclusion about it: while the other mechanisms of *perestroika* are not yet running smoothly, *glasnost* alone is supporting the process.

Having daily contact with the western press one sees what an enormous change Gorbachev caused in people’s minds all over the world. In essence, he has already laid the foundation for a new era in international relations. The people who do not want the new thinking and are afraid of it still have to *de facto* participate in the Seven game in Venice, and the reaction to it in the world shows this very clearly. Public opinion surveys all over the Western Europe show that Gorbachev has surpassed Reagan as “the ruler” of the political atmosphere in Europe.

I was at the museum of fine arts at the Russian-French exhibition. How unattractive our counts, princes, and their daughters and wives were, except for the Shuvalovs—faces with “un-Russian expressions.” There were silver and diamond studded gold pieces: it was a totally different life, if so much labor, patience, talent, time and money was invested in such things! And now all of that brings only one question to a normal person’s mind—what was it for? I also noticed the dresses and camisoles from the times of Peter I and Catherine (including her own dresses). How petite people were two centuries ago! The average present-day woman, or even a young woman or a girl would not fit into Ekaterina’s dress, and she was considered a good-sized woman in her day. In general, one sees very few beautiful women on the streets and in the crowds of people [nowadays].

I read some Pushkin and kept coming across poems that have later been made into romances one sometimes hears on the radio. I just feel like spitting at it. I would forbid it. But it's too late: Tchaikovsky and Glinka started the vulgarization of Pushkin. And it continues to this day. And they are delighted by it, saying that he inspired this and that... while in reality it's just an outcome of mediocrity and something foreign touching a genius.

June 15, 1987

Gorbachev calls me: are you alive, Anatoly Sergeich⁹?

- How is everything with the preparation of the Women's Congress? You know, more feelings are necessary there. We can attract this audience to our policies through emotion. It cannot be done otherwise. Remember Engels? He said: "Woman is a different civilization." We should proceed from that.
- I replied: Yes, Engels was a pro in this subject matter.
- He laughs: Well, for lack of personal experience we will have to lean on the classic.
- I: You are being modest, Mikhail Sergeyevich.
- He: Alright. You understand what I meant. We need [to discuss] Venice, Reykjavik, West Berlin. The world has shifted. Society feels the realities and is interested in our policies. Remember how Yakovlev and others protested against publishing the results of West European surveys about Gorbachev being better liked than Reagan and having done more for peace. They are afraid that we might cultivate a cult.
- Why? – I objected.
- I do not see any cult here.
- I: I also do not see one. And in general, Mikhail Sergeyevich, the people are receiving you properly. There are no associations with the past, despite the fact that you are in every newspaper. This is deserved authority. Remember Pushkin? "He was a worker on the throne" ([Gorbachev] laughs).
- M.S.: So we see the reality and society is beginning to see it too. And we make real policies, rather than putting up a cheap traveling show (that was about

⁹ Sergeich is the short and familiar form of the patronymic Sergeyevich.

Reagan in West Berlin)¹⁰. He is putting up this farce to win back Venice, which the world forced them to agree to. At the same time he is provoking us, so we that we would break down and help them to bring back the “Soviet threat.” If I gave weekly interviews like Reagan I would say that after eight years he has not been able to break free from his former profession. It’s good that you sent me records of my speeches from the last PB. Only you have an incorrect record there: it was the leaders of “Pamyat” who called the XXVII Congress a “congregation of scum and prostitutes,” rather than me calling their “society” that. I cited them, you didn’t hear me. But you are right—it is a congregation of scum and prostitutes.

But in general it was a major talk at the PB. And everyone spoke well. We are growing, getting better. We are becoming educated in this.

- I: That’s for sure, Mikhail Sergeyevich, especially when you gave the descriptions from the words of western propaganda:

Gorbachev—the Westernizer, like Peter I;

Ligachev—the Russifier (there is even a letter going around “from Ligachev”);

Yakovlev—the Mason, uniting cosmopolitans around him;

Ryzhkov—this one is a technocrat and doesn’t care about ideology.

Everybody’s laughing and you too, and while laughing they are making a note of it!

- M.S. laughs into the telephone: That’s the kind of impromptu speeches I have to use, Anatoly! Oh, and it’s difficult going. This is the thin edge of the wedge. But that’s alright. The report (for the Plenum) is turning out strong. The theses are only a skeleton, the meat is in the report, and I’m adding some bones to it too. I have put off the interview with *[Der] Spiegel*. I don’t want to flirt with the Germans right now (he means Rust the pilot and the orgy [шабаш] in Berlin for the city’s 750th anniversary). As soon as we straighten out the German policy a little, I will publish it in *[Der] Spiegel*. And about Rust—don’t oversimplify it.

- I: I am not oversimplifying, but I am sure that even if he was objectively someone’s weapon, personally he did not have any bad intentions.

- M.S.: Still, do not oversimplify it. We will seal him off [мы его запечатаем]. According to the law, everything as it should be. Let them ask...

¹⁰ President Reagan’s Speech in West Berlin at the Brandenburg Gate on June 12, 1987 during which he challenged Gorbachev to “take down this wall.”

Today Aksenov Jr. and his “comrades in arms” –the creators of the neo-Marxism-Leninism—came to visit me. Chernyshev, the youngest, spoke for the most part. He has an amazing mind, a phenomenal education and the ability to wield thought and word together. This is a true giftedness that is being left at the curbside. But already [in his mind] there is schematism and adherence to logic that is too strict and moves away from the real life.

Everyone is “for” it, they told me. They’ve been to visit Bobkov eighteen times, visited Medvedev¹¹ three times, a number of times they discussed it with Kosolapov, Zagladin, Shevardnadze, Bessmertnykh, and other influential people. And what came of it? Everyone is for it, but no one can do anything.

In the summer I persuaded M.S. to read their essay. He read it “with interest.” Assigned Medvedev and Yakovlev to take care of it. When I started pestering Medvedev about it he said that he would not deal with that issue. Yakovlev excused himself citing his being busy.

Right now I suggested that they write an article for the *Communist*. Only without any outrageous material. I will see to it that it be discussed. And then all the heads will have to decide what to do with your “eureka.”

For a long time they pressed the great significance of their discovery on me. I feel that abstractly they are right.

For now we stopped at that.

I told [Anatoly] Kovalev what happened at the PB, praised his boss (Shevardnadze). He told me that there were plans to make Burlatsky editor of the *International Affairs* [Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’] at the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs].

June 20, 1987

At 10 p.m. on the private telephone line: M.S. calls me to Volynskoe-2. By the skill of my chauffeur I was there in half an hour.

M.S., Yakovlev, Medvedev, Slyunkov, Boldin are in the hall, discussing the draft of “The basic clauses of economic development,” which will be passed at the Plenum on June 26.

¹¹ Vadim Medvedev—Secretary of the CC CPSU in charge of relations with socialist countries, replacing Rusakov in February 1986, later full member of the Politburo.

M.S. sat me down next to him, and said: “read!” and passed me the report he had been working on here for 10 days.

I delved into it. He kept asking me “So, how is it?” They were arguing about something, I listened in. They were stuck on the issue of “control numbers.” M.S. summoned Ryzhkov to Volynskoe.

An argument flared up. The Premier [Ryzhkov] insisted on more levers of control for the center. Medvedev tried to convince him that in that case the “new mechanism” and the economic system of control will not work. M.S. kept entering the argument, refuting Ryzhkov, but he did not want to offend him. He doesn’t want it to be obvious that he supported Medvedev rather than the Premier. In the end they softened the formula and agreed to leave it until the PB, when all the additions will be discussed before the CC Plenum.

Yakovlev jokingly threw me a comment across the table: so Anatoly, this is how the fate of the country is decided. M.S. laughed.

[Gorbachev] asked me again: “How is it?”

I told him that I studied these thoughts and their conception through different sources (I’m hinting at the book).

M.S. (laughingly, bitingly): So there is nothing new for you in here?

I: Why do you say that? Everything here is systematized and in its final form. It is a whole symphony of *perestroika*.

We moved on to editing the draft Plenum Resolution. He accepted a few of my suggestions. He has such a mastery of the material that he quickly finds the optimal formulas.

I submitted my additions to his speech at the Women’s Congress (June 23), (which is why he summoned me in the first place). The main one is about the administrative system that formed in the ‘30s and which, in his version, he says was the only one possible. It turned out to be a 100 percent justification (historically) of this Stalinist system. He listened to this comment (Yakovlev supported me). Then he said: “later, later,” and put my paper aside.

We finished quickly with the women’s text. He liked it. But he made me redo the “disarmament” theme: he did not want to get into a squabble either with “Venice,” or with Reagan in West Berlin.

We said goodbye, he started getting ready to leave. It was already 6 a.m. He said: “you have worn me out; I could agree to anything that you might slip me right now.”

I left right after him. Then there was a call to the car, from his car: "Listen, did you leave your insertion with them?"

- No. You did not work on it.

- Well, all right. As you get to the CC right now, retype it and send it over.

July 5, 1987

Life is so dense [with events] and the days go by so quickly that more than two weeks have flown by since the last entry.

And it is probably impossible to even recreate the chronology of events.

On June 23, M.S. spoke before the women. I think he was not too happy with how he spoke (he really was tired and there was no excitement, especially in the first "women's half [женской половине]" of the text; he got worked up when he started to shame the West about the INF [intermediate nuclear forces] and the SRM [short-range missiles]... He really liked the idea of "word and deed"—our and their programs. And this was what got the attention of the Western press).

Later he told me: "I was nervous about how they would receive me. You see, they were from all over the world, black, yellow, and others, all brainwashed by the anti-Soviet trash. What do they know about us? And when they greeted me... and then... these children... the American woman brought them out. You know, I am not a sentimental person, but here I got teary-eyed... did you see it?" (Yes, I saw it; everyone saw how he turned away from the TV and took out a handkerchief). "And it would be alright if it was only 'Gorbachev, Gorbachev, Gorbachev!!' but they yelled: Raisa¹²! What is she to them? That is how the political factor works out, Anatoly. Only our average guy cannot accept it... and not only the average one."

In response I told him (from the words of Gusenkov, who accompanied R.M.[Raisa Maksimovna]) how afterwards, when he left the Congress, the people surrounded R.M. and she had to right away give several interviews to different newspapers; how she [interacted] with several groups around her. She behaved expertly—she is a teacher, after all! And she is educated.

On June 24, I remember, I was preparing materials like mad for meetings with Perez de Cuellar and Rajiv Gandhi, whom I received on the 29th.

¹²Gorbachev's wife, Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva.

The Plenum.¹³ I think this was a more significant event in the life of the country than the transition to the NEP [New Economic Policy] in 1921, because it turned out that it was possible to crush the NEP... We hadn't seen what it would come to. We had no experience. We thought that since the pre-history became "real history"—when the person created it himself and was not a slave to natural laws—then we could do anything we wanted with the country, just as long as we wanted it badly enough.

Now a return to Stalinism is impossible, for if we do it for the third time then the death of socialism is provided for... and we will be well on the way to becoming a third-world country.

But retreats are possible and, most importantly, shuffling in one spot is very dangerous, it could trample the shoots of anything new. They are still very weak, the Plenum showed that. Some (mostly from the lower ends: *kolkhoz* chairmen, directors, etc.) were ardently and passionately "for" [*perestroika*]... But they are acting by their gut feelings. Vagin (chairman of the Gorky oblast' *kolkhoz*) for example, does not need to undergo *perestroika*, he was born a *perestroika* man, i.e. he is for common sense. But of course he does not understand the entire historical and philosophical (a trendy word) depth of the undertaking. Maybe he doesn't even need to.

Or, let's say Nikonov—the president of The Lenin Academy of All-Soviet Agricultural Sciences. He is smart, honest, educated, and even "from the people." His professional goal is to make the land work and feed the people. But he is not concerned with "forcing" society to form as the result of this. It seems he does not even think about it. But in general, such a stance is not too bad. He will do his necessary part of *perestroika* well, like a professional.

The trouble is that members of the PB—Shcherbitsky, Vorotnikov and first deputies of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, *obkom* [oblast committee] secretaries do not understand what is going on. And even though they utter good words about the revolution, about the changes, etc., it is clear that for them it is just their job, not participation in a revolution. They are not leaders of the process at their levels, they are just disciplined bureaucrats who will adjust to the process rather than form it, thinking that it will happen on its own. They do not know how to reform society. They are from the old structure, in essence they come from a Stalinist type of leadership.

[Viktor] Nikonov (he has the same last name as the person I mentioned above, he is a member of the PB, secretary of the CC for agriculture) is another matter. It was no accident when clever M.S. made him a Politburo member. This is a person who is soft, absolutely indifferent to any kind of personal interest; by the way, his looks and personality resemble the artist Leonov. He has a deep knowledge of our agriculture and he understands everything. It is this soft, goodhearted person who will do the destructive part of the work. He made such a statement in his speech at the PB. His most important

¹³ Plenum of the CC CPSU on radical reform of the economy, June 25-26, 1987

goal is to forever **stop** intervention into agriculture by anybody (except for science), such as party, soviet, industrial, administrative, or other superiors. And then, after we feed the people, we will see what will come of it from the socio-political point of view.

Gorbachev dictated his report three times. For two weeks before the Plenum he lived by this report day and night. He thought through all the details, he called me often, thinking out loud about how it would resonate, how it would be received, whether it would be understood and whether it was necessary for everything to be understood. “I myself do not understand everything completely” he worried.

The report truly was a turning point (in everything, in its very Leninism). If one reads carefully and looks several layers deeper between the lines, then the explosive, revolutionary nature of the report is evident.

And the debates? They were not only not at the level of the report, they were not even at the level of the Plenum agenda.

On Wednesday, July 1, a Politburo session took place. It drew conclusions from the Plenum. Premier Ryzhkov spoke frankly and deeply. He understands what is important right now. That is why he said that even at the Plenum that surpassed anything our people or the West could have expected, we did not say the entire truth, but only a half-truth about the present situation and how incredibly difficult the process of adjusting the new economic mechanism is going.

Everybody is worried about the fact that we will have to raise prices. By the way, Ligachev reported that prices at the market are higher than last year but the fruit and vegetable supply of Moscow is worse, already more produce has been lost than in the previous year. And this is a matter of big politics. The fate of *perestroika* is in this.

Ryzhkov added that it was difficult to come to such a Plenum and it is staggering how quickly Mikhail Sergeyevich was able to prepare such positions. But it will be even more difficult to keep moving, to bring the Plenum ideas to life. This not a task measured in months, but in years.

During the discussion, Gorbachev suddenly said: “I received a letter from Shmelev, the guy who published an article in *Novy Mir* about unemployment, about which a voter asked me, you remember?.. You see, people are interested in everything, there are fewer and fewer indifferent people. So anyway, this Shmelev admits in the letter that he got carried away but insists that something needs to be done about the loafers. He swears that he is ready to loyally serve *perestroika* and thanks me for being so lenient toward him when I answered the voter’s question. It’s alright; we need this kind of people as well. Let him! We need to learn to use all our brains and not be nervous. And [we need to learn] not to hit people over the head as soon as we don’t like something.” (By the way, Arbatov admitted to me that he “organized” that letter, and then edited the text).

At the Plenum [Dinmuhamed] Kunaev (First Secretary of Kazakhstan's Communist Party) was removed from the CC. Before the start of the session he grabbed my elbow in the hallway and cheerfully and self-assuredly said to me: "Tell Mikhail Sergeyevich to briefly receive me. Do it for an old friend. Remember what a good trip to England we had."¹⁴

During the session Ligachev read the Kazakhstan Communist Party CC's request to withdraw Kunaev from the CPSU CC, then he stated the claims against him, gave a description of what Kunaev turned out to be like in reality. Kunaev asked to be permitted to speak. Gorbachev allowed him to speak. And the guy started to impudently and aggressively praise himself: it was he who discovered mineral resources in Kazakhstan (Kunaev is a geologist), he condemned the nationalistic book *History of Kazakhstan*, he built the ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy in the republic, he modernized the cities, he... etc., etc., etc. As for "those December events,"¹⁵ so what? Some boys ran out into the streets and to deal with him like this for that... Stop comrades, do not make a hasty decision..." M.S. couldn't get him to stop, one could see how he restrained his indignation, he kept calling him by his full name with patronimic[по имени отчеству]....

Then three Kazakhs spoke—"impromptu with a piece of paper"—and "referred to the facts." But overall, Kunaev's behavior was the strongest factor against him. There was a secret vote. He left before the results were announced: 298 out of 299 were in favor of removing him.

A Plenum is a Plenum, but my work had to go on: during the week there was one [visit] after another—Perez de Cuellar on the 29th, Carter on the 1st, Rajiv Ghandi on the 2nd and 3rd, and on the 7th [Richard] Weizsäcker—to whom M.S. assigned great importance because of Germany.

I've become adept at preparing such material based on what I get from the MFA, the CC International Department, some of the specialists, and of course the departments: [Vladimir] Kamentsev, [Sergey] Akhromeyev, Chebrikov. But it must have Gorbachev's idea in it. Almost always from his former talks, his speeches at the PB, from his other replies "for the occasion," from constant contact with him I can imagine what he is thinking, what his position on this or that topic is. And nowadays I am rarely mistaken... Even though during conversations he moves away from the prepared material and makes the conversation deeper and richer with thought (by the way, he never reads texts when he is face to face with the person he is talking to. He does not even keep his notes open, only glances at them sometimes to start a new question). But the passages that he really likes he repeats to different people.

¹⁴ We really did go to a congress in Great Britain with him about ten years ago. I remembered a story he told then, about how as a student in Moscow he watched from the other side of the Moscow River how the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was blown up. [Footnote in the original]

¹⁵ December 17-19, 1986 ethnic riots in Alma-Ata in response to Kunaev's removal as first Secretary of Kazakh Communist party and his replacement by an ethnic Russian Gennady Kolbin. Over 300 people were wounded when the riots were put down with force.

That happened with de Cuellar, and with Carter, who turned out to be a rather dry and boring type. I looked at him and thought—how could it be that such a person was President of a superpower that determines the fate of humanity? And then I stopped myself. What kinds of types have we had ourselves?!

But I was talking about something else. Whoever sits opposite M.S. (with the possible exception of Quaddafi's representative) trusts him, and there is a feeling that they do not speak with the other “great” leaders such as Reagan, Mitterrand, Deng Xiaoping, and even with Thatcher so sincerely...

They believe that he wants to do exactly what he tells them, as well as what he says publicly. It is another matter that he cannot do everything, or even the most part, of what he says.

It is impossible to be cunning and play games in a conversation with him. He is open and he disarms any “class” opponent because by his entire manner he invites him to be first and foremost a normal human being.

The Indian festival in Moscow has completely worn him out, especially since he hates “protocol.” I came in to ask him about when he will be one on one with Gandhi whether it will be really one on one as it was in Delhi, or with advisers. He sat back, smiled weakly. “Come to the meeting, why not... and Rajiv will probably bring an adviser. You know, I am terribly tired. I work into the night every day. I don’t feel myself anymore, and the work just keeps piling on. But, Anatoly, it needs to be done. We have started upon such a great cause! There is nowhere to retreat. And what a Plenum! Oh, I will go far. I will not back down, I will not waver. The most important thing is not to waver and not to show that you’re hesitant, that you’re tired, unsure... And you know what’s upsetting: they do not want to believe that I’m doing it for the cause. They are jealous. Jealousy, you see, is this strange thing...” (I of course didn’t ask him who exactly he had in mind. I only noted that jealousy is not characteristic of the Russian character. But, “what you are describing,” I remarked, “is the heritage of moral rebirth of a society that came from Stalin.”)

He said: you’re at it again. Although, you’re right. Stalin is not just 1937. It is a system, a system in everything—from economics to people’s consciousness. Everyone was delighted with his short phrases and did not notice the short thoughts that then came down on us all... and it still goes on today! Everything is from there. Everything that we need to overcome now, it is all from there! That’s how it is.

But he is not very consistent in that. I already mentioned how difficult it was for me to convince him to make the reservation that not everything in Stalin’s command-administrative system was justified by the circumstances (in the Plenum report)... he inserted a phrase, but not the one I suggested. It was a very watered-down version... He’s afraid that he will be blamed (!) for tarnishing names and nihilism about the past. Perhaps the instinct of carefulness is at work here: since he is preparing to go far from the

socialism we had and have, he thinks it tactically appropriate not to distance himself from what was done before, no matter by what means it was done! Maybe that's it. Also I noticed that it is because of his paradoxical feeling of love for the people, because of respect.

On June 22 there was the following splash at the PB. In some connection (M.S.' Plenum report was being discussed) Ligachev started deriding the "vilifiers" of the past, once again mentioning Yuri Afanasyev, Academician Samsonov (Yakovlev told me yesterday that Yegor Kuzmich [Ligachev] assigned them to collect "some materials" on them). Some others agreed: Solomentsev, Vorotnikov, Gromyko. And M.S. took off about this: the biggest political mistake is to allow disrespect for the people, while they... not sparing themselves, hungry, tattered, with only the shirt on their backs, with heads shaved against lice, they worked without leaving anything for themselves, not even counting on using the fruit of their hellish labors—they were building the country, preparing it against fascism, fighting for an idea... And what now, are we so smart that we can tar all of that? Are we to say "You did the wrong thing?" No, here we must be very careful. We need to respect the people.

I sat there, listened and was angry. When I came to my office I dictated five pages about how Stalin "respected" the people: he destroyed the most diligent muzhik—the peasantry, the best part of the village population; he put 3-4 million soldiers under fascist tanks by his games with Hitler and by the attempts to appease him in the summer of 1941; and how he "complied" with the party by liquidating everybody who made the revolution and started socialism in Russia.

I sent it to him. He read it. But—not a word, although yesterday when we were discussing the "Book" it was clear that something stuck. I think [the comments] about "jealousy" were also in relation to this. Recently the BBC had a great deal of material about the preparation to publish Trotsky's "Stalin," which he hadn't finished when his hero put an end to him. There, "jealousy" is one of Stalin's main character traits during his entire political life. That was the "jealousy of the mediocre" of anybody outstanding. I think M.S. spoke about jealousy in relation to him with this association.

Here is an episode that took place towards the evening of July 3, the second day of Gandhi's stay here. Two conversations took place at which I was present. On July 2 there was a dinner in a "close circle" in Novo-Ogarevo (plus Raisa Maksimovna); on the 3rd a "lunch" at the Indian embassy was scheduled before the meeting of friendship in Luzhniki. About an hour and a half before the lunch, M.S. calls me:

- Where are you?
- At work, as you can see.
- You know, Gandhi is telling me right now (as they were walking down the Cathedral Square) that we will have to say speeches... at this

luncheon. And I don't know anything... Yes, Vorontsov told me about this yesterday, but I asked him to convince Gandhi to make it without speeches, just short toasts "to health" and such.

- And, what is Gandhi saying?
- I don't know. Call Vorontsov right now so I can hear [your conversation].
- I'm calling. He's not there, he's gone somewhere to the Indians.
- Well, then give me a speech.
- I can't. I already used all the words and thoughts for speech about "Great India" and its leader. (He laughs).
- It's alright, you won't die. Come up with a couple of pages and send them over right now. I'm in my office at the Kremlin.

And he hung up the receiver.

I called Tamara and right away started to dictate in an unbroken flow. She recorded it and typed it up. I corrected it. The entire process took 20 minutes. I sent it to him.

There was no reaction. And I have a strict rule: not to ask him about the results of my work. Never, in any shape or form.

I came home around 9 p.m. Suddenly the work telephone rings. He is calling from Luzhniki (it's the opening day; there are celebrations, dances-shmances [танцы-манцы]):

- Anatoly Sergeyevich, Mikhail Sergeyevich asked to give the speech that he said at the Indian embassy luncheon to the press, and also to translate it into English to give to Gandhi before his departure.
- In the form in which I sent it to him?
- Yes, exactly in that form.

Work! It is around 11 p.m., the newspapers have been formatted, and Gandhi leaves at 12:15 a.m. The only copy [of the speech] is in my office.

I called TASS [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union] and let them know. I called for a car. There is no Xerox machine; no one of the typists is around. At the MFA there's only one man on duty, no translators. I sent what I had to the TASS, they held up

the newspapers. By TV [sic] from TASS they communicated it to this poor man on duty at the MFA.

The next day around 11 a.m. M.S. called together Yakovlev, Frolov, Boldin and me in his office.

- What will we do with the “Book?” (The one I had been working on in March at the Gorky dacha)

We all decided that it would be a sensation even in the present raw state. But they criticized it, gave advice, recommended things, and enriched it. We agreed that on July 10 I would again go to a dacha in Serebryannyi Bor and finish it in a month.

And he [Gorbachev] started the meeting by telling about what happened with this “toast” at the Indian embassy—that Gandhi literally demanded that the speech be published in Moscow and in Delhi. “You see,” he says, “the most effective things come impromptu.”

July 12, 1987

The week consisted of Weizsäcker. M.S. again displayed depth and unexpectedness. Once again he charmed the person he was talking to: on the “European home” and especially on the issue of the Russian Germans. He feels it in his heart that the problem cannot be removed and that someday the Germans will reunite. That is why he said straightforwardly: let history run its course, let’s leave it to history.

He also surprised Weizsäcker with his unexpected move: he said to give his sincere hello to Chancellor Kohl...

An incident took place. A day ago Gromyko hosted a lunch for Weizsäcker. Weizsäcker’s [speech] was twice as long (and he is a German!). Gromyko told Kvitsinsky to reduce it to “equal [lengths],” of course this was done at the expense of parts that, as Gromyko said, would be “unpleasant to the Soviet people.” (About Kant in Koenigsberg, about a single German consciousness, about freedom being the freedom to visit each other, a hint at the “Wall,” etc. In other words, this was the most important part for Weizsäcker, who tried—an aristocrat and an intellectual—to be maximally loyal and tactful).

And it was printed that way. The Germans started to express their surprise, disappointment, and offense through all possible channels (“what about your *glasnost*, Thatcher and Chirac were printed in full”). I received phone calls from our people: Arbatov, [Valentin] Falin, Shakhnazarov, asking what was going on. Why are we making fools of ourselves again? *Glasnost* should be *glasnost*.

I call Kvitsinsky, prodding him: back in the FRG you probably aren't used to *glasnost* at home, why did you do that? He says: Gromyko put it down as an order.

M.S. comes to work, I call him. Tell him what I think—we are making a mistake. The thing that works in our favor we are turning on ourselves. And then, we could let our readers know that even such a highbrow and noble representative of the FRG has parted with his revanchist sentiments.

M.S. spoke angrily: Well, let it be so. That's how we should behave with the Germans. They like order—Ordnung (what does that have to do with anything?). And then he started saying something jokingly about how our [soldiers] slept with German women when they went to Paris to overthrow Napoleon.

I said alright... I felt that he was worked up about something, or maybe frustrated with himself... This was the night before his meeting with Weizsäcker.

Later I find out the following from Yakovlev: after the lunch where the speeches were given, Gromyko decided to consult with his colleagues—Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev—whether it was necessary to censor Weizsäcker. Everybody was decidedly against it, and Ryzhkov was particularly direct about it. Gromyko got upset, turned around and left.

And I “figured it out:” he went to call Gorbachev. The latter had not read the speech and agreed with Gromyko. That's why he had such an angry reaction when I came in and started reminding him about *glasnost*.

After M.S.' talk with Weizsäcker (who did not say anything about this episode) we went into the presidium room of the Kremlin: M.S., Shevardnadze, Kvitsinsky, and me. I brought up the publication again. Shevardnadze strongly supported me, Kvitsinsky kept quiet. M.S. shifted the conversation to another topic. I understood that once he gave his agreement to Gromyko, he did not want to “disagree” with himself.

After returning to my office, I called Yakovlev and we agreed to publish the full Weizsäcker text in *Novoe vremya* and in *Nedelya* (which is an addition to *Izvestiya*). So really it was in *Nedelya*, since *Novoe vremya* would come out in a week.

I don't know either M.S.' or Gromyko's reactions to this action. But the Western press noticed the “censorship.”

The Politburo was on the 9th.

The question of building housing and selling construction materials and household goods in general to the population was discussed sharply. Once again Voronov (deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and the ministers tried to report that in 1985 there was this much, now there is that much, even though they haven't fulfilled the

plans and assignments for a single position. And letters just keep coming in, angry ones and with a stinging hint: what's happening with *perestroika*? Somehow we, the common people, aren't getting anything from it.

M.S. flew into a rage: this is the people's need. In our Soviet state the big heads have all the blessings, they renovate their apartments at the expense of special departments, and they couldn't care less about the people. And these are CC members, ministers, members of the Soviet government. How long will we allow this to go on?!

He concluded by saying that this is the last time this conversation takes place about such issues. If you do not get it done, we will be talking with new people.

Shevardnadze's note about the 70th anniversary of diplomatic service was discussed. All kinds of jubilees are proposed, including distinguishing with memorial plaques the houses in which Chicherin, Litvinov, and Kollontai lived. Gromyko took the podium, he was very irritated.

"Chicherin? What did he do that was so special?.. So, he worked with Lenin. Well, all right, Chicherin's name can be understood. But Litvinov!! How could that be proposed? The CC dismissed him from the position of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Did you all know about that? And for what? For disagreeing with the line of the party! He was against reorienting from England and France to Germany. And he was removed... well, temporarily... that was clear from the start... They sent him as an ambassador to Washington, but even there he pushed his line. You can read his ciphered telegrams. And from there he was removed as well. He was replaced by a different fellow" (i.e. Gromyko).

I looked around at the PB members, their faces were full of barely concealed irony. Everybody understands the meaning of his words: you suggested Litvinov and Kollontai, but did not even mention him, Gromyko.

And he went on: "Kollontai? Who is Kollontai? Yes, Lenin knew her. But she was always against him! Remember Brest, remember the worker's opposition. So, she was an ambassador to Mexico, and after her [service there] Mexico broke diplomatic relations with us (that was because of the Soviet-German agreement of 1939!!). Then she was in Sweden. And so what, some underground activities... It is true that recently articles about her came out "from the point of view of particular authors," etc.

How will M.S. behave? He already baited Gromyko during his tirade when he commented about Litvinov being removed from his post by order of the CC ("But, Andrey Andreyevich," with a smile, "it seems Chicherin also did not leave his post completely of his own volition!")...

Further M.S. said this: Chicherin, yes. Nobody is objecting to that, even, it seems, not Andrei Andreevich. And let's keep Litvinov, too. You say he did not agree. But an

anti-Hitler coalition took place after all. That means he was not totally wrong in predicting the outcome of events.

As for Kollontai—it's true, there were many significant ambassadors. Andrei Andreievich named some of them (he named Pushkin, Vinogradov, Zorin, Gusev... was creeping up to himself). But she was not famous for that. And the fact that she spoke against Lenin, well, Vladimir Ilyich said himself: everybody makes mistakes! And he respected her very much.

The facts you, Andrey Andreyevich, mentioned—that she was the daughter of a tsar's general, and Litvinov the son of a major merchant—have no relation to this matter.

That's how M.S. told him off with the public's approval. Gromyko sat down with a frown. But... how will this continue? How long can one stand this scoundrel who thinks that everything that happened in his time was good and right?

By the way, when we were discussing M.S.' "Book" on the fourth, the conversation about Gromyko's memoirs came up again (they are sitting in Politizdat, the editor-in-chief of which came to the CC asking what to do, instigated by a note from me). M.S. assigned Yakovlev to "resolve" the matter. He laughed. I spoke my mind: "This is an absolutely harmful thing."

- M.S.: And what about *glasnost*? (He got me there)
- Frolov: But he is a PB member. If he was not, there would be no problem.
- M.S. (to Yakovlev): Still, look at the "connection between the times," we need to do this somehow... objectively, honestly.
- Yakovlev (laughs): If we do it honestly then it is what Anatoly Sergeyevich said.

The conversation did not arrive at anything in the end. Gromyko's assistant Parkhitko is calling everybody and threatening Politizdat's editor-in-chief with some punishment, especially with the idea that Andrey Andreyevich **himself** will give him a call!

Rust's case was also discussed at the PB. Chebrikov reported. He cited [Rust's] statement made during the investigation: I wanted to meet with Gorbachev because it would have been pointless to meet with Reagan. I chose the extravagant method because otherwise it is impossible to attract the necessary attention.

Chebrikov's proposition was to give him to the Hamburg court, which brought the case against him. He added that some research was done among the people and it turns out that the public is of the same opinion.

It is established that Rust is not quite normal in the head. But if we send him to get an examination the whole world will shout about the “madhouse” that the Russians are experts of. And it will turn out that he was normal when he came here and insane when he left.

There was no discussion. Only Zaikov asked a question: imagine that our boy had landed in Washington. What would they do with him?

Chebrikov: “Well, first of all, they would have shot him down while he was still in the air...” (laughter). And right away he noted that our anti-aircraft gunners had aimed and made a photo-shot at Rust 10 times. Each time they had 100 percent accuracy. But they did not have an order for a real shot, because the head anti-aircraft defense commander found out about Rust when the latter had maneuvered over to the cathedral of Christ the Savior.

I watched M.S.: he was turning pale, while his eyes became black like uncut diamonds. One could see that he was growing furious: so what do we have here? He wanted to see me, he says. Many people see me: they write me letters, and I answer them. And here... no, this is a provocation. We have 150 generals and officers under trial. We've replaced the Minister of Defense. And what for? Perhaps we didn't have to? And now we let him go, free? No. Democracy is not babyish helplessness. He broke our laws three times (crossing the border, flying outside of air corridors, and landing in a populated area). And he must be punished according to the law. Is the investigation closed? Yes, it is. Let there be a trial. Everything is in order; he is supposed to get from one to ten years... and we'll go from there.

August 28, 1987¹⁶

¹⁶ In August and September I was in Crimea with Gorbachev, not at the ill-fated dacha in Foros (it was called “Sunrise”), but at the [dacha] inherited from Brezhnev in Nizhniaia Oreanda.

Gorbachev was mostly busy working on the book, which he initially proposed to call “A word about perestroika” [Слово о перестройке]. But then he came up with another name “Perestroika and New Thinking for our Country and the Entire World.” Millions of copies were published under this name in America and then in many other countries.

Gorbachev was working on the text “with passion,” dictated it two or three times over. He foresaw that this book would create a new image for him and for the changing country; it would help win the West's trust, which, according to his plans, is supposed to become the new and most important factor in transforming international relations.

We spent many hours on the terrace (he in the sun, I in the shade), discussing the “movement” of the text and the major issues.

We had to get distracted for routine affairs: information from Moscow was coming in non-stop. Sometimes he thought out loud about some things. Some of them I recorded and provide below.

It seems Cuba still needs primitive socialism with wage-leveling. Castro has gigantic thoughts about this. He is a great orator! But wage-leveling socialism will lead nowhere and we will not move forward with it.

They pulled us into Afghanistan, f***** it all [ë.т.м.], and now one doesn't know how to get out of there.

Karmalism is the dogmatism of Marxism-Leninism plus parasitism in relation to the USSR. In general we have a shitload [до х.] of Marxists, in Africa too. It was pretty awful when you had to defend Brezhnev's policies. They were terrible. And now you are defending what you think and believe in. Trust and independence are the norms of our new politics.

August 31, 1987

We raised a great cause, but we need intuition to feel the fine line between "smearing the past" and deserved criticism. We should not dash around. The party conference is coming up. We are painting the portrait of socialism with *perestroika*. But it should not be blurry in the surrealist style, where it's impossible to tell feet from other parts, etc... Double-dyed [махровые] figures are rising in the changing society. A search is in progress. We created the carcass of a new building—the renewed socialism. We have the carcass, we will come up with the rest. And we will see what turns out. But do not let anyone claim truth in the highest instance.

Look carefully at Marx and Lenin, there are "shades" between them. I read Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* from 1844. In it, he does not reject private property.

There will be no miracle. What a lazy society we have after all! And the leaders are no better: they came to power, got their feed, are sipping some tea and not only tea, and railing at higher leadership. Others, like Yakovlev, are sniveling [раскоплившись].

To Afanasiev (Pravda): tell him not to add fuel to the fire of the Tatar issue. Let the committee work in peace. In general the press should not fuel any campaign.

To Lukich (Georgii Lukich Smirnov, the General Secretary's adviser for ideology): call and tell him to prepare materials on the nationality question for the Plenum.

To Bromel' (academician, director of the Ethnology Institute at the USSR Academy of Sciences): assign him to prepare detailed material on the situation of nations and nationalities of the USSR—about what was done under Soviet rule and what was done wrong. And he should give a frank analysis. He should show everything fully.

September 3, 1987

Call Ivan Frolov (the General Secretary's adviser): tell him that the theme of estrangement needs to be developed in my article in the *Communist* (about socialism and the market). Marx planned to return the person to himself through the socialization of private property. But, truth be told, we had an estrangement in the economy and in politics due to the absence of democracy. Directive methods of the command-administrative system deprived us of the opportunity to resolve this most important problem of socialism.

...The criteria to evaluate society and its true level of development are not the level of consumption or consumerism, but the growth of the individual, the development of his abilities and possibilities. All of this needs to be "worked through" in the concept of "new thinking."

When the theme of "developing socialism" (a concept we have yet to understand fully) is discussed in an article, we need to show that our goal is to restore the socialist nature of society.

September 17, 1987

Three Yegors have sent me [Gorbachev] letters here: Yegor [Kuzmich] Ligachev, Yegor Yakovlev¹⁷, and Georgy (he's also a Yegor!) Arbatov. I read them all and here's what I have to say to you about them.

We have planned and started a colossal, historical work. All three are deeply concerned—they want our plans, which are significant on a historic scale, to be realized. But their positions reflect an incredible range of differing opinions, arguments, positions, discussions—all of the now-open pluralism of our society.

There are people who have already called Gorbachev a revisionist. Others, on the contrary, scrutinize me for intentions to destroy Marxism-Leninism because they've forgotten about the creative methodology of Marxism-Leninism. Look at how carefully and delicately Bukharin approached every question. And he was meticulous about being true to socialism.

And how do our discussions go? Instead of a calm discussion, analysis and realistic evaluations they attack each other right away. All three Yegors are concerned

¹⁷ Yegor Yakovlev was a prominent Soviet journalist, editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Moskovskie Novosti* [Moscow News] from 1986. He should not be confused with Aleksandr Nikolaevich Yakovlev, who was Gorbachev's adviser from 1985 to 1991.

about the same thing. But they all are panicking that we might, God forbid, bog down and suffocate. They think that we are opening the gates of indiscriminate morality. They mention the recent film about a brothel that came out in Riga. This movie truly is an example of moral decay: they are reveling in obscenities, there is nothing sacred. A naked woman [баба] on a boar... And to speak about the movie with Klimov (the producer), for example, he will tell you that it is a great film! Depravity and moral decay bring forth repulsion, so from his, Klimov's, point of view, the film is denunciatory. But I think that it advocates permissiveness, this admiration of a raspberry [любование малинкой].

The range of opinions is enormous right now. Overall that is good, it is inevitable with such a change as we started. Confusion always accompanies revolution, especially with the intelligentsia. But at the same time we didn't want to destroy everything sacred—our patriotism, our love of the Motherland.

We want to awaken and free everyone from the social passivity, from everything that hinders the forward movement and *perestroika*.

All three Yegors are for democratization. The intellectuals, workers, and peasants are joining the process. But keep in mind the fact that we have 18 million officials plus their family members. That's about 60 million around the country. They are all afraid for their source of income...

In the end of his letter Arbatov complains that he might have displeased the General Secretary, he's afraid to spoil our relations. Tell him all that is rubbish. Tell him that Gorbachev values his opinion, his information, his thoughts that he shares frankly, and that I read his notes carefully. And let our relations remain the same as they were. The main concern is that our work does not stop, and I understand him. Let Yury Arkadievich not panic.

We need to see the criteria of *glasnost*. They are in the values of socialism. There is overkill, and that causes a reaction. *Pamyat'* is a part of this reaction, a manifestation of the self-preservation instinct. On the other hand... Viktor Nekrasov died in Paris recently. And another Yegor (Yakovlev) puts Nekrasov's portrait in his newspaper in a black frame of mourning. A frame of mourning for an anti-Soviet!

So overall, they should not panic. I had a conversation with Yegor Kuzmich [Ligachev]. "Some officials," he said, "are not accountable enough before the people. Yakovlev told me (*i.e. Yakovlev told Ligachev at a CC meeting with the editors*) that he might leave." That's responsibility?!

Tell Falin not to dramatize what happened at Yegor Kuzmich's meeting, but let them draw conclusions.

Yegor Yakovlev writes about the popularity of his newspaper. But this popularity must serve the *perestroika* cause. There is no comparison of opinions in *Moskovskie*

Novosti [Moscow News], as well as in *Ogonek*, and in much of the other press media. There is no diversity of authors. Only “our” people are there. We need to have others there, too. Then we’ll have democracy and *glasnost*. There are different topics, burning issues. But we should not make sensations out of them. We will do great work. We need clean hands and clean intentions rather than stuffing people’s minds with God-knows-what in order to cause a stir and a sensation.

I am disgusted when people settle for something worthless. Let the authors of the letters think about this.

Yegor Kuzmich told me that at the meeting with editors he noted that many good issues are raised in the MN [Moscow News]. So he does not see everything in one bleak color.

Aleksandr Nikolaevich [Yakovlev] recently told me over the phone that he said to Ligachev that they are not walking the same road. Meanwhile he collects all kinds of information about Yegor Kuzmich and gives it to me.

Sure, I agree that Ligachev is short on polite expressions. But he is honestly concerned for our cause, for *perestroika*. As for methods of interaction, well, he does not always get it right. I agree that right now not only what is said is very important, but also how it is said. Tell Yegor (Yakovlev) that Graham Greene visited all of Siberia and was surprised at how much the Bolsheviks accomplished after the October Revolution. But he—Yegor—has been abroad all over, gave all kinds of interviews, but he hasn’t been around his own country. Is that good?

Come on Anatoly, we need to unite them all. I do not think that these people are a lost cause.

... Mistakes harm *perestroika*. We cannot afford to provoke the people who are “for” or the people who are “against” to do things that damage our movement.

Yes, yes, the entire society, and the Politburo as well, are getting wound up...

It would be a mistake to remove Yegor Yakovlev right now. Although the CC Propaganda Department is refusing to work with him, saying that there’s just no keeping him in check. I told Yegor Kuzmich: it will not do to remove him. But at the same time let Yegor think at the MN about his responsibilities. In a word, let everyone act and not panic.

But overall, Anatoly, in our own leadership provincialism is also prospering.

Postscript

The year 1987—the peak of *perestroika*. If we refer to Kant's idea of the “phenomenal world” or Schopenhauer’s “the world as representation,” we can recognize that in this sense *perestroika* was on the rise. *Glasnost* was strongly making a name for itself as “freedom of speech” as it began to be seen less and less only as an ideological instrument of the CPSU. It created an absolutely new atmosphere in society as it responded to the many years of repressed need for truth and honesty along the line of “power—people.”

The hidden processes however, the “things in themselves” (if we again follow Kant), were poorly recognized by the “mind of *perestroika*” and were decreasingly subject to its influence.

By moving in essence (not in form) away from the Marxist-Leninst dogmas, Gorbachev demonstrated outstanding analytical and cognitive abilities; he pointed out more and more frankly where “real socialism” has lead us. This “volume” contains his deep, oratorically masterful and completely frank speeches. At this point, he is still full of optimism about the initiated reforms, and tries in many ways to instill this in “the consciousness of the party and the masses.” However, during this year his first doubts emerge about the possibility of success. He trusted only to the people closest to him with these doubts. There was uncertainty as to where the “unknown forces are leading us.”

The famous January Plenum was devoted to staff policies, here for the first time since Lenin the Party's and the CC's culpability for what had happened in the country, for the country's critical situation, was brought up. However, the Plenum did not produce the results *perestroika* needed, while Gorbachev had had great hopes for it. From then on, the Party never found the wish nor the ability to be the vanguard of change. (Much later Gorbachev recognized that the party by its nature was not suitable for this role). He found a solution: to take away all governmental power functions from the CPSU through the All-union party conference and to restore the full power of the Soviets, which Stalin had liquidated in the 1920s. (It had continued to exist after the Revolution, although in the control framework of the party).

For the same reason--the absence of the “subject” of change, of loyal to *perestroika* and capable cadres--the subsequent attempt to eradicate the consequences of Stalin's forced collectivization and to return the village to its role of bread-winner of the country were unsuccessful.

The year 1987 gave clear evidence of resistance to *perestroika*. At this stage it was still “structural resistance” [сопротивление материала] rather than political-ideological opposition: signs of disappointment in the people (“we do not get anything, the *perestroika* is only in the center,” etc.), which meant growing apathy, and most importantly—passivity, lack of talent, Stalinist stupefaction [зачумленность], unprofessional work and unwillingness to work in the new way of the people who, according to Gorbachev's plan, were supposed to be the “superintendents of *perestroika*.”

The cohort of the “founding fathers” slowly dissipates. They still more or less agree in their description of the “present situation,” but their positions increasingly differed on the readiness to tell people the truth, on the evaluation of the existing order, which they wanted to “improve,” as well as on specific measures for “what is to be done.” More and more often their discussions reveal essential differences. In the highest leadership next to Gorbachev the only people who really remained were Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and Ryzhkov (later joined by Medvedev).

Gorbachev tries to “regulate” the chaotic review of Soviet history. For this purpose he used the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. But the “balanced criticism” of individual moments in history in his anniversary report, and especially the rehabilitation of Bukharin, turned into a powerful impulse for the rapid growth of this process, and very soon the question arose of whether we ever had socialism, and whether we even need it (even with a “human face”).

At the same time, the year 1987 is distinguished with a breakthrough into the outside world. Gorbachev's international recognition and fame are quickly growing. In the West people are slowly convinced that the “Gorbachev phenomenon” in the USSR is not the Kremlin's tricky maneuver, that *perestroika* is for real. A new and powerful factor arises in foreign policy—**trust**. This factor will later make possible the end of the Cold War. The conclusion of the first treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons seals the tendency of ceasing confrontation.

In this context the final rejection of the Comintern legacy in the Communist Movement is natural.

Gorbachev's book, “*Perestroika* and New Thinking for Our Country and the World,” which became an international bestseller, played an enormous role in the formation of Gorbachev's and the Soviet Union's new image.

Starting in '87, there is a divergence of vectors in Gorbachev's foreign and domestic policy—not in the sense that they lose interdependence (in this case it's actually the opposite), but in the sense of being able to achieve the goals that were set. The gap in Gorbachev's international and domestic authority formed and began to grow during this year.

Finally, 1987 will enter history as a year during which the dangerous and in due time “unidentified object” appeared in the *perestroika* sky, namely—Yeltsin.

His loud, abrupt, and demagogically saturated activity in Moscow did not convince the Politburo that he was ready to be transferred from a candidate to a member of the Areopagus. Resentful Yeltsin presented criticism of Gorbachev's report for the 70th anniversary of October, impudently casting doubt on everything that had been accomplished during the three years of *perestroika*. (By the way, nobody remembers the Stalinist note in his criticism).

Gorbachev did not like this nihilism. In general he considered harmful such fault-finding approaches, especially “in the beginning of the journey.” Plus, people were not used to encroachments on the unquestionable authority of the General Secretary. Moreover, it was clear to everybody that Yeltsin was beginning to be manipulated by the people of his circle: himself he was not capable of formulating his objections so clearly. It was also obvious that Yeltsin was not acting out of conviction, but with the aim of flying to the top should *perestroika* succeed in breaking down the traditional forms and functioning of power.

Mikhail Sergeyevich allowed himself to waive the principle of “the pluralism of opinion,” which he himself had announced. He taught Yeltsin (at this time still a delicate) lesson, which was “learned” quite differently from the intention. Two weeks later, at the CC Plenum devoted to the discussion of Gorbachev’s 70th October anniversary, Yeltsin decided to openly blackmail the leadership, sharply criticizing the CC Secretariat and threatening resignation. The result is known. Yeltsin was cast to the fringes of politics, but not “squashed.” This fact was then used by the real opposition to Gorbachev.

There is a great deal of coincidence in the incident with Yeltsin, which brought such ill-fated consequences for the country. But something essential in it was a natural outcome. It was a collision of two tendencies: one was the inertia of the past and the other the result of *perestroika*. One was “holy” for the Leninist party—the untouchable nature of its monolithic unity and the absolute authority of the highest leadership. The other was the need for real democratization of the party life and the “rules of the game.”

Formally, the first tendency won. The “heretic” already could not be burned to ashes as he inevitably would have been under a totalitarian regime. The winds of democracy were blowing. But the kind of democracy that later grew from the remaining rootlet to this day leaves people with nostalgic memories of the totalitarian times.

As it were, when speaking of the year 1987 in the history of the country, one has to acknowledge: the year of the 70th anniversary of the Revolution did not gain enough potential for development that people had counted on in preparation for it.

Translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya

for the National Security Archive

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1988

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

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January 3, 1988.

I am at the “Pines” sanatorium.

I’m reading “Life and Fate” of Vasilii Grossman (so far it is published in tamizdat¹). Truly, it is “War and Peace.” And he is longing for “perestroika.” This was written in 1960!

Lesha Kozlov died on December 28. He was a great guy and one of the talented consultants at the International Department. We buried him on the 30th. There was a reception; Askol'dov, I, and the consultants talked about Lesha and about Dobrynin, with whom everybody is unhappy. I said a little too much, namely that M.S. [Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev] has already once promised to take the consultant group away from Dobrynin and give it to me.

M.S. gave me some “homework” for my vacation, with the idea that when I ski in fresh air, I might get some fresh ideas... This is for the CC Plenum on schools, where he would like to speak about ideology. The matter is very timely. We already have such a store of freedom of thought that it’s time to synthesize it. The impulses from the 70th anniversary report gave off powerful results, driving Ligachev and Co. into a panic... And I think at the Plenum where he is one of the speakers, Ligachev will try to “stop” and “reverse” what has been achieved. That is why M.S. wants to speak himself. He told me to think about “our values.” But what are our values, when even the main value—socialism—is being questioned in its very core?

For example, today on TV there was a program: “Meeting our Businessmen.” There were people from five regions of European Russia: a family contract, a contracting team, a cooperative, a leasing group, etc. I was so glad! M.S.’ ideas are coming to life in the most varied forms, under the slogan of “free labor for free people.” Three engineers from Moscow rented a farm with 120 calves and spoke about property rights for land for these calves. The raikom [regional committee] supports them. A professor—a PhD in Economics and a consultant in the CC Department of Agriculture—brilliantly defended all these ideas and made a reference to the West, where they have family farms. “Small commercial farms” do not interfere with agricultural industrialization and produce unbelievable levels of output.

All that is to say: what ideological values are we to tend to, when our central value—denouncing private property—is beginning to waver?

Does that leave us with the universal values, i.e. the Christian Ten Commandments? Maybe this is the point of history, when, after 2000 years, having suffered through fascism, Stalinism, Hiroshima and Chernobyl, humanity finally has the opportunity to realize the Ten Commandments in practice!

It seems that nothing is accidental with M.S. We should reflect on his book. There are passages that show him to be truly ready to go far and defy all the dogmas, taboos and other “values” of Stalin’s perverted version of socialism. It is not without reason that he has twice publicly “released” the idea that we will celebrate the Millennium of the Baptism of Russia.

¹ Literature published abroad, usually without the permission of the Soviet Union—Translator.

And it appears that he is going to follow the common sense of a normal, cultured, intelligent, and good hearted person.

He has been named the world's "Man of the Year." It is amazing how history has carried him to the top of the present-day world. When you are in daily contact with him, when you are dazzled by his truly natural democratism, you sometimes forget with whom you are so casually interacting. When you are so close, it is difficult to imagine that this is a great man. And he is truly a major figure, in the historical sense.

I can't stop thinking about Lesha: constantly... what is the meaning of everything, if just like that... even when everybody it sincerely saddened and grieved, and for some his death is a "loss..." But... alas! A loss that can be easily surmounted. And everything comes full circle... for some "higher" meaning of life. You can't jump out of the circle of banality. And, still! Can it be that all of life is banality?

January 4, 1988.

Pravda started a discussion page. It is responding to its declining circulation—the only central newspaper. *Perestroika* is beginning to put even Afanas'ev on guard, even though he does not believe in it and is placing his bets on Ligachev.

... But he takes Yakovlev into account, for while M.S. is here, Yakovlev will continue to lead in *perestroika* ideology. Already he has said publicly at an all-union meeting of newspaper editors that *Pravda* is not in step with *perestroika*. Later Ligachev corrected Yakovlev: upon his return from France he visited *Pravda* and spoke with its staff. Afterwards, Afanas'ev made it known through Moscow that "some at the CC are of a different opinion [than Yakovlev]." It was interpreted as follows in Moscow: "According to Ligachev's statement, Yakovlev was not speaking in the name of the Politburo." These are the games.

M.S. sees all of this. His conversation with Razumovsky—Vilnius-Moscow... He is upset. But once again it worked out. Yeltsin really did some damage here, he paved the way [qq: зацементировал дорожку]...

January 6, 1988.

[I am reading] Stalin's conversation with Budyakin... from Grossman's "Life and Fate." I am nearing the end and becoming increasingly suffused with it. Today I read Kazurin's response to the publication of Shatrov's "Farther, Farther" in "Znamya." It has the following phrase: "He (Stalin) will remain on the stage until each one of us has it out with him completely." I think that to have it out with him completely, everyone should read Vasili Grossman's great book about our Stalinist era. (I still cannot believe that the entire work will be published in the "October.")

Yesterday I went to Zvenigorod. It's a Chekhovian provincial town... it hasn't changed. Of

course, it has signs of Soviet life. Once again, this is proof that people live for themselves, not for the government or for the “big idea.” There is nothing you can do about that. *Perestroika* could improve their life, let's say to the level of Finland (even though right now it might seem incredible!). That will be the end of any kind of idea. But the kind of idea Stalin had—God forbid.

But Platonov... he had an idea, a universal idea... But what would it be, if everybody lives “well?” What would people need it for...

January 7, 1988.

I finished Grossman's book. It's difficult to define my feelings right now. There is a sense of oppression and hopelessness, but not only about our country's history as it appeared after all the denunciations of the *perestroika* years. In a condensed form, history has attacked me through this book, forcing me to think differently “concerning” myself. I am plagued by the meaninglessness of my life. Seemingly, I should be satisfied: the General Secretary's adviser... (and what a General Secretary!) who has really begun to break Stalinism. I have my work, I was the right [choice] for the General Secretary; I was able to help him in some ways. But still, dissatisfaction is gnawing at me... it's a “strategic” discontentment with myself (to use Mao's terminology).

The stream of New Year's greetings adds to this feeling (there must have been over a hundred, I did not open most of them). I understand the bureaucratic formality of this procedure. They come from PB [Politburo] members (except for Ligachev), from Ministers and the like, many of whom I do not even know. But these greetings intensify the feeling of discrepancy between who I am and what I am perceived to be. There is another aspect to this: they think that sending greetings to Gorbachev's adviser is just “what's done.” They think that by this action they place the addressee on their level, or even emphasize his higher status. While he, the addressee, does not give a damn about all of this. He despises this waste of postal supplies. The very procedure of official importance is despicable to him. It oppresses him, since unwittingly it emphasizes his belonging to “the deck,” “clan,” “elite.” He does not believe that he belongs. He does not want such an elite to exist, and this atmosphere in this stratum of power. He does not feel that he has any power, except for the favor of M.S., who sometimes agrees with his intellectual tastes and preferences.

Some people take for modesty the fact that I shun appearing “close to [Gorbachev]” at the official ceremonies and in the press, some think it's a game at modesty. In reality I am depressed by these receptions and “protocols.” Especially I cannot stand to get into the sleigh not according to my rank, just because I have a permanent spot there.

As rarely happens, I am trying to project what I've read onto my life and fate, to decide what my place in all of this was and is. And could it be that the country is actually, finally, beginning to turn into a normal country... achieving this by suffering through Gorbachev.

But many of those who maimed and crippled our country for so many decades, both physically and morally, many of them are still alive—and receiving good pensions. And most importantly, they “spawned” (through the atmosphere, and the entire style and mechanism of public life) many millions of descendants in all generations. A vast swamp of ignorance, lack of culture, and plain illiteracy remains. In a flash (as it happened in the 20s and 30s), this soil can produce the necessary number of Yezhovs, Berias, and others like them.

There are forces of terrible conservatism at the very top, headed by Ligachev. These forces will not stop at having to use the services of Stalinist followers, who possibly do not even realize that that's what they are.

In a word, one of the newspaper authors is right when he says “Just wait, they will not forgive us (the *perestroika* generation)...”

M.S. understands this. But you cannot build a dam against this swamp and its inhabitants with nobleness alone. Aleksandr Nikolaevich (Yakovlev) is a little nervous and often petty, but he sees the danger more clearly.

To come back to the point: M.S. assigned me to think at leisure about ideas that should be specified at the Plenum dedicated to school reform (with Ligachev reporting). This is all relevant to my thoughts! The danger that I am writing about. And what are the results? I've been thinking in my free time for two weeks now and haven't come up with anything different from what is already written in the newspapers and journals.

March 26, 1988.

For several days and nights, when I couldn't sleep, I've been reproaching myself for not writing. It's a crime against history. I opened up K. Simonov's dictations in “Znamya” No. 3. They are dedicated to Stalin. But he saw or spoke on the phone with Stalin only 5 times, while I interact with a great man almost on a daily basis...

So I've decided to be disciplined and to make at least brief notes of my every contact with Gorbachev. Maybe later I will be able to recreate something from these notes. I just don't have the strength to record it in detail, as I have done in the past: I write so much during the day, and then get home around 9-10 p.m. absolutely beat, and still have to read the newspapers and journals. Right now I have to read, it's an “epoch” that will become a part of history for centuries.

I would like to start, maybe, from a crucial moment.

On Thursday, March 24, there was a PB (during the congress of collective farmers). Around 50 obkom [oblast committee] secretaries were present. Braun, Demidenko from Kazakhstan. The latter called the field-team leaders and the brigade leaders by name as he spoke. And the names are all—Grosz, Frank, Fritz... “These are the names I have there,” he comments

on his speech. The room laughs.

... This was striking: M.S. didn't know that if a state order is sent down, people are fined if it is not carried out. After all, according to corporate law, if no contract is made, one is not responsible for carrying something out...

I saw that he is “charmed” by the resolutions. The obkom secretaries and Birukova explained to him that it hasn't changed, since a state order is like the plan, even “more strict...”

... M.S. offered the PB members to move to the CC Secretariat conference hall (from the Marble Hall).

Routine work followed. Then the outsiders took their leave and only the PB members, candidates and CC Secretaries remained.

I thought that they would discuss Nagorny-Karabakh (on the 26th, meetings and other events are scheduled in Yerevan). But the next day, Friday, Yakovlev calls me. “I am going to second part of yesterday's PB,” he says. “Yesterday, after you left, M.S. brought up the Nina Andreeva article in *Sovetskaia Rossia* [“Soviet Russia”] for discussion. It all started over tea in the Kremlin Palace during a break in the collective farmers' congress. Vorotnikov started the conversation... and for some reason M.S. flared up: 'since you brought it up, let's clear it up, something is going on here... ' And right away he proposed to discuss the article after the PB.”

Yakovlev continues telling me: “Gromyko spoke first. His speech was unintelligible. The only thing I understood was that he does not fully approve of the article. Then Vorotnikov justified himself for something poorly said (I did not understand what) at tea in the Kremlin. Then I made up my mind to speak. Otherwise, I thought, they will make an assessment before they could see how the article could be interpreted. And I picked it apart piece by piece—that it is an anti-*perestroika* manifesto, in places directly opposing positions publicly stated by Gorbachev. Everyone became cautious, it looks like they had not understood this when they read the article. Ligachev was listening, red as a lobster. Then he took the floor and started lying: that Chikin (editor of *Sovetskaia Rossia*) had indeed visited him, but besides this he has nothing to do with the article. He swore his devotion to *perestroika* and to Gorbachev. In reality, everything is the other way around... This Nina Andreeva really did write a pathetic little letter, half a page long, defending Stalinist values. In response, on Ligachev's orders a team was sent to her in Leningrad, which had finished up the letter for her... to the point that no one can believe that a teacher at Chemistry-Technology Institute could compose such a page.”

At the conference of editors, Ligachev waved the article in the air, saying that this is the party line. His camp sent an order to the censors—not to allow anything that would criticize or disagree with the article. (And it worked, something broke through only in “Moskovskie novosti” [“Moscow News”]. Falin called me—like a litmus test.) Adamovich came to visit, said that entire brochures from the new samizdat, composed of articles against Nina, were rejected by different editorial offices!

At the political day on Trubnaya, a thousand agitators-propagandists were told that the

article was a directive. Ligachev received a stream of thanks and enthusiasm from provincial obkoms and raikoms: “Thank you! Finally, we got the word of the party! It’s time to do away with these vilifiers!..”

But at the PB, looking the General Secretary in the eye, Egor Kuzmich says that he had nothing do with the article.

March 28, 1988.

Yakovlev called. I asked him whether he needs the material Gubenko brought from Lubimov in Madrid, I gave it to M.S.--about Lubimov's “stopover” [заезд] in the USSR?

Don't, he says, and I agreed—let “Izvestiya” give his interview. - They might give me a dressing down, but I don't want to involve him in this.

Later, when I asked M.S. whether he read it, he said: “No. And what for? I am in general in favor of the idea that everyone who wants to can go to hell. Open the doors wide for them. And... the ones that we think should join them—same goes for them. And Lubimov? What do we need him for!?” Then he switched to rowdy language and from this I understood that he will not deal with “this” himself: whatever happens will happen.

We spoke about tomorrow's meeting Natta and Co. (General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party). “In a second, call all the advisers: at 16:30 I am getting all the deputies (of departments) and you all will be there too. You don't need to bring anything besides your ears.” (I took that to mean that he does not want me to record it. But, that was not the case.)

We met. But Yakovlev already told me that we will be discussing the Nina Andreeva article in “Sovetskaya Rossia,” just as the two closed PBs on Thursday and Friday had done.

I ask him: How is that possible? Is that a draw?

He says: “No, of course not! It was a two-day thrashing (of Ligachev)!” And A.N. is so happy about it, so pleased.

M.S. started with a discussion of the XIX party conference. Should we present the theses for public discussion, or discuss them within the party? Should the party decide on it first? Think about it. The nature of the theses will depend on this.

The conference has to become a powerful impetus for all the *perestroika* processes. We have to think through everything: the progress of *perestroika* and measures to intensify it; how to go about the practical aspect of calling together the conference. How to prepare the report... We'll get this done. How should we prepare the party for the conference, that's another question. We will need sharp self-criticism: are we fulfilling the Plenum resolutions, are we following the “unity of word and deed!?” What has been done, what failed, and who is responsible. We should also think about finishing up what's left over in the remaining months, and analyze what has been

done: not what we have done in terms of volume, but what we've done using the new methods, whether we've followed the agreements.

We should also speak about the achievements—economic, political, social. This is the first point.

The second point. The progress of democratization in society. There will be one report. Contribute your thoughts, how you imagine democratization. I have some ideas. But I will not talk about all of them. We will convene about this next week.

Think about the qualitative composition of the delegates at the conference, about the documents, the procedure.

I already said some things at the February Plenum. The issues of political reconstruction—the Soviets—will be the central topic. They need to be revived. We need Lenin's approach to their place and role. About the role of the party—the more I think about and study this question, the more convinced I become that if we allow the weakening of the party, we will fail. The party is everything—theory, comprehension, the organization of the masses, and the consciousness of the masses. Who would do this if it weren't for the party?! Nobody would be able to manage this. Even now we see that as soon as we let something slip or fall behind, it immediately makes itself known, resounds through all of society.

I am convinced that we need to radically reform the Supreme Soviet. When I think about it, all I see is the Great Kremlin Palace: everybody is sitting dumbly, some are listening, some aren't even doing that. All the work they do is applaud and vote. Then they go home. Is this the kind of Supreme Soviet we need—in its essence, composition, size, and work?

I am convinced that we need a limit on how long an office can be held. For everybody, up to the General Secretary. But not how the Yugoslavs have it, I've seen enough there. All the leaders are happy not to have a General Secretary. Each one at his place makes speeches for the entire country. Every one is aiming for the first place.

Medvedev: On the other hand, we don't have anybody to invite for a return visit!

Everybody laughs.

Gorbachev: But let's take a look at ourselves. Recently we were working on the staffing of first secretaries of obkoms. There is not a single fitting candidate under 40. And where would they come from? They were excluded from the political process. Every person has to climb the ladder of party work. They had no other way. And now people who were born in the 30s are 50 years old. A person is expected to move to the center only when he approaches 60. Our process of creating specialists is broken.

So, think about this. And in general, how do you envision the apparatus?

This is the second aspect of the XIX Party Conference.

Now I would like to speak about the following: we (the PB) have been discussing the article in *Sovetskaia Rossia* for two days. We have unanimously (!) judged it to be a harmful and an anti-*perestroika* piece, some have even called it reactionary.

The discussion took place on my initiative. We share this point of view. There were members of the PB, candidates, secretaries (except for Dobrynin, he is on vacation).

That such an article should appear would seem normal during *glasnost*. This point of view is possible. A person can express any opinion. I myself have read worse letters to you. A great deal of everything is printed in the newspapers and journals. This is normal. People are considering everything, they want to understand what happened with history. After all, did we live 70 years for nothing? And what did we fight for? Others say that everything was brilliant... But then why should we have such a Plenum? Whose idea was it?

And we, the party, want to examine our point of view: we tread a difficult path, many things have happened. But we were on the path to socialism... We've stated our perspective at the 70th anniversary of the October and in other documents. This set new processes in motion, it touched all the levels of society. It started discussions, flared up passions. Questions rose up in the minds of many people.

It seemed that we had clarified these questions. But in life everything is much more complicated. Everything is mixed up in people's minds. Even at the level of the CC not everything is uniform. And this is normal. Every person wants to figure out for himself exactly what happened, and how. This is normal. Sensing this confusion, I decided to speak at the February Plenum. You remember how attentively everybody listened. But I saw that some people were stunned. They started thinking... started going to personnel policy, more discussions started. And let them happen. We did not issue any orders from here.

After all, we are speaking of transforming people's consciousness. It's not like assigning the First Cavalry to destroy Denikin². We are talking about *perestroika* of consciousnesses of the people who grew up in the Soviet times. This is why we need globalization and democracy. These are our primary instruments.

Now we run into this campaign (Nina Andreeva's article in *Sovetskaia Rossia*). That is precisely how I would like to characterize it—a campaign against the February Plenum, it was planned and executed. And I could not leave this without making a judgment on it. We've assigned *Pravda* to run a response article.

The article in *Sovetskaia Rossia*... It caught my attention right away that some Nina Andreeva could not have written it.

Frolov: It was prepared here, in these walls...

M.S.: Where? By whom?

² A metaphor referring to the legends of the Russian civil war. Assigning the First Cavalry to destroy General Denikin would imply something that is easily done—Translator.

Frolov is quiet... M.S. understood that Ligachev might be named, and let off Frolov.

M.S.: Where else could it have been prepared, but our propaganda department?..

But Yakovlev doesn't know. Ligachev—doesn't know... (M.S. is once again cunning... he understood long ago whose work this was, but he doesn't want to dot the "i" in public).

Sklyarov doesn't know. Who knows? What is going on then? Will we follow the XXVII Congress line and refer to what the General Secretary says, or will we make politics in dark corners?

I had a conversation with Chikin (editor of *Sovetskaia Rossia*). He himself was surprised by such a reaction. He said, he thought he was helping *perestroika*. He is a decent person. And I like *Sovetskaia Rossia*. It has done a great deal for the Plenum. It is a good, serious newspaper. It has discussed so many subjects! It brought the writer Ivan Vasiliev to its pages.

It so happened that it lost its way. Chikin lost his bearing. I told him our trust in him we are not questioning our trust in him.

But this article is not a mere accident. What is it then? Sklyarov saw its bias, so did Yakovlev, and Frolov too. (Oh, M.S. is playing cat and mouse, leading away from the main track, calling the people who are "above suspicion!")

I was flying to Yugoslavia. I didn't have time to read it. I usually put all the materials that require my attention in a separate folder. I returned on Saturday, read the article and thought—what is this? This isn't right, absolutely not right!

Now the questions have started coming in—where is this coming from? People come and ask me whether it's true that the article is preparing the public for news that Gorbachev has already been removed from his work, so that people would begin to understand why he's been removed.

Look how far this has come!

I tell Chikin: you were at the congress of collective farmers. You saw what was going on... What is holding us back? This is all coming from "there," from Stalin. And you throw this article into a heated atmosphere.

He says—there are different opinions.

Yes, they are different. There are also monarchists and revolutionaries. Some people consider October to be a squiggle in history. And then there are people who have no ties or allegiances, they present history without its roots...

Chikin says to me: I wanted to show the different opinions.

I say to him: It looks like you wanted to present me with some information. As if I don't

know about the different opinions, you wanted to bring it to my attention... The country is dealing with such issues, it's on the edge of a crisis, and you are throwing into the pot a detached quote about "counterrevolutionary nations!"

Chikin was worried. I believe him (Wrongly! He is a Ligachev's suck up and a Stalinist!)... I believe people in general. Sometimes, of course, they can disappoint me, act underhandedly.

I said at the PB: we have a very important role in history—to pull our country, to set it on the right path... to return it to Lenin... Be attentive, look ahead.

I was sitting next to a Latvian man from "Agdzhi" (a prosperous Latvian collective farm). He says to me: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, there is such a thick layer between the leadership and the people. They are tying up the people, not letting them breathe or work."

Viktor Petrovich (M.S. says this to Nikonov), you propose to reduce the Regional Agro-Industrial Union [RAIU] by 50 percent, I propose 60 percent and more. For example, in Saratov alone, there are hundreds of people in RAIU, an entire squadron, robust gals (he points to the breast), this reserve is for beets. Nine hundred people are occupied for the RAIU only in Saratov.

Do we need RAIU like this? The policies have been set. We have told them what to do. The State will provide orders, so why do we need these intermediates? The people have forgotten how to act independently. Ivan Vasiliev spoke at the collective farmers' congress: I've seen it all, he says. Now nobody will sign a lease contract, they don't want to deal with it... Why is this so? Because the specialists are against it. They've been sitting around for decades, doing nothing, and they've ruined the villages. And then a contract comes around and produces results that they couldn't dream of. This discredits them and of course they are against any novelties. These are the kinds of things we reveal through our reform. The people see all of this. We should say this to the specialists, because they've turned into bureaucrats themselves. Naturally, I am against firing a thousand people today and a thousand more tomorrow. It needs to be done humanely, so the process is consistent. We do not need any strong-arm tactics, we should not nip any new undertakings. We should give complete freedom to everything, to everybody who would like to get something done.

The other day I read in "Ogonek" how in Uzbekistan women who work with cotton are being poisoned by the fertilizers. And nobody cares. One woman spoke up, and for that she was persecuted and left without a salary. People like her are beaten down, so they suffocate with their initiative and complaints.

Perestroika is yet to bring us many different things. We cannot get stuck on the little things. The laws need to start working. Recall the instigators in Armenia. There are people like them. They feed on problems, on troubles. We need to take such instigators and put them on public trial, and jail them.

There is a great power in our policies, but we need to be able to enforce it. Chebrikov in his department conducted an analysis (they run such "sociological" studies) and came to the

conclusion that criticism related to *perestroika* is not destructive in nature. I want the department deputies to know this.

Perhaps we should pass a resolution at the Politburo on the *Sovetskaia Rossia* article (there are voices of agreement). It wouldn't hurt to send it around the party organizations as well.

To Boldin: Do we have a record of what was said at the Politburo? (Boldin hesitates, because for a long time it has been forbidden to record anything at the Politburos. M.S. understood that he gave something away... he continues) There has to be something. Collect everything that has been said by Politburo members, make a good note, so people would read it and understand what's going on, and send it around the obkoms. I wanted to say all of this to you so you keep it under consideration.

And now I'm moving to the 120th anniversary of Gorky.³ It's not a good round figure, but I have to do it: hands are being raised even against Gorky...

April 1, 1988.

A.N. Yakovlev acted out to me how it all started. It happened at the Kremlin, in the Presidium room during the break in the collective farmers' congress. People took their seats.

Vorotnikov : Once again this scoundrel Soyfer was published in "Ogonek." What are we going to do with the press?.. We need to do something...

M.S. : Why? They published scholars afterwards, who raised objections about the first publication. What do you want? Some people say one thing, others another. These are scholars, it's their milieu. Let them do this... why are you nervous about it? We can't operate as we once used to...

Ligachev : The press has also started biting back... There was an article in *Sovetskaia Rossia*. A very good article. Our party line.

Vorotnikov : Yes! A genuine, valid article. This is what we need. Otherwise things are getting out of hand...

Gromyko : Yes, I think it is a good article. It puts things in their places.

Solomentsev started saying something along those lines. And Chebrikov was about to open his mouth...

M.S. I looked through it briefly before my trip to Yugoslavia. ... (he is interrupted with "It's a worthwhile article. Consider this...") I read it thoroughly when I came back... (Once

³ Maxim Gorky, famous Soviet writer, father of the "socialist realism" in literature, his books include *Mother*, *On the Bottom* and many others.

again, people are vying in praising the article). And I am of a different opinion...

Vorotnikov : Indeed!

M.S. : Indeed what?...

(There is an awkward silence; they are looking at each other.)

So, let us discuss this at the Politburo. I see this matter is moving in the wrong direction. It smells of dissent. What is it indeed? This article is against *perestroika*, against the February plenum. I never object when people express their views, whatever they might be, and whether they are expressed in print, in letters, or in articles. But I see that this article has been made a directive. In party organizations it is discussed as if it were our base position. It is prohibited to publish objections to this article... this is an entirely different matter.

At the February Plenum I did not give “my” report. We all discussed and approved it. It was a Politburo report and the Plenum approved it. And now, it turns out they are giving us another line... I am not holding on to my chair. But as long as I am here, in this chair, I am going to defend the ideas of *perestroika*... No! This will not do. We will discuss this at the Politburo.

On Thursday evening, after the official part of the PB, when we, the assistants, were asked to leave, the conversation continued as follows...

The following paragraphs are narrated by Yakovlev: M.S. said a few words, but such words that Ligachev turned pale and had to speak first.

Ligachev : Yes, Chikin visited me. I liked the article. But further than that I had nothing to do with it (Yakovlev’s commentary: he is lying, and I saw how it infuriated the General Secretary).

Gromyko already adjusted his position, spoke incomprehensibly for a long time, but it was clear that it was in nobody’s favor.

Vorotnikov was excusing himself for yesterday’s “Indeed!” but looked for a way out by complaining about the press and saying that there is no keeping it in check.

After Vorotnikov—Yakovlev said—I understood that it was time for me to speak, because I wasn’t sure that everyone had read the article, even the people who might have spoken against it, so it turned out that they would start automatically agreeing to the lack of discipline in the press and the matter would have been hushed up...

I spoke for about 20 minutes. I demonstrated point by point that the meaning of the article—in spirit and in tone, and in its every position—is against Gorbachev, against the February Plenum, that it is an anti-*perestroika* manifesto. It was late when I finished, around 10pm. M.S. suggested that we finish for the day and continue the next day.

The next day Ryzhkov spoke first. He spoke harshly and mercilessly against the article.

His speech was the strongest.

I had two impressions from the article, Ryzhkov said:

- What do we need this *perestroika* for?!

- Since such an unfortunate thing as *perestroika* has happened, we should limit and suppress it as much as we can.

Yakovlev said to me: I will not repeat everything that people said afterwards, and one cannot remember it all. What is important is the breakdown of the main ideas.

Shevardnadze condemned the article strongly and categorically. Medvedev's speech was decisive and well argumented. Slyunkov and Maslyukov spoke briefly, but to the point and emotionally, with indignation. Chebrikov (who had almost stumbled the day before) spoke his calm and condemning word and M.S. liked that very much (he even repeated it to Natta). Chebrikov said that their KGB "sociological" studies have shown that the criticism, which is gaining in scope, is not destructive!

General Yazov mumbled something vague about the press that doesn't know where to stop, but "on the whole" he was on the side of the General Secretary.

Solomentsev, Nikonov, and Lukyanov "came to the rescue" of Ligachev and the article... M.S. later said that this surprised and disappointed him. He even called Luk'yanov to his office (this is his friend from the university, they lived together in the dormitory on Stramynka street). Zaikov, who came back from his vacation especially for this, was not very concrete. (Perhaps it's because his hands aren't clean... this article was copied in the Moscow party organizations and was discussed as a directive. This probably did not happen without his knowledge, maybe even coordinated with him. In a word, he did not figure this out in time!)

Yakovlev for some reason did not mention Dolgikh and Biryukova. I did not ask him. But I think that Dolgikh was in Ligachev's wing.

Razumovsky spoke well.

Of course, a unanimous decision was made to condemn the article, and to assign *Pravda* to present a crushing article.

M.S. started the meeting with department heads and us with this: that we should officially formalize this decision with a PB resolution and send out a note to the oblast committees, summarizing what was said at the PB.

Today Yakovlev showed me the first draft of the *Pravda* article. It is written effectively. God willing, they will not maim it in distribution. I "intensified" some more points in it.

Frolov started to backtrack, saying that a crushing article in *Pravda* is the old method, while we are responding to a letter to the newspaper. Let the response be a signed letter in the

same *Sovetskaia Rossia*. I became furious: the revolution is a very authoritative affair, if we mumble, the Stalinists will hush everything up again, etc.

In a word, this is a turning point in the history of *perestroika*. (Ryzhkov even suggested relieving Ligachev of his duties as a supervisor of ideology! And if, as Yakovlev said, M.S. does not take pity on Egor Kuz'mich, the data will be in the records.)

I had other interactions with M.S. today as well.

Mengistu is crying for help, the Eritrean army has demolished his forces... so save him! The SOS flew out to Moscow, Havana, Berlin: he demands weapons, money, transportation, supplies, etc.

Yazov, Maslyukov, and Dobrynin are ready to oblige. According to tradition, they prepared a note and a draft resolution to supply 10 AN-12 planes, 40 tanks, cannons, machine-guns, and rockets.

I write on the draft: Mikhail Sergeyevich, at the PB and in public you have been steering people toward political resolutions. But here we are, giving the routine answer right away: immediately providing more weapons. It will not change anything, while with this "help" we will push Mengistu toward the hopeless attempt to "solve" everything through military force. Instead, we should hint to him that he should learn some lessons from what is happening...

A couple hours later I was told that he took off my note and signed the resolution.

At 5p.m. there was a PB on Afghanistan... At the end of the meeting we started discussing Ethiopia. M.S. called on Akhromeev, who depicted a catastrophically hopeless picture of Mengistu's chances of winning a military victory. He has been fighting for Eritrea for fourteen years, and the matters have been getting worse and worse. Meanwhile, we are pursuing his "worthless policies" [негодную политику] instead of pursuing our own. During this speech M.S. kept glancing at me, probably thinking that his adviser is sitting there and gloating.

Afghanistan. Shultz sent a letter to Shevardnadze. They are ready to sign [the agreements] in Geneva if the issue of continuing to supply the Mujaheddin with military aid is dropped. (Honestly: why did they start with that nonsense in the first place? No agreement would be able to put an end to this "aid").

The Politburo was supposed to decide whether we are signing in Geneva or not. M.S. weighed all the pros and contras. The "pros" clearly have the majority: we decided to pull out a long time ago, and it would be easier and more graceful to do it within the framework of an agreement. And most importantly: our boys there are still dying! What are we doing: did we decide to keep a firing-ground for our weapons there? And where is the word and deed! It is one more victory for the reality of the new thinking. Plus the burden of 6 billion [rubles] a year (from the 20 billion addition to the national income!).

M.S. asked each member of the PB personally. Everybody is for it. Akhromeev showed

on a map the plan for withdrawing our troops. In any case, whether the agreement is signed or not, we will begin withdrawing on May 15th.

April 3, 1988.

There are 100,000 young people on the Arbat. But are they outside politics? They are using *perestroika*. But are they ready to stand up for it? Do they understand the meaning of Gorbachev? Do they appreciate him? Do they know that this is the “one string,” on which their freedom hangs right now?!

I walked to my school. My heart aches. Moscow is slovenly, all over the place there are potholes, dirt, trash, and dilapidated roads. In many places the buildings look like Stalingrad in 1942. Good Lord! How much money—and manpower—is necessary everywhere, wherever you look.

Arbatov called me. He found out somehow that there was a PB on the article from *Sovetskaia Rossia*.

April 10, 1988.

From the 6th to the 8th I was in Tashkent. Before the trip, M.S. called me up: we are going. Everything changed. We have to support Najibullah. And... put an end to this matter... Two days later, in a speech at the Uzbekistan CC he said the word “trouble,” saying that it is the mildest word that can be used. But this phrase did not make it into the published version of the text, he crossed it out.

In the airplane on the way there, as we were both thinking about what to say to Najibullah M.S. was correcting the material I prepared in a hurry... Suddenly he brought up the story with *Sovetskaia Rossiya*.

You know, he says, before I went to Yugoslavia I saw this article (Nina Andreeva’s piece) and put it into the box where I usually put away things to come back to later. When I got back, I read it carefully; the talk about it started going around already, I understood what it means... But I was not yet “ripe” to raise the question at the Politburo. And then, when we were having tea (during a break in the congress of collective farmers) we started talking about it. Vorotnikov brought it up... Then I understood that it cannot be left as it is: “If this is a model for you then let’s discuss it...”

M.S. saw by my reaction that I already know most of this. He hesitated, and I said:

- Mikhail Sergeyevich, sometimes I get the feeling that your colleagues do not understand what you want, they do not read carefully what you say and write... or they cannot understand the essence of it.

- You see, that is the limit! (and he made a gesture with his hand). A limit this high. I do not think that there are bad intentions here, factionalism, or a disagreement in principle... it's just the limit. And this is also bad.

We were housed in one of [Sharaf] Rashid[ov]'s mansions. In the evening, M.S., Shevardnadze, Kryuchkov (Chebrikov's deputy on foreign intelligence), and Lushchikov (M.S.' adviser) sat together in the dining room and finished up the joint Soviet-American declaration, in order to send it to Najibullah today (Najibullah is staying in the city).

We had dinner, there was a funny episode. Kryuchkov: we should not have mentioned Cordovés in the declaration, he is a scoundrel.

M.S.: Why is he a scoundrel, he's not giving you any data? (Everybody laughs)

Kryuchkov : No, he is not!

Shevardnadze : Why do you think that is?

Kryuchkov : They are paying him a good salary. (Laughter).

On the morning of the 7th there was a meeting with Nadjibullah. He was with an adviser. M.S. asked Nishanov to join him, so later he would show up in the report: "To support Uzbekistan, because they have been completely trampled down" (because of the Rashid[ov] scandal⁴).

They reached agreements quickly. Najibullah (knowing that we have no other option) asked us for cash, weapons, material support, and food.

M.S. promised to look into it.

Najibullah looks confident. He has probably cast a much wider net than he tells us. And he has no alternative. "The seven" other opponents have all squabbled with each other... and the world knows him.

In a word, he wants us to leave.

Then we visited a collective farm, a greenhouse growing cucumbers, a residence... M.S. knows how to communicate with people. And he does it so easily, without adjusting his personality or elevating himself in inaccessibility. From the conversations he perceives how the people act, what they say and how they say it. [The people in Uzbekistan] spoke to him freely in broken Russian, they were open and respectful; they were not intimidated and only rarely were they shy (the men). The Uzbek women in the greenhouses were ready to kiss him and afterwards they all asked to take pictures with him from every angle. They sat down on the ground around him—so it looked just like a harem scene.

⁴ Former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan responsible for unprecedeted levels of corruption and abuse in cotton industry of the republic.

When we were returning to the “residence” he said that he has definitively made up his mind to speak before the active [party members]. So let us have dinner and then sit down to prepare... we will have a contest of the minds.

Here is how the work progressed: M.S. produced a stream of ideas, I kept interrupting with “formulations,” or to extract something from his “stream of consciousness” that could be put down on paper. Shevardnadze and Lishchikov did not say much. The session ended only around midnight. Well, M.S. says (to me and Lushchikov), make this presentable and give it to the man on duty.

We went to the neighboring building—a hotel where the girls were staying (secretaries, stenographers)... And I had to practically re-write the 40 page shorthand record, moving parts around, bringing out the central ideas, removing repetitions, in a word, doing in-depth editing. Lushchikov does not know how to do this.

I stayed up till 4a.m. We had to get up at 7:30 a.m. to lay flowers at the Lenin monument... Then we visited the factory “Algorithm” (there are almost no Uzbek employees there), and then there was a speech at the CC. The text was only a skeleton for him... In essence he made a new speech; the previous evening had served to gather his thoughts together and to practice.

No! We haven’t had a leader like him since Lenin and his colleagues. The comparison with Kirov does not work because Kirov was “the people’s tribune,” but he took his cues from the primitive. And he was not as intelligent. Perhaps they are comparable in their moral qualities and their feeling of responsibility.

Then we had pilaf at the palace from which Najibullah had left shortly prior. Then we flew home. On the airplane we drank tea together for a long time. M.S. was tired and happy with what was accomplished, especially by the fact that he “rehabilitated” the Uzbek people from the blemish and scorn resulting from the Rashid[ov] scandal. (His words to the collective farmers that “it is not the people’s fault” instantly spread through the republic). We all spoke a lot, about everything. Sometimes Raisa Maksimovna led the conversation, at those times M.S. quieted down...

What I remember particularly is that he was hurt by Shatrov's new appearance at the cinematographers' convention. Shatrov said that he had lunch with the American President at the White House and that Leontieff spoke, and said that “*perestroika* offers *glasnost'* for the intelligentsia, but the regular people need meat!” And Gorbachev applauded even to these words.

But first of all, nobody spoke at the White House besides M.S., Reagan, and Cliburn.⁵ Secondly, even if Shatrov confused a lunch at the White House with a reception at the embassy, Leontief (Nobel laureate in economics, a former Russian) said nothing of the sort. And thirdly, even if this had taken place, how can you prattle about it... After all, it goes against the entire

⁵ Van Cliburn, an American pianist who won the first International Tchaikovsky Piano Competition in Moscow in 1958.

spirit and style, against all of Gorbachev's politics!

... Truly, the conceit of the foremen of *perestroika* is overshadowing decency, and Yakovlev was right when he said: "They want to be the Aleksandr Matrosov of *perestroika*, but end up being Pavlik Morozov..."

I moralized about this to Yu. Afanasiev.

M.S. was upset, especially by the fact that this segment of Shatrov's speech was broadcast by TV around the country.

... The article in *Pravda* (April 5) put many people in an awkward situation. M.S. said to me in the airplane: Ligachev visited me. He looks beaten. He's suffering. He said to me: let's conduct an investigation. Give an order to check the facts: I did not give an order to make the Nina Andreeva article the directive. I did not give it.

M.S. says to me: Maybe he did not give it. But he got his opinion across to the right people and the anti-*perestroika* [ones] were immediately ready to oblige. And the ball started rolling. Some party committees already gave an order to discuss it at party meetings (as a model of how to approach *perestroika*). Not to mention the fact that some Nina Andreeva could not have written such an article, which I saw as soon as I read it. This is a platform, a manifesto... To Yegor (i.e. Ligachev) I said: calm down, we are not going to conduct any investigations. The last thing we need is to organize a schism in the PB with our own hands.

M.S. went on: it's good that this happened, it's a lesson to everybody... Chebrikov gave a good speech (saying that the nature of the criticism is not destructive).

M.S.' speech in Tashkent was published today. He made some more edits after Yakovlev and me, particularly in the place where "everybody in the party is equal and there should not be leaderism." He removed the phrase "the General Secretary and the common communist are equal..." And he was right to do so, it would not sound serious, as if he were playing up to something. It is one thing when it is said in a small circle or even at a large, but closed auditorium. But if it were published in the entire country it would look like demagoguery.

Thus, upon arriving from Tashkent he was at the CC till midnight, and had no more energy to prepare materials for Arafat's visit. In the morning, with [Karen] Brutents' help, he prepared up some positions for the meeting with Arafat.

When Shevardnadze, Dobrynin, Brutents and I entered his office at the Kremlin five minutes before the meeting with Arafat, M.S. looked tired... Critically and as a joke, he said: I should fire you... I'll kick the bucket, I'm so tired. I have no desire to meet with this Arafat... What's the point?.. Only Anatoly (and he points at me) was against this meeting all the way. And you all insisted on it. (It is true that I was against it; I even had major conversations with E.A. [Shevardnadze]; I sabotaged the execution of PB's resolution to receive him; convinced M.S. temporarily not to carry it out. But it looks like E.A. became engaged in this and... we carry different weight, M.S. agreed with him in the end.)

The talk really was practically pointless. And we do not need him. Arafat, on the other hand, is celebrating. Now he feels even more important.

Perhaps the only useful point was that he heard from M.S.'s own lips that on no account should the "Palestinian rebels" take up weapons; that would be the end of everything.

April 24, 1988.

The most important events have been three meetings between M.S. and the First Secretaries of the obkoms and the Republics' CCs, a total of 150 people. I recorded everything in detail. He checked the idea of "All power to the Soviets!" on them... and presented the idea that the First Secretary should be the Chairman of the Presidium of any Soviet, but he should be popularly elected. If you are not elected--leave. And this set up would go to the very top: even in Pitsunda he said that the idea is that he would become a "President-General Secretary." And this is right. This is the central idea of *perestroika*, while he is alive. But during this time--through the XIX party conference, he wants to create elections and other guarantees against dictatorship... not only of the individual, but also of the party.

The main theme in the text and subtext of these meetings was the Nina Andreeva article. Razumovsky notified the first two groups (there was a break of three days between them) what the subject at hand would be. Therefore, it started from Pugo's (Riga) second speech: how could it have happened that a CC organ (*Sovetskaia Rossia*) printed something like this, etc. And why was there an order to print it in the oblast' newspapers...

But I, Pugo said, "suspected something fishy" and stopped the printing, and in two days it was recalled. But many printed it, and in some places, including Leningrad, started to "positively" support it at the party conferences. People say that some were even planning to conduct a "theory seminar" on Gorbachev's ideological mistakes (by way of *glasnost'*).

Others were more harsh. One said: how does this happen? We are members of the CC. We approved your (M.S.) report at the February Plenum. Now all of a sudden a CC organ offers a completely reverse platform! Who are we after that? Why weren't we asked?..

A third raised a question--why don't we remove Chikin and dismiss the editorial staff?

M.S. flatly opposed this: we cannot use "those" methods to convince people that the new ideas are right... We will proceed only by the democratic process. He said to them directly: "Not all of you saw it, not all of you understood the anti-*perestroika* nature of the article. You hesitated."

He was especially furious when Petrov (Sverdlovsk, the "workers' aristocracy" from Stalin's brood) from the third group (which hadn't been notified) stood up and said: "So what! I liked the article and I ordered it to be reprinted. It's time to stop being humiliated for our past. The worker's collectives want to know: when will it stop!"

M.S. was somewhat disconcerted: "Did you get to the bottom of it, after the article in *Pravda*?"

Petrov: I'm working on it. Of course, Nina Andreeva is not right in everything. But *Pravda*, too, does not answer questions. Plus, after the first objective collection of responses to the article, it started printing only one-sided evaluations!

M.S. restrained himself, you could see.

Petrov: You demand that everyone says what he thinks... So I am saying it. And I am still trying to figure it out for myself.

There were no sharp condemnations of Nina's article in this group. Most of the speakers did not touch upon the subject at all; they spoke on the subject of the conference: their ideas on reforming the political system and party work, i.e., they were giving their thoughts for the XIX party conference.

As the meeting progressed, Gorbachev raised the subject of Stalinshchina. When we did not know the whole picture, he said, it was one thing. But when we found out more and more about what happened... there can be no two ways about it. For your consideration I will give you some numbers: 1 million party activists were executed. Three million were sent to camps, to rot. This is not considering the effects of collectivization. Lists were made of the best people of the party, to be removed...

And Nina Andreeva... if we follow her logic, she is asking us to return to 1937. Do you want that? You are members of the CC. You have to think deeply about the fate of our country and of socialism. And constantly remember--we are all for socialism, but what kind of socialism? We do not need the kind we had under Stalin.

A Secretary of the Kalininskiy obkom started to complain that some groups, especially from the intelligentsia, are demanding that the city be renamed with the name of Tver'. They used to base this on historical reasons. Now, after the article "The President's Wife" in *Ogonek*, they are also basing it on the fact that Kalinin does not deserve to have the city named after him. "What are we coming to?" he exclaimed.

M.S. answers him: "So what? Everything written in *Ogonek* is correct. That is how it was. Remember, how Lenin framed the question when Stalin offended Krupskaia. And here! Stalin sent Kalinin's wife to jail... as well as other wives. And they acted as if nothing had happened. They continued to praise him and crawl at his feet. What moral is this! What kind of Bolsheviks are these?! So figure this out for yourself. I am not imposing anything. But figure it out with the people (about the city's name)."

And with Brezhnev. Churbanov (his son-in-law) was prosecuted for 700,000 [rubles] in bribes that he got from all around the Soviet Union. And this is Leonid Il'yich's family! How can

we prevent people from rejecting his name: Brezhnev region, city... Naberezhnye Chelny⁶, an icebreaker!..

Several days later I had a conversation with Yakovlev. He asks me: When do you think this change happened in M.S.? Remember how sourly he received *The Children of Arbat*⁷? And then the affair with Shatrov⁸... Compared to what is printed right now, that stuff is baby talk. It's as if there is a new man in his place: he does not tolerate even the slightest indulgence in Stalinism.

I answer him: I think it happened when he saw that the people around him who are headed by Ligachev think (and do) the same as Nina Andreeva, and that even in the generalship of the party they do not understand the depth of his plans... or do not accept it.

In the end, if there was no Nina Andreeva, we should have invented her. All of this caused such a storm of anti-Stalinism, and such freedom in the newspapers, that Ligachev and others "would not have it!" in the past. And now he has his tail between his legs. I observed him at the Politburo last Thursday, April 14. He doesn't have the same aplomb anymore. He spends more time being quiet; he looks kind of pathetic. And when he spoke on some peripheral issue--I think it was about the fact that vocational schools should be managed from the center, rather than being attached to factories--Ryzhkov came down on his sharply (and this was in the presence of several ministers), Zaikov "disagreed," and even Vorotnikov said something.

M.S. comments were worthy of Solomon--as is his customary manner when he speaks about details: saying that everybody has some rationale. But in essence he supported the Premier. Ligachev pathetically quieted down. I thought: this is the beginning of the "rejection."

Yesterday an unscheduled Secretariat on the preparation of the XIX party conference took place. Gorbachev led it himself. He did not trust Ligachev to do it, even though according to his "status," the latter was supposed to lead it.

Last Friday, I think, M.S. went to the hospital to visit [Hafez al-] Assad, who came secretly for a medical examination. He is very open with him. With others--with the Europeans, even with Shultz, this is the right thing to do because they are decent human beings. But with this guy (as with Najibullah) you have to be more careful. Guile is in their blood. Assad needs nothing better than to milk us. He wants the rockets to be no worse than Israel's. Everything else he understands "his way." It's not for nothing that he is close to Khomeini.

Shultz was here on April 22. I prepared a great deal of materials for the meeting. M.S. kept changing "conceptions" and dictating to me. It seems he was not satisfied--he made Dobrynin write two more pages late at night. But he did not even look at them later.

⁶ A city that was named "Brezhnev" after the latter's death in 1982, subsequently renamed Naberezhnye Chelny in 1988.

⁷ In the 1985 installment of the Diary, Chernyaev writes about a continuous struggle to get permission to publish Rybakov's novel *The Children of Arbat*.

⁸ A.N. is speaking about M.S.'s reaction to the ending of Shatrov's play *And Further, Further!* where Lenin leaves, and Stalin stays. [Footnote in the original]

When he sat down across from Shultz, he put everything aside. He opened the folder, which had held the papers and which had his comments written across it.

Shultz: This is all that you have?--jokingly.

M.S.: I have a lot of things--also with irony.

And he presented everything calmly, confidently, and deeply. He was in great force. Nowadays he feels very confident during talks in general. He always thinks of unexpected moves ("the unpredictable General Secretary," he jokes). About Reagan's last speeches he said "whatever you do, you can't make (America) like you." And the greater Gorbachev's popularity in the world, the less capable Reagan & Co. will be to accept the *new thinking*; i.e. not even agree, but proceed from the fact that there won't be any communist aggression and expansion (from Moscow), and objectively there cannot be.

Dobrynin continues to be an "ambassador" even as he is the head of the International Department of the CC. This gives me a lot of work, since I get no help from the MFA or from the International Department in preparing materials for M.S. What they are providing is nothing more than references or trivialities. As a rule, there are zero ideas, or even original trains of thought. Except from Brutents.

Not that M.S. doesn't have plenty of his own ideas. Nevertheless, with his inhuman workload in domestic affairs, one wants to "guess" for him; to remind him of the most important in this or that foreign opportunity, in talks and documents, resolutions and preparation of PB discussions. I think so far I have been able to do this.

I have also been successful in preparing reports on the outcome of his talks. He likes it because it is easy for me to catch the "spirit," I know how he really thinks, and mostly know what he would like to present to the public. We also have a similar style of writing--no water, no unnecessary words, no blank shots.

This work he entrusts to me completely. Still, sometimes he checks. On the outcome of the talks with Shultz, for example, he called me from the car after the conclusion of the evening honoring Lenin (April 22), literally 20 minutes before the TV program *Vremya* ["Time"] and asked me to read what I composed. He approved it.

I developed a totally new style [for writing these reports] in comparison with Aleksandrov's work with Gorbachev, not only with Brezhnev and Chernenko. I write the reports about the talks based on fact (as opposed to writing it beforehand based on the MFA's style), using not only the thoughts, but even M.S.'s expressions and characteristic words.

And somehow everybody recognized these reports as a substitute for press-conferences, which are customary in the West for high-level meetings and which M.S.'s interlocutors give here at the press-house on Zubovskaia or on the plane... In a word, this is our evaluation of the meetings and what we would like to say in that regard.

M.S. just called. It seems he wanted to talk. "I am sitting," he says, "surrounded by journals and articles. Raisa Maksimovna came in and scolded me: why are you sitting around! The air is so fresh! You haven't moved all day, let's go for a walk!" Her hello to me... But he still talked with me for 20 minutes.

The first topic was the reaction in the world to his talk with Shultz. Everybody jumped to defend Reagan. It's good that we transferred the leadership from Thatcher to Reagan. That's where it belongs, that kind of leadership... And she already started fussing, asking for it again: but we let her know.

Me: Naturally. She had such a chance-- "closeness with Gorbachev!" She's not going anywhere. Let Reagan get himself clean.

M.S. (picks up): Everybody should know that we are not trading off our dignity under any circumstances. You know, Anatoly, they do not respect weakness. They will trample you and smear you. From time to time you have to remind them, who they are dealing with. Just look, how they listened (i.e. Shultz, Nitze, Ridgeway).

Me: Nobody rushed to defend their President.

M.S.: Yes. Shultz is an intelligent and decent person. The reports from Kiev say that he did not seek a meeting with the dissidents. He is speaking with the people, becoming convinced that I am saying the truth.

And Nitze? He's an old man...

Me: I think the politicking that reigns under Reagan is even unpleasant to themselves. But, they have to play the game with him.

M.S.: When we were saying goodbye, Nitze (M.S. spoke with each one separately when they were leaving) said to me: it's too bad that I am already old and will not be able to do your important work with you. But age is also wisdom. I've seen many things in my time. I've had to work with many people. But with you, something totally new is opening. And I still want to do something worthwhile. With you, it is possible.

Ridgeway said: I am amazed at you. Where does this stream of thoughts come from, this ability to see everything immediately, and to look far. It is all so simple and so disarming.

And look (M.S. says to me), Shevardnadze told me that Ridgeway and Bessmertnykh sat down and conducted negotiations, and they were on the same wavelength--this issue is like this, that issue we will not touch for now, we'll put it off, etc. They were like two normal, reasonable, intelligent people. This team works well together. When will there be another one like them?

Me: Mikhail Sergeyevich, I observed you during the meeting. When they were listening to you, these people forgot that they are officials... serving Reagan...

M.S.: Overall, we seized the moment the right way. And this is a notice for Reagan's visit

here. We should warn him. Let him know that we will not go easy. We will guard our dignity.

The second subject was the XIX party conference and yesterday's Secretariat.

You know, he says, I did not get anything from yesterday's discussion. The only people who added something were Yakovlev, Medvedev, and Lukyanov. The rest... are thinking only about their ambitions and about their positions.

Me: I agree, there are no ambitions. There is nothing to bring.

M.S.: You are right. There is a philosophical impoverishment. They are limited, they are lacking culture. The poverty of thought results from this, not to mention their attitude toward my plans... There is something here, Tolya! And Ligachev surprised me again, when he attacked the press. He said that the only good thing is the Russian government, while the USSR Sovmin [Council of Ministers] does nothing. Just think! He is openly declaring his allegiances and antipathies... Does he think we are so primitive that we do not understand this? Vorotnikov's is the worst government of all the republics. Did you notice how they railed at him (without naming him) at the meetings with obkom secretaries. And Ryzhkov? We don't let him work--dragging all his affairs to the PB. And here everything comes down to the powerlessness of the Soviet government! But, Yegor [Ligachev] hates Nikolai [Ryzhkov], and gets the same in return...

This is the ceiling, Tolya! What can you expect from him. For 18 years he (Ligachev) led an obkom, he does not know any other way. And the education plays a role. We need to look for a way out...

We need a breakthrough at the party conference. A new intellectual breakthrough.

Look at the party. It should have an avant-garde role, but how, if we take away its command and its governance? "All power to the Soviets!" But how? How do we make the Soviets work after a 60-year-old habit of being henchmen, and after their complete discrediting?

We say: return Lenin's image to socialism! Yes. But what does it mean in today's circumstances? We are cleaning it from Stalinshchina, Brezhnevshchina... there is a lot more work here. But this is a negativist work. What should the construction be? A legal socialist state. It's a major problem, etc.

It's time to fill everything with concrete content. We've had enough declarations. People will lose faith if we keep speaking in formulas and promises.

Our youth—what do we say to them? What does this world mean to them? How do they understand it, and why do they need democracy? What do they prefer?

In a word, we need to think. Time is flying by.

Tomorrow at 3pm we—the advisers and Yakovlev—and we will think.

I told M.S. about Boffa, with whom I met yesterday.

April 26, 1988.

M.S. got together Yakovlev, Slyunkov, Medvedev, Lukyanov, three advisers, Bikkenin, Sitaryan, Mozhin (deputy of the Department of Economics), and Boldin, and talked through all the XIX party conference ideas... The most important thing is that it will go down in history as the first fundamental reconstruction of the political system since World War II; featuring a new concept for the avant-garde role of the party; "All power to the Soviets!;" a legal state; and the national question ("All the doors and windows are banging, and stones are drumming on the roof")—we cannot wait with the national question till the Plenum.

The outcomes of *perestroika*. Self-criticism of the past three years. But it became clear from the speeches of Slyunkov and Sitaryan, there is not even an idea of how to tune the economic mechanism to work on the new principles. It is an alarming situation. Production is falling; the market supply is growing scanty. Sugar is sold through food stamps even in Moscow. This is *a propos*.

By the way, M.S. told us ("for you only") the following in relation to the problem of guaranteeing the irreversibility of *perestroika*. The people are very worried that the whole thing might be tipped over. The situation has escalated during these three weeks of the standstill (between the publication in *Sovetskaia Rossia* and the article in *Pravda*). Here is an example... remember, last week I did not come to work for three days. I had to undergo a medical examination, I've been putting it off for a long time. Well, the traffic police stopped my son-in-law (he is a doctor in the municipal hospital No.1), they know his license plate. They asked him directly: "Where is Mikhail Sergeyevich?" My son-in-law didn't give them a clear answer, and they said: "Don't try to play around it. Tell us, where is M.S.? We know that his car hasn't been entering the city in three days! There are rumors that he's been removed..." If that's true, tell us. The people are wound up, they say that if he's been removed—they will arm themselves and take to the streets!"

Everybody spoke in order; a lot was said. I also spoke. Very loudly, and unlike the others, I was standing, in the heat of the moment. Two of the themes that I discussed should be recorded:

- 1) Against Ivan's (Frolov) thesis "on returning from Lenin to Marx."

Yes, it's true that we do not read enough Marx, that we know him poorly, not substantively, that we got scared by the Western debates over his early works. We need to do something, but not at the expense of Lenin.

- 2) Against Shakhnazarov's thesis to "enter the world community, saying that we are the same as everybody else..."

On this point I was vehement. Our power is in our difference. Should we say that we

want to fit in? We (i.e. Gorbachev) have been saying it to the West for three years already. This is not enough. For Reagan (his last three speeches) we are still a totalitarian government, the breeding ground of communist expansion, we are suppressing our people, etc... It has always been like this and will continue to be like this with Reagan & Co. But the fact that not one West European newspaper published these speeches, and only two American newspapers published it—this is a historical fact in itself.

At the meeting with Shultz M.S. openly criticized Reagan's two speeches. But neither Shultz, Nitze, Ridgeway or Powell protested, because they are decent people and they must be embarrassed for their boss, even though their position requires them to defend him. This is also a significant fact.

You, Georgy, say that “we are the same...” They will answer this: excuse me, if you are the same as us, tell us—how many personal computers do you have per capita? Oh, 48 times less than we do! Then say goodbye to the place of a superpower. We would treat you as we treat Panama, if you didn't have big rockets... They still mean something for now...

And yet. What do we have right now? We have a high-level session of NATO in Brussels on the subject of “How do we stop Gorbachev?”

That's how it is. We are not “the same as everybody,” we are a powerhouse of modern world development of morality and justice. This is our strength, and we should foster it.

The third theme was that the XIX party conference should be a critical border. But we should not usurp April of 1985. The revolution started then. The conference should be a border in the sense of the things that will be said there: we are finally cutting the umbilical chord from the command-administrative system and from all the inheritance of Stalinism. It is especially important to say this considering “Ninochka...” [Andreeva] She and others like her need to hear it from the tribune. The word “irreversible” is becoming obsolete. The baby=*perestroika* has already been born. The prenatal period is over. His further development will depend on the cleanliness of the swaddling clothes and the novelty of his toys.

Today I wrote an outline for the international section of the report at the conference. I got together all of “my” experts (Galkin, Veber, Koval’skiy, Ambartsumov, Rybakov, Gusenkov). We went over my ideas; they added many interesting thoughts. I re-wrote the scheme and asked them to share their thoughts in writing by May 1st. Tomorrow I am leaving for Volynskoe-2. The others left today.

But I still have Arismendi coming up, the Japanese (CP and SP [Communist Party and Socialist Party (КП и СП)]), and Vogel (SPD). And routine work. Today, for example, I entirely re-wrote the Statement from the Soviet government to Afghanistan, written by Shevardnadze, Chebrikov, Yazov, and Dobrynin... and M.S. accepted my version without a single correction.

In the morning, M.S. will receive the Patriarch. Ivan struggled for a long time over what form of address to propose: holy father, Your Holiness [преосвящество] or by his secular name?

Yakovlev gave an excellent speech last Friday before the CC apparatus. The thoughts, the words, the passion, the ideology, and the eloquence of his speech! There was pathos--"where were you (we), during the time before *Pravda* came out and said: 'It is ok to defend *perestroika!*'"

June 19, 1988.

In the end of April I was in Volynskoe-2. We were working on a draft of the theses for the XIX conference, which M.S. re-dictated... I had to insist on, with Shevardnadze's help, having some self-assessment in the international section. He agreed... this is a historical shift... For the first time we are speaking critically about our foreign policy prior to 1985.

For the Conference report I prepared an even more critical version, leading to ideas about the evolution of imperialism... Which, however, Honecker has already noted in the theses and in his circle has expressed his disagreement. Same with Bilyak. In general, our friends are very afraid of *perestroika* and new thinking.

We took a break from Volynskoe-2 due to Reagan's visit.

You can't say more about it than is already said in our press and theirs. But from my perspective--M.S. guessed what would touch Reagan's emotions. And he did precisely that... Reagan saw that we are not an "empire of evil," but normal people, with a rich history at that, and... we are such a giant that you cannot intimidate or dazzle us. And this works. Reagan still keeps telling everyone how he walked around the Red Square and Arbat. He sent M.S. a personal letter, "To Mikhail from Ron." I prepared a draft response, "To Ron from Mikhail," but M.S. has been sitting on it for the third day already--either he is too busy or he is thinking it over.

Immediately after Reagan we re-located to Novo-Ogarevo (to prepare the party conference).⁹ M.S. came every morning at 10 and we worked together till 10-11 in the evening. He re-dictated our drafts.

When I speak of "we" I mean Yakovlev, Medvedev, Lukyanov, Frolov, Shakhnazarov, Boldin, and myself. Nobody else...

The project to re-structure the political system will shock, first and foremost, his colleagues at the PB... He sent out the reports (104 pgs) two days ago. The discussion at the PB will be tomorrow.

It will stun them because the majority of them will not have high-level positions in the new system.

⁹ Novo-Ogarevo was a state house (dacha) near Moscow where advisers and speechwriters gathered to draft Gorbachev's speeches and other documents.

M.S. hesitated for a long time and thought out loud in front of us: he started the section by saying that he will resign, but offers the following structure (the General Secretary becomes Chairman not of the Presidium but of the USSR Supreme Soviet, i.e. “the President”). And let the conference... or later the Congress of the Soviets (a new institution) decide on this question...

He moved away from this thought with the refrain that “I do not need a new burden.” It is true that *perestroika* will not take place if it is not enforced from the top. The only people who want and can enforce it are M.S. and maybe 2-3 more members of the Politburo, and a part of the CC Secretaries.

So this decision will really decide our fate.

Nevertheless, even judging by the very critical and skeptical letters and press, everybody understands that *perestroika* is Gorbachev, and if he disappears, everything will fall through under the current PB.

When M.S. was with us, Frolov told an anecdote that his daughter brought from MGU [Moscow State University]: “It is the opening of the XIX party conference. The first person to enter the Presidium is Ivan Susanin, then Gorbachev, and then the rest. Susanin leads Gorbachev to the Chairman’s place, and tells the rest: ‘As for you, we are going to keep walking...’” Everybody laughs, and M.S. even more than everybody else. Truly, this is the voice of the people.

In the breaks in Novo-Ogarevo there were meetings with Najibullah and Cardinal Casaroli. Both were significant. Najibullah showed himself to be weak, confused, and incompetent (he asked us to leave Polyanichko--an adviser from the KGB--with him); he offered to organize a joint war: USSR-India-Afghanistan against Pakistan. He asked us to conduct major operations with the participation of the Soviet troops (although in the third echelon) against the mujahedeen... to lift the moral spirits of the Afghani troops... “And if they run away?”--M.S. rebuffed him pretty bluntly on both counts.

The conversation with the Cardinal was philosophical. This man, behind whom stands all the wisdom of millennia of Christianity and all the cunning of a Jesuit, he understood that he was dealing with a man who is opening the door into a new era for humanity.

M.S. did not send out a record of his talk with Casaroli around the PB. He doesn’t want to tease the geese--an expression he’s been using for all kinds of occasions lately. Of course, they would not “understand” this conversation.

The press is raging about Stalin, Brezhnev, and the present-day epigones. There are unbelievably frank discussions of the theses and of how the apparatus stifled the elections to the party conference. The Moscow party conference discussed the episodes with Afanasiev and Gelman. M.S. defended the latter and “suggested” to Zaikov to remove Afanasiev, whom the raikom failed to elect...

Afanasiev paid us back (as M.S. told us in Novo-Ogarevo) by starting an affair with an Italian student, visiting her regularly at the hotel where she lives while she completes her school training and represents the CIA at the same time.

July 10, 1988.

A week has passed since the conference. A great deal has been written about it. The most precise and subtle observations are printed in the serious press. By the way, only today I've been able to read my fill of it, and it has calmed me down. They were able to see correctly that M.S. is a great politician who has done the maximum (and even a little more) of what was possible. He likes to say so himself, that politics is the art of the possible.

This side of him has been revealed for the participants of the conference, even though they thought they knew him well. But they knew him as an extraordinary personality; an interesting interlocutor; a sincere man who does not have an attitude and does not show off; a person who gets carried away; who is capable of making unexpected moves and brave decisions; who is smart and resourceful, etc. But this time they saw the politician with enormous self-confidence, who wields the art of winning over and subduing, and who knows how to lead.

This calmed me down because I, as the majority of the intelligentsia, had a mixed impression from the conference. It was a huge event, a turning point like never before, M.S.' authority and the people's love for him are unquestionable and have gone up a notch; his superiority and the people's trust in him are all encompassing; the decisions (resolutions) are unique... But people's state of mind is dejected, even alarmed... I even wanted to tell him about this if the opportunity came up... But he was so cheerful and confident in the days after the conference that I just could not. And all this despite Armenia and other troubles.

On the other hand, he led the Politburo in a very businesslike manner, talking about the conference very rationally and without any turgidity. He did not hesitate to agree with Ligachev-Zaikov-Vorotnikov that despite the enterprise law (which discredits the entire psychology of a self-supporting economy) we should leave the former practice of sending citizens to collect the harvest, for the harvest is in danger (as if you can save it by these means!)...

And still, for some reason the mood is depressing. Because first of all, this truly historical conference (nothing like this has happened since the 1920s) has hit the press and intelligentsia in the face, i.e. those rushed into *perestroika* headlong and without whom it would not have started or progressed, without whom this conference would have been impossible.

Secondly, Ligachev's speech was just so clever, skillful, and foul, deceitful, and impudent... Once again, M.S. is saying that the party, the people, and the country achieved *perestroika* through suffering, to have gone on like this would have been fatal; that *perestroika* naturally grew out of the crisis, etc. But Ligachev declares that everything depended on an intrigue in the PB; that he, Ligachev, was at the heart of the events; and that together with Chebrikov, Gromyko, and Solomentsev they nominated Gorbachev in March of 1985... But these

four, they could have nominated somebody else! He also said that just like he [Ligachev] made Tomskaya oblast' prosper, he could have done the same for the entire country, if only the talk of freedom, democracy, and *glasnost'* weren't getting in the way.

He even quoted Pushkin that "in the wild noises of animosity" he hears the sound of approval... This was in the context of the Western press and the local administrators of *perestroika* criticizing him, while this same West names Gorbachev "Man of the Year" and keeps admiring him.

Ligachev was able to state his position fully, including the fact that he supported Bondarev--a reactionary, obscure speech a la "Nina Andreeva," and with an anti-Semitic subtext to boot!

Plus, the depressive mood is also stemming from this episode: Baklanov¹⁰ was driven from the podium, but Bondarev received an ovation. Baklanov did show himself to be a Jewish milksop--he should have left after the first claps and exclamations. That would have been a defiant action. But he really wanted to give a speech, which would have been more fitting at a youth-literary symposium rather than an event like this... and on the heels of Bondarev. By the way, I am sure that the reaction against Baklanov also had an anti-Semitic air.

And M.S. should have been above the Ligachev-Yeltsin conflict. Instead, he dedicated a third of his concluding remarks to Yeltsin. By doing that, he practically joined Ligachev, or in any case he "swallowed" his platform and his insults. He has a complex here... By the way, Yakovlev told me that M.S. did not want to talk about Yeltsin. Supposedly, in the back room during the break he spoke with PB members in this vein. But suddenly, Raisa Maksimovna came in and started to berate Yeltsin indignantly, saying that "we can't leave it like this." That settled the question.

Yakovlev told me another thing: M.S. was very afraid that in one of the speeches Yeltsin (or somebody else) would name Raisa Maksimovna and get a round of applause. Now I understand why he was so angry even when he was leaving the hall, when it became clear that it would be impossible not to allow Yeltsin to speak.

Raisa Maksimovna's influence is also telling in another issue. Before the last day of the conference, M.S. got us all together (after the conference, at 9pm in the presidium room of the Great Kremlin Hall) to talk about his closing remarks. Slyunkov, Boldin, Yakovlev, Frolov, Shakhnazarov, and I were present.

Some gave advice, thought out loud, he himself poured out ideas. I also stated my thoughts; by the way, I suggested that we should speak about the lessons of the conference itself, about its plusses and minuses. Particularly that it is impossible to pass by such a "spoonful of tar"¹¹ as Bondarev's speech--it was reactionary, obscure, anti-*perestroika*, etc. M.S. stopped me,

¹⁰ G. Baklanov, just as U. Bondarev, is a writer, who in the 1950s started the so-called "truth from the trenches" in prose about the Great Patriotic War. [Footnote in the original]

¹¹ From the Russian saying "Like a spoonful of tar in a barrel of honey."

dismissing my comments with a wave of his arm and saying: "Did you see how the audience reacted to him?"

--I saw it! That made it especially embarrassing. That is exactly why we should talk about it.

Nobody said anything (even though one on one, quietly, Shakh[nazarov], Ivan, and Yakovlev all expressed their indignation with Bondarev and Ligachev's support of him). Then again, Shakh told me that when Ligachev for some reason came by the row where we were sitting, Ivan enthusiastically shook his hand and congratulated him with a "brilliant speech." I did not see this myself. But Shakh assures me that he saw this and now he understands completely "what kind of a person Frolov is," who constantly brags that he was righteous and principled during the entire period of the stagnation!

So, everyone kept quiet. And M.S. cut me off: "I am not going to do what you are proposing!"

Now I learn the following... M.S. is going to Poland. Medvedev, the Department of Culture, and Yakovlev prepared a list of the delegation, which included the academician Likhachev (M.S. will have to attend a major meeting with scientists and cultural figures). Sagdeev was also on the list. I doubt that they made the list without consulting M.S. Suddenly, he crosses both of them off the list (already three days after the conference), and suggests... Bondarev. This is despite the fact that both academicians have already packed their suitcases and are very honored by such trust... In response to our words that it would be inappropriate, he firmly insisted. To Medvedev's merit, he was decisively against Bondarev and did not allow his inclusion, saying that the Poles will not understand... he is an inveterate Russian chauvinist! But the academicians were still removed. I suspect that this is also R.M.'s work, to whom Likhachev is "boss" on the Cultural Fond, and he probably did not please her in something.

M.S.' terrible weakness in this regard (R.M.) is dangerous to his authority. People are saying that he loves Frolov and looks past his impudent idleness and exploitation of his position as an adviser in academic areas because Raisa Maksimovna went to school with Frolov's wife and they might even have been friends in the past.

M.S. is ready to fulfill her smallest whim. He almost fired Gusenkov when during R.M.' time together with Nancy Reagan (Gusenkov was in charge of the "women's program")¹² something seemed not quite right to her in how she was shown on TV. She spoke with Gusenkov in a "raised" voice, reprimanded him and hinted that "perhaps we should part ways." In a word, she's going to extremes.

This is very bad. Yakovlev saw the danger in this a long time ago. Back then, I thought he was exaggerating.

Well, what about myself? Am I satisfied with my work over these months of preparation

¹² During Reagan's visit to Moscow

and carrying out of the conference? Yes, I am. I did a lot of work besides the international section and the theses, the report, and the first resolution. In all three cases M.S. accepted my materials “from the first presentation” and did not re-dictate them, even though he smoothed out some of my overly-critical corners.

In a word, the international sections practically did not take away any extra time from M.S. and the Novo-Ogarevo and Volynskoe-2 team.

But not only that... Yakovlev, the team leader, gave me all the other sections to edit (except for economics), and twice. The Frolov pieces I just re-wrote (and he did not even write them himself, he got his “white slaves” from *The Communist*--Latsis and Kolesnikov--to write them). Without batting an eyelid, he presented them as his own, even though he did not know who re-wrote them. He must have thought it was Yakovlev, the team-leader.

And during the review of all the texts of the reports and resolutions I intruded more than once, to the annoyance of M.S. (He allows himself to tell me to “resume my seat” rather impolitely, and even though I snap back, he never does this to Frolov--the academician!--and once again, he’s afraid to offend R.M.!)

M.S. took me into the first committee, which reviewed the first two major resolutions. And since there was no “apparatus” attached to it (165 people), I was writing down the results of the discussion. And M.S. accepted almost everything, including the famous oath that “the CPSU will never again allow anything like a cult and stagnation.” The entire world noticed it, saying: “The CPSU has reached the pinnacle of the rift from the past.” (*Messaggero*).

In a word, I am happy with my anonymous contribution to the “turning-point event” of our history.

About Rust. Back in Novo-Ogarevo somebody brought him up in relation to something. M.S. asked what we should do with him. I put my two-cents in immediately: “We should let him go. Right after the conference we should do this as a demonstration of our humanitarianism, which it will fuel. And God forbid that we do it close to Kohl’s or Genscher’s visit.”

Luk’yanov and Yakovlev supported me right away. M.S. decided--let’s let him go! He assigned Boldin to call Chebrikov to prepare the release. But there was no paper on this account. Yesterday, after the meeting with India’s president in the Ekaterinian Hall, I tell him: “Mikhail Sergeyevich, you are leaving for Poland. Right now you will immerse yourself in last-minute preparations. I have some pressing matters.” He says: “Let’s go to the CC right now, we’ll talk there.” I ask him, “What do you mean, ‘go?’” And he said that we’ll walk with our feet. We left the building and went. He told security to “move back” so they “do not flicker before us.” The two of us kept walking. There were tons of people at the Kremlin: sightseers, tourists. The crowd was stupefied at seeing him. Some stopped in confusion and retreated to the walls, while others rushed to shake his hand; the women embraced him. He tried to talk to them, but of course they were speechless. They delightedly exclaimed something and applauded. He approached another group, started a conversation about life, about the conference. Asked people where they were from, reacted to their responses. A group of young Frenchmen appeared, he talked with them. An

enormous crowd collected by the Aleksandrovsky cathedral: our people from Khabarovsk to Minsk, plus Bulgarians, Czechs, people from the GDR. Each one wanted to say his name, shake his hand, touch him. When he came up to the French tourists, one of our provincial women ran up to him, saying "What about me? What about me?" He gave her a hug, said something, and they kept standing like that, in an embrace, surrounded by elated French tourists who were taking pictures. By the bell he talked with another crowd... and quickly walked toward the **Spassky tower**. People were running toward him from all directions, from the cannon and the garden. We passed the Spassky gates, and the entire Red Square was astir. I told him: this is where Rust landed. If you remember, you wanted to finish with this business... Yes, yes, he says, it's good that you reminded me. When we get to the CC I'll make a phone call. (And he did call Shevardnadze when we got there, since Chebrikov is on vacation, and ordered to have the paperwork delivered "today.")

By the Cathedral of St. Basil the Blessed the queue dispersed. The people ran to the fence. Some Swedes showed up, started embracing him and saying something. One man put his hand on M.S.' shoulder and said: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, you should work less, take care of yourself. We can see that you are tired." M.S. also clapped him on the shoulder, saying: "It's ok, friend. We will endure. This is the time to work, we'll rest later." Hundreds of people were yelling from behind the fence of the Cathedral: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, we are with you, be strong. We are always with you. It is good. Thank you."

Then he told me, "let's walk down Razin street. I want to walk past the 'Rossia' hotel. I used to always stop here when I would come over from Stavropol." We crossed the street to the building of the commissariat. A group of Italians was coming toward us, about 25 people... These guys had no reservations at all and clung to him from every side. And I noticed that every one of the 25-30 people there either shook his hand, or embraced him, or held him at the elbow or waist. They were yelling, inviting him to Italy... That was real enthusiasm.

We went down Razina street in front of the amazed pedestrians, and starting from Ipat'evskyi lane it was in front of the amazed CC apparatus, which was at this time moving toward the cafeteria en masse.

We reached the entrance and he took me to his office, where he dealt with his routine work. This is when I found out that on August 1st he is going on vacation. And he said to me: "Get ready, we are going together again... and maybe we'll think something up this time, too..." (He was hinting at the year 1986 when he "thought up" Reykjavik, and 1987 with the book "*Perestroika*" and the report on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.)

September 13, 1988.

In September M.S. is planning to visit Krasnoyarsk. I am on Michurinskiy avenue, at a hospital with an ailing heart. While I have some free time, I'll describe what happened in the Crimea.

From August 1st till September 4th we were at “Zarya” (near Foros). For the fourth time M.S. takes me along with him for vacation. This is at a wild beach near Tesseli, where I took vacations once, swimming beyond the cliff. But the entire territory to the lighthouse (Sarych) is taken. The presidential palace in “Livadiya” is a barn compared to what is built here. I asked M.S. the day after we arrived whether he likes it here. He said yes... but some of the superfluities are tiresome, such as the escalator to the sea, but it wasn’t built for me (hinting at Brezhnev or Chernenko). But he’s dissembling: the Tesseli-Foros inhabitants say that everything here was built a year and a half ago.

What does he need this for? The rumors are not only in Crimea, but in Moscow, too: it cost 189 million or so. There are also rumors that in Messera (near Pizunda) there is another “dacha,” which cost 132 million. It is possible that the numbers are exaggerated... but even if it is half as much, and “Zarya” does not cost less. Plus, there is a whole army of security and servants... what does he need it for? Or is he powerless before the wishes of R.M. in this, as well? With her provincial psychology: if she got to this point... if her husband is so great and does not spare himself for his country!... Under the impression of this “Zarya” for the first time I had major doubts, how does one say it, maybe--doubts of the selfless nature of the heroic deed of *perestroika*. And it is a heroic deed, I write this word without any quotation marks.

Our relationship has also changed. Even in comparison with Pitsunda (there were already signs) last summer. He is still very spontaneous. For example, he got carried away with the shorthand records of the first party congresses after 1917--the VIII, XI, and XII. And when he invited me and Tamara Prokofievna (the stenographer), this time he never invited me alone, he was animated like a young student, reading excerpts out loud, commenting, drawing conclusions for the present day, and making very sharp philosophical remarks about the polemics of those, Lenin’s, congresses...

But unlike before, he did not “talk to us” simply, and when I started on a subject that he thought he would disagree with from the first words, he immediately interrupted me and stated his position in a way that let me know that the discussion is closed.

I chose a different method, which I use almost everyday in Moscow (but it’s a different matter here [in Moscow], where he has dozens of live interlocutors)... I write or dictate my opinions, evaluations, or suggestions on a separate sheet of paper and send it to him together with other documents that he receives from me. Sometimes he considers them, but I find out about it much later or indirectly. Sometimes he reacts right away and calls me, but only if he accepts them. Sometimes he just ignores them and the girls return my papers without any comments written on them.

At times he acts (how does one say this--considering who he is, and who I am) not very respectfully, even though he likes this expression himself and uses it often. For example, Shevardnadze decided to write an article on the year 1939. M.S. calls me late at night in Tesseli (where I lived within a five-minute walking distance from my “workplace” near his palace, but an 11km roundabout drive by car, [which I took] three times a day: in the morning, at lunch, and after work): read this carefully and give me your opinion. I wrote a full review. He agreed with it and added that England and France wanted to incite Hitler against us, while Stalin wanted to

incite them against each other. Or: “these kinds of things are not done in two days” (i.e. Hitler sent us the letter on the 20th, and on the 23rd we signed the pact)... In a word he was thinking quite decisively in the spirit of Kulish's article in *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, which appeared two days later. And he agreed with me that the Agreement of August 23rd was faulty in principle and brought only troubles and losses.

He called Ligachev himself. They agreed that the article would be taken down; saying that next year the 50th anniversary of the war is coming up, new research will be ready, and we will make our official position then. Plus, he asked me to call Ligachev and “explain everything in detail.”

And what's the outcome? One August 1st, an article appears in *Pravda* with the same signatures as in the first version, with minor corrections. It was stupid, without proofs, and practically freeing Stalin from blame.

Of course I did not allow myself to ask him for “explanations” (last year, under different circumstances, I would have asked). I found out from Boldin and Vorontsov what happened, which was the following: Ligachev took M.S.' opinion for a “dissatisfaction” with the existing text. And he assigned the authors (through Vorontsov) to work on it some more. He sent the new version to M.S., who returned the article without any corrections to Boldin and gave Ligachev the go-ahead! And all this despite the fact, which is clear to him (and I wrote to him about it in my review), that unless he plans on canceling *glasnost'*, historians will still come to Kulish's point of view (or something close to that). Why should he connect himself to this flawed concept, which Falin already once imposed on him (though Yakovlev) in the report on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution (now he swept aside my objections). But since then, a lot of *glasnost'*-suffused water has flowed under bridge, in this as in many other matters. Of course, the West reacted very clearly to his article as a victory for the Ligachev line in the present moment.

On the other hand, Chebrikov sent me a draft of his interview with *Pravda* about his work in the KGB and *perestroika*. I marked it up quite unceremoniously, and sent it to M.S. (especially about the “ideological functions” of the KGB and the relations with the market and cooperatives). He not only agreed with all of my comments, but as I saw from the texts in the newspaper, added some too.

These are two contrasting examples. What do they indicate? That in relation to me (and maybe not only me) he has already developed an “instrumental” approach: the person does work, and let him; I'll take what I need and discard what I don't need. I don't have time to explain things to him, and why should I? He'll get over it!

Overall, my hurts are ridiculous. He has turned the country upside down. He has given it back a human face. He saved humanity from a catastrophe, which would have inevitably happened if we continued with Brezhnev's foreign policy. He will truly enter history on the same level as Lenin, whatever *perestroika* comes to.

And who am I? Nobody in particular. **That's right.** But... the traits that come through

in his relations with me can disfigure him as a statesman of *perestroika* and new thinking... As in a drop of water, "according to the unforgettable Ponomarev."

When he was taking me south with him, he stated the objectives on which we would work:

- prepare materials for a lecture (or a brochure) "on socialism;"
- prepare the main speech for Krasnoyarsk;
- develop a conception for the reform of the CC and its apparatus.

Besides, we had to finish the postscript to the Polish-Soviet book (based on the outcomes of his trip to Poland), which he promised the Polish intellectuals. By the way, there I also offered him to step away from the position on 1939 that he offered in the report on the 70th anniversary of October. But... alas! He condemned the Agreement of September 28th--on the friendship and border with Germany. He did that much. But that is not new...

I think the stormy meetings in the Baltics during these days played their role in this. To recognize August 23rd as faulty would mean to put the joining of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania in question... Even though he clearly sees and does not deny that the "joining" was an intervention from the very beginning.

We came up with quite a bit "on socialism." He dictated a new part: why do we need this subject right now? Everything is so scattered that nobody knows anymore, what's socialism, what's not, and what it means at all.

I made a summary of the kinds of evaluations of our pre-*perestroika* society that have appeared in our press: was it socialism at all, etc. There are four main directions--from Afanasiev to Astafiev. According to preliminary analysis, which I asked Ambartsumov to conduct, plus the book *Inogo ne dano* [We Do Not Have Another Way], I wrote a 30 page scheme of the evolution of Lenin's understanding of socialism. On 40 more pages I summarized and unified what Gorbachev himself has said in these three years on this subject--how he imagines socialism.

But he did not work on this material, which I handed to him week after week. When we got back on Monday, he got together the advisers, and said that we have this material and that it needs to be turned "from quantity to quality," and we should use it to prepare for the CC Plenum, at which the reorganization of the political system will be confirmed. This is where we'll need a "theory of socialism." "We all need to work--and Ivan Timofeevich will be team leader"--he said, without batting an eyelid.

This is the magic of an academic title, a fabricated one, received through a career in bureaucracy... Despite the fact that the XIX conference has already shown that Frolov is incapable of anything besides chattering on the theme... "about man," and he does not have any real ammunition. Shakhnazarov has a great deal more of it, and I just read more about it, I live it... I have found that I have read and studied more in philosophy than the philosopher-

academician Frolov. But what can you do! Anyway, it is completely clear to me in this matter, and I have been “informed” of this before from many sides, that the mystery of M.S.’ benevolence toward Ivan is R.M. This is how he got into Gorbachev’s circles in the first place. Ah, let it be! God forgive my sinner’s soul!

M.S. worked on the Krasnoyarsk speech very thoroughly. He dictated it many times, sometimes even at night over the regular phone line in Tesseli.

I prepared the international section quickly, went over it with the MFA, with [Marshal] Akhromeev and Kamentsev (foreign economic committee). M.S. approved, accepted, and praised it (which you rarely hear from him); and did not come back to it. But he painstakingly belabored the domestic section. He is very worried by the situation that arose after the party conference. Objectively, it worked out that the party conference added fuel to the fire: the apparatus understood that its days are numbered and at best stopped working, practically turning off the old mechanism of the administrative system (in the worst case it is aiming to show that all of this is Gorbachev’s venture). The new mechanism has not started functioning yet... And there is nothing on the shelves. The word in Moscow is that the times are worse than under Grishin... and they are intensely comparing this time to the two years when Yeltsin was in Moscow.

Gorbachev is beginning to be irritated by the intelligentsia, which keeps adding panicky analyses, producing facts claiming that in the years 1927, 1950, and 1968 there was plenty of food on the shelves and everything was available.

He asked for numbers and data. He dictated one thing, then another, then crossed it all out. He looked for approaches. But he still brought a “justificatory” and “coaxing” speech to Moscow. Only when he was here he found the right key: the goal we set is a difficult one but we do not have another, we will go forward, and the people who implemented the new approaches are already reaping results. Do not ask me how *perestroika* is going. I am supposed to be asking you: I gave you full freedom to act how you think is best. So act. Feed, clothe, provide for yourselves, etc.

He got the idea for this conception in Sevastopol’, where he decided to go for a tour a day before leaving for Moscow. At the very sea-front he was met by a crowd of many thousands, and he spent the three and a half hours of his “tour” in debate and polemic with the people (as I had warned him would happen).

When they pestered him with questions on the Sapun mountain--about the deficit in sugar, housing, subscription, pensions, the failure of the enterprise law, the Crimean atomic power station, (by the way, he never once lost his temper--he knows how to talk to people), he said: am I a Tsar? Or Stalin? Do you want me to go around cities, pointing and saying that you get an apartment, you get a pension, you get a fair salary, and you get order at your factory? No. In two years you had time to judge which people would be good leaders and organizers. And to elect them; to drive out the worthless ones; to organize yourselves and carry out what you would like to see happen. This is the essence of *perestroika*. It means that you have not understood it entirely, if you keep demanding all the answers from me and keep waiting for directions and charity from Moscow.

As the result, the speech for Krasnoyarsk became strong and “optimistic.” I also “complimented” him when he called me on Sunday, the last day before his departure.

September 14, 1988.

Yesterday I watched M.S.’ speech in Krasnoyarsk on TV. He was superb, especially at the meeting with scientists and economic executives. He was calm, confident, and his reactions and direction of the conversation were knowledgeable. He does not get irritated, but he is sharp and even strongly-worded, but without hurtful and offensive tones. And he sees the person immediately--whether a person should be asked at all, whether it would be meaningful to enter into a polemics with this person. His keen black eyes light up if the person is interesting. And his faces dulls, he averts his gaze, and quiets down if it’s a bureaucrat [чинуша]. In a word, he is a real leader of the country that he is freeing from idiotism, and about whom we hear daily, weekly, and monthly in the newspapers and journals. It is a celebration of common sense. One would think, how easy this is!

By the way, in these live conversations he sometimes “blurts out” (or maybe he does it intentionally, in his folk-aristocratic manner) ideas that he is not always ready to present officially. Yesterday, for example, he called the famous state farm director Veprev to the podium (Veprev is a true statesman, unlike many of the ministers at the same podium).

Veprev: soon we will have to enter the peasant into the endangered species list, if things go on this way. Family contracts are the only solution.

M.S.: Not many people are rushing to make these contracts.

Veprev: We have to move away from the gradual approach. It cannot go on like this.

M.S.: I will ask you a direct question. Once before in 1929-30, we already conducted a sweeping change. We are still dealing with the aftereffects of that. We should not force people to lease. If we rush, we could compromise a deep change.

And that’s M.S.’ evaluation of collectivization. It is final. But he has not said it officially yet; he is probably saving it for the Agricultural Plenum. He is preparing for it; when we were on vacation he kept sharing his thoughts about it. (By the way, I suggested the term “to de-peasant [раскрестьянивание] the country.” He seized it right away, and now he has used it.)

Here is what I am driving at: in Tesseli I asked the intellectuals Galkin and Krasin whether they had looked through the collection “Gorbachev’s visit to Poland?” No, they had not. They said that it’s routine material, banal information that is not really relevant... I told them that they should not dismiss it. The conversations with the Polish people on the streets and with academicians are full of things that M.S. has not yet said officially. Some of the issues, including strictly “ideological questions,” that he brings up in these conversations he has never formulated as clearly before.

About his work on the CC apparatus reorganization note (in “Zarya”). He dictated it twice. Both times he asked me to work on the text, to format it and to add to it, “if you come up with something.”

The main ideas are: if we hold a congress (of the party) right now, we will not get a “new” CC, because the “new” cadres have not come to light. But we need to work on the fundamental reform of the CC. Also—this needs to be a functioning organ and people need to be appointed not according to their position, but according to their brains and the capability to be *perestroika* revolutionaries. We need to create CC member committees, which would develop policies. The departments will be their apparatus.

About the apparatus itself. It contains almost 3000 people. At first M.S. said: we’ll decrease it by half. I said we should decrease it by two thirds. We agreed on a decrease of a half to two-thirds, but the final version read “by a half or more.”

Of course, that is considerable. But it is not the main thing. He is removing almost all the economic-administrational divisions and the industrial departments. He will leave the socio-economic department, but as a theoretical unit, stripping it from any administrative rights (this is a polemic and it’s directed against someone who gave him “considerations.” Later at the PB, I understood that it was [Vladimir] Dolgikh). They will have absolutely no administrative privileges; otherwise everything would slip back to its former ways.

From the economic-functional departments he will leave the Department of Agriculture, because the issue is just too sensitive. But this is temporary, until we resolve it…

Also the defense industry remains. [Nikolai] Ryzhkov objected to this at the PB: once again, it will control the military-industrial committee of the Soviet of Ministers. M.S. agreed: there should be a conceptual-control department for the General Secretary’s military policies in the capacity of Chairman of the Defense Soviet. When we were in “Zarya” in the summer, I told him that this department is not necessary. When he is the president, he can put together a group of experts to advise him.

There will be one International Department instead of three.

There will be one Department of Ideology instead of three.

There will be a General Department to manage the affairs of the CC.

He did not write directly what will happen to our current secretaries. But he dropped a clue in a phrase that says that the apparatus will attend to the PB and the CC secretaries.

I asked him as he was dictating: what will happen to the current secretaries who are in charge of departments? You are practically liquidating them with this note and at the same time you are assigning the “Secretariat” to prepare “concrete proposals on how to reform the apparatus along the lines of this note…”

He bore though me with his black coals: This is my duty. Let them think about it. And let

them think about themselves, too. I am thinking about them... and he softened up.

When he got to Moscow he revealed his thoughts at a meeting with advisers. Maybe he did not tell me that time because the stenographer was present.

So, what is he “thinking?”

He wants to separate [Yegor Kuzmich] Ligachev and [Aleksandr Nikolaevich] Yakovlev and “release” both of them from ideology. (Oh, he is clever!) Yakovlev will be moved to the (consolidated) International Department as a curator. A.N. asked for this himself, in order to get away from daily interaction with E.K... In secret, he said: let him get fools to write his speeches (without a buffer, like A.N.’ Baltic speeches in response to Ligachev’s Chernigov speech).

Medvedev will go to the Department of Ideology. M.S. spoke well of him ... Said that he knows the economy, and he has worked in the ideological spheres as far back as Leningrad. He is sensible and has character. Sometimes, M.S. said, I want to punch him in the face. At the PB, for example. Sometimes it looks like we finally finished, barely settling everything by compromising, when Medvedev gets up and pushes his line... and he makes his arguments dryly, efficiently, and irrefutably... And I like it. He has his point of view and he doesn't glance over his shoulder when he persistently defends his opinion.

Everybody, and especially I, actively agreed and added our own ideas:

- [Nikolai] Slyunkov should be transferred to the socio-economic department.

- [Vitaly] Vorotnikov should be made the Chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: where “he can continue to grumble.” We will find a Premier for Russia from the new and brave, and we will make him a candidate member of the PB.

- What's to be done with Ligachev? I thought perhaps he should be sent to the transformed Committee of Party Control. But this would be better for [Boris] Pugo. He is honest and smart. But Latvia did not accept him: he is not “their own.” They already have “their own,” who is making his way up... M.S. named some Latvian last name (how does he remember it all!).

- Ligachev should to the Department of Agriculture. He knows this field...

We, the advisers, all supported this plan.

The legal department will also be a part of the CC. Here he had his fill of talking about the fact that this (i.e. the political system) is the deciding factor in our long revolution. This should always be close by.

Somehow I did not catch whether he will put [Anatoly] Lukyanov in charge of this, or whether he wants him in the Supreme Soviet, closer to the president.

He praised [Aleksandra] Biryukova. He wants to make her deputy representative of light

industry, or chairman of the All-Union Central Soviet of Professional Unions (where she was before). He is leaning toward the first option. She is smart, active, principled, and she has a good grasp of the work... and she is a woman.

In regard to Pugo he added: we need to fill the central organs, the PB as well, with people from the republics. I am ready to bring him here right now. But who would replace him? There is nobody, not even on the way to being ready. These are the fruit of cadre politics, if I may say so!

He sent the note around the PB and to the secretaries. On October 8 it was discussed at the PB for six hours. Of course, everybody was "for it." But there were shades of disagreement.

The first "concern" was what to do with the people who will lose their jobs. M.S. answered that those who are still "alright" and have the right attitude should be given government work in the mass media, in science, in universities and in diplomacy. But the majority has lost their profession and will have to be let go. Boldin-Kruchin offered a proposal to allow retirement without an age restriction with a pension of 90-95 percent of what it would be if the person retired at 60.

The proposal was not accepted. M.S. said that some will see this as an [unfair] privilege, especially since these people were in power during the period of stagnation. We have to think about it. Ryzhkov said: this has to do with the party apparatus and the election organs, but what should we do with the ministers?

In a word, this issue was left for later. The question was symptomatic—already now nobody wants do party work; former secretaries of party organizations are refusing to run for elections.

In the note, M.S. mentioned a salary increase for party workers.

Yesterday in *Znamya* I read V[ladimir] Tendryakov's "Okhota" [The Hunt]—the year 1948. It is about [Aleksandr] Fadeev, about cosmopolitanism. Talent comes through in every phrase. The force of action is enormous... The story is a social-moral phenomenon beyond comparison...

Especially the fact that it is written by a Russian person. Emka Mandel' (Korzhavin) is published there. I thought back to the time when I knew him. One particular episode comes to mind. I was coming home from work in a tram; I was still living on Kutuzov street. It was late, the tram was empty. At a kiosk at work I bought a little book—a collection of his poems. I was flipping through it when I saw the poem "From Nekrasov."

Nekrasov writes:

He will stop a horse in mid-gallop

He will go into a burning house.

Korzhavin continues:

And the horses still gallop and gallop,

And the houses still burn and burn.

I was chocked with tears. Right there, in the tram. From that time whenever I remember this poem, I cry.

I looked through two issues of *Kommunist* (12th and 13th). The subjects are: private property, bureaucracy, socialism, professional unions. Bukharin. The history of morality after 1917. Darwinism. Religion and nationalism. *Kommunist* is now the leader of progressive thought.

In *Izvestiya* there is a stupid article by [Georgy] Arbatov. He made a laughingstock of himself, revealing his ignorance in scholarship and in theory. He stuck his head out because he cannot gracefully accept the fact that he is no longer at the center. He should have stuck to his reputation as an expert on the U.S. He was still alright in that position. I think he will destroy the last credit of M.S.' trust, while all of society will laugh at him.

Recently I had a rather rude argument with him: he came in "without permission," even though I asked him not to come over because I needed every minute of my time (before Krasnoyarsk). He still came in and started his whining: that the respectable scholars are turning away from M.S.; writers are leaving the struggle because he did not support the foremen of *perestroika*; prices, stores, etc. I blew up. Said a heap of rude things. Then we apologized to each other over the phone.

September 15, 1988.

From the conversation in the Crimea.

M.S. can't stop admiring Bukharin, he is reading him. I offered him some more brochures and articles from the years 1925-27. I think that last year's acquaintance with Bukharin had a strong effect on his evaluation of the "era of the cult" and his readiness for rehabilitation. He picked up a great deal from getting to know the situation with the party and around Lenin. He was especially interested in the relations between Lenin and Bukharin, about whom he said: "What a talent! What a mind! He got carried away, did not think things through. He was in a hurry! But he was always thinking... developing Lenin's ideas. Not a single encounter with Lenin passed by without a result: he knew how to learn and to correct himself."

I should write about M.S.' reaction to Ligachev's speech from Gorky.

I read all kinds of things in the newspapers and journals and it makes me want to go back to the source: to read *Besy* [The Devils, by Dostoyevsky], *Idiot* [The Idiot, by Dostoyevsky], Tolstoy, Chekhov... It turns out there is a great deal that I did not understand when I read them. Maybe I should come back to the many works that I once read superficially, with eyes that did not yet see the depth? And in general, I read more Western books than Russian classics.

[Fyodor] Burlatskiy published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* from September 14, an article called “Brezhnev and the breakdown of [Khrushchev’s] Thaw.” This article is an event and an action, despite all of Fyodor’s vain eccentricities. And it is a very useful action for everybody, including M.S. (I think he will like the article’s spirit, even though he might express himself in his usual manner on certain passages.)

But to come back to Ligachev. Tesseli. The TV program *Vremya* just finished.

M.S. calls me: Did you see what Yegor just said (in Gorky)?

I reply: I saw it.

M.S.: What do you think?

I don’t remember exactly what I said, but I remember that it was rough and along the lines of: “it is an attack on the foundations of the new thinking. And even though I told you before that I agree that this happens because of his lack of understanding, because even your closest colleagues are incapable of reading what you say publicly and what they signed in official documents of *perestroika*; now (including Ye.K.’s speech at the XIX party conference) I am convinced that this is a program. It might be hastily constructed, but it is consciously driven and opposed to you. And behind it are not only cadres, but entire structures as well... And if anything adds confusion (that Ligachev mentioned) it is that this demonstration of an alternative to new thinking goes ‘unpunished.’”

He listened to me without interrupting.

M.S.: Alright, you are generalizing as always. Tomorrow, write down your thoughts on this for me ... about the international part of his speech. But make it brief, for a conversation (with whom?).

In the morning I did this, but I could not resist adding evaluations of the entire speech and the speaker’s pretensions. Specifically, I referred to the fact that in other PB members’ and secretaries’ public speeches after the XIX party conference, nobody touched the subject of international affairs. But this guy, rather than addressing some burning international question that a member of the Soviet government cannot leave uncommented, he tackled the theoretical essence—the class nature of international development.

M.S. received it, but—not a word. He also did not say anything about Yakovlev’s speeches in Riga and Vilnius, which followed immediately after Ligachev’s speech. I tried to start a conversation about this, since A.N. gives a direct response to Ligachev. I asked him whether he had read Yakovlev’s speeches in “Soviet Latvia” or “Soviet Lithuania?”

He answered curtly: No.

I understood that he does not want to involve me in a conflict between two PB members. This means that he does not trust me to keep his thoughts to myself.

Three or four days later I asked Shishlin to send me from Moscow articles from English, French, and American journals about this episode with Yegor Kuzmich and Yakovlev. This theme was already all over the radio intercepts. M.S. noticed this. For some reason during a telephone conversation with me he froze up in surprise: “they understood it all...”

I gave him the articles. The one in *The Economist* is particularly strong and intelligent, it provides a comprehensive breakdown of the relations between Ligachev and Gorbachev in the given situation.

He kept them. I already know what that means: he added them to his “archive.” Otherwise, when he does not think the material is important, he sends it back without commentary.

We came back to Moscow. On Monday the 5th, he got together the advisers. When he started speaking frankly about how and where he would like to appoint his colleagues [in the scheme of staff reform], the problem of Ligachev came up. Shakhnazarov and Ivan expressed themselves sharply. Ivan offered the example of a letter that some Moscow engineer sent to Ye. K. He wrote that he is upset by the TV show “5oe Koleso” [The fifth wheel] (or “Vzglyad” [Look]) in which unattractive young people of Jewish descent impose their questionable views on the Soviet audience. Ye. K. sent this letter around the Secretariat and assigned his minions [Pyotr] Slezko (deputy director of the Department of Propaganda) and Zaitsev (deputy director of the Department of Culture) to “look into it and take measures.” This is the resolution on the letter.

Ivan: Is this politics? Is this politics? How is this possible!...

M.S. heard him out, but did not react. Later on in the conversation he started to shield Ligachev again: I’ve known him for many years. I’ve seen a lot. He is an honest guy. He’s just lacking culture... it’s his level. What can one do.

At this point I commented: Mikhail Sergeyevich, in his position, ignorance and a lack of culture are political problems. It is a danger for our entire cause.

Later he notified us that he is sending him to the Department of Agriculture, and he’ll “divorce” him from ideology.

Overall, he has subtle tactics.

We expressed our sympathy that he has to do this. We can understand him on a human level: [it is difficult] to remove people with whom everyday, every week at the PB you worked on the same cause... And now he has to remove [Andrey] Gromyko, [Mikhail] Solomentsev—“that’s a decided matter” (M.S.), to move around or distance others... while he is moving to a position superior to all, the position practically of the president. Yes, it is for the good of the party and the country. And we do not have an alternative if we want *perestroika* to succeed. But one can understand him. He is sure that the country needs him precisely in that capacity; that the current PB does not do its part and has become a hindrance; and that the majority will “not have

a job in the PB,” as he described it himself.

He has done the maximum to make the ousting look like the result of an “objective” process of *perestroika* of the political system, rather than the result of his personal “sympathies and antipathies” and his “personal” staff politics.

One can understand his caution and tact. Plus, when he got up to answer the phone at another table, he commented: “do not forget that we could have a vote at the PB, too...”

September 20, 1988.

M.S. came back to work yesterday after Krasnoyarsk. He got carried away telling about the trip; he said he was walking on the edge and came to some sharp realizations. The problem is in the staff. They do not know how to work, they are behind, and they are incapable. But, he said, “I spoke against hongweibingism [хунвейбинство]¹³, against “firing at the headquarters,” I made it pretty dramatic...” You cannot make people join *perestroika* through a new 1937. There are some smart people. But it is all so un-coordinated, un-organized, they don’t know how... And the party active is falling back into its well-worn path “under Yegor’s direction and protection.” (!) (He decided to show me some of his secret thoughts and plans). I “complimented” him on the impromptu speech in Shushensky (on the new thinking as related to Lenin, who in Shushensky for the first time had the idea that humankind takes precedence over classes). Suddenly he came out with a tirade against Frolov. “His only excuse is that he is a philosopher.” M.S. got the common-mankind idea when he was flipping through the pages of a book in the room where Lenin lived. And he used it right away.

In a word, he is satisfied, even though the workload was hellish. He said many timely and necessary things, such as that difficulties are inevitable because it is a time of change. That we are going through a great school; and those who have already started “studying” the subjects of *perestroika* are seeing results.

Regarding materials for the talk with [Hassan] Sharq, the Afghani Prime Minister

M.S. sees the situation as follows: Sharq and [Mohammad] Najibullah have made an arrangement. They probably want to remove the NDPA [National Democratic Party of Afghanistan] from power, or to fundamentally transform it. Both of them, together and separately, are doing things against the Politburo and all the Ministries. They are ones of the few who understood that we will really **leave**, and on time! Therefore they are betting on a real coalition rather than a screen for the NDPA.

M.S. believes that we should let them do this. Our main goal is to avoid any bloody conflicts when we leave. Nobody would forgive us that, neither in the third world, nor in the most obscure liberal circles in the West, which for 10 years have been railing at us for the

¹³ A reference to the Chinese Red Guard, Youth Squadrons that “enforced” the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s.

occupation.

The conversation had major subtexts in this vein. I tried to reflect this in the report. I sent it to M.S. (I do this rarely, but this time the material is too delicate). He either did not see it among his other papers, or he decided that it is better to keep the subtexts: “let everyone guess and draw conclusions.”

I don’t know how he will react tomorrow, when he sees it in the paper.

September 25, 1988.

It has been a week since I left the hospital. Mostly I’ve been busy with routine work. From things that might have political significance: Shevardnadze asked me to comment on his draft for the speech at the UN General Assembly. I advised him not to play up [педалировать]¹⁴ the role of the Security Council, even though it is mentioned at the congress and later. [As the result of the] serious objective process in world politics, it is nowadays not “fashionable” to elevate the role of the superpowers. India “openly” dislikes this, same as the FRG and Japan. I don’t know whether he’ll accept my suggestions.

Yakovlev asked me about what happened in the Crimea, whether M.S. if finally planning to get rid of “his most devoted *perestroika-guy*” (Ye. K.). I told him the same idea I have been suggesting to everyone: that M.S. is not a simpleton, he does not want people to think that he is removing only the people he does not like. He wants to arrange it so that “objectively” in the course of political reform there just would not be place for some people.

Vaksberg published an article about Aliev in *Literaturnaia Gazeta* with a condemnation that most likely nothing will follow. M.S. does not want reprisals, even if they are deserved; he does not way to play up to the people who favor “1937 in reverse.”

What I have read this week: besides Tendryakov, I read Evgenia Ginzburg’s (Aksenov’s mother) novel *Krutoi Marshrut* [“Journey into the Whirlwind”] in *Yunost’*. Talented writing, which once again makes you terrified for state in which we, and I personally, lived. As for us, the excellent elite 1st pilot Gorky school, we did not see much of it, even though Nina Gegechkori was taken from our class, and some of our fathers were taken away [into Soviet prisons and camps]. I distinctly remember that we sympathized with her and helped her as we children could, and then accepted her back with compassion, but without hatred toward those that did this to her... We saw politics as some kind of higher, elemental force, to which normal human criteria did not apply.

I edited the discussion at the XIX conference, the discussion of the resolutions. It’s time to publish the transcript of the party conference. The PB made the decision not to publish the

¹⁴ Chernyaev uses a slang term, педалировать, which is derived from the word “to pedal” and means to increase something by pedaling, such as the speed of a bicycle or the sound of a piano. [Efremova’s Electronic Dictionary. педалировать. May 19, 2008. <http://edu.prometey.org/dictionary/d1/73342.html>]

speeches made after the end of the conference. Mostly, this decision was taken in order not to publish Yuriy Afanasiev, even though he already printed his speech in *Pravda* in the end of June, with certain circumstances.

September 27, 1988.

During these two days M.S. has been clearing up the Politburo and the Secretariat. Yesterday morning he called people to his office one by one, starting with Gromyko.

Today he conducted the Politburo. So far we know the following results:

Chebrikov—secretary of the CC.

Yakovlev—international affairs.

Medvedev—member of the PB on ideology.

Vorotnikov—chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet instead of Orlov, i.e. moved to a less powerful position.

Dolgikh—retirement.

Demichev—retirement.

Lukyanov—candidate member of the PB and first deputy of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Gromyko—retirement.

Dobrynin—retirement (but M.S. promised to later make him a personal adviser “of the president”).

Biryukova—candidate member of the PB and deputy representative of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Talyzin—replaces Antonov in CMEA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance].

Solomentsev—retirement.

It's strange that he did not promote Boldin to a secretary.

He is in a hurry because there has already been a leak about his note on the reorganization of the party apparatus, “and nobody is doing anything.”

I visited the International Department today, everybody was glad to see me. One guy said: “Anatoly Sergeyevich, nobody is working right now, people just smoke in the hallways and

moan. They are afraid of retirement..."

On the 30th M.S. wants to conduct a Plenum to "consolidate everything" and quickly reorganize and reduce the apparatus. In the evening he called me about a trifle: the schedule for [Ciriaco] de Mita (Italian prime minister).

M.S.: You probably heard?

Me: I heard something...

M.S.: Don't downplay it... Anyway, send me a program (for de Mita) to my house. I'm under emotional distress right now.

I don't envy him during these times. He has to say something to everyone... and then show them out, after having built *perestroika* with them for three years. It's true that they weren't very good, but they tried.

Dobrynin called me after the PB. Well, he said, my secretary-days are over. And he said it briskly, like he usually talks. Of course it's sad, he's still energetic and his mind is still sharp. That's why he wasn't thrilled to hear the word "retirement."

I have to grant it to him--he did not whine or complain. I sympathized with him and pretended that I didn't know anything, saying that this is the first time I hear about it and I am very surprised! He did not do very well as a secretary, but he is a good guy and would have been useful to me as an expert on America.

The reason I went to the International Department was to visit [Boris Nikolaevich] Ponomarev. He asked me very pitifully to come over, saying that it was "work related, nothing personal..." This is what he had to tell me: he was on vacation in Bulgaria (in a regular sanatorium, after the personal dachas!), where he met with vacationers from our fraternal parties. They told him that the negativism in our press is undermining their positions. So B.N. teaches me that we should have some positive material on our achievements.

I ask him, what positive material?

-Well, about the victories of socialism, that we do not have unemployment, that our healthcare and education are free, etc.

I got wound up: first of all, we already have unemployment and it's likely to stay, and our healthcare and education are in such a state that it's embarrassing even to mention them. The vacation norm in the West is 5 weeks, here it's two. People can't survive on our pensions. The quality of life is 2-3 times below the West. Should we write about these virtues? Should we slip back into demagoguery? They didn't believe us then, and they definitely will not believe us now. Our friends are used to being dependent on us and living in illusions. When we left them one on one with the reality, they found themselves in low water. No thanks, B.N.

He is pathetic and ludicrous. He gave me a note to give to M.S., advising him that he

needs to give some attention to the youth. Thanks! M.S. would never have guessed. B.N. asked me to find a place for him at some project, writing the history of the CPSU...

I saw that even though he spends hours in the International Department in his dim little room, he doesn't reach much and knows very little of what is written about *perestroika*. And he definitely does not understand anything.

October 3, 1988.

M.S. carried out his plan. The Plenum was on the 30th, the session of the Supreme Soviet was on Saturday, October 1st. He emerged from it as the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Back in the summer I was against it, but my complaints were met with a disapproving, piercing glance. Plus, someone needs to carry out the reform, and we can't try to use the party again—we would be going against our stated logic. But the post is tarnished by Podgorny, Brezhnev, and in general [by everybody] after Kalinin... The intelligentsia met the developments as one would expect: "We've seen this before..."

Recently he called me about a minor question. I congratulated him (without epithets), and sympathized about how on a human level it was difficult for him to do this. I said that overall it worked out like an objective political process, rather than [the pursuit of] personal considerations. I told him what was going around Moscow as soon as people found out about the Plenum: that M.S. decided to damn it all and resign, since the people do not want to do anything for themselves. He laughed. He said that the French were the first to guess that it's all happening according to Gorbachev's premeditated plan.

Then I said something about the fact that everything converges on him now and it will be impossible for anybody to blame the hindrances of the PB anymore. "Yes," he said, "the responsibility is greater. On the one hand it's easier, I won't have to waste time and effort on diplomacy and listening to endless talks, on the other hand—I have to act in a way that would soon produce results..."

October 9, 1988.

On Monday M.S. called me and Shakhnazarov to his office. He kissed Shakhnazarov—it was his birthday, he turned 64. We put together a schedule of M.S.' meetings and visits. He has made the final decision to go to the UN on December 7-8, from there to Cuba, and on the way back to make a stopover in London to talk with Thatcher. While we were at it, we removed [Uliy] Kvitsinsky from the post of deputy of the International Department.

M.S. lost his patience in regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. He stood opposite to us and started talking: "I want it to be done humanely; I don't want blood, I want for us to start talking with each other. The corrupted public is having an effect. [Stepan] Demirchan (first secretary of

Armenia's CP) is organizing his own group of people. They are egging on the public. The intellectuals have gone bankrupt; they cannot offer anything that would lead to a solution. But I do not know a solution either. If I knew what the solution is, nothing could stop me, I would break all the conventions to get it done. But I don't know it!"

He unexpectedly mentioned Alievshchina (Aliev is already retired). We dug into this matter, and the affair that we are unearthing might be bigger than Rashid's.

I used the opportunity and told him what Shatrov passed on to me: during a break in the Plenum, [Mikhail] Zimyanin and Yu. Zhukov came up to Chakovsky and said: "You bastard, you'll regret printing that about Aliev!" (The night before, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published Vaksberg's article on Aliev's affairs under Brezhnev with quotes from his speeches about Brezhnev, mentioning the gifts, the palaces, and the bribes).

At 1p.m. M.S. got together Yakovlev, Medvedev, Luk'yanov, Frolov, Shakhnazarov, and me to discuss ideas for the forthcoming political events. We discussed it for a long time, until Luk'yanov reminded us about the resolutions of the XIX party conference. Then everything fell in place quickly: at the November Plenum there will be a brief message from Ryzhkov on the progress of RER and the socio-economic program until the year 2005. At the session on the next day there will be a report on election law and amendments to the Constitution.

Gorbachev's major report on the nature of socialism and the final political reorganization will take place at the Congress of People's Deputies in April of 1989. (At the Plenum before the Congress we should state his ideas). Additionally, the Agricultural Plenum is in February, where the questions of economic relations in the village and of private property will be resolved. This will be integrated into the themes of the Congress.

We spent three hours there, sometimes digressing from the subject. By the way, M.S. criticized the article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* about Stalin's poisoning of Bekhterev because Bekhterev diagnosed him with paranoia. ... "Why do we bother then, if Stalin was just crazy? Why do we need history, theory, etc.? It's all so easy."

He also mentioned that we should not rule out the possibility to remove editors if they are "harmful" and "do not listen to arguments." Medvedev started to object.

... It was just our luck that the next day it became known that Yegor Yakovlev (*Moskovskie Novosti*) was resigning in protest against the firing of his deputy Bandura by the administration of the *Novosti* Press Agency. He was fired because he did not follow the order not to portray Churbanov's trial as a political process against Brezhnev ("a criminal trial"). When I found out, I tried to talk to Yegor (saying that it's not about personal matters at such a moment in history). I asked Falin what happened. But he took the bit between his teeth and wouldn't back down; he's in an administrative rage, [insisting that] a breach of discipline must result in punishment. In a word, Falin brought his 1937 and his cold war even here, he's reverting to Ligachev-methods from personal longhair motivations. It's a normal thing in Russia!

Meanwhile, a meeting of the editorial board of *Moskovskie novosti* took place, which

Falin attended. They gave him a hard time there... He called them all a congregation of anarchists and opportunists, and they called him a bureaucrat. Then at the meeting of *Moskovskie novosti* party organization they even cited M.S. from his last meeting with editors, saying that he supports the repression and wants to confine journalists to the usual cage of control and censorship, even though he had said that everything is allowed (to print!) that is not restricted by law. And overall: "the meeting resulted in the conclusion that we cannot work with this kind of *Novosti* Press Agency administration."

Falin reported to Medvedev, who said that he sent the note to the CC.

I think it will conclude with the expulsion of Yegor Yakovlev according to the Yeltsin formula (voluntary resignation), and... with the bankruptcy of *Moskovskie Novosti* even without Ligachev's involvement, who is on vacation right now; brought about by the hands of the *perestroika* makers, represented by Falin (the administration voted 11 in favor of firing Bandura, 5 in favor of a serious reprimand, but leaving him at his post).

Yesterday I was finishing up the materials for Vancio and de Mita. I spoke on the phone twice with M.S. Shevardnadze. Bondarenko complained to him that Chernyaev is setting the General Secretary against interfering in Austria's joining of the EEC [European Economic Community]. I really did express myself sharply against the superpower approach to the modern meaning of the 1955 State treaty on Austria's neutrality.

October 23, 1988.

It looks like today I won't have to work, unlike the previous two weekends.

Yesterday M.S. called me to talk about the materials for Kohl. When we were discussing Kohl himself, I told M.S. that "the country is ready to go very far with us, but he is not." To which he replied: "It's the opposite with us—the leadership is ready, and not only with the FRG, but the country is not..."

On Friday I forgot that overall the program with Kohl had been coordinated, and decided that besides the one on one meeting, M.S. should not lead the negotiations (as he did with de Mita). Let Ryzhkov do it. Shevardnadze raised a great din about this. He called me and spoke to me in a tone that was unusually rude for him. M.S. called me immediately afterwards and jumped at me: "Who came up with this ridiculous idea?" I told him that I did. And I did it deliberately. After all, there is an order: you are the president, he is a prime minister. It's a different matter with the Italians because we have such "heartfelt relations" with them. Plus, de Mita never compared you with Goebbels. Not to mention the fact that you are worn out to the limit and it's time to stop constantly appearing on the TV screen in the Georgievsky and other halls and to fill newspaper pages while the shelves in the stores are empty.

He softened up a bit, started to calm down: "What are you saying, it would be a scandal. We can't do that." In a word, he restored everything to its former order.

The same morning, I had another unpleasant conversation with Shevardnadze about his proposal to appoint deputy Minister Karpov. This time he also had an irritated tone with me, saying that he knows what he is doing and answers for his proposals. Shevardnadze and I haven't had these kinds of confrontations before. But he should also know that I'm filling his position not only to write post factum communiqués.

M.S. gave an interview to *Der Spiegel*. I had insisted on it for a long time. It came out great: he sat down and had a measured conversation with intelligent German [reporters]. They were blown away.

At the PB on Thursday (which I left after the first question) a vehement encounter between Ryzhkov and Ligachev (who had just come back from his vacation, so this was his first PB with the "demotion") took place, actually over that first question. They were discussing the plan for 1989. Ryzhkov made his report that they added everything up, cleaned everything thoroughly, and were barely able to balance the account, with a deficit; they tried not to tap into the means of the industries and the republics too much; in a word, as much as they could in RER. Of course, they had to freeze or cancel many construction projects; the agro-industrial complex, where small projects have been built for decades, was also affected.

And now Ligachev stands up and begins to passionately defend the food program and the people's interests, looking after the regular people who have nothing to buy at the stores, etc. Maslyukov, Slyunkov, and others tried to dissuade him. Vlasov, the new Premier of Russia, supported him.

Ryzhkov blew up: it appears as though you are for the people, and we are just technocrats and do not care about them. And it went on from there... Then Ligachev made the statement that he is appointed to defend the food program for the people, he got a sphere that is collapsing. And while he is here, he is going to fight for the people's interests.

During the discussion M.S. tried to reconcile them in his usual way, but after this statement he said that he has to also make a speech. And he did! (I have it written down). The general idea is: if you want to oppose yourself to the PB, that you alone are for the people and we all are for the devil knows what, it won't work.

When we were leaving, Frolov whispered to me: "His number's up, at best he'll be around for a couple months longer." Then Yakovlev told me about a personal conversation he had with M.S., who cursed Ye.K. left and right... It looks like he is finally convinced that Ligachev is a burden on *perestroika*, that he hinders the process and will continue to do so.

I am exhausted: Vranitzky, de Mita, Sarney, Kohl... and permanent ongoing matters that take up 12-14 hours a day. M.S. asked me: can you handle it? I told him that it does not have "historic significance" whether I can or not. But for him... (this was after he told me that he has a flicker in one of his eyes). He really has so much to do: constitutional affairs; history of the CPSU; the economic program for 1989 and beyond; the cadres; and hundreds of everyday affairs...

October 28, 1988.

Kohl visited. He met one-on-one with Gorbachev (plus me and Teltschik [assistant to the chancellor]). When you watch this striving “at the highest level” to speak as one human being to another (mutually), you physically feel that we are entering a new world where the determinant is no longer class struggle, ideology, and polarity in general, but something all-human. And you realize how brave and far-sighted M.S. is. He declared the new thinking “without any theoretical preparation,” and began to act according to common sense.

After all, his ideas—“freedom of choice,” “mutual respect for each other’s values,” “renunciation of force in politics,” “common European home,” “liquidation of nuclear armaments,” etc., etc.—all of this is by no means new. What is new is that a person who came out of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, from a Soviet society conditioned from top to bottom by Stalinism, began to carry out these ideas with all earnestness and sincerity when he became head of state. No wonder the world is stunned and full of admiration. But our public still cannot appreciate that he has already led them from one state to another.

Sometimes he is still caught in the old clichés. For example, after the “embrace” with Kohl during the first meeting, Kohl made a speech several hours later in which he again and again spoke about a “unified Germany” and about “Berlin, ...” The next morning M.S. consulted as to what sharp words he should say to him at the start of the negotiations. He even made Falin and me write a “page” so that he would not forget the sharpness of everything he wanted to say. But he did not say any of it ... Later it was as if he “made excuses,” saying that Kohl needed [to speak] about unity in order to fight off his allies and the overly-enthusiastic public at home!

Three days ago I wrote him a note, protesting Vorontsov-Varennikov-Zaitsev’s proposal to organize a pogrom of the mujaheddin with bombs, rockets, and flame-throwers over the entire territory of Afghanistan, in order to make them more compliant with Najibullah.

M.S. did not say anything to me. But in his circle, during a session of the Supreme Soviet, “in the back” (off stage, while they were having tea) he said some cutting remarks “to nobody in particular” that there are some people who think that we will succeed with mere talks and persuasions, who want to practically leave Najibullah to his own devices, etc. Yakovlev made a comment along the lines of Najibullah not being important enough to sacrifice the lives of hundreds and thousands of people and to risk our prestige (on following Geneva). At this point M.S. got really wound up (as always happens when he knows that he is not right, and when the conversation turns to Yeltsin and Nagorno-Karabakh). The other members of the PB acquiesced.

But it must have touched a chord. Yakovlev got the sense from speaking with [Dmitriy] Yazov that M.S. gave him some orders to “rein him in.”

In relation to the beginning of today’s entry, on the destruction of the dogmas and principles with which we lived for two-thirds of the 20th century: Shainis wrote in MEMO [*Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, Journal of World Economics and

International Affairs] about socialism; Borko in *Kommunist* on capitalism; two people in *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn'* on neocolonialism. There are similar articles in every issue of the serious journals. This is a sweeping destruction of the pillars that held the entire official "Marxism-Leninism," which was studied at the universities and were the topic of hundreds of dissertations.

M.S. sometimes says similar things, for example in the afterword to the Soviet-Polish book, which recently came out in Warsaw in Politizdat.

The following episode is also characteristic: Chebrikov tells M.S. about Sakharov's election to the Academy of Sciences Presidium that "Our Academy is not very mature." M.S. made fun of that as soon as he put down the phone, by telling Chebrikov that Sakharov should be permitted to travel abroad, he has proved himself a patriot and an honest person. Then he bitterly and venomously told about Chebrikov's comment to Yakovlev. Chebrikov said to M.S. about Ligachev and Ryzhkov's confrontation at the PB: "Yakovlev and Ligachev seem to be buddies [дружки]!"

M.S. made a master move when he removed Chebrikov from the KGB, thereby leaving him without the levers and the apparatus of power. As a Secretary of the CC he is powerless against *perestroika*.

But there is still Vorotnikov, as well as Ligachev, [Viktor] Nikonov, and the "swampy" ones at the PB. There is also the CC, over half of whose members have been removed or sent into retirement "based on age." Of course, there are also the officialdom, which is being reduced in all areas right now and is finding itself in low waters... and what is worse, they are finding positions in different places.

Sometimes M.S. has minutes when he just wants to talk without planning it ahead of time. When this happens, he turns on his direct line, which he did three days ago. We talked for about five minutes, I don't remember what about. Then we came across a subject for which we needed Medvedev, so we talked three-ways, interrupting each other.

In the course of the conversation M.S. says: I asked Kruchina to calculate how much I cost our people. He counted that in 10 years I cost Moscow 100,000 rubles; while I gave back to the government 850,000 rubles, especially through the royalties from the book *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie* [Perestroika and the New Thinking]. And this is without the hard currency part of the royalties.

Burlatsky published a filthy opus on his role in the politics of the 1950-70 in *Novyi Mir*. This is all from vanity. Our *perestroika* officials are so petty against the background of progress!

Yakovlev is asking me to intercede with M.S. about publishing his articles and speeches.

There is a great deal of personal relations between our politicians. (Maybe, this is good. For it is not based on a conspiracy against our own people, like it was in the '30s, '40s, '50s... all way up until 1985.)

November 3, 1988. Politburo.

Today is a historical day. After the planned Politburo, M.S. became more serious and, clearly nervous, he began to speak on the subject that he "tried out" during his main talk three days ago with Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Falin, and Dobrynin. This was about of his trip to the UN in December.

M.S: Cdes. Ryzhkov and Maslukov, as well as other colleagues, are asking me a question. This question is also in the letters that I am receiving. Very recently, at a meeting with young Comsomols I once again came across this question: they asked me, why do we need such a big army? People have been troubled by this question for a long time.

We approached this theme at the XIX party conference. In the report, in the theses, and in the resolution we said that we need quality, not quantity.

Now the moment has come when we need to make a major decision. We are taking little steps, like the agreement to liquidate medium and short-range missiles [INF] and some other things. But that does not change the principal nature of the situation. E.A. comes across this every day... Today Shultz talked about it again. The military doctrine we announced differs from what we are actually doing in military building. If we publish how the matters stand, that we spend over twice as much as the US on military needs, if we let the scope of our expenses be known, all our new thinking and our new foreign policy will go to hell. Not one country in the world spend as much per capita on weapons as we do, except perhaps the developing nations that we are swamping with weapons and getting nothing in return.

We said that we are ready to publish data and we are pushing the Americans on this account, but if it really comes to that, what are we going to do? But that is not the main thing. We will not solve the *perestroika* objectives if we leave the army as it is: the best scientific-technical forces, the best production funds, reliable supplies... The little-Comsomols are right, why do we need such a big army?! Six million people! Somebody told me that they are offering to lower the conscription age to 17. (Maslyukov inserts a comment: Yagodin came to me with this proposal, but I refused to sign it). What are we doing? We are depleting our intellectual resources of their best young forces! Who is going to conduct *perestroika*? (Yazov: by November 9th I will present a proposal on all these questions... M.S. probably gave him an assignment immediately after the conversation).

In the GDR we have [stationed] a powerful group of armored forces, plus pontoon forces. When all this hangs over them, how can they believe that our doctrine is defensive?!

There is also the question of reducing (for now reducing) our presence in socialist countries. Today E.A. [Shevardnadze] told me about his talk with Grosz. Right now the issue is not very acute. But it could become severe under a situation like the one in Hungary right now. And then we won't be leaving voluntarily, we'll be driven out of there...Dmitriy Timofeevich! (Marshall Yazov) They say your troops are standing on a territory that contains a historical

monument of world importance?

Yazov: The territory contains a famous church. A reconnaissance battalion and a medical battalion are station there, but we are already moving them.

M.S. Thank God! At least the monument is safe! (Laughter)

So comrades, we need to think through this issue and discuss it with our friends. I propose that the Defense Council considers everything. Then we will come back to this at the PB. Does anybody have any questions?

(Everybody nods)

Ryzhkov: (very tensely) I feel responsible to say that if we do not do this we will not achieve the XIII five-year-plan, and there can be no talk of a raise in the quality of life. Whatever government you place here, it will not resolve this problem [without reducing military spending].

M.S.: If we all agree and if we make some major decisions, then I plan to announce this in my speech at the UN.

Everybody: Yes, yes...

M.S.: This will make a great impression... after the agreement to liquidate middle and short-range missiles, and after Afghanistan, this action... the world will see that is not empty talk, these are policies. We will advance the entire process. I would put it this way: with all the significance this has for the impression in the world and for the advancement of our policy of peace, the most important aspect is still *perestroika*. Nikolai Ivanovich (Ryzhkov) is right: we will not succeed with *perestroika* without this action.

There is no question that we should be militarily powerful. But we should achieve our power through scientific advancement, through technology, through qualified cadres and modern organization of our troops. Planes, missiles... but not like Karmal who sucks us dry but doesn't produce results. We cannot be weak. This is the axiom. But we need to be powerful for security's sake, not for the purposes of intimidation.

M.S. also said that he is talking about unilateral reductions, not about the material that is going into the negotiations with the Americans and the mandate of Vienna meeting.

This will be the evidence that I was present at an event that may well take the second place of importance after the April of 1985.

Additionally, the PB discussed food supply to Moscow. On this count there was total mess and nonsense, both from Zaikov and Mesyats. We did not reach anything, even M.S. could not think of something.

There was also talk of “Memorial...”¹⁵ Kapto already started “to act,” he wrote a denunciation. But M.S. took the following approach: it’s your own fault; you decided to create a memorial to the victims of Stalinism and once again nothing got done... So people decided to do it themselves, except now they have exceeded the limits... (Kapto is already charging it with the desire to become an “alternative political structure.”) M.S. stifled that idea and said—study it!)

We discussed Solzhenitsyn. Frolov, I, and Shakhnazarov write him (Gorbachev) a “protest” against Chebrikov and Medvedev’s note, which says that “we should uphold the decree that strips him of his citizenship as a traitor of the Motherland...”

M.S. understood our point of view: yes, he is an enemy, irreconcilable and staunch. But he is an ideological enemy, and we do not try people for their beliefs in a legal state. So “think about it.” The authors of the note sat there, steaming. Chebrikov tried to interject that “he did betray...” (i.e. there was an action). M.S. just hemmed at that.

November 9, 1988.

Gorbachev called me very late at night yesterday. Said he could not reach anyone. “You family hasn’t disowned you yet?.. Well, since I reached you, let’s talk.” And he started to rapidly tell me what he would like to say to the people on TV on the ethnic question, Estonia is especially worrisome right now.

He talked for forty minutes. Afterwards I tried to reproduce it for the stenographer and sent the copy to him.

Today I learned from Shakhnazarov that this text is already on his desk, with an assignment to write an introduction.

Before the holidays Shevardnadze sent M.S. an outraged note that the military are cheating the policy (as they did 10 years ago with the SS-20). They are creating new weapons systems, locating powerful troops near NATO, provoking the NATO people with their reconnaissance activities, etc. In a word, they are undermining the trust in the new thinking and the defense doctrine.

M.S. erupted in an order: a make a report!

Today this was the topic at the Defense Council. But the main subject was—what to say at the UN on the unilateral reduction of weapons and armed forces in Europe.

Shatrov published a very good interview in *Ogonek*, it deals with “Leninism” and with Solzhenitsyn.

¹⁵ A non-governmental organization formed in 1987. Memorial was established in order to find information and build a memorial to the victims of Stalinist repressions

In *Izvestiya* there was an interview with Glazunov (a popular artist). He really stripped for them. He's a scoundrel and a bigot... I wonder how M.S. and R.M. took it, since he is a favorite of theirs. And how does Ligachev look now, who opened Glazunov's exhibition at the Youth House on Komsomol'sky Avenue this summer, and then got him TV, newspapers, and other publicity.

Korolenko. Letter to Lunacharsky from 1920. This is in the vein of Shatrov's thesis on removing the robes of holiness from our revolution... But if it ceases being a legend and heroism, why do we need it? It was more terrible than the French revolution. But 200 years after their revolution, they still keep it covered with blankets of romanticism, even the people ideologically opposed to it—the reactionaries!

November 13, 1988.

I spent the last few days preparing materials for M.S.'s trip to India. Of course, there were "initial" materials from the MFA, Kamentsev, and the International Department. But I am shocked by the level of these drafts, it's as though the people were not reading Gorbachev's speeches, as if they didn't know his philosophy, his way of thinking and his manner of speech. What's worse is that the MFA is handing us positions which do not agree with the official positions of the Politburo.

Every day brings new information on almost every relevant issue. But the drafts they offer the General Secretary look as though they had been written months ago. Plus, the speeches they write are dozens of pages long, as though Brezhnev and Chernenko were still in their places and were going to read these texts "into the face" of their interlocutor.

Every time I have to rework this crap into something decent so it's not embarrassing to show it to M.S., who has very little time to "master" the material. And that's exactly what he does, he masters the material before every foreign meeting.

Friday in the afternoon after some internal meeting he calls me and says: "Tolya! We need an international piece for the speech in Orel (he is going there for two days, to promote *perestroika* in that part of Russia). What should we tell them? (It will be a meeting of the obkom secretaries). We started discussing it, and in the evening I sent him a text. But I did it like this: I called Veber and Ermonskey, told them what M.S. and I had come up with. Three hours later they sent me a text. In two hours I re-wrote it and sent it to M.S. There is no reaction from him, which means he accepted it. He wants to talk about the material with which he will go to the UN and to Thatcher.

Yesterday I presented the Indian materials.

In *Novyi Mir* there is Lebedev's article on our entertainment industry... The way things are moving, our public opinion (and press) will perceive, evaluate, and illuminate socialism in a Soviet state the same way as, for example, the mass media in England evaluates its own society.

That is, not partisan, but “free” to think whatever it wants, rather than what is allowed.

Today I was at the Manezh at an exhibition of young artists, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of All-union Leninist Young Communist League. All the art is professionally weak. But it presents such a powerful picture of the agitation of spirit in the country, the liberation of calling, talent, abilities, and preferences for creative energy!

November 15, 1988.

M.S. is back from Orel. He is happy, and why shouldn’t he be! He saw the first fruit of *perestroika* in the main criteria—in food, housing, in the villages. And what people!

But the meeting with Medvedev, Slyunkov, and Chebrikov, who just came back from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, dumped three buckets of cold water on his good mood. As people say, all three of them were “horrified.” Daily and nightly they were picketed with slogans such as: “Russians get out of here!” “KGB, MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Soviet army—to Moscow!” “Do away with the dictatorship from Moscow!” “Immediate withdrawal from the Union!” “Full Sovereignty!” etc.

Fanaticism and hysteria have already obliterated reason. During talks the intelligentsia say one thing, and at meetings—with the same Medvedev, Slyunkov, and Chebrikov present—they say the exact opposite. They have a full national consensus.

Chebrikov tells about a beauty contest, where a girl in a bikini was asked what she would say to Chebrikov if she met him on the street... “otherwise he spends all his time hanging around here.” She hesitated, stroking her breast, and said: “Leave us alone!”

In a word, Czechoslovakia of 1968 or Finland of 1918 is drawing near... M.S. has to make a decision. Both are very dangerous. But the first would be the death of *perestroika* and the new thinking. While Russian chauvinism plus conservatism in the second option can be withstood, if other oblasts follow Orel’s example.

November 27, 1988.

M.S. televised at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, they were discussing Estonia. The speeches were shabby, he shouldn’t have organized this public appearance. Our guys don’t know how to lead “parliamentary debates.” They know how to criticize while acquiescing to what they think their assignment will be; even if the assignment is not given, as happens right now in the *perestroika* era. And M.S. couldn’t find the arguments to convincingly show the unfoundedness of the Estonians. He went into economic calculations: how much we are giving the republic and how much it is giving us. But they don’t need, and they never needed what we have been “giving” them for 40 years. As for the “isolation” of “subsistence farming,” this is really not a threat for them. As soon as they leave, the Finns, Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, the FRG and the

US will take them under their wing and in a year and a half or two Estonia will turn into a “candy” sweeter than Finland.

There is not way out except for renew the treaty between the republics, which really means to start from the same place as Lenin did when he spoke against Stalin's “autonomization.” For some reason I am sure that if we gave them complete freedom to choose, without imposing anything on them, they, as well as Latvia and Lithuania, would vote for the Union, but for independent existence within it. And that would be good! M.S. says himself that each republic should have the standard of living that it can earn for itself, as any self-supporting organization.

No. I am too Russian to condemn the Estonians.

On Friday Yakovlev stopped by. He told me about an episode that took place in the “Walnut Room” before the PB session. This PB was scheduled to discuss Estonia, amendments to the Constitution, the events in Azerbaijan where they are already burning the infantry combat vehicles, the armored carriers, and even tanks, military trucks. Three Russian soldiers were killed there. In Baku people are walking around with green flags and with Khomeini's portraits, calling for an all-round repetition of Sumgait for Armenians.

So in this heated atmosphere Ligachev once again pushed his line: I said back in February that we should use force, restore order, show all of them! How long are we going to stand this? We've let it all go, everything is coming loose, the country is falling apart, etc.

At first, M.S. listened to him ironically, egging him on. But then he blew up: why are you always trying to scare me, Yegor?! Why do you always thrust it under my nose—“see what your *perestroika* is leading to! Where are we going! What is happening!” Well, I was and I will be for *perestroika*. I am not afraid of the things that are unfolding. If you (he addresses the members of the PB) think that we cannot go on like this, that I am doing something wrong, then please let's go to the next room (points to the PB conference room) and I will submit my resignation. On the spot, without a word of grievance or protest. Elect whomever you like and let him conduct affairs as he can. But while I am in this seat, I am conducting my line and I won't back down!

...The conversation ended there, and we went to the meeting. But E.K was not the instigator at the start of the conversation, it was Vorotnikov. Ligachev only joined in.

In the evening after the Politburo M.S. summoned Yakovlev. He was upset, even though he cannot get “distracted” right now. In the morning he was at the National Economy Achievement Exhibition—mechanization from the defense sector for agricultural purposes; then he had a meeting with Mitterrand, then a Presidium on Estonia and on the day before the session, then Mitterrand again, followed by the preparation of the Plenum report (which is tomorrow) and preparation for the sessions of the Supreme Soviet (December 29-31).

M.S. and Yakovlev talked. Yakovlev said: I told you Mikhail Sergeyevich! A resentful person cannot be an adviser, especially if he is an opponent of *perestroika* at heart!

It has only been a week since we returned from India, but it feels like it was months ago. He hasn't started preparing for the UN, Cuba, and Thatcher yet. Though, at a PB we did discuss unilateral reduction of armed forces (clearly not enough!), "human rights"--to release all political prisoners, write off the debt of third-world countries. The MFA an draft about these three points, the text is long and florid, in the style of Tolya Kovalyov and Petrovsky. E.A. approved it and it was sent to M.S. on Monday. As for the "philosophical" part of it—it is full of beautiful words, they want to substitute wordiness substance.

Before the trip to India I asked Veber and Ermonskey to think about something. I told them of my intention to advance the new thinking through our ideological canons. They came up with some material. I built a text around that (including some specific topics proposed by the MFA). I like what I wrote, it is 27 pages. I sent it to him last night. I had been writing it all week, neglecting operational preparation for New York and London, and for this I got a dressing down from Raisa Maksimovna the other day. I barely restrained myself from saying a couple of strong words, which would ensure my retirement the next day. Her women's games, pretensions of a president's wife! Maybe they are well-founded. But why me? There are entire departments in the MFA, in the embassies! Dozens of people whose job it is to do these things. And she is well aware of what my job is and how busy I am to delve into protocols! But her sense of tact must have atrophied together with the perception of real life.

December 4, 1988.

The day after tomorrow we are flying to New York (UN) – Cuba – London. The workload will be nightmarish—14 hour workdays with no weekends. The speech for the UN is 30 pages; M.S. read my draft the day before yesterday and yesterday I edited it according to his idea. He liked the text (the ideas and form), but he didn't like the structure... and I had to clean it of Yakovlev's additions, which M.S. had initially encouraged him to make. Now I have to make excuses with A.N.

Even though I changed the additions, they still looked high-flown and created repetitions.

What's new?

- 1) Advancement in new thinking, moving farther away from "Marxism-Leninsm;"
- 2) On human rights—release of political prisoners and "refuseniks" ["отказников"]
- 3) Writing off the third-world debt
- 4) Unilateral reduction of troops in the GDR, CzSSR, and the People's Republic of Hungary.

There will be a sensation.

Additionally, there are numerous drafts for his speeches in New York and materials (and

references) for his talks, including the talks with Reagan and Bush. And all of this is either done by me or through me.

Meanwhile, the Baltic states are storming; in Armenia and Azerbaijan there were around 50 murders this week; there is outright violence between the ethnic groups; there are 50,000 refugees, children are out in the cold, the houses and apartments are plundered, there are strikes everywhere, sabotage of public transportation, etc.

M.S. led the session of the Supreme Soviet his way. He was once again magnificent. And every time after his impromptu additions to his speeches he called to “brag” that he won once again. (He said: to praise yourself is to give yourself moral support.) His workload is superhuman and it's hard to imagine how he manages.

He made major concessions to the Estonians and others like them, removing provocative (ambiguous) amendments to the Constitution and brought the situation with the republics out of the crisis by promising second-stage political reforms. And despite the fact that at the PB (and especially at the Plenum) nobody objected, the majority “purse their lips” and do not approve of his liberalism. They can sense that he is ready to go very far along the path of “federalization” of the Union. It's not for no reason that he leaves [.....] the most general concepts: the October Revolution, socialism, fidelity to Lenin's decisions. His idea is that in everything else we'll find a way to compromise.

But he is often worried about the reaction of the Russian part of the empire. Several times in our one on one conversations he alluded to the fact that the “superpower” potential is rumbling menacingly. (I personally think that “united and indivisible” is not the main theme in Russian nationalism right now. The current nationalism is of the kind that says: all these Estonians and Armenians can go to hell!)

It seems the people really don't care. It is the anti-*perestroika* crowd that is spreading the idea that M.S. is splitting the Soviet Union—our great achievement.

M.S. asked me, and I found out that he asked Shakhnazarov and Yakovlev as well, whether the Balts really want to leave. I answered him: it looks like they do. And the matter is far along if the People's Artist of the USSR Via Artmane publicly speaks about the “40-year occupation of Latvia.” I don't know whether M.S. is playing dumb or whether he truly thinks so, but he responded that the countries would “perish” if they separate from the rest of the Union.

The hijacking of a bus with 30 children in Ordzhonikidze, the flight to Tel-Aviv, the conduct of the Jews has been impeccable. The whole world will appreciate this. But our programs on TV haven't said a word of gratitude. This thing [antisemitism] is still somewhere in our system!

Nina Berberova is published in *October*. What style and what precise information! This is because she is dealing with form of high artistic merit, writing about Gorky, Pasternak, Merezhovsky, Bunin, Romain Rolland and the entire Soviet “society” from that perspective.

December 17, 1988.

M.S. is sick. He caught a cold, or more likely some infection, in Armenia. He says the infection is “seeding” right now, he has chills and feels dizzy. He hasn't come to the CC in a week.

Meanwhile, I can record what happened at the UN.

We flew into New York on the 6th. The welcome was more than humble, it did not promise any triumph to come. To “have some fun” M.S. scheduled a meeting with our team (the so-called press group), which came in advance to prepare the Americans for Gorbachev's arrival.

There was tea for 40 people, including everybody from Mark Zakharov to Lisovolik. Arbatov, Zorin, and Shishlin were showing off. Dobrynin's conversation was smart. Pozner was brief.

M.S. seated Banionis, Vasiliev, Abduladze, and Mark Zakharov across the table from himself. Somebody was telling about a world-famous artist, a man from Lithuania who lived in Israel, who is pro-Soviet and wanted to write M.S.' portrait. He replied: when we start making portraits and handing out medals, it will be the end of *perestroika*.

At this moment I was looking at Zakharov, who, as it turns out, said at a press conference the day before that the opponents of *perestroika* in the USSR are the majority.

...Zorin bragged about how he “washed off” this comment from the press-group.

After the reception was over, M.S. left 10 people with him to go over the program for tomorrow. I could feel that he did not want “unnecessary” public speeches and interviews.

In the morning I showed him a short and unintelligible telegram about the earthquake. Neither he, nor I gave it much thought.

Then the UN... in the hallways groups of officials met him with applause...

I was sure that the speech would make an impression. But I was expecting anything like this. For over an hour nobody stirred. And then the audience erupted in ovations, and they would not let M.S. go for a long time. He even had to get up and bow as if he were on stage.

Directly from there we went to Governor's island. There streets were still fairly empty... In the car he spoke on the telephone with Ryzhkov and found out that the earthquake in Armenia was terrible.

December 21, 1988.

America. I probably should not give too much detail, since it's all in the papers. But the Gorbachev phenomenon is truly the most critical movement in history... To discover its simple human meaning is possible already in our time (at least for us, but also for "them").

And it works out so simply—like an everyday thing—with him. In the airplane [on the way to New York] for example, he called me, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev, and started "digging" in phrases and paragraphs... it would seem like it's a regular thing. But he was "straightening out" a historic action. Or how he made the decision to cut short his trip because of Armenia. He called his advisers and the delegation—8 people after [Peréz] Cuéllar's reception. He was sitting in a shirt without a jacket, Raisa Maksimovna at his side. He asked for vodka and a full dinner. With the first glass he thanked everybody (but he gave me a meaningful look) for the help in preparing the speech. He already understood that it was bigger than a sensation... a triumph which did not die down even after the earthquake.

Then he called Plekhanov ("9") and said: "Tomorrow we are going home! Eduard Ambrosievich, please invite some correspondents and explain our reasons... You and you (to me and Shakh)--sent telegrams to Thatcher and Castro, telling them that we will not be visiting..." Then several times he came back to it, saying: "This is the right decision!... I can't do otherwise. I would never forgive myself!" Which means he had doubts and was seeking our support. This was also a historic decision.

He still wasn't sure whether he would fly to Armenia when we were in the airplane on the way back. He came out of his room to join us. Talked about some things. But when we landed at Vnukovo, as soon as he met with the PB he made the decision. As he was saying goodbye he said "I have to go!" And this was a historic action, which was not overshadowed by the selfless Ryzhkov, who had been there for two weeks, seen his share of horrors and fixed things "with his own hands."

M.S. is still sick after Armenia. I am communicating with him through notes, reminders about telegrams and over the phone, when he calls me. I sent him the "outcomes of New York" for the Politburo (it will take place on 12.27), and then everyday some matters came up.

– Bezymensky found in the GDR's MFA new facts about the protocol for August 23 of 1939. He wrote me a note that it's time to admit to things.

– The note by Ukrainian seismologists, who had been predicting earthquakes for many years, and predicted the one in Armenia, which they presented at a seminar in Tomsk in June of 1988.

– Yakovlev's speech in Perm with a very brave movement in the course of new thinking, with his commentary.

– A note written together with Shakhnazarov about the countries with a "socialist orientation," which are a millstone around our neck and which accept neither *perestroika*, nor the new thinking. M.S. wrote "good" across the top and assigned us to prepare a conception for the PB at the end of April.

- Note on Cuba, that we should not go there at all and that it's time to tell "the Beard" that aren't even thinking about it, and that it's time to stop being a revolutionary at the expense of 1/5 of the growth of the Soviet national income. M.S. reacted to this: "If I go there, it won't be before December" (clearly sarcastic!)

- Ponomarev's vile request to leave him the dacha.

- Because of my vacation M.S. assigned Dobrynin to prepare the material for the meeting with the "Trilateral Commission" (Nakasone, Giscard, Rockefeller, Kissinger, Brzezinski) on February 18th. But he called me right afterwards because he had doubts that Dobrynin will manage the task ("he's forgotten how to think a long time ago") and asked to add Zagliadin to this project, and for me to lead a "three-way" meeting for the three of us.

- A schedule of his meetings and trips for the first half of 1988 [sic]. He leaves a minimum. But a lot will be added on later. I will oppose as much as I can: he can't turn into a constant interviewee [проходной собеседник], and everybody wants an interview with him. It became a status-symbol: what's your significance at home and in international politics if you haven't had a meeting with Gorbachev!

- I protested against Razumovsky's and Boldin's imposing of "their" structure on the CC International Department (M.S. supported me in this).

Some of my friends are telling me that people are railing against Gorbachev, and especially against Raisa. Nobody believes anything. This is coming from the academic circles. If that's the case, then our so-called intelligentsia is worthless.

Some of this reaches M.S., especially about the empty shelves in the stores. This is reflected in the conversations about *perestroika*.

On the third day after he got sick we had the following conversation on the phone. He asked me for what I thought about the reaction to the UN [speech]. I said something like "the very course of history" and that more and more people feel this.

He said: "Yes, I am sure that I made the right choice (I understood that he was talking about the internal *perestroika*). If I felt that I made a mistake I would immediately submit my resignation. But I am sure that there is no other way, we chose the right way! But it's going to be so hard, Tolya!"

I haven't noted another one of my undertakings. Under the impression the his success and "resounding fame" from the speech at the UN I once again thought that our educated public does not seem to notice the evolution in the "new thinking." This evolution happens in almost every M.S.' major speech. People did not notice it in his appearance before the Polish intellectuals in Warsaw, etc. But the West German, English, French, and even American newspapers noticed that he is progressively moving away from Marxism-Leninism. And all ours can write about are the initiatives!

I told Falin that we should assign Veber & Co. to write a big article for *Kommunist* in which they would trace the evolution of the new thinking after the XXVII congress. At the same time they should analyze how some have rushed to the “openings” that M.S. created, such as our scientists—the leaders in different scientific journals, first and foremost the MEMO, in the journal *Rabochii klass i mezhdunarodnaia politika* [The Working class and International Politics], and in the literary thick journals, in Yu. Afanas'ev's book, etc. In some places there is foolishness, but in others it's the real emancipation of thought.

Falin tells me: I am all for it, but Medvedev is jealous about any encroachment on his sphere. “I'll take the responsibility for it” I said impudently and smugly. But seriously: while I can, I will take it on; during the era of *glasnost'* even the small steps become irreversible.

December 31, 1988.

It is the last day of a great and dramatic year. Truly, without fools and demagoguery, it is a turning-point year.

Starting on the 24th of December I was supposed to be at a branch of Barvikha near Domodedovo. In reality I was there for only three days.

Yakovlev called there, told me about the PB that discussed New York. He advised me to be “alert” to the possibility that the election method “from the party” might bring the gang of Bondarev, Ivanov, Alekseev, etc. to the Congress of Soviets.

He sent me a philosophical congratulatory note and two bottles of Bulgarian [wine]. He is drawn towards me for some reason.

Anya (my daughter) organized a return match for Ruby (member of the Italian parliament). He came with his wife Vera, who is a former Soviet citizen. She is smart and sharp. In the age of Eurocommunism, here she was considered to be most maliciously anti-Soviet. Popov (translator from the Italian) was also here with his Natasha.

We had an interesting conversation: talked about *perestroika*, about our recent past with PCI-CPSU, about Gorbachev, Berlinguer. I raised the question of what will happen to the world revolutionary process when we, the USSR, cease being a superpower?

Indeed. Right now the West is euphoric about us because Gorbachev had the courage to refuse this status and remove “the Soviet threat.” But without this, in everything else, why would the developed West need us? What could be their interest in us, as compared to, say, Latin America or China?

Curiosity? Yes... after all there are Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and others, on whom the world myths about us are built.

A problem. It's ok if it's a world issue. But what if it's a provincial one, only ours?

Ruby brought a request to meet with M.S. from Occhetto (General Secretary of PCI). I suggested this to M.S. before. He said: "It's not clear!" Now, after the conversation with Ruby, I wrote him a long note yesterday, suggesting January 13th. We'll see what he says.

In the newspapers, journals, and TV there is total discord (on the outcomes of the year and regarding the New Year) of our entire 70 year-long system. None of the terminology is shunned anymore—down even to totalitarianism. The "kolkhoz and sovkhoz" have been declared to be a mistake "from the start." Almost all the émigrés are now good, "and we, their Motherland, are guilty." Now those émigrés are presented as our only wealth, our "spiritual potential," which has mostly been scattered or destroyed over these 70 years.

On the TV you now often see metropolitans and bishops, whom the participants of the conversation, including little boys and girls, are calling "my lord" [владыко].

Gavriil Popov (yesterday on TV) is right when he said that in 1989 nothing noticeable will happen in "the state of life," even though new trends will appear. But it looks like this is his internal plan, or maybe an objective logic that Gorbachev started (and he does not want to resist it, even though he still says words of "restraint"), that the regime which was constructed over 70 years has to break down, only then our society will begin to rebuild itself anew, "out of the instinct of self-preservation." And no dogmas of the past are accepted, even if they are "Lenin's!"

Popov is right in term of the economy. But from the perspective of further disintegration of the regime, the year 1989 will bring major events. This is the "uncontrollable" tempo that has started!

1988. Outcome and Significance.

The year 1988 became a turning-point, and not in the best direction. Gorbachev's stated intentions and his actions were not able to give *perestroika* stability.

During this year Gorbachev formulated (of course, in continuation of previously outlined objectives) what we could call a strategy of changes and took some more-or-less decisive measures to ensure their irreversibility. His implacability in regard to attempts and demands from his colleagues to rein in *glasnost'* and to check the growth of groups and organizations independent from the CPSU helped to turn *glasnost'* into real freedom of speech.

Gorbachev firmly and finally disassociated himself from the nostalgia for Stalinism and irrevocably condemned it, taking advantage of the "Nina Andreeva affair." This position was most conclusively reflected in the spring, during his meetings with three groups of first secretaries of CPSU obkoms—the Generalship of the party. He prepared the XIX all-Union party conference according to his own plan, and started the real separation of the party from state

power. In this context, he conducted a major re-organization of the central party apparatus and removed from the Politburo and the CC Secretariat people who had been the inheritance of the Brezhnev era. The response to this was the formation of a “party” opposition to Gorbachev-style *perestroika*, his personal authority, and his power.

Gorbachev did not serious measures to neutralize or suppress this opposition. He did not do it out of moral considerations and because it contradicted the principles of his reform ideas and his democratization purposes. But this left room for the destructive activities from the side of his opponents, as well as from his ultra-radical supporters. As a result, he did not succeed in replacing the power of the party with a civil government of the Soviets.

During the trip to the Krasnoyarsk region, Gorbachev saw first hand that in the fourth year of *perestroika* there was nobody who could continuing the work. There were no cadres capable and sincerely devoted to carrying out fundamental reforms, or even working in a new way “under democratic conditions.”

On top of this came the unexpectedly rapid growth of ethnic problems and contradictions. Gorbachev saw the danger in them already at that point, but he delayed forming a new national-federal policy (which, as the development of the events has shown, would still not have saved the country from dissolution).

The mechanism of the State began to unravel.

The year 1988 revealed the inadequacy of the initiated market reforms (and in essence their general impossibility in the USSR). The innovations Gorbachev initiated and the departure from the Soviet state-planned economy abruptly worsened the economic situation along with the psychological atmosphere in the country. In these circumstances the “pluralism of opinion” adopted by the intelligentsia and the offended apparatchiki enabled them to make use of the mass dissatisfaction with the policy of *perestroika* and the nature of Gorbachev's leadership. In turn, this provided the impetus to turn the criticism of the “deformation of socialism” and “deviation from Lenin” into a total debunking of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology and a theory, and the rejection of a socialist regime in general.

But the year 1988 is also a critical point at which Gorbachev himself moves away from Marxist-Leninist approaches to the evaluation of the domestic, and especially the international situation. The brightest, and one could say historical, event in this sense is his speech at the UN General Assembly. The policy of “new thinking” was confirmed in practice by the withdrawal (even though belated) form Afghanistan. The decision to move out the troops in itself was a significant event. No less significant was the lengthy discussion of the “Afghan question,” which was absolutely uncharacteristic for the Soviet leadership. It meant that everywhere from now on, **in principle** the expansionist element was removed from the USSR's international operations.

From the records in this volume we can see that the author continues to admire Gorbachev's historical deed, even as he believes less and less in the possibility of his plan's success. In the relationship between the adviser and his hero, what becomes evident is the author's different evaluation of Gorbachev's great statesmanship, and his personal ability to

resist the temptation of power in everyday life and in his relations with people.

If we rightfully speak about the tragic nature of Gorbachev's fate (in the grand, Shakespearean sense), it is during 1988 that not only his adviser, but Gorbachev himself felt this tragedy.

For many, the sign from above of this tragic nature was the terrible earthquake in Armenia, which seemed to close the year.

Translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1989

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

Translated by Anna Melyakova

Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

January 1, 1989.

The New Year has come. M.S.¹ speech was rather boring. The most important thing is that he did not make any sweet promises; but he could have given a more interesting analysis of the year.

There was an open letter to Gorbachev from Ulyanov, Baklanov, Gelman, Klimov, Sagdeev, and Granin in the *Moskovskie Novosti* [Moscow News]. It is a new genre. We already know about the letters to Stalin, Dear Nikita Sergeyevich and Leonid Ilyich. But this letter has a position and voices demands. By the way, they remind him that back in the day, anybody at any leadership position who conducted the Party line sloppily, against personal convictions, and strained to make the bare minimum effort would be removed, if not shot. During the *perestroika*, however, we allow the vast majority to operate like this.

January 15, 1989.

Today the list of candidates for the CPSU People's Deputies was published in newspapers. My last name is on the list. It was a great surprise to me to see my name among the "suggestions" that were handed out at registration to the CC Plenum participants. I am the only one of the General Secretary's assistants who is among that hundred of guaranteed candidates. People noticed this. Moreover, I am the only one from the CC apparatus.

This is a present from M.S., an encouragement, a recognition... or whatever it is. In essence, how can I realize this position? I have neither an electorate, nor a constituency in front of whom I would be responsible, nor a platform for my voters. In practice, a deputy's responsibilities coincide with the responsibilities of a passive CC member or even of a regular communist.

But M.S. imparts it with significance. He congratulated me twice. While I was in his office he was telling Raisa Maksimovna² on the phone that "we made Anatoly Sergeyevich a candidate today... Here he is standing in front of me."

It did not even strike me to thank him and I sincerely do not understand why I need this. I do not feel anything about this except for a vague discomfort, which is amplified by the sense that "100" Plenum-appointed deputies is a vestige of the past, and my appointment even more so.

I was called back from my vacation and for several days I applied all my strength and energy to the treatise for M.S.' meeting with the trilateral commission (Kissinger, Giscard, Nakasone, Rockefeller), 40 pages plus references. I like it. I wonder how he will use this...

Recently I had an almost two-hour one-on-one discussion with M.S. He clearly wanted to just chat. He asks me:

"Have you read Solzhenitsyn's *Lenin in Zurich*?"

¹ Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

² Raisa Maksimovna Gorbachev

“No!”

“I just read it. It’s very powerful. Spiteful, but talented.”

What he did afterwards is impossible to convey on paper. He walked around his office, stopped, gesticulated, sat in a chair, stooped and hunched over, portraying Solzhenitsyn’s Lenin. “Forty-seven years old... and still nothing is accomplished! He was nervous, bilious... He split with everyone. Did not allow anyone close to him. Inessa... Listen, his true love is depicted... from the year 1908 until 1920. A joke! Remember Ulyanov in Shatrov’s *And Farther, Farther?* as he clings to her bosom? Then it seemed like blasphemy. But now I read it... What of it? It’s human... It’s possible to show any hero or great man as a regular person... But this is not a caricature. You recognize Lenin...”

“Even though,” (here I interrupted) “you can show the same thing in a positive or a negative light.”

“Yes, yes,” M.S. agreed. “It turns out that something we understood to be textbook truth could be shown from another angle . And it would not be lying. It is a powerful work! But Lenin is portrayed as a destroyer... And one against all.”

M.S. “portrayed” him for a long time, he was emotional and artistic. It was clear that it has touched him deeply.

I later tried to analyze this. Here is what I think. Even before, he did not iconize Lenin when he admired him, appealed to him and kept him handy. He saw Lenin’s main attribute in the fact that he was ready to disregard every dogma for the sake of the mission, for the sake of the real, concrete revolution.

Now he saw another one of Lenin’s qualities: his disregard for Russia. It was merely the same kind of testing ground for “the mission” as Germany, the USA (where, out of desperation, Lenin was considering to move) and Switzerland, where in 1916 he was trying to stir up a revolution among his Swiss assistants, not taking into account the absurdity of the very idea of a revolution on Switzerland.

It was not an accident that M.S. brought up the speculations about Lenin’s Jewish ancestors that started spreading at one point (and Shaginyan “in her innocence” took up this matter). Solzhenitsyn writes that Lenin was only a quarter Russian! “When I found out about this,” M.S. said, “I requested all this ‘data’ and hid it away under a secure lock. It has a very strong impact on people...”

Several times he repeated the fact that “he was only a quarter Russian” and started to think about Lenin’s Jewish-Swedish and Kalmyk bloodlines. It looks like herein lies his lenience toward Belov, Astaf’ev, Alekseev, Rasputin, Proskurin, and Bondarev, these rigid Black Hundreds.³ They “root for” the Russian *muzhik* and are appalled at the ruin of the Russian

³ The Black Hundreds was a conservative pro-monarchy and ultra-nationalist movement in Russia active in the first decade of the 20th century.

people and Russia. (And they know Solzhenitsyn by heart!) From here stems the blame they are laying on Stalin's dispossession of the kulaks, the mass terror of the civil war, the massacre of the Antonovtsy⁴ and the Kronstadtys.⁵ They cite Trotsky, Sverdlov and other "Jews" ... and they have raised a tail at Lenin! M.S. is constantly oscillating between the class-nature of the October Revolution and "Russia." A recent episode: in the list of candidates for the People's Deputies that was sent around the PB [Politburo] there were over 300 names. The PB chose 100. Among the three hundred were both Baklanov and Bondarev. M.S. is benevolent towards Baklanov and wanted to keep him in the 100. (Yakovlev told me this as I was on vacation. And, it seems, the matter was decided in the "chestnut room.") But he was warned: during the secret ballot at the CC Plenum Baklanov would not make it. At that point M.S. removed Baklanov and Bondarev.

Yesterday I stopped by Yakovlev's. M.S. ordered us to make a schedule of his visits to foreign countries for the year 1989 (this is a separate issue).

A[lexander].N[ikolayevich Yakovlev].: Yesterday I stayed on after you and Ivan (Frolov) left after meeting with M.S. He said to me: "Oh, those gossips... They have it coming. I'm going to deal with them during elections."

I: Whom did he have in mind?

A.N.: Who do you think? Everybody knows, his "closest" colleagues!

At the same time he left "the 100" up to a secret ballot. After all, not only Zaikov or Yakovlev could have been hit, but M.S. himself. Sixty to seventy percent of the Plenum consists of people against *perestroika* and those who have a bone to pick.

On Friday evening Yakovlev, Frolov, and I had a discussion with M.S. about his schedule. He started by reading us a ciphered telegram from the KGB in Prague: they hate with a passion your *perestroika* and the whole group who took power in 1968 and was treated nicely by Brezhnev & Co. They forecast total chaos and failure for us. And Jakeš is a milksop (First Secretary of the CzCP CC).

Recently he visited Castro, who railed against our *perestroika*, calling it the betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, of revolution, socialism, "friends;" opportunism and revisionism of the worst kind... He said that Marxism-Leninism has its last sanctuary in Cuba, and that they will follow this path to the end. (I wonder how, if we cut off the 5 billion per year in support?)

M.S. raised the question of whether he should go to Cuba (the visit scheduled for immediately after the UN did not take place because of the earthquake in Armenia). I gave a "speech" along the lines of: "The Beard" [Fidel Castro] wasted the revolution and now he is ruining the country, which is spiraling towards a total mess. It's true that he will not stop in his demagoguery about orthodox Marxism-Leninism and going "to the end;" since this is the last

⁴ Participants of a 1919-1921 peasant rebellion, also known as the Tambov rebellion, against the confiscation of grain by the Bolshevik authorities.

⁵ Participants of the 1921 Kronstadt rebellion against the Bolsheviks.

thing he can use to preserve his “revolutionary halo.” But this halo is already a myth... Nobody reckons with Cuba in South America, it is no longer setting any kind of example. The Cuban factor has waned. A break in relations? But we are not the ones who are causing it. It Castro breaks it will not be like the Chinese scenario. Quite the opposite--he is only going to harm himself. We will only win, and save 5 billion doing it. Are people going to grumble about this? Yes, some will: the dogmatists and dissenters from the “revolutionary camp” and the Communist Parties that are becoming extinct, whose time has passed.

Your visit could delay the break. But it will not change anything, because we cannot give them 10, 20 billion, which is what they want from us. Since we cannot provide, it means that we are revisionists and traitors, in a conspiracy with imperialism.

... In general, in politics it is best not to put something off in hopes that it will figure itself out, when it is clear that this is objectively impossible. This is what happened with Afghanistan: a year and a half ago it was clear that the outcome will be exactly what it is right now. But we waited, wasting billions of rubles, thousands of Afghan lives and hundreds of the lives of our boys. Why?! At this point M.S. really became angry...

Frolov started to echo him, referring to metropolitan Pitirim (an acquaintance of his) who “teaches us to be patient.” Quite a joke!

M.S.: “You are wrong, Anatoly. I should go to Cuba. We cannot afford to open another front against us, you see what is happening in Czechoslovakia! And what about Romania, Kim Il-sung, and Honecker!”

I continued to grumble, but he counted the dates and set February 29 for his visit to Cuba.

January 20, 1989.

M.S. brilliantly conducted the “Trilateral Commission” meeting, he practically did not use my notes.

On the evening before, on the 17th, he asked me to stay after a meeting with the advisers and again (as he alternated between gesticulating and moving around the office and sitting in front of me on the back of a reclining chair) expounded his idea for the new book about the year 1988--the turning point year. At the meeting he stated his intention to have a “personal” election campaign (Ukraine, Moscow State University, Zvyozdnyi Gorodok⁶--about the Scientific-Technical Revolution) and divided up assignments to prepare his speeches.

To return to the “Trilateral Commission.” He interpreted the idea of coexisting as the adaptation of capitalism and socialism to each other, not only as a realistic approach to international politics at the state level. This is something new!

⁶ A closed military training facility in the Moscow Oblast, where Soviet cosmonauts were trained since the 1960s.

During these days the following episode took place. Yakovlev called me and asked whether I had seen the special folder with Shevardnadze's proposal after his trip to Afghanistan.

I: "No."

A.N.: "You should request to see it... I don't know what to do. Do I again have to go against E.[duard] A[mvrosiyevich Shevardnadze] and M.S.? I've already had my ears boxed a couple of times... But my conscience is heavy."

I: "Why?"

A.N.: "You see, Najibullah proposed a plan for us to send a brigade (3000-5000) from Turkestan to break the Kandahar blockade and secure the passage of caravans with weapons..."

I: "Is E.A. crazy, or does he not understand that Najibullah is setting a trap so we can't leave, in order to cause us to clash with the Americans and with the rest of the world? Or is he so weak-willed that he cannot stand up against his requests?"

A.N.: "I don't even know what to do..."

I: "Sasha, we need to tell M.S. We have to prevent one more crime! This would take even more of our boys' lives... for a lost cause. For whom and for what? We came to the same point we knew we would come to a year ago, even a year and a half! Najibullah (and in essence we are saving his skin, since the regime cannot be saved) is not worth even ten of our boys , and it looks like this operation would take the lives of a hundred, if not more."

As soon as we finished the conversation I received some papers from the top--the Special folder. I immediately wrote a note to M.S. along the lines of "What are we doing?! In terms of casualties as well as the hopelessness of the situation? We are withdrawing and Najibullah is not worth violating the Geneva agreements." And I added, "It looks like E.A. either succumbed to emotions, or he was personally tied up with Najibullah and decided to deal with dozens more of our boys' lives."

I sent the note right away.

A couple minutes later M.S. called me, I don't even remember regarding what particular question. I did not know the answer, so he connected Yakovlev to the conversation. The issue was quickly resolved and Sashka⁷ said: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, I can't bring myself to initial the document regarding the 56th storm brigade."

M.S.: "What brigade?"

I interrupt: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, I just wrote you a note about this. It is inconceivable to agree with this action."

⁷ The familiar version of the name Alexander.

M.S.: "Hold on, hold on. What brigade do you speak of?"

Yakovlev and I vied with each other in explaining that E.A. send a Special folder around the PB, in which he agrees with Najibullah's plan...

M.S.: "He was telling me something, asking for permission to send it around, but there was no word of a brigade..."

He connected Shevardnadze to the intercom and right away a Yakovlev-Shevardnadze-Chernyaev argument broke out. M.S. listened to us and made comments, which were more and more in my and Yakovlev's favor. From Shevardnadze's side we heard childish prattling, and he increasingly blamed the military men. I interrupted him rather rudely, saying that the military provided technical developments for a political plan that you agreed with. And this plan goes against all our policies and general common sense, not to speak of the sacrifice you are condemning our boys to once again.

E.A. got angry: "You were not there! Do you know what we've done there in 10 years?!"

I: "Why would we want to aggravate our crimes? What's the logic? We will not save Najibullah in any case..."

E.A.: "He says that if he lasts one year after our withdrawal, he will last for a long time..."

I: "And you believe that? Based on that you are ready to throw our men into battle and break the word we gave in Geneva?!"

M.S. Started to break up the argument and reasoned with me, saying that we should not create the impression of running away, "the third world" is watching us closely, etc.

M.S.: "Alright. I am disconnecting you for now. I will speak with Kabul (Kryuchkov is there)." [He called Moiseyev, the Head of the General Staff, but he was not in his office. When Moiseyev got back he called me. I explained to him why the General Secretary was looking for him. We exchange opinions and I understood that the new head of the General Staff is against this venture.]

The next day M.S. said nothing to me and Yakovlev. E.A. left for Vienna. M.S. led the "Trilateral Commission" and then had a Defense Council meeting until late at night. Today I read a ciphered telegram from Kabul: Kryuchkov, Zaikov, and Vorontsov report directly to M.S. that "a method to help Kandahar without a storm brigade was found."

So that's that. It's likely that E.A. will see this as a slap in his face. And it serves him right! If he is such a humanist in Vienna and the UN he should think twice when "asked" to sacrifice human lives. Oh, it is so deeply ingrained in our consciousness that politics has the "right" to decide such questions without a second thought!

M.S. already said that I will be going with him to Georgia (to Pitsunda) on February 25, for two weeks. He said we'll think about the new book in our spare time.

January 21, 1989.

I notified M.S. (in written form, as he is at the Moscow conference) that the editorial board of "Pravda" condemned their editor-in-chief Afanas'ev for his personal action of printing the authors Alekseev, Belov, Proskurin & Co. in defense of Bondarev. Astaf'ev stated that his signature was affixed without his knowledge! A denunciation that is handy for *perestroika*!

Sakharov, Bonner & Co. presented a thorough report of their visit to Armenia. I asked them to forward it to M.S.

January 22, 1989.

I read *Lenin in Zurich* for myself. What can one say, the author is fairly objective, if you consider his hatred for Lenin's mission. Lenin's personality is recognizable. It is another matter that many of the "Bolshevist values" are now devalued. Subsequent experience has turned them into their opposites, according to universal human values.

February 19, 1989.

Yesterday I wrote a note for M.S. on the state of ideology (impressed by his meeting with the working class on February 14, and *Pravda*'s editorial on the meeting's outcome). I criticized the Department of Ideology, Medvedev as well as Frolov. But later I removed the part about Frolov because it will look like a denunciation, even though his behavior of late is unbearable.

Then M.S. dictated three or four times the main ideas for the agrarian plenum. He is pretty determined, especially in light of the latest tricks from Ligachev (in Kharkov) about consolidating *kolkhozes* and *sovkhозes*⁸--to spite the General Secretary. Later, he was happy about a little thing: I took a trip to Moscow for a few hours (on the 6th) to pick up my notebooks with the PB session records and started preparing material for the book "*Perestroika: The Test of Life.*" He came up with that title. Initially he wanted to title his second book "*1988: The Turning-point Year.*" I took up the idea and sent it to Serebryanyi bor ahead of Veber, Ermonsny & Co. Tomorrow I will join them and by the end of the month we should have the foundation of the book.

At Pitsunda M.S. got worked up because of Sakharov (as the result of an interview in *Figaro*). I tried to tell him that he should not make a persistent problem out of Sakharov... but he lashed out at me, and angrily... He dictated to *Izvestiya* how to put Sakharov in his place. But in the end, he was on the losing end, even though nobody knows that he started this.

He is impressionable, impulsive. It is not permissible in his position.

⁸ *Kolkhoz* is a collective farm; a *sovkhоз* is a state farm.

A similar episode took place with one American senior official, who chased his secretary around the desk, after which the Senate did not want to appoint him. This guy had also said something like “we need to pressure Gorbachev.” M.S. made me incorporate a rebuke to him into the Kiev speech. I objected, but he insisted. Only in Moscow I persuaded him to remove this passage: it is not appropriate at his level to enter into arguments with various anti-soviets. If Bush had changed his policies, it would be a different matter.

I read a great deal during my evenings at Pitsunda. There is such a wealth of thought and talent in Russia when there is freedom! This in itself is a great victory which will enter the annals of history, even if *perestroika* itself does not work out.

M.S. thinks about this. He does not rule out the possibility of failure, even though he is very passionate about his work. His speech at the meeting with the workers was at the level of our Great Revolution. His oratory skill is equal to Lenin’s. But who stands next to him! Everybody can see this [inadequacy]. At the meeting, one Moscow milling-machine operator openly said: “What is happening, Mikhail Sergeyevich! You are carrying the entire burden, the successes and the failures of *perestroika*. What about the others? Are they going to lie low until we read in the newspapers that due to old age and ailing health [you can no longer hold office]...” The presidium of the meeting was quite embarrassed. M.S. blushed, but found a way out of the situation. In print, this episode was only alluded to with the words: “the workers asked some really tough questions.”

Yesterday I spent the whole day at work. I edited M.S.’ dictation for the book’s introduction, made a few more entries. I heard that Najibullah called him and asked to restore the air-bridge to Kabul and send weapons, and to conduct bombing air raids from Soviet territory. I don’t know what M.S. promised him. Later I heard from the MFA that he assigned Varennikov to “delve into the question.” The MFA (Ivanov, E.A.’s adviser) asked me how to write the paper. I told them that it is their business. But I, as the General Secretary’s adviser, will resolutely protest this matter.

March 8, 1989.

I spent most of this week at Serebryany bor. Yesterday we almost finished “*Perestroika: The Test of Life*.” Gorbachev’s second book is composed 95 percent of his own words, phrases, and thoughts expressed at the PB, one on one with me, in narrow circles and at closed meetings. Here he “bares himself” almost completely. And if he does not remove the most charged and colorful parts, this book will make an even bigger impression in the world than the first one.

My team was composed of Veber, Ermonsny, Antyasov, Ivanchenko, and, for a few days, Ambartsumov. Also three women. The operational procedure was as follows: I dictate from my notebooks (I had already dictated a great deal at Pitsunda), together we divide the material into themes, each person edits his section for consistency and literariness (I watched carefully that they do not slip into using their own words stylize too much). Then I finalize the order, come up with marginalia and subheadings, edit the entire piece, mostly reproducing his manner in places where they guys hesitated to do it.

It is already 400 pages. Yesterday I spent some time on the conclusion. I think we will finish tomorrow.

A colleague from the Department of Party Organizational Work called. He asked me if I am planning make any speeches, since they are summing up the results of the CPSU candidates' participation in election campaigns, and according to their records I have not made any appearances. I said that I am not planning on it. He replied that in this case, it might have to be mentioned at the Plenum. I am probably the only one. I did not even assign authorized representatives for myself. I do not want to succumb to these formalities. I see my candidacy as a "reward" from Gorbachev personally and I don't want to play Deputy, because it would be absurd in my position.

On March 2 there was a PB in preparation for the Plenum on agrarian issues. The invited members of the CC Agrarian Commission (about 40 people) made M.S. furious (led by Nikonov and Ligachev). He gave a battle to the "kolkhozniki."

Ryzhkov got personal against Ligachev and Nikonov. The situation was on the brink of scandal or a split. M.S. twice asked the "rhetorical question:" maybe we should cancel the Plenum completely, maybe we are not ready for new agrarian policies?

March 11, 1989.

Today I finished working on the greeting that will be videotaped for the XVIII Congress of the Italian Communist Party. It turned out beautifully... in my opinion.

All these days M.S. has been at Novo-Ogarevo with Yakovlev, Medvedev, and Boldin, preparing the report for the agrarian Plenum (after that PB). I read it today. It is powerful. But the historical part--saying goodbye to the past and to collectivization--is stronger than the part on the new agrarian policy. The essence is not lacking, it is revolutionary. But the expression is weak: wordiness, lack of intensity. The kind of intensity that is present in the historical part, which he practically dictated to us himself, and started back in Pitsunda. In the second part you feel the gibberish of ready-made apparatus phrases.

Tomorrow he is holding a PB to hear comments on his text. I tried to dissuade him, why does he need this? He has observed the formalities, the PB on March 2nd already discussed the Plenum draft and framework of the report. All he has to do is prepare the report "taking the discussion into consideration." Why should he sit through more groaning... and agreement through clenched teeth?

"No!" he said, "later they will say that I operated single-handedly..."

Well, he does as he sees fit. He called me this morning. He personally compares the significance of this Plenum to the discussions of 1927-28, when "the choice was being made"... I think he is right.

Also, Najibullah is crying out for help. He's saying that Jalalabad is under siege and will fall any minute, opening the road to Kabul. He is demanding that we conduct bomb air-raids

from Soviet territory. (Bomb air-raids!) Otherwise, he says, any day now everything will collapse.

The humanist and liberal Shevardnadze is supporting Najibullah very strongly and with Georgian-style passion, and he is pulling Kryuchkov and Yazov after him. Although Yazov is holding a general's position, along the lines of: there is no sense in these bomb air-raids from a military point of view, we will not be able to conceal them from the world, but if there is a political decision--I'm a military man!

In response to two panicky telegrams from Kabul, last night M.S. held a PB in Novo-Ogarevo at 6 o'clock. I was not invited, it was a narrow circle. I am recording it from Yakovlev's "colorful" description.

First M.S. asked Yazov to speak. The latter stated the above mentioned position without enthusiasm. Then E.A. started to furiously argue that "we cannot act otherwise, it would be a betrayal, we promised, we are forsaking our friends... what will the third word say, Mengistu... if Najibullah can last two more months he might be able to stay for good," etc. Kryuchkov supported him (on about 75 percent).

"Who else wants to speak?" M.S. asked.

Silence... Chebrikov got up, started talking, mostly in the right direction, and buying time, trying to guess what the General Secretary is thinking (A.N.'s evaluation).

Afterwards there again was silence. M.S. asked Yakovlev if he wanted to speak.

According to A.N., he did not mince his words.

"From a military point of view it is a waste of time. Moreover, where is that army of 200,000 plus the shock guard and the rest that Najibullah, as well as Shevardnadze and Kryuchkov, told us about?

I've forgotten the war (A.N. is a veteran) but I remember that a ratio of one to three is enough for defense. So what do we have? The Mujahedeen have 15,000 and where is the regime's army? They don't want to fight... So why should we again put our boys forward for this lost cause? The Pakistanis can shoot down our planes from F-16s without leaving their airspace."

E.A. threw out a comment that Pakistan is brazenly violating the Geneva agreements.

A.N.: "But we are not Pakistan. It took us so much work to win international confidence and we are beginning to reach something as the result of New Thinking. Are we going to flush it down the drain by this single action? And for what?! Our people are just beginning to slowly recover from Afghanistan. We greeted [General] Gromov at the border together with the last soldiers who fought on Afghan soil... and what are we doing?! To top it off, this is the middle of an election campaign. Or do we not give a damn about our public opinion, about our people?!"

M.S.: "Anybody else?"

Slyunkov: "I completely support what Alexander Nikolayevich has said."

Nikonov spoke in more general terms, but also against the bomb air-raids.

Medvedev spoke calmly, but repeated Yakovlev's arguments.

Maslyukov--the same. He provided some technical arguments why the bomb air-raids would be pointless from a military aspect.

Ryzhkov was not there, he is in Siberia. Ligachev is in Prague.

Finally, M.S. spoke. He was all red and angry: "I am totally against all these bomb air-raids or anything like them. And while I am General Secretary I will not allow anyone to trample on the word we gave before the whole world. Did we not know what we were doing when we decided to withdraw troops? Were we certain that Najibullah would be able to stay? Or did we count on it, even for ourselves, as a condition for what we signed in Geneva?" Etc.

Yakovlev said that he cannot coherently convey all the arguments M.S. gave because it was an emotional explosion, from which followed that there can be no other answer to Najibullah except a total refusal of the bomb air-raids.

This was immediately sent to Kabul. Today I was already reading Najibullah's lamentations to Vorontsov.

Besides saying that he will not leave Kabul and will die there, etc., he said in a lower timbre that if the regime crashes it would be a hit to Gorbachev's prestige, once again--what will the third world say. But most importantly: if you (Russians) had not come in then, in 1979, the matter would have been resolved quickly. One of the sides would have won, and there might have been a hundred casualties. But you did come in, and the Afghan problem became international. We are not the only ones responsible, you share the burden. And now you are washing your hands of us.

He is right. But why should our nation and the entire new direction of our country pay for something that was done 10 years ago by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Andropov?

Boldin called right now, he is reminding me that I am the only CPSU Deputy candidate who has not made any speeches and that a question might be raised at the Plenum. I don't care.

The book "*Perestroika: The Test of Life*" is completed. 400 pages. I sent it to M.S. on March 9th. He has not said anything. Of course, he does not have time to devote to the book right now; but we should publish it before the Congress of Soviets. Plus, the year it is devoted to is receding... New events are coming up and taking over. The dacha in Serebryanyi bor is closed.

April 3, 1989.

The plane to London did not leave on schedule because of a severe thunderstorm. I returned home. In issue No. 5 of *The Communist* I read an article by a certain Panarin, titled “Dialectics of Humanism.” This is the rejection of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology! The seeds of M.S.’ New Thinking have grown deep and are already bearing their own fruit. I should make M.S. read this article carefully.

I have not been recording some very important things because of fatigue. This last week I’ve been feeling particularly unwell.

Yakovlev on his conversation with M.S. regarding Zaikov’s and Yeltsin’s “provocations”... I also had a conversation with M.S. about this when I was working through materials for England.

M.S.: “He is a good person, honest, concerned, not looking out for his personal interests... but it is not his thing!”

I: “He is not a politician.”

M.S.: “Not only that. One can become a politician. But there has to be a foundation... a vessel. The contents will come with experience, but the vessel comes from God. Take me, for example. Have I changed much since childhood? Not really. In essence I am the same as I always was...”

Shakhnazarov spoke with him, saying that it is time to get a new team. “Look at us,” he said, “me, Chernyaev, others. We’ve spent our entire lives writing; we might have been able to get something done if we had been given access to the decision-making process in due time. Mikhail Sergeyevich, don’t let the moment pass. Get fresh forces, there are plenty of them. Anatoly and I are getting old, we have only a little bit of time left, it is too late to make ‘politicians’ out of us.”

He has a conversation with Grosz (Hungarian General Secretary) left; which in its own right, in essence, is the end of the Brezhnev doctrine. Grosz said: “I will disband the PB and let the people choose a new one, the kind that the country needs.” Shakhnazarov jokingly suggested that we should follow his example... M.S. objected, saying that we cannot do that with the present CC. This Central Committee will not yield the necessary Politburo.

The Western and our press are all saying in unison: Gorbachev consciously “set up” the party bureaucracy to take a hit from the voters. By the way, Solovyov was overtly saying this at the PB on election outcomes. He said that the Leningrad party members are complaining that the CC left them to their own devices. Ligachev also supported this “idea” in his speech, during which he incidentally let it be understood that he considers Gorbachev’s agrarian policy “a statement,” rather than a workable proposal.

It is unlikely that M.S. was consciously trying to show “who’s who.” But he gave a strong rebuke to Lukyanov at the PB when the latter tried to rally people in support of those who lost the elections.

"They," M.S. spoke bluntly, "are going to sit in their chairs and treat people like scum-- we are still getting letters that show us how they deal with people who come to the regional committees and executive committees... They do nothing to sort out the problem of food supply... Meanwhile the CC is supposed to support and defend them! This will not happen! Let them draw conclusions from the elections. And let them work better..."

M.S. hinted to me and Yakovlev that he is also planning to "draw conclusions" from the elections... especially regarding Moscow and Leningrad.

Yesterday when we were seeing Gorbachev off at the airport there was a serious clash between some PB members--at some distance from the foreign ambassadors, who were watching the scene in surprise. The main issue was between Gorbachev and Zaikov. You could see that it was a very heated conversation. When the airplane was taxiing to take off, I found myself in a group with Ryzhkov, Slyunkov, Zaikov, Birukova, and Lukyanov. The Premier was practically shouting at Zaikov for the state he has allowed Moscow to fall into; from his corner, Slyunkov was also adding steam. Zaikov was losing his temper... Overall it looked quite curious! The country's high-level executives quarrelling over the fact that in one dairy shop you can find only milk, in the other only cream, in the third only kefir. Cabbage rots at open-air markets while you can't find any of it in stores.

I could not follow the conversation very closely. It was clearly a continuation of what had started while M.S. was here. But Nikolai Ivanovich kept repeating like a refrain: you and Ligachev can offer whatever you want. I am going to oppose it, because it is a dead end, a disaster.

April 16, 1989.

From April 3rd through the 7th I was in London, my favorite city. For some reason not a single other foreign trip has left such an impression on me as London. It is my fifth time, and I still feel the same.

About Gorbachev's visit itself. The result can be seen in the brochure for Politizdat (on the visit to Great Britain) which I finished editing yesterday, filling in the spaces between the texts of M.S.' and Thatcher's speeches. The journalists who were supposed to deliver the reports did a shoddy job... And all their banalities and simply fabricated material, lies, were printed in our newspapers.

On the most important: the Madam was magnificent. For three hours I sat across from her in the room where the negotiations with M.S. were conducted. She was aiming to carry him away in conversation. He sensed that and was "playing" the role of a man "who creates an impression."

Publicly Thatcher was liberal with the highest praises and excellent appraisals. She did this confidently, defiant of her own establishment and of other Western leaders, and Bush. She was playing to public policy, to history, to herself. If M.S. succeeds in his plans, then she will be remembered for this.

Her “cunning” runs in the channel of New Thinking, which he proposed himself: Russia has no other option left. It has to become like everybody else. If this happens, then the October and Stalin syndromes will disappear from world politics. The world will truly be completely different.

I am convinced that she sincerely wishes the best for us. Her pride and ambition coincide with her feminine and human impulse. M.S. is playing careful. Mostly, he is afraid of our people. In the airplane on the way back he said: she does it that way, and we this way (i.e. with reserve)... He looked at me and said: Anatoly disagrees (present were Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Kamentsev, Frolov and Raisa Maksimovna).

I said that of course I disagree. Firstly, it is unfair not to react to kindness. She is doing us good: she raised the plank of *perestroika* and your prestige so high that Kohl, Mitterrand, and even Bush urgently need to learn how to high-jump. She practically cancelled the wave of negativism that started to roll over our *perestroika*. You mentioned this wave yourself, maybe even too much.

Secondly, she is influencing public policy from our position, i.e. she is doing what you yourself would like to do through your New Thinking. Her position on Namibia is eloquent testimony to that. Nobody helps you to change the international situation so forthrightly. Why should you pretend that you do not appreciate it? Besides, she is a woman... and it is wrong to think of her as a man in a skirt. Her character, even her political manner is feminine. And she is an Englishwoman... If she opens herself so sincerely and is not reciprocated, the pride factor will kick in... and we will lose a great deal.

There was an episode at the embassy while we were finishing up work on M.S.’ Guildhall speech. Everybody who came to the residence after the official lunch at Downing street was present (Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Kamentsev, Falin, Kovalyov, Akhromeev). I first snapped at Kamentsev, who was dabbling in something he does not understand, then at Kovalyov, and finally at Yakovlev, which cause a mini-shock. M.S. diffused the situation, saying: pluralism is in action here, too. It was fine in the end, and, as it turned out, A.N. was right to demand that we take out three polemic pages that would have been inappropriate for the enthusiastic (there is no other word for it) audience of the British establishment in Guildhall. On the airplane I admitted my mistake and asked A.N. to excuse me. He took it in a friendly way.

M.S.’ meeting with Vogel is one more step toward liquidating the ICM.⁹

Recently M.S. read a synopsis of a book by the French author Lilly Marcou titled “Gorbachev’s Challenge.” For 20 minutes on the phone he was in raptures about how she understood him better than his own country has, better than some people in his circle. She has revealed intentions he has had all along. He said he hasn’t seen anything deeper or more insightful (from the dozen or so books on this subject). Let’s write her back. And immediately he started dictating the text; albeit removing the part about “intentions” that she revealed.

⁹ International Communist Movement.

This is regarding the intentions. When he got back from London two “presents” were waiting for him: the sinking of one of our newest submarines, and the bloody events in Georgia.

Well, the submarine is “in the natural order of things” considering our disorderliness and, sadly (!) M.S.’ own inconsistency. If he said “A” (at the UN) he should say “B,” not play around like this.

Georgia--this is fate; more precisely a sign from fate. If this Christian nation, beloved by Russians, with whom we have lived on the best of terms for 200 years, with whom we fought together and truly respected each other, if they want to leave the USSR, then what does this mean? This is not the Baltics, where everything is clear. That means there are two choices: occupation, which would mean an “empire” again, or a confederation type of federation. The end-of-June Plenum should decide that.

For now M.S. is not ready for such a step, and I don’t know whether he is personally not ready or if he thinks that “they will not let him.” But he decided to empty the CC of 83 elderly (and such) members on April 25. About 5 people know about this right now... This move will have an enormous moral impact (it is not a question of this dead weight being able to stall any initiative or even “abolish” M.S.--they are not capable of that anymore). The point is that he will show who is in charge of the situation. In a month he will become “President.” Then it will be time to start following those intentions: to make Russia a normal country, even if not quite so centralized.

My personal affairs. I feel that I am getting worn out. The workload is not lightening. But I think I am still managing it. I feel like there is a certain element of uncertainty in the relationship with M.S. Maybe it is because he is used to me that there is no sign of “recognition of services.” I have never been vain, which I remember I wrote in my war diary in 1943. But nothing else is left by way of motivation. I earn less than a miner or a bus driver.

He is still confidential with me. Sometimes he says unexpected things, for example about the Georgian leadership, “which wet its pants and set the troops against the people.” They cannot imagine another kind of leadership, he said. However, after expressing his sympathies about the women who died in the clash, he immediately said: “Every cloud has a silver lining!” It is a mystery to me what he meant.

He has more self-confidence, but at the same time he does not lose his healthy sober-ironic approach to things. For example, about censored telegrams. “I know their worth,” he said, “they see what they are supposed to do (in the sense that the KGB writes about policing problems, the diplomats about their own ambitions, the army men about their cares) and they do not analyze the whole picture, it is as though they want to intimidate us. Well, to each his own. It serves its own purpose--so we here in Moscow keep our eyes open and don’t sleep.”

By the way, Ligachev was not at the PB and there was a totally different atmosphere. Yakovlev and I were talking about it: it is not that people are afraid of him; it is just unpleasant to say what you think openly and sincerely when you see in front of you a person who considers you a traitor and an enemy.

The dismantling of Leninism, or at least Marxism-Leninism, has unfurled at full speed since Tsipko's famous articles (he is an adviser at the CC International Department, by the way). Only Lenin's period from 1921-23 is steadily withstanding [scrutiny].

Under Diligensky's leadership, the journal "World Economics and International Relations" is systematically and openly demolishing the theory of imperialism and the orthodox revolutionary process. Now Primakov and Martynov's book is also adding to the process, it has gotten high reviews in *Pravda* the other day. M.S. does not have the time to seriously follow this process, but when he finally looks around, he will see that the playing field is completely clear for the "new theory" or for a complete rejection of theory in the ideological sense.

April 23, 1989.

A week has passed, marked by a PB session, which discussed Shevardnadze's report on his "business trip" to Georgia and the April 9th events in Tbilisi. In general, wherever you look... the country is in torment. The country is unwell. And *glasnost* is like a sick person's feverish delirium. As of yet, there are no signs of improvement...

What Georgia reminded us about, the address of the people's Deputies from the Baltic states formulated in words: Russia must cease being an empire. Then what, and how, should it become? Who can lead it into another state (in this sense)?

Nedelya published material by Voronskoy (a famous literary critic and the editor of an influential journal in the 1920s, a Trotskyite, was repressed). *Ogonek* printed Radek' and Trotsky's articles on Lenin, and earlier it had an article by Bukharin about Lenin. You read all of this, written during Lenin's lifetime, and in every line you recognize Gorbachev... except he is a notch lower (the level of education is not the same), but his mentality, his spirit, the methodology of political action, the principle is the same as theirs--everything stems from life. If theory does not correspond to life, then so much the worse for the theory. They are similar in ethical habits, in the way they treat people. It is amazing! After all, Gorbachev is not trying act like Lenin, this is his own nature!

April 30, 1989.

The CC Plenum was truly unprecedented. CC member Gellert, a German woman from Kazakhstan who is a tractor operator, described what her colleagues were talking about before the Plenum: "they are planning to overthrow Gorbachev. What should we do?" At the Plenum itself people's tongues were loose. The local bosses sensed (after the elections) that it's time to mobilize. Their speeches were impudent, unduly familiar, even contained some offensive allusions to M.S. He immediately found his bearings and ordered that every single word of the proceedings be published, so people can see who stands for what! But he did not really put up a fight, even though he did not back down on any issue, including the mass media, regarding which he wavers.

No one of his real supporters entered into polemics straight off. Why? I think for these reasons:

- a) They have no experience...
- b) They were oppressed by the negative “facts” which the other side wielded...
- c) They could not be sure that they would get unequivocal support from M.S.

Yesterday he said that the speeches sounded somehow “coordinated,” as if they spoke from notes and repeated the same thing...

Immediately after the Plenum he called me. He was curious how I saw it. I told him that “Nina Andreyeva” ran the show and that even if these people support *perestroika*, their level of awareness is not above Nina’s, and naturally there will be no *perestroika* with such cadres heading the *oblast’* committees [obkoms].

He railed against a number of people (Bobovik, Melnikov from Komi) but he was not trying to show off. He even said: well, should we follow the example of Egorychev¹⁰ in 1967--he was gone the next day!

I think it would do some good. People would understand--if we are waging a revolution then democratic measures are not always appropriate.

Afterwards I wrote him a “treatise” on the Plenum. He used some of it on Thursday for the PB on the Plenum’s outcomes. My specific proposals are: to reduce the CC to 100 members; to do away with the “representative” principle; to raise the intellectual level of the CC, moving it closer to Lenin’s model from 1918-22. And I suggested that something has to be done with the Leningrad organization, with Solovyov.

The PB was indecisive because people are afraid to appear to be ignoring criticism from below, especially from the CC. Which means that they were under the pressure of the same negative outcomes as the Plenum members had been, these *perestroika* men. Shevardnadze came close to exposing the “[Nina] Andreyeva” nature of the Plenum. Yakovlev and Medvedev were very careful. Others (even Ryzhkov) generally took the “spontaneous” course of self-criticism, saying that we need to draw serious conclusions... and they came down hard on the mass media and neo-dissidents. So the only positive result of the Plenum was the removal of the “old men,” the retirees. This is positive not because they were a hindrance to *perestroika*--they are already beyond politics and (despite unjustified fears) matters could not have come to a vote of no confidence for removing the PB. The positive is in the signal it sends: M.S. has the power to do the same against active opponents if they go against his policies.

Last night (on Saturday) he called Ryzhkov, Yakovlev, Medvedev, Maslyukov, Boldin, Lukyanov and the advisers to meet in order to make decisions about preparations for the Congress of People’s Deputies. The neo-dissidents on Trubnaya Square have already stated their

¹⁰ M.S. is referring to a CC Plenum episode during the Brezhnev era. First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee, Egorychev, under an impression from the Arab-Israeli war, ventured to give a careful criticism of the state of Moscow’s anti-aircraft defense. He was immediately removed from his position. [Footnote in the original]

time-frame and program, the gist of which is presented in G. Popov's article in *Ogonek*. It is clearly juxtaposed to the "apparatus" time-frame and Lukyanov's projects, which, admittedly, have some gaps. The most important objective of the meeting was to decide what should be said in the leader of the country's address. The discussion lasted for 6 hours. One entire hour was consumed by Frolov's smug idle talk. Nevertheless, M.S. referred to him the most, even attributed some of my ideas to him. Here at work is the magic of the title of Academician (provincialism), plus the fact that he is Raisa Maksimovna's favorite. M.S.' attitude towards Shakhnazarov, who has already done a great deal to prepare the report, was user-ironic. I think two factors are playing into this: M.S. doesn't like the fact that Shakh[nazarov] keeps offering options similar to what is in *Ogonek* and in *Moskovskie novosti* [Moscow news]; but most importantly, Shakh has not been too polite in responding to "requests" and "suggestions" from R.M. Alas!

I think this is the reason M.S. made Shakhnazarov partner up with Ostroumov, who will be working on socialist countries.

Thus, a very difficult month is ahead of us, especially since on the 5th there is a meeting with [Sosuke] Uno from Japan and then Baker.

May 2, 1989.

I am finishing reading Marienhof's *Cynics*. Magnificent prose. We lost so much after Socialist Realism did away with such writers, dozens like him. My main impression is that back then, talented and perceptive people could see, they knew that nothing would come of socialism in Russia. It was not without reason that Lenin exiled all the Berdyaevs and Shestovs abroad... Although by doing that he also ended Marxism, because around 1920-23 he realized that the kind of Marxism that started the Revolution could not exist in Russia, and something new was needed, like the true Leninism of 1923. However, the party did not understand and accept this and tried to quickly cover it up with glorification and a cult image.

Overall I am anxious and troubled. I feel a sense of crisis of the Gorbachev period. He is ready to go far, but what does that mean? His favorite word is unpredictability.

What is most likely is a breakdown of the country and something akin to chaos. He cannot go far because he feels like he has lost the levers of power... completely. He is holding on to the familiar methods, but in velvet gloves. There is no conception of what we are moving toward. The invocations of "socialist values" and "the ideals of October"... as soon as he starts reciting them they sound ironic in knowing ears--there is no substance behind them. Now the "socialist security." What do we have now, when 22 million people earn less than 60 rubles?! And so forth. He is fighting off demagogues who are destroying our "values" unaware (or aware) of the fact that this will bring us back to what we walked away from in 1917, i.e. capitalism. In reality, we did not walk away, or rather--we walked into nowhere and now we don't know what kind of society we live in.

At that meeting with M.S. (April 29) we discussed Yemelyanov. We gave M.S. a record of what Yemelyanov, who is a professor at Moscow State University, was telling his students

when he was already a Deputy. Specifically, he said that *perestroika* is already four years old, it is clearly a failure and its leaders have run out of steam.

M.S.: "So what should we do with him?"

Medvedev, Lukyanov, Yakovlev: Work with him...

When I was coming back from dacha yesterday (May 1) in the car on radio *Mayak* I heard an interview with Yemelyanov (on the occasion of May 1). Here is almost literally what he said: "*Perestroika* is truly a revolution. But it is a textbook truth of Marxism-Leninism that a revolution raises the question of power. The same now: there will be talk about power at the Congress of People's Deputies. We know that the ruling elite never voluntarily gives up its power, which means that we have to take it. This is what the Congress is for."

So people like Yemelyanov, G. Popov and such will be taking the power from Gorbachev. But since it is true that he will not give it up voluntarily, they will create an obstruction--he will have to use force...and here we go again: another dissolution of the Constituent Assembly?¹¹

May 9, 1989.

On May 7th I was preparing materials for M.S.' meeting with Baker. Naturally, I did not use the instructions and drafts from the MFA, which are so outdated they could have been used a year ago for Shultz-Reagan. The absence of an imagination and the bureaucratic inertia is simply staggering. They have no comprehension or philosophy of the current situation.

M.S. had appeared to get ready to meet with journalists to "talk" about his personal life. When he finished the meeting with Uno from Japan he asked me and Shevardnadze to stay for a consultation. He mentioned that rumors are multiplying, R.M. is upset, he has nothing to hide and is ready to speak openly about everything.

I suggested that he should do this after the Congress, when he becomes President. It would look more natural. If he does it right now, it will look like ingratiating with the philistine public opinion. Neither he nor E.A. agreed with me. He was preparing to go ahead, but then... he did not invite the journalists. I don't know, maybe he remembered my advice and changed his mind.

On the 3rd there was a meeting in Mossovet¹² with the Deputies. [Gorbachev] once again charmed... the Gdlyan issue. Scum. There is already a poster on Arbat: "Yeltsin, Georgia, Gdlyan... who's next?"

On the 8th I wrote the international section for M.S. for the Congress. It was difficult, everything seems to have been said already. I decided to use a polemic against the CC Plenum (Bobovikov & Co.).

¹¹ A reference to the events of 1918, in which the Bolsheviks took power in the government.

¹² Moscow City Soviet.

May 13, 1989.

Baker was here the day before yesterday. The American idea is that we, the USSR, have nowhere to go, the situation is moving toward collapse, therefore the Secretary of State came empty handed...

M.S. outshone him on all counts. He dealt a blow to NATO's sore point... Let them figure it out. After all, New Thinking is already working in the sense that it is clear that nobody is going to attack us and we can conduct our work with *perestroika* and reduce the army as much as we want, reduce the military-industrial complex, withdraw from Eastern Europe...

Gorbachev has unraveled everywhere the irreversible processes of "collapse" which had been held in place or covered up by:

- the arms race;

- fear of war;

- myths about the ICM, about the "socialist commonwealth," the "worldwide revolutionary process," and "proletarian internationalism."

... Socialism is disappearing in Eastern Europe.

... Communist parties are falling apart in Western Europe, where they did not manage to get a foothold as even the smallest national power...

Everything that has been long-ripe in reality has now spilled over onto the surface and taken its natural form... And it turned out that nothing was like what was imagined and portrayed.

But the most important is the dissolution of myths and unnatural life-forms of our society:

- the economy is falling apart;

- the image of socialism is disintegrating; there is no ideology proper;

- the federation, the empire, is collapsing.

- the Party is crumbling, having lost its position of the ruling and, overall, repressive, punishing force;

- the leadership is shaky to a critical point...

And no alternative leadership has formed yet... The first sprouts of chaos have come up, since no one is capable of enforcing the grave laws intended to maintain discipline; and our people can be accustomed to order only through force.

The main focus before the Congress is the nationalities question. The day before yesterday the PB was examining the situation in the Baltic states. Six members of the PB presented a note after all the committees and dispatches. The note is program-like, panicky: everything is collapsing, the people's fronts are taking power. In this atmosphere the three First Secretaries Vaino, Brazauskas, and Vargis were criticized. But they did not allow themselves to be torn apart. They held a dignified manner and shot back with irrefutable arguments.

I sat and worried about what M.S. would do. Once again he came up several grades above his colleagues (I later "complimented" him and admired his closing speech).

The main ideas were:

- We have to trust the First Secretaries. It could not be otherwise.
- We cannot identify the popular fronts, which have the support of 90 percent of the population in the republics, with extremists. We need to communicate with them.
- If we announce referendums then no one, not even Lithuania, will leave.
- We must involve the popular front leaders into national and government leadership, give them positions where they can show how good they are connecting words and deeds.
- Overall we need to think as hard as we can on how to practically transform the federation. Otherwise, it really will fall apart.
- The use of force is out of the question. If we eliminated it in foreign policy then so much the more we have to eliminate it with our own people.
- We need to elevate the level of analysis of the processes. In this regard, we need to improve the Document of "the six." We have to be more careful with all kinds of "qualifications" and "labels." This is the nationalities question.
- State planning should not assume a mentoring position. Do the utmost to meet them halfway.
- Etc.

And the second thing... the Leningrad reelections are tomorrow. For several days 34 candidates from one district where the March 26 elections fell through, shone on the Leningrad TVs with flaming demagoguery. It was like a competition in who will surpass in abusing the local and Moscow leadership. One worker had the following to say. (Oh! This myth about the working class!)

- Gorbachev is lying to us.
- Let us do away with the 750 Deputies from the CPSU and social organizations for the Congress. Let us give these places to the workers.

- The working class has never been so exploited as during *perestroika*.
- How much longer are we going to see empty store shelves?! It's a mockery!
- The working class has not seen any democracy. The bureaucrats rule everything, and they have kept their privileges.
- The working class is ready to take to the streets with weapons.
- Do away with the Moscow mafia!

And more of the same.

Nobody objected. Nobody stopped this man or corrected him, including the TV-show host. There are suspicions that this has been purposefully organized against Gorbachev in revenge for March 26 (since he betrayed the apparatus he can have a taste of his own *glasnost* medicine).

M.S. says to Jaruzelski that one should not be afraid or get mad at the people (this is in regard to the April Plenum). But who is--the people? Who is speaking in the name of the people? For now it is the mob, and the Leningrad worker was a representative.

Today somebody on TV recalled the words of the anarchist prince Kropotkin: freedom is not democratic, it is aristocratic. How deep this is!

May 21, 1989.

The Plenum is tomorrow. I found out from Ivan (Frolov) about M.S.' comment: "we need to go farther, farther" ... (he must have remembered Shatrov). Judging by the gravity with which it was said, Ivan decided that he was referring to "firing" someone else from the PB.

The Congress is in a few days.

I am uneasy. Baglai wrote rightly in *Izvestiya* that we are behaving as if we have 100 years of stable democracy behind us, which can easily process any extremism, etc.

What are we doing? On TV there was a broadcast of an anti-Semitic meeting headed by Yevseev and an "interview" with five drunk anti-Semites from *Pamyat'*, who declared that Jews have come to power with the PB's help: Shatrov, Baklanov, Pozner, Zakharov, Borovik, Korotich.

And the "response" was an ironic reaction from the young TV journalists who conducted the interview, who, by the way, offered to have a discussion between the six named Jews and their interviewees.

Pryakhin, who called himself a worker Deputy candidate, at a meeting with constituents declared on TV for the entire Soviet Union to hear that Gorbachev is lying to the people with his programs, which carry no trace of real bread or meat.

There was a decision to put Gdlyan and Ivanov in their place. TV is broadcasting the “universal indignation of the people.” But at the same time a meeting is scheduled in Moscow, organized by a “strike committee” in defense of Gdlyan. They not only accused Ligachev, Solomentsev, and Romanov of corruption (in front of the entire Soviet Union), but also hinted at Gorbachev.

Today in Luzhniki 100,000 people are gathering at a meeting organized by *Memorial* and the People’s front of Moscow. Formally it is in support of *perestroika*. But what form might it take? Yesterday Karyakin visited me (he is currently the chairman of *Memorial*). He said that he does not exclude the possibility that the meeting might demand the resolution (from the Deputies, there are going to be around 40 present) to nominate Yeltsin for presidency.

I asked him about the chances of this happening.

He said: “Why not... they might accept and put forward a proposal at the Congress... you never know.”

I: “But this would be the ruin of all our work...”

Karyakin: “We will fight... Yeltsin and Sakharov went to Tbilisi. Now they are spreading rumors that not only Chebrikov, Yazov, and Ligachev are to blame for the ‘bloody Sunday’ but also Gorbachev...”

I: “Stop sticking these allegations on him, he was not even in Moscow.” I explained to Karyakin what really happened.

He said: “I believe you, but...” and he made a gesture in reference to the rest of the people.

So, matters are pretty gloomy.

Yesterday and the day before M.S. called me a couple times. He has come to himself after the trip to China. He sounds cheerful and confident... he made jokes. I asked him if he planned to expound his report at the Congress.

M.S.: “Definitely not! They will start up the nonsense again, like at the April Plenum... This time at the Plenum we will only have the procedural’ Congress issues.”

Nobody except the PB members know whom he is moving into the key posts in the Supreme Soviet (the speakers, the committee leaders, etc). At this point, there is no certainty that these nominations will go through... In fact, there is no guarantee that the Congress order designed by Lukyanov will be adopted. And it is very doubtful that Ryzhkov will be Premier.

It is difficult for me to say whether it would be good or bad if people like Gavrila Popov or Shmelev would take key positions. But if I were M.S. I would not try to resist: let them demonstrate whether their word can turn into action. We are not getting much from the familiar and controllable officials in Lukyanov's and Chebrikov-Pavlov's Departments. This was demonstrated by last months' notorious laws, which were blamed for everything.

One can see the PB's incompetence. Sometimes I get ashamed sitting and listening to the discussion. M.S. rises high above everyone else, but he cannot go deeply into everything... He cannot organize the preparation of all drafts in every detail, considering all aspects. Lukyanov is a good official, he is competent, but he is covering his totalitarian ideology with faithfulness to the law. And for now he is the one writing the laws; the drafts, at least.

M.S.' speech in Peking before scholars and public officials is another step in New Thinking. Unlike the UN speech, the world has not yet taken notice of this one, of its essence. (He wrote it with Shakhnazarov).

Medvedev (the team-leader in preparing M.S.' speech for the Congress) is keeping me in suspense about my international section. I took his main suggestions into consideration (to distance New Thinking from the principals of foreign policy, so as not to force the Parliament to confirm philosophy). What after that? Darkness... Yakovlev did not get involved. He said it appeared to be suitable. However, if it they take out the polemic implications against the April Plenum--these morons who applauded Bebel--the international section "will not resound."

I finally finished reading Marienhof's book. The wisdom of high prose: a fusion content (the epoch) and form, free of any tinsel and external emotions, and consequently starkly impressive.

Towards evening I walked to the Kremlin to register my Deputy status. I ran into Vaino Valjas in the stairwell. I commended him on his courage and his speech at the PB. He asked me to tell M.S. that he will support the Union to the end, to the "last second."

The procedure [of registering] is simple. They gave me 400 rubles. I saw yesterday on TV that an American congressman has 18 employees and a budget of 670,000 dollars per year. But even if I had that much, what would I do, what could I do? I cannot imagine myself in the role of a Deputy. Maybe I am just tired; plus, I was never made for active public work. I always avoided it... Because I did not know how. I am a private person. My place in politics is "behind the scenes."

I wrote for M.S. a scorching response-commentary to the nationalities question theses that were prepared in Chebrikov's team as a platform for discussion before the end-of-July Plenum on nationalities issues. This is based on the principle: change without changing. I don't know how he will react. By the way, we need to finally speak openly about Russia's and the Russian people's special role in the Union; we need to frankly explain why a Russian basis predominates in the life and political processes of the country.

And whoever does not want to stay with the Russians can “get lost”... At the same time, the Russians need to bear their burden adequately, on the level of internationalist respect.

... How much chauvinist narrow-mindedness is still left in us! Not pride, as here:

We understand all--the sharp Gallic wit,

As well’s the gloomy Germanic genius.¹³

We need a people of high culture to carry the burden of the Russian person in the Union, the federation. Not ideology, but culture.

There are portraits of Nikolai II on Arbat. For the second time, *Ogonek* is publishing large articles on the execution in Yekaterinburg. On TV there are photos (and very interesting ones) of the coronation in 1896. That is all to say: the October is an episode in Russian history and that is exactly how we should treat it...

Now we go to France. M.S.’ speech at the Sorbonne. Zagladin composed an analogy between 1789-1917. No! This is outdated! Even his refined and educated mind does not sense the era and Gorbachev’s intentions. I found the same in the Bessmertnykh’s (Shevardnadze’s first deputy) corrections in the text of the international section for the Congress--it is the MFA’s understanding of New Thinking (only as a concept, not a new philosophy that rejects ideology).

When I was putting away yet another diary notebook I decided to leaf through some of my old diaries, from 40 years ago... immediately after the war: my God! I managed to read so much serious, completely un-Marxist, very philosophical literature! I wrote down a ton of excerpts. This was at the peak of the cult of personality, and it seems I totally did not care about it deep inside. I lived separately from the external ideological environment. Neither before, nor during, nor after the war did the cult of Stalinism make an imprint on my spiritual development. Curiously enough, I developed the dullness of mind and consciousness after the XX Congress, during Khrushchev’s retreat from the Congress and my work for the CC Department of Sciences-work that was stultifying and degrading to my spirit. But then there was the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* [PPS],¹⁴ which saved me. And while I am not inclined to share in the enthusiasm about A.M. Rumyantsev (I always thought he was a bit dull and ignorant) he did play a role in my life. He remembered about me after his appointment as editor-in-chief of PPS and invited me to come to Prague from the CC, and Kirillin (head of the Department of Sciences) was glad to let me go.

When M.S. says that we are all children of our time (in the sense that we all need to scrape the past off ourselves)... and he enlists me in that company, I do not join. After all, I lived primarily by the rules of Russian intelligentsia. I never hated the Whites; I never considered anyone, including Trotsky, “an enemy of the people;” I never admired Stalin and always noted his spiritual poverty; I never professed the official, i.e. Stalin’s, version of Marxism-Leninism. I remember my behavior at the lectures on historical materialism and dialectical materialism at

¹³ Aleksandr Blok, “The Scythians.”

¹⁴ *World Marxist Review* in its English-language version.

Moscow State University, when I put Koval'zon and Kelle into awkward situations by asking them questions to which they knew the answers, but could not utter them. I could see that they agreed, but they tried to train me.

If God had given me a more capable mind and a more disciplined personality I might have been able to leave something behind...

Then again--what could I leave? Zagladin, for example, has written a combined total of probably over a thousand printed pages. But who needs them? Will anyone ever read them? I am glad I stopped publishing my pieces in the 1970s. Not only because I am lazy, but also because I could not write in a way that would not make me ashamed later in life.

Remembering what I wrote in the 1960s, I would agree with professor Yerusalismky that my article in the journal *New and Contemporary History*, written immediately upon returning from Prague, was the most outstanding and honest. Professor Yerusalimsky said that it quadrupled the circulation of that issue. I recall my report at the academic conference at the International Department. It was published in a collection with a tiny printing run (for those days) of 3000 copies in 1968. Burlatsy called me then and said: you are lucky, Tolya, to be sitting behind the thick walls of the CC CPSU. We, mere mortals, would get our Party ticket revoked for this kind of article.

So, Mikhail Sergeyevich, we are not all children of our times. Some of us are children of the XIX century. And if I go to the very root of it, I owe this to my mother, one of the former generation.

M.S. ended up not calling me to Volynskoe-2, where he, Yakovlev, and Medvedev were finishing up the Congress report today. I am particularly worried about my international section, although M.S. should not yield anything substantial from his New Thinking.

May 28, 1989.

What did the three days of Congress show? First and foremost that the PB is isolated from the affairs of state, which arise through the work of the Congress. At the Congress itself, Ligachev & Co. sat in a corner where the apparatchiks would normally sit. They looked like observers and were the target for angry, malicious mockery.

Gorbachev is isolated from the Party leadership and in a sense he is separated from it. The “grey masses” (as defined by Yu. Afanas’ev) is an aggressively-submissive majority that strongly confines the “intellectuals,” but at the same time managed to push back Yeltsin. Suleimenov (a Kazakh poet) used the following true image in his speech: the more you row with the left oar, the more the boat will drift to the right. He carefully noted a serious danger. The PB could ask M.S.--where did you bring us?! Isn’t it time for you to clear off? And without you, we will restrain this public (the intellectuals) in no time.

Both the grey masses and the intellectuals reject M.S.' internal policies, especially the economic aspect. The former because of the empty shelves in stores and the cooperative prices, the latter because of its incompetence.

Afanas'ev & Co. are typical Mensheviks, who wallow in their intellectual superiority over the grey masses and the leadership, including Gorbachev. They impudently demonstrate this. And I think they will lose, just like their predecessors in 1917. They do not take into account that we (and they!) have the kind of people that we do... But who will play the role of the Bolsheviks? Who will say: there is such a Party! Who will want to take power? The provincials, who are showing energy and willingness to speak out, and most importantly--hatred of Moscow in general? Who will be the Kornilovtsy? Ligachev, Voroshilov & Co.?

Gorbachev is handling the matter at the limit of what is possible. But even he cannot overcome the consequences of his trust in the apparatus methods in preparing and conducting the Congress. He is leaning toward "the familiar," as Nikita (Khrushchev) had done once, though he has a larger coefficient of intelligence.

M.S. is making one mistake after another in tactics. His improvisations are not always successful. The decision to start a discussion on Afanas'ev was probably advantageous, but the discussion itself revealed, among other things, that he is beginning to lose the edge of intellectual superiority over the audience. The attempt to craftily slip Lukyanov into the position of First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and at the same time in an open vote--that was a discrediting failure.

He also underestimated the possible repercussions of Karabakh, Tbilisi and the Gdlyan affair. Once again he relied on old methods, decided that nobody would dare to blame him.

On the one hand, he underestimate the moral potential of people like Zaslavksiy and Starovoitova, who would burn at the stake for truth; on the other hand the dishonorableness of people like Afanas'ev, Popov & Co., whom he personally brought to the forefront, and who were the first to attack him.

I think Yeltsin is history. It looks like in this case he did most of the work himself--his imbecility became more evident at the meetings and at the Congress. Possibly the people who were creating a myth and using his imbecility realized that they won't get very far with him once real work and responsibility become necessary.

M.S.' "dacha Achilles" heel has revealed itself. I had expressed my bewilderment about it on these pages back in September.¹⁵ If he wants to have something befitting a president of a superpower, then he should behave like a president, i.e. with a growing accent on authoritarianism. Only then would the people shut up and recognize his right to live in (a?) palace. If he continues to play the democrat along the lines of "I am the same as everybody else," then the "dacha" will discredit him and weaken his authority. (Under "dacha" I mean all of Raisa Maksimovna's regalia and ambitions.)

¹⁵ Referring to my surprise and dislike when I saw the palace in "Zarya" (Foros, Crimea). [Footnote in the original]

The failure with Lukyanov, which could easily happen, could start a chain reaction that would lead to the collapse of the PB as such, as body that is effectively heard in the regions and departments.

Ryzhkov's position is at risk. Is M.S. thinking of alternatives? If the Congress rejects Lukyanov and Ryzhkov, they will not allow Maslyukov as a Premier, nor even Shakhnazarov to replace Lukyanov. Then again, why not Shakh. Albakin should be made Premier.

In general, though, all of this is terribly strange--to watch such familiar sources of authority fall apart. Is M.S. himself ready for this? After all, on the eve of the Congress he again convened the *obkom* secretaries and instructed them, gave them to understand that they are the foundation. But this foundation was skinned at the Soviet of Nationalities polls, only three *obkom* secretaries made it in. If this is not a sign for the party apparatus! Their choices are either to leave, or to bristle up, their time is running out at the speed of a mountain torrent.

Today Gorbachev is at Volynskoe-2. Together with him are Maslyukov, Boldin, and Yakovlev. Once again they are discussing the economy, most likely influenced by what was said at the Congress. He probably has not even looked at my international section. The subject of international relations has been largely unmentioned at the Congress.

It is too bad that he keeps only Yakovlev and sometimes Medvedev close by. Shakhnazarov makes a fuss about this: why doesn't he depend on us more... we are just as smart, and most importantly we can speak our minds. Why does he shut himself up with Yakovlev, cut off from his colleagues? Yakovlev himself is confused right now.

This Congress has brought one more innovation: at the CC Plenums, not to mention the XIX Party Conference last year, people stood up and even applauded when Gorbachev entered the room. Of course, not like they used to under Brezhnev or Chernenko, but still... Lenin's custom of not having people stand was not reinstated. Now it happened for a different reason. At the Conference nobody even stirred when Gorbachev appeared at the same corner entrance from which the entire PB used to emerge headed by the General Secretary, and moved to the center of the Presidium table. This is a change in psychology, which is significant. During breaks, Gorbachev often walks around the auditorium or the hallways and a crowd of a couple dozen people gathers around him. The majority of the people, however, continue to walk around talking amongst each other or sitting in their places--they are not interested in the conversation the General Secretary and President is having with the people.

Will he have enough substantial authority to command respect after the external authority is gone (after all, this is Russia!). Our people are ungrateful and forgetful. Right now, in the era of collapse of every norm, foundation, and formality, there is danger in this new phenomenon.

I have one more observation regarding the spectrum from the Baltics to Central Asia, to Siberia. In the auditorium, the delegations are even "territorially" separated at different ends of the room (to my left are the rightists, and to my right are the leftists). But I am speaking about a different spectrum: from culture to barbarity. One side chatters in Latin phrases (about laws and

norms), the other, when they don't like something, drown out the speaker or someone jumps up and (without a microphone) starts yelling something very rude.

September 11, 1989.

Today we had Suharto. It was very untimely, but what can we do? We cannot shut down our foreign policy because the country is a mess... It would be worse, people would say that M.S. is completely giving up, even neglecting the protocol.

While he has not given up... despite the Baltics and Transcaucasia, the supply failures, the fact that everybody is cursing him--not only the apparatus (which hates him and dreams of life as it was 5-10 years ago), but also millions of regular people. His popularity is falling. He can see that. It is falling on all levels, including among the intelligentsia, which is faithful to *perestroika*.

From August 5th through September 6th I was with M.S. in the Crimea (in the abovementioned palace). Besides routine work, he wore me out with ideas for the Nationalities Plenum. He would say something on the phone or dictate something and give it to me to "play around with it." I would be left to turn a telephone conversation into a literary text.

Later he became angry about Granin's article in *Sovetskaya Kultura* [Soviet Culture], where the latter criticized M.S. for manipulating the Congress and the Supreme Soviet. M.S. immediately ordered me to start writing and to organize a whole group in Moscow who would expose those who give "erroneous cues" and confuse the people, the leftists and the rightists, etc. He got ready to make a TV appearance about it and started to dictate the text to us. He almost called the TV crews to Yalta. But then the events of August 23rd in the Baltics were upon us and he made me compose the CC statement. The departments came up with one version, while Shakhnazarov, who was on vacation in "Yuzhnyi," and I had a different one. I had to combine the two. The final result was nothing to brag about. The Balts are irritated. The Moscow intelligentsia is grumbling. M.S. sees a positive aspect in the fact he made the leaders of the People's front and *Sajudis* reveal their cards.

But what is it to the Balts? In their civilized manner they could be sailing away from the USSR for years. So far they haven't smashed anybody's face or spilled a drop of blood. While in Transcaucasia blood is flowing daily. Baku is protesting for the 6th day in a row. The People's front of Azerbaijan is demanding to disband the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region [NKAR]. Already Azeri military detachments are preparing for war with the Armenians over Karabakh. Armenians are doing likewise.

This morning M.S. spoke with Vezirov (First Secretary of Azerbaijan's CP). I do not know how it will turn out. I cannot penetrate his secret intentions (if he has any)... When he was dictating material against the left and right he retorted against the fact that they demand stability: "What stability! We are in a revolution... If we create stability, it will be the end of *perestroika*. Stability is stagnation. A revolution must have instability."

Why then does he fill with indignation at the people who stir up trouble?! He is calm--no panic, no nerves. As if deep inside he is certain that we will not sink.

He has a dangerous tendency to play up to "Russians" (he met with Bondarev, gave Astaf'ev the Hero of the Soviet Union award, made Kunyaev editor of *Literaturnaya Rossiya* [Literary Russia]). He repeats over and over again that "if Russia rises up" then things will pick up...

But what will pick up? He is dead-set against creating a Communist Party of the RSFSR, against giving RSFSR the full status of a Union republic. At the PB last time he said: "That would be the end of the empire."

In a word, he is holding on to the old levers of power. As Nikita had done in his time... but now, the country has unprecedented free reign and it cannot be held in check or turned back.

The same in the economy--he is afraid of the market, free prices, cooperatives; he is afraid to disperse the *kolkhoz* structure and the departments, even though he can see that the lease system will not progress otherwise. At the last PB he said that the March Plenum is being botched (but his resolutions will not start to work without implementing changes in the nature of property and industrial relations!).

Who is botching it? He himself said that it is the *kolkhoz* chairmen, those Heroes of Socialist Labor... headed by Ligachev, who travels around the country and consolidates the *kolkhoz* system. The PB is afraid to do away with him.

M.S. did not agree with my proposal to convene a special CPSU Congress in November to discuss re-electing the CC. I wrote three pages of arguments for him, explaining why this is necessary. No! Even though he understands that the CC is against him and against *perestroika*, and that with the current composition it is ruining the Party's authority (or what is left of it). He was not bewildered even by Ryzhkov's "betrayal" at the *Obkom* Secretaries' Conference in June (practically a CC Plenum), he does not want to use his new Presidential power to take drastic measures against his team.

When he got back from the south he led a PB on soap and other shortages. People are laughing. He found some scapegoats--threw Gusev, Lakhitin, and Efimov to the crowds, as if anything depended on them (although Efimov, Maslyukov's deputy, did show a phenomenal helplessness and ignorance at the PB).

September 16, 1989 (Saturday).

Today I was at work, preparing materials for Thatcher's visit, she is arriving on the 23rd, on her way from Tokyo. I was fantasizing on the intimate.

M.S. sent me the Plenum report, asked me to read it. I am mostly familiar with it based on work done in the Crimea and Shakhnazarov's version, which became its foundation.

The mountain brought forth a mouse. Half-admissions, half-condemnations, half a break with the past. Half-decisions. Wordiness. And the main cause for this is hesitation to part with the empire. Many of the arguments do not hold water; particularly on the nations' benefit of being a part of the USSR, especially in light of Stalinism and the current collapse.

In the meantime, Ukraine formed a People's front. Its founding Congress will be held in Kharkov on November 11-12th. The Rukh's¹⁶ final goal, following Latvia and Lithuania, is a "reunited" Ukrainian state! There are 1200 delegates, 500 guests from all over the Soviet Union. The Congress took place with cheers for independence and yellow-white flags.

A Congress of Worker's Committees took place in Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk (it will conclude in Leningrad on September 17-18). A United Labor Front will be created. The foundation for this came from the strike committees of the Kuznetsk and Donetsk Basins and Vorkuta miners, whose slogan is--things were better before *perestroika*, let's do away with Gorbachev.

Yeltsin's visit to the US: what disgraceful mediocrity! But Bush & Co. are looking at him as an alternative.

The Transcaucasia region (Baku and the NKAR area) is on the verge of civil war. The People's front of Azerbaijan [PFA] has practically taken power in Baku. Vezirov's name is publicly covered in mud. Whenever it wants to, the PFA declares universal strikes, convenes meetings of hundreds of thousands, and in general runs the show without regard for anyone. Hundreds of trains are stopped in their tracks to prevent them from reaching Armenia.

Sakharov and Starovoitova were in Chelyabinsk at the re-interment of 300,000 victims of the 1930s Gulag. There, Sakharov said the following about Gorbachev: I do not idealize him, he is indecisive and ineffective. He has to finally make up his mind whether he is the leader of *perestroika* or the nomenclature.

The CIA forecasts that Gorbachev will last no more than 6 months.

Starovoitova preached to the Latvians that "It is impossible to leave an empire, such cases are unheard of. It is possible to leave a democratic state, which we first need to build."

In a word, everyone is looking to the heart of the matter. We cannot build our country on Leninism.

September 17, 1989.

I started reading Shafarevich's *Rusophobia*. What he lashes out against (which he does convincingly on an academic level) is his own conception of Russia and it is old, fabricated, a product of mind exercises. We have not found a way out yet and we do not have a real conception of Russia.

¹⁶ The People's Movement of Ukraine.

M.S. stated at the PB that he probably should publish in *Kommunist* [Communist] on the subject: what is socialism and its renewal. This is last year's idea. We started it in the Crimea, now Van'ka¹⁷ (Frolov) and his aides Latsis and Kolesnikov are finishing up this theme. I am certain that nothing serious will come of it. Because Yu. Afanas'ev is right: we have to step away from the issue of capitalism-socialism. It is antiquated. We cannot look for our future on the dogmatic track of Marxism-Leninism, no matter how much we renovate it. We need a completely free idea and theory that would be based on modern reality. Marxism-Leninism is a product of the XIX century, and it yielded catastrophic results in the XX.

Yesterday, when I walked into the art gallery on Krymskaya street, in the lobby I saw sculptures that were placed there a long time ago: a Red Army soldier at his post in a fur coat with a bayonet, Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya, a shepherd from Dagestan...

I was aghast. We are dismantling everything that comprised the ideological atmosphere of our youth. All the signifiers have been reversed. Everything around us was a lie.

...Probably, it was always so... I am glad that back then, in the 1930s, I was not into politics, and joined the *komsomol*¹⁸ only right before the war. I read Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, and dozens of books published by Gorky's *Vsemirnaya Literatura* [World Literature]; Dostoevsky in the pre-war, pre-1914 editions; Oscar Wilde and Aldington, Kellerman, Zweig, Roger Martin du Gard, Andre Gide, Romain Rolland, Anatole France, the Goncourt brothers, and Herzen. I read hundreds of books; and I picked the ones that others were not reading--I was being original. As the result, I did not lose something that our "progressive" press is lamenting right now--moral standards and a conscience. Consequently, I was never charmed by Stalin, never considered him great because in my eyes he was not "noble" or an "aristocrat," not an intellectual, i.e. a person of culture.

My mother's hopeless attempts to hold on to the impossible--to raise me in the traditions of Russian nobility, the canons of that pre-revolutionary era in which she grew up herself (with piano, French and German lessons with the governess Kseniya Petrovna), they did not pass in vain. Even though I cannot truly play the piano or speak these languages, I have always been internally free. The only period in my life when this freedom was called in question was when I worked in the CC CPSU Scientific Department, in the late 1950s. At that time I had to do some vile functions for work, even though I tried to resist and to somehow neutralize this department's blows to the "children of the XX Congress."

Looks like I've started daydreaming...

What is going to happen to us now? Gorbachev is losing the country's levers of power. Maybe Sakharov (who borrowed this idea from Afanas'ev) is right that it is time to decide whether he will be the leader of *perestroika* or the nomenclature. His attempts to take leave of the past and of some colleagues have been too timid. At the same time, he knows what his colleagues are worth and with me he speaks frankly about them.

¹⁷ Familiar version of the name Ivan.

¹⁸ Communist Youth League.

The day before yesterday he sent Talyzin (from State Planning) and Shcherbitsky into retirement, and Nikonov is next in line. But Talyzin and Nikonov have long been dead souls in the PB, and Shcherbitsky's retirement will now be interpreted as the dictate of the opposition, i.e. once again as lagging behind and loss of initiative. And overall... what is the PB right now? Most likely it is a place where Mikhail Sergeyevich can speak at length and frankly.

September 23, 1989.

Thatcher was here yesterday. She was beautiful, extraordinary, feminine. It is not true that she is a woman with balls, or a man in a skirt. She is a woman through and through, and what a woman!

She praised Gorbachev. Yesterday our television gave her almost an hour to do that. M.S. is favorably disposed toward her. Probably because she correctly understood his intentions, that he does not care about communist ideology, that he wants to make his country a normal, civilized state. If it wasn't for the catastrophic situation with national welfare, the country would have reached that goal already.

He had lunch with her at the Schechtel mansion on Alexei Tolstoy Street.

The day before yesterday Gorbachev hosted Georges Marchais and spent around five hours with his guests. M.S. was in good shape, cheerful, charming, made jokes, and amazed the Frenchmen with his lively intellect. Compared to M.S., they seemed like outdated provincials. Georges puffed up incredibly. But with all his effrontery and the French high horse, he could not hide his confusion and feeling of inferiority compared to Gorbachev.

M.S. added a measure of "brotherly" confidentiality to the conversation, but did not yield one iota, did not give the slightest reason for the Frenchman to conclude that he is playing a game while in essence keeping to the class positions.

M.S. won the Plenum... with his impromptu, brilliant concluding speech and one more shakeup of the PB and Secretariat.

October 1, 1989.

I am beginning to prepare materials for the visit to Finland, but before that we still have Asad (President of Syria), Brandt and the papal nuncio. With each, there are very delicate issues to discuss: how to stop Syria in Lebanon; how to discipline Brant, since he suddenly started talking about "reunification;" how to deal with the union issue with the Pope (with whom M.S. will soon be meeting at the Vatican): our Orthodox Church is hard set against it! They are quite the Stalinists! This was very evident from the speeches of two metropolitans at a meeting of the International Committee of the People's Deputies on September 27-29th.

The following episode took place at the airport when Gorbachev was departing for Kiev. The people seeing him off flocked together: Zaikov, Yazov, Lukyanov, Primakov, Medvedev, the advisers, Kruchina. Zaikov started telling how the Moscow city committee started to "work" with Yu. Afanas'ev. Shortly before, Afanas'ev spoke at a meeting of Inter-regional Group of

People's Deputies in Leningrad and at the Committee on the year 1939, created within the Supreme Soviet. These speeches put Gorbachev out of temper.

Zaikov said he assigned two of his deputies to speak with Afanas'ev. They summoned him to the City Committee and he said to them: "What of my speeches? Yes, I stand for separating the party from the state, for separating the state from the economy. Yes, I would like to do away with democratic centralism and create freedom for different platforms within the party and open discussion. Yes, I am seeking support for my views from the working class. Yes, we should say the entire truth about 1939. The Soviet Union should be renewed on the basis of a new, truly voluntary agreement. Nevertheless, I am going to fight for my party ticket (he pointed to a pocket on the left side of his chest)."

At this point Lukyanov commented that he is not going to fight, he does not need the party ticket. He wants to have his own party, with him at the head. Zaikov started to object, but somewhat confusedly. He said his deputies came to speak with him after that conversation and asked him what to do. But he does not know himself...

October 4, 1989.

The outcomes of the September Plenum were discussed at the PB today. M.S. said many brave things in the presence of CP Secretaries from all the republics and major *obkoms*. The outcomes of the post-earthquake rebuilding efforts in Armenia were discussed. The situation is dire. A year has passed but only 28 percent of the planned housing has been constructed, 23 percent of schools and hospitals; in Leninakan only one building has been settled, 150,000 people are homeless; in Kirovakan only three homes have been rented. Azerbaijan is blocking the railways. Over the past four days only one train has been allowed through out of 120 going to Armenia. Rail cars with cement are flooded with water and have to be thrown off tracks together with the solidified cement. Fuel tanks are emptied right on the tracks. This is one of the forms of the Armenian-Azerbaijan war.

The last person to speak on this subject was Arutyunyan (First Secretary of Armenia's CP). During his speech, Sokolov (First Secretary of Byelorussia's CP) suddenly jumped up and, red in the face, lashed out against the Armenian: "All the republics, the entire country is helping Armenia... and how does Armenia repay the country?"

Arutyunyan became confused, and mumbled, not understanding the question: "How can we help right now?"

Sokolov pressed on: "My question is how Armenia repaid the country--with Karabakh and all the mess surrounding it?"

Gorbachev understood that it is time to intervene, and said: "You can take that tone of discussion out in the hall." He proceeded to sum up this point of the agenda.

"It is such a tragedy! The life of an entire nation has been disrupted. Remember the history of this nation, it is a tragic history. Now the children of Armenia are dispersed throughout the country; 700,000 including refugees are homeless... Such a disaster..."

When you return home, you must all check how matters stand with help for Armenia. It is shameful when relief plans get lowered without permission and we do not deliver on our promises. This is not only a political problem. This concerns our morals and our humanism." Etc.

Everybody listened quietly, glancing at Sokolov as he sat in front of the senior ranks of the party and the newly elected PB and CC Secretariat members, looking like he'd just been dragged through mud.

Tremendous Mikhail Sergeyevich. This is how he attempts to teach political culture.

The PB discussed national grain balance figures. It turns out that free self-financing led to a 37 million ton shortage of grain in the state granaries, while this year's harvest yielded 205 million tons.

Vorotnikov called for taking the grain with an iron fist. Ryzhkov threatened that we are standing on the edge of an abyss and a catastrophe. Similarly to his previous speeches on the outcomes of the Plenum, there was a note of hysteria in his speech, even though he opened with his usual phrase, "Of course, I am not trying to be dramatic..."

M.S. found a Solomonic way out: when our comrades go back home, they should check what else can be done. Those who will sell to the government in excess of the plan will get reimbursed with construction materials, gasoline, vehicles.

In the lobby I spoke with Valjas and Brazauskas. They are genuine... But neither Ryzhkov, nor the departments want to listen to them. They see them as nationalists and separatists.

October 5, 1989.

Yesterday, the Supreme Soviet published a decree declaring martial law on the roadways in Transcaucasia. It is intended to lift the blockade on Armenia.

Today the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet passed a ruling on their sovereignty, in which it declares complete power over Karabakh; excludes any intervention in its affairs; inviolability of territory; the "Center," Moscow, keeps only the rights that Baku voluntarily concedes; the right of free succession from the USSR.

On the radio it has only been said the blockade of Armenia continues and trains are not given passage.

While we were talking with the Balts and scaring ourselves with their "departure," the Muslims started to collapse the state. If troops go in to free the trains to Armenia tomorrow, a

general strike will be declared, followed by armed resistance; if we bring in troops it will be called aggression, they will turn to the UN for help, etc.

Meanwhile, tomorrow M.S. is flying to the GDR for its 40th anniversary. He really does not want to. He called me twice, said that he polished his speech to the letter, knowing that they will be examining it under a microscope... there is not a word in support of Honecker... but he will support the Republic and revolution.

Today in Dresden 20,000 people came out to demonstrate. Yesterday in Leipzig there were even more. We are receiving information that during Gorbachev's visit they will storm the Wall. There were terrible scenes surrounding a special GDR refugee train passing through Dresden on the way from Prague. The West-German TV recorded this and is showing it in the GDR. The Western press is brimming with articles on the "reunification" of Germany.

Tomorrow a Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [HSWP] in Budapest will declare the self-liquidation of the "Socialist Hungarian People's Republic." Needless to mention Poland: the Polish United Workers Party [PUWP] not only lost power, but it is doubtful whether it will survive till its next Congress in February.

In a word, a complete dismantling of socialism as a factor of world development is in process. Maybe this is inevitable and good. For this is a matter of humanity uniting on the basis of common sense. And this process was started by a regular guy from Stavropol.

Perhaps Thatcher is right when she admires him precisely because she thinks that "in his heart" he envisioned the self-liquidation of a society that is alien to human nature and the natural order of things.

It is another matter... whether Russia needed the year 1917... and once again (!) our great sacrifices so that humanity would come to this conclusion.

Tomorrow the Supreme Soviet Parliamentary Committee will begin to examine the Afghan question. Arbatov, who is in charge of the project, stopped by today.

October 8, 1989.

Yesterday M.S. got back from the GDR. It appears from the speeches and the TV interviews that he navigated the situation successfully.

At the airport, Shakhnazarov and Raisa Maksimovna were describing how it went... As M.S. and Honecker walked together, a continuous roar in the air: "Gorby! Gorby!" emanated from the thousands, or hundreds of thousands of people. Nobody paid attention to Erich. At the meetings there were posters in Russian: "Gorbachev—you are our hope!" Besides Gorbachev, there were around 20 various leaders in attendance (Zhivkov, Ceausescu, Nicaraguan Ortega, etc.), but nobody gave them much heed. All the festivity concentrated on Gorbachev's presence in Berlin.

He came back satisfied. The recognition and support he receives "over there" encourages and reassures him, in contrast to the worthless treatment he gets from his own people.

Krenz said to Falin: "Our Erich sees everything, but does not want to admit anything." On October 10, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany will have a Plenum... They might overthrow Erich. Otherwise, it will soon come to a storm on the Wall. In any case, the Prague-Dresden-FRG refugee trains passed through a row of exalted greetings, were showered with flowers, etc. The policemen waved at the Russians...

What are my feelings? They are comprised from what I get from the press, the internal ciphers, the reports from the regions to the CC, from notes and various letters. All of it creates the impression of general collapse...

Nujkin published an article in *Ogonek*. It is an intellectual depravity. Overall, the *perestroika* intelligentsia has become confused when the time came to do "positive" work. The majority, in any case... In their inertia, they are stuck exposing the past.

Ogonek printed Bazhanov, who was Stalin's adviser from 1922-28 and afterwards fled abroad. Along with embellished bragging, it contains some unique information, particularly on the role of the leaders' secretaries and advisers. The system which has survived until the days of Gorbachev was created under Lenin. Some people from the PB and CC Secretariat still look at me according to that tradition, considering me to be "more important" than some PB members or even the PB itself (particularly Biryukova, Baklanov, even Slyunkov, and some ministers). It is amazing how Stalin felt which levers would allow him to control the country, and created those levers... which are relevant to this day. Even M.S. uses them, particularly in the "clerical" (drafting documents) aspect.

During the conversation at the airport, N.I. Ryzhkov described the following episode (present were Yakovlev, Shakhnazarov, Frolov): "I called Vezirov (after the Supreme Soviet's decree on martial law for Transcaucasian roadways) and asked him whether I should be talking to him or the People's Front? Give me a straight answer, I said, I don't need an 'interpreter.' Do you still have the power, or should I go directly to them? I am giving you 24 hours. If you do not lift the blockade, I will bring in troops with all ensuing consequences... Vezirov replied that he will 'consult' with leaders of the People's Front. At first, 8 out of 16 'members of the board' arrived. They said that they will not make a decision without the quorum. Finally, they assembled a quorum... And said that they will start to slowly let trains go through... They got a bit scared, even though they put on airs," concluded our Premier.

So this is the situation. We are saying that the PUWP has been removed from power and reduced to an insignificant size, and the HSWP is next in line. Meanwhile, in our Azerbaijan the same thing is happening as in Lithuania!

October 9, 1989.

Today, Oleg Uralov visited me for the second time. He is the producer I found to make the film "Portrait of Gorbachev." It is M.S.' idea. About two weeks ago he called me and said to undertake this project... for the visit to Italy. But it should not consist of clichés and banalities.

Uralov turned out to be the right person for the job. He is very interested in the project, he is smart, handsome, educated, and, as it turned out, a talented man of considerable culture, with good taste.

He interviewed me thoroughly. We talked for about two hours. I tried to show him the characteristics of the portrait. I was quite frank, said some things which I had not told before to any outsiders. In the end, he said that if we are to do this project, it would have to start with a conversation with Gorbachev. It would provide a direction and some content for the script. Plus, there are some practical questions...

I sent M.S. a note. He called me when he got back from the Supreme Soviet. He said that it is too early for the kind of portrait Uralov has in mind. It is not the time. Right now, the portrait has to consist of deeds... Then he said he will explain this to Uralov himself, and in an hour and a half, Uralov and I were in M.S.' office.

He charmed the producer in his usual manner. M.S. supported his ideas and plans and explained why right now is not the right time. In a year or two we need to make a breakthrough and bring our society into equilibrium. We have to earn the right for a "portrait" through achievements.

Uralov: "But the portrait is needed right now; later it will only have a historical significance."

M.S.: "Yes, you are right. For now... could you make a simple film for the Italians, cut it out from material that is already available... But do not discard the bigger idea, you can get started on it right now. And here... (he pointed at me) all questions go to A.S."

Uralov: "Yes, A.S. and I understand each other well."

M.S.: "I trust him completely... Anatoly and I think alike, and he knows everything. Of course, sometimes he gets carried away and I have to keep him in check (he laughed). But it is good when a man his age can still get carried away..."

Uralov: "It seems like you are also the type who gets carried away."

M.S.: "Yes, alas. Thus, we found each other..."

This is the unexpected "declaration of love" I received.

All of Europe is raving about M.S. in Berlin. And everybody in Europe is whispering in our ear: it is good that the USSR has delicately expressed its stance against German reunification.

Zagladin traveled all around France and met with everybody--from Mitterrand to mayors. He has buried Moscow with records of his conversations (with gusto! There is nothing he likes better). They all say in unison--nobody wants a unified Germany. Attali (Mitterrand's adviser)

brought up the possibility of restoring a serious Soviet-French alliance, including military "integration," but camouflaged as a joint use of armies to fight natural disasters.

Thatcher, when she asked to go off record during the conversation with M.S., expressed her views decisively against Germany's reunification. But, she said this is not something she can openly say at home or in NATO. In short, they want to prevent this with our hands.

October 11, 1989.

Today M.S. met with Rakowski (the Polish Premier). I was not present, but read the record of his meeting with Jaruzelski and Rakowski in Berlin. One on one, M.S. said to them and Honecker some things that he probably should not have said. He was playing along, or maybe paying tribute to whatever orthodoxy is left in him when he said that the PUWP and the HSWP have lost, let things get away, receded from the positions of socialism.

He did not say this to the Hungarians. As for the Poles, he agrees with them when they say it themselves.

Record of conversation with Honecker... when speaking with me and Shakhnazarov, M.S. called him scumbag. M.S. said, "He could have said to his people that he has had 4 operations, he is 78, he does not have the strength to fill his position, so could they please 'let him go,' he has done his duty. Then, maybe, he would have remained an esteemed figure in history." Shakhnazarov and I were doubtful that he would get a place in history if he did this right now. Two-three years ago, maybe. Right now he is already in a position similar to Kadar's. He has been cursed by the people.

The PB in Berlin is meeting for the second day. Krenz asked our ambassador to convey to M.S. that he will raise the question about change. Honecker warned Krenz that should he do this, they will be enemies. But it looks like he did it anyway. What will come of it?

The day before yesterday, Kohl tried to speak with M.S over the phone. Yesterday I reminded M.S. about this, but he brushed it aside--he did not want to. Today he called me and said: "go ahead, put the call through..." As soon as I reached for the phone, he called again: "Should I? The results of the Berlin PB are not clear yet. And in general..."

I told him that he should, otherwise it would be awkward. Plus, I am sure that he is calling to disassociate himself from his statements regarding reunification (in connection to the flight of GDR citizens to the FRG).

The conversation lasted 17 minutes. Kohl promised to help in Hungary and Poland, planned a visit to Warsaw, and most importantly--assured M.S. that he will not destabilize the GDR. M.S. replied: "This is a very important statement. I will take it into consideration." They talked about bilateral economic ties in follow up to M.S.' visit to Bonn.

Shakhnazarov and I led a pogrom against Shevardnadze and Kryuchkov's note on our country's politics towards countries with a "socialist orientation." They offered timid changes. We, on the other hand, are against the very essence of this category of "socialist orientation,"

against dividing the third world based on ideology; against exporting weapons, which tempts them and distracts from what they should be doing...

In a word, we suggested to radically change this course. The old one, which formed according to ideological motifs and military-strategic concerns of yesterday, did not meet expectations, it became bankrupt, and showed that it is not compatible with New Thinking.

M.S. agrees with us, judging by the fact that he sent our memorandum to Shevardnadze and Yakovlev, and told them to rewrite their note.

Without realizing what I was doing, I gave Borovik (a renowned international affairs journalist) permission to invite Peres (Israel) to the Soviet Union. Sure, it would be a social, not a political, visit, but he is still the Deputy Prime Minister of a country with which we have no diplomatic relations. Borovik snuck up on me between sessions of the Supreme Soviet International Committee, presented all kinds of arguments and promised that it would be beneficial. I said: if you have the authority, invite him. And now Peres is giving newspaper interviews on what he is planning to do during the visit. Naturally, his plans are not to talk commerce with the Peace Council but to do politics. M.S. and Shevardnadze will find out about this from the interviews. I might get a thrashing for this!

On the whole, when I speak with M.S., observe him, see and hear him at the Supreme Soviet sessions, I do not get the feeling that a civil war has broken out in the country. Military trains and escorts through Azerbaijan to Armenia have come under fire, there have already been several “battles” with the use of automatic weapons.

I am preparing a “world outlook” material for M.S.’ meeting with Brandt (October 17). We are moving toward a renewal of unity, liquidation of the historical split between the Social-democratic and Communist movements (if the latter still exists).

October 15, 1989.

On Friday, M.S. had another meeting with the leaders of the mass media. I did not go--I am running out of time on Brandt. But Serezha Morozov (now the editor of the *Za rubezhom* [Abroad] magazine) described the meeting in detail from his notes.

I think this event will be compared with the meeting between Khrushchev and Pasternak, or Khrushchev’s meeting with the intelligentsia, which started the open rollback of the Thaw.

The day before, on Thursday at the PB, M.S. declared: “I will tell them (!) tomorrow...” (this was a reaction to yet another attack on the press by the republics’ CC Secretaries!)

He started with the usual, even excusing himself that he has to repeat the banalities: “*Perestroika* is going through what is most likely the most difficult period. Everything is under tension. As difficult as it may be, I am going to stay the course. People blame me for sitting on two chairs. No. I am on one chair, the *perestroika* chair. But what are you doing!” (The entire time he addressed the audience as “you,” i.e. indiscriminately). “Some of you are shouting ‘catastrophe!', others are threatening us with a coup. Poltoranin writes and broadcasts (at the CC

Higher Party School) that regardless of anything, there will be a rebellion. Except, he states, if we go down the path suggested by the Inter-regional Deputies Group (of which he is a part), there will be 5 million victims. But if we keep going down Gorbachev's path, there will be a 100 million victims.

"We have heard this before," M.S. continued. "Do you recognize it?" Somebody from the audience answered--Mao! "Correct. People are truly agitated, nerves are strained, we are standing wheel-deep in kerosene. Meanwhile, some people are shamelessly playing with matches. Take Zaslavskaya for example. She said on TV that we are inevitably moving toward bread rationing. What happened after that? People rushed to buy up flour. All the milling plants in the country started working 4 shifts. But there is still not enough, everything gets wiped off the shelves. This is what you are doing!"

Shevardnadze took Shmelev with him to the US (Shmelev is an economist). (Further I continue quoting Gorbachev). "They had a conversation with Baker, who is Secretary of State right now, but he is also a renowned financial expert, he was Minister of Finance. He said to them: 'We ran some calculations based on the CIA's analysis, and we are not as pessimistic about the outlook for the Soviet economy as your economists are (in the USSR).' Shmelev replied: 'no, you are wrong, the USSR is moving towards disaster.' Upon returning to Moscow he published an article in *Vecherka* [Evening news], arguing that Baker is wrong. What have we come to!

There are mass attacks on the Party. People say to me that this is a frank analysis of the situation in the CPSU. But I am not naïve and I can differentiate analysis from intentional slander, discrediting, and undermining of the party position before the elections for the republics and regional Soviets.

Next in line is the abuse of the leadership and the General Secretary. There are discussions that the leadership does not have a conception, it does not know what to do, it is ruining *perestroika* through half-measures, it is going to bring about a rebellion. There is a dead end everywhere--in relations with the working class, in national affairs. While a war rages in Transcaucasia, the leadership is imposing meager laws instead of finding the political solutions it always calls for...

What is your conclusion? It is as follows: there are alternatives to Gorbachev and his team--Lukyanov, Nenashev, etc. Look how many smart people have shown themselves; there are plenty of fish in the sea.

The People's Deputies receive similar unequal treatment. Some are praised, others humiliated along the lines of: 'Alekseev is alright, but he is a far shot from Sobchak!' Even *Izvestiya* [News] is doing this. *Argumenty i fakty* [Arguments and facts] has gone so far as to publish a list of names of 100 Deputies, with a 'sociological' survey right next to them. Of course, the favorites have the most points. Sakharov leads in popularity, and Shevchenko (a woman from Ukraine) is the last on the list. Is this a study!

“In your place,” (he turned toward the editor of *Argumenty i fakty*, asked whether he is present, and the man stood up) “as a Communist, I would go into retirement after such a publication.” (Actually, M.S. told me the day before that he is going to remove him!)

“The Inter-regional Deputies Group has created its own ‘forum’ in Leningrad. They have their own Politburo, ready to replace ours, and their own General Secretary--Yu. Afanas’ev. They have a program: multi-party system, market economy, anyone who wants to can leave the USSR (the Baltic States are first on the list), freedom of the press, etc. I do not know why we allow such people in our party. If Afanas’ev has his own platform, then he should leave the party and follow his own course. We do not need this kind of ‘communists.’ This is a different era (in the sense that he won’t get imprisoned)... but if he disagrees with the party, what is he doing in it? I think that the Inter-regional Deputies Group and the Party Control Committee need to deal with Afanas’ev. We cannot allow such a person to head an institute and to teach our students. This also has to be taken care of.”

This was his speech. Again and again he comes back to his favorite toy: consolidation. He continued: “There has been enough of scandals and squabbles in front of the entire nation (between journals and newspapers). What kind of *glasnost* do we have? You pick up a journal and when you see a question in the headlines, you already know what the position is going to be. They give the floor to some people, and stifle the others. I have to say that *Ogonek* did recently publish its ‘opponent,’” (he must be referring to Kozhinov), “but immediately gave him an editorial rebuke.”

(By the way, I explained to M.S. on several occasions that people are laughing about this requirement of his. The different faces is what separates one journal from another. This has always been the case in Russia and all over the world. If he is pro-*glasnost* then he cannot insist on conformity of opinion. It is not logical. But he is stubborn...)

“And look at what is happening on the television,” M.S. continued, “Irresponsibility and instigation are rampant. People are beginning to turn off their receivers. I was recently listening to *Mayak*, which was playing songs from the 50s and 60s, when the host announced: ‘And now we are going to play rock-music. Fans of the previous program can turn off their radios--you won’t understand anything anyway!’ Is this necessary? How are you treating people!”

M.S. remembered Marinicheva’s article in *Komsomolka* from a week ago (I also noticed it and almost started crying myself, like she did). The title is: “To the core, but what for?” Plus Svetlov’s “Grenada,” about the ideals on which generations were raised. We cannot trample them just because of Stalin’s blemish. Otherwise we have emptiness and soullessness. I had wanted to send this newspaper issue to M.S., but it turns out he noticed it himself. That’s how it goes!

Yesterday morning he called and asked if I had been at the meeting.

I: “No, I did not have time. But I know what happened, I was told in detail...”

M.S.: "Yes, I decided to go into an attack. As I was later told, they 'exchanged' (another favorite word of his) among themselves, saying, 'It's true that we (the press) have crossed the line.' And you know, nobody wanted to speak after me. There was silence. I offered several times. In the end I said: If this is the case, I will see you next time."

He decided not to publish this speech (he spoke for almost two hours). I told him that is a good idea, since he had named names, there will be ripples. The ripples will spread in any case and people are going to attribute things to him, which were not there... "It's alright," he said, and we moved on to financial matters.

I asked Serezha Morozov if M.S. was agitated at the meeting. He said that overall he was not. He spoke as usual, with passion when speaking without notes. But sometimes he got wound up, his eyes grew dark and you could see that some people had really tried his patience.

I thought to myself that he probably (most likely) does not want to go back on *glasnost*. However, he must feel (not without help from hints in Klyamkin and even Aleskseyev's publications) that it is time he was more authoritarian, before the empire falls to pieces.

Yet, while the store shelves are empty and the crime rate high, it is impossible to stop the movement without completely shutting down *perestroika*. The kinds of actions taken with Afanas'ev and Starkov (from *Argumenty i fakty*) only discredit him personally. We already went through this with Nikita and we all remember how it ended.

It is very important for him to keep the image he developed in the first years of *perestroika*. If the distinction between him and Ligachev (who is also pro-*perestroika*) fades, all will be lost.

Gorbachev is staggering on his way... I must not forget to describe the "Russian question," which he brought up very testily at the PB, in connection with Chinese border negotiation directives for Rogachev (deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs).

October 15, 1989.

My home phone nearly rang off the hook: M.S. is looking for me. I called him. The entire Finnish program is mangled. Koivisto got mad. M.S. assigned me to prepare several pages for the Defense Council on our foreign policy during *perestroika*, explaining why we still need to strengthen our defense. This is for tomorrow. But tomorrow I also have to prepare two speeches for Finland and material for a meeting with the papal nuncio, plus something for the Supreme Soviet International Committee on the Afghan question.

When am I going to do all of this?! How much longer will this last? It is so simple for him--we (I) are instruments that can do anything, if he needs it.

October 16, 1989.

Reaction to the meeting with the press. The participants' feelings are: if this is how Gorbachev treats us, the praetorians of *perestroika*, then we will find something else to do. If he

puts everyone like Sobchak, Zaslavskaya, and Shmelev into the opposition camp, with whom is he planning to build *perestroika*?

In reality, M.S.' mass base is the intelligentsia. The working class is for Yeltsin. What does Gorbachev plan to achieve by moving toward Ligachev in his relationship with the intelligentsia? If a "case" is started on Afanas'ev (as it is bound to, because his primary party organization is not going to expel him, which means the Party Control Committee will have to do it, disregarding the democratic process) it would open the gates for a multi-party system. No argument will remain for preserving the CPSU monopoly.

If Gorbachev is calling for consolidation and in the meanwhile reverting to organizational conclusions, it is the end of *glasnost*. It means people will act not on their conscience, but with a consideration for conforming to the leadership's views. Consequently, we could bid farewell to Gorbachev's own appeals --"let's do it together." Now it looks like-- "let's do it how I want, in a way that suits me."

Yeltsin has convened a meeting, after recovering from the "attempt on his life," which was actually a drunken fight that started after he hit on somebody's wife. The theme of this meeting was: Gorbachev has exhausted his potential and has to be immediately removed.

Regrettably, it were Afanas'ev and Starkov that M.S. proposed to expel from the party and remove from their positions, not Yeltsin (even though an according resolution by the CC Plenum already exists). And now, Yeltsin & Co. together with Afanas'ev & Co., who have nothing to lose since all their bridges are burned, will launch a desperate attack. They say that a demonstration is scheduled on October 25th by the CC building, to demand that three people be removed--Ligachev, Zaikov, and Vorotnikov. For now.

Even Ryzhov (director of the Moscow Aviation Institute and now Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Science Commission) spoke on the TV yesterday from Yeltsin's positions. And he is one of M.S.' friends.

In a word, this "meeting with the press" was a mistake. These steps lead to the path taken by Khrushchev.

I spent all day writing a speech that will be presented at the "Finlandia" Hall. Composed some materials for the Defense Council; plus a hundred other small tasks and phone calls. The MFA is once again letting us down. There is still no draft for the speech at Koivisto's lunch, nor any materials for negotiations with him. Kovalyov is a wind-bag and too petty to be the first deputy of the MFA.

I composed a draft for Gorbachev's letter to Bush, which Primakov will deliver with the Parliamentary Delegation.

October 23, 1989.

Drop by drop M.S. gave me his thoughts and edits for the Finland texts, removing some of my compliments addressed to the Finns. He explained that he does not want our Balts to feel jealous of how we treat Finland and imagine that they could also be like Finland, only if...

Yesterday I read a heap of Western analyses of our economic situation, and their recommendations. Many of them (except for Pipes and Brzezinski, of course) are interested in *perestroika*'s success. A Thatcher-style success, mostly. But the most serious of them realize that we cannot completely turn into a Western society. There are also some who prognosticate a "Soviet economic miracle," if...

There is a common consensus that Gorbachev needs to finally decide to make a breakthrough; he cannot linger and play on the safe side any longer, he has to step away from half-measures, time is working against him. Difficult times for some layers of society are inevitable, but there are worldwide laws of economic recovery and nobody has been able to circumvent them yet.

There is another common factor in the Western scholarship--the personification of our reforms. Everybody appeals to the personality. If Gorbachev would do this and that... If would make up his mind so and so... if he would implement the following measures, etc.

But the problem is that Gorbachev no longer has the power to do anything decisive, even if he makes up his mind. This is not because, as the West thinks, he is hindered by Ligachev, the apparatus, or the bureaucracy. It is because Gorbachev does not have a mechanism through which he can implement his decisions. There is nobody to enforce them. The Party is no longer recognized as a governing body. The Soviets continue to be helpless. The economic executives are split between two chairs: there are no orders from the top, but at the same time they do not have the freedom to conduct affairs themselves. They do not know whom to turn to in order to make their industries work interdependently with each other, otherwise they will simply stop functioning. The regional apparatus is either demoralized, or is waiting with their arms crossed until everything will fall through. The nomenclature has nothing to lose.

Gorbachev's slogan to "include the regular man" proved to be inapplicable because our regular man became lost without a guide to show him every step of the way. Now the regular man is angry, because he does not have anything and there is no one from whom he can demand, all he can do now is shout abuses.

The working class is raising its head dangerously. It is being led by members of professional unions and regional committee party bosses, who understood that the only way for them to save their positions at the upcoming elections is through double-dyed populism and demagoguery aimed at the very top. The meetings of different "workers' fronts" are conducted under the slogans: "Give us Marxism-Leninism," and "*Perestroika* the socialist way, not the capitalist way!" etc.

Meanwhile, M.S. continues to play up to people like Yarin (workers' leader from Kuznetsk Basin). At meetings, people demand that this Yarin be made a part of the PB. Ideology trips up *perestroika* even here, not only in the economy and *glasnost*.

Yegor Yakovlev called me. He asked for a meeting with M.S. for him, Gelman, Adamovich, and Klimov. I wrote Gorbachev a note. On Saturday, for a long time he explained to me over the phone what to say to Yegor. He praised all four of them very highly, gave each one a precise testimonial and promised to meet with them as soon as he can. Right now he does not have a minute to spare, whereas he would like to sit down with them to a serious conversation, especially since Yegor told me that they plan to “open Gorbachev’s eyes” to the real ideological situation in Moscow. In the meantime, M.S. told me to explain to Yegor & Co. that they should not panic and try to understand him: his main task right now is to save the course from the rightists and the leftists. Both are touring the country and instigating people against the General Secretary and *perestroika*. If they succeed, it will be the end.

I think he finally understood the danger of people like Yarin, but he is directing his anger at Yu. Afanas’ev and his company; even though he made a clever move after the meeting with the press and removed another Afanas’ev (Viktor) from his post as editor of *Pravda*.

Today at the Supreme Soviet session Gorbachev once again spoke against electing him President through a nation-wide vote. “We have seen where saviors of the Motherland have brought us,” he declared. I was looking at expressions on the Deputies’ faces as he was speaking. They were derisive and ironic. They no longer take him seriously with his constant calls to “let’s get along” and “most importantly, we are on the right path,” etc.

He does not seem to sense this. He still believes in his ability to convince anyone. He still holds a paternalistic air with the Supreme Soviet and other contenders for power. He sermonizes and admonishes, he takes it upon himself to draw “final conclusions” from what others say and discuss.

October 29, 1989.

October 25-27th in Finland. Gorbachev’s success is stunning. He combines all the temperaments. The key to this is not only his personal charisma and the ability to almost always find the optimal version of what to say and how to communicate with an individual. The additional factor is his frankness in speaking about ourselves and his freedom from ideology; even though this is less effective now that everyone can see for themselves what is happening in our country.

The second impression is that we are hopelessly behind. It is true that some people in the West predict a Soviet economic miracle, if we only finally follow “their path.” Even in this case we would need 10 years. M.S. has let the moment pass while he was being cautious and afraid to lose our socialist values, even though he knew that these values consist of wave-leveling, social egoism, and dependency that is a millstone around the government’s neck.

Now all these socialist values are turning against him as the workers’ movement is arising with its natural law of trade-unions: “give me what I want, and I could not care less about the rest.”

I've never been to Japan so I can't compare, but Finland struck me as a truly modern, civilized society, successful and highly developed; where there is no difference between the capital and a small town like Oulu.

The visit took place against the background of political strikes in Vorkuta and a civil war over Karabakh. When they show our soldiers on TV it becomes difficult to understand what is happening: they are shot at, there are armed ambushes against them, the local authorities prevent them from going where they do not want them to go, and there is nothing they can do.

Gorbachev is calm, to the surprise of the entire world. They give him credit for that. In Finland he once again developed his New Thinking ideas and continued to expand them in comparison to his UN speech in Strasbourg.

My third impression consists of my own personal feelings. I am losing the desire to serve him. Of course, I could always reassure myself by saying I am not serving him, but the cause--the country, the world, preventing war, working for the victory of common sense over militarism and our militaristic psychology, etc. In the end, however, I am serving him. He is a very prominent figure, a world-class politician; he was able to use all means available to irreversibly change the situation at the core. But his thoughts and actions need to be faceted before he steps into the outside world. Sometimes he needs other people's thoughts. This is my job. I am not always alone. The MFA, the CC International Department, academic institutions and other departments also prepare materials for him. But theirs is a semi-finished product. I am the one who supplies the final versions, I am the one who develops the final form. In these matters, form substantial--each phrase is meaningful. I am the one who composes messages for the press on his meetings with Western leaders. The world judges what took place through these publications. Any one of his meetings only becomes a political action when it is published. In our country, this form, which I invented, replaces the interviews Gorbachev's foreign interlocutors usually give to the press after the meeting.

I do not think that Gorbachev does not understand this. But in the four years that I have worked for him he has never shown it to me, and much less to others.

Yesterday I visited Brutents in the hospital on Michurinskiy Avenue. He had a heart attack in Dublin. We talked for about an hour and a half, mostly about what this world is coming to, and what Gorbachev thinks about it. I told him about my belief that M.S. sincerely believes in his formula that "socialism is the creation of the masses." So let them create, and we'll see what they come up with.

Karen agreed with me, but added that at the same time, someone has to govern.

I said to him: how can you govern if there is no governing mechanism? You could create a plan, but nowadays people do not want to live by plans, they have had enough. And even if they wanted to, they will not be able to. We have proven convincingly to everybody and to ourselves that a society cannot develop through plans. The government can... until a certain moment when it becomes completely disconnected from society.

We also discussed the fact that more and more often M.S. includes personal issues into cadres politics and politics in general. This discredits him. The most dangerous symptoms of this personalized reaction is his treatment of Yu. Afanas'ev, Starkov's work, his praises of Van'ka Frolov and the fact that he appointed his adviser as editor of *Pravda*.

A couple of days before the trip to Finland, A.N. Yakovlev came to visit me. He has the same issue with Gorbachev's ingratitude. He has not received a single "Thank you" in their five years of working together, not even for what Yakovlev initiated. Sure, he has a friendly relationship and trust (and sometimes a pretence of trust). But not a hint of recognition or reward. Most likely, Gorbachev does not want to identify himself with Yakovlev in front of the PB or CC (where they hate Yakovlev), or society. By identifying himself with Yakovlev he would be disassociating himself from Ligachev once and for all. He is keeping A.N. "for himself," for when he needs some advice, or to assign him to write something.

A.N. complains: during *perestroika* all the former and current PB members spoke at the November 7 (October revolution anniversary) and the Lenin days. Yakovlev was never assigned to do this. And this time Gorbachev gave the speech to the newly-made PB member Kryuchkov. A.N. is worried about it. For the umpteenth time he is "asking my advice" on whether he should retire. Of course I protest, even though I understand that he just wants to get it out of his system. If he were to actually leave, everybody would clearly see that it is the end of *glasnost* and Gorbachev is definitely heading down Nikita's path.

When I was walking him to the door, he asked me in a whisper: what is the deal with M.S. bringing up the idea that maybe it is time for him to retire?

I answered that I am not surprised. When I went with him on vacation, sometimes I would hear about this on the airplane, when the three of us would be there: myself, M.S., and Raisa Maksimovna. This is her idea. Last January in Pitsunda and this summer in Foros she was arguing almost seriously, in my presence: "It is time, Mikhail Sergeyevich, to leave, to lead a private life and write your memoirs." One cannot underestimate her influence on him. Once, she directly said: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, you have done your part."

I am re-reading "Gulag" in *Novyi Mir* [New World] No.9--about 1917-21. It is tendentious about the war, etc. It is not very historical. But... A year ago, M.S. declared that he will not let it be published. Now "Gulag" is being printed in both the leftist and rightist journals. Next year a complete works will come out. And most importantly, as V. Astaf'ev recently said in *Komsomolka*: this is a blow not only to the October ideology, but to all of history that claims we "really were building a bright future." This is a blow with the weapon of morality. The power of language. Here it is mighty in its zeal.

November 6, 1989.

"Forgive us, as we forgave you." These are M.S.' words to Ligachev at the PB. Ligachev, after yet another indignant reaction at the press, made a gesture to signify it is a lost cause and said: "You have put everything up for execution, trampled everything in the mud--the past and the present, there is nothing left."

Regarding one of Ryzhkov's latest hysterias that the all one can hear from every side are cries about the crisis: "The economy--in crisis, society--in crisis, Party--in crisis, supply--in crisis. Everything!" M.S. pointed out: "But they are only repeating what we said ourselves, at the XIX Party conference among other things... when they start speaking of catastrophe, this is where I disagree."

M.S. must have remembered the note I forwarded him from the academician Goldansky when he said that we should examine anti-Semitism when creating a state committee on the nationalities question within the RSFSR government. Ligachev immediately reacted: well, then we should also examine Russophobia. M.S. stopped short and added: yes, of course, examine Russophobia as well. (Ligachev does not affect him as a personality, but through the layer of our country's society he represents).

Berdyayev's opus *Christianity and Anti-Semitism* is relevant to the "Friendship of Nations" issue... We need to crush *Pamyat'* with the help of our Russian classics. You cannot get them any other way. Not even them, but the stench with which they are filling society.

I am getting tired of Gorbachev. Or rather, of his instrumental attitude to me. He is so sure that if I take up a task it will be done right, that he stopped "talking" with me. He no longer advises with me, only unburdens his mind on rare occasion. And now he almost never formulates ideas ahead of time for the assignments he gives me, as he used to do. This was the case with all the last visits: to England, the FRG, Paris, Strasbourg, Finland.

In addition, he started heaping on me the preparation of all kinds of drafts for messages to foreign leaders, salutatory addresses for conferences and anniversaries. There are vast numbers of preliminary authors like the MFA, the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies, the International Department, the Peace Council, etc. But what they provide is "cud," as he expressed himself, and he has stopped reading their precursory versions. If some text of a message or a telegram in his name, some greeting passed me by and goes to the PB, I later revise it overtop many PB members' signatures. Then M.S. puts his final signature on it, taking my revisions into account and sometimes correcting me, as well.

I am paying compliments to myself. I (truly) do not like doing this. I left Ponomarev's school, where quality was determined by pleasing the superiors. My age does not allow me to engage in this. But this kind of work takes up 60-70 percent of my time and deprives me of the opportunity to think seriously and globally about the long-term outlook; to think substantially about major issues. Or else, I have to do it in a hurry and under pressure.

He must think that I have no "personal life" and need no "free time." That is why he calls me on Saturday, Sunday, late at night, sometimes at midnight. If he cannot reach me, he makes displeased jokes. Yes, of course, he has the CC, the Kremlin, his home, and the dacha with Raisa Maksimovna. All of it! My schedule is similar, but does not exactly coincide with his. I am cheating my real time. But there is barely any leeway for such cheating.

He is very worried that the leaders of the regional deputies' group (G. Popov, Yeltsin, Afanas'ev...) have come together with the "workers movement"--Vorkuta, Sverdlovsk, Kuznets

Basin, the nationals. They make up the ideological headquarters. The Cooperatives Union, for example, made an agreement to supply materials to the Vorkuta strike committee. They will be providing printing machines, paper, allowances for the strikers. In other words, they are giving the strikers an economic base. All of this is directed against Gorbachev's *perestroika*.

Askol'dov (the author and producer of the movie "The Commissar," which spent over 10 years lying on a shelf) described a meeting with Yeltsin, Afanas'ev, and Popov at the Palace of Film. When greeting Yeltsin, the "intelligentsia" gave a standing ovation for several minutes, yelling hysterically... And had the same reaction to all of his and Yu. Afanas'ev's anti-Gorbachev's tricks.

This is low and disgraceful. This is not a real intelligentsia... It only inherited the superficial traits from the classical Russian intelligentsia which we thrice destroyed, but there is no trace of its essence.

November 10, 1989.

The Berlin Wall has fallen. An entire era in the history of the "socialist system" has come to an end.

Honecker fell after the PUWP and the HSWP; today we got a message that Zhivkov is "leaving." Only our "best friends" are left: Castro, Ceausescu, and Kim Il-Sung, who hate our guts.

The most important, however, is the GDR and the Berlin Wall. This is no longer a matter of socialism, but of a change in the world balance of powers, the end of Yalta, the end of Stalin's legacy and the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Great War.

This is what Gorbachev has done! He is truly a great man because he sensed the footsteps of history and helped it to follow its natural course.

A meeting with Bush is approaching. Will we witness a historic conversation? There are two main ideas in the instructions M.S. gave me to prepare materials: the role of two superpowers in leading the world to a civilized state and the balance of interests. But Bush might disregard our arguments... We do not really have anything to show except for our past a the fear that we could return to totalitarianism.

It is Slutsky's 70th anniversary in the Writers House. I knew Slutsky. I used to visit him at home in his truly barracks-like apartment near the airport, back in the days when his wonderful Tanya was still with us.

November 12, 1989.

I am under pressure at work. It is time to be preparing for Italy, Malta is approaching rapidly, while I am stuck with routine work: [Roland] Dumas, [Rita] Süssmuth, Kohl (yesterday M.S. spoke with him on the phone). Last night he once again assigned me to write the text for the upcoming speech at a student form (he will be speaking after Medvedev, Ivan Frolov,

Yakovlev). I spent all evening and this morning working on it. I am performing my usual task--expressing ideas in literary language. While I'm at it, I took out some stuff, for example more railing against the press. I wonder if he will notice.

Yesterday we talked for a long time. He called me from his car. He was affected by my note, in which I wrote about A.N. Yakovlev (regarding the fact that M.S. subordinated him to Medvedev for the preparation of the Party Congress) and what this means in light of the upcoming "dialectical overcoming of Lenin"...

He justified himself by saying that what is important is the cause, not ambitions (one of his favorite words). Most importantly, he criticized the intelligentsia, who is criticizing him for coming down hard on the left. He had to do this because the left is provoking the right; they "mobilize" them with their shouts and attacks on Lenin, the October, socialism... They raise a panic without understanding that for me (Gorbachev) the path backwards or to the right is closed. I am doomed to go forward and only forward, and if I take a step sideways, both I am my cause will perish. How could they think that I am with Ligachev?! Etc. He cursed.

By the way, Yakovlev told me that he witnessed a scene in which Van'ka came into M.S.' office and said, "M.S., I spent time with some of my friends over the holidays and I have come to the conclusion that I must tell you this (he was shaking as he spoke): you have to get rid of Ligachev. People's disdain and hatred towards him is boundless. And most importantly--there is a growing sense that you and he are on the same page! That you are only pretending to be a *perestroika*-man..."

I asked A.N. about M.S. reaction. He said M.S. started pacing around the office. He was silent, and finally said: That is quite a dilemma you presented me with... That was the end of the episode.

December 31, 1989.

This is the last entry of the passing year. I would like to sum it up in the form of a New Year's address to Gorbachev.

For you this was a year to create the environment to break out of the crisis. The year 1990 will be a year of decisions. They depend on you (alas, the country holds on to the inertia of the cult of personality). You are falling behind. Some journals are saying that you have already stopped. Gefter from *Moskovskie Novosti* [Moscow news] wrote: "Gorbachev is stuck because he is not an opponent to himself." I have been with you for four years. I observed from the inside how you, appealing to Lenin, rejected your own postulates if they were refuted by real life. You still have a great deal of fear that everything will fall apart if we renounce all the old foundations and levers of power.

People are tired of your endless references to socialist values, which have long since lost their worth (such as the right to work, social protection, etc).

What happened with your rejection to introduce new laws in the fall (1989) to regulate land, property, the republics' economic independence, the division of power between regions and the center?.. In August, in Crimea you told me about this. Moreover, you had me prepare a speech for TV, in which you would promise this to the country. (It never took place). Now, it was you who made sure that these laws were postponed until 1990. Why?

You are afraid of these laws. But it is a step you are going to have to take. For how long did you oppose at the Supreme Soviet the laws granting the Baltic States economic independence? Nevertheless, on the night before the decisive session you told me on the phone: I have decided. This is going to be a major step.

You started the foolish ordeal with the Constitutional Oversight Committee at the Congress. Everybody could see how unreasonable your stubbornness and lack of argumentation was. Twice, the Congress was shaken up because of this; first when it was put on the agenda, and then while adopting the resolution. But there is still no committee! We only elected the chairman and deputy chairman, and the committee is supposed to (according to the law) start working on January 1st! This is absurd.

Why did you do this? Is it a straw--to save the Union from collapse, to rein in the republics? But these reins will become taut and snap at the slightest turn.

You fought desperately against abolishing clause 6 of the Constitution. You tried to use the "obedient" majority at the Congress for this. I can understand your apprehension that it will spur "pogroms" against the regional committees and the oblast committees, stripping them of the party property, which they amassed at the nation's expense. The PB will lose the legal right to be a de facto ruling organ. However, this is inevitable. Why draw it out, thereby increasing hatred among the population toward the party's monopoly on power? Meanwhile, it cannot even use the power anymore. Look at the PB meetings... they discuss, criticize, hear proposals, and produce the habitual drawn-out resolutions on many sheets. But none of them, with the exception of supplying more weapons to Iraq or Iran, get implemented.

"In your heart" you have taken the course to transfer real power from the party to the Supreme Soviet. So what are you afraid of? Ligachev and his cronies at the Plenum? There is a suspicion going around, since he sits next to you at the Plenums and the word is given to each of you in turn (as if he is the "second in command" after you!). You are always communicating with him: joking, laughing, exchanging views, whispering with each other and showing in every way that you and he are in perfect harmony. This is hypocrisy. And it is disorienting people...

Are you seriously afraid of him? You think he represents the party? Then the party is really in bad shape. In that case you have to transfer power to the Supreme Soviet as soon as possible and create an executive cabinet under the President.

In the course of the Plenum, backstage over tea you decided to "fight" and threatened to resign. Ryzhkov urged you to stay, saying that we started all of this together, etc. Nobody took your threat seriously. But Yakovlev promised to resign if he continues to be treated like a whipping boy at the PB and the Plenums.

M.S. shared his impressions of the Plenum with me, which he said was worse than the December (12.9) and April ones. I told him that he needs to do away with these kinds of Plenums if he wants to keep the party for *perestroika*. The majority of this Plenum and the CC do not accept *perestroika* and despise you. My boys from the International Department--Ostroumov, Yakovlev's adviser Kosolapov--were sitting next to the generals in the balcony. Similarly to Plenums in the past, they could hear the spiteful commentary the generals exchanged amongst themselves. When at the December Plenum Gorbachev said that he will resign (after Mel'nikov's speech, in which he declared that Gorbachev's politics are aimed at pleasing the bourgeoisie and the Pope) the generals said almost in unison: "It's about time!" At the last Plenum Gorbachev again "banged his fist on the table" in response to the demand to prohibit *Sajudis* and expel Brazauskas from the party. He said that he will conduct the policies he followed all along, not any other, and he will not allow blood to flow. He has made his choice. Otherwise he will leave. The generals on the balcony reacted to that: "That's some threat he came up with! Would be great if he left!"

A kind of "spot" has formed in the auditorium where the Plenum is held, about 10 by 20 square meters, which holds 150-200 people. Concentrated in this spot are those who hiss and drown out any reasonable idea.

When we were discussing the outcomes of the Plenum at the PB, Gorbachev asked why the others, those who support *perestroika*, are quiet in the auditorium. He asked me that question as well. I told him: they were quiet until you exploded in one of your brilliant impromptu speeches. Until that point they simply did not know **how** to support you. At the Congress and at the December Plenum you let Ligachev speak before you, and his speech was directed against you and all your philosophy and policies. During a break in the Congress, behind the scenes, you even praised Ligachev for his essentially anti-*perestroika* speech. You said that he stood up for the Party! At the Plenum Ligachev made a speech that inspired his supporters in "the spot." They saw that they can put you down.

Your report on Lithuania contained both elements. On the one hand you swore that you will never resort to force; on the other hand you gave questionable arguments on what you are going to do to keep Lithuania. People could read the ambiguity in any way they wanted to. Supporters of *perestroika* (i.e. the CC members who are ready to defend you) were afraid to find themselves in the wrong boat because they could not understand your true intentions. Only when you "banged the table" did Ul'yanov, Zakharov, Ivanova, Novozhilov and others come up to the podium. The Ligachev crowd immediately grew quiet. This is the explanation. The Party is expecting clarity from you. Even Sakharov said: Gorbachev has to finally decide whether he is with the apparatus or with the people. While you are publicly embracing Ligachev, whom you despise, there will be no renewal in the party.

M.S. knows how to be cunning! Fifteen hundred people signed up to speak at the Congress. Only a few over four hundred got the chance. But Gorbachev made sure to give the podium to Yu. Afanas'ev, even though he knew what the latter had to say—he spoke against Ryzhkov's economic plan. M.S. used Afanas'ev in his concluding remarks, as he connected Ryzhkov's plan with the urgent need to adopt new laws on property, land, regional

independence, etc. at the next Supreme Soviet session. He not only created a connection between the two, but hinged the plan's success on the passage of the laws.

I cannot understand whether it is a politician's intuition or the old fear to break with the "friends" in the PB. Ryzhkov's plan was confirmed not only at the PB but at the December Plenum as well.

My evaluation matched Yakovlev's. He came to me on the third day after speaking with M.S. I don't know whether he really said to him what he told me: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, you should have stood up and left at that moment when you exploded and uttered the indignant words against the pogrom-minded crowd ("blood" "ruled out" "persecute"). You should have said that you cannot and do not want to work with such a Plenum. This is what I would have done in your place. I assure you that Medvedev, Shevardnadze, Kryuchkov, Slyunkov and maybe even Ryzhkov would have followed you."

To that I added: Over a hundred people would have gotten up and left the auditorium. Split in the party? So what! At some point it has to be done. It is impossible to continue *perestroika* with this crowd. Either it will ruin you together with *perestroika*, or you have to cut it off, maybe together with the CPSU in its present nomenclature form.

M.S. once asked me over the phone whether I am thinking about the platform for the CC January Plenum, i.e. the discussions before the Congress. I am. I wrote a draft platform. Sent it to him. No response. I am certain that yet another 80-100 pages of nonsense will be composed for the Congress under Medvedev's guidance.

Gorbachev is going to Lithuania. For a while now, I have been advising him to "let it go" like Latvia and Estonia. Shakhnazarov offered him to go there not with admonitions and arguments, but with an offer to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union (as many other countries, including Central Asia, they did not sign a treaty of alliance in 1922-4). But once again he will only draw it out and increase the tension, as already happened two years ago with the recognition of the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Back then, this problem did not have to become the symbol of separatism and provoke people to come out with candles and torches to form lines of hundreds of kilometers on August 23. This could have been prevented. He thought it would be fine. But it was not, Mikhail Sergeyevich! Eventually, after Yakovlev's committee (on the 1939 Pact), the Congress adopted an ever harsher resolution, virtually condemning the Pact, than it would have, had we in due time admitted at least that it was a mistake...

Postscript for 1989

I would like to direct the reader's attention to the last entry—December 31. It contains a summary of the year as I envisioned it at the time.

Here, I will describe how the author sees it from the distance of over ten years.

During this year, the **Soviet** state started to crumble. The center of power—the Politburo—lost its authority and the ability to enforce its decisions. It became a place for discussion about the inexorably deteriorating situation in the country. The Politburo virtually divided into two camps: supporters of Gorbachev and Ligachev. But neither of these groups was cohesive. The persistent refusal to split the Party and discard the burden of its reactionary part became more and more dangerous to *perestroika*.

In the regions, the Party rapidly lost its power functions. The Soviets proved to be incapable of assuming power. One can only wonder that the state survived two more years... In most of the country, it must have been primarily due to the inertia of horizontal economic and administrative interdependence developed over decades. The Soviet system and the CPSU were losing their legitimacy.

The Center no longer had control over society. The heavy criticism of the Soviet system and Soviet history (practically a denunciation and discrediting) did not meet a serious ideological and political resistance.

The intelligentsia did not accept Gorbachev's attempts to stop this destructive process through arguments and admonitions. Meanwhile, Gorbachev rejected the demands of his colleagues to use force: it would have called into question all his policies and the philosophy of *perestroika*; it would have been the end of *glasnost* and of the democratization course. The fall of ideology took out one of the two main pillars that held the stability of Soviet society. The other one—fear and repressions—had been removed by Gorbachev even earlier.

A great number of all sorts of political clubs, blocs, unions, societies, associations, “tribunes,” “People’s fronts,” “platforms,” “movements,” etc., sprung up. They did not form a united opposition but in general presented a broad anti-Gorbachev and anti-communist position, aimed at taking power. The opposition grew impetuously in correlation with the sharp deterioration of the economic situation (the “empty store shelves”). The Inter-regional Group of People’s Deputies (Yu. Afanas’ev, Boris Yeltsin, Gavril Popov, Anatoly Sobchak and others) emerged as the opposition leader, with a program that was called the “Five Ds:” de-monopolization, decentralization, de-Partizanization, de-ideologization, and democratization.

An opposition movement formed within the Party itself, the “CPSU democratic platform,” which extended its influence to about 40 percent of Party members.

The collapse of the planned economy became irreversible, opening the playing field for “shadow merchants” and new “market participants” who in essence acted on the basis of private property. Significant material resources were concentrated in this environment (which was technically a thieves’ operation). People and groups from this milieu also wanted to play political role, at this point mostly from behind the scenes.

The “nationalities bomb” exploded. In the Caucasus, a real war broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh. The Baltic States were de facto no longer under Moscow’s control.

The Russian factor, the most dangerous for the integrity of the “empire,” came up. Together with it arose the “Yeltsin factor” and received strong support from the quickly-forming workers and strikers movements (aside from influential political forces).

The year’s paradox is that in contrast to the breakdown of the state, 1989 was the year that brought forth the truly historic fruit of Gorbachev’s foreign policy: the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan; the permanent rejection of the expansionist component from USSR’s international activity; the fall of the Berlin Wall and start of German reunification; the Malta Conference, which signified the end of the Cold War; the beginning of Eastern European countries’ exit from the “socialist commonwealth” and the liquidation of “communist” regimes there as the result of Gorbachev’s rejection of the use of force to preserve it.

The 1989 entries are saturated with personal feelings and impressions. They include a great deal about Gorbachev as a person and a statesman; critical observations of his behavior in various situations. Sometimes his actions could be contradictory, and they were not always suitable to his level.

However, the author of these entries is not inclined to accuse Gorbachev of any grave mistakes. Overall, this is not about mistakes. Long before Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet system exhausted its historic mission in Russia, and was doomed to dissipate. Objectively, *perestroika* could not have saved it; and as it turned out, this was not one of its goals. Nobody could have stopped the flow of events that was spurred by the Russian understanding of “freedom,” granted by Gorbachev. It is no accident that responsible, competent and sufficiently numerous people did not come forth from the Stalinist era cadres to organize the movement to the new quality of society.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1990

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January 1, 1990.

To continue last year's theme: around a month and a half ago, after yet another meeting with a foreign politician, M.S. [Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev] told me, then Shakhnazarov, then Yakovlev: "I have fulfilled my mission!"

It is true. But I do not think that he will want to leave. It is more likely that he will have to become "president," which will bring about another "pause"—people will be looking to see how he will take charge and manage things without the burden of Ligachev, the PB [Politburo], and the CC [Central Committee].

I re-read *The History of Pugachev* after coming back from the dacha (I was still under the spell of *The Squire's Daughter*, which I found on my bed-side table). How simple things were back then! Words meant what they meant, moral norms were indubitable, the Motherland was always right, etc. That is why the language that Pushkin made to correspond with the norms of the time was so clear and simple.

January 2, 1990.

Glancing at my last diary entry, I realized that there was not a word about M.S.' visit to Italy, nor the Pope, nor Malta.

There is absolutely no time to write and, most importantly, I don't know how to telegraphically summarize (like in Blok's diaries!) the essence of my views on current events (although this method leaves a great deal unexplained).

So: we were in Italy on November 24-30th, then Malta—on the ship "Maxim Gorky" from November 30th to December 2nd.

I am used to such trips and they do not particularly excite me personally. I try to avoid formal events (lunches, banquets), and this time I visited only one—at the Prime Minister's at Capitoline. I found myself in the company of such talkative women at the reception (they spoke French) that with the accompaniment of wine I allowed myself to use my French to have a hearty conversation. A propos!

I lived with M.S. at the "Abimelech," plus two secretaries. Not a comfortable setup. As usual, there is a lot of work and commotion, no time to think ponder the essence of things and to reflect.

Again and again we saw the people's fantastically sincere sympathy with Gorbachev, at times multiplied by the Italian temperament. This is not just popularity...

The talks and the signed documents don't seem significant: all of this has already been done before with other countries and so far little of it is being turned into action (for us and for them). The heart of the matter is the change of atmosphere in the general political situation.

I felt this most acutely in Milan. It was some kind of mass hysteria. The cars could barely move through the crowds along the streets. When M.S. stepped out on the La Scala square and started walking to the Municipality, something unbelievable was going on... the crowd was a solid mass, which barely parted to let him take a few steps. Everywhere, in the windows, on the rails, on any protruding surface people were on top of each other. There was a deafening cry of "Gorby! Gorby!" The police was trampled. The security services had a heart attack. Only innate culture prevented people from crushing each other to death.

Later, after M.S.' speech at the Municipality (as he later admitted, he botched the speech because he was in shock and couldn't find the right words) he came out and a group of women broke through to his car. You could tell by their clothes that they were from the high circles of society, the establishment. Utterly hysterical, with tears in their eyes, they threw themselves at the car windows, when the guards tore them away they tried to run back, etc.

What is this? In the past we did not know and could not understand to what terror we subjected Europe with our military might, our 1968, our Afghanistan; and the shock the Europeans felt after we installed the SS-20s. We did not want to know this: we were demonstrating socialism's power. And now Gorby removed this terror. The country now appears to be normal, even unfortunate.

This is it! This is why now Gorbachev is not just the "man of the year" but the "man of the decade." Again and again: with our revolutions we give more to others than to ourselves.

We arrived in **Malta** at night, and again we were met with a pandemonium by the Palace in honor of Gorby's visit.

About Malta—Gorbachev-Bush. A lot has been written on this "event of the century," about everything related to it. Arbatov, who hates expenditures on the naval forces, expressed himself in his sarcastically-Jewish manner: I told you that the naval forces are useless, plus the rightness of "Socialist Realism" (this is regarding the fact that we provided the ship "Maxim Gorky." Initially the plan was to conduct the meetings in turn on the American frigate and our cruiser, but a storm got in the way. We had to conduct the talks on our ship).

Now, getting to the point. Despite the sensational nature of the event, I did not for a second hold my breath in excitement. To me (maybe because I am tired, constantly worried not to forget or miss something) it seemed like a regular, normal affair... M.S. acted like he and Bush were old pals—frank and simple, and openly well-intentioned.

M.S. knows that the negotiations over how many missiles to we cut back on today or tomorrow are not the deciding matter. **The deciding factor is that the USSR and U.S. are no longer enemies. This is the most important thing.** Khrushchev also wanted this, but ideology got in his way. He wanted to win the "war" in favor of socialism and to bury capitalism, without starting a war or spilling a drop of blood.

M.S. does not believe in any ideology. He often says: are we supposed to duel just because we believe in different gods? This is not just a funny metaphor, it is his true conviction.

He knows that nobody will start a war against us. There is no real military threat. We need the army for the superpower prestige, and internally because there is nothing we can do with it right now. It has turned into an organic burden on society. There are more marshals and generals in Moscow alone than in the rest of the world combined! This is a political and social problem. It is fine that Arbatov and “Ogonek” are yelping at Yazov and Akhromeev and tearing at their coattails, they’re in a good spot! But what is it like for Gorbachev with this horde and armada!

In a word, Gorbachev played up the symbolism so beloved by people in the West to do away with the “Soviet threat.” Truly, it is unlikely that anybody believes in it anymore, except for the most unenlightened... For in reality it does not exist while there is Gorbachev and *perestroika*.

Both of them (M.S. and Bush) truly looked “good” together—and gave hope to all of humanity.

I did not fly to Moscow with everybody after Malta, but as agreed beforehand with M.S., I returned to Rome on the invitation of Rubbi-Occhetto and spent the night at our embassy. I spent five days in Italy, walking around the streets and museums, visiting Rubbi and Boffa. More about this later.

About the Pope. “For them” it is another great event, but for us it passed almost without notice. It did not even have an impact on the events in Lvov. However, it takes time to evaluate the consequences of such a meeting. History will be its judge. I was not present during the one-on-one meeting with the Pope (unlike the meeting with Bush), but read the transcript. They spoke like two good Christians, but modern and politicized.

There was a Politburo scheduled for today. On the 31st I was notified in an unusual manner: “Comrade Gorbachev is inviting you...” (as opposed to the usual “such-and-such a date, at such-and-such an hour”). There was an alarm from Yakovlev and Gusenkov that there would be a final “conversation” on who stands for what and with whom.

Shakhnazarov called an hour ago. He was there. Nothing happened. M.S. calmly reviewed the year (like his New Year’s address), there was a bit of discussion; he talked about (Ryzhkov’s) economic program that was approved at the Congress. He said that work should start on day one; stated that 1990 will be the deciding year. If we do not change the situation with supplies for the better, “we have to leave.” He scheduled the Supreme Soviet Presidium for January 4th, and the Supreme Soviet itself for February 15th. But he identified for discussion at the Supreme Soviet only... the tax code! (Again lagging on private property and land).

Then they discussed the topic for the Congress. Medvedev prepared a platform for discussion—85 pages! M.S. proposed to reduce it to 50, some to 40, and Shakhnazarov called out, “20!” “But,” he added, “I was not heard.” (This means my project is completely sidelined!)

Medvedev suggested to develop the theme of “workers private property” for the platform (it is Gorbachev’s device to cover new ideas with old words. This device is sometimes handy, but more often a hindrance).

They discussed what to do with Eastern Europe. M.S. proposed to analyze and project; paying particular attention to the fact that Communists have been removed from power, and in some places sentenced to oblivion. The question is what to do with East European Communist parties. He again complained that, “where we are late, there will be an inevitable outbreak,” even in such economically sound countries as the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

There was a discussion on when he should go to Lithuania. Someone (Shakhnazarov did not say who) suggested to stall it as long as possible. For this is our last chance. If matters follow the same course, it will be a blow to M.S.’ prestige and *perestroika*’s authority. Lukyanov added (and he is right): “The new Communist Party of Lithuania will vehemently defend its decisions. This is the only way to get results at the elections. If it budges, it will be obliterated!” In a word, it is better not to go without Shakhnazarov’s idea, without the proposal to make an agreement between “Lithuania and the USSR,” or it will be a total failure.

That was it. It seems Yakovlev was keeping quiet.

They also talked about Azerbaijan, where the People’s Front practically has the power and where the situation on the Iranian border is becoming more and more dangerous. A breakthrough of women and children is being prepared under the banner of the Great Azerbaijan!

No conclusions were reached.

In a word, M.S. is again acting his role of unifier, pacifier, and adviser.

Dangerous!

January 3, 1990.

I leaning more and more (with my experience, in which my entire life and politics is turned towards Gorbachev) to the idea that until he throws off the image of “a communist who is true to socialist values,” he will not be able to move *perestroika* any further. Society has gone too far from this concept, while the “Party” clings on to it in order to pull it back—to socialism without Stalin and repressions, to “that very one” that was “mostly built.”

Gusenkov told me that M.S. and the team have set out for Novo-Ogarevo to prepare the Plenum (on the pre-congress Platform), which is scheduled for January 29-30th.

It seems that the year 1990 will be the last in my political life... What am I saying—“seems.” It is certain: and the final point will be the Party Congress in October. (How many times have I tried to convince M.S. to convene the Congress as soon as possible—an urgent one to replace the CC!).

Most likely this is the extent of my physical life. I can't remember whether I predicted it already in '89? But now it is more realistic.

January 4, 1990.

This morning I was reading Marquis de Sade. It's an interesting read, even though it's not the first time that I'm turning to these two volumes, bought in Rome 10 years ago. In any case, the enlightenment aspect is obvious and besides it's a historical era! But the passions are still the same.

Voinovich's *Ivankiada* is printed in "Druzhba Nadorov" [Friendship of Nations] No. 12. I'm falling behind the events... At least I have time to think.

My prediction is that we will be saved when *perestroika* becomes routine, when the people will become nationalized, under the condition that the food situation in Russia will improve at least a little bit. But the Union will begin to "contract." The Baltics will become a "negotiated" part of the Union... while Russia will be expanded from within by the Tatars, Bashkir, Yakut, Komi, etc.

January 6, 1990.

It turns out I needn't have written my draft of the Platform. At work I mostly caught up on the information I missed during my illness. M.S. is working in the CC but called me only towards the evening. He says: "I read your 'memo' to the fellows at Volynskoe (all the teams are there right now to prepare materials for the Plenum and for Lithuania). Everybody liked it... Let them work on it, then we'll get together in a narrow circle and finish it up before the Plenum."

He was cheerful and animated. Following my suggestion he cancelled all his meetings before the New Year (Modrow, Gyzi, Assad, Kinnock, Abe, Auren, Delors, Walesa, and somebody else). Then all of a sudden yesterday morning Falin tells me that from a car phone he received instructions to prepare a meeting with Abe for January 15th. (I saw it immediately: Yakovlev's work, he was in Japan recently). I write M.S. a note: what are you doing? How will the others take it when you refuse them?

In the evening, when he called me, I started on this subject again. "It's alright Tolya, he just needs 20 minutes of my time for the TV. You guessed "source" correctly though! (laughing)... As for Kinnock and the others, we'll be fine without them, as long as *perestroika* is alive!" (laughing again)

By the way, some American correspondent managed to get me on the phone last night and persistently kept asking me why M.S. cancelled all the meetings. "Is the internal situation that bad? Or is he ill?!" Today these speculations are already circulating around TASS. It appears the West could not care less that M.S. doesn't have a moment to catch his breath... he has less time and more on his plate than Bush, Thatcher and Mitterrand, who can afford to appear before the press practically every day.

January 21, 1990.

Today is the anniversary of Lenin's death. Unnoticeable.

On January 15th there was a meeting between M.S. and Abe... there were broad hints at the possibility of resolving some "difficult questions" (the islands). Japan is buzzing with guesses and discussions.

M.S. later told me: "They will have to be disappointed in Gorbachev." By the way, Yeltsin was recently in Japan and proposed a reasonable plan (his whole "lecture" there was right on the dot, regrettably... he was also calmer regarding Gorbachev, but pointed correctly at the dangers and weaknesses).

On January 16th there was a meeting with Perez de Cuellar. It was just... polite empty politeness. No matter how hard we try to squeeze some real universalism from the UN, all we've been able to get so far is only symbolic.

Together with Petrovsky, the MFA and Zagladin we prepared a speech for M.S. for the forum on ecology-survival. He presented it on January 19th and I heard he was pleased with himself: foreigners from 83 countries created a "euphoria" for him. This stands in contrast to the meeting with the workers, peasants and the engineer-technical personnel at the Kremlin Palace (18-19th), where he recycled the same tired wordage and he was asked trite and shameless questions by the "representatives" of the working class... they heaped him with outraged questions along the lines of "do you have any idea what's happening in the provinces," and with production?! Why does he need these "meetings" on TV?.. They only demonstrate the Center's and his own inability to deal with the economic crisis. Yeltsin predicted that M.S. has enough credit left for less than a year.

Yesterday morning the PB held a secret meeting on Azerbaijan. Ivan Frolov later told me that M.S. is leaning towards convening the Congress in June! So it plays out according to Yeltsin: more and more, M.S. listens only to himself. Last summer, Frolov and I tried to convince him that the Congress should have been held in '89, before the Supreme Soviet, or at least before the Congress of the People's Deputies. He eventually came to this conclusion himself, but again the moment has passed... And his attempts to keep the party are causing him to lose it, while he is left entangled with Ligachev & Co., the Department of Party Organizational Work and other departments, not to mention the obkom [oblast committee] leaders, like the recently expelled Bogomiakov (in Tyumen).

I was not at the forum myself, as I had prompted him to give me and Shakhnazarov an assignment to completely rework the Platform, which he is bringing to the Plenum on January 29-30th and to pre-Congress discussion. The one prepared by Medvedev & Co. over the course of four months and then "attuned" under M.S.' own leadership in Novo-Ogarevo (Yakovlev, Medvedev, Frolov, Boldin and myself) was sickening: 54 pages of muddled soup, with barely discernible thoughts and positions.

So: M.S. asked me twice about the impression I got from his trip to Lithuania. I said: you might have made the process of leaving [the Union] a little more civilized, but you didn't stop it... and the most important thing in this regard is the Plenum—in Lithuania you made public

promises about the Platform, saying it would have everything. But they will not see in it what you promised—regarding the federation, socialism, the Party, and about Stalinism (you called the regime totalitarian for the first time)... i.e. you went much further [in Lithuania] than what is in the Novo-Ogarevo 54-page version. Something has to be done about this.

He says: yes, we came up with some kind of murky product. You know... why don't you and Shakhnazarov go to Volynskoe and make a new version before the PB (January 22). Can you do it? And make it concise and programmatic, not drawn out. I'll be grading you!

Shakh and I withdrew ourselves and worked according to the following method: I edited him, he edited me, then I him again and he me. I re-write, he finishes up. In 72 hours we put together a version that was only half as long. On Friday evening I sent it to M.S. There has been no reaction yet; he's been busy elsewhere... a war has started in Azerbaijan. It's a state of emergency, people are shooting at soldiers, the soldiers started shooting back, there are hundreds of casualties... the People's Front of Azerbaijan has turned to the world community—to save the people from genocide by the Russians, etc. M.S. is in endless meetings, yesterday made a solemn speech on TV. But Baku is raging under different flags, despite the curfew and tanks... By now the main motto is—leave the USSR.

M.S. does not have a political solution, except for the natural responsibility of protecting the people from pogroms, massacres, having Armenians burned in the streets, and the like.

The situation in Lithuania and the events in Azerbaijan have incited demonstrations in Krasnodar, Stavropol, Rostov on the Don, Tuapse, and the Cossack villages and communities in the North Caucasus, where Yazov (the idiot) ordered to call up the reservists. This caused a wave of protests: “No to a new Afghanistan!” “Why must Russian men die because of these Armenians and Azerbaijanis! Let them figure it out themselves, and in the meanwhile they are speculating in our markets!”... etc.

So, under the influence of all of this I remembered Astaf'ev-Rasputin's “concept” (plus, I am reading V. Solovyov's *Russkii vopros* [The Russian Question]) and started leaning towards the idea that the USSR's multinational problem can only be solved through the “Russian question”... Let Russia leave the USSR and let the others “do as they please.” Although, if Ukraine leaves too, for a while we will cease being a “great power.” So what, we'll survive! And we will eventually return this “title” through the revival of Russia. By the way, Yeltsin said that he is running for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and wants to become its president! I think he will go down this path. As for Gorbachev, he is no longer trusted with this post in Russia. That's how it plays out: Yeltsin will reap the fruit of a great historical change for which everyone—Russia and the whole world—are indebted to Gorbachev.

Yesterday at the CC I was reading up on the events in the world. Eastern Europe is pushing away from us completely and there is nothing we can do... It is becoming more and more evident that the All-European home will get started without us, without the USSR, which for now (!) can exist in its neighborhood!

The Communist Movement is crumbling everywhere.

A new, totally new era is upon us...

We need to move decisively and boldly away from the stereotypes of Leninism, otherwise we will be left on the outskirts of world history. Meanwhile, “fears” from the past still hold Gorbachev by the coattails. It seems that with his instinct and heart he is eager to reach new freedoms, but his reason cannot grasp everything... or he is afraid to “draw conclusions”—political ones.

January 28, 1990.

On Monday there was PB, discussing the “CPSU Platform” composed by Skakh and me and edited by M.S. The level [of discussion] is hopelessly bad. Although Egor did “quiet down” and was not too aggressive, though he did say that he is strongly opposed to “a multiparty system.”

By the way, M.S. picked new secretaries for the PB: Usmanov, Stroev, Girenko, Manaenkov, etc. “Good guys.” But they shouldn’t be above the level of a mid-level oblast committee. Why should they be in the highest echelon? He himself keeps talking about intellectual potential!

Nevertheless on Monday M.S. called together Yakovlev, Medvedev, Frolov, Boldin, Shakhnazarov, and me. He “interpreted” the PB’s outcomes, so Shakhnazarov and I would edit our text accordingly.

We spent the whole day in his office. He did not give up his positions on the multi-party system and private property, but ordered that we make it “more rounded.” He agreed with me that the term “Marxism-Leninism” should not be allowed into the Platform.

The next day Shakhnazarov and I went back to Volynskoe—we had three days to work. Although he assigned the social-economic section to Boldin and Petrakov (a corresponding member, his new adviser), we still had to rework what they sent us.

The work was boisterous and exciting. We pretty much had to rewrite the main parts of the text; not without some Shakhnazarov-Chernyaev conflicts. But I was compromisingly stubborn and even declared to Zhorka—“then we will offer alternative texts: your version and my version.” M.S. laughed about this... Shakhnazarov has a very strong legalistic, jurisprudential “flux,” which separates him from Soviet realities and goes against Gorbachev’s tactics of introducing new (even purely Western) ideas without provoking the mastodons (this is not always good and proper, but on the whole it was this technique that brought success to democratization and *glasnost*).

Yesterday we presented the material to M.S. He went over it and the new draft was sent out to the PB.

Yakovlev appeared at Volynskoe unexpectedly. At first I thought maybe M.S. sent him to manage over us for a bit. Turned out it was “worse...” In strict secrecy he told me that M.S. called him to his office twice, and once even came over to Yakovlev’s office himself. He is

frustrated, anxious, and lonely. Asking what to do with Azerbaijan, Lithuania, the economy, “radicals,” “social-democrats”... and people are on the edge.

What did Yakovlev say he told M.S. (and the latter listened)?

“You have to act. The biggest obstacle to *perestroika* and your entire politics is the Politburo, then the Plenum. There is no need to convene it so often. If you continue to delay taking power, everything will fall apart. In the next couple of weeks, maybe instead of the Supreme Soviet that is scheduled for the middle of February, you should convene a Congress of People’s Deputies and establish presidential power. Let the Congress elect you president.” (By the way, M.S. agreed with this in principle even in Novo-Ogarevo and the idea was even included in the second draft of the Platform, which was at the PB on January 22nd. But there wasn’t enough resolution to do it immediately, without delaying it till May or the fall).

“Thus,” A.N. [Yakovlev] continued, “to concentrate the real, plenipotentiary State power in your hands, removing the Politburo and even the talkative Supreme Soviet from the levers of power.”

“In the next few days before the Plenum, which is now scheduled for February 5-6,” Yakovlev continued, “appear on TV and make a direct appeal to the people, accepting full responsibility for the truly emergency program according the formula: land to the peasants, factories to the workers, real independence for republics, not a Union state, but a union of states, multi-party system and the practical rejection of CPSU’s monopoly, large loans from the West, military reform—get rid of the generals and replace them with Colonels, recall troops from Eastern Europe, liquidate the Ministries, sharply reduce the apparatus—all forms of it, etc. Plus, special emphasis (in the TV speech) on a series of emergency economic measures (in principle—private enterprise; apparently, Slyunkov, who is in opposition to Ryzhkov-Maslyukov, has a preparatory paper on this)... Furthermore: start the process of replacing Ryzhkov. You cannot make any reforms with a Premier who thinks on the level of a factory director, with State Planning that was raised on the methods of the military-industrial complex.”

“And who instead?” M.S. asked Yakovlev.

“There are plenty of people, you just have to take them more boldly, that’s what a revolution is for!”

Yakovlev did not let me know what M.S. agreed with and what he didn’t. M.S. followed his usual course, telling Yakovlev to “go to Volynskoe, lock the doors there and don’t tell anyone a word. Take a couple trusted people with you who know how to write, and prepare a speech for TV, we’ll go from there.”

I responded to Yakovlev: in a word, we are talking about a coup d’Etat here...

“Yes,” A.N. agreed. “And we cannot delay.”

Yakovlev is also very opposed to rescheduling the Party Congress to June. M.S. agreed to this at the meeting of workers and engineer-technical personnel in the Kremlin on January 18-

19th. Yakovlev is against it because the apparatus together with the “working class” will send to the Congress the kind of people who will break the necks of both Gorbachev and *perestroika* too. The Congress will oppose itself to the parliament and we will have chaos... In general, Yakovlev is proposing that the Party is “pushed aside” right now—let it go down the path of the SED and the CPCz, PUWP, i.e. to fall apart or turn into one of the social-democratic parties (Yu.

Afanas’ev already created an association of social-democratic parties in Tallinn), etc. A rebellion has indeed started in the party, but as they say, it is ambiguous: the Leningrad affair, Bogomyakov was expelled in Tyumen, in Volgograd it was Kalashnikov. The CC apparatus in Baku expelled Vezirov from the Party. But who is replacing them? Younger and worse people—anti-Gorbachev representatives of the very “working class,” the mythology of which Gorbachev can’t seem to shake.

Gorbachev is hesitating...

Thus, the coming week (the CC Plenum (5-6th), if it’s not cancelled) could be decisive. It could... but most likely will not be. But we really cannot delay any longer.

On Thursday (January 25th) M.S. called us from Volynskoe (Yakovlev, me and Shakhnazarov) to the CC—to discuss **the German problem**. Also present were Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, Kryuchkov, Falin, Fedorov and Akhromeev. We were there for 4 hours. I proposed to focus on the FRG, since we no longer have any support in the GDR capable of influencing the process. What’s more—to focus particularly on Kohl, not on the SPD, which has turned the whole matter into an object of the election campaign.

As for Kohl (he still holds more to the “theory” of unification within the framework of the pan-European process), he is bound by allies and is more faithful in personal relations with M.S. Also, he understands that he will lose to Brandt-Figel [sic]. I am not opposed to inviting Modrow to Moscow (although this is of little importance, the question of his reception was decided long ago). We should deal with Gyzi, why attach ourselves to a party that will soon practically cease to exist! (Others did not agree). And then, convene “the six players”: the US, Great Britain, France, USSR, plus Kohl and Modrow, i.e. the winners and losers of the war. And come to an agreement... because the German unification process cannot be stopped, but we need to make sure that it takes place with us present and not against it.

Everyone agreed with the “six players.” But they argued that we should use other channels of influence (Shakh suggested focusing on the SPD, Yakovlev supported him). Shevardnadze mostly supported me. Ryzhkov is against “giving everything to Kohl.” Kryuchkov is, as always, for everything that will be accepted. Although he did confirm that the SED no longer exists and that all the GDR’s government structures have collapsed, it is no longer a real state.

Ryzhkov said that the incompatible economies present an obstacle for unification...

As for Fedorov, he argued that nobody wants unification, especially in the FRG! This is our chief expert on Germany!!

M.S. outlined five points for action to orient ourselves:

1. The FRG: Kohl and the SPD.
2. The “six players.”
3. Modrow and the SED (“it is impossible that of 2.5 million party members there is no one to constitute a real force!”)
4. London, Paris—“I might just fly over there, a day per capital!”
5. Akhromeev is to prepare the withdrawal of troops from the GDR. This is more an internal than external problem. There are 300 thousand troops; 100 thousand of them are officers with families. We have to put them somewhere!

February 25, 1990.

Today is the day of the “February revolution of 1990” as declared by Yu. Afanas’ev and his ilk. Its main manifestation is going to take place on Zubovsky square; outside my window are trucks with Ministry of the Interior troops, between buildings and in courtyards are crowds of plain-clothes militia.

In the last few days they have stirred panic, which probably comes mostly from the law enforcement agencies and the apparatus themselves. All the Jewry is waiting for pogroms and fleeing the country... tens of thousands every month.

There is a wave of meetings around the country leading to the “dispersal” of regional and oblast committees and sweeping resignations of leaders of local significance.

The Moscow demonstrations are also carrying the slogans of “new deputies” and “do away with the Kremlin mafia.” They even wanted to form a human chain around the Kremlin. For a long time M.S. did not react, but then he understood the danger and off it went: statement by the Supreme Soviet, statement by the CC; statement by the government, mobilization of forces... At the last PB there was a special discussion about the 17 thousand internal security forces, protection of the RC (rocket complexes), etc. Mobile security services for elite buildings... The fact of the matter is that fliers were hung around Arbat with a photo of the building on Plotnikov lane, specifying the apartments of PB members Slyun’kov, Medvedev, Zaikov, Biryukova, Shevardnadze...

From the start, the “presidential process” met with resistance from the Supreme Soviet. They barely agreed to include the presidency question on the session’s agenda, but refused to schedule a date for the Congress. Shakhnazarov and I spent a long time preparing a concept of presidential power. Yesterday it was distributed to members of the Supreme Soviet, on Thursday it was discussed at the PB (this requires a special mention). Its discussion by the Supreme Soviet is scheduled for February 27th, at which point they will also schedule a date for the Congress (at the PB M.S. offered March 6-7th). Should the Supreme Soviet not support it, M.S. will be in a position of practically failing.

Three ideas are circulating around (in the Supreme Soviet too):

- A referendum and then election by the whole population. This would mean a long delay.
- Just renaming Gorbachev from Chairman of the Supreme Soviet to President. This is offered by people who are afraid that someone else might slip in instead of M.S.
- To elect the president alternatively through a secret ballot at the Congress.

M.S., who just a little while ago didn't even want to hear the word "president," is for the third option—as the fairest.

Judging by the comments in narrow circles and by the call I got from R.M. [Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva] I got the feeling that Gorbachev is ready to leave. He has made his great contribution and now the people to whom he gave freedom are deciding their own fate... however they want and are able to. Although, he is being held back by a feeling of responsibility and the hope that it might still be possible to regulate the process.

At the PB, all members except Ligachev took the floor and spoke "in favor" of presidency. But when the question of the CC Plenum (according to the Charter) came up, E.K. wanted to toss in a dead cat: with his face pale, he violently demanded that the Plenum be convened before the Congress of People's Deputies, so the CC, the Party (CC) nominated a president and presented him to the Congress. He made a speech: "The Party is the only thing we have left, the only thing we can rely on to save everything. If we neglect the party—it will be the end!"

Ryzhkov supported him.

M.S., as always, immediately succumbed to Ligachev; turning red and not understanding the latter's intentions. He started talking about the "role of the party" and with a calendar in hand tried to figure out when the Plenum could be held (elections are taking place in RSFSR and other republics).

Prokofiev (First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee), who was present at the PB, saved the situation (which is strange, judging by the recent anti-Gorbachev Moscow City Committee Plenum). He stood up and said: if the CC Plenum nominates a president—the whole thing will be ruined. The Supreme Soviet will say "so, you cancelled the sixth article of the Constitution but you want to keep everything as it was, retaining the monopoly and the party's power through the president"... and they will bury it...

This sobered people up, including M.S. The Plenum was scheduled for March 11th. But it's not clear whether the Supreme Soviet will agree to March 6-7th as the date for the Congress.

Yakovlev stops by every day, brings me his "reflections," which he has together with M.S. Judging by A.N.'s conclusions, Gorbachev has made up his mind to detach himself from the PB (once again, too late by a year, if not more) and transfer the center of power "to the presidency."

Then why does he gather the PB every week? To let them discuss papers from which a “death sentence” is staring in the faces of the majority of the members.

Yakovlev believes that “they” are already working against him with the army and the KGB. That’s where the panic is coming from, and the pogrom moods (to provoke people to demand an iron fist!) Yakovlev thinks that both Nina Andreeva and the Jew Evseev, who is strung out on anti-Semitism, and Vasiliev (from “Pamiat”) are all paid agents of the KGB (but not Kryuchkov’s; he is manipulated by a team led by the more-or-less decent Chebrikov). A.N. showed me the protocol of Lubyanka’s core party members—it is a program of a Nina Andreeva-type coup, packaged into traditional phrases (demands to M.S.) and “promises” to restore order.

What can M.S. lean on in such a situation? He pushed away the people with empty shelves and disorder; he pushes away *perestroika*-minded Party members by embracing Ligachev; he pushed away the intelligentsia by clear support for Bondarev, Belov, Rasputin; and he pushed away the nationals by not giving them complete freedom or by saving them from each other.

The opportunity has been missed... he should have broken the constitutional norms and convened an emergency Congress of the People’s Deputies immediately after the January Plenum. He should have emphasized the idea that they themselves can decide whether they have gathered in Moscow legally or illegally; and he would have been elected President. Let the left and the right squeal afterwards. But they would have been dealing with the President of the country!

I went to a meeting on Smolenskaya and Zubovskaya streets. There was organization, security, clearly paid “carriers” of banners with slogans. Yu. Afanas’ev declared, when the stream of people coming from the direction of the Park of Culture merged with the others, that 500 thousand people showed up. Visually and from my experience with May Day demonstrations in Red Square, I would say there were around 100 thousand... The main themes were against forcing panic and persecution, which is allegedly organized by the authorities to thwart the rallies; and against the presidency.

Not a single good word was said about M.S. Someone called on him to step back; a certain Kuznetsov called Gorbachev’s entire policy a crime, and the like.

The resolution Yu. Afanas’ev read out was rather “loyal.” The gist of it is to liquidate the “existing order” and replace the people in power.

This begs the analogy: Nicholas II and the Manifesto of 1905. He gave freedom but wanted people to use it at his discretion. It resulted in a rebellion.

Yes, what Afanase’ev & Co. represent is already a party. A party of overthrowing the existing system, a party of demagogery that is inevitable in a situation like this—it is impossible to get to power without it.

M.S. (to return to my observations at work) is moving things along towards a real multi-party system. Otherwise there couldn't have appeared a note signed by Kruchina and Pavlov (deputy of the CC's Legal Department) regarding the inventory of Party property and preparation to return everything that belongs to the Party-State (ciphered information systems and communications, private phones, the enormous party buildings, security details, services that are excessive for a mere political party, etc). The deadline—two months.

Yakovlev keeps asking me when he should send in his resignation from the PB. I tell him: your resignation will be the final answer to the question posed at the meeting, "Who are you with, Mikhail Sergeyevich?" Yakovlev discussed his resignation with M.S., too. At first he was meant to be the vice-president. But even the Supreme Soviet Presidium did not accept this position. This means that the maximum he could be is a member of the president's cabinet... "I am not going to stay in the Party (i.e. in the apparatus, even the highest echelons)," Yakovlev kept telling me.

What else to mention from current events? M.S.' responses to "Pravda" on the German question. I put them together in one morning. He was looking for me all around town, found me from a car and handed over an assignment. Up until then he wanted to tell "Pravda" only about the troops (195 thousand), but then decided to tell them about the GDR-FRG as well. It was received properly everywhere.

As the same S. Kuznetsov said, "he is a fading star, whose light is still somewhat visible in the West."

The PB discussed the CPSU Charter for six hours and finally came to the conclusion that a lot of new wine has been poured into old skins, but the skins are still very perceptible. Frolov spoke against using the word "democratic"... if someone else had said something like this, M.S. would have ignored it. But in this case he immediately paid attention. Well, even Van'ka comes in useful with his impudence.

Akhromeev spoke at a meeting in the "Wings of Soviets" Palace of Sports in a row with Nina Andreeva, who was giving a report! What does this mean? The President's adviser in an embrace with Nina Andreeva!!! Maybe he is also afraid of being exposed?.. Especially if they start on Afghanistan, on SS-20s and such.

Nenashev got a dressing down at the PB on Thursday... State funds (although, they are public!) are being spent on TV that disgraces and discredits the government and the party! Everyone was clamoring. Ryzhkov made a scene: he will not allow his wife to be publicly ridiculed on screen! And if this happens again, he doesn't know what he'll do!

...Nenashev tried to fight back (supported by Medvedev) that TV reflects what goes on in society, it's the mirror...

But they kept telling him: people don't even want to turn on the "black box" anymore, it shows life to be so terrible and hopeless.

And the like. But when it came to figuring out what to do, Frolov's idea about creating a Party channel was not accepted (this would mean that soon other parties would have to be given their own channels too). Nenashev's idea about public channels along with State ones was also rejected. But M.S. first of all forbade the program "7 Days," where analysts gather whatever negativity took place over the course of the week and impose their personal antipathy to *perestroika* on society. Secondly, he was relentless about having a "Russian channel" on channel 2, either entirely or partially. "The channel 'Rossiya,'" he declared, "will be the core, it will set the political and moral tone to everything else." This is a dangerous idea... It means that Yu. Bondarev + Belov + "Pamyat" will have their own outlet on TV... No other way about it.

I cannot quite understand M.S. in this. Unless this is the "straw." Or he expects to save Russia, particularly through elections. But the new RSFSR parliament will most likely start by separating Russia from the USSR—and let all these Armenians and Lithuanians "take a hike"—a burden off our back.

On Friday, Craddock, Thatcher's international adviser (he came with Ambassador Braithwaite), stopped by my office. He was trying to find out whether Gorbachev will last. And against this background—our views on German unification. They are afraid. Madam (Thatcher) the more so than anyone else in Europe... she is afraid that Great Britain will lose its position as a "great power." Her messenger's logic and argumentation are understandable and in essence similar to our own. But they have an alternative: Germany in NATO.

We talked a great deal and excitedly for an hour and a half, and it was natural! When I came to my senses, I didn't even immediately realize that I hadn't been speaking with a "comrade."

March 3, 1990.

Yesterday's PB was very disturbing. M.S. was not in the role of bearer of New Thinking, but in the role of a typical statesman from the past. At first they discussed the February 25th meetings. Ryzhkov started out: a great victory has been held over "them," and we should continue to pressure them in this manner. Kryuchkov referred to the agents: the people finally felt that "we have power," and more in this vein. Finally, Bakatin (Minister of Internal Affairs) threw them all off this track: what victory?! We intimidated the people. Out of fear many of them did not go to the meetings. That's why they did not have a million people, but they could have had it. And in reality, the rally in Moscow gathered more than Kryuchkov's estimate of 70-100 thousand, it was closer to 230-300 thousand. Intimidation created order, but this is not a viable policy. In a month, or on May 1st, they will gather their million. And they will go to the Kremlin, as promised. What then? Shoot them, bring out the batons and armored vehicles against them?! What committee are we going to create in the Supreme Soviet then? This is a mass phenomenon, it is fed by general dissatisfaction and we should not underestimate it. We need a policy with dialogue at the core. We need a "round table." If I am not understanding something correctly, then I should leave my post. But I disagree with what the PB members are saying here.

Bakatin's speech created a deafening impression. Nobody mentioned "victory" after that. But Bakatin himself took a hit and most of all from Gorbachev himself:

- A panicky attitude. This must be the Minister's environment, so he reports it.
- The leaders' slogans are not the public's slogans. There is dissatisfaction, and they are speculating on it.
- The working class has not come out and said its word yet.¹
- The "round table" is nonsense. We have no one to sit down at the table with, and no reason to do so. "They" do not represent anybody. If Bakatin would like, let him conduct a round table with "them."
- (Reads quotes from speeches by Gavrila Popov, Stankevich, Chernichenko, Boncharov, Ryzhov...) "All of these bastards," Gorbachev continues, "are political scoundrels. We can give them no trust and no round tables!"
- "They" all praised the police. Bakatin, you hear how much they like you!
- Now "they" are not just crying out "down with Ligachev" or "down with Gorbachev," they are yelling "down with the CPSU," and the latest "down with the KGB, which was always close to the party."
- They want to trample on everything and leave power lying in the dust, where they would just come and pick it up.

In a word, on the one hand they tried his patience, on the other, it seems he is trying the presidency on for size. Of course, the regional politicians have shown themselves to be complete amateurs and intriguers, but they are not all scoundrels. Gorbachev himself drew Ryzhkov and Stankevich into drafting the concept of presidency. And now they not only took a position that is a 180 degree reversal of what they promised him, but also emerged as the organizers of a public vilification campaign of Gorbachev both at the Supreme Soviet and on the street. They pointed fingers at him, saying this is the one who craves personal power.

At Dezkin's² funeral I got into a conversation with Nemka Korzhavin (one of our major poets, we are friends). "I listened to what was happening at the Supreme Soviet," he said, "What wise-guys, what babbler! They say it all so logically, neatly, and reasonably about what the president should be like and how he should be furnished with laws and procedures. Only they are forgetting that we live in Russia, not England or America."

I added: "and it's foul that they are blaming Gorbachev; dumb that they do not see an opportunity to make real democratic power under Gorbachev, who is by nature against dictatorship and cultism. Precisely under him it would have been possible to develop various procedures and lay the foundations of necessary institutions of power."

"Yes," someone might say to me, "Lenin was also a stranger to cultism and tyrannical intentions, and look what happened!" But I would object that back then there was an ideology of dictatorship, while today we have an ideology of democracy.

What do "they" want, if they are thinking of State interests, not personal ambition? To have everything fall apart while we prepare a national ballot for presidency? And what have they

¹ My personal addendum: the working class had just said its word, for example in Donetsk, among other things demanding the resignation of the entire oblast committee. (author's note)

² Soviet poet David Samoilov (translator).

achieved? They have made Gorbachev swing in the direction of Ligachev. The spirit of Ligachev permeated all of his comments and speeches at this PB. Gorbachev agreed with him whenever he spoke and the only point on which he disagreed on was entering a resolution “on the unity of the party” into the CC Plenum.

Everyone at the PB came to the common conclusion to hold course toward driving the party’s sphere of influences to exclude Afanas’evs and the like, to push away and isolate the interregional players in order to “call the People’s Deputies to order” with the help of the Supreme Soviet. Otherwise it is outrageous that they receive 500-700 rubles of state salary when all they do is destroy the state and undermine the leadership.

Gorbachev made all the PB members state their opinion, although Zaikov, Yakovlev and Vorotnikov did not ask to speak. Everybody said something acceptable to Gorbachev, including Yakovlev. Although the latter did qualify his statement, thereby angering Ryzhkov, by saying that while our economy is in its present state we will not be able to achieve anything and no amount of “work with the masses” will help.

There was also a discussion of Gdlyan. At this point Gorbachev was right to work up a temper. He railed at Sukharev (Minister of Justice) and the same Bakatin, and mentioned Kryuchkov as well: the state’s top leadership is reviled, shamed, slandered... and who is doing this? Criminals who imprisoned mothers with many children, extortionists who recreated 1937 in Uzbekistan!³ Meanwhile all our law-enforcement agencies can do is whine! The law is the law! Are you afraid to find out that Gorbachev is a thief?! Is that what you are afraid of? If he is a thief, let them prove it. If need be, Gorbachev will do what the law requires. But if it is slander—Gorbachev added—Gdlyan and Ivan belong on the prisoners’ dock for contempt of supreme state leadership. It would be impossible to imagine anything like this taking place in any civilized country.

The question of Lithuania’s separation and the Union Treaty was discussed in the forceful vein, from the position of “one and indivisible” (Vorotnikov, for example, said this in earnest). Gorbachev was speaking in unison with Maslyukov, Ligachev, Ryzhkov, and the same Vorotnikov...

In a word, there is a break from reality that threatens to leave only one argument—tanks.

There is also something unsubstantial in the preparation for presidency; once again we’re concerned with making a nice inauguration speech instead of worrying about creating institutions. What is he going to do the day after the inauguration? With whom? How? After all, everyone is going to be counting each day of the presidency and expecting real change. Or, as his opponents believe, is he going to transfer the Politburo into the Presidential Committee and everything will remain the same?!

Or maybe he is consciously aiming for failure in order to “step down”? Unlikely... he would not be working up such a force...

³ Gdlyan and his accomplice Ivanov were investigating abuses in Uzbekistan, leading the so-called “Rashidov case” with flagrant disregard for the law. (author’s note)

Today again he called the Supreme Soviet Presidium. It seems (from the comments at the PB) he does not plan to discuss the presidency at the Plenum and to “nominate himself from the CPSU,” for, as Shakhnazarov and I warned him, he would immediately lose several voices at the Congress.

Today is his birthday. He is fifty-nine!

I was watching “Press-Club” on TV. It consists of young people’s footage which is then discussed by journalists from various media.

Three impressions:

1. Horror at the clips themselves (especially the “maximum security kindergarten”).
2. The anger of representatives from “Molodaya gvardiya” [Young Guard] and “Nash sovremennik” [Our contemporary]: it seems if Gorbachev were to appear among them, they would trample him.
3. The repulsiveness of the clever Jewish boys from “Moskovskii komsomolets” [Moscow Komsomol], the TV and elsewhere, who refute and debunk everyone in insulting and arrogant tones. Truly, you begin to “understand” the anti-Semites.

There is confusion in my heart. Society is falling apart; so far the rudiments of a new society are nowhere in sight. Judging by my latest observations, Gorbachev is losing a sense of control over the processes. It seems also has “gotten lost” (one of his favorite expressions) in what is going on and is beginning to look for “simple solutions” (another favorite formula).

And even I, saturated with politics as I am, want to hide from life and carry a gun in my pocket as something to rely on for spiritual calm.

March 22, 1990.

Today at the PB might have been the “Charnyna Tizsa”⁴ for Lithuania. Things are moving towards Czechoslovakia-’90. I am horrified. Everyone was chiming in with the most vulgar and conceited great-power sentiments. Yakovlev and Medvedev kept their silence.

What should I do? Yesterday he appointed me as Adviser to the President. But if he makes a massacre in Lithuania I am not only going to leave... I will probably do something else besides.

Today is a week (March 15) since he’s been president. But the Politburo is still in power.

The PB today rejected the CPSU’s “democratic platform” and came to an agreement on how to furnish the deputies elected to the RSFSR and the Moscow City Council.

March 25, 1990.

⁴ A township on the border with Czechoslovakia, where in August of 1968 Brezhnev’s Politburo was deciding the possibility of intervention. (author’s note)

M.S. received American teachers. Oh, what a peace of mind it gave him. He opened up, charmed them, and was full of “ideas” just like in the past, when he was on the ascent.

Soviet teachers will be resentful: look at that, he has plenty of time for American teachers while we are sitting here in shit.

Later we talked (after Admiral Crowe)...

I: Mikhail Sergeyevich, yesterday’s Politburo scared me.

He: It always scares you...

I: Not always. Sometimes it surprises me, or upsets me, or makes me laugh, or makes me indignant.

He: Why?

I: I am beginning to not understand you. I am used to being able to tell what your goals are, and what is just tactics. With Lithuania I am confused. If you are thinking to keep Lithuania by threats but without the use of troops—this is unrealistic. All your successes with *perestroika* are always tied to you being able to face reality, as YOU like to say. If you “do not rule out,” as you said yesterday at the Poliburo, “Varennikov’s option” (a state of emergency, direct presidential rule, introduction of three regiments and the “isolation” of the top at Vilnius, the use of Lithuanian marionettes who would “ask” for our troops, like in 1968 Prague) then it would be a complete failure. It would be the downfall of your great cause. And for what? For a superpower complex? Because economically we will not lose anything, and they will carefully follow all the conditions if we make an agreement, they have no choice!

He: Come on, Tolya, everything will be fine, everything will be done right!

He was listening to me and responding in passing, while flipping through some papers on his desk...

Yesterday the composition of the Presidential Council was announced. He had kept it a secret... I found out something from Yakovlev: regarding Aitmatov and Rasputin (!), against whom A.N. had vigorously protested. I heard about the rest yesterday on TV.

Once again, in this I am beginning not to understand him. He did not ask Shakhnazarov (his legal expert) about this either. All he asked me is what to do with Zagladin. I think the composition, especially Yarin and Rasputin, will be disappointing to the Supreme Soviet and to the intelligentsia, i.e. *perestroika*’s “conscious” foundation. In a word, I am in a state of uncertainty: ceasing to understand M.S.

On the one hand, he seems to be moving away from “power of the party,” on the other—especially with Lithuania—he is acting in the spirit of Ligachev-Yazov-Vorotnikov-Kryuchkov... on purely ideological grounds. Without any reasonable arguments or explanations.

For all of them, the goal is clear and not subject to discussion: “Do not let go!” This is despite the Constitution and legal provision for leaving, etc.

Furthermore, when the Georgians take down one or two Lenin statues per day and at every street corner yell about leaving the Union, cancelling all Soviet and Communist symbols and signs, when they openly amass weapons and fighters—this is not a problem... No reaction from the top. But when it comes to Lithuania, the orders keep coming one after another! Even though in this case the danger of ruining the “great cause” is clear: the US, Europe, and the democratic world do not see Lithuania as a domestic problem, but they consider Georgia and Azerbaijan to be our business!!

Solzhenitsyn, “March of 1917.” Newspapers, newspapers. Today in “Komsomolka” [Komsomolskaya Pravda] from March 22nd—on the disintegration of the Komsomol. On TV one sees society falling apart... And the people at the CC Plenum are holding on to idols from the past. Ligachev demands that the Charter declare the goal to be communism. He made a scene at the PB that his proposal was once again ignored (all that was noted down was a “communist perspective”).

It is amazing that journals and even newspapers and TV are full of intelligent discussions on the essence and fate of Marxism, socialism, Leninism... While this drabness heading the CPSU, with a theoretical background on the level of 1950s Highest Party School teachings, could not care less. “Communism is our goal.” “Marxism-Leninism” is the ideological core of the party! Come hell or high water. And the Politburo is full of people like this, with the exception of maybe two-three individuals. But it dictates the spirit of our policies. It does...

Once again: why does M.S. need such a Presidential Council?!

Deyneka’s exhibition on Kropotkinskaya Street. A pencil portrait of a woman in an old-fashioned dress on a divan. I could not tear myself away for an hour and a half. In general, plenty of “associations and reminiscences,” but the halls are empty, even though today is the last day.

M.S. to me on the phone: regarding Goldansky’s article on anti-Semitism (for the “Washington Post”). He was upset. Cursed. Jews are cowards. Ordered me have a talk with him!

On Zagladin: make him an Adviser to the President and put him in charge of public organizations, ours and international.

For me: pick a staff (a group of consultants under the assistant).

Varennikov is provoking Gorbachev from Lithuania... oh, how impatient he is to liquidate *perestroika* as soon as possible!

April 12, 1990.

Gorbachev is continuing the game with Lithuania. He was proving to the foreigners (Edward Kennedy was here and then the boring Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain Douglas Hurd) and trying to convince them that he is as much a man of law as they are. Yes,

legally he might be right, but historically and politically he is losing. And, God helps us, in the best case scenario he will only lose his personal prestige.

He gave candid answers to the thousands of questions flying at him during a meeting with the Komsomol before their Congress, including about the Gdlyan-Ivanov slander: "I, the President, am not going to go and try to prove that I am not a thief and I do not take bribes!" They applauded when he declared that Gdlyan and Ivanov will be dealt with in the open at the Supreme Soviet (who knows whose side they were applauding).

"Moscow" congratulates me with the "Adviser to the President" post, but there is no official document. Shakh is upset and I'm being ironic about it because everything is going to remain as it is: he needs us in the capacity of speechwriters, scribes, not advisers... he prefers different people for this, although sometimes he reckons with us when we impose our opinions on him because we have access to him. Just last week I wrote him a sharp protest against the possibility of a second PB discussion of the "CC letter" to the communists on the distancing from Yu. Afanas'ev and the like. He read it before at the PB opening discussion, without naming the author, and conducted the meeting "with consideration" of my anxiety and arguments. Although I was not the only one who protested.

As the result, the CC's letter to the party came out much softer than the first and second versions. But the essence remained ("100 flowers") and turbulent "indignations" are already breaking out in party organizations. The All-Union Leninist Young Communist League Congress is also going to be discussing it! I am sure that it will be in the "anti" spirit.

I suggested to Gorbachev to send Dobrynin as Ambassador to India instead of the failing Isakov. But he wants to send him into retirement. I cannot understand and do not like Shevardnadze's manner, he sent his entire fairly-strong team of deputies away as ambassadors: Bessmertnykh, Vorontsov, Adamishin, Aboimov... Now he is left with the "gentle Tolya" (Kovalev) and Nikiforov (party nomenclature man).

Brutents and I bypassed Shevardnadze really nicely on the subject of relations with South Korea. He is either afraid, or has made commitments to Kim Il-Sung. M.S. first of all "met with him" (a piano in the bushes), and secondly agreed to send a delegation to Seoul and in general to "concrete action." And now he met with Moon (at yesterday's meeting with publishers). Although he grimaced and grumbled over the phone.

Gorbachev is active and seems cheerful and confident. This is impressive, although mostly to foreigners. It is deceptive. It is the result of his physical and moral health, not of political confidence. Things keep getting worse. Though I do not believe in civil war, unless we want it "ourselves." So far only the generals want it, they are spewing hatred for everything related to Gorbachev. And the frenzied apparatus. There will be a fight at the CP RSFSR and then at the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU.

I, Yakovlev, Arbatov, and other like us are facing a dilemma: which party to be in... M.S., it seems, is ready to stay in Ligachev's party, although he was able to strongly distance and transfer him into the direct opposition. At the PB he no longer hides his distance from E.K. At

the last PB Yakovlev openly opposed Ligachev (and Ryzhkov), who demanded a Plenum (on the “CC letter,” clearly so M.S. would be offered to resign). Later Frolov reviled against the CC, which “has no authority and is discredited.”

Egor Kuzmich spoke “in conclusion,” i.e. after M.S. closing speech, to rebuff this slander of the CC, which has “survived (!) more than any other CC” (i.e. put up with Gorbachev and *perestroika*). The majority rejected convening a Plenum, some said openly—this would be the beginning of a split done by our own hand!

April 13, 1990.

Yesterday Gorbachev led the Presidential Council on the topic of radicalization of economic reforms. I did not go. Routine work is intense. What is happening to the country, how much longer until complete paralysis?

There was a meeting with American senators. M.S. was frank and at his best. He is stubborn on Lithuania...

The Secretariat was led by Medvedev. Brutents was there, he said it was all helpless jabber. For forty minutes they discussed the sequence for awarding the Lenin’s prize (instead of the Committee), while the country and party are in such a state. By the way, one guy from the Committee for Party Control “informed” them that according to the CC Letter, it will not be possible to expel Yu. Afanas’ev. Afanas’ev was summoned by the regional committee, but told them to go to the primary organization. But there (the institute where he is director) Afanas’ev was met with a standing ovation!

In a word, M.S. got what he was warned about. The “CC letter” is the best present to the “democratic platform.”

April 15, 1990.

Brutents told me how he was at the American embassy for Matlock’s reception for the senators (Mitchell & Co.). Burlatsky, Afanas’ev, Nishanov, Arbatov and others were there, kissing the Americans in all the possible places. How open they were, how frank, breaking all the seals! This is considered good form nowadays. As Brutents said, one really wants to run to “Pamiat” from all this filth.

G. Popov is being baited by “Sovetskaia Rossiia” [Soviet Russia] and others (“Moskovskaia Pravda” is more careful) in order to smear his way to chairmanship of the Moscow City Council [Mososov]. This is the implementation not of a direct order, but of a conversation at the PB: to “kick in the head” the Interregional Group of Deputies and the “democratic platform.” And the “CC letter” is also pulling in that direction... (By the way, the fact that the “Letter” is often seen as the beginning of a crackdown on dissent slips through even in the cleaned-up information on the discussion of the “letter” from the Department of Party Organizational Work. Most importantly, they do not know “whom to exclude”).

Gavrila Popov is, of course, quite the goose, a professional scoundrel. But still... Plus, why not try these people in action?

Rumors are circulating around Moscow that if Gavrila gets to power in the Mossovet, they will seize the apparatchiks' apartments, since the CC administration has been giving them out, which is illegal. It's believed that the "communists" are already intimidated and do not know whom to turn to in case there is a shake-up.

Stanislav Kondrashov writes in "Izvestia"—"Prague Spring of 1990." A swinging blow to everything.

It is the common opinion in society and the mass media that we do not have socialism and never had it. I wrote this idea into Gorbachev's "Word about Lenin" (he is going to present a report for Lenin's birthday). I think he will neatly cross it out.

In the evening I turned on the TV. Three channels were showing close-ups of church service. Priests, parishioners, public. There are different kinds of priests. Some lead a simple "service," like any other; others (young ones) have fervor and a "challenge;" the third type is dull (let's break our fast as soon as possible). The public: hysterical women, curious onlookers, young girls with the expression of "oh, look!" or "why am I here?" They are responding to the cameras. Many young people. Notably, in Moscow churches there are mostly young men, while in Leningrad it is mostly women. In the provinces it is both, all kinds of people. Taken all together—I cannot understand it!

I cannot believe that they believe, unless of course they are not well in the head, their psyche is unbalanced. Of course, it is possible that God exists. The greatest thinkers have thought so, including the magnificent constellation of Silver Age philosophers. But not the kind of god worshipped by the church [*bozhen'ka*]. Rather, a real Creator. There is something up There (!) that no science can explain.

Ligachev protested the recommendation (paper from Lukyanov) of the academician Goldansky for the position of head of the International Lenin Prize Committee, because the latter appeared in the "Washington Post" with an article about anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union ("Sovetskaia Rossiia" put him down for it). The objection was sent around the PB. I don't know what it will come of it. Lukyanov insists that he no longer takes orders from Ligachev.

Last Sunday I was in the Foreign Library at an exhibition of photos of the last aristocratic families: Trubetskoi, Obolentsky, Sivers, Abrikosov. It makes a stunning impression. What a gene pool of the nation, what deep and naturally developing culture, what a tradition of nobleness and honor, and what great talents in different fields. All squandered. Lost... Killed (shot left and right in Solovki even in 1920 and 1929!) or banished. Trubetskoi's three daughters, beauties, lived out their lives there. Dozens of others gave what they could to foreign lands, not to us, not to their people. This is was the elite of our people!

The CC's May First summons (we are still doing this) draft has been sent around the PB. Ligachev demanded to return the slogan "Workers of the World Unite!" When Brutents stopped

by my office I told him about this. We laughed for a long time... What's significant is not it is typical of E.K., but that causes such a reaction in normal people.

Just now I read in "Junost" [Youth] No. 3 an essay by Prince Evgenny Trubetskoi "Maximalism." Absolute genius. In 1920 he predicted everything that is happening right now, and why it is! Once again you become convinced that genius is a mystery. Visionary. I should tell M.S. to read it. It also has an explanation of why people are turning away from *perestroika*.

I thought: for M.S. to make policy, he should read more of this kind of material, not the routine mass of documents and drafts in red folders. Let the advisers and members of the Council read that and correct him if any of his thoughts differ from the routine facts.

April 21, 1990.

Yesterday with his "Word about Lenin" M.S. definitively distanced himself from Ligachev & Co. and created an opposition in the PB to them... and to Ryzhkov, whom he is pushing away through the Presidential Council.

I am glad that he put emphasis on the passage about the "museum of Bolshevik rarities"⁵ and the analogy with Lenin when he started introducing NEP: at closed sessions everyone said "yes" but as soon as he turned his back they whispered "no!"

In the evening after a performance at Bolshoi Theater, M.S. called and said: no one from the people close to me at the Presidium could find how to respond.

Mossovet, which passed into the hands of Gavila Popov, expressed clear dissatisfaction with the CC letter: all we will have left are office workers and the gray masses. Mossovet has practically declared a market economy and is initiating the denigration of Lenin. A Mossovet session was not ashamed to revoke "certificate No. 1" (i.e. Lenin's eternal Mossovet membership) and to remove his bust from the conference room. In response to an initiative of five deputies to put a wreath at the Mausoleum, Popov called this action "the personal business of these five people, not representative of Mossovet deputies."

There is a ruckus in the Supreme Soviet over Gdlyan, with demands to replace Sukharev (Minister of Justice). It has been declared that the organs, i.e. Kryuchkov, the Prosecutor's Office, and others, have no right to use the excuse that they are serving socialism. The Supreme Soviet will decide whom they are to serve; otherwise, they can take a hike.

On "Deutsche Welle" Strelyannyi (a political writer) said everything about the Presidential Council, the Party, and about the fact that it will not be *de jure* laws that will determine what is to be done.

⁵ Loginov and I borrowed this metaphor from the memoirs of Valentin Volskoi. We put some clever material into M.S.' report. Lenin's cited words refer to him talking about old Bolsheviks who made the revolution, but did not know how to build a "new world." It was a hint at the place that it was time for Ligachev & Co. to take. (author's note)

M.S. will accept all of this, I think. He has no animosity towards Mossovet, not even against Soloukhin, who publicly defames Lenin. M.S. recently was admiring his own "Word about Lenin." "In general," he said, "when I read a really talented piece I am not so much absorbed by the plot as by the language, words. I can think about a single phrase for hours."

I told him that in this case he would love Solzhenitsyn... He has depth and mystery of Russian meaning not only in every word, but in the spaces between the words. Gorbachev did not say anything. He has not read "October of 1916" or "March of 1917"...

M.S. is cooling towards foreign policy. Possibly because of Lithuania. I brought him his schedule of meetings for May-June. He said: cancel Delors, forget Mitterrand (although I got worked up about this, as we had already notified Mitterrand), cancel the Socialist International delegation. Kinnock as well. Then he adds: wouldn't it be nice if Margo [Margaret Thatcher] would cancel her visit to Kiev. And Bush cancel the meeting as well. That would be so great. I could get down to business.

April 22, 1990.

Work yesterday was routine. Germany, Thatcher, Bush... and their "threats" regarding Lithuania. Madam is once again offering her services. For now Western Europe is high on rhetoric, Prunskiene went to Oslo and to Denmark. They received her very well but did not make any promises regarding oil to break our blockade.

The people in Lithuania are starting to think whether they made the right choice. Perhaps it was better with Brazauskas?

Is it possible that M.S. will once again prove to be right? Could he be ready for such a risk in the "game"? He seems to be evolving too... Although, when the three of us were working on the Lenin report, there was a paragraph on Stalin and the federation, that some people took it seriously. He added "That's how we see it!" I.e. we are going to keep up the rhetoric and lawmaking to reform the federation, but in reality we will "maintain the empire."

I look at the collapse of the former structures and think: maybe he (M.S.) is indeed ready to "go so far that you (to me and Yakovlev) cannot imagine." He had said this before, too a while ago. Maybe he really does want to say goodbye to everything that ties us to the last 70 years, leaving only some symbolism to be different from the West? Maybe he so adamantly insisted on the letter from the CC to the party in order to finally break it, or at least to remove it from real power? Although this would be hard to believe by looking at him at the Politburo. Perhaps he constantly struggles between his two tendencies: sometimes the impulsive one wins, the one from his obkom habits. But then he starts to "figure it out," backtrack and use for short-term benefit the aspects that are clearly detrimental to his policies. In any case, a long time ago he understood that he and Egor Kuzmichev, Ryzhkov, Vorotnikov, Zaikov, and the like are on divergent paths. Assigning different labels to them, "in our circle" he did not conceal his resentment, at least of the first two. I understood that it was a matter of time before they would be gone. Now he has almost reached this goal. But not in the way that others called on him to do it: remove them from the PB, revitalize the PB, replace, etc. To him this seemed to be "old

thinking” methods. He has done more: he removed the PB itself from power. This is already visible. At the laying of wreaths at the Mausoleum, he stood in the first row with Lukyanov and Ryzhkov (i.e. not the party bosses). A little to the side was Yakovlev (member of the Presidential Council). The “party heads” Ligachev & Co. stood in the second row.

The events associated with the formation of a RSFSR Communist Party are creating a situation in which Gorbachev must hurry. As soon as possible, he should bring the CPSU as a whole outside the power framework, thereby making his rule completely “secular.” Although the problem of Russia remains. Strelyannyi makes a good point in his article: the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, which will be elected at the Russian Congress in May, will not be as docile as the Supreme Soviet of the USSR... especially if Yeltsin becomes president... I think we should not resist the transformation of the Soviet Union into a Union of States, a confederation. Then he would govern over Russia. But as it stands now... if he were no longer to control Russia, how would he govern the rest of the country? A major miscalculation is looming over us. If only the Lithuanian obstacle were taken care of soon—by giving a special status to all the Baltic states in the Union. Of course, the others will want such a status. Nazarbaev is already stomping his feet, not to mention Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. So what? You cannot prevent the inevitable.

Gorbachev told me yesterday, and not for the first time: I will never agree to try people for “abuse of power” during the period of stagnation. It would mean putting 100 thousand on trial. We would be going back to 1937.

April 30, 1990.

M.S. came back from Sverdlovsk filled with a sense of “victory”—he won over the working class. Although they say he was met rather coolly, even with some jeers and “those kinds” of posters.

Before the Congress he told me that he is satisfied with the “Word about Lenin.” He must have read the responses to it. We have moved forward (in the sense of filling the New Thinking). In Sverdlovsk he “moved forward” even more in his successful impromptu speeches.

I keep thinking, did he consciously bring matters to an ideological-psychological breakdown in society and confusion in people’s minds, or did it just work out that way while he was adapting and “straddling the process,” as always? Although, there could be no renewal without this. Even the defamation and discrediting of Lenin by the “extremists” (radicalists [radikalistami], as he started to call them) serves to liberate our minds and solidify the “feeling of complete freedom.” This permissiveness prepares the ground for a new social consciousness that will be truly pluralistic and independent from the top.

Zagladin and Grachev brought from Western Europe reports of concerns over the possibility of resurgence (according to the law of the pendulum) of a new fascism. Because in Eastern Europe not even the “center,” but the right-wing came to power. Reactionary sentiments are growing, and what is most dangerous, they are growing on the popular, mostly nationalistic level as the rejection of anything remotely resembling “communism,” which implies anything “leftist.”

This means that no matter how the social-democrats railed against the USSR and Eastern Europe, they saw in it something of a “home front” of the entire leftist movement, a counterbalance to reactionaries. This home front has disappeared. Meanwhile, our national disintegration and Russian chauvinism are threatening to bring back if not Stalinism, then something akin to Nicholas II’s Russia—the bulwark of everything reactionary. Or, a “great power,” but worse—a former great power, i.e. with the Versailles syndrome, since German unification and the loss of allies “takes away” its victory in the Great War—its only recognized contribution to the progress of humanity and its own dignity.

In a conversation with Assad (Syrian President) M.S. once again digressed to talk about the “socialist idea” within the framework of *perestroika*. Does he not see that in society this idea hinges only on conservative inertia (“What did we struggle for!” “At least we had equality, even in poverty”)? This is characterized by the nearly moronic People’s Deputy Sukhov—a taxi driver from Kharkov.

Does M.S. not see that the “socialist idea” has nothing original to offer that would be news for modern capitalism? Not in economics, not in democracy, not in other values. We did not fill this idea with original content and at this point nobody can do it.

Lithuania is his (M.S.’) sorest spot. It is in an economic blockade, but the “revolt” he thought would come against Landsbergis and Prunskiene is nowhere to be seen. He does not have a Lithuania policy, just pure ideology of power: not to allow the breakup of the empire. Recently in Sverdlovsk he said it again: he is not going to back down.

He is very tired and aging by the minute. After the meeting with Assad we were on Alexey Tolstoy Street and he complained to me and Brutents that he has reached the breaking point, his head is bursting. And indeed: yesterday on the spur of the moment he said some things to de Maiziere (GDR’s Premier) that we will have to retract. Then he dictated his speech for the RSFSR Congress, which could be really crucial if Russia decides to leave the USSR.

Vorotnikov already resigned (from the post of Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers). It is thought that Vlasov will take his place at the PB. Probably, though, this will not happen. Most likely it will be Yeltsin “with all the ensuing consequences.” Meanwhile, in Sverdlovsk M.S. announced him to be politically finished.

I decided to copy some passages from Selyunin: an article called “Sometimes I feel like Cassandra,” in “Sobesednik” [Interlocutor] No. 17 from April, 1990:

“We need competent leadership and a market system. The current government is incapable of telling the people, ‘The communists took the country in the wrong direction’... And it must leave, making space for a coalition government, which will have one advantage: it would not be connected to the dying ideology, or to the choice which was supposedly made once and for all in 1917, or to baggage, or to crimes of the past.

...The new laws (the current ones have exhausted their credit of trust) will be aimed at introducing a market system and changing the social order.”

Also, “Gorbachev could not act otherwise; he could not avoid falling behind... Three years ago he could not have revoked Article 6 of the Constitution, introduced a law for withdrawing from the USSR, announced various types of private property, introduced a multi-party system, etc. Had he done this, the next day he would have turned into ‘yet another retiree of national standing’.”

“...If it is not a coalition government that offers this program there may be chaos, civil war, and possibly dictatorship.”

The article was written on April 2nd, i.e. before the Presidential Council’s resolutions on the economy, when M.S. no longer spoke of a “planned-market” but simply of a “market economy”... Though, he declared in Sverdlovsk that he is again going to “consult with the people.” But the people will never “advise” to deregulate prices. They will hold on to the old (let the “tsar” provide), and if he does not provide, they will overthrow him—through “the street.”

We shall see whether Cassandra will be prophetic.

May 5, 1990.

May 1st on Red Square. An historic day... For the first time there was a rally, then a procession, but instead of “Hooray, hail May Day!” there were demands and warnings. After the first, official wave of demonstrators passed, a second wave of “Moscow voters’ clubs” burst onto the Square, with banners of “Down with Gorbachev,” “Down with the CPSU—the Exploiter and Robber of the People,” “Down with Socialism,” “Down with the Fascist Red Empire,” “Lenin’s Party Out of the Way,” etc. Gorbachev and the others started to descend from the Mausoleum to jeering and laughter, accompanied by yells of “Shame,” “Vulgarians.” The Red Square was covered with deafening whistles. Such hatred. Thirty thousand. Even if, as Bakatin says, only 7 thousand among them were activists, the remaining 23 thousand stood next to them, which means with them.

Gorbachev called me in the evening, fuming: scoundrels, ugly mugs. This is the Gavril Popov’s Moscow City Soviet for you! It is his idea!

On May 3rd the event was discussed at the PB. Prokofiev (First Secretary of Moscow City Committee) was assigned to condemn the action in “Pravda.” When speaking with foreign journalists, Yakovlev blamed everything on the right, on reactionaries and the monarchists. M.S. said at the PB: we should not exaggerate it, but we should not underestimate it, either.

Against this backdrop the PB discussed preparations for the XXVIII Party Congress. In unison they said that there are not enough workers (among the candidates).

...What is behind this? Yakovlev is right: it means that the Congress members are forming an apparatus that will kick you and me out together with M.S.

The Russian Congress is coming up. M.S. has finally given up and admitted that the formation of a Russian Communist Party is inevitable. But all of a sudden, Frolov in his usual rude manner correctly pointed out at the PB that if we do not take this matter (formation of RCP)

into our own hands, we will have a chauvinistic, racist party that will demolish the CPSU, the USSR, and will ruin all of this *perestroika*. The Leningrad founding conference showed us in April where this RCP is heading.

Yakovlev stopped by today, beaming. He was with Gorbachev at VDNKh [All-Union Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy], which is hosting a celebration for the "Pravda" newspaper. A crowd formed around Yakovlev bigger than the one around Gorbachev. "And so many compliments, Tolya, and what compliments! I have never heard such things about myself during my entire political career! And mostly from people from the provinces."

"Smiling" at his vanity, I thought: could it be that the real, simple Russia is for Yakovlev, not Yeltsin? Then why doesn't he run for President of Russia?

At the PB Shevardnadze got the directives for "two + four." Gorbachev broke into a steely speech: "Do not let Germany into NATO and that's that! I will risk breaking the Vienna negotiations, if it comes to that. The document with proposals about this was signed by Shevardnadze, as well as Yakovlev, Yazov and Kryuchkov. At the PB session everyone, including them, did not say a word. And nobody asks my opinion there."

In the morning I composed a memo for Gorbachev—in protest. The gist of it is that PB members are not in the loop and are not informed, so they can discuss whatever they like. But in order to make decisions one has to know the subject and not succumb to Ligachev's cry of "NATO is getting close to our borders!" This is nonsense, Mikhail Sergeyevich, on the level of 1945, it is the false patriotism of the masses. No matter what, Germany will be in NATO and you will again miss the train (as with the Russian Communist Party)... Instead of presenting your conditions and then "putting a good face" (on business that will inevitably be bad).

So far he has not answered me, most likely he got angry: it always happens when he is wrong, when emotions from his obkom origin overpower him.

We started preparing the program for his visit to the US. Bush offers two points: Washington and Camp David. That is all, despite the fact that in his time he himself and Reagan invited Gorbachev to "see America." Bush must be afraid of the Americans' enthusiasm, which would tie him on Lithuania, Germany, START... How would he press on Gorby if the people admire and trust him?!

I persuaded Arbatov, who is going to appear on American television, to make an innocent comment on this issue.

Afanas'ev and Drach gave an interview to "La Repubblica" (an Italian newspaper) about the empire and Gorbachev. They are probably right about the empire. We should let everyone leave so those who choose to can come back on their own. Otherwise there will be a collapse and blood.

May 7, 1990.

Shevardnadze came back from “two + four.” Judging by the ciphered telegrams and by his report to Gorbachev it is clear that we lost by rejecting a document that was swamped at the PB (regarding the conditions for our agreement to Germany in NATO). Shevardnadze had to make do with general phrases, instead of forcing our partners to discuss our concrete conditions. Both Kohl and Baker did not hesitate to use this. Kohl called the meeting “historic,” adding: “There are no longer any obstacles.”

On Sunday I got a call from Bisher (USSR People’s Deputy from Latvia). It turns out Gorbachev already told Rubiks (Latvia’s CP CC secretary) that we will do the same thing to Latvia as to Lithuania if they do not revoke the “May 3rd Declaration.” This has already been published in “Pravda.” Shakhnazarov got a call about this from Wulfson (also a People’s Deputy). Both are crying the same thing: intervene, please ask the President to read the address we sent him closely. We intervened. Gorbachev told Shakh: “I will make everyone come through!”

Yes... something is happening to Gorbachev. Today he organized a meeting with Heroes of the Soviet Union and those decorated with the Order of Glory. Some general from Latvia spoke for 20 minutes, saying God knows what! As if he is not in 1990, but in 1950. Others were similar, and everything to the accompaniment of thunderous applause. Western press surmises that Gorbachev is doing these celebrations, the 45 year anniversary of Victory Day and the rest of it in order to butter up the army, which has yet to say its word in politics. They are probably right. But his “emotions” are playing a role in this also. (So why don’t I have them? Rather, mine are very different, these emotions, even though I had, just as these generals and decorated men, fought with the Germans, not in Afghanistan).

Yazov also gave a speech in the manner of a general, in essence cynical. He came down on the vilifying scholars: they tallied up 46 million, while only (!) 8 had died in battle. He forgot even the 3 million prisoners taken in 1941 alone. Whose fault was it, Comrade Yazov? And their fate turned out to be worse than that of the dead. In a word, M.S. is spreading a layer of grayness to cover up *perestroika*’s gaps. This action of his is precisely the “other extreme” that he so vehemently condemns.

Shevardnadze brought important concessions on START from Baker. Could it be that we will be stubborn again?

May 11, 1990.

A report on the 45th anniversary of “Victory.” The part where he mentioned the victims was very good... He even remembered the *sharashki*. The conclusions are good; they are moving New Thinking forward. This stands in sharp contrast to Yazov’s speech at the Mausoleum (for the parade) and his order. The Defense Minister’s speech would have been fitting ten years ago.

The parade was impressive, designed for domestic consumption, to show “all of those types” after the second wave at the May Day parade that while the leadership has this kind of power, opponents can feel free to yelp and shriek. This already fits into Gorbachev’s new logic.

Yesterday for the first time I was at the Presidential Council in its narrow composition. It is very noticeable that, having broken down the old (Party) power, he hopes (somewhere in his heart) that it will pass to him personally... After all, he is for progress (as he was again fervently telling us yesterday). He is not following a reactionary policy—he would say—he wants good for the people and knows how to accomplish it. There you go... when he reacts to something on an emotional level and ceases to think calmly, it turns out that this is his idea of a democratic process.

M.S. once again got worked up about Lithuania. He came down on mass media, which has “gotten out of hand” (this reeks of Gdlyan) and shows no respect to the country’s President. He was describing a meeting between Raisa Maksimovna and Pamela Harriman, who was struck by the Soviet people’s ingratitude to Gorbachev, and their failure to understand the importance of his work. He concluded his tirade by saying that it is time for everyone to choose right now, including the people sitting here.

That’s that... Yakovlev again took it personally. He came in the evening to complain. “I don’t know what to do, maybe I should leave.” Why? After all, when Gorbachev was talking about the mass media he added: notice, if Medvedev asks an editor for something, the latter will ignore him. But if Yakovlev asks, the editor will do it. He was right on the dot, but with a subtext: Medvedev reflects the “correct” point of view while Yakovlev has a more dubious, opportunistic position, adjusting to the radicals.

A.N. thinks that Kryuchkov is sending Gorbachev “targeted” information. Perhaps, perhaps. It is true that Kryuchkov has gone back to the old approach of giving information to the top that will be interpreted “correctly.” For example, about the Zionists’ intentions. Not once has he provided information on the actions of “Pamyat” or the Black Hundredist nature of “Literaturaia Rossiia” [Literary Russia].

In a note to Gorbachev I railed against Yazov, Baklanov, Belousov, and Katushev for their demands to keep supplying socialist countries and socialist-oriented governments with weapons as if nothing has changed. I expected that this time Gorbachev would react. Instead, he scribbled on my note: “Bring to Baklanov’s attention.”

Klyamkin wrote an article for “Moskovskie novosti” [Moscow News]. It is called “Farewell to May 1st. ” His conclusion: “the end of unity between the leadership and the people.”

May 13, 1990.

I got a lot done yesterday:

- Draft for M.S.’ interview for *Time*;
- Letter to Andreotti, which Adamishin will deliver;
- A speech for a lunch with Mubarak and materials for a talk with him;

I tried to figure out for Tolya Kovalev whether Shevardnadze had actually separated German unification and the European process. Everyone from Kohl to Gandhi are raising a fuss

about it (this is the result of our defeat at “two + four” in Bonn, now we have to weasel our way out with handouts for propaganda). Gorbachev rejected mine and Shevardnadze’s draft response to Baker (regarding aircraft for START). He agreed with Akhromeev, before whom Yazov and Zaikov could not stand their ground.

Yesterday, Gorbachev’s discussion with his electorate for the XXXVIII Congress in the Frunze district was broadcast on TV. He was in superb form and fought with quite a Lenin-like passion, and he was frank as he is in PB. He touched upon the Russian people and the RCP, and on the fact that he will never back down and those who think they know everything and have an agenda that will lead to success are political crooks; that the second wave on May 1st on Red Square is rifraff with their “Down with Gorbachev” posters and portraits of Nicholas II, Stalin and Yeltsin. In a word, he was not speaking in a presidential manner, but in his old fierce style. Although there were notes of anger, unlike before.

There were a lot of questions. One of them: the Bolsheviks had a plan and knew where to take the country, while the current leadership doesn’t know where and doesn’t know how. He retorted immediately: They knew? They had a plan? So they led the country where it is... No! We are going to proceed from life, rather than breaking life to fit the model.

The alternative contender (in elections for the Congress) is a worker from the “democratic platform.” He started off by saying, “We have been carried away by Lenin’s rule that revolution is worth something if it can defend itself. It is time to turn it around: a revolution is worth something, when there is something to defend!”

I wonder what the outcomes of the elections will be. The mediocrity and incommensurability of the opponent are so obvious they hit you in the eye. If voters prefer him to Gorbachev, well, then *perestroika* truly is finished.

Gorbachev called me in the evening; they are still putting together the American team with R.M. He informed me that they are including Frolov. As if apologizing, he said “We need someone from ‘Pravda’.” Understood.

He asked me about my impression of his speech in the Frunze district. He wanted to know whether he missed something in the speech. Then he asked with alarm: “What do you think, will I get elected?” Very symptomatic of Gorbachev nowadays.

I finished reading the next installment of Solzhenitsyn’s “March of 1917,” published in “Neva.” It is practically a textbook on how revolutions happen. All very similar. I think, we are approaching the Russian 1917!

I got a call from Wulfson—an old Jewish Latvian. He is very nervous. He said that Rubiks announced a general strike for May 15th to demand the “Declaration of May 3rd” to be repealed. The police force is all Russian; they are going to support the strikers. The army held meetings, they will support the police. If the strikers go to the street, the Latvians will come out too.

I am very afraid... If slaughter breaks out it will be the end, truly the end because it is clear whose side Gorbachev will take. It will be game over for the trip to the US and to everything in general, after all we are on the eve of a Russian Congress and the Russian Party Conference. The strikes in Kuzbass, Donbass and Vorkuta are just around the corner. Yu. Afanas'ev, Yeltsin and Travkin have already publicly sworn to create an anti-communist party.

All of this is very similar to Solzhenitsyn's account of 1917.

For some reason, I feel no fear...

May 20, 1990.

Yesterday, on Saturday, M.S. called me to Novo-Ogarevo to work on the concept for the XXVIII CPSU Congress. Present were Yakovlev, Primakov, Frolov, Shakhnazarov, Boldin, Petrakov, and myself. We discussed it all day. Along the way we heard his thoughts about "his lot": "What is life? We only get one. One is not sorry to spend it on something worthwhile, there is more to life than food or women. I don't regret anything. I've moved such a country. They cry: chaos, empty shelves! He destroyed the Party, there is no order! But how could it be otherwise? There is no other way to make history. As a rule, such major changes are accompanied by a great deal of bloodshed. We have managed to avoid it so far. This alone is a monumental achievement. The whole world is thinking in the spirit of New Thinking now. What about that? Is it a small measure? And everything is oriented toward the person, on the civilizing course. As for the deficits and empty shelves, we will make it through. We will have sausage on the shelves again. They rail against me, they curse me! Seventy percent of the CC and CC apparatus are against me, they hate me. It is no compliment to them: if you scratch you will find pure self-interest. I do not regret anything and I am not afraid. And I will neither repent nor make excuses at the Congress."

We talked about these issues the whole day. He even agreed with my statement (which I have mentioned to him more than once) that *perestroika* means a change of the social system. He agreed, but added: within the framework of socialist choice. That's fine, for now...

In the end he assigned Primakov, Shakh, and me to summarize and in two days to present to him a prospectus of the speech for the Congress.

I wrote all day today. Composed 14 pages. What next? I have to prepare the materials for Washington, on this my work hasn't gotten off the ground. This means that I cannot sit down with Shakh right now, and I also cannot entrust him with my work—he will bend it in his own way. I will probably end up having to give it to him + Yakovlev, let them work on it while we are "travelling around the Americas."

Yesterday in Novo-Ogarevo I made another impassioned speech regarding the fact that we have to raise the question of women in a new way at the Congress.

June 17, 1990.

On May 29-30th we were in Canada. At the airport in Ottawa, someone asked Gorbachev about his views on Yeltsin's election as Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. He gave a needlessly drawn-out response. One more point in Yeltsin's favor.

From May 30th-June 4th we were in Washington. Meetings, visits, tours around the city, and exhausting nighttime work on summing up Gorbachev's frenzied activity. He was at his best: there, in the West, he is in an environment where people understand him and value the magnitude of his achievements, while at home he faces sheer smuttiness.

Minneapolis-St. Paul, "Counter-Date" [sic], etc. Crowds everywhere like in Finland's Oulu or Italy's Milan. Stanford University—cheers of enthusiasm from the students. He spoke in a vast hall to continuous applause. George Shultz, who is the university's rector, speaking after M.S. called him a great man—leader and thinker. Needless to say, our newspapers did not report this.

Meanwhile in Moscow... At the peasants' Congress Ligachev is already openly calling the President a traitor who ruined the country and the socialist commonwealth. He added that he, Ligachev, will fight until the end.

At the Moscow party conference Prokofiev outflanked Gorbachev on the left. Silaev, Russia's Prime Minister, spoke in favor of private property (this technocrat has underwent a complete metamorphosis). By the way, Yeltsin was afraid of taking Bocharov as a Premier, so he took Silaev, even though the latter used to be one of Gorbachev's men. Amazing!

For two days I struggled over Gorbachev's report for the Supreme Soviet. The MFA did not supply a single line of material.

I cannot understand what people want. Some have gone mad in pursuit of glory and praise. The most important thing for them is to be noticed. This is the case at the Russian Congress, at the Supreme Soviet, and in the mass media.

At the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the President was treated to a concert of hoots, led by Yeltsin himself.

The following conversation took place on the airplane on the way back from the United States. Gorbachev tells me: "Tolya, you think I don't see who is in it for the cause and who just sticks around to get a reflection of the limelight and show themselves in public? I see it, do not doubt it." I tried to justify the people he was referring to, but he said: "Come on... You are quite the liberal..."

In general, when I get distracted from the daily overwork, I get a feeling of complete collapse and wreckage... Maybe it is what real revolution feels like, going from system to system. This is what I am trying to include in the report for the XXVIII Congress. It must be how people live through times like these.

June 24, 1990.

Yesterday Polozkov was elected First Secretary of the Russian Communist Party. Protesting telegrams and phone calls are coming in from all sides, including the editorial board of "Kommunist," various writers and theater personalities. Individuals and whole groups want to leave the party. I should think about it too. Gorbachev was at the Congress the entire time, listening to the rudeness and taking direct blows from this mob, including General Makashev. Gorbachev did not take up the general's challenge, thereby in essence betraying everyone who tried to defend him. He bore not only insults, but out-and-out barbarism. Then he made a concluding speech, but he turned it into a Q&A session (they demanded this of him!). The questions were provocative, spiteful, with catches. Not a single "respectful" one, all dumb. His answers were confusing, verbose, muddled, sometimes he was unable to express what he meant—because he did not want to be clear, and as always he was afraid of being specific. He repeated his cliché: he is against leaving the post of General Secretary; he is against turning the CPSU into a parliamentary party; he is for the working class as the social base of the party, etc., etc. In essence, these are populist affirmations that compromise his *perestroika* concept of things.

He has become too different: one persona abroad and a different one here. This contrast is especially visible after his recent trip to America. His common sense and his theory of "moving the country to prosperity" come through over there. Here, his instincts of fear and the tactical-apparatus mode of action emerge, as well as his reliance on compromises that is causing great damage to policies and his entire cause. If he goes to the CC CPSU Plenum (to get approval for the draft of his speech for the XXVIII Congress) then they will tear him apart, after this dark RCP Congress. They might even remove him from the position of General Secretary. No doubt they will do it, if he presents the report created at Volynskoe-2. And it seems he is not planning to go all in, judging by his behavior at the RCP Congress. Which means he will submit. I think he might back down from the market, too... and bring about universal disgrace and an ignominious end. Perhaps not immediately, but along a steeply inclined downhill. "A great man," he ended up in a position where he could not remain at the height of his greatness when the hour had struck. And it struck precisely over these last few days.

Right now it is either a "Treaty of Brest-Litovsk" or what was done at the X Congress of Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)—the time has come to make an ultimatum to the party, as Lenin had done. Otherwise *perestroika* will no longer be Gorbachev's, just as socialism after Lenin was not Lenin's.

Shakhnazarov and I wrote him a note, begging him to leave the party post. We tried to prove that to leave the party right now would mean to rise above all parties and really become a president. And, by the way, if he left he could separate himself from the attacks and insults by the nonentities who are using the rights provided by the party Charter to discredit him at the level of their own "culture." The note was ignored. Gorbachev either thinks that he will be able to get away with it (although every time this strategy works worse and worse for him and for the country), or he has something planned. But then why would he publicly undress himself at the RCP Congress? To be later accused of fraud and treachery?

After Polozkov's election, Shatalin started looking for Gorbachev from his phone in the hospital to demand an immediate convocation of the Congress of People's Deputies. Otherwise he, Shatalin, will leave the Presidential Council. Gorbachev is silent. We do not know his

opinion of the Congress speech draft, with only a week left. Though, maybe he thinks as always that a day before the Congress he will dictate a version that would be just right. Except now I no longer believe that it will come out "just right." He can no longer make successful impromptu speeches at home, in front of his own people. They are boring and confusing, in contrast to the brilliant, talented impromptu speeches he makes during trips abroad. There, he senses the friendly and understanding environment and therefore allows himself not to conceal what he really thinks. There he is sincere, while at home he is dodgy... There is an ideological train following him here, and he fears that without this train he will not be understood.

July 1, 1990.

Gorbachev is sitting at the dacha and making the final corrections to his report for the Party Congress. Sometimes he comes to Volynskoe-2 and we sit until 2-4a.m. Sometimes he relocates to Novo-Ogarevo. The last such session there was last Thursday. We chewed over every phrase, and kept returning to the parts that were already edited. "We" consists of: Yakovlev, Medvedev, Frolov, Boldin, Shakhnazarov, Petrakov, Bikkenin, and me, the poor sinner. The economic section was the most bothersome. Gorbachev kept trying to show progress by manipulating the numbers. We managed to convince him to reduce mention of successes to a minimum.

In the evening on that day he called a Politburo meeting at Novo-Ogarevo. We were not allowed to attend. They sat till 12a.m., going over candidates for the position of Chairman of the CPSU (or General Secretary) and the First Deputy (a new position). Almost everyone announced that they are leaving the PB. Ryzhkov and Frolov were suggested as leaders for the CPSU. Both refused—the first so as not to appear to be running away from the government. Well, that's noble! The second was flirting, as if to say—for now I would rather work on ideology at the PB. Van'ka is unsteady...

Bakatin was also named. Ligachev demanded that Gorbachev leave the Presidential post and devote himself entirely to the party. Clever move!

Gorbachev took the following position: either I am the sole contender for the first position in the Party—as General Secretary, Chairman, whatever—or I refuse a party post altogether. In other words, he sees a point in uniting the party and governmental posts only in his own person. Otherwise, in his words, it would be nonsense (from the perspective of *perestroika*).

At the CC Plenum on Friday they demanded that Gorbachev pick one of the posts. He replied the same way as at the PB.

Mal'kov, from Chita, demanded that Polozkov's portraits be displayed as well (clearly on a tip from Ligachev).

In the meantime, the independent press, including "Kommunist," is publishing their employee's statements that they will not join the RCP. In retaliation, at the meeting of delegation representatives, Latsis (member of the "Kommunist" editorial board) was expelled from two Congress committees, and bawlers immediately demanded that he be expelled from the party.

Gorbachev's speech at the Plenum was sharp and tough. He said that he will not tolerate any more rudeness as there was at the Russian Congress. When he is in our circle, he has a vigorous and ironic outlook; he looks deadly tired. This is his element—to struggle. Here he gains strength.

It looks like things are moving in the direction of turning the CC and Politburo into an average team that will work solely on party affairs. M.S. is not going to let them have access to power. On the contrary, most likely he will strengthen the Presidential Council as an institution of power rather than a consultative body. As for the General Secretary position, he needs it to keep the party from getting out of hand and becoming a completely hostile force. If Ligachev becomes head of the party (even as the second from the top) then two parties will form, one of them on the "democratic platform."

Novo-Ogarevo. On the next day after the last CC CPSU Politburo session in history, a large table was brought to the banks of Moscow-river, and situated at the edge of a precipice. Waiters brought appetizers and cognac. Someone started to develop a 35-gramm theory. I am sitting there and thinking—here is a man around whom the whole world is turning right now.... And we are sitting with him at a round table, like buddies. Sometimes he becomes so familiar, especially when reminiscing about Stavropol' or MGU. But who are we around him? Who am I? Around ten days ago he paid me such a compliment in front of everybody. "You've got style," he says. "Neither Frolov, nor Shakh, nor Bekkenin have such style. Anatoly's style! He feels me better than anybody. And his style is stricter than my own; he doesn't like verbose explanations."

I included the famous phrase *Hic Rhodas, hic salta!* in the text of his speech. The expression remained in the text until the very last draft; everyone made a fuss and asked for it to be removed, but Gorbachev held on to it until the last draft.

July 8, 1990.

The Party Congress is in session. It is an assembly of crazed provincials and metropolitan demagogues. The level is so primitive that they are simply incapable to understanding anything besides the Higher Party School-taught "Marxism-Leninism." Everything else is betrayal in their eyes. The best case scenario is the absence of ideology.

Yesterday Medvedev offered a brilliant rebuff; he was on the offensive and tried to prove that now we need to view the very essence of ideology differently. People listened to him because his speech was powerful, but in the end they were critical. One man came up to the microphone, help up his party ticket (it was red) and said: "Comrade Medvedev, do you know what this card would mean in the hands of a soccer referee? So, I am showing you a red card, i.e. 'Off the field!' as someone who grossly violated the rules of the game."

The masses are thirsty for blood; they are demanding to hear every PB member in order to turn the Congress into an execution. Although Yakovlev did manage to slur them over with his sincerity, he's a smart cookie. They even applauded him. Overall he did not let them tear him apart. But yesterday during the Q&A he showed himself to be completely useless, simply unprofessional. He said a mass of dumb and banal things about Eastern Europe, about the

Communist Movement, which according to him became even better. He started reading quotes from his speeches in Lithuania, but people countered with other quotes from the same speeches—showing how he played up to the Balts. They brought up a transcript of his conversation with leaders of the “democratic platform” from the day before yesterday. He got so carried away with his talking that following the example of Tret'yakov from “Moskovskie novosti” he presented himself as an ideologue and pioneer of *perestroika*; implying that this is his role and Gorbachev merely translated his idea into slogans.

In general he was tongue-tied and pitiful.

Gorbachev said to me after meeting with raikom [regional committee] and gorkom [city committee] secretaries: “They are seekers of personal advantage. All they want are easy pickings and power.” He cursed. I told him: “Let them go. You are the President. You see what this party is, and you are practically turning into its hostage, its whipping boy.” His response: “You know, Tolya, you think I don’t see it? I see it very well. All your (!) Arbatovs and Shmelevs... write me notes in a similar vein. But you cannot let this mangy dog off the leash. If I let it go, this entire mass will turn against me.”

Yesterday at the Congress Ivashko took M.S. aside and whispered something to him. It turns out he warned M.S. there were plans to give the General Secretary an evaluation of “Unsatisfactory” in the Congress’ resolution. Immediately M.S. took the chairmanship of the Congress into his own hands. The majority had just voted to listen to every member of the PB and give them individual evaluations. M.S. rushed to “save the situation”: “If you do this, the party will split.” So it goes, instead of splitting the party himself two years ago he keeps trying to save it now, when it turned into a force hostile to him and to *perestroika*.

Sometimes reasonable voices break through at the Congress, but they are immediately knocked down. There are some “heartfelt cries,” for example yesterday’s speech by a woman from Tver’, but they only strengthen the general outcry against Gorbachev.

He is isolated. The days are gone when crowds of people would rush to him with questions after his speeches. He walks off the stage alone, accompanied by his bodyguard Volodya. One feels pity for him. And it is terrible when you feel pity for the head of state. But he is already pitied publicly, in newspapers and on television.

He blames his opponents for not realizing that we are living in an already different society. But he does not realize it himself, because his view of “a different society” does not correspond to what it is in reality. And for the most part, in reality it turned out to be bad, not good—as he expected it to be when he gave it freedom.

July 9, 1990.

Yesterday Gorbachev spent all day with “workers and peasants” at their Congress in the Kremlin. Then—a commission on the Party Charter. Relentless and persistent. Only what is he striving for? To have Ligachev as the General Secretary’s Deputy? And what will he “have” from a party like that?

All of Moscow's intelligentsia press is railing against the Congress and Ligachev with Polozkov, and they are at a loss regarding Gorbachev's tactics. There are indications that creative unions are planning to leave the CPSU en masse.

On this day came a message from George Bush, in which he tells about the meeting of the NATO Council in London. It is a good, friendly letter—moral support.

Yesterday Gorbachev gave an interview after meeting with the workers. Once again: "The CPSU is a workers' party. Its ideology stems from the working class." The people who stand with Gorbachev, or even without him but with *perestroika*, are in utter confusion. He says one thing in the Congress report, but under the threat of a strike in Kuzbass and the pressure from the Congress' loudmouths he says something else. He does not hear the rumble of history, as he had himself once warned Honecker.

Yeltsin's speech stands in contrast. It was written for him by Poptsov. One of the delegates called it Bonapartist, perhaps correctly from the populist perspective with an aim to prevent a civil war. Yeltsin in general looked more reliable than the President because he has a more definite stance. Meanwhile the latter thrashes in his tactics of compromise, even though a politically semi-literate person could understand that there will be no consolidation.

Today the candidates for General Secretary will be proposed. They will make decisions. I wonder, what will remain of the market and New Thinking ideas?

Yakovlev called, upset at having failed in his answers at the Congress. No, Sasha, you cannot speak well without preliminary preparations!

This week Kohl and Wörner (Secretary General of NATO) are already in Moscow. It is time for me to do my job. Meanwhile, the theatricals in the Kremlin continue... while the harvest, they say, is unprecedented this year. Who is going to reap it?

July 10, 1990.

It looks like today is a key day of the Congress. I don't know, maybe it is also key to all of *perestroika*. Gorbachev won once again, although there were 1300 votes against him. His concluding remarks were brilliant. I am particularly happy that he used everything I prepared on ideology, including about the "short course;" also that he offered the dissenting generals to retire. He made a strong comeback to questions about the market and agrarian policies, and all of foreign policy, not giving in on any point! But in answers to questions he again sang of "the socialist choice" and gave an unfortunate response to a question about Yeltsin ("if he is with us...").

Ligachev was not nominated for General Secretary. They must be saving him for the post of First Deputy.

From two sources I heard a rumor about a conspiracy by military-men (I heard from one major from Arbatov's institute and from a member of the Political News Agency, to whom

Makashev opened up, taking him to be one of their own). I need to warn Gorbachev, even though I have no facts.

July 11, 1990.

Gorbachev called me at midnight, satisfied. He was going over the twists and turns on his way to victory. We talked about the intellectual level of the Congress. Cohen told him: "By the end, the Congress turned more to the left." I replied: "Westerners reduce everything to the simple formula of 'left—right'." Reality is much more complex.

He told me that he is going to travel with Kohl in the Stavropol region. Here, Comrade Falin, is Yuri's Day for you.

He asked me to make a list of candidates for the CC from the intellectuals (as General Secretary he gets to propose a list of 75 people). He named Zhurkin and Martynov (director of academic institutes). I supported the choices. "But we no longer need Arbatov," he said.

Where am I going to find intellectuals under 60 for him? He asked me to name some women. He agreed with me that we are doing very poorly with the question of women. I said that I have only one in mind—Iskra Stepanovna Andreeva. "How old is she?"—60. "Well, it's a bit late."

He asked me to prepare materials for talks with Kohl.

July 12, 1990.

Today Yeltsin made a theatrical gesture from the podium at the Congress and announced that he is leaving the party. He left the room to the occasional cries of "Shame!" M.S. called me in the evening and started to explain that this is the "logical end." I replied, "You cannot underestimate this move." These kinds of things make a strong impression:

Firstly, on an emotional level. He allowed himself to do it, which elicits respect and interest in him.

Secondly, it is a signal to the public and the Soviets that from now on, one can disregard the CPSU. From now on, you can deal with the Party apparatus like this.

Thirdly, it is a signal to the communists. You no longer have to cherish your Party ticket and still ride high.

Fourthly (at the time I did not say this point to Gorbachev), you are the one who brought matters to the point where this became possible.

Fifthly, for two weeks you have been arguing over where to place the commas. You are ruining your authority by spreading out this empty jabber in front of the whole country. Meanwhile, the harvest is falling in the fields. And in general everything is coming to a standstill.

Finally and most importantly (I kept this to myself also) you fought fiercely to keep the Party General Secretary post to yourself. While he (Yeltsin) spat in its face and went off to do what you should have been doing.

Gorbachev got upset when I started praising the team of ministers and parliamentarians Yeltsin and Silaev put together. Gustily—in the Gorbachev manner—he started to predict failure for them. Just let them come face to face with real life, he said. That's just it, I replied: I think they will get a hold of Russia pretty quickly. Oh, how worked up he got, accused me of being professorial, of applauding them, of being euphoric, etc. Of course, I was not too delicate... after the musical moment with Yeltsin's outburst at the Congress.

June 14, 1990.

Yesterday I prepared materials for Gorbachev's meetings with Kohl. In the end I wrote that they should come to an agreement on how Kohl will publicly respond to Gorbachev's consent to Germany's entry into NATO. After all, the world does not know about the agreement made with Bush in Washington, so it could appear that Bush was not able to convince Gorbachev, but the German quickly won him over with loans.

I do not attend the Congress. All that goes on there is shameful fussing over paragraphs, words and phrases. They are reviling against the “democratic platform” of Shestakovsky, Sobchak, Lysenko, “who disgraced the Congress;” they are demanding to expel these individuals from the Party and even strip them of their academic titles, because their dissertations are probably not based on Marxism-Leninism. This is the party for which Gorbachev fought.

Gorbachev filled his quota of CC members... and it is something! Among them are obvious enemies of *perestroika* such as deputy heads from the apparatus: Babichev, Degtyarev, Afonin, and others. They say he wants to make Van'ka (Frolov) a PB member.

Yakovlev came by, he is sad. He is in the position of “the Moor has done his duty...” On the whole, so am I. We are scribblers compared to Van'ka. Yakovlev is also offended by the fact that “towards the end,” Gorbachev fired his adviser Kuznetsov for chasing skirts and drinking, but in reality for being friends with general Kalugin, who caused a scandal at the KGB.

It must be said Kryuchkov turned into a vulgar informer, and vindictive to boot.

In this situation, I really don't want to fly with him and Kohl to the Caucasus. Maybe I won't have to? M.S. is becoming unpleasant to me on a human level.

July 15, 1990.

Wörner was visiting Gorbachev yesterday. This is an event.

Today—Kohl. In the morning they are meeting at the Schechtel mansion on Alexei Tolstoy Street. Gorbachev confirms his agreement to unified Germany's entry into NATO. Kohl is decisive and assertive. He leads a clean but tough game. And it is not the bait (loans) but the

fact that it is pointless to resist here, it would go against the current of events, it would be contrary to the very realities that M.S. likes to refer to so much.

I feel somehow dilapidated; I can't understand what's wrong with me. Of course, the Congress left an oppressive impression. I am also affected by Gorbachev's treatment of people who are loyal to him till the end, who help him to remain at his level and realize his potential. Without them a lot of it would have been impossible. His attitude to us is also increasingly frustrating. He is beginning to be spoiled by power, as everyone does. Too bad.

Lately I have been thinking about retirement. Of course, it is ridiculous to take offense at the President of a superpower, and in general what are my feelings in the face of his tremendous workload. Still, there is a sense of personal worth. Moreover, considering his behavior, the work I do for him has lost its excitement. This was exactly how I was feeling when I "skipped work." From the mansion on Alexei Tolstoy Street I went to the CC instead of going to the airport to fly to the Caucasus. I used the excuse that he (M.S.) did not invite me personally. Although I knew that my name was on the confirmed list of the accompanying party. I really did not want to go with him this time, so I gave myself a little absence without leave. Later many people asked me, especially the Germans, why I was not at Arkhyz. Some suspected politics...

For some reason my thoughts about retirement correspond to Yeltsin's, Sobchak's, and Popov's withdrawal from the Party, and the intentions of many intellectuals to do the same. Most likely this is not a simple coincidence.

July 21, 1990.

At work I was preparing materials for Gorbachev's meeting with the Indian Singh. It seems like Gandhi has been passed over. So many solemn words were said. M.S. had sincerely believed that relations will blossom with "great India"... Nothing happened. In economic relations everything is as it was; we are reducing the military relations. The main focus was wrong.

Delors visited him. He is also taking a close look. Promised to study everything. But he will not give us money "for nothing." Overall, Gorbachev's name is becoming an increasingly questionable mortgage for the West. Look how much he has said recently: to Kohl, to Wörner, to the Indian Prime Minister, to each of the excellent foreigners? That we will have a credible Presidential Council, a strong Federation Council, and that we are going to have a union agreement. But when this Federation Council assembled, Yeltsin did not show up, and the Baltic States sent minor officials. Although, Prunskiene came, but immediately said that she has no intention of participating in any Union agreements; that Lithuania is leaving and she is only interested in this question. Gorbachev personally asked Gorbunov from Latvia to come, but he did not. Yeltsin is claiming the Kremlin as the President of Russia and for greater show. He gave a bunch of orders, compared to which the Estonian laws from last year—which practically disavowed the Center's rights—are mere child's prattle. Gorbachev has turned into power without connections and levers. How does he plan to govern?

No, Mikhail Sergeyevich. The logic of life is by far not the logic of correct reasoning. You started a process that has to have logical development. You built this into *perestroika*'s main idea. And it happened. So do not discredit yourself by trying to rule from the Center. You are left to wisely watch as everything starts working on its own; your job is not to interfere or harm anything. After all, this is your slogan—not to interfere. Except you were saying it in relation to the *kolkhozes* and their fate. But now it needs to be extended to everything, to the entire country. To begin with—do away with the ministries. The British Minister correctly pointed out when speaking to you in regard to our reform: “It hurts less when a cat's tail is cut off in one swoop than piece by piece.”

Gavril Popov made a Moscow-wide order to call back all policemen from guarding public sites, starting with the CC, the Moscow City Committee, raikoms, etc. He said there are not enough policemen to fight crime, while they stand around guarding Volynskoe-1, Volynskoe-2 and however many more of them there are.

Gorbachev told me “You are coming,” i.e. he is going on vacation to Crimea and I am accompanying him. But Kruchina did not provide me with a government car this time. Will they give me stenographers? After all, the Presidential Council is still a gray mouse.

July 29, 1990.

It was a difficult week. Singh is handsome, smart, calm, and is more interesting and serious than Rajiv. Immediately after him we had Andreotti. The preparation for him was even more serious. In between them Gorbachev managed to meet with Sakurate [sic] from Japan, after whom he complained: “if we keep talking about nothing but the islands, I am not going on a visit to Japan.”

Luckily, a meeting with Ikeda was scheduled soon after. He is an interesting figure. All the time he kept patting Gorbachev on the shoulder and every now in then would call out something in Japanese—out of delight for this great person. This inspired Gorbachev. He started philosophizing and again “went a long way.” The same thing happened with Andreotti. However, there is a hope that this one will provide some real help, unlike Delors, Bush, Hurd and others. In the meanwhile, Yeltsin addressed his fellow countrymen with a call to take in the harvest and promised a reward, i.e. not working for free! With these slogans and more he has done what I advised Gorbachev to do. He ignored it and is once again late.

By the way, Yeltsin's address contains the following words: “Let us save what there is left to save in Russia, which has been the subject of such a careless experiment.” That's about *perestroika*.

In an interview to an Austrian newspaper Yeltsin again wrote off Gorbachev. Right now he is vacationing in Yurmala and making agreements with the Balts about allied relations as equals. Here he is ahead of Gorbachev as well.

He is openly taking advantage of Gorbachev's undertakings and the results of his policies. There would be no Yeltsin without Gorbachev.

Yesterday I re-wrote the text for the agreement with Germany after Kvitsinsky and Falin. Then I packed my suitcase and books. Tomorrow I am off to Crimea for “sweet forced labor.” This time with Petrakov and three women.

Shakhnazarov stopped by yesterday and said, “Maybe he (Gorbachev) does not need me anymore?”

“Why?”

“How is he taking on a third Armenian?”

At first I didn’t understand whom he meant. I thought Brutents, whom I pressed upon Gorbachev as an adviser. I was wrong. Primakov became the third.

August 21, 1990.

(The entry was made after returning from Crimea to Moscow)

On the day we arrived in Crimea for vacation, M.S. stumped me with an assignment to write an article on the subject of “Market and socialism.” “They accuse me of wanting to lead the country away from socialism, of betraying the socialist choice,” he said. Two days later I brought him a draft. “You misunderstood me. It is possible that I did not express my idea clearly.” I understood from what he said that he wanted something completely different.

Three days later I brought a new version. He grimaced, but said that it seems to be getting better. In a word, the cat loves fish but hates water. Most importantly, the combination of the two words in the title doesn’t work.

At the same time he assigned Shakhnazarov to prepare an interview on the issues of a Union agreement. When Shakhnazarov sent him a draft, Gorbachev rejected it and grumbled for a long time. He was upset because Shakhnazarov portrayed realistically what is inevitably going to happen. M.S. does not want this and is again lagging behind. First he struggles to restore a Leninist understanding of a federation, then struggles for a renewed federalism, then for a union of sovereign republics. Finally, for a Union of states, this is after some republics already announced their withdrawal from the USSR. Shakhnazarov changed his draft and sent over a tearful jumble, an admonition—do not leave, so to say, you will be in a bad way, while in the new Union it will be good!

But Gorbachev changed his mind regarding the article and the interview.

He decided to go to the Odessa military district maneuvers to make a speech touching upon these themes. Three times he re-dictated the texts. There seemed to be progress on the market question. For the first time he said that private property lies at the core of everything, without the “socialist” adjective or some other. He made up his mind regarding the crisis of socialism, calmed down about privatization, included it into socialist choice, but at the top of everything he decidedly placed denationalization. In a word, ideology, or rather mythology, still

has a strong hold on him because he believes that the majority of the population is still attached to it. He pays it a tribute, although less and less.

Upon returning from Odessa he asked me what responses there were to the speech. Alas! I could not tell him anything. I did not hear any responses from Moscow or among the vacationers at the sanatorium where I lived. He cannot accept the fact that word is only valued as deed nowadays, not as a reflection of ideology. Ideology is truly finished everywhere.

From Crimea he responded to various organizations' requests and sent greetings to all kinds of conferences, conventions, international meetings. But they were not published even in the national newspapers, much less were there any responses to them.

On August 11, 1990, in the evening he gathered in Mukhalatka some of the big bosses, who were vacationing in Crimea at the time. He has been doing this every year, but it was the first time I was invited to such a get-together. Present were Nazarbaev, Yazov, Medvedev, Frolov, Nishanov, Niyazov, Primakov; those with wives brought them too. Primakov, of course, was the master of ceremonies. Everybody was saying toasts. Gorbachev personally called on people to take the floor.

Nazarbaev spoke several times and there was a marked note of confidence in his voice. He was talking a great deal about the free market and about the unique natural wealth of "his state" without which other states in the Union would not survive.

Meanwhile, the crisis in Iraq was developing. I was afraid that M.S. would be hesitant to sharply condemn Hussein. Luckily, I was wrong. Plus, Shevardnadze was acting resolutely in the spirit of New Thinking. He coordinated everything with Gorbachev over the phone though, starting with the agreement to meet with Baker in Moscow and issue a joint statement. Sometimes, if he called at night, I would not disturb Gorbachev and take the responsibility on myself, assuring Eduard Amvrosievich that Gorbachev would support the decision.

One evening Gorbachev invited me and Primakov to a family dinner at his dacha. We had a sincere conversation, mostly about Yeltsin and Polozkov.

Gorbachev: "Everybody sees what a scoundrel Yeltsin is; he is a man of no rules, no morals, and no culture. Everyone can see he is engaged in demagoguery (Freedom to Tatariya. Freedom to Komi. Freedom to Bashkiria—no problem!). It is Gorbachev that will have to pick up the tab. There is not a single criticism, not to mention a condemnation of him in any newspaper or TV program. Nothing is said even on his offensive interviews to various Swiss and Japanese newspapers, where he cannot but speak disparagingly of Gorbachev. I can have nothing to do with him as a person, but politically I will maintain a position of compromise because you cannot do anything without Russia."

We started talking about Polozkov. I said that the worse the situation in the RCP, the better. The more Stalinist it is, the sooner it will be off the political stage.

Primakov said there is a danger of a Yeltsin-Polozkov union. I agreed. There is. If the RCP grows weaker, Yeltsin will do it a favor by picking it up and using it to serve his Bonapartism. If it grows stronger, he will try to make an enemy out of it. Primakov suggested that we should be nice to Polozkov, give him some good position and let him leave the post of first in the RCP, while we put a *perestroika*-man in his place. I objected that this is an illusion. Polozkov may be dim, but he understands that if he leaves the post or gives up his Nina-Andreeva program, he will be a political corpse.

M.S. ignored our moves around this topic. He concluded like this: I have known Polozkov for a long time. He is an honest, decent guy, but he is dense, uneducated. Even in his last interview he showed that he does not understand what he says—whatever someone writes for him, he reads.

The conversation turned to Ryzhkov. Primakov's take: we should say goodbye to Ryzhkov. He unites the Military-Industrial Complex, the directors (including the military men), and he unites them on anti-Gorbachev positions. He is incapable of grasping the market, much less of implementing market concepts. He publicly opposes his program to the President's program, discredits the "Group 13,"⁶ and Abalkin has turned into his minion.

I supported Primakov. Gorbachev said: "You are little kittens. If in this situation I create another opposition front here, it will be the end. Ryzhkov and even the Council of Ministers will fall as the natural victims of the market system's objective development. The same will happen with the party's state power, and it will happen this year." Primakov and I agreed verbally, but not in our hearts, because we are again losing time. An economic program needs to be accepted not at some vague point in the future, but this September.

Shortly before his departure from Crimea Gorbachev (at Primakov's suggestion) invited Ignatenko to offer him "Fitzwater's post" (Bush' press secretary). Ignatenko is handsome, smart, talented. He has taken the magazine "Novoe vremya" [New Time] in a very good direction. He was very flattered by the offer, behaved in a very dignified manner. He reminded Gorbachev that had once made a film about Brezhnev, for which he got the Lenin Prize. M.S. did not make a big deal out of it. "The important thing," he said, "is what you are thinking and doing right now. All of us came from that time." In the evening they took a walk down the trails surrounding the dacha. Gorbachev was sounding him out on various subjects.

Ignatenko flew to Moscow and the next day called Primakov. According to Zhenya, he sounded somewhat sour—either because he got scared, or he doesn't want to leave the magazine and lose his freedom, or he is afraid to get too engaged with Gorbachev. Although during the conversation with Gorbachev he said boldly: two years ago I might have been hesitant, i.e. when Gorbachev was still on the rise, but now I agree irrevocably (when Gorbachev is doing worse and worse).

⁶ A group created by Gorbachev in concurrence with Yeltsin to prepare a market program (Shatalin, Petrakov, Yavlinsky and others). (author's note)

There was an order to reinstate citizenship for Solzhenitsyn and twenty-three other people. Gorbachev is late in this, too. This should have been done two, two and a half years ago, when such an action would have been attributed to him personally. Now nobody would give him credit for it; and in reality it is the result of the logic of the times. He gave it the impetus, but nobody connects it to him anymore. By the way, we (I, Shakhnazarov, Yakovlev, Arbatov) have been pestering him for a long time with Solzhenitsyn, even when the Politburo was in shape and had power. But at the PB he said: never! Although he had instructed us many times never to say “never.”

August 26, 1990.

Yesterday M.S. met with Dumas, France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Dumas was bowing and scraping: “France and the USSR make an irreplaceable [alliance]. It is particularly important for the Near East and Europe in light of German unification. Also it shows the United States that Europe where France is together with the USSR can do without them.” And the like. M.S. was in his top form and talked about his most sore points—the economy and the Union. He does not rule out the possibility that he former will be obstructed and the latter will collapse. He mocked Yeltsin. He no longer analyzes, as he used to do with foreigners, but waits for what is coming, ready for everything.

By the way, not too long ago in Crimea he told me, “I don’t want to work. I don’t want to do anything, I’m only continuing out of decency.” Quite the Boris Godunov kind of fate. Every day brings something new: either the tobacco riots, or fighting on the Armenian-Azeri front, or an explosion at the Ufa distillery and phenol in the water supply of a city with a million people, or Yeltsin’s games with handing out freedom to all of Russia’s regions and republics. He told the Frenchman that he will meet with Yeltsin soon, maybe on Tuesday, and will try to curb his populist style, to say that he is no longer at a meeting and has for a while been endowed with government responsibilities...

The people (mob) simply hate Gorbachev. He can feel it. He told me that “all of them” (i.e. Yeltsin & Co.) are deliberately exacerbating the destabilization, using people’s hatred and anger to seize power. He sees it as his task not to let them take it, because this would push the country into chaos and dictatorship. The atmosphere is ripe for it.

Ryzhkov does not want to leave the Kremlin. I think while he is in office the Council of Ministers will remain.

A scene at the airport. The following company was meeting M.S. on his return from the Crimea: members of the Presidential Council (for now this body has no state power, it is more a group of consultants and companions-in-arms), some people from the Politburo (Dzasokhov). Ryzhkov clashed with the authors of the “Group 13” program until he was white in the face. Gorbachev had to separate them. After Gorbachev left, Ryzhkov walked up to us, the advisers, to say goodbye and, shaking with hatred, said to Petrakov, “Oh, I will have you go down in history!” Lukyanov, who was standing nearby, added, “If you keep going like this, the Supreme Soviet will overthrow the government in September, and in November the Congress of People’s

Deputies will be disbanded, as well as the Supreme Soviet itself. New elections will be scheduled and no later than December the President will be overthrown... and you, too."

August 27, 1990.

Today Meguid was here—Egypt's Minister of Foreign Affairs. M.S. incorporated a "Soviet-Egyptian" factor with a nuance, an accent on the Arabs. It is good that he is restoring relations with Egypt in time, essentially giving them preference in the Arab world, despite Assad's pretensions. Overall, so far we are in a "white jabot" over there. And we are maintaining New Thinking. But if Hussein does not back down, it will be a nightmare.

Telegrams from all over the place are coming in for Gorbachev: crime is taking us by the throat in the worst forms—murder, burglary, robbery, rape of minors, arms depots. The provinces are asking to arm the citizens. There is an outcry regarding the authorities' and the President's helplessness. The crime rate is exacerbated by the empty shelves, the tobacco shortage (there have been tobacco riots), economic and national disorder. This is the perfect atmosphere for dictatorship. Where will it come from? Gorbachev is incapable of it. Should power be handed over to some emergency committee?

What a symptom of the crash of communism—in Sofia the CC building was burned down and for three hours they would not let the firefighters get close. It is 1933 Reichstag in reverse! With the same potential outcome.

This time a united Germany will save Europe. But who is going to save us? Should Gorbachev leave, everyone will distance themselves from us.

August 28, 1990.

It looks like Gorbachev met with Yeltsin. Yesterday he was receiving the Hungarian Thürmer. He leads the party that replaced the HSWP. I remember how 12 years ago, he was a young kid accompanying me around Budapest, carrying my suitcase. I recall I slammed his hand with a car door. He was talking about "imperialists" who are pressuring Eastern Europe's communists.

Shakhnazarov stopped by. He suggested that Gorbachev write a letter to Bush and Thatcher, urging them not to stir up the neo-fascists against the communists in Eastern Europe. I mocked the idea. In general, Ostroumov—Gorbachev's adviser on CPSU affairs—out of his over-suspicious nature and Shakhnazarov out of concern for public property (Armenian nature) are calling not to be too soft on our own fascists, who also can burn down buildings, including the CC. I find it funny and hard to believe, and I am not afraid even though something is clearly coming.

M.S. does not see it, or maybe he does not want to react. I think Russia will not be renewed without a shock, especially after such collapse and disintegration. And what hatred can be felt towards communism everywhere!

September 1, 1990.

The Presidential Council was in session for two days. Afterwards, M.S. gave a press conference and quite confidently talked in the spirit of “let’s be friends.” In fact, there had been a scandal. The demand for Ryzhkov’s resignation sounded as the session’s refrain. In response, Ryzhkov said that he needs a day to think about it, and immediately burst forth with, “If it comes to resignations then we should all resign (he looked at M.S.). We all played a hand in the collapse, all brought the matters to blood, to economic chaos, we were all striving for what we have... Why do I have to be the scapegoat?”

At a press conference today Yeltsin was merciful to Gorbachev, but said, “Ryzhkov should leave himself. If he doesn’t, we will leave him.” He highly praised Shatalin’s program and promised to implement it as the core of Russia’s reform.

The program (I examined it) is not even the European Common Market, but more like EAST [sic]. Little is left of the Union. But, it looks like there is no other way to maintain a semblance like the USSR had been. Although, Yeltsin offered to form a “Council of Presidents” as a supreme power with equal representation.

The people in food lines are seeping with anger and hatred for Gorbachev. Today “Pravda” published a collection of workers’ letters, which sputter at *perestroika* and Gorbachev. Next to them is praise for Stalin and Brezhnev. Yes, this is the start of the road to Golgotha.

Yeltsin has credit to last him at least two years, while Gorbachev’s credit is moving closer to zero every day. Yeltsin is freeloading off Gorbachev’s ideas and statements, and off his inconsistency. Everything he says right now has been said by M.S. at the corresponding stages over *perestroika*’s five years. But he was too hesitant to act, ideology held him by his coattails. He is still not free from it.

In Crimea this year he started off by coming up with a concept for an article that would make excuses and show that he is for socialism. At the same time he patronized the “Group 13” with Shatalin, Petrakov, and others, who do not even use the words socialism, socialist choice, ideology, etc.

Maybe he tried to reconcile them at the Presidential Council, too, along the lines of “why should we push away Ryzhkov. If someone cannot handle the work, he can be replaced. But why such extremes—resignation of the government.” Although he said even in Crimea that Ryzhkov is hopeless.

In the end, he has cast aside everyone with whom he started *perestroika*, except Yakovlev and Medvedev. Everyone ended up overboard or as his fierce enemy who has his own groups and followers. But he stretched this “process” out for 3 years, while this revolution should have been made like revolutions ought to be.

September 2, 1990.

M.S. asked me to work out (for the meeting with Bush) three possible outcomes for the Persian Gulf.

- Blockade (how long will Hussein be able to hold out, will it yield results);
- A military solution (outcomes for both sides and for us);
- Compromise (what kind?)

He assigned me to ask Mitterrand and Mubarak what they would “advise.” Also, send a message to Hussein: can he say anything new in relation to the Bush-Gorbachev meeting?

While Shevardnadze is travelling to China and Japan, Kovalev has been “coordinating” every line with me, including who is going to be present at the breakfast in Helsinki: this is really not my “profession”!

What is going to happen with Ryzhkov? With the economic program? With the Union? I think by New Years we are no longer going to have a country. Will we have Gorbachev? Probably yes.

September 4, 1990.

At a breakneck pace I have been preparing materials for M.S.’ meeting with American senators, with Aziz (from Hussein), and doing some major work on the “five blocks” for Helsinki with Bush. Brutents gave me an acceptable block. The materials from the MFA are cheap and bureaucratic texts.

“Izvestia” is printing Shatalin’s program. The Russian parliament is in the initial stages of adopting it. All the while the Congress of the Russian Communist Party (stage two) is calling all of this anti-Soviet, a betrayal of socialism and the surrender of the country to capitalism. All of this is happening against the background of the “latest deficit” (after which there can only be a rebellion in Russia)—the bread deficit. Thousand-people-long lines form at the bakeries where bread is available. Something incredible has happened to Russia. Maybe we really are on the threshold of a violent catastrophe?

It seems Gorbachev is at a loss. Power is crawling out of his hands before his eyes, while he spends entire days in meetings with various representatives of the economic platform and the union agreement, instead of waiting for the parliaments to do it. And he spends half his day attending the RSFSR CP Congress. What does he expect from them? It looks like he is completely confused and does not know what is going on. He does not see what can be done. He asked Shakhnazarov this question yesterday.

September 13, 1990.

On the evening of September 9th we flew to Helsinki with M.S. There was a conversation with Koivisto at the Presidential Palace. Lunch of two presidential couples and Kalela and I (he is Koivisto’s Chief Clerk). M.S. became very open as if he were with a bosom (Soviet) friend, talking about the market, the soul, the fate of a statesman, the fact that he has “accomplished his mission” and can leave. In a word, there was a completely informal atmosphere.

At night M.S. gathered his compatriots-in-arms for a brainstorming session before the meeting with Bush. We stayed up until 3a.m. Shevardnadze did not say much. Primakov was

pushing to consider the Arabs. Falin kept returning to the “class line,” referring to a conference of Europe’s “left” in Tampere. I was calling for “Realpolitik”—America has to be given preference over the Arabs. This is our salvation and our future. To my surprise, at the meeting with Bush, 95 percent of the time M.S. took my direction and left 5 percent for the Arabs. This has an effect, because the Americans do not trust us completely.

I stayed up practically until morning, making a conversation diagram based on the discussion. In the morning we were walking from the hotel to the Embassy, hearing tipsy Finnish couples saying “Hello!” ... (Actually, one could have a special discussion about this—friendly, happy, calm, well-fed, self-confident people).

On the 10th in the morning, M.S.—Bush + Scowcroft and I. M.S. dominated. Bush really wanted support, he was nervous that Gorbachev would fall through, after all the Persian Gulf and Hussein have put Bush’ presidency on the line. But M.S. gave him the maximum: even unexpectedly, without waiting for Bush’ suggestion, he said that the Sabah family (Kuwait’s rulers) should be reinstated. He almost convinced [Bush] of the necessity to connect dealing with Hussein with the Palestinian question.

Then we had lunch. Afterwards there was a meeting of the delegations, to which I was late because I was composing the background for the press-conference. The press-conference itself was quite an event! M.S. was confident and very good. In a word, he showed the world that he is the leader of a power, a great power, despite the chaos at home. And the whole world believed in him once again.

But to our people, it’s like water off a duck’s back. Even this they did not appreciate. They did not notice history being made in Helsinki.

September 14, 1990.

Yesterday 22 American businessmen visited Gorbachev. M.S. charmed them, but they are business people and through Matlock’s lips persistently tried to find out: with whom do you do business here? Herein lies the main problem of Soviet business.

Stopping the conversation mid-way through, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Baker, Ross, and I went to the adjoining room. As if continuing the enthusiasm of his businessmen, Baker said openly to Gorbachev that in his entire political career he had not met a more courageous, bold, and great leader, who dared to turn the country around, overturning 70 years of its history. “Until last year,” Baker went on, “I was hesitant and cautious. But today Bush and I are wholly behind you. We sincerely wish you success.”

The conversation, as they say, went arm-in-arm. M.S. called him Jim. However, he did not promise transport aircraft to transfer Syrian troops to Saudi Arabia (later, when Shevardnadze asked him about it he replied: we don’t need to get involved!).

He asked Baker for a non-binding loan of billion to a billion and a half dollars with repayment in five years. Baker personally would have agreed, but he said the law does not allow

it. If they were to go to Congress with, “you’d be able to finish two *perestroikas* in that amount of time.”

By the way, in relation to such closeness between Gorbachev and the Secretary of State, I remembered Helsinki. The one-on-one talk with Bush was finished, but Bush was hesitating about something... Then he held out his hand, “Until lunch! See you soon!” and suddenly, “Can I call you by your first name?” (i.e. by the familiar address) M.S. gladly replied and immediately called him George. From this moment on M.S. became Michael.

In the meantime, we both still have weapons capable of destroying each other ten times over. As it turns out, the START talks in Vienna are going badly (this is Baker and Shevardnadze’s evaluation, which they gave yesterday in a talk with M.S.). This means Michael and George’s Helsinki plan to come to an agreement this year is in jeopardy.

I told Akhromeev about this today. He says, “We cannot do anything. The Americans are refusing to negotiate on marine aviation.” That’s Mike and George for you! And there is Comrade Moiseev too (Chief of General Staff), who is worse than Akhromeev.

Today Gorbachev met with Hurd (Great Britain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs). Before the meeting I armed him with some information I got from Zamyatin (Ambassador in London). He writes that Thatcher is offended, she is jealous of Gorbachev’s attention, says that he has lost interest. He is always with Kohl or Mitterrand, while she deserves to be treated better. M.S. tried to “compensate” and in the conversation with Hurd he flowed with praise for Margaret and even offered to make an agreement similar to the one with Germany and France. In the evening Gorbachev met with two Israeli ministers (finances and energy).

We are counting on getting 10 billion... Well, well! In any case this meeting is a sensation with enormous consequences. Especially in the context of the Persian Gulf War.

By the way, Gorbachev notified Baker yesterday that he will meet with the Israelis. Baker, laughing and shaking his finger, exclaimed, “Just don’t ask them for money! Look at the fix Reagan got himself into.” (The fact of the matter is that with Israel as the intermediary, Reagan asked Iran for money, in order to send it to the Nicaraguan Contras). Later, when we were leaving from the Kremlin and Gorbachev put me in the car with him I blurted out, “Then what are these ministers for, anyways?!” He laughed. But I tried to suggest the economist (!) Petrakov for this meeting with the Israelis. He and Yakovlev attended.

September 15, 1990.

The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs De Michelis visited M.S. On behalf of Andreotti he announced that Gorbachev had been awarded a prize by the Fiuggi Foundation (Italians equate it to the Nobel Prize). After the Italians left, and Shevardnadze and Adamishin with them, Gorbachev said to me, “Tolya, what should I do? What is there to grasp on to?” Indeed. Yesterday at the Supreme Soviet there was a competition between the programs offered by Abalkin, Aganbegyan, Shatalin. Each defended his own, while the people’s jaw is dropping. Ryzhkov keeps insisting on his own plan: “My program is realistic, sparing.” Should there be a

referendum on the programs? It is silly. The Republics were sent the alternative options; they can each choose whatever they like. But Russia has already entered the market and in general does whatever it wants. Ryzhkov promised to raise the purchasing price of meat starting January 1st. Word got out and meat disappeared completely. Then Silaev announced that prices in Russia will be raised on September 15th. What is Ryzhkov's resolution without Russia?!

Yesterday the Politburo discussed in panic what to do about the demonstration by half a million people that is scheduled for September 15th in Moscow and other cities under the slogan "Down with Ryzhkov" and in some places Gorbachev, too.

I am swamped this week; I have been writing materials for Gorbachev's daily talks with foreigners, then recording what they say during the meetings, then writing messages for TASS and the newspapers. My imagination is worn thin; there are not enough words to escape the banality, although Gorbachev does help out—he always has some unusual turn of thought or some "such" phrase.

Nowadays he is asking everyone for money and loans. Today, for example, he asked De Michelis for a billion and a half.

September 16, 1990.

I am catching up on my reading for a week. Viktor Nekrasov in "Literaturnaya gazeta" [Literary Gazette] published an article called "Testament," written in 1981. It is about the tragedy of a generation, about us, history, about his famous book ("V okopakh Stalingrada" [Front-line Stalingrad]); he finishes his article with the words: "The enemy was defeated! We were victorious! But our cause turned out to be wrong."

Petrenko's article about Lenin's illness. Sick and nearing death, Lenin reassesses his work. There is a desire to step aside. Reality did not match up to theory and he (Lenin!) started to look for justification in flattering and enthusiastic mass praises of his genius.

Sokolov's article on the situation in the country—no reform program is going to work here, even if it is made by the best minds in the world with the help of the most powerful computers. Because there is no stability, no law, no continuity of solutions, no security, citizens are unprotected... Because the state is collapsing.

The three articles are three "points" that define my personal drama right now—hopelessness.

September 18, 1990.

At the Supreme Soviet Aganbegyan, Shatalin, and Abalkin continue their battle. The first two are saying that it is not a choice between socialism and capitalism, but between life and the grave. Abalkin defends Ryzhkov, he wants to save him (and himself) with populism. The Congress of People's Deputies gives more and more material to people like Sukhov (driver from Donbass) to blame Gorbachev for betrayal of the party and socialism.

M.S. asked me yesterday whether I've been going to the Supreme Soviet sessions. I said, "No."

- Out of principle?
- No time.
- I see.

He wanted to know my opinion of his speech yesterday at the Supreme Soviet. Petrakov told me it was good... if everything had not been adjusted and forced to comply with the socialist idea.

September 20, 1990.

All day today I was preparing materials for M.S.' meeting with Lafontaine tomorrow. For several months I have been trying to resist this meeting, especially lately. We do not need this double game. Even if he becomes chancellor (with Genscher's support) he will be doing the same thing as Kohl—German unification (no matter how upset he is with us).

However, the lobbying efforts by Falin & Co., and M.S.' social-democratic friends (even Kvitsinskiy joined them) won him over: M.S. will see Lafontaine. So I was racking my brains on how not to ruin the "party" with Kohl during this most crucial stage of united Germany's emergence. I am also going to have to "adapt" the conversation's results for the press: M.S. might be overly frank.

Solzhenitsyn: a brochure in "Komsomolskaia Pravda" and "Literurnaia gazeta." Ignatenko's conversation with M.S. about Solzhenitsyn: he will remain in history... and you. Lenin will fade away, but you two will remain. Think big, right?

September 22, 1990.

Everything is becoming more and more confused. The Supreme Soviet did not accept the market program. The Abalkin-Shatalin-Aganbegyan group has been reestablished. There will be different versions. Gorbachev demanded emergency powers to implement a market. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet bristled and produced a decree: none of the USSR President's resolutions are valid in Russia without the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's ratification.

Travkin later told me about the accusations Russia's deputies threw at Gorbachev: he destroyed the CPSU, broke up the Union, lost Eastern Europe, liquidated Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, dealt a blow to the army, emptied the shelves, spread crime, etc. By the way, in his speech at the Supreme Soviet before the discussions of market programs, Gorbachev made a bad "faux pas"—again he started talking about a federation instead of a Union of States. By the way, who is telling him that the era of sovereignty has passed?

During a break M.S. spoke with Lafontaine. In the evening Aitmatov pressed upon him to meet with a Mufti and some foreign Mullahs to discuss the role of Islam. This is becoming absurd—the difference between his position internationally and domestically.

All the mass media can talk about is Yeltsin's minor car accident, in which he sustained a small bruise. The weekly "Souz" [Union] published an interview with him. He is truly growing into a leader. He has surpassed M.S. in the definitiveness of his positions, in his ambition and impudence, not to mention popularity.

Days, days, weeks. The sense that everything is going to come crashing down grows ever sharper. The life I have in my work reminds me every day that a change of regime has taken place and I, together with others in a similar position, are finding ourselves like the former people in 1917. Everything that I had or earned came from the old regime. It was a reward for serving it. Now I can no longer boast that I've been working all my life. Ask for compensation? From whom? They will tell me: ask from whomever you served. And overall, it will be fair.

September 23, 1990.

I took Khodasevich off the shelf, what poetry! "Khralishche" [Repository] and others get under your skin... It is strange that only in old age I really began to feel poetry, to distinguish its language from a simple "method of expression."

The revolution is coming. The one Gorbachev caused. But he was not expecting this and for a long time did not want to call it a change of government, not to mention a change of regime. Even still, he only talks about a change in the economic system. No, what is happening is truly equal to 1917, even if "in reverse."

September 25, 1990.

To use Gorbachev's term, yesterday was a breakthrough. M.S. made several heated speeches about the market program and demanded special powers to implement it. But the decision was delayed once again, and yet another committee was formed, to be headed by Gorbachev, and again it will try to combine the incompatible. Everyone can see it, but they are conceding to his indestructible compromise tactics.

Yesterday "Izvestia" carried an article by Pavlova-Selvanskaya—a most intelligent and angry aristocrat. She gave a careful analysis of Gorbachev's "strategy and tactics," which led to what we have, and provided a striking and deeply consistent personal, economic and systemic analysis.

In the meanwhile, everything is going downhill, the harvest is spoiling, communications are breaking, deliveries have ceased, the stores are empty, factories have stopped, and transportation workers are striking. By the way, there was an announcement on TV—the salary for some shabby little position ranges from 300-1000 rubles! There is no market yet, but the prices are already climbing up.

September 27, 1990.

It is 11a.m. and I am still home. Even here "discipline is lacking." I would never have allowed myself something like this before...

Today I will have to prepare M.S.' telegram to Weizsäcker on the occasion of Germany's unification; find some materials for his meeting tomorrow with General Electric; decide on a schedule for October-November: Mitterrand, the Standing Consultative Commission (WTO's funeral) in Budapest, Spain, Kohl at his birthplace with a big Soviet-German Agreement; Andreotti with an Agreement and the Fiuggi; the Pan-European Summit, etc.

He keeps postponing the decision; Shevardnadze is already knocking... (By the way, at the UN, E.A. made a very "progressive" speech, which means that we have completely torn with ideology-based foreign policy. "Over there" it created an impression, but here I had to pressure Efremov ("Izvestia" editor) to publish the full text.)

M.S. called last night: "People say that after Helsinki Gorbachev did not do anything for the Persian Gulf crisis..."

"Who says that?"

"The Americans..."

"How is that possible? You meet with various foreign dignitaries practically every day and you confirm the approach you developed at Helsinki... Plus, consider Shevardnadze's speech, it also demonstrates your policies. Nobody would think that he 'allowed himself' to give that speech."

M.S. calmed down. But where did he get these ideas? Who is feeding them to him? I haven't seen such information, but he must have a special source.

Yesterday with Andrei Grachev we were picking people for the Presidential Council's International Department. Some from the CC International Department, but the majority will be fresh people who made themselves known through "party-unaffiliated" newspapers.

Bovin keeps asking: Count, let's get together and have a real heart-to-heart. I keep promising him, but things come up, and I don't really want to drink. Most importantly—it is no longer interesting to me. There is nothing I could get from him that I could not get from the newspapers. Nowadays, the kitchen conversations that were so popular during the stagnation period are somehow no longer appealing.

Frolov spent 10 days with his wife and two advisers touring France by car (for the *Fête de L'Humanité*), two weeks in Italy (at *L'Unità*'s festivities). On October 2nd there will be a party meeting in "Pravda." On the agenda: expressing distrust in its leadership. I would be very happy if he were slammed precisely when he "achieved" his highest point. Kulak nature. And so M.S. would see whom he cherished and exalted!

September 29, 1990.

Last night at work I finished up M.S.' greetings for Weizsäcker and Kohl on the occasion of Germany's unification. Then M.S. met with the intelligentsia. I was devouring telegrams. I wrote him a proposal—something should be done about our specialists working in Iraq. Unlike

the Americans and others, we once again do not take care of our own people, and they are beginning to mutiny. We did not evacuate them early and now they are trapped. Hussein is already including them in the “human shield.” I wrote a note about Lafontaine and Bahr’s suggestion to train our officers in civilian professions.

Gusenkov and Arbatov called regarding the “threat” of a military coup and civil war. My friends, this will not happen! It will be worse.

It is truly time to get rid of the Supreme Soviet. Today it discussed the issue of cancelling the friendship agreement with the GDR. It would seem this is a routine-formal act. The Germans cancelled this agreement by a government decree, since the subject of the agreement has disappeared. But our people kept discussing it until they decided to make Kohl the successor of this agreement, which by the way mentions the inviolability of the border between the two Germanys, the struggle against West-German imperialism, etc.! And in the end, they did not accept a resolution. Tomorrow they will continue the discussion.

I advised Kovalev (Shevardnadze is in New York right now) to tell M.S. about this. M.S.’ reaction was: tell them to go to hell! But it is not only stupidity at work here. It is a conscious provocation against Gorbachev’s policies towards Germany from people like General Makashov and others, who believe that we gave Eastern Europe away “without a fight” and the like; against all of “this so called New Thinking.” They do not really try to hide their attitude that it would be nice to have Stalin back to deal with “all these politics of ours.” Falin, the CC, and “my” International Department, which is desperately struggling for survival, are playing along to these types of politicians.

Ambassador Blech from Germany visited me. He was effusive in gratitude to Gorbachev. He left a message from Kohl. M.S. did not want to publish it here. (I insisted on a review in “*Izvestia*”). It is his obkom fear before the people—not to appear to be flirting with the Germans...

Nevertheless M.S. agreed to my proposal to publish his greetings to Weizsäcker and Kohl. It has already been broadcast today on TV’s “*Vremya*” [Time].

Yesterday I glanced at my diary from the end of the war and 1945 up until mobilization. I had not looked at it in decades. I was stunned—the language is intelligent and literary, expressing an educated view. In some places it did not even sound like me! After all, I had only three years of university behind me and the war....

October 6, 1990.

Yesterday after a meeting with the ILO (Hansenne) I stayed with M.S. to work on his speech for the CC Plenum together. Shakhnazarov came over and we once again started rewriting. We worked on it until 9p.m., as always getting frequently distracted... He was railing against “*Izvestia*” for supporting all anti-Gorbachev sentiments, I objected.

Frolov called M.S., complaining about the beating he took at the party meeting of “Pravda” editors... I was listening to the conversation... M.S. saying into the phone: “No need to publish, we will figure it out, this is the CC Secretariat’s job. Send me a transcript.” He was calming him down, but not too approvingly.

When he finished the conversation, he came up to us. I said: “How quickly Ivan brought things to a mutiny aboard. You know what was the last drop? His trip with his wife and team in France and Italy. Two weeks instead of two days at the expense of the treasury and “friends,” and at such a time in our country!”

“That was nothing... It was those drunkards, who with Afanas’ev (former “Pravda” editor) had a nice party and stirred things up... It is aimed against me...”

“Clearly. Ivan can’t say two words without referring to how you love him and support him in everything.”

“Stop, Anatoly. You are not objective, I know how you feel about Ivan...”

“How can one be objective?! For over two years he has been an adviser and brazenly and defiantly did nothing. The only thing he did was become an academician... As for him not doing any work—here are live witnesses (I pointed to Shakh, the secretaries), you could bring the whole staff of typists here, they would tell you how they retyped for the umpteenth time his twenty-year-old book on the ‘Man and Lysenko’—at the public’s expense and on government paper! Meanwhile, you made him CC Secretary, editor of ‘Pravda,’ member of the PB!!”

“Let it go Anatoly, I am telling you that you are not objective. Subjectivity fits neither science nor politics! See how worked up you’ve become!”

That was the end of the conversation...

When we started talking about the tarnishing of our history on TV, Gorbachev again “jumped” to talking about Stalin’s hatred for the peasants and his deliberate campaign to destroy them. But on our TV they “keep showing these lies that life in villages was good, while in reality, I should know, it was rags, poverty, and hopelessness.”

When M.S. decided to introduce into his speech an already worn-out topic of how people came down on Lenin when he was introducing the NEP, I told him, “The most important and relevant thing is not that they came down on him, but that they did not understand it and rejected it, with the ensuing consequences. Everything went awry.”

I bought Nietzsche’s “Thus spoke Zarathustra.” It swept over me. I had read it when I was a student, before the war, after finding it in a used-book shop. How engrossed I was! How clearly I remembered my impressions from it. But now I am having difficulty getting through it. Probably there is a proper time for everything, even in personal development.

I am reading the White-Army officer Roman Gul, “Ledovoi poxod” [Ice March]—everything is turning over. Our whole history is before my eyes. Naumov visited me; he is the

“team-leader” on the project of writing “Essays on the History of the CPSU.” They raised such layers that the whole world is flipped upside down. We did not have history for practically a century. What we knew and what we were taught was sheer forgery and lies. This concerns our side—the revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks; it concerns White Russia, it concerns all our people during the revolution and afterwards.

However, I remember my childhood in Maryina Roshcha. There were some material difficulties, yes... after 1929... Something with the kolkhozes... how we would go to the dacha during the hungry years, how we waited for father at the station—he would bring a little bag of bread. But overall the memories are bright... Mother’s quasi-aristocratic impetus must have saved us from the reality of daily life: the piano, German lessons, French lessons, a foreign governess, distance from the Roshcha’s raggedy environment—“blue blood.” Books, books. Then an elite school.

October 9, 1990.

The Plenum started yesterday. “Vremya” mentioned it in 20th place: the announcer stated the agenda and that Gorbachev spoke. That was it. It is a sign that the party is truly leaving the stage. Gusekov was telling me that the Plenum was nothing but whining that the party has been open to debasement, everyone tramples and drives it away, mocks it and pushes it aside. And there is no one to protect it. The General Secretary abandoned it; he has no time for it. And in general—the market is dealing the final blow to the conditions in which the party could have meant something. M.S. was allegedly annoyed by Ivashko and Dzasokhov’s weak reports; afterwards he convened the PB.

Why does he bother with this? The first rule of politics is to be able to leave behind something that has already been worked out. I still cannot figure out, did he want to reduce the party to such a state? If yes, then why try to galvanize it? It is impossible to revitalize “this” party, without disbanding it.

Or did it happen by the logic he endowed *perestroika* with? I.e. he did not expect such a precipitous destruction of the party’s authority and together with it of Marxism-Leninism—a term that has practically turned into an obscenity. But then he should have resisted the collapse. Instead, he tolerates anti-Gorbachev articles in “Pravda” itself. Although, they say the Sunday “Komsomolka” already revealed the contents of “Pravda’s” party meeting—they demanded to remove their top leadership.

I finished reading Solzhenitsyn’s “March of 1917.” A brilliant work—he predicted everything. I think future generations are going to formulate their idea of our Great Revolution through the Solzhenitsyn’s “Krasnoe Koleso” [Red Wheel], just as many generations imagined 1812 based on L.N. Tolstoy’s “War and Peace.”

October 14, 1990.

I was preparing M.S.’ meeting with Reichman & Co. (a Jewish-American millionaire). Nobody has worked on it since the spring meeting—neither Sitaryan, nor Malkevich, who sent

200 runners to Canada to “feed.” Now Reichman cannot stand him and even asked not to invite him to the meeting with M.S.

There was an episode with Primakov’s “packet” for Hussein (after his trip there). Shevardnadze blocked it, he was jealous. It is amazing. I wrote M.S. a note, he wrote a resolution on it (taking out the paragraphs about jealousy and other that would be offensive to Shevardnadze). He ordered E.A. and Primakov to urgently prepare a proposal on Primakov’s trip—Rome-Paris-Washington D.C.... But Primakov later called, Shevardnadze blocked the proposal, “without me, I am not participating in this, the Americans will not start a war.” By the way, to a great extent Primakov owes his political career to Shevardnadze, it was thanks to him that Gorbachev decided to promote Primakov and not Arbatov.

Yesterday after work I took a walk down Moscow streets. I felt like I’ve outlived my time and simply do not understand anything around me anymore. The angry public has lost all criteria of a decent life. Very rarely you see a normal Muscovite, or an intelligent face. The city’s atmosphere is saturated with vanity and crime.

For the umpteenth day M.S. has been sitting on the Presidential Council and the Federation Council. Again he is leading the discussion of a new version of the market program. I don’t know, I don’t know... He has already recoiled from Shatalin. “Life,” he told me, “has raised this beautiful program to the clouds.” Now at the Supreme Soviet he is going to be defending a symbiosis or just Ryzhkov’s program, although he promised “not to make a jumble out of them.”

M.S. made a strategic mistake during the transition from *perestroika*’s destructive period, when his ratings were soaring, to the “constructive” period. Despite saying on numerous occasions that the natural logic of society’s development needs to be freed instead having yet another plan imposed upon it, he is now trying to play the role of chief designer and architect of a new society. But this is already impossible even in principle, not to mention that for all his talent he is not competent for this function.

I had hoped that after becoming president he would rise “above” the daily political process. It turns out that he only intended to obtain a way to “control the process.” Pernicious nonsense. He is grasping at everything and imposing himself on the party, the parliament, all kinds of committees, and scientific gatherings.

It looks like we are going to Spain on October 26-28th and to France on the 28-29th.

I am uneasy. My diligent work under Gorbachev seems ever more meaningless. The work in foreign policy that brought the turning point has already been done. What remains is to keep the military men at bay; more precisely—to wait out until this generation of generals is gone.

October 17, 1990.

Today, by the way, is a fateful date: on October 16, 1941 there was a panic in Moscow. Precisely on this date, yesterday, Yeltsin made a speech at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. It was a declaration of war on Gorbachev. In essence: the President broke the agreement with Yeltsin. The market program he proposed at the USSR Supreme Soviet is unachievable. It is a betrayal of Russia. Now Russia has to choose from three options:

1. To separate (its own money, its own border customs, its own army, etc);
2. A shared coalition union government: half from Gorbachev, half from the democrats and Russia,
3. A card system until Gorbachev's program falls through. Then, in the chaos, we will figure it out; the people will take to the streets.

At 10a.m. Gorbachev called a meeting of the Presidential Council. Not everyone had read Yeltsin's speech yet. The discussion started. Meanwhile, in my "historical" memory I saw a session of the Provisional Government in the Winter Palace in October of 1917: Smolny dictates, otherwise an assault.

Lukyanov called for tough measures. Kryuchkov supported him. Revenko noncommittally agreed, adding by the way that Ukraine had already fallen off and after Yeltsin's speech there will be a chain reaction, and hesitation will be fatal. The academician Osipyan analyzed extensively why Yeltsin made the speech now as opposed to some other time. Only Shevardnadze spoke against confrontation and against having M.S. appear on TV to censure Yeltsin. Medvedev also urged to "continue the legal process" without asking for trouble or playing up to Yeltsin by responding in kind with rudeness and threats. Ryzhkov raged: here we go again! The government is a whipping boy! Nobody listens to me. I, the chairman of the government, call some official and he does not show up. Orders are not carried out. The country is out of control. The collapse is in full swing. All the media is against us. Everyone is in opposition. Even the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the party. But we are communists, Nikolai Ivanovich clamored, we are from this party! Even "Izvestia" and "Pravda" are working against us. We should at least get the CC organ newspapers back. And clear out half the television people.

Rasputin spoke in the same vein. In a word, everyone is scared. It was comical, bitter and shameful to watch this highest Areopagus of the state. What shallow people it is made of, who are incapable of statesmanlike thought or action. M.S. was sitting there and letting emotions get the better of him, furious, he agreed that he should make a televised appearance today and give a rebuff.

Then it was 12p.m., time for his meeting with Cheney (US Defense Secretary). They went into a different room, and it was like a different Gorbachev. Once again in the saddle, the leader of a great power, in control of the situation, who knows exactly what to do, certain of success. He did not let the American even open his mouth.

Afterwards he came back to the room where the Presidential Council was gathered. People had gotten up and were starting to leave. Lukyanov whispered something to him. M.S. turned to Shevardnadze and said, "Eduard, reschedule some foreign trips and cancel some

altogether, including Spain and France.” I was taken aback. What a present to Yeltsin. What a demonstration of loss of power and self-control. M.S. started walking to his office through the enfilade. Petrakov, Shatalin, Ignatenko and I ran over and surrounded him. We started to argue against his speech on TV. He cursed us all: “I already decided, this is not something you can let go. If I don’t respond, what will the people say? It would be cowardly, a trump for Yeltsin. That paranoiac is aiming for the President’s chair, he’s sick. Everyone eggs him on. He needs a good punch to the face.”

He kept walking. Ignatenko ran up to me, “Anatoly Sergeyevich, we have to break it off.” The two of us went after Gorbachev. I said ironically, “Mikhail Sergeyevich, should I quit preparing the materials for Spain, then?” He says, “Come to my office.” Ignatenko rushed after me. We both fell on him. I said, “What are you afraid of? Ryzhkov has started threatening along the lines of: in the best case scenario we get shot, in the worst—we get hanged. But I, for example, am not scared. Yeltsin is blackmailing us, he is bluffing. He does not have the capacity to become a real threat. How is he going to make a Russian army, customs, etc. You need to rise above this latest provocation.”

He is standing in front of us, silent. He picked up the phone, Shevardnadze was not in his office. He talked to Kovalev: “Have you already cancelled Paris and Madrid?” “Not yet,” Kovalev responds. “Hold off on it.”

Having made sure that he would not do anything stupid such as cancelling Madrid, Ignatenko and I again started talking about the appearance on TV. In the end he called Lukyanov and ordered him to do it instead.

October 19, 2010.

How right we were with Ignatenko to latch on to M.S. and dissuade him from giving Yelstin a televised rebuff that same day.

A Supreme Soviet session convened. Steadily and calmly Aganbegyan argued that the “general directions” is the most realistic approach we can take and that it is impossible not to take it. He elegantly exposed Yeltsin by showing that the text of his speech had been written before the distribution of the presidential program, that Yeltsin had not read it, and that no matter what program Gorbachev presented, Yeltsin invariably would be against it. Today Gorbachev calmly acknowledged in his big report: yes, we have made some mistakes, but now we have to this program. And the Supreme Soviet accepted it today. He touched on Yeltsin a little, without the panic that reigned at the Presidential Council, produced by Lukyanov and Ryzhkov. Maybe it was my exclamation during the squabble at the Presidential Council that did the trick: Yeltsin has scared everyone to death! But I am not scared. At first glance it is clear he is bluffing.

By the way, Boldin told me that yesterday Yeltsin had tried to reach Gorbachev, and when he reached him he tried to extricate and justify himself.

Glazunov painted a portrait of King Carlos. This is so he would be taken to Spain, and he insisted that M.S. give the portrait to the King himself. I took a firm stand against it... also

against including Lukyanov in the team. Glazunov started threatening me with Raisa. Haven't her eyes been opened about this bastard?

Raisa Maksimovna called me to ask why we are not reacting to the stream of congratulations about the Nobel Prize. I replied: we are. I ordered the MFA to send all the telegrams about this to Kravchenko in TASS, so he produces a review with an appraisal and quotes. I am sure that nobody will do anything.

October 20, 1990.

All day I worked on materials for Spain. M.S. came to the CC to take care of some papers. Shevardnadze reported that Mitterrand invited Gorbachev to stop by his farm in the Pyrenees on the way back from Spain. M.S. agreed.

Two people from the American embassy came by, brought a letter from Bush to Michael. Bush thanks M.S. for sending Primakov to Bagdad, but insists that we do not give Hussein "premiums and do not let him save face." On my suggestion, Primakov stopped by London in the course of his travels to meet with Madam (Thatcher), "otherwise it's all Andreotti, Mitterrand, Bush, while she is left out."

Upon receiving the letter from Bush, M.S. gave him a call. He caught on that the US President needs Michael! I also caught on... but things are moving towards war.

Ignatenko stopped by, relayed M.S.' comment: "I am going to scatter this riffraff (Council of Ministers)..." M.S. also said to me, when we were trying to convince him not to "rebuff" Yeltsin—"What Ryzhkov! Is it about him? He is yesterday's news!" This is to say that despite the fact that Yeltsin named Ryzhkov three times in his October 16th speech, he is not really aiming for his place; he is "looking to be President," i.e. going for Gorbachev's place.

Shevardnadze called: the Czechs and Hungarians have prepared such a draft of the declaration for Budapest (WTO PCC) that it would be better not to convene it at all... a dishonorable funeral! M.S. agreed to reschedule it for after the Paris summit (November 3-4th), even though it has already been announced in the newspapers.

October 21, 1990.

Primakov returned from his travels (Rome-Paris-Washington-London). He called me last night: "I felt with my skin that a strike is inevitable. It is a matter of a week." He asked for help in talking with M.S.—he wants to go to Cairo, Riyadh, and to Hussein to say, "We've done everything we can. If you do not concede you have yourself to blame."

M.S. approved my writings for Madrid. There are still "toasts," minor points and materials for talks. I asked him to see Santra with Gusenkov (without me), and give the interview to *El País* with Ignatenko. He agreed.

October 22, 1990.

I was writing the texts for Spain. At 12-volume dictionary of the Russian language is no longer sufficient to find words that would not sound trite. Actually, stylistic beauty is beginning to look ridiculous against the background of what is happening in the country. KGB agents are reporting from different parts of the Soviet Union that Gorbachev's Nobel Prize is viewed negatively by the majority of the population. *Time* is carrying an article called "Praised Abroad and Cursed at Home" with a caricature portrait of him as a monument.

Phone calls are wearing me out—various people and departments trying to go to Spain. Boldin is simply "recommending" all his new servants. I reminded him that the KGB is sending 150 security personnel... and nobody wants to say a word against it, or he will be accused of undermining the President's security. During every visit, this hoard brazenly feeds itself, shaming everyone and everything around them, making a laughingstock out of us!

The country is falling apart. The People's Front of Moldavia has already pronounced the decision to join Romania and rename the State "People's Republic of Moldova." The situation is on the verge of a civil war between the Gagauz and Russians.

In Tatariya, October 15th has been announced the national memorial day for the defenders of Kazan from Ivan the Terrible (1552)!

The devil knows what is happening in Russia's regions. The "Democrats of Russia" Congress created a mass opposition to the CPSU and made a resolution: resignation of the President and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Meanwhile, we are going to Spain, where crowds will be chocking with delight to see Gorbachev. We will be talking about the Soviet-Spanish factor in the fate of Europe and the Mediterranean, about Don Quixote, about both nations' vocation to work together to "improve the world," while one of these nations could care less about all of this, including about Spain.

M.S. keeps consulting with economists. He is "perfecting" the style of the economic program's main provisions. Meanwhile Grushin, a political scientist and friend of Gorbachev's favorite Frolov, virtually declared on TV yesterday that no matter what you do, none of these programs is implementable.

"Rodina" [Homeland] carried Yu. Afanas'ev comments on the session of the National Assembly in August 1917—same problems as today. Afanas'ev and I were close before *perestroika* and during its early days. He came to me for support, first from me, then from M.S. If it were not for me, he would not be rector of the Historical-Archival Institute. I persuaded Zimyanin back then. M.S. had really esteemed him at the beginning. Now he repays him by "objectively analyzing" Gorbachev's strengths and weaknesses, and his doom.

October 23, 1990.

I wrote two notes to Gorbachev:

1. Having found out that yet another atomic bomb is scheduled to be exploded on Novaya Zemlya, in a rage I wrote: what's happening? At such a moment, when you

are planning to go to Scandinavia, which is a neighbor to Novaya Zemlya, to receive your Nobel Prize for peace... You will soon be saying sweet words in Spain; you are about to attend the Paris summit and sign the Common European Agreement on conventional weapons... who needs this explosion and why all these games?! What will the RSFSR Supreme Soviet say? We cannot explode anything in Kazakhstan (Semipalatinsk test site), but we can in Russia?! He read the note and did not say a word.

2. Grinevsky sent a ciphered note from Vienna. He is alarmed about the breakdown in negotiations on conventional weapons, which means the Paris meeting would also fall apart. General Staff generals are giving directives to their people in the delegation, who in turn tie Grinevsky's hands. I burst forth in a note: it is time to choose between the generals' way of thinking (or maybe scheming) and the near future of New Thinking policies. There is a danger that all our efforts to win the West's support during this critical point in *perestroika* will fail.

Gorbachev attached a slip to my note, assigning Shevardnadze, Yazov and Zaikov to resolve all the issues in two days and give the resolution to Vienna. Then he called me, saying, "I signed your thing... I'm involving Shevardnadze, who was happy about it." But the note was also sent to Yazov, and in the note I tear apart the generals in the verge of obscenities.

Gorbachev spent a long time flipping through excerpts from letters and telegrams regarding his Nobel Prize. He read some out loud to me and commented. For example, "Mister (!) General Secretary of the CC CPSU, congratulations on the imperialist's prize for ruining the USSR, selling out Eastern Europe, destroying the Red Army, handing over all our resources to the United States and the mass media to the Zionists." Or, "Minister Nobel Prize winner, congratulations on sending the entire country to the poorhouse, on earning a prize from world imperialism and Zionism, on betraying Lenin and October, on destroying Marxism-Leninism." There are dozens of such letters and telegrams.

I asked him: why does Kryuchkov collect all of this and put it on your desk? Why do they on a regular basis calculate and bring you polls from regions and workers' collectives with a 90 percent negative response to your Nobel Prize? He responded: "Do you think I haven't thought about this?" And continued to flip through them. I said: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, do you really want to spend your time and nerves on this junk? It is time for you in your Presidential position to 'soar above' this ignorance." He did not say anything.

October 31, 1990.

Four days in Madrid and Barcelona. Gorbachev is "on vacation," as Deputy Kraiko put it, from the atmosphere at home. He is once again a leader who is the best of his contemporaries. Again there are sincerely cheering crowds on the street, again the highest-level receptions and genuine respect from the King, Premier Gonzalez, and later from Mitterrand. Again intoxicating philosophical discussions about the new era, about the world's destiny, about mutual responsibility. Again the highest-level statements that *perestroika* is not only our phenomenon, i.e. not only a Soviet affair. If it fails, everyone will suffer. And the like.

I am in a golden cage again. I do not see the streets, I do not attend the receptions—only the talks... and then rush to write them down, to condense many hours of conversation into 3-4 pages of newspaper text (nowadays it is not even considered work, even though I created this style; it is signed “TASS,” even though every aspect of each word is thought through, stylistically chewed over and in general consists of my brain cells and my entire University education.)

This time he made me a member of the delegation. His other aides and adviser Zagladin are listed as “accompanying party.” But he did not say thank you.

However, he left Spain to the roar of an explosion in Novaya Zemlya and mass media overflowing with protests from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, etc., as well as the Russian Parliament and USSR Supreme Soviet. Despite this, today I read his order signed on October 30th on conducting explosions in Semipalatinsk until 1993, and starting with 1991—until an unknown date—in Novaya Zemlya. This is despite the fact that Kazakhstan’s Supreme Soviet passed a law banning explosions on its territory once and for all; the Arkhangelsk Soviet passed a similar resolution regarding Novaya Zemlya; the RSFSR Supreme Soviet will pass an analogous law any day now; and the USSR Supreme Soviet is planning to today pass a ruling on the USSR Government’s violation of nuclear testing procedures (in the sense that it was done without the Supreme Soviet’s approval).

Where does Comrade Gorbachev live? Or is he so intimidated that he signs on the dotted line whatever Boldin gives him?

Teltschik is ringing the phone off the hook: we are putting Kohl in an unseemly position, especially after Gorbachev’s visit to France and Spain (the problem is that Gorbachev still has not named a date for a meeting with Kohl). Is he “afraid of the people”? Lukyanov feeds this, saying that parliamentarians perceive foreign trips ambiguously.

But we owe Kohl more than anybody else for the “new European process,” not to mention the fact that he gave us practically 20 billion, while Mitterrand gave only a billion and a half and Gonzalez a bit more, Andreotti a little more, and Saudi Arabia gave 4 billion.

This is the kind of thanks he gets... if we make the Germans mad, they will tell us to go to hell (our troops in Germany now are as good as hostages, you cannot intimidate anyone with them!). Everything is holding on the Germans’ good word!

On the Persian Gulf. No matter how Primakov and Mitterrand may try, Gorbachev is reasonably saying that we cannot separate from the Americans, no matter how much we might want to avoid war. Then everything would come undone. Some of Gorbachev’s expressions at a press conference caused a fuss in Madrid and Paris. They wondered whether Gorbachev might be excluding the possibility of a military solution altogether? I know that he is not. Today, when Arbatov called asking how to react to questions from his acquaintances the Ambassadors of Kuwait, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, I told Yurka: “Let them know that we will never sacrifice our alliance with the United States in this matter.”

Paris (Gorbachev's "working" meeting regarding the Persian Gulf). In the evening we (M.S., Mitterrand, Vedrin, and I) went straight to the Élysée Palace. Afterwards, everyone went to have dinner with the ladies, and I went to write. After midnight we went for a walk down the Champs- Élysées. Walked for an hour and a half, it was already empty, even though it is Sunday.

At 10a.m. Mitterrand picked up M.S. and we went to Rambouillet. The drive was a pleasure. Again M.S. and Mitterrand one on one, then + Rocard, Shevardnadze and Dumas. Then the signing of a Consent Agreement, then a press-conference, then lunch hosted by the "President of France." I was seated next to Rocard and started speaking French not only about the visit and the Soviet-French factor, but about Camus and Sartre. He got carried away... then realized it and asked me if I understand. I said about 80 percent. He was satisfied and continued. I could not stop being surprised at myself, how quickly the language came back to me in a French setting.

November 3, 1990.

Since morning it has been a full day of work. Yesterday M.S. finally named the date for Kohl in Germany and the big Agreement—November 9-10th. He will need two speeches, not to mention negotiations materials.

The day before yesterday he called me in the evening: "I will be speaking on the 6th at a grand meeting (on the October Revolution). Before going to Spain I asked Yakovlev to prepare something, he read it to me today with pathos... But Tolya, it is all philosophy and moralizing... Why don't you give it a try..." and he dictated some things.

However, it is all a matter of words. I was exhausted by Spain and France. In the morning, I called Verber. He brought Yermonsky and Kuvaldin. I told them what I need. In 24 hours they brought me... complete pseudo-scientific crap.

So I had to compose it myself today. Sent it off. But M.S. was busy all day with the Moldovans, where a new "Karabakh" has developed. There are some casualties, but this time among the Russians. (The Balts did not allow themselves anything like this; and the Armenian-Azeri butchery is a completely different matter.) Our people are not to be trifled with, especially if you want to give Moldavia to Romania!⁷

The outcomes of M.S.' meeting with the Moldovans were broadcast on TV. Exhortations and again, again compromises, even though it is time to act.

November 5, 1990.

Today I was at the Presidential Council. Abalkin was reporting on stabilization measures.

⁷ How wrong I was about the Russians' reaction! They endured everything—the shame of turning into a "national minority," pogroms and ingratitude. At the time I had not realized that the great nation had depleted its historical reserve. (Author's note, from 2002).

Shatalin, Petrakov and Co.'s article in Sunday's "Komsomolka" caused a scandal with its sharp condemnation of the President's economic policy and devastating attacks on Ryzhkov.

Following Lukyanov, Maslyukov, and Ryzhkov, Gorbachev cursed the authors and promised to "send them packing." The whole council makes a poor impression. Ryzhkov threatened that dictatorship is coming. Lukyanov blackmailed with democrats. Shevardnadze talked about the need to study the process of transferring power.

I left early to compose speeches for Germany away from telephones.

Today M.S. re-dictated my draft for November 7th; he took 40 percent of it, in my opinion not the strongest parts. The rest is from Yakovlev and some third text. The final result is again long, with mixed styles and full of banalities, which M.S. lately has more and more of.

November 9, 1990.

Before leaving for Germany M.S. called me at home and we had a long conversation. He has some corrections to the completed speeches on Bonn (he especially liked the paragraphs about Germans from the GDR who were the first to start breaking down the "walls" between us, even through love and marriages). The texts had already been sent to Bonn, so we had to transfer the corrections through the MFA.

Newspapers are raging, mocking October and Gorbachev. There is an intelligent article in "Komsomolka" by my friend Vladlen Loginov about the October Revolution. But it is like beating your head against a brick wall.

It seems that now, as then, we are going to go "to the core, but what then"? However, I am not afraid of anything. Maybe it is my age, maybe personality, maybe experience and my old habit (from the war) of calm and restraint in the face of the greatest danger.

November 15, 1990.

On Sunday Gorbachev is supposed to go to Italy, for another "big agreement," plus the Fiuggi Prize (the monetary reward is greater than the Nobel).

Maybe we are on the brink of a collapse? Again his meeting with Yeltsin flared up the situation to a critical point. They agreed not to publicize it, but the next day Yeltsin went to the Russian parliament and aggressively, disrespectfully, in the form of an ultimatum described what happened. Gorbachev kept it all to himself. Ignatenko's attempts to convince him to make a televised appearance and "inform the public and the USSR parliament" came to naught. Gorbachev must still be thinking in terms of Politburo and the obkom—if I think so, then it must be so. Now he worked up a fury and again yelled among his people that he will no longer tolerate it, that he finally "declares war."

In the meantime, the Supreme Soviet ignored its own agenda and demanded that the President immediately report on the situation in the country and the outcomes of his conversation with Yeltsin. Gorbachev obediently agreed to this call on the carpet, instead of making it clear

who he is and politely asking the parliament to do its job. Meanwhile, deputies are shouting in front of TV cameras about “protection of people’s interests” and demanding that the “tsar” should “give” everything to these people.

Gorbachev spent the entire day dictating tomorrow’s report on the “State of the Nation” (in the United States it takes half a year to prepare such a text!). Nevertheless, despite my protests, he took the time to meet with leaders of former Communist Parties of former socialist countries (they are having a conference in Moscow). And yesterday he met with Communist Party of France trade union representatives. Today, he talked with Occhetto (General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party) for several hours. I suspect he wants to show the foreigners that things are progressing in due course.

Ambramtsumov, Bykov, Adamovich, Karyakin, Afanas’ev, Gelman, and a dozen others whom Gorbachev had once brought in, treated kindly, praised, protected and promoted—yesterday they published in “Moskovskie novosti” a message to the people and the President, in which they suggested that he should resign. Gorbachev was more hurt by this than anything else in the last few days. He saw it as a personal betrayal.

The country is in ruins and panic. All the newspapers are predicting riots, civil war, and a coup. Almost every critical statement ends with the demand for the President to “Leave!” if he cannot even use the powers provided him. Western newspapers are beginning to publish articles about him without the former admiration, now they are closer to pity or sympathetic jokes about the underdog.

In a word, something is bound to happen tomorrow. But I am afraid that he will once again “wear out” the Supreme Soviet with his calls for consolidation, unity, etc. Since the deputies themselves do not know what to do, most likely they will succumb to his arguments, or they will demand sacrifices—Ryzhkov or maybe even Gorbachev. Perhaps he himself will finally say, “I am leaving.” That would probably be the right thing to do. He would go to Oslo, get his Nobel Prize and start living as a private person. The era he stirred up has truly gone beyond him. The things he wants to avoid with his carefulness, with his gradual steps, with compromises—all of it has already happened and in the worst form, with bloodshed on the peripheries and the danger of a serious famine. You cannot ask people to justify him. After all, even after the worst catastrophe of Stalin’s collectivization, after 5-6 years (exactly the equivalent of *perestroika*) “Life had become better, life had become merrier” (Stalin). I remember that myself. I saw it with my own eyes. People ask: why has it not happened now, when we have a hundred times more resources. Yes, we could not have continued on with the system we had in 1985. It is true that you cannot break down the old system without chaos. But the people do not want to pay for 70 years of criminal policies. They will never understand why, in order to become a civilized country by the end of 21st century, you have to go through hunger, collapse, depravity, crime, and our other attractions.

In the meanwhile, I am “doing my work.” I write beautiful texts for M.S.’ trips to Rome and Paris. They turn out nicely. Even I like them! But what for? Or c’est la vie?

November 24, 1990.

On Sunday, November 18th, M.S. was in Italy, accepting the Fiuggi Prize. In the evening he flew straight to Paris. On the same day there was a meeting with Bush. For two hours they talked about Hussein. Bush to M.S., “Michael, help me!”

M.S. was in his style (regarding a “political solution”) but with a clear, thought-out tendency to stay close to Bush in any turn of events. This protestant pair (Bush and Baker) is more reliable even than Kohl, because they are detached... They need very little—for us not thwart at the Security Council their punishment of Hussein, even though they would be glad to avoid military action (Bush spoke plaintively about “his boys” he had just visited on the Rhine and who were immediately sent to the Saudi desert).

Their conversation over lunch, with Shevardnadze, Baker, Yazov, was a conversation between two friends. M.S. did not for a minute object to the Security Council’s new resolution. But he also did not want to use the words “military means.” And Bush did not suggest it, even though all the newspapers wrote about nothing else and later claimed that Bush could not “break M.S.” Nonsense, there were no discrepancies between them.

The Paris meeting itself. Of course, M.S. was number one, no matter how Mitterrand tried with his “French” speeches and rare appearance in the hall.

Kohl was number two! In relation to M.S. Kohl acted in the spirit of “it was the two of us who made this possible.”

Bush was number three. Overall he was modest in his dignity and did not impose himself.

Thatcher. The same has been done with her as with Churchill during Potsdam. At M.S.’ residence I sat opposite her and admired her. Beautiful! She enjoyed my admiration. I was sure that she would “leave,” but after the vote at the Tory conference (204 instead of the necessary 214) she promised to return to London and “put everything in order”—in front of journalists right from the steps of her residence.

I was living at the Grenelle, close to M.S. I was at the meetings, recorded them, and traveled here and there. I did not get to see anything; I did not even take one walk through the streets. On the 20th he already assigned me to write a report for the Supreme Soviet on the outcomes of the Paris summit.

Later, when he was getting ready to go on round of Versailles (evening of the 20th), I happened to be in his room. Putting on his tie, he was thinking out loud... I asked him: what about the 8 points that you stated at the Supreme Soviet before this trip? Are you going say anything new after coming back tomorrow?

“Sure! I assigned people to work on it.”

“Who?”

“Lukyanov, Kryuchkov, Sitaryan, someone else...”

I did not reply. It's all clear!

One day after coming back from France he “ascended” to the Supreme Soviet and again started producing improvisations (which he had dictated on the day before until 12a.m.). Once again he provoked irritation, devaluing the “fear” he incited on the 18th.

The Paris summit was, of course, a major event. This was perhaps the last time that Gorbachev appeared as the demiurge of modern history. Everyone directly or indirectly acknowledged it. It was clear that they did not want the USSR—as Gorbachev planned to make it—cease to exist. This possibility generated fear. But obviously, they felt sympathy too. They felt Christian-like compassion toward all of us, which we failed to appreciate. Out of this sympathy arose the phenomenon of practical solidarity, which in more practical terms was the desire to help us make it through the winter. They were afraid of a Russian rebellion, collapse, and everything that could have made *perestroika* quite different from what Gorbachev presented it to be.

As for me, I am sad. Sad, because I am “strategically” tired, worn out, because the count of my life has gone from years to months, and I have not taken everything from it. There are still things to take: books, paintings, streets, people. I am also sad because I see M.S. summoning up courage, but he is out of steam. He is repeating himself, and not only in words and behavioral patterns. He is repeating himself as a politician, he is moving in circles. He is practically alone. Despite all of this, he is holding on to this deadwood: Ryzhkov, Sitaryan, Maslyukov, Boldin. What’s worse, he bothers with the General Secretary post. Because of this, he holds on even to Polozkov, despite the fact that in a recent CC CPSU Plenum this Polozkov openly railed against him, saying that he broke the Union, destroyed socialism, gave away Eastern Europe, ruined the army, trampled the party and threw it to the wolves, etc. M.S. does not have people to fill the structures he announced on November 18th in his short and expressive speech at the Supreme Soviet. And he does not dare to take new people, especially from the opposition. He does not dare to break with everyone who was in the nomenclature. He does not care for them, he does not trust them. But even though they are from the “Polozkov camp,” they are familiar!

Home and abroad Gorbachev is two different people, both in how he is perceived and in his own feelings.

December 1, 1990.

Yesterday Gorbachev summoned Yakovlev, Primakov, Medvedev, and Petrakov in Kremlin’s Walnut room (later Shatalin showed up on his own accord). He proposed to discuss the concept of the report for the Congress of People’s Deputies (December 17th). And so it began! Instead of developing a plan and assigning tasks in 20 minutes, we sat there for a good six hours. M.S. walked around us (the Walnut room has a round table), and together we formulated versions of the phrases which, usually, ended up turning into things he has repeated tens of times.

Primakov and I ganged up and pretty rudely interrupted his torrent of words. We kept saying that this should be a short presidential speech, like the one he said on November 18th,

without any explanations, excuses and arguments. It should only define the clear position of the Head of State and briefly delineate what has been done since November 18th and what the President intends to do in the near future. Include only the most important things, namely: food, power, and the Union. Slowly we steered him toward this approach. He pounced on me several times.

Along the way he edited together with those present the Decree on worker's control over trade. We argued without concern for formalities. This again is the "class approach" and mythology of the past. Inanity. Nobody is going to carry out this decree, same as the ones before it. It will turn into an additional source of corruption, abuse, and lawlessness at the expense of millions of people.

But Gorbachev was stubborn and checked us. As the result, today the decree has already been announced by the media in the program 120 minutes. Still, we managed to get some nonsense out of there.

So... instead of long ago creating a qualified apparatus where every person would know his job (and would be able to do it!), M.S. spends most of his time writing and editing speeches. Just this week he made three or four of them.

I had started to persuade Gorbachev not to speak at the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, for which Shakhnazarov had prepared a speech for him long time ago. Primakov was also against that speech. We were both saying that regardless of this speech they are going to accept the land reform—the second edition of Stolypin's reforms—and the President will look pitiful, especially since these are good reforms. They are going to accept amendments to the Constitution, which will solidify what was already clear from their drafts, appropriate even for Sweden or Denmark. There is nothing left there of socialist choice, not even the word "Soviets." What will you look like there?

December 1, evening.

In the morning I was at work, finishing up reading ciphered telegrams. At 12p.m. I went over to Yakovlev's in the Kremlin. We assigned sections for people to work on for Gorbachev's report. Talked about this and that, particularly about private ownership of land that is being discussed right now in the Russian Parliament. Recently, at a meeting with cultural figures Gorbachev declared that he will "never agree to it." By the way, when we were discussing the prospectus for Gorbachev's report, Petrakov showed M.S. an issue of "Sovetskaia Rossia." It talked about the new "Union" party that Lukyanov created to oppose the Regions party; the article also mentioned that the Union party also demanded the President's resignation. Gorbachev waved it aside. But Petrakov persisted: why, Mikhail Sergeyevich, when Popov or Stankevich or anyone else from their group says anything like that, you become angry, but when it comes from Lukyanov you dismiss it. Gorbachev replied, "I do not need advisers who give me one-sided information." Primakov intervened. He tried to describe what had actually happened at the meeting of the "Union" party, and what happened at Lukyanov's meeting with the regional group (Popov, Afanas'ev, Yablokov, Murashov, and others). Gorbachev again got angry and said, "Well, this is what Lukyanov told me about this meeting... They set some conditions and if

the President fails to fulfill them, they will speak at the Congress of the People's Deputies in favor of his resignation. Lukyanov only reports the truth." It is amazing that Gorbachev wants to believe this, even though he has known for a long time that Lukyanov organized a special information service for himself.

Yuriy Afanas'ev actually did say that we, i.e. the interregional group and "Union" are demanding the same thing—the President's resignation—but from different positions. M.S., however, comes down for this on the "regionals" but not on the "Union" because the former is "our own," just like Polozkov & Co.

December 5, 1990. Volynskoe-II.

An event took place yesterday that is worth mentioning—a botched address by the President at the Supreme Soviet. He simply mumbled, not saying anything new in comparison to the 8 points announced on November 18th... it was received with complete indifference and even contempt in the audience. In order to calm fears about the food situation M.S. read some muddled information from ministerial inquiries about spaghetti and fish for December and March. Yakovlev, Primakov and I happened to be in the same room when the speech was broadcast by "Mayak," and we were horrified: what, how, and why is he saying this?! Shatalin, Medvedev, and Ignatenko arrived from a meeting at the Kremlin with similar and worse impressions. Shatalin cried: "We were all shocked. Although this whole Supreme Soviet is shitty... Where have the Russian talents gone?" Medvedev noted, "Gorbachev is too overworked, angry, and confused." Yakovlev was completely dejected. In a whisper, he told me, "I am now convinced that he has exhausted his potential."

December 19, 1990.

From the 3-15th we were at Volynskoe-2, working on Gorbachev's report for the Congress of People's Deputies. We went through five versions. More than once he presided... Then on Sunday before the event, already without us, he added three mentions of "socialist choice" and the "Communist Party as a pillar of the people." He warned us that he would insert things we do not want him to say. At first we argued, then gave up. When he read the part on the private ownership of land, he burst forth, "Who could include this, knowing that I will never say it!?" I raised my hand... One had to see Yeltsin's sarcastic smile when from the podium at the Congress Gorbachev spoke about the "inadmissibility" of private property.

The betrayals have started. Rasputin betrayed him with his speech at the Plenum of the Congress of Writers. Falin is betraying him with his behaviors and speeches at the International Committee of the Supreme Soviet (on the German agreement). At the same time he is disassociating himself from his closeness to Gorbachev. Then there is the betrayal of that bitch Umalatova, a Chechen, a member of the CC CPSU whom Gorbachev had personally entered into the "red hundred" to ensure her position as a People's Deputy. Promoted by him, now she was the one who opened the Congress with a hysterical speech, demanding Gorbachev's resignation because he "ruined the country and sent the people to the poorhouse." "It is the work of Polozkov's people," M.S. said about this. We soon found out that Lukyanov, who chaired the Congress, intentionally let her go first, knowing what she would say.

During this stretch at Volynskoe Yakovlev and Petrakov became academicians. They had been very nervous the night before, but with some difficulty they both passed. A party was thrown at Volynskoe for the occasion. By the way, Yakovlev was depressed: again a worker deputy condemned him from the Congress' podium for "the collapse of ideology."

Ryzhkov made a beautiful speech at the Congress today, it was written for him by Abalkin. In essence it was anti-Gorbachev. But during lunch at Volynskoe Gorbachev congratulated him, "Nikolai, I had to leave when you made your speech, but I watched it on TV. Congratulations, it was well done." In a word, the characteristically Gorbachev style.

At night I am reading Vasiliy Rozanov for the first time. How lovely! What a talent... in incredible simplicity!

December 21, 1990.

Yesterday Shevardnadze announced his resignation. He warned of an impending dictatorship. The whole world is talking about it.

Likhachev, Zalygin, Roy Medvedev, and Burlatsky took the podium to make hysterical statements. Adamovich was shrieking too. All about the threat of dictatorship. And people like Petrushchenko and Alksnis are fanning the flames. Pretrushchenko declared, "We do not want power, but you are asking us to come and take it." Alksnis, by the way, is an excellent orator, he trumpeted from the podium, "Yes, call me reactionary, call me a scumbag. Yes, I am a hawk when they tear the skin off an old man and throw a baby into the fire..."

When Shevardnadze spoke, M.S.' expression reflected something like puzzlement, but he let E.A. speak his mind. Afterwards... what will happen afterwards? Shevardnadze is not coming back, he seems to have played up the sensation and made it so he would require a very special request.

Who will replace him? The most deserving choice would be Yakovlev. This appointment would have been made by the former Gorbachev... Most likely he will settle on Primakov. But the best choice would be Bessmertnykh: he is a neutral figure, professional, intelligent. And it would be a gesture for the Americans, to say that everything is remaining the same.

From my conversations with Yakovlev, Primakov, Arbatov in the back rooms at the Congress I realized that M.S. does not consult with any of them. They are all convinced that he consults with Ivashko and Lukyanov, who are openly and enthusiastically declaring that they knocked down another one of Gorbachev's allies (Shevardnadze).

For a long time I hesitated whether to go to the session of the International Committee of the Supreme Soviet. I was afraid to lose my temper. I went... and lost my temper. In front of everybody I rather rudely accused Falin for giving a good argument to "all the Petrushchenko's out there" at the last session of the committee on the German agreement with his statement, "did we give it away too cheaply?"

M.S., in the meantime, is busy meeting with “workers and peasants.” He appeals to them, saying that they will have the final word. However, I think that especially right now, and technically always, in politics the **first** word is decisive.

There is a great deal of “intellectual potential” at the Congress, democracy’s only achievement. But there is little statesmanship and healthy pragmatism. In general it is a school of polishing orators. Everybody starts their speeches nicely and figuratively.

Of course, during these days the question is being decided—will this country continue to exist or not. It seems that it will not. And people walk on the streets as if nothing is happening.

In general, the Congress has turned into a mob. It is intimidating itself and the people. This is the source of our greatest danger. This institution should be dispersed as soon as possible. It has played its part for democracy. It is time to switch to a normal parliament, comprised of the people who have shown that they would be more or less willing and capable to be parliamentarians.

...Until M.S. breaks with Polozkov and Ivashko, nothing will happen.

December 23, 1990.

Some kind of phantasmagoria has set in: Gorbachev sits at the Congress’ Presidium next to Yeltsin. They smile at each other. Whisper among themselves. Lukyanov, who has been shamelessly playing against M.S., sits on his left. In Lukyanov’s reports on Constitutional amendments there are proposals to tie the president’s every step with parliamentary control.

M.S. is not talking with any of us, he does not call his advisers, not even his favorites Yakovlev and Primakov. Lukyanov is the one helping him put together papers and pick cadres for the new structures.

I wrote him a note the day before yesterday, about the fact that Shevardnadze is not coming back and it is time to think about a replacement. My suggestions were in the following order: Yakovlev, Bessmertnykh, Primakov, Dzasokhov. I wrote a reference for each one from the point of view of foreign and domestic resonance to each candidate’s appointment, as well as a personal review. For Yakovlev, I wrote: this would be the act of the Gorbachev who does not back down from *perestroika* “despite and regardless” of anything.

Yesterday Primakov told me that he also suggested Yakovlev to Gorbachev, but M.S. objected: firstly because he will not pass, secondly because “he is giving interviews against me.” Truly, Kryuchkov and Lukyanov and the rest have told some stories to Gorbachev about Yakovlev.

In the evening M.S. called me from a car phone:

“What do we have?”

“You know better what we have.”

“Alright. What do you have?”

“Exchange of televised messages with Bush for New Years; greetings for the Arab meeting regarding the Persian Gulf; response to Fidel; an interview for “Asahi” and other small items.”

“What’s happening with the visit to Japan?” (I was very surprised by this question. As if he does not have other things to think about!)

“Two months ago you created a committee headed by Yakovlev to prepare the visit to Japan. I am not sure what it has produced, but I have my own file.”

“What else?”

“Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs is coming in early January. Who is he going to see?”

“Alright. Goodbye.” And he hung up.

For a long time I was offended that he did not want to speak to me about the important things, about what is happening around us. On the other hand, what am I going to do? Follow in Shevardnadze’s footsteps? There would not be a worldwide buzz about it, of course, but some people will notice a trend, and the press will consolidate it. However, it is more than just inertia that prevents me from doing this. There is also a feeling of loyalty. It would be indecent to leave him at a moment like this.

Yesterday “Ogonek” published an article by a certain Aleksandr Genis, “View from a Dead End,” about Soviet literature. He asks what held it up, even in the darkest of times. It was held up by the promise of a future—communism (even for those, who cringed at this word). Or the pure ideals of the revolution (even for those, who did not accept it, even for emigrants). The *Thaw* of 1950-60s was also based on this. Namely, on returning to the basics and the pure ideas, becoming free from the filth of Stalinism in order to proceed to the future... Then *perestroika* showed up and opened up “nothingness.” There is no future. Paradise disappeared (it never existed). Without paradise socialist realism collapsed overnight. There is no more wonderful literature.

I think this argument can be projected onto our society as a whole. Paradise disappeared and everything went tumbling down. The former Orthodox Christian paradise, which is being artificially created by the church right now, is only a dummy. It can attract the people who really want to be shut off from reality. But for the society it is too late. I projected this also onto the forthcoming Congress of the People’s Deputies. Yes, yes, we are looking in the wrong place. While Gorbachev, either instinctively or consciously wants to save the paradise with his stubborn repetition of commitment to socialist choice. He feels that an ailing society cannot do without it just like the Americans cannot do without their ideal of freedom. For example, why are they ready to fight Hussein? Not only because of oil. For them, the United States is the stronghold and symbol of freedom. That is why Iraq (Hussein) is the Americans’ purely ideological internal problem.

December 24, 1990.

Today the Supreme Soviet spent almost the whole day adopting a decision on Gorbachev's report on the situation in the country. I am surprised. Is it the parliament's job to rearrange words and together edit phrases in a draft resolution! Gorbachev suddenly became upset, took the floor and loudly, incoherently accused the Congress of ignoring presidential legislative initiatives, particularly on the land ownership referendum, and on withdrawal from the Union. I cannot understand whether he had not read the draft resolution or used the previous version, because both those points are in there. And none of the deputies from the Congress and the Supreme Soviet pointed this fact out to him, including the chairman of the editorial board Nazarbaev. Maybe they were uncomfortable, or they could not allow that the President had not read the draft and gave them a beating. They pretended that he probably wanted to have separate resolutions on these issues. I carefully watched his face from the auditorium. He was clearly embarrassed upon realizing that his attack was unfounded. But one more crack occurred, and it was his fault.

The strangest and most regrettable part was that for the referendum on withdrawing from the Union he insisted on the following wording: "are you 'for' or 'against' preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," i.e. instead of the politic use of only the word "Union" in the referendum's question (Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, and Moldova might have agreed with this), he issued a challenge. They will not want to stay in a "Socialist Union."

Or had ideology come over him again? Or did the spirit of Polozkov win him over? I am utterly confused. The crowd (Congress) voted "for" it, most likely without understanding the impolitic nature of the question's phrasing.

Ignatenko suggested that we should write a letter to Bush regarding Shevardnadze's resignation. Truly, how can we not show some closeness when the whole world is judging and guessing what happened. I composed a draft letter. Sent it to M.S, then called him. He immediately agreed to send such a letter. But my draft might be overly heart-to-heart. Will he accept it?

December 25, 1990.

Today Gorbachev twice made himself vulnerable at the Congress of People's Deputies. They were discussing an amendment to the Constitution on the new power structures and came to the Chamber of Control. Back in Volynskoe we told him that it is confusing and will not pass. At the Congress nobody said anything against it, not a single comment was made, but the vote was overwhelmingly against it. The President took the floor and made a confusing argument that this is an essential organ. He spoke for a long time, with his characteristic gestures. The vote became even more negative. Then they came to the Federation Council. The question here was whether to include representatives of the autonomous republics into the Soviet. Opinions split. Again Gorbachev took the floor and made a dull argument that the autonomous republics should not be included in the Federation Soviet. The vote: from the 1890 people present, only 140 voted "with" the President. He sat there, red and pitiful.

What is happening? Has he completely ceased to realize how low his charisma has fallen? People are thinking the opposite even when they sympathize with him. Why does he open himself to such blows? It would seem the question at hand is presidential power, but it is forming in the context of the President's own authority plummeting!

The item about the Presidential Council was removed from the Constitution. Only 34 people objected. In that moment Yakovlev, Primakov, Shatalin, Yarik, and Medvedev became nobodies. Primakov came up to me, laughing. "I should go order a car from the Academy of Sciences," he says. "They won't be sending one from the Presidential Council. I remember when at the CC Plenum I was made candidate member of the Politburo, by the time I left the building there was already a 'member-mobile' (a car with a bodyguard) waiting for me outside."

1990. Afterword.

This year became truly tragic both for the country and for Gorbachev.

It became completely clear that the great and noble idea—to lead the country out of Stalinist totalitarianism and build a new, truly national society—was not accepted. The *glasnost* and freedom granted for this purpose set loose a destructive force, comprised of the energy of protest and chaos that had been stored up for decades. It broke free and by 1990 overtook practically all spheres of life in the country.

At the same time it became evident that the nation, which had been impoverished by the shocks of the 20th century, no longer possessed the creative energy to build itself a worthy new society. There was nothing left of the imperial drive that had been the source and impetus for Russia's development and transformation into a great power. But there were no other resources, because for over five centuries the Russian nation in all its aspects, the positive and the negative, had evolved and gained vitality precisely as an imperial state. This is, by the way, why it was so malleable and tolerant of totalitarian rule, whether monarchy or Bolshevik dictatorship.

But, remaining a European power, it could no longer continue in this mode by the end of the 20th century, when the Christian civilization was entering a new era.

It was Gorbachev's lot to understand this. And he offered the correct, the only possible solution—to turn the country toward the more promising direction of modern world development, to reject its "special nature" that had opposed it to the West, which was the center of this development.

In order for this to happen, we had to overcome our totalitarian past. *Perestroika*'s central mission was to find out how this could be done. Gorbachev tried to reform the Soviet, in essence totalitarian, regime. But it turned out that it could not be reformed. In 1990 this became completely clear.

To reform means to proceed in an evolutionary manner, rejecting the revolutionary-forceful methods that had discredited and eventually destroyed the high ideals of the Great Revolution of 1917, and brought the country to a dead end.

Gorbachev also could not use forceful methods due to his moral considerations and spiritual nature. Had he been a different person, more like his predecessors and colleagues, he would not have dared to start *perestroika* at all.

It is at this point that the tragic contradiction between ends and means occurred. The only way to cleanse society (Soviet and Russian) from the Stalinist legacy and impose new laws of life was through revolution comparable in scope and power to the October Revolution.

However, the nation had neither the strength nor the means to make this revolution. The same was true for Gorbachev as a leader, who would have needed a corresponding socio-political mass “army” for this purpose. But the path of gradual overcoming of totalitarianism with the personnel, bodies, “rules of the game,” means and methods that had **formed in** this system led to the government’s collapse and eventual dissolution of the country.

As the reader has noted, the year 1990 is filled with Gorbachev’s feverish attempts to mobilize the means—social and material—to continue and consolidate the reforms. Gorbachev spared no effort to make the Party serve *perestroika*. This was his chief mistake but he continued to intensify it despite all the setbacks, failures and disappointments that came with every CC Plenum, almost every Politburo session, and every meeting with the Party “generals.” During this year the Party rapidly turned into an open enemy of Gorbachev-style reforms. This was especially obvious in its upper echelons—in the Politburo, the Central Committee, the apparatus at all levels, and the oblast committees.

Gorbachev was fatally late in transferring the authority of highest power from the Politburo and CC CPSU to social channels, and in establishing the presidential system. Gorbachev had illusions such as the “CPSU is the vanguard of *perestroika*,” as well as fears of rejecting the Party and pushing it to the sidelines of the political process. These illusions and apprehensions hindered Gorbachev from creating a new, effective center of power in a timely manner. He became powerless in the face of the nationalist explosion and the collapse of the country’s economic base. However, I am convinced that both issues were **objectively** inevitable with the rejection of totalitarian methods of preserving the empire and centralized government.

After the first Congress of the People’s Deputies, the newly elected, largely on an alternative basis, parliamentary bodies quickly transformed from an “aggressively obedient majority” (as defined by Yu. Afanas’ev) into an “aggressively-garrulous” one. Neither the Congress nor the Supreme Soviet formed a powerful authority, and they did not have the levers to control the country. Gorbachev’s idea to recreate the Soviets, which would have taken over the CPSU’s managerial functions from the regional and oblast committees, petered out at the very start.

His attempts to establish cooperation between the executive branch (himself and the government) with the legislative branch and the parliament produced no results. The

government's authority was discredited in general by the rampant negative criticism that fell greedily upon the free platform of the "ambitious representatives of the people." This provoked further destabilization in society as a whole.

Gorbachev rushed about in search of alternatives, compromises, "optimal" combinations of former and new methods of leadership and governing. There were mistakes, miscalculations, delays, faux pas, and some nonsense. But they were not the cause of the disintegration in society and the state that began during this year. That was inevitable due to the very nature of the transformation, completely unique in world history. It was the transformation of a society with complexes, corrupted by a long dictatorship, to freedom. The people, with no experience in democracy and voluntary organization, understood this freedom in the Russian sense of "everything is allowed." From time immemorial freedom has meant *volya* to the Russian people, something akin to anarchy.

It was the beginning of a chaotic movement without any effective rules. **The process of collapse** of the Soviet state had begun; **it became uncontrollable and irreversible exactly during this year, in 1990.**

From a historical point of view it is pointless to try to assign individual blame, though alas! Some of our (and to a lesser extent foreign) demagogues and dilettantes are still doing this, heaping the majority (and sometimes the entirety) of the blame on Gorbachev.

It was not accidental that during this year Gorbachev started thinking (and speaking about in his close circle) about leaving. He sensed that the mission assigned to him by God and history had been fulfilled. Beyond that, nobody could have presented a paradise on earth in exchange for the Soviet system to a nation of 240 million, consisting of over a hundred nationalities. But this is what people wanted and expected of him. Nothing less. Only in that case would have they recognized Gorbachev as a great politician and the "savior of the Motherland." Empty shelves turned into Gorbachev's curse and at the same time a symbol of *perestroika*'s limited capabilities.

The Soviet people could not deal with freedom and... stepped off the historical stage. The leaders of Russia who usurped power were no longer dealing with a people, a great nation, but with a motley population.

And, apparently, this fate was predetermined for my country by the start of the third millennium of its existence in this world.

At the same time, it was in 1990 that the world witnessed the outstanding results of Gorbachev's foreign policy. Precisely during this year the turning point in the history of the 20th century became evident—a turn from a disastrous confrontation to the peaceful period in the civilized part of the world.

The coincidence with the beginning of decline and collapse of the main "agent" of great changes on the world stage should not be surprising. There is a historical precedent, for example the Directorate period after the French Revolution, when at home there was hunger and the post-

Thermidorian nightmare but Napoleon at the head of his Italian army tore a path through Europe to the 19th century. Except Napoleon did this by force of arms, while Gorbachev made a break into the next, 21st, century with his **dynamic peacemaking policy of New Thinking**.

This policy responded to humanity's historical needs at the turn of an era. As the result, it was welcomed and accepted by the more advanced, democratic part of the international community. Here, Gorbachev's historical choice was not only right, but implementable. After justified hesitations, doubts and suspicions, his impulse towards the West (which aimed primarily at progress and benefits for his own country) was finally understood. The West was ready to accept the reformed USSR (on certain conditions) into its "settled" family. But the USSR was not ready.

Thus, the seemingly inevitable convergence stopped halfway. Moreover, one of the parties of the barely started process collapsed and disappeared, fueling the other's temptation to return to the rules of the game in the spirit of "old thinking."

Gorbachev's foreign policy achievements were not in vain. We can feel this in the new century... Humanity can live and develop only along the criteria of New Thinking. I am not referring to specific components of it as a doctrine, but its inherent fundamental ideas of a salutary development of the present and future of the world.

The year 1990 is also related to noticeable changes in the relationship between the author and the great Gorbachev. But this is a detail.

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1991

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

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January 2, 1991

This is the year of my 70th anniversary. It is also the year of Gorbachev's last chance and *perestroika*'s last efforts. [Gorbachev] made a New Year's address to the Soviet people. Yakovlev called today, saying, "You know, it seems the words aren't very banal or anything. But it's just out of steam!" I also catch myself thinking that no matter what Gorbachev says now, it really is "out of steam." I felt this very acutely during the Congress. He is no longer regarded with respect or interest; at best, he is pitied. He has outlived his achievements, while disasters and chaos exacerbate the people's irritation with him. He does not see this, from this stems his even greater drama. His overconfidence is becoming absurd, laughable even.

After recording the New Year's address to the Soviet people and the Americans, he called Shakhnazarov and me to his office. He shuffled papers on his desk and "put down" some resolutions. We sat there, quietly. Then he spoke. He asked us whom to name Premier. Shakhnazarov suggested Abalkin. I objected: he is intelligent and honest, but psychologically unacceptable. People have even come up with a term: "Abalkin's tax." I suggested Vol'skoy. Gorbachev did not agree, hinting that he knows more about him than I do. I began to rant, saying that we need someone fresh, not from the deck. Even if there is a mistake, he could be removed. But if someone like Voronin gets appointed, that's it! The people will lose their faith completely. Gorbachev started discussing Masliukov. I expressed my concerns: the military-industrial complex. Plus, it is a little puzzling to me why he likes Masliukov so much. He started telling us that many people are imposing Pavlov on him, the Minister of Finance. I personally met Pavlov, surprisingly enough, at the pool. Even more surprisingly, this rather heavy-set man swam athletically and quite fast. I had a hard time keeping up with him. Sometimes we exchanged political opinions in the locker room. He grumbled. Still, he won me over with his sharp remarks regarding Ryzhkov's actions and positions. However, as I told Gorbachev then, Pavlov stained himself with unpopular measures as the Minister of Finance. The people will not accept him, and even the Supreme Soviet may turn him down.

Sobchak was on the tip of my tongue, but I did not say his name at the time. I did not want to flare the President's temper right before New Years. He later connected Yakovlev through the intercom to our conversation. Yakovlev also did not name Sobchak, although he later told me that "Sobchak would have been alright."

I suggested Sobchak yesterday on the phone, when M.S. was telling me about his conversation with Bush. (It seems they are great friends, M.S. again was very emotional when talking about him). Unexpectedly, M.S. paid attention to my arguments, even though as a refrain he kept repeating that he "would not pass."

I got impudent: "Pass by you, or by the Supreme Soviet?"

My arguments were that he is smart, has an organized and rigorous mind, has character, is persistent, has already had a taste of administrative affairs in Leningrad and understands that it is nothing like a meeting or having popularity at a Congress or the Supreme Soviet. He might even be the Trojan horse for the regions.

M.S. neither rejected him, nor did he agree. But maybe the idea will take root, we shall see!

Sobchak's personal qualities are not what strikes me as his most useful aspect. He is, of course, a demagogue, you can feel that strongly. But he is from the radical democrats. And such an appointment would be like an outstretched hand from Gorbachev in that direction—toward the creation of, in effect, a coalition government; of shared responsibility with the principal critics, inviting them to show what they can do. By the way, it would be a counterbalance to Yeltsin.

My God! I've picked up so much knowledge over the years! Is there a topic I haven't touched? But I never studied anything in depth... I've read so many philosophers and poets, and regular authors. But if anyone were to ask me in particular about any one of them, I would not be able to give a good answer, oftentimes I do not even remember the basic plot... even of Dostoyevsky's novels...

Why is all of this in me?!

Yesterday M.S. told me that Petrakov submitted his resignation. He started swearing. I said, "This is not good, Mikhail Sergeyevich."

"Give it up!" he got worked up. "All these newspaper outbursts, saying that everyone is leaving Gorbachev one by one, you think they matter?"

"They do. Besides, Petrakov is offended and rightly so."

"By what?"

"You did not remember about him even once in all the days since Volynskoe, even though Presidential decrees in his field, the field of economics, followed one after another. You and Pavlov spoke at the Congress about the economic situation in the country. The draft Congress resolution was submitted in your name. And, remember, it did not pass. Then why do you have an economic adviser, if you do not remember about him even when preparing such documents?"

"Did I have the time?"

"And in general, Mikhail Sergeyevich, the person has been working for you for a year, and Boldin has not even given him a secretary. His ID badge still says that he is the adviser to the General Secretary, not the President."

"Really?"

"Yes."

"Why didn't he say anything?"

“To whom? Should he have bothered you about the ID badge?”

“You’re right, it’s outrageous. Boldin in general should be relieved of his duties in the CC. Let him concentrate on the Presidential apparatus. We will create a unified Presidential apparatus.”

At this point, I made a short speech about the fact that it’s been a year since Gorbachev became president and he still does not have a Kremlin apparatus. As for Petrakov, I added, he is a shy man, and with dignity.

“I did not want to ruin his mood before New Years when he first told me about his resignation,” M.S. responded. “I said, ‘It’s out of the question, just work.’”

M.S. is self-assured even in this. He does not understand that it is not so attractive for an academician to serve as an adviser, especially when he is pushed around.

January 7, 1991

Today, on the orders of Yeltsin and Silaev, was the first official Christmas throughout the entire Russian territory. But the CC had to work, and M.S. demonstratively came to work. I had to work too; spent all day sitting in the office. Boredom. A feeling of powerlessness and pointlessness. Even foreign affairs, which under Shevardnadze centered around us, are now starting to pass us by. We increasingly find ourselves on the sidelines, in the offside, in the mythology of the superpower. M.S. no longer seriously thinks about foreign policy issues. He is busy with “structures” and “small affairs”—talking with one person or the next, whoever is imposed on him: one day he meets with Bronfman, then Japanese parliamentarians, then somebody else. He does not prepare for anything, he repeats the same thing ten times.

In the meantime, a ground war in the Persian Gulf is approaching. Nothing is being done on our side. Opinion-based journalism is on a rampage, starting to touch foreign policy as well. Even *Izvestiya* and *Novoe vremya* are turning hostile towards “Shevardnadze’s line,” implying Gorbachev.

I’m sick of it. But what can one do?

I spoke with Primakov—tried to convince him not to run from M.S. right now. They will line all of us up: Yakovlev, Bakatin, Shevardnadze...

Judging from Petrakov’s words, it doesn’t look like Yanaev’s committee (he is tasked with making proposals for the Cabinet) will have any new figures. They just want to change the titles.

And so it will probably happen.

Meanwhile, Sobchak—he rose high with “Vozrozhdenie” [Rebirth]—is making St. Petersburg TV, a marathon to collect means to rebuild the city. And his New Years speech to Leningrad residents cannot even be compared to M.S.’ yawn-inducing one.

January 8, 1991

Today the front page of *Izvestiya* featured Shalnev's correspondence from New York on Fitzwater's speculation whether the February 11-13th meeting between Gorbachev and Bush will take place as planned. For some time now, American newspapers have been going on about this. Matlock (he visited me Saturday), Braithwaite (on Thursday) and today the Japanese Ambassador have asked me whether the meeting will take place. I decisively averted their doubts, referring to a letter from Gorbachev to Bush about Shevardnadze's resignation, as well as the telephone conversation between the two presidents on January 1st.

But alongside Shalnev's note, an article appeared by the *Izvestiya*'s diplomatic correspondent, Yusin, titled "Will there be a summit?" It cites a senior official within the Foreign Ministry, saying that worries about the meeting are not groundless, because the Soviet Union deceived the West with conventional weapons. The Paris Treaty is up in the air, people do not trust us, and we should not think that Bush will come "no matter what." In a word, the article contains all the points of Shevardnadze's hysterical letter to Gorbachev from January 4th; the military men, according to him, are undermining START, Bush' visit, and the European process.

I called Kovalev. As usual, he doesn't know anything and did not read *Izvestiya*. I called Yefimov (*Izvestiya* editor). He is out, at Lukyanov's. I called Gorbachev. He is in the Walnut Room with the CC Secretaries (probably cooking up policies). I managed to get a hold of him only at 9 p.m. He immediately pounced: "How could you all (who is "we all"?) have allowed such an article to appear in *Izvestiya*!?" I mumbled something in response, myself indignant.

He said: "Why are you getting all emotional on me? Figure this out together with Ignatenko." With that, I went home. But as soon as I closed the door, there was a phone call. Gorbachev. "I just called Shevardnadze," he said, "it seems he hasn't read the article. I told him that his advisers are fouling things up. He should find out who did it, and throw them out of the MFA immediately. I ordered Lukyanov to summon Efimov (he is the editor of the newspaper, which is an organ of the Supreme Soviet) and figure out who is this anonymous senior official in the MFA. This whole chain needs to be worked out and... kicked out!"

I pointed out: "In general, Mikhail Sergeyevich, you need to decide something about Shevardnadze. A mismanaged agency is the most dangerous kind." I reminded him of Kozma Prutkov's saying, "When leaving, leave!"

January 11, 1991

Tonight Gorbachev spoke with Bush over the phone. In recent days the Americans are always on M.S.' mind for two reasons: the Persian Gulf and the Baltic states. But the conversation began in a roundabout way. Gorbachev said that we are "tacking the budget," that we reduced military spending by over two billion. A very critical analysis of the entire situation is at hand, so we can begin market processes in the coming months, but in a way so as not to disrupt economic ties. To do this, we are insisting on economic agreements between the republics.

M.S. told Bush that tomorrow at the Federation Council there will be a discussion of candidates for the posts of Premier and Deputy Premier. He did not mention names. He said that he intends to accelerate work on the draft Union Treaty.

Bush asked about the Baltics. Gorbachev said that Lithuania was “one of the critical moments,” and added Georgia and Karabakh to the list. He assured Bush that he is trying to avoid sharp, radical turns. However, not everything is simple, he said. He complained that there is great pressure on him. People are demanding that he introduce presidential rule in the Baltics.

“The trouble is,” he continued, “that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and Landsbergis are not willing to make any compromises, they make no steps to meet us halfway. I addressed Lithuania’s Supreme Soviet. Today, the situation is not comforting. Strikes have started. I will try to exhaust all political methods, and unless some emergency arises, I will continue with these methods. Not everything depends on us. Already there are clashes, some people were hurt. Nevertheless, I will do everything to prevent bloodshed.”

I could not understand everything Bush said, I was not on an extension line. So I could only guess. In any case, mostly it was Gorbachev who spoke, while Bush reacted with questions and comments.

On the Persian Gulf War you could hear reproach in Gorbachev’s voice. “You are being polite,” he said, “you appear to seek advice, you seemingly listen to Moscow’s opinion. But you still do things your way. I would like us to have total agreement, since we started working as a team. Eduard [Shevardnadze] had constant contact with Jim (Baker). I am ready to send Bessmertnykh to you right now, in order to discuss the whole situation in detail. My offer to hold a brief meeting according to the ‘Helsinki’ formula (referring to their meeting in the Finnish capital in September, 1990) remains in force. See what Bessmertnykh brings you. If we can come to an agreement on that basis, I would send him to Baghdad immediately.” The date of January 15th was mentioned as the final deadline for the ultimatum to Hussein. Gorbachev agreed, but added, “There should not be any be any breaking out, though our common strict position remains. Let us remain optimistic. The Soviet Union and the United States mean something in this world.”

January 13, 1991, Sunday

Twenty years ago I buried my mother.

Never did I think that the inspiring processes started by Gorbachev could come to such an ignominious end. I am worn out by the confusion, and, alas, the arbitrariness of our work; some kind of “spontaneity” in our affairs; and most importantly, Gorbachev’s tendency to believe “his own” people, and in the end seek support precisely from them (the CPSU!).

All of this led to the “spontaneous” actions of commandos and tanks in the Baltics and ended in bloodshed. They say there are 180 wounded and 14 dead in Vilnius in one night!

The radio is buzzing with insults and accusations of Gorbachev. Russian deputies are already publicly saying, “Gorbachev and his clique,” “Gorbachev—the greatest liar of our time,” “He lied to everyone and Yeltsin first and foremost,” “Dirty regime,” “I will not serve his regime.”

Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet Wulfson was crying on the phone: “Anatoly Sergeyevich, help us! The same thing (as in Vilnius) will happen here (in Riga) tomorrow. Where is the Parliament looking? Where are the deputies?” In the meantime, Bush has already petitioned Congress about invading Iraq.

The radio continues to shriek. I try to record as much as I can: “Gorbachev is creeping up to the Russian Parliament.” “Vilnius is the handiwork of the puppet Lithuania Rescue Committee, which is under Gorbachev’s protection.” Svyatoslav Fedorov: “A boat is ready for me, Sobchak, and Popov, to send us abroad.” (A reference to the deportation of philosophers in 1922). He announced that he will put down his deputy mandate “from the Red Hundred.” Some worker woman on the radio called people to protest Gorbachev’s actions by putting down their Party tickets.

“Twenty-one Russian soldiers defected to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania and protected the parliament building.” “A soldier in the hatch of a tank with tears in his eyes.” They also comment that there are soldiers who are ready to kill 100 and 200 people per minute without blinking an eye. There are reports that six out of the fourteen people killed cannot be identified because their faces were mutilated.

“Bloody victories of the Soviet Army over its own people,” “Black colonels running the show,” “People are being killed for wanting to be free.”

There are calls to the radio, which immediately go on air: “I am ashamed to be Russian,” “Gorbachev is worse than Hitler,” “The events in Lithuania are a signal to all the republics,” “The republican parliaments should have their say.” “We should not count on the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.” All of this is punctuated by calls for “a trial of the executioners,” and demands to raise the question of stripping Gorbachev of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Yuri Afanas’ev, Starovoitova, Chernichenko, and Stankevich led a rally on the Red Square. Then they headed a demonstration down the streets, raising their parliamentary credentials. The crowd chanted, “Freedom for Lithuania!” “Shame on the executioners!”

On Friday I insisted that Gorbachev call Bush on the Persian Gulf on the eve of day “X.” The conversation was “friendly.” But M.S. talked a load of baloney regarding Lithuania, he promised to avoid using force. Before this, Bessmertnykh sent a telegram to Washington with Primakov’s plan. Bush did not accept the plan. M.S. was resigned to this. But it is important that the world found out that M.S. intervened once again in favor of a peaceful solution.

Bessmertnykh has started on the job. Gorbachev chose him (to replace Shevardnadze). In my note with candidates for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was number two. I did not really expect him to be selected. But I was convinced that we need a de-ideologized person, who would

be connected with Shevardnadze and known in the United States. As for Shevardnadze, he got out in time (as a political figure, not as the Minister of Foreign Affairs)!

The Lithuanian affair has finally ruined Gorbachev's reputation and maybe his post as well. Yes... this is so, even though he hates "alarmists." The radio is broadcasting poems by Pushkin, Lermontov, Mayakovski, reminding us about the violence authorities commit against their own people, about the responsibility of kings.

In the meantime, Velikhov and Khairov are pressuring me with their "Foundation for the Survival of Humanity," on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of Gorbachev's declaration about a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 (January 15). Gorbachev agreed to meet with this foundation's Board of Directors. But how can one say trite phrases about peace in 2000 when the Persian Gulf and Lithuania are before our eyes?

In a word, I am again facing Czechoslovakia-1968. But then, the problem was to break with Brezhnev, whom I barely knew. Now it is Gorbachev, who is associated with a great historic cause, even though he is ruining it with his own hands. The press here and in the West is wondering whether the Vilnius action was done with Gorbachev's knowledge, or whether events in the country have slipped out of his control entirely. Or was it the initiative of Lithuanian communists and military men? I, too, am unsure. But I suspect that Gorbachev, secretly even from himself, wanted for something like this to happen. It was provoked by a workers' demonstration in front of the Supreme Soviet in Vilnius, which led to Prunskiene's resignation. However, if this had not happened, something else may have had to be "invented." It seems M.S. considers it inconceivable to betray Burokevičius and Shvets (Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPL). Apparently, from the outset they fostered a "fifth column" in Brazaukas' Communist Party.

Radio. 1:50 a.m. Vilnius is blockaded with tanks and armored personnel carriers. The TV station, radio, and the Ministry of Finance are under attack. The windows in the republican Supreme Soviet building are filled with sandbags. There are 100 thousand people on the street.

Yeltsin has left for Tallinn to "discuss the situation" with the leaders of the Baltic States. At the Federation Council he was the "ringleader" (Gorbachev's terminology) of the resolution condemning the actions in Lithuania.

At a meeting with Bronfman, Yeltsin condemned anti-Semitism. He announced that he will not allow it to spread in Russia. In a word, Yeltsin knows how to use any opportunity to boost his rating.

I foresee that tomorrow's Supreme Soviet meeting will be a bunch of baloney. Lukyanov will make sure of it. This morning Stankevich called me from the Moscow City Council [Mossovet]. He clearly expected to get some information on Lithuania from the top. What could I tell him? I did not even know the things that were broadcast on the radio for many hours. I need to think about what to do with myself.

January 14, 1991

The “Echo of Moscow” radio station broadcasts: A demonstration in defense of Lithuania and Russia is planned for January 20th. Its slogan will be “Gorbachev’s team must resign!” and it will proceed along the Sadovoe [koltso], then down Arbat and to Staraya Ploshchad’, because there, according to the radio, is the “devil incarnate,” from there stems the “Party-military coup.”

Today the Supreme Soviet began, of course, with Lithuania. Pugo and Yazov made stupid, false, boorish speeches. Gorbachev himself spoke after the break, and his speech was pathetic, inarticulate, and full of pointless digressions. And no policy. It was sickening—plain hypocritical evasion. There was no answer to the most important question. The speech was worthy neither of the former Gorbachev, nor of the present moment, when the fate of his entire five-year cause is being decided. It was embarrassing and sad to hear.

In the morning, Ignatenko spoke to me about resignation. Andrei Grachev came from the session of the Supreme Soviet and asked not to be confirmed as the Head of the President’s International Department. “I’ve had enough with 1968 and 1979. This is intolerable.” What about me?

By the way, the CC cafeteria started using coupons for food. This is after last year the “feeder” came to an end. What does this mean? Is it compensation to the nomenclature?

January 15, 1991

I did not go to the meeting between Gorbachev and Velikhov’s Foundation for the Survival of Humanity. It would be nauseating to meet with them, embarrassing to look people in the eye. I thought he would cancel in such circumstances. But once again, I “underestimated” him. He went. He called Yakovlev, Boldin, and Bessmertnykh, who was just appointed [Minister of Foreign Affairs] by the Supreme Soviet. And, as if nothing has happened, he went on for nearly two hours in front of the Americans and others about his commitment to new thinking. They, as was expected, did not ask any questions...

Ignatenko stopped by. He told me that last night he, Yakovlev, and Primakov tried to persuade Gorbachev to go to Vilnius, lay a wreath, speak at the Supreme Soviet, meet with the collectives, the military, etc. Gorbachev seemed to welcome the idea and told them to prepare by morning the texts for his speeches there. They prepared them; put them on his desk in the morning. Then, all day long Ignatenko tried to catch Gorbachev in order to find out what he decided. M.S. pretended that nothing happened and there had been no conversation with these three men. From this, Ignatenko concluded that M.S. is not “misinformed” as many people think, but that he is carrying out his plan of intimidating the Balts. During the day, the military took a technical radio station and there are no plans to leave either the TV tower, or the House of the Press. In Riga they captured a military school and dispersed the students.

I woke up at 5 a.m. and could not fall asleep again. I thought about my intentions. When I came to work, I dictated to Tamara a six-page explanation to Gorbachev, sharply and frankly, roundhouse-style, with the conclusion: “I am also leaving.” Here is the text:

“Mikhail Sergeyevich,

Because the break has finally come and because it was hard to imagine that it would be so sad and shameful, nobody has the right to remain silent.

For some time now we, your advisers, have noticed that you do not need us. We know nothing of your intentions, plans or prospective actions or nominations... You are clearly not interested in our opinions. But that does not mean that we do not have opinions about what's going on.

I have sincerely and truly devoted everything I could to your cause, but now I consider it my duty to tell you the following.

Your speech at the Supreme Soviet is a sign of the end. It is not what our country and the world were waiting for. It is not the speech of a great statesman at a time when his entire cause is hanging in the balance. It was confused, inarticulate, with some strange impressions from a meeting with Prunskiene, with a faulty "plotline" of events, about which the world knows ten times more. There was a total sense that you are simply uninformed or are trying to tiptoe around what you really wanted to achieve.

The speech was missing the most important element—policy. As you taught us yourself, policy is always a choice. This time, the choice is either to say directly that you will not allow even an inch of the Soviet Union to break off and will use all means, including tanks, to prevent it; or to admit that a tragic event has taken place without the Center's control, and that you condemn those who used force and killed people, and you will bring them to justice.

In the first case it would mean that you are burying everything you said and did during the last five years. You would be admitting that you yourself and the country were not ready for a revolutionary turn toward a civilized path and that things will be done, and people will be treated, as before.

In the second case, the matter could still be corrected for the sake of continuing the *perestroika* course. Although something irreversible has already happened. No prosecutor or investigator, no matter what conclusions they reach on the ground, can change the assessment the international community and all the political echelons of the Western world have given to the events. The official conclusions would also not affect our public opinion, which you obviously underestimate or simplify because you are misinformed about its real content.

You seem not to know the people's feelings towards you—on the streets, in shops, in trolleybuses, at meetings, in hallways and smoking rooms. You are bombarded with telegrams (although from your past experience, you are well aware how this is done) from thousands of people. But you simply do not want to know the opinion of the other tens of thousands, and millions, of people; they do not fit into your intentions. Do you know what "Echo of Moscow" and even "Mayak" are broadcasting practically around the clock? They already have a regular term, "Gorbachev and his clique." And it's all over the world. Yesterday's broadcast of Leningrad TV appalled people: coffins, corpses, sobbing women, tanks with rotating turrets, a girl pulling her umbrella from under a tank, etc. Is this not supposed to influence policy? Only telegrams selected personally for you are supposed to affect policy?

Trust--the main achievement of new thinking policy--is being destroyed. People will no longer believe you, no matter what you do. It is a moment of triumph for people who warned that new thinking is merely a shell that would be discarded at the right moment (or when things got tough). I can imagine the mood of Bush, Baker, and dozens of others who sincerely trusted you.

You gave Yeltsin & Co. another, perhaps the final, chance to beat you. After all, the agreement he made with the Balts and appealed to the UN, the “council of four” he created with Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan, with “no place for the Center,” means that they will carry the new state formation (whatever the Soviet Union might be eventually called) to the global community—bypassing you, in spite of you, and against you. You started the process of returning the country to civilization, but it got stuck on your tenet of the “one and indivisible.” You said more than once to me and other colleagues that the Russians will never forgive anyone for the “collapse of the empire.” Meanwhile, Yeltsin is impudently doing just that in the name of Russia, and you don’t see many Russians protesting. Even Polozkov-followers in his own parliament do not dare to protest in any effective way.

As a result, you doomed yourself to a policy with an objective that can only be achieved by force, thereby coming into conflict with your own declared philosophy.

You publicly mentioned many times that as long as you are in power, you will not allow armed violence against the people. Let’s say you “didn’t know,” did not give permission to shoot and crush people with tanks that night in Vilnius. But what happened was the result of your policies, your unwillingness to let Lithuania go in good time.

It was announced on the radio yesterday that a “cautionary political strike” will take place in Moscow and other cities, summoned by the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. On Sunday there will be a mass demonstration led by Yeltsin, which will wind up on Staraya Ploshchad’. Their slogan is “Gorbachev and his team must resign!”

You know the resolutions of the Presidiums of Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, Moscow City Council, Leningrad City Council, etc, etc. But somehow one does not see any demonstrations in support of the actions taken in Lithuania. It was hard to justify our policy there before; but now, after 13 dead and hundreds wounded, it is unthinkable, if one has a conscience.

The only justification that has any formal resonance to people, and not to very many, is that Landsbergis & Co. are violating the USSR Constitution. But of all people you should know that there are various kinds of legality. And if the law has to be imposed by tanks and APCs, then... well, we’ve gone over this already. It is not the legality of a law-based state, which, according to your own statements, can only be the result of a democratic process.

Eighteen months ago in Crimea, when the Balts built a many thousand kilometer-long human chain, holding candles, if you remember I told you that only tanks could stop their withdrawal from the USSR. You brushed me off. Now we are watching it happen. The question is, why and for whom is this necessary? After all, *perestroika* is for people! And if out of Lithuania’s population of over 3 million people, 150 thousand or so want to remain in the Soviet Union, it does not mean that for their sake, headed by Shvets and Burokevičius, we can treat the

other representatives of the republic in such a manner. The excuses Pugo and Yazov tried to present yesterday sounded pathetic and disgraceful. They are discrediting you, representing the Center in an absurd light. Then again, you repeated their “logic,” which is the logic of a village street: I got beat up (when the delegation of the Committee of Salvation appeared at the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania), so I will call my big brother and he will show you!

In a state that has declared that it wants to be law-based, you cannot replace political and legal assessments with a story about a public organization that became outraged at radio broadcasts, called out for help from troops and together they went to storm the TV tower. This is equivalent to some group in Moscow getting offended by “Vzglyad” or “120 Minutes,” asking a regiment or division commander they know to allocate a neat little battalion for them in order to besiege the Ostankino Tower and drive out all the personnel from there. And if the policeman at the door started shooting at them, they would send in tanks. In essence, that’s all the explanations our parliament and the entire world heard are worth.

In a word, for the sake of keeping Lithuania in the USSR, you are ruining with your own hands the work that, as you correctly said on many occasions, was intended to change the world.

I have the impression that you do not read even the ciphered telegrams from abroad, which are full of protest, indignation, anger, disappointment and threats to break off all planned communications with us—from the governments, parties, and the public. It is a picture (including around the fences of our embassies) that we seem to have forgotten since the days of Sakharov in Gorky.

Against this background, the appointment of cabinet members in the Supreme Soviet looks like some strange phantasmagoria: a government is being appointment for nobody knows what state. We can forget about your version of the Union Treaty.

I know you well enough, Mikhail Sergeyevich, to anticipate how you will react to this note: you will say, “Another one has ‘rolled back,’ he broke down.” So be it. But I am in my 70th year of life and it will be very difficult for you to suspect me of some kind of ambitions, vanity, or conceit. After all, you got to know me a little bit too, even though you were never very interested in me. I did not chase after promotions or seek out anything for myself personally. The point of this message is to say that I have faithfully served “that” Gorbachev—the great pioneer and author of *perestroika*. But now I do not recognize or understand him.

Prague [1968] was a very painful experience for me. I condemned [the Soviet government’s actions] in my heart, among my friends, and to my daughter, who was a schoolgirl then. I told her, “Remember, a great country covered itself in shame, and we will have no forgiveness.” I did not conceal among my CC International Department colleagues my strong indignation when we invaded Afghanistan. My moral responsibility for the policies leading to those events was only what could be expected from a regular apparatchik. But I had a close connection to the policies of the last five years. These policies precluded the possibility of something like 1968 or 1979 happening again. As it turns out, this is not the case. I cannot have anything to do with a policy that is capable of betraying its very nature.

Mikhail Sergeyevich! Ever since I started working for you I never thought that I might feel the painful shame for the Soviet leadership's policies as I did under Brezhnev and Chernenko. Alas! It has happened...

Respectfully,

A. Chernyaev."

At first, Tamara refused to type it. Then, having typed it, she hid it in her safe. She told me, "It would be such a blow to him from your side. And he cares about you so!"... Women have their own cunning. Maybe she feels sorry for me, and not him? Brutents stopped by. She told him about it and asked what he thought. Naturally, he advised "not to hurry." Everyone thinks about himself, too...

I listened to Bessmertnykh's smart speech when he was appointed by the Supreme Soviet, and I wavered in my determination to "wave goodbye to Gorbachev." Politics are truly dirty, and a lifetime would not be enough to get clean. But it depends. You can make amends for something with an important action, but you're unlikely to fix anything. After all, a gesture is an action. Shevardnadze's action had no impact on Gorbachev. On the contrary, he does not care about such gestures. But as soon as you come in contact with some new information about the events, your heart cries out. For example: a girl was crushed by a tank, an old man was shot point-blank from a tank, etc.

January 16, 1991

Today is the last day of the Supreme Soviet session. Gorbachev had his last chance to deal with Lithuania, and to restore his image as the leader of *perestroika*. In the morning, he even assigned Primakov to draft a text. Zhenya and Ignatenko drafted it, naturally condemning the events. But M.S. didn't use it. After a report by Dementey, who led a Supreme Soviet delegation (with Oleinik and Ter-Petrosyan) to Lithuania (their report was empty and formal), after the ensuing discussion, he offered... to suspend the law about the press and introduce a censor from the Supreme Soviet in every agency. There was an uproar, M.S. did not insist. But he showed his face and intentions. It appeared as if he is on the side of the killers in Vilnius—he has things to conceal.

Nevzorov¹ made a TV program in Vilnius, about the attack by the special police forces. It is a completely Black Hundred-type program. The Supreme Soviet ordered it to be shown, while other "sketches" from Vilnius, including foreign ones, were restricted.

Today Primakov asked for resignation. M.S. told him, "I, not you, will decide what to do with you."

The entire team of "Moskovskie Novosti," led by Yegor Yakovlev, withdrew from the CPSU. IMEMO, headed by Martynov, its director and member of the CC, adopted a resolution

¹ Alexander Nevzorov was a prominent and influential journalist, and the host of the popular TV program "600 Seconds." [Translator's Note]

condemning the events and made a statement that the institute refuses to cooperate with the country's leadership.

There was no reply from Gorbachev to our proposal for him to meet with his advisers. Anna, my daughter, is clearly in favor of me "leaving." Today I saw her for the first time since she got back from Copenhagen. I outlined for her my take on Gorbachev, whose only driving logic now is to stay in power at any cost. His new speech against Landsbergis and about Yeltsin's press-conference, just like the previous one at the Supreme Soviet, was confused, empty, off topic, petty and "personal." Completely not at the level of the moment.

January 17, 1991

The war in the Persian Gulf has started (ground campaign). I had no doubt that it would. They woke me up at 4 a.m., went to the Kremlin. Stopped by Primakov's, Dzasokhov and Falin were there. We started working on Gorbachev's statement.

Around 7 a.m. in the Walnut Room M.S. called together—my jaw dropped when I walked in—members of the Politburo, CC Secretaries... "We have come full circle," I thought. This is a symptom. Of course, Yazov was there too, he spread a map on the table and showed what he thought would happen (by the way, he guessed correctly).

If only the Americans knew... It is nighttime, an emergency situation. The gathered group consists of amateurs in the issue at hand. The President's rooms have neither a fax, nor any direct line to the information service. We waited for the stenographer for half an hour. It took over an hour to re-type a two-page statement with corrections. Gorbachev asked Yazov, "When did you 'see' it?" (Meaning when did he learn from the military and technical intelligence about the start of American attacks). "I did not see it, I heard it. About an hour after it started. We intercepted an exchange between a B-52 and Milwaukee (aircraft carrier)."

That's the company M.S. had when he decided the question related to an event, the consequences of which could surpass the results of World War II in terms of state conflicts, factors, and the regrouping of all the world powers.

I am not sure whether Ignatenko was lying or telling the truth when he said that he was sitting next to one of the CC secretaries and when ships were mentioned in the course of the conversation, he leaned over and asked, "What have ships got to do with it? Is it close to the sea?"

By the way, Boldin was the one who called people and sent cars out to the dachas. But he did not call or notify me. It was Primakov who called and said that we are all meeting. This is curious. After all, I am the President's adviser on international relations and everybody knows that I am involved in this issue.

After Gorbachev let people go around 9 a.m., he suddenly beckoned me into his office. He talked about Lithuania. I understood that he got wind of my backroom conversations and intentions. Meanwhile, *Moskovskie Novosti* fired off: "bloody Sunday" and a list of accusations

at Gorbachev, signed by around 30 politicians—from Abuladze to Karyakin, from Bovin to Gelman, almost all Gorbachev’s former favorites. It made an impression on him. The day before, when he was presenting Bessmertnykh at the MFA, he referred to the article, saying: “They are already calling me a criminal and a murderer.”

I thought it was a filthy thing of them to do. This publication plus the outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf have cooled my desire to give him my resignation letter, which Tamara locked in her safe and guards carefully. Gorbachev talked, seemingly regretful that things were turning out this way. Such a confrontation, such a split, such hostility in society, it is as if the walls have started marching against each other. I told him, “So let them fight each other, even until death. But why tanks? It is the ruin of your cause. Is Lithuania worth such stakes?” “You do not understand,” Gorbachev said. “It is the army. I could not openly disassociate myself from them and condemn them after the Lithuanians humiliated them and their families in the garrisons.”

Precisely, I thought. This only confirms the analysis of the situation coming from all sides: M.S. has fallen into the embrace of “Petrushchenkovs” against his own will and found himself without a base. Now he is forced to follow the logic of protecting power at all costs. He does not feel the danger. But the strike is coming tomorrow and on Sunday there will be a demonstration in Moscow under the slogan “Gorbachev must resign.” But why he called me over: to work with me, in light of the fact that Petrakov and Shatalin not only resigned, but signed that very article in *Moskovskie Novosti* where he is called a murderer. Does he want Chernyaev to leave too, the “most loyal” one?

January 18, 1991

Gorbachev had three telephone conversations:

- With Mitterrand. The latter called. No substance. It seems he just wanted to show himself next to Gorbachev in being distanced from Bush’s direct and uncompromising position on the Persian Gulf.
- With Kohl. M.S. called him. Congratulated him on his election as Chancellor of United Germany. They are on familiar terms with each other: Misha, Helmut. The same declarations of love and faithfulness. Kohl assured M.S. that he does not believe that Gorbachev turned away from *perestroika* and moved into the right-wing camp because of Lithuania. He assured M.S. that everything will remain as they agreed at their meetings in Arkhyz, Moscow, and Bonn.
- The conversation with Bush started out coldly. M.S. did not consider it necessary to praise him for taking on the war upon himself—for everybody. He did not express his condolences for the boys who already died. He immediately started on his two-phase theory: there is already victory in the first phase (Hussein is politically discredited, his military potential is undermined, the risk of hegemony in the region is removed—so why should we keep killing others and put our boys on the line?)

He laid out his plan: a pause in hostilities under the condition that Hussein declares that he will withdraw from Kuwait. A promise to negotiate on all issues after the withdrawal.

Bush did not agree. This was followed by a dropped call for “technical reasons.” In reality, Bush probably needed to consult with his team. After the line was reconnected, he said he did not believe that Hussein would accept such a plan. I noticed that Gorbachev’s attitude was: if that’s what you want—okay, go ahead, later you can tell us how it went.

This morning I made a scene to Gorbachev in the presence of Bessmertnykh, Pavlov, Primakov, Ignatenko: “Again Boldin did not notify me that people are gathering in the Walnut Room to discuss the war in the Persian Gulf. I am not needed in international affairs? My opinion is of no interest in this important matter?” Gorbachev started to apologize, trying to turn it into a joke. He cursed Boldin, but at the same time justified him by saying that advisers should attend such events automatically and do not need separate invitations. “See,” he said, “everyone suspects me. But if Chernyaev started to suspect me, then the matter has gone really deep in our society.” This was said against the background of the abovementioned action by 30 members of the intelligentsia in *Moskovskie Novosti*, and then 116 more members of the intelligentsia, including some close to Gorbachev, in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*. Then there was another group in *Komsomolka [Komsomol'skaya Pravda]*. And another collective statement in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* that praised Yeltsin: he supposedly saved the honor of the Russian people, in contrast to Gorbachev, who disgraced Russian people. Add to that Petrakov’s resignation and the grumbling and resignation threats from Yakovlev, Primakov’s statement, Shatalin’s endless interviews in newspapers where he rails against Gorbachev, and Vitaliy Ignatenko’s talks with him (Gorbachev). Against this background, Chernyaev seems to be the last redoubt; everyone is leaving and betraying him. He felt that I was on the brink. Though, I repeat, I remain by his side because of the Persian Gulf War. By the way, he threw out this joke: in some Canadian newspaper, some Canadian millionaire, whom M.S. never met, is inviting him over, promising him a country house and a lifetime pension. He jokes: “Maybe we should go? We’ll write memoirs together.”

Yesterday, *Kuranty* published an excerpt from Ligachev’s book, about how he made Gorbachev General Secretary. The book is called *The Birth and Demise of Perestroika*. The author is glad that finally, after Lithuania, *perestroika* is returning to its proper course, i.e. the one always indicated by Yegor Kuzmich.

January 19, 1991

I spent the whole day at work. I was preparing materials for the visit to Japan. Judging by Gorbachev’s conversation with Bush yesterday, the US President is not cancelling his visit to Moscow, for now. Hussein has not yet responded to Gorbachev’s plan. The Americans continue to clobber Iraq.

January 20, 1991, Sunday

In the morning I went to Uspenka alone and raced on my skis for about three hours. It was precisely racing, because the traction was so good that I was surprised at myself, how can someone at 70 ski so fast! It was effortless fun, almost without dipping below racing speeds.

The traditional hard frosts of the season are only at -3 degrees Celsius.

January 21, 1991, Monday

I was awakened at night by Bisher (Deputy Chairman of the Latvian government). In a panicked tone he told me that the special police force attacked the Interior Ministry building in Riga, four people are killed, eight wounded. What could I tell him? In the morning I wrote to Gorbachev about it. I did not get a response. It was impossible to reach him. The whole day he either had meetings with Rujtel (so the same thing does not happen in Estonia as in Vilnius and Riga), or was laying a wreath at Lenin's tomb (tomorrow is his birthday), or once again was behind closed doors with Pugo, Yazov, Kryuchkov, etc... Instead of going to the podium and stating his position—the position of the leader of a great power.

The Russian parliament. Extraordinary session. Yeltsin presented a report on the situation in the country, in a generally "balanced" (as people say nowadays) way, without any direct insults to Gorbachev and without agitating to overthrow him (as he did yesterday on Manezhnaya Ploshchad', in front of 3000 people). Anyway, this might be even more dangerous for M.S.

Our attempts (Primakov's, Ignatenko's and mine) to reach Gorbachev and have a serious conversation with him led to nothing. The mass media is already issuing an official version: the events in Riga were a domestic conflict. A woman from the special police force was raped; people's patience ran out, etc. In a word, they are reducing it to the level of a kitchen squabble. Meanwhile, the political significance of these events is in the world's response to these squabbles.

The radio is transmitting a session of the Russian parliament. Many of the things they say are sensible. But almost everyone rails against Gorbachev and stings his most painful wounds. Among others: Yeltsin immediately went to Vilnius when he heard about the events... as opposed to Gorbachev, who is silent and lying low.

January 22, 1991, Tuesday

Primakov, Ignatenko and I continued our attempts to get Gorbachev to speak on Lithuania and Latvia at the Supreme Soviet. Last night he agreed only to see us at 10 a.m. We showed up. He immediately came down on yesterday's Russian parliament. Then he started telling us how he worked things out with Rujtel, and is now waiting for Gorbunov and Rubiks.

He agreed to let us write a draft for his speech in Lithuania. He gave me Shakhnazarov's version (which means that he was already thinking about it yesterday). After coming back to my office, I wrote five pages in half an hour, using some things from Shakhnazarov. At 1:30 p.m. M.S. called people to the Walnut Room to discuss the Persian Gulf War. Present were: Yazov, Kryuchkov, Pugo, Bessmertnykh, Primakov, Belonogov, Ignatenko and I. We discussed the situation and agreed that I will write a draft letter to Bush, Bessmertnykh to Baker. So far, M.S. has not agreed to my proposal to invite Bush to have a close meeting somewhere like Helsinki instead of his visit to Moscow. Afterwards, Primakov, Shakhnazarov, Ignatenko and I got to

work on the text of M.S.' speech on Lithuania. M.S. started to re-dictate it based on my draft. He threw out some of the "most interesting" parts, including the approval of Sunday rallies as an expression of a living democracy. But the essence remained: the events in Riga and Vilnius are not Gorbachev's policies. They were spontaneous, the result of a crisis and the violation of law by the authorities themselves. In a word, he disassociated himself. He expressed his condolences. He denounced the appeal to the army in a political struggle and the use of troops without orders. In short, he said everything that should have been said a week ago. Then, maybe there would have been no events in Riga, no rallies in Moscow, no curses, no flight of intellectuals from him, no anxiety in the West with threats to stop supporting us.

But M.S. is his usual self—always late. *Komsomolka* published Shatalin's appeal to Gorbachev to resign. Yet another interview with Petrakov is published in *La Stampa*, along the same lines. This is filthy. It is self-expression at the level of petty vanity, on the verge of betrayal: because they know Gorbachev, they know that he has not changed the fundamental course, only made another unfortunate maneuver.

January 24, 1991, Wednesday

In the morning Matlock requested to meet with Gorbachev. I convinced him to see the ambassador. It turned out to be a very important meeting. M.S. (after listening to a translation of a letter from Bush, which Matlock brought with him) spent an hour convincing him that Bush is not reacting adequately to the situation in the Baltic States, that Bush seems ready to sacrifice the unique relationship between them, without which "none of this would have been possible" in the world. He spent some time interpreting Bush's expressions from the letter. Matlock, even though he knows Russian very well, sometimes does not feel the nuances in the language. That is why one could have interpreted the translation to mean that Bush already imposed sanctions against us, while Matlock assured us that Bush would impose them, if Gorbachev did not improve.

Andrei Grachev stopped by again. I held off on telling Gorbachev about Grachev's refusal to become the Head of the President's International Department. But I told him today. With all due respect to Andryusha, to his intellectuality, something gnawed in my heart because of his insistence in this matter.

A currency exchange has been announced: 50 and 100 ruble bills. Pavlov's "reforms."

In connection with Grachev's visit, I viewed the recent article in *Moskovskie Novosti* somewhat differently. It was called "Look who left." The gist is that Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Bakatin, Petrakov, and Shatalin have left, and Gorbachev is stripped in an intellectual sense. He preferred the company of mediocrity. But dear sirs, neither Shatalin, nor Petrakov, nor especially Bakatin contributed much intellectual substance to *perestroika*, or they did not have the time to do so. As for Chernyaev, he is outside the intellectual circles, for a very simple reason. Because he has not betrayed Gorbachev. Had I signed one of the appeals and manifestos condemning Gorbachev, I would have immediately become a big intellectual. It's a good thing that Tamara held on to my letter to Gorbachev immediately after the events in Lithuania. How petty is our intelligentsia, consumed by vanity through and through.

January 25, 1991

In the morning I was composing Gorbachev's response to Bush, which Bessmertnykh will take to Washington tomorrow. In the style of: George, how could you think because of Lithuania that I betrayed *perestroika*? Etc.

In the evening M.S. invited me to his office together with Bessmertnykh. He went through the text, removing the more "lively passages." Then I started relating to him other people's requests, in particular the requests of other advisers. He said to me:

"What salary are you receiving? The same as them? So don't play the role of advocate and solicitor."

"But they turn to me... If their messages did not go through me, you'd never get them."

"You are the same as them."

"Alright. I will proceed from this..."

"The difference is in your actual position..." And, turning to Bessmertnykh, pointing at me, he said, "I want to appoint him as national security adviser, the Secretary and member of the Security Council."

"What is a Secretary of the Security Council?" I asked.

"We'll see."

"But if it turns out to involve administrative duties, I refuse. I am useless as an administrator."

"Okay, okay."

"Not okay... Maybe as a "research supervisor" (people noticed this at the university) or as the supervisor of a consultative group (colleagues noticed this at the International Department) I may be adequate, but as an administrator—spare me.

"Okay," and he showed us both to the door.

In the vestibule Aleksandr Aleksandrovich started to actively persuade me not to decline the position: "God forbid this post goes to someone like... It would be the doom of our foreign policy."

"Yes... But don't think it would be anything like the American Security Council. This one will contain everything—from the economy, to healthcare, to the Ministry of Interior Affairs."

We argued for a long time. When I got to my office, Primakov also started persuading me over the phone. I thought to myself: why do I need this? To ruin my life's work in my last years... Or is this Gorbachev's reward for my "loyalty" despite Lithuania?

The currency exchange is disgraceful. It is as though M.S. decided to go "all in" with his authority. It is so humiliating for people! Through these fifty ruble banknotes they are checking to see whether you will exchange your hard-earned money... All our Lumpenproletariat mentality, our rudeness, jealousy and filth are coming out. Supposedly we are moving toward a "free economy," but at the same time there are orders to look into each other's wallets, to see a crook and a dodger in everyone. And what a humiliating ordeal this is for the elderly!

January 26, 1991, Sunday

Went to work. There was information from the war. It seems like the end is near, and it will be a bloody end. The Americans cannot linger. The end and the outcomes will be quite different from what was expected, which was to punish the aggressor. After such a punishment, one wouldn't have enough gunpowder to punish someone else this way.

By the way, yesterday I forgot to note... when Bessmertnykh and I were sitting at M.S.'s, Bronfman came up in conversation. M.S. said: "People kept trying to get me to meet with him. So I did! And look whom he turned out to be. Before meeting with me, he was kissing with Yeltsin. And that's where he went after our meeting, too. That's all his business... Oh well, he found a suitable partner! And in general, see who surrounds Yeltsin, look who is on his team: Jews, all Jews."

I thought about who I know from that team. And indeed, mostly they are Jewish. And they constitute the majority of the turncoats, including one of my close acquaintances, about whom, by the way, Bronfman said the following, "When I first met this gentleman five years ago, he assured me that he was Russian. Now he is arguing with the same ardor that he is Jewish." Yes, the Jews are in fashion nowadays. Their worst quality is coming to the surface. The Jewish press strongly provokes the intelligentsia's flight from Gorbachev.

January 28, 1991

I wrote a letter from Gorbachev to Andreotti. The MFA draft is once again garbage. There is information... The West is turning away from us, the *perestroika* atmosphere has evaporated. Internal information shows more and more that the only levers of power Gorbachev has left are the army and the KGB. And more and more openly he is leaning towards using them. His moral-political isolation is a fact, he is sustained by inertia. The country simply does not know what to do with itself.

Money was taken away. But Muscovites, even those who exchanged their money, did not get the exchanged 50-hundred ruble bills in their salaries: there are not enough banknotes. The government is afraid to print them, because it is unclear what State emblem the country will have soon, and what the country will be called. Not to mention, which leader will have to be printed on the banknotes.

January 29, 1991

I put the following passage in the letter to Andreotti: “To the person who best understands us and can stop the disintegration of good relations with the Soviet Union, save the European process and prepare all of us to build peace after the Persian Gulf War.” M.S. corrected the text heavily, removing the most “heartfelt” parts.

Bessmertnykh convinced Bush and Baker to stop the Lithuania-related economic reprisals. The Americans still need us—to finish off Hussein.

Kryuchkov brought Gorbachev another batch of bogus information that the U.S. is about to strike Hussein with nuclear weapons. Tolya Kovalyov, following Kryuchkov’s lead, immediately composed a statement from the USSR MFA in protest. I asked to see it... then attached a biting note to it and sent it to Gorbachev. He returned it to me with the resolution, “Hold until special circumstances.” What nitwits we have in our departments! They simply cannot tell apart big-time politics from tactical propaganda games.

Petrakov stopped by to say goodbye. We parted as friends. In my parting words to him, I suggested that he shouldn’t slam the door anymore. Usually that’s done once, not four or five times. Still, I told him, “In your place I would have done the same, if M.S. had changed foreign policy” (for which I feel responsible).

In *Sovetskaia rossiya* there was a brazen article about Shatalin, “Lumpen—academician.” Shameless. Though perhaps he really is as much of a scholar as Ponomarev, Yegorov, and the like. I.e. exclusively for their time. Looks like it. When one talks with him, one does not get the impression that he is a scholar—*uchenyi*—in the normal, intellectual sense of the word (i.e. not a derivative of the word science—*nauka*, but of the word for learning—*uchenost’*).

Ignatenko and I covertly went to the President and threw a scene about Yazov and Pugo’s “initiative” on patrolling the cities. M.S. yelled at us: “This is none of your business! Do you have nothing better to do? You don’t understand! This is nothing special! It’s normal practice. And in general, you scurry around and panic like the intelligentsia: one foot here, one there.”

I didn’t give up, kept saying that it’s the job of city and the Supreme Soviets to invite troops to patrol the city. Otherwise it is the introduction of martial law, which is unconstitutional. M.S. was angry, threw various arguments at us, along the lines of Ignatenko and me being worthless. I stood my ground.

“We are on your team and have to know your intentions and maneuvers.”

“I will tell you my maneuvers when I see fit.”

“It is impossible to work under such conditions.”

“It’s possible!”

“No, it is impossible. If you want real work, we have to find out about such things not from the newspapers.” And more, along the same “elevated-official” style.

In the evening he called me and said that he signed an order to do away with the patrols... taking into consideration the positions of local and Supreme Soviets.

He practically doesn’t read the newspapers anymore. His main source of information is what this or that person tells him. But, as we know, not everyone has the right to “say” things to him. Especially directly. The people who can are Lukyanov, Yazov, Kryuchkov, Pugo. Such is his current circle of “real” advisers.

January 30, 1991

I met with the Finnish ambassador. I praised Koivisto on Gorbachev’s behalf. I promised a letter from Gorbachev and even a date for Koivisto’s visit to the USSR. Indeed, if Finland had taken a position on Lithuania similar to, say, Denmark, we would have been in a much more difficult position.

Moskovskie novosti has been printing issue after issue of crushing articles against M.S. There is the currency exchange, and Lithuania, and the end of *perestroika* and democracy. On the cover they show a soldier in an armored personnel carrier and the title: “*Perestroika*’s over. Time for a break!” And more along those lines.

The RSFSR People’s Deputy Tarasov wrote in *Vecherka* that during negotiations with Nakayama (Foreign Minister of Japan) Gorbachev sold four islands for 250 billion dollars...

Late last night M.S. called Shakhnazarov and me to edit an article about the referendum. It tries to persuade the reader that the Union should not be broken. By the way, “socialist choice” is no longer mentioned. Two hours before this at the Politburo, to which the advisers were suddenly invited,² the Moscow secretary Prokofiev and others demanded that tomorrow at the CC Plenum Gorbachev said directly: we are no longer talking about a struggle for power, but about changing the social system, about capitalism.

In general, the Politburo creates a very strange impression of being some underground party. Rubiks and Burokevičius are insolent, demanding their rights. Nobody puts them in their place.

February 1, 1991

Yesterday the CC Plenum took place. I did not go. I find it repulsive. I was told that each person spoke according to his personal interest, to the degree of his understanding of the essence of recent events, and according to his knowledge of what Gorbachev actually thinks right now and for the future.

² Once we ceased being advisers to the General Secretary, we were not supposed to attend the Politburo.
[Author’s note]

In general, judging by the responses, the very fact that the plenum took place is a demonstration of the fact that M.S. is returning to “his” environment. Because it appears that he does not have another one. It is terrible. It is terrible that Yeltsin speaks the truth. Yesterday on the TV program “Koleso” he said, “The ground is slipping from under Gorbachev’s feet, we are witnessing the agony of State, of the regime... and it is dangerous.”

How right Ignatenko and I were regarding the city patrols! The republics one after another are prohibiting the implementation of the decree on their territories, arguing that it is illegal. One more blow to the President’s prestige... next to the currency exchange.

I am losing interest in my work. I sit behind a closed door in my office. However, ambassadors do stop by: the British, Italian... today I had the Japanese. I shame them: “How could this happen? You believed Landsbergis over Gorbachev.” I must appear to be a true Gorbachev-patriot, but in my heart I no longer believe him—not as a person, but as a statesman. He improvises on a very shallow level. In the first 2-3 years of *perestroika* it was good and effective, but right now it is fatal.

February 5, 1991, Tuesday

On Saturday, February 2nd, we were sitting in the Walnut Room: Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Primakov, Medvedev, Shakhnazarov, Boldin, Ignatenko, and I. “Privy Council,” I called it, to Gorbachev’s displeasure. We started speaking freely about everything, even though he specified the topic: the situation in the country. Everyone gave his own assessment. I talked mostly about the fact that salvation is in orientation toward the sovereign energy of the republics. And in the end again and again, like the Roman Cato, I said: we have to let the Baltics go! M.S. raised an eyebrow.

On Monday I was at work. Letter to Koivisto. Response to Mitterrand, letter to Rajiv Gandhi. The Persian Gulf War: I am watching where we are going with it and after it. The BBC is pestering me for an interview.

A Jewish woman has been calling non-stop about Hasidic manuscripts. Gubenko³ has been ignoring her. She spoke beautifully, in the well-phrased language of a highly educated Moscow Jewish woman. “Gubenko,” she said, “Treats me as a vulgar Jew, who was hired to plead the cause of the community beyond the cordon.”

Later, when I joined her in the ironic tone, she told me she is the most intelligent and most beautiful woman in Moscow. What can you do—this Jewish trait is indestructible! It even made me want to spend some time with her.

Gorbachev took pity on me. Asked if I need a vacation. It turns out that Boldin was the one who told him that I am worn out. I reminded him of my previous request: better he should give me a day or two of rest when I request it; it would seem improper to take a vacation right now.

³ At the time he was Minister of Culture. [Author’s note]

Arbatov called. I told him to go to... Yeltsin. He did not get it right away, but when he did he was offended. It seems this is it for me and him, after 30 years of camaraderie and sometimes even friendship.

I had a good conversation with Anna (daughter). She imitated her “collective” at work (the Institute for International Labor Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences, directed by Timofeev). They are all tattered, externally and internally confused people who’ve lost their footing, the meaning of their life and work. For 30-40-50 years they worked on something that turned out to be empty, useless rubbish. In a very artistic and natural manner, Anna portrayed all of them together and some of them individually. It is very unpleasant for her there. What do these researchers do on a daily basis? They sit for hours in the cafeteria, which has started serving vodka.

On February 2nd it was five years since I joined Gorbachev’s team. Only five years! And how much has happened, the whole world is upside down.

February 7, 1991

In the morning I chaired a meeting of experts on the Persian Gulf War: Yura Mirsky and his team (thirteen people). They said many smart things. Surprisingly, these narrow specialists are also divided into Westerners and Arab patriots. Nevertheless, the conversation was much more interesting and useful in a practical sense than yesterday’s meeting of the official “Group on the Persian Gulf War,” headed by Bessmertnykh (Yazov, Primakov, Kryuchkov).

I rewrote the draft statement on the Persian Gulf prepared for Gorbachev by the MFA. Returned it to Aleksandr Aleksandrovich.

Gorbachev sent my note on Polozkov to Ivashko, Dzasokhov, and Shenin, which really set me up. Although, he is playing an open game: if you have an opinion, don’t be afraid if the people against whom it is directed find out about it.

February 9, 1991

On my insistence, Gorbachev held a meeting of the Persian Gulf War group. Baker has already announced the course of action, and Mitterrand too. Everything in noble terms. Plus, Iran got active, ready to “get things done,” it offered its mediation. Our orthodox people raised a public outcry about the horrors of war. The subtext is obvious: Hussein is our ally and embodies the anti-imperialist forces, while we are betraying him.

Gorbachev was a little capricious about the text of the statement. He made mean jokes along the lines of “Chernyaev didn’t go far enough in editing the MFA text to ingratiate the Americans.” And then he stepped up the text precisely in this sense, adding that we are affirming our support of the UN Security Council’s resolution. Today the text will go on air. On the spot, Gorbachev decided to send Primakov to Baghdad. It would be a strong step, he said, not like Kryuchkov’s proposal to invite Aziz here again.

We speculated a little about the prospects of events. I shared the analysis of experts I had received recently. Overall, it looks like this: the war is ending. Hussein will surrender as soon as ground troops start advancing past Kuwait. It will look “honorable”—in the face of superior forces. Not capitulation! He is counting on appearing a hero in the Arab world. He dared to raise a hand against Goliath himself (?), so to say, and even hit Israel with some missiles.

Unreciprocated! He will get the airplanes back from Iran. The prisoners will be released home from Kuwait, though without weapons. And he will have an army again to continue ruling. Since the whole world will be dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict—it cannot be avoided—Hussein will be able to boast that after all these years of waltzing around the problem he made it move forward, making sacrifices for the “great Arab cause” and “for the glory of Islam.” We’ll see whether this view will be justified.

We decided to discuss the Warsaw Pact while we’re at it. In the morning, over the phone, I started to “kick back” Dzasokhov and Politburo’s idea, they were insisting on having another high-level PCC [Political Consultative Committee]—at the same level at which the Warsaw Pact was created (the underlying idea is to persuade the participants to save “something” for the future). I vehemently argued that this is an illusion. A PCC with Gorbachev would be the Warsaw Pact’s first-class funeral .This would mean shame, it would mean Gorbachev would once again expose himself to all kinds of Petrushenkos and Alksnises in the press and in the Supreme Soviet.

Bessmertnykh supported me at the group meeting. As a result, we quickly put together a telegram to the heads of Warsaw Pact states. Yazov grudgingly agreed. So we will bury it at the level of the MFA and the Ministry of Defense.

Yeltsin created a Presidential Council. “Russia’s intellectual powerhouse,” one newspaper wrote in rapture. He himself presents the brightest example of this intellectual power. All the participants of parliamentary struggles gathered over there. “Buffoons,” Ryzhov⁴ called them, adding that such “councils” existed under the tsar to speak the inconvenient truth.

The political significance of this latest initiative is to remove Gorbachev. After that, they will remove this pathetic, cowardly public, maybe even with the butts of rifles. And nobody will make a peep. It’s not yelping at Gorbachev for you! Maybe Starovoitova will stand up to them with her big breasts.

February 10, 1991

Yesterday, when we were sitting in the Walnut Room discussing the Persian Gulf War and the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev, as usual, went off on unrelated issues (many of them I’ve heard a dozen times before). But he did say one thing that’s worth noting—about military intervention in civil conflicts. Turning to Yazov, he said: “Remember when there was shooting in Riga at night between the special police forces and the Latvian people’s guard? Your and my telephones were ringing off the hook with calls from the government, saying there is bloody

⁴ Academician, future Ambassador in Paris, at the time a member of Gorbachev’s Presidential Council. [Author’s note]

murder going on, asking us to send in a military unit, to stop these developments! Neither you nor I took that step. And it was a provocation—to drag in the soldiers and then blame everything on the Center, on Gorbachev.”

February 11, 1991

Matlock visited me. He brought an alarmed letter from Bush to Gorbachev about our violation of the Treaty on Conventional Weapons (after signing it in Paris we “repainted” three land divisions into naval infantry with a thousand tanks). The problem came up in December, back when Shevardnadze was Minister. He was nervous about it. Incidentally, it was one of the reasons why he left. Bessmertnykh brought from Washington Baker’s protest and in my presence tried to convince Gorbachev that we have to resolve the matter, there’s no way around it. It was clearly a fuckup [*ob’ebalovka*], so to speak, on our side.

Also in December, I wrote a note to Gorbachev on this topic. He sent it for examination to Akhromeev and Moiseev. They kept saying that since the Americans refused to negotiate on naval armaments, what do they care now what we have there. When asked why we have a thousand tanks in Murmansk, they avoided the question with the generals’ usual “elegance.” And now Bush has gotten involved in the matter, qualifying this action as a blow to trust and the reliability of our signature on agreements in general.

While Matlock was over, I took the opportunity to open a lively discussion on the Baltics. I raised the issue to the level of the fate of the European process and the new world politics. He fended me off with hackneyed arguments. Overall, he is no Braithwaite, who recently sent me a quote from Turgenev, indicating the magnitude of his understanding of what is happening in our country.

I sent it to Gorbachev with a note: “Mikhail Sergeyevich! Look in what categories the British Ambassador Braithwaite sees our *perestroika*.”

“Dear Anatoly Sergeyevich,

I was recently reading I.S. Turgenev’s speech from 1880 in honor of Pushkin. It reminded me of what you said during our last meeting. I enclose a copy.

‘The living thing changes organically by growing. And Russia is growing, not declining. One need not try to prove that such development—like any growth—is inevitably tied to illnesses, painful crises, with most vicious, seemingly hopeless contradictions. We know this not only from general history, but even from the history of every individual. Science itself tells us about necessary diseases. But only obsolete or shortsighted people can be embarrassed by this, can mourn the old, relative calm and try to return to it and return others to it, even by force. In eras that are called transitional, the thinking man’s role, the role of a true citizen of his homeland is to move forward despite the path being difficult and often muddy, to go without for a moment losing from view those fundamental ideals on which the whole life of society is built. He is a living man in this society.’”

I immediately sent Bush's letter to Gorbachev with my commentary. Then I went to lunch. It turns out that in the meantime, he gathered the "interested persons" on this matter. They couldn't find me. Bessmertnykh, Kryuchkov, Yazov, and Moiseev discussed it and satisfied American demands. The usual story: to try and see whether impertinence might go unnoticed. And then we get offended that people do not trust us and always demand inspections.

February 12, 1991, Tuesday

Today I wrote a very "strong" (on a first-name basis) letter from Gorbachev to Kohl. He signed it without a single correction.

Gorbachev had a meeting with Dumas.⁵ M.S. spoke very frankly about our affairs. He spoke sharply against suspicions that he stepped away from the ideals of *perestroika*. He presented his version of events in Lithuania and Latvia, suggesting that Landsbergis and the Latvian leaders provoked "all of that" to put blood on the hands of the Center and save themselves from being overthrown like Prunskiene. He barely gave Dumas a chance to open his mouth. The latter threw in little spiteful questions, but Gorbachev ignored them.

Dumas left, Bessmertnykh and I stayed behind. Suddenly, M.S. announced that he is appointing Komplektov as ambassador to the United States. I brazenly asked Aleksandr Aleksandrovich whether it was his idea. He shook his head. M.S. interrupted: "It's my idea." I pointed out that Komplektov is a one-dimensional, small-caliber man, a petty official. This is not the kind of person we need in the U.S. right now. But once Gorbachev makes up his mind, you can't argue with him. I wonder who tossed this idea to him?

By the way, the Turgenev quote that Sir Roger Braithwaite sent to me—Gorbachev read it in "his circle" and asked them to guess the author. Bessmertnykh, Zaikov, Yazov, and Moiseev thought for a long time and finally all agreed that it is a modern, *perestroika* author. But the text is 110 years old.

February 15, 1991

Yesterday M.S. met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait. His name has many "Sabah's" [Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah]. He is a most cunning Arab. M.S. knows how to make an important international move in a simple way, for example, with the phrase: "I hope that in the near future Kuwait will again become a prosperous state..."

Today he met with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Velayati—smart, reserved, intelligent, but a Persian! Velayati barely said anything the whole time, only asked two "clarifying" questions in the end. He wrote down every word. Gorbachev won his confidence by sharing his concern that the Americans will deal with the region according to their own plans if they crush Hussein militarily and if the political factor is not added in time. Naturally, he found an "anti-American understanding" with his interlocutor. While yesterday, when he spoke with the Arab, he was full of conviction and unequivocal about the inviolability of our unity with the United

⁵ Roland Dumas, Foreign Minister of France between 1984-1986 and 1988-1993. [Translator's Note]

States against aggression, about the USSR's commitment to the UN Security Council's resolutions, etc.

The *New York Times* published an article on Gorbachev in the worst tradition of the past: he is a dictator, a liar, he's playing a double game in the Persian Gulf, tricked the Americans with disarmament, etc.

There is a scandal around Pavlov's statement in *Trud* ["Labor" magazine] that the Western financial capital created a plot to destroy Gorbachev through the influx of 50-100 ruble banknotes into our country. Gibberish?! Or maybe a special maneuver?

When I was speaking with Matlock, I tried to disassociate from Pavlov, saying that in the capacity of the President's adviser I don't have information to support the Premier's statements.

Shakhnazarov and I made a speech to Gorbachev on this account, demanding that he address this statement. M.S. remained silent. And Bessmertnykh in such affairs is, alas, no Shevardnadze.

February 18, 1991

I've gotten lost in the cobwebs of service. On Saturday a trio from the European Community was in Moscow—the ministers Michelis, Poos, and Van den Broek. They came to preach to Gorbachev about democracy and the Charter of Paris. But they got a counter-attack: are they not ashamed for believing that Gorbachev betrayed *perestroika*?! The ministers got confused, mumbled some banalities. However, the campaign to unmask Gorbachev persists in Europe. They don't want to hear any of his arguments. They have no doubt that there was an attempt to "restore order" in Lithuania and Latvia by force.

Today Aziz was here (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq). Gorbachev handled it masterfully. He outlined his plan for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. This time, Aziz did not make a peep. Gorbachev made it clear that Bush really does not want to appease Hussein. He wants strike him dead (for the morale, and considering the interests).

Gorbachev is trying to beat Bush on humanism, but by American standards it is worth nothing. We'll see whether Hussein will agree to his plan. One has to worry that the Americans might strike precisely during these days to foil the plan. But Primakov seems to have done his job. In his time, though, Shevardnadze also did all the right things by joining the UN Security Council's resolution and in effect reaffirming our agreement to military action should other measures fail.

Today I sent information to Bush, Kohl, Mitterrand, Andreotti, and others, on the outcome of the meeting with Aziz. M.S. assigned Bessmertnykh and Primakov to write it, but I ended up doing it.

Meanwhile, the intelligentsia press keeps saying that after the departure of Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Bakatin, Petrakov, and Shatalin, "nobody is left" in Gorbachev's circle. As though they wrote "*Perestroika*" (book), dozens of documents and speeches, including the UN

speeches, Congress speeches, the XIX Party Conference... where the New Thinking was formed and a new style of international relations emerged. Alas, everything is based on mythology, on vulgar journalists' symbolism.

I want to and will leave as a "gray shadow." Although, my soul has gotten so old that all of this no longer bothers me; all of it is empty vanity, except feminine beauty and great books. The other day I read in Rozanov, "Corporeal beauty is a terrible and powerful force not only in the physical, but in a spiritual sense as well."

On Saturday I got a whole stack of books on philosophy: Frank, Losev, Florensky, Yurkovich, Tkachev, Rozanov. I devour several pages from each book without any system. I'm amazed: on the one hand, I've never been a stranger to these thoughts (from my schooldays, from my Roshchinsky home); but on the other hand—our intelligentsia and our spiritual life were deprived of such wealth! And now the intelligentsia, without properly understanding the essence of this heritage, picks out from these great books passages to quote for cheap journalism. Only a handful of people are studying this seriously. For example, for several years the public shouted and demanded the publication of the collected works of Klyuchevsky, Solovyov, Karamzin and other great Russian historians. They were published, some even several times. But show me a single person (of course, not a specialist historian) who read even a couple volumes from these collected works?!

February 19, 1991

Today Yeltsin spoke live on air for 40 minutes. Prior to this, for a whole month there was talk of how he, the head of Russia, does not have access to central television. Thus, the country was at attention: he, the savior of Russia, would speak about prices, the referendum, the army, about all the most urgent issues. In his inarticulate style, roughly and clumsily, he did just that. But he promised to speak about the referendum later, right before the event. And then he read out what seems to have been the most important aspect, the reason why he was bursting to get a TV appearance—a text that seems to have been prepared by "Russia's intellectual powerhouse": Gorbachev is lying to everybody, his policies are against the people, he has the blood of ethnic conflicts on his hands, he ruined the country, he is guilty for the people's increasing poverty, he hasn't fulfilled any of his promises. Therefore, he, Yeltsin, is calling for Gorbachev's resignation.

Thus, the glove has been thrown from the highest position. He mentioned similar things before many times—in interviews with foreign newspapers, even on the radio, and to all kinds of leaflets created by the day-laborers of the leftist press. Now it was said "at the state level"—on behalf of Russia.

Yesterday in the vestibule, before the meeting with Aziz, M.S. got into a conversation with Ignatenko and me about Yeltsin. The gist of it is that Yeltsin's number is up. He can't get anything done and the people are already expecting things from him. He is running in panic. But even the people from his closest circles are walking all over him, cursing at him, and in the parliament they said that they will not be his herd of sheep, etc. Someone brought this info to M.S. Probably, Kryuchkov.

In a word, M.S. seems to have written Yeltsin off as a threat.

But Pavlov will bring him down before Yeltsin does. I just heard his replies and polemics at the Supreme Soviet on prices. He is smart and professional. The various parliamentarians are whelps to him. He despises them and strikes down any argument from them. He is a cynic, and unlike Ryzhkov does not try to hold on to his post. He could care less what they and “the public” as a whole think about him. He will do as he considers best.

Judging from the responses to our information on Aziz sent to Bush, Mitterrand, Kohl, etc., it looks like Bush at least is not satisfied with Gorbachev’s plan. It’s getting in the way of striking Hussein.

February 20, 1991

Today Gorbachev twice convened his “Privy Council” (Yakovlev, Bakatin, Medvedev, Revenko, Primakov, Shakhnazarov, Ignatenko, Boldin, and me). We discussed Yeltsin, advised Gorbachev not to get involved. It looks like he did not want to himself. As for the assessments, mostly people agreed that Yeltsin chose the moment to topple Gorbachev when people are on the brink because of prices.

All day today the USSR Supreme Soviet discussed Yeltsin’s speech (they have nothing better to do). They passed a condemning resolution. At the “Privy Council” there were thoughts that the Supreme Soviet of Russia should ask Yeltsin on whose behalf he spoke, and demand to convene a congress. There was a hint at possible impeachment. In a word, again there is a fuss because our democracy spewed some dregs to the surface... And again, mediocrity reigns.

In a demonstration against Gorbachev, the intelligentsia is slowly leaving the Party. I heard that the writer Baklanov already left.

February 22, 1991

Gorbachev called Washington today at 7:30 p.m. Baker was on the phone. They greeted each other. Baker spoke for a long time. Five-seven minutes later, Bush showed up and joined the conversation. Gorbachev told him that he was at an event to mark the anniversary of the Soviet army. There were six thousand people present. This is why he could not phone earlier. He said that Jim (Baker) outlined the position currently held by the U.S. administration in regards to what to do with Hussein. “I have a question,” Gorbachev said, “Is it true that the various resolutions to the situation we have been discussing with Iraqi representatives over the last 24 hours, that these ideas are unacceptable to the United States?” He listed the points of the plan that he pressed upon Aziz earlier, and which had been conveyed to Washington. This is the plan Jim had been reacting to.

1. Hussein immediately declares full and unconditional withdrawal of troops from Kuwait.
2. The withdrawal starts the next day after a cease-fire.
3. The withdrawal takes place strictly within a fixed timeframe.
4. After 2/3 of the troops are withdrawn, the economic sanctions against Iraq are lifted.

5. After the full withdrawal of troops, the causes of the UN Security Council's resolutions in effect disappear, and the resolutions are annulled.
6. The withdrawal is monitored by observers appointed by the UN Security Council.

The most difficult question is the timeframe for withdrawal. "You recall," Gorbachev said, "That I categorically rejected the six weeks first mentioned by Aziz."

"And now," Gorbachev continued, "I heard from Jim that none of this is acceptable. The question arises—what do we prefer, a political method or a military action, i.e. a ground offensive? In working with you, I saw my role in protecting the population and the soldiers from terrible casualties, while at the same time achieving strategic objectives—to eliminate the conflict. If you have the same position, then we have to find a solution that would be tough, but doable. If you make an ultimatum, you are paving the way for a military solution. If a political solution is unacceptable to you in principle, that is another matter. I think based on what we were able to achieve in Moscow with Aziz, and considering your suggestions, we could call a meeting of the Security Council and somehow integrate both plans (yours and mine) to find a political solution. We should do it urgently, within a day or two."

The most important thing, and I want to emphasize it right now, is that from the beginning of this conflict and until the last moment we stand together. We used all imaginable and unimaginable means, including the first phase of military action, to force Hussein to back down, to comply with the Security Council's resolution. And we achieved it. This is already a lesson to everybody. This is the new reality, which everyone—all potential aggressors and war mongers—will have to reckon with.

Thus, we have an opportunity to salvage the situation at the brink of its transition into the most difficult phase associated with a war on the ground. I think this already is a major victory. The world and the people of the United States, I think, will appreciate the actions of their president. And the fact that during the crisis we worked together not only with each other, but with other major partners, will mean it is a joint achievement also. Everybody will see that both presidents, while remaining steadfast in achieving their goal, nevertheless did not forget that the human life carries the highest value. I think you can be 80-90 percent sure that the entire world community would approve.

I repeat, right now there is every reason not to lose the chance for a political solution. Let us not succumb to pressure, let us not be nervous. There is pressure here, and in your camp, and all around the world. Our responsibility is very high, George. If right now we make a move to avoid further carnage in its worst form, it will be a major achievement for many years to come. These are my arguments; forgive me for my 'grandiloquence.'"

From the other side of the wire poured clarifications about Aziz and his ability to actually convince Hussein to completely withdraw. It seems that Bush was fervently arguing that this will not happen. M.S.' attempts to jump into the conversation were unsuccessful. After listening for 2-3 minutes, M.S. kept saying "George! George! George!" But the latter would not let up.

"I understand everything," Gorbachev said when Bush finally stopped. "We do not have different views on Saddam Hussein. His fate is sealed. And I am not trying to whitewash or justify him, to preserve his image, etc. But we both have to deal with him because he is a real active player who opposes us. We are not talking about Hussein's personality or his methods. We are talking about using what we achieved to curb his aggression—the enormous contribution to this effort by the United States and the American President—to transfer the solution of this issue into a purely political track and avoid a greater disaster and tragedy for a great number of people. This is the central issue. The prestige of our countries and ourselves, George, are locked in this matter.

I will convey your demands for Hussein through Aziz. But I repeat my final suggestion: let's maybe determine it right now, namely that we present a joint initiative to convene the Security Council and immediately start a review of the entire package of demands to Hussein. We have to squeeze everything we can out of him to force him to meet our requirements.

Remember, George, that our priority is collaboration with the United States within the framework of our responsibility to our own people and the world community. At this moment this responsibility is to resolve this conflict and achieve the goal while avoiding a catastrophe."

Bush again objected. Gorbachev told him that we are waiting for a new response from Baghdad (after the nighttime talk with Aziz). Therefore it is crucial right now to ask oneself: are we taking a course for a political or military solution.⁶

February 25, 1991, Monday

For the whole day on Saturday, February 23rd, Gorbachev (and we with him) was telephoning Bush, Major, Andreotti, Mubarak, Assad, Mitterrand, Kohl, Kaifu, Rafsanjani... Trying to convince them that Hussein will leave Kuwait, that he has no other options.

And nobody, including the people he is on close terms with, told him directly: "Don't fuss, Mikhail! Everything was decided two weeks ago. Nobody wants Hussein to withdraw, or more precisely, Bush doesn't want him to withdraw, and we can't stand in the way. He has to stay so we can arrange a modern-day 'Stalingrad' for him." They played games with him. Sometimes he felt it, but kept hoping that the New Thinking criteria would kick in, that trust means something. But no such luck! The logic of traditional politics was at work: where there is power, wealth, and interests, there is "right." And it was easy to find a moral cover for his, especially against Hussein.

⁶ Comment years later, post factum. Baker had called Bessmertnykh to inform him that the offensive had begun—the tanks started moving. From this we can once again conclude that when he and President kept up the discussion with Gorbachev over the phone, the decision had already been made. All orders had been given a long time ago. And the troops were on the "line of attack." The U.S. Administration's intention to use this opportunity to strike Hussein hard, at the same time showing all the Arabs and the world who is "running the show," had acquired a very concrete "content" in the headquarters of the armed services.

I do not think that Bush "did not care" about the fact that he was fooling "his friend Michael," after all, for some time they had led a "fair game." But the instincts of the "old thinking", well-coached in the Cold War, were still too strong. And after Gorbachev left, they were again decisive and dominant. [Author's Note]

Records of his telephone conversations are the swan song of new policy aimed at “a new world order.” As could be expected, he turned out to be a dreamer-idealist. He believed that humanity will become the core of world politics. And we, the people around him, also believed it, even if we doubted it at times.

In a word, Gorbachev passed the “test by Hussein.” The West did not pass it. Allah and the Christian God will note it for us. But that’s about it.

We are doomed to be friends with America, no matter what it does. Otherwise we’d again face isolation and everything will go haywire. The remains of *perestroika* would also be lost. Though today, when I advised Gorbachev not to respond to Hussein’s latest message, he said: “You are right. What is it now! It’s a new era. Even in our country it is already post-*perestroika*. All revolutions end in failure, even if they change the country, and some change the whole world.”

Late in the evening we dragged M.S. into Yakovlev’s office. Primakov, Bakatin, Ignatenko and I were already there. The conversation was lofty, but in the traditional Russian style of “Do you respect me? I respect you.”⁷ Gorbachev said many smart things, but I don’t remember them because I was drunk, though I held up well. For the first time he embraced me as a [World War II] veteran (and not just Yakovlev, as he has always done before). There was a reason: The Day of the Soviet Army.

In the morning I was again writing “Persian motifs;” though I didn’t go to work but got a courier to bring my work home.

On Saturday (before the calls to various capitals) Yakovlev and I were sitting with Gorbachev. Suddenly, right in front of us, he started signing decrees on presidential advisers. Yakovlev said to him, “You could at least call me a senior adviser.” I jumped in and suggested that Yakovlev should be called the “president’s representative for special assignments.”

“What is this position? Before whom would he be representing?” Gorbachev objected.

“But you cannot place Alexander Nikolayevich at the same level as, say, Ozherel’ev...”

“Come on, Tolya, the important thing is that we are still together. That is the most important thing.”

“But only you, I, and maybe a few other people know this important element. In society, however, people are judged by their position.”

My persistence didn’t work. He doesn’t want to identify himself with Yakovlev officially; he knows that it will be troublesome in the Politburo and that the Supreme Soviet—Gorbachev is sure of this—will not pass it.

⁷ A common phrase that invites drinking and toasting. [Translator’s note]

Then we started picking others, just advisers. Besides Zagladin and Akhromeev, Gorbachev named Medvedev, Osipyan, Abalkin, Aganbegyan. Then we started looking among the writers. He said, “I would take Baklanov, but I heard he left the Party the other day.” I suggested Shatrov. We discussed him and Gorbachev included him. I also suggested Dedkov from *Kommunist*, Gorbachev included him as well. Martynov, Yadov, Zhurkin—directors of academic institutes—also made it on the list. By the way, I think Velikhov is also on the list. But Brutents, whom Gorbachev promised to include a long time ago, was not included. Already a week ago Medvedev tripped Karen up.

February 26, 1991, Tuesday

During the day I was at home. Gorbachev went to Belorussia. I decided to give myself a day off. However, I did stop by work in the morning. It turns out that Hussein sent Gorbachev an “SOS!” He swears to leave Kuwait. He no longer calls Kuwait the nineteenth province of Iraq, and asks us to request the UN Security Council to stop the offensive. He reports that he will leave the city Al-Kuwait tonight; he even announced it on the radio.

Bessmertnykh called Baker. But what good is it now? At one point, Aziz demanded two months to withdraw troops, then six weeks, then some other amount. M.S. had agreed to 21 days, while Bush said one week, and three days later launched the ground offensive. Now Americans are acting as if “nothing is happening” and no matter what Hussein might say, they continue with their offensive. So it is! Power proved that it still makes real policy.

I walked around the dirty streets for a little while. Moscow is an appalling spectacle. Trash bins, mountains of snow, huge puddles, queues at every store. Milk will probably soon disappear completely: our milk processing plants don’t have the raw materials—imported milk powder (for hard currency). And our cows have no feed.

Burlatsky called. *Pravda* came down on him for the round table he held with Alekseyev and Shatalin: they want to create a social-democratic party within the CPSU... I thought, why are people always itching to do something? Can’t they see the incredible polarization and unprecedented atomization of society? People are thinking about survival. Right now, no party will be able to offer or do anything more than squabbles on the surface.

By the way, Primakov is quickly writing a pamphlet entitled, “A war that could have been avoided.” *Pravda* is starting to print it by chapter. Yesterday he called me:

“Can I read one page to you?”

“Sure.”

“... First it talks about the creation of the Crisis Committee headed by Gorbachev, with Bessmertnykh as deputy. The following people were included (he lists), including the President’s adviser Chernyaev... (He reads) ‘This person is always in the shadows. He must think that his position requires it. But in reality he plays a major role in international politics, in its development and implementation.’”

“Zhenya, please, take out that part. Gorbachev won’t like it. He had a disagreement with Shevardnadze over the same thing. He saw similar claims from him as from Yakovlev, who practically openly declared that Gorbachev is merely voicing the texts and carrying out the advice he gets from Yakovlev. This is not true, Zhenya! In essence it is not true. Not to mention, of course, that it is insulting to Gorbachev to hear something like that.”

Primakov argued noisily that he will not take it out. I started pleading with him, “Do it for the sake of our friendship!” He cursed, “Why did I ever call you!” But he promised to take it into account.

March 2, Evening, Gorbachev’s 60th anniversary

The day before, the women—two Tamaras and Olga—demanded that I write a birthday address from them, from the people who are here but are not officials... I kept putting it off, I was busy. Suddenly Shakhnazarov called me. He said, “I wrote something up, take a look.” I looked at it, and it was conventional stuff. So I dictated my text to Tamara off the top of my head. By coincidence, she came across a quote from Lincoln in a Carnegie book. I included it. She typed it up.

Yakovlev called, invited me to sign their address. It is mostly from the former members of the Presidential Council. Shakhnazarov and I hesitated, but signed their paper. In the morning, on March 2nd, we had to find a moment to “appear” before the birthday boy in a break between official congratulations. We got a chance when he stopped by his office in the CC after greetings at the Politburo. It turned out very sweet. He was moved by our message. He kissed all the girls, said something to each one and rushed to the Kremlin to continue the events.

Our top officials, ministers and others, gathered in the “TV room.” Lukyanov made a speech. Advisers and former members of the Presidential Council—Yakovlev, Bakatin, Primakov, Medvedev, Revenko, and some others—did not feel comfortable interfering there. Afterwards, he joined us in good spirits. He said, “Who is going to give the first speech?” Alexander Nikolayevich stepped forward. He opened his folder and started reading the text that Shakhnazarov and I barely decided to sign. After the first paragraph, M.S. took away the folder, closed it, put it on the table and, turning to the orator, asked him to speak freely. Yakovlev started to speak freely, but his impromptu speeches are always worse than his flowery texts.

M.S. hugged everyone and led us to the same room where he met with the senior officials. There was a table with drinks and sandwiches. We drank, a conversation got going. M.S. spoke well and a great deal. He spoke clearly, smoothly and profoundly, as he does when he is at his best and surrounded by understanding and sympathetic people (as often happens in the company of foreigners). Too bad I couldn’t take notes; our technology for recording such impromptu speeches is practically nonexistent.

Suddenly he said to me, “Anatoly, where is that address of yours?”

“It was left at your office.”

“Get it over here.”

I stepped out and told the couriers to bring the text from M.S.’ CC office with lightning speed. In ten minutes it was presented to Gorbachev.

He began reading it himself, with obvious pleasure. His glasses were not in his pocket, so I offered him mine. He laughed. “You see,” he said, “Chernyaev and I even see things through the same glasses.”

Boldin quipped: it’s a good text, almost as good as ours (i.e. the one Gorbachev did not listen to).

Here is the text:

“Dear Mikhail Sergeyevich!

This is not political congratulations on an anniversary. You will receive plenty of those from every corner of the world; most will be more sincere than not. This here is an expression of our admiration for you and, maybe, our astonishment (an anniversary allows you not to be shy in expressing feelings).

Usually in such cases we say “This mission has befallen you,” and corresponding words to follow. But in this case it is not quite true—you took this great historical burden upon yourself at great personal risk. You did it for your people, for the dignity and wellbeing of your country; you were moved by conscience and shame for the state to which our country was brought by your predecessors.

Six years ago it was difficult to imagine that you would be able to move this continent from seemingly dead-set rivets. We know that you foresaw what this might mean for such a country and for every family, for a rather drawn-out period. But this did not scare you, even though you do feel a tenfold sense of responsibility for everything that happens.

However, history, which is always right, has already entered you into its most significant pages. Nobody will ever be able to cross this out or cover it up. Though one of the most regrettable aspects of the current situation is that such attempts are taking place on a massive scale in your own homeland.

You seem to have learned to take it in stride. However, your temperament and liveliness of mind make it very difficult for you to restrain yourself from trying to explain, to persuade, and to appeal to common sense even in cases when it would be better to heed Pushkin’s advice: “do not argue with a fool.” Your trust and love for people often let you down. But this is because of your great soul. This trait also makes us in awe of you, same as your unpredictability, which is a trait at the heart of the Russian nation.

Hundreds of books and countless articles have been written about you, and thousands more will be written in the future. Allow us to make a comparison with another book, to indirectly give you some advice. For a long time, Abraham Lincoln also had to learn to ignore

the fierce criticism waged against him, until finally he said, ‘If I tried to read all the attacks against me, not to mention respond to them, I would have no time to do anything else. I am doing everything I can, absolutely everything, and I intend to continue to do so until the end. If in the end we succeed, then all attacks against me will be irrelevant. If we fail, then even if ten angels swear that I was right, it would not change anything.’

We entreat you to use this advice to save your energy and nerves to continue your great cause, which will inevitably win in the end. Everybody is going through a hard time. We, the people close to you, suffer with you at the defeats and rejoice at large and small victories. We are nourished by your amazing vitality and confidence that all obstacles can be overcome, that anything can be done if the goal is worth it. We are proud to belong to an era that will forever be associated with your name, and we are proud that fate has placed us at your side, to work for the country in an atmosphere of goodwill, spiritual openness, and intellectual demand that you create around you. The fact that we can say what is on our minds to ‘such superiors,’ and even hope that some of it will be taken into account, is already immensely satisfying. We trust you.

With that, we will win.”

We started dispersing. But then, an incident took place that could have implications for my relationship with Ignatenko and Primakov.

M.S. asked Primakov, “What is your Saddam up to, has he fled already or is he still putting on airs?” We talked. Yakovlev joined the conversation, “Mikhail Sergeyevich, Baker is going to the Middle East, and we should send one of our representatives to the region as well. Our presence should be felt; we shouldn’t give all the glory to America. And when Baker comes here, we will have our own notes. After all, the Arabs won’t tell him everything, and so on.”

I realized what was going on. The night before, Ignatenko presented this idea to me vividly, he is good at that. He suggested that Primakov loved the idea and of course he should be the one to go. Later, Primakov himself called me and suggested that we persuade Gorbachev. I mumbled, tried to make excuses, chimed in half-heartedly. I didn’t promise to approach Gorbachev with this, only if a good opportunity came up.

I immediately had suspicions and a bad feeling about this idea—it was a petty and fussy way to try to snatch up a piece of American victory. We would appear before the whole world as trying to “latch on to glory.” During the war, Gorbachev’s efforts were justified as humanism in the eyes of the world. In spite of Bush’s annoyance, he was trying to avoid new casualties and destruction, and he was defending the priority of peaceful means (in the spirit of new thinking). Now these motives are gone and our attempts would look pathetic. In a word, the idea seemed to me to be fussy and not respectable.

There was no way out, so I voiced my objections rather sharply. M.S. looked at me askance and asked uncomfortable questions. But he could not knock down my position. In the end, he said: “Indeed, why should we fuss? It will not be respectable. They will be fine without us. We did our duty.”

An awkward silence followed. In the evening, Bessmertnykh called and thanked me for shooting down this idea. By the way, Gorbachev told him about this episode, not without some spitefulness.

March 3, 1991

The week was quite varied. M.S. went to Belorussia to explain to the people “where we are” and “where he is,” what he plans to focus on (seems like on centrism, which he understands to mean common sense). As always, he is late... the positions have been finalized and it is difficult to combine them. Although, yesterday in a close circle at his 60th anniversary he analyzed the situation as follows: there are about 25 percent of “extremists” on both sides, and the rest could follow the “center,” i.e. in line with national self-preservation.

So, I used the opportunity while M.S. was gone and went to Uspenka...

In the meantime, the war came to an end. The “Persian Gulf emergency team” met without me (even without Gorbachev), as a mere formality. On the 1st I came back to work. A mountain of work piled up. The British ambassador came by with girl whose skirt was down to her navel (my grandson’s expression). The new Prime Minister John Major’s visit is coming up.

Afterward, I led a three-hour meeting with scholars and experts on the topic “What I would do if I were the director (i.e. president)”... There was once a column with that name in some newspaper during the stagnation years. I wanted to find out what they thought we should do after the resounding American victory over Hussein.

Two academicians were present—Simonia and Zhurkin, plus Brutents, Bovin, Galkin, Diligensky, guys from the CC International Department—Weber, Kuvaldin, Yermovsky, Malashenko, Likhotal. Overall it was amateurish; with few useful ideas that could be suggested for policy that I would not have myself thought to tell the President. But the majority of serious and sensible stuff came from Bovin, Kuvaldin, and other guys from the apparatus, not from the scholars-experts.

I recorded the meeting on tape.

March 5, 1991, Tuesday

All day yesterday I prepared materials for Gorbachev’s meeting with Major. But, he led the conversation according to “a different logic” and in his manner. It was optimistic, but with a warning that “you” (i.e. the West) could get someone else in this seat (i.e. at the Catherine Hall of the Kremlin), and you will regret it.

Major is a nice guy, tactful, smart, calm, natural, with no flourishes or arrogance that is usually inherent to leaders—this is British political culture. He will probably go far. A modern statesman.

Gorbachev hosted dinner in the luxurious Schechtel mansion on Alexei Tolstoy Street. A pretty setting.

In the evening M.S. spoke with Kohl over the phone. The German requested the call, to “congratulate himself” on the ratification of agreements on German unification.

March 8, 1991

Yesterday M.S. spoke for two hours at the Supreme Soviet, on various subjects. His speech was complex and confusing; he was presenting members of the Security Council. They are all senior officials—Pavlov, Yanaev, Pugo, Yazov, Kryuchkov, Bessmertnykh, plus Primakov, Bakatin and Boldin.

Primakov and Boldin did not pass the first voting round. After lengthy persuasions from the Chair, Primakov passed the second time around, gaining seven votes over 50 percent, but Boldin didn't make it the second time, either. Another slight to Gorbachev. After all, he is not dragging Boldin along for a good reason, but for “gratitude for his service and loyalty.” What kind of a Security Council or Cabinet of Ministers is this?! Besides two new faces, it is made up of the same people! Who is he going to “confer” with--Yazov? Kryuchkov? There is a conflict with department interests, plus they are not shining with brilliant intelligence, not to mention a fresh worldview.

In the meantime, a plenum of the RCP [Russian Communist Party] CC took place. Polozkov presented a scheduled report. So the “Party of Order” is fully formed, and it includes the “Black Colonels,” and... Gorbachev himself.

It is not based on Marxism-Leninism, though it does defend the Leninist legacy. It also does not reject the market, but recognizes class struggle. It is something that could appeal to tens of millions of “regular people.” Especially because they promise to “restore order.” It doesn't look like they plan to push it as far as civil war, but they are warning that a dictatorship might be “necessary.” Against this background, the mass media—from Korotich to Yegor Yakovlev—look like squealing intellectuals, grumbling in defense of *glasnost*.

A.N. Yakovlev called me, “appalled,” saying that nothing like this has happened since 1937. But no, this is different. Far from 1937. It looks more like a sign of the kind of polarization that could take us back to 1918.

Yakovlev is slighted. M.S. never did offer his candidacy for the Security Council... his excuse was that Yakovlev would not pass. Although, most likely he would have passed. M.S. simply does not want to publicly “stain” himself with Yakovlev—“the reformist, revisionist who broke up the Baltics and the Marxist-Leninist ideology, who gave the press into the hands of counterrevolutionaries.” Privately, though, he probably loves his “Sashka” and considers it dishonorable to turn away from him completely. After all, they started out together!

Yakovlev said yesterday, “I asked Eduard Amvrosievich why he made such a show at the Congress and left.” Shevardnadze said, “For a while now, I felt insincerity (from M.S.).” This is probably the case. From the beginning, he was somewhat dodgy, it is in his compromising nature. Yakovlev is suffering, saying that it's time to leave. “Remember,” he said, “M.S. was

selecting advisers with us for the president's group, which I was supposed to lead? That was the end of it. For the third week now, I haven't heard a word about it."

My friend Kutsenkov stopped by. He was in India for six weeks. He would like to be ambassador to India. I mentioned this to Bessmertnykh; he asked for a paper—an objective. Tol'ka has started looking after personal ambitions lately. Oh, this vanity! Yakovlev, and Primakov... all are in his power. It is embarrassing and sad.

March 10, 1991

In the evening, still at the dacha, I started preparing materials for the arrival of the Turkish President Ozal. M.S. called, hurried me along. In the morning on the 9th I came back to Moscow. Came to work. There I heard Yeltsin's speech over the radio, from the meeting of left-wing parties in the Palace of Cinema. The speech was completely unbridled: "The President is a liar, he is cheating everywhere. The CPSU is mobilizing. It is time to act to preserve democracy. You say I broke up the Union? That's a lie. The President let the Union disintegrate through his criminal policies. The Army? I support the army, but I object to it being used against the people," and more along this line. Right now there is a demonstration in Moscow in support of Yeltsin, with the slogans, "Down with Pavlov and his prices!" and of course, "Down with the President!"

In the evening I sat down to write a letter from Gorbachev to Kohl. Over the phone M.S. did not tell him about his request, but it is an "SOS," because hunger has already started in some regions, the Kuznetsk basin went on strike, also "Down with the President!" In the stores in big cities the shelves are empty, quite literally. M.S. is asking Kohl to help immediately—to make the banks give us some credit, and also to give us a cash advance under the mortgage of military equipment that is being left behind by our troops leaving Germany. The letter has been sent.

The collapse is approaching. The March 17th referendum could serve as a detonator.

March 14, 1991, Thursday

On Monday, M.S. gathered the advisers in the Walnut Room, including two members of the Security Council (Bakatin and Primakov), plus Boldin. He held such a meeting for the first time. He put everyone on the same level... to Yakovlev's increasing despondency, whom he thereby made equal to Ozherel'ev and Yegorov.

Judging by this meeting, M.S. is growing more and more petty, and becoming more irritable. And he is less informed. It turns out, there exists an "Information Department," headed by Boldin, about which nobody knew until now. I discovered this by accident, when the "girls" brought me some paper that mentioned it. I became curious and found out that this department makes daily reviews for the President. I asked Boldin to show me at least one example of these reviews. He sent it to me, with a note "Please return." This explains a great deal. This is an ultra-biased, totally Brezhnev-style review of the press and cables. This is where Gorbachev gets his petty offenses, where he gets his "conclusions" and assessments of recent events.

He gave his assistants and advisers (whom M.S. equalized in salary) each 4-6 consultants, while members of the Security Council got 8 consultants plus two secretaries. Yakovlev lost a consultant and his secretary. This is one more sting, one more insult! One gets the impression that M.S. is pushing Yakovlev to resign "on his own volition."

Overall, it was a pointless and rather tactless meeting, where Gorbachev swore to us that he will not turn back, but also ordered to serve only him. If someone wants to act differently, he should leave. And if he notices that someone is acting the wrong way, he will ask him to leave.

I butted in (immediately remembering my audacity in relation to the battalion commander in 1942): "So, Mikhail Sergeyevich, disagreeing with you is no longer allowed?" He gave me a long look, but did not deign to answer.

Yesterday I sent him a note: following Baker's instructions, Matlock is organizing a "Party meeting." He is inviting presidents of the Union republics and the chairmen of their Supreme Soviets to the embassy. And they already started up their airplane engines! What an embarrassment! M.S. was furious. In the morning he ordered Bessmertnykh and Dzasokhov to get on the phone. He also started calling the capitals of the republics. We succeeded in thwarting Matlock's "event." And I, by the way, had to "explain" to Yakovlev, Bakatin, and Primakov that it would not be the best idea for them to go there.

But what impudence! I don't understand whether we have a different mentality, a different take on ethics, that we can't understand what's normal for Americans. Or is this a conscious rudeness of victors over Hussein, when they no longer need Gorbachev or the "European process."

The issue of the "naval infantry" (our carrying out the Agreement on Conventional Weapons in Europe) is still unsolved. M.S. does not delve into the matter. Though, this is the case for everything nowadays. For example, he did not prepare for the meeting with Ozal and was boring and banal despite his interlocutor's enthusiasm about the "Black Sea Economic Community" and his readiness to provide telephone service to all the Soviet villages...

He is suffering from vanity (despite everything!) and he is worn out by the internal political scandals, the persecution. It seems like he is tired "strategically"⁸... And he doesn't leave, because he missed the best time, when he could have left with respect and glory.

Lukyanov is the cleverer one, though. In *Komsomolka* he said: "We did what we could. We tore this continent off its chains." Let others finish the job. This is what I wrote to M.S. in his 60th anniversary greeting.

Yesterday he, Yakovlev, and Shakhnazarov were composing a speech for a TV appearance on the referendum (to keep the Union). In the evening he asked me to look at what they came up with. I re-wrote it, it was too perfunctory. In the morning, after a tempestuous outbreak in reaction to Baker's "action" (the abovementioned "Party conference" at the American

⁸ According to Mao Zedong, one can be tired "tactically," or "strategically." [Author's note]

embassy), he sat down with Shakhnazarov and Kravchenko to re-dictate his TV speech. I don't know what he'll use from my version, and what he will retain from yesterday's silliness, like the reference to Yaroslav the Wise...

Izvestiya carried an article by Latsis called "Masks." He writes very accurately about what is happening in the so-called social movements: public consciousness has been emasculated... What can one say if the refined cultural elite at the Palace of Cinema applauds the commonplace, vulgar, semi-literate, boorish "leader"! Who will believe that they do not understand who stands in front of them? This means the elite wants this? But does it itself know, for what?

March 17, 1991

The referendum: "Our Motherland--to be or not to be?" In reality, phrasing this question in such a way is yet another example of demagogic. There will be nothing, no matter what the results of the referendum.

The second question of the referendum has to do with a President of Russia. If it is not Yeltsin, why not?

Baker visited M.S. on Friday. He acted as if nothing had happened, as if it were last November or December. But this is thanks to Jim, who knew that he did something wrong, and immediately took a conciliatory course. And M.S. had been putting together some material to present to him, to say that he is engaged in some subversive activities over here. In reality, Kryuchkov is the one conducting subversive activities, either out of stupidity or in the line of duty. M.S. is very susceptible to the things, which that department produces. I think I put together a pretty good report on the meeting with Baker. M.S. was inspired and voluble. He spoke like in the olden days.

Yesterday I was preparing materials for the meeting with Genscher. In the meantime, we "stole" Honecker. I don't understand it. I, the president's adviser, found out about it from the radio, even though it started back in December (Yazov and Kryuchkov's first note, which M.S. had ignored back then). Why should we smear ourselves with this? How is this going to look with new thinking? We abducted a citizen of a foreign country, plus one who is on trial? Apparently, Kohl didn't know anything about it. But he did not say anything. Actually, for them it is probably good riddance. Still, it is too impudent. What about the sovereignty of already-united Germany, aspiring to the status of a great power?! I don't know how M.S. is going to make excuses for this one.

March 20, 1991

What happened this week? On Monday we had Genscher. He barely touched the subject of Honecker, just enough for a checkmark. Not a shadow of indignation, no demands. I guess they are happy with such an arrangement. Let the Russians get smeared with their piece of shit one last time, so to say.

One gets a real sense of history when talking with the Germans, a sense of irreversible transition to a new era, historical moments are passing into history. I had a similar feeling when I was present at M.S.' interview for *Der Spiegel*. But there is another, sadder, observation: Gorbachev is repeating himself. Words, phrases, examples, trains of thought, arguments that were shocking in 1986 and still impressive in 1988, now sound like standard blather. He is stuck in his discoveries; he hasn't evolved at all, especially since *perestroika* went into a gallop. He used to read articles and even books that became available through the freedom he made possible. He read and tried to discover in them something relevant to him, and he developed himself. But when things went downhill, he started seeing any new thought as opposition, as something aimed against him. And he is becoming intellectually impoverished and hardened. He has become monotonous and dull in politics... He is looking for ways to avoid change. How could one stay ahead of the curve this way!

Right now everyone is asking about the outcomes of the referendum, about the framework and general concept of sovereignty. He has not once mentioned that he might allow someone to leave the Union. He is making excuses about the "constitutional process" and legality... And no reaction when Baker advised him to make a speech after the referendum and say, "Republics, you are free. I am letting you go." Then all the talk of divorce and remarriage would follow a normal course. But no, he continues to repeat that "we are indivisible." He said it again today, despite the fact that at the referendum, Russians practically voted against the empire.

Yes, he has exhausted himself intellectually as a politician. He is tired. Time has passed him by; his own time, created by him.

We are busy with the program for his visit to Japan. Dunaev is "enriching" him and Raisa with knowledge. Raisa keeps changing the lists, throwing out people who ever said any word against M.S. But the most "interesting" part is that there is still no "concept" of the visit--will he give them the islands or not? And without this "concept" there is no point in going.

Yeltsin was at the Putilov factory. Live on Leningrad TV. He was vulgar, petty, confusing, muddled, impudent, and his whole message was directed against Gorbachev. But he presented himself triumphantly. The working class, the Leningrad aristocracy of workers, gave him a standing ovation. They joined him in a chorus, chanting "Gorbachev must resign!"

All things can be explained. But I still cannot understand why Gorbachev inspires such unbridled and irrational hatred. Probably a politician, especially a reformer, cannot be dodgy, cannot be inconsistent, and it is ill-advised to sermonize to the people.

In a word, he lost as a politician. He will remain in history as a messiah, and their fates are always the same.

By the way, yesterday when Augstein (publisher of *Der Spiegel*) was saying goodbye, he said that he wished Gorbachev luck in his "great work--like Lincoln in America." But, the German continued, "I do not wish you his fate." Very tactful! But, I think, M.S. did not notice the slip.

March 24, 1991

Yesterday Gorbachev gathered a group at the Kremlin to discuss our position before the visit to Japan (Yanaev, Yakovlev, Bessmertnykh, Boldin, Falin, Rogachev (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), myself, and, of course, Primakov).

The Foreign Ministry suggested returning to the formula from 1956. I said that having studied a bunch of analyses and brainstorming sessions from the institutes, I came to the conclusion that we will have to give them the islands eventually. The question is when and how. If you don't do it, Yeltsin will. He will become president of Russia and he'll do it—to the applause of the Russian people. You remember how you were afraid that the Russian people would not forgive you, or any politician, the smallest step that could be interpreted as destruction of the empire. And now Yeltsin is openly and impudently collapsing the Union—the empire. And, incidentally, the Russians are the ones giving him standing ovations.

M.S. replied, "I'd be very happy to give this mission to Yeltsin." Then he kept talking and admonishing us for a long time, and in the end decided not to give away the islands. He leaned toward veiling the issue in pretty words and to promise a "process"—a favorite word of his from his "theory of compromise," which brought us here... It is boring.

Of course, we started talking about Yeltsin's speech at the Putilov factory.

Gorbachev started out with a question: "Should we show this speech on Channel 1 on TV? The people will see it and realize what pit Yeltsin is dragging the country into." I strongly objected. If we show this impudence, this insult, these chants of "President must resign!" on TV, then people will be completely convinced that there really is no authority, at least in the central government if such things are allowed. They will assume that one can wipe his feet on the President.

Gorbachev complained that in no other country are the mass media allowed to sneer, jeer, insult the President, and lie like this. He said that he will stand until the end. And what are these democrats, he said, who appeal to the mob, to the "mine" (referring to the miner's strike), who, supposedly for the people's sake, destroy everything created by the people, etc. etc.

All these arguments are stemming from his helplessness and maybe a feeling of doom. Gorbachev no longer has a position or a policy that would be adequate for the present moment. And where would he get one? (The advisers also cannot offer anything). Yeltsin and his "democrats" don't have a policy either. All they have is lust for power.

For three days M.S. spent hours going over his TV speech on the outcomes of the referendum. At the same time, he is completely disconnected from the real reaction to this referendum. Plus, no matter what he says, nobody cares anymore. The only thing that would bring a reaction right now would be his resignation. But even that would fade very quickly (that's what happened with Ryzhkov, so quickly!). He would turn into an object for historians, who will "pay homage" to him (and even in this, only the Western historians at first). Our historians will again rewrite history according to the situation.

March 25, 1991, Monday

I persuaded M.S. to meet with Matlock. It turned out to be a good conversation, very sincere. M.S. said that he wants to be close with Bush, and wants Bush to remain close with him. He values his position. He wants everyone in the U.S. to know about the USSR (let the special services do their job). He praised the Ambassador, but asked that U.S. refrain from outlining its position on our domestic woes.

Still, all of this isn't what we need. How much time did he spend preparing his speech for TV? Shakhnazarov, who had been ill and only later saw what they came up with, was appalled and rejected the text. "Our President has not been given such dull mediocrity before. And you know, the trouble is that M.S. no longer senses that it is dull... He is losing the feeling for the audience's reaction... He must be completely lost. He assigned me to prepare a speech for the Russian parliament?! I will get it done, but I will protest against him speaking there. He already once helped Yeltsin to become Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Now he's going to help him become President of Russia."

I cried out, "One has to be completely oblivious to the situation to go to the Russian parliament right now and speak against Yeltsin, to the hooting of the crowds. They will catcall him... or a fight will break out between the deputies!"

Shakhnazarov replied, "M.S. is sure that he will not allow Yeltsin to become President. In the meantime, March 28th could be the beginning of the end, if Yeltsin calls for a general political strike... Essentially, it was already started by the miners, metallurgists, Putilov factory workers, etc. And if Moscow goes on strike, you and I won't be here on Thursday."

As for myself, I am even curious to see what would happen. Something like that might take place. We will be left without a pension even, they will say, "Go get your pension through the Presidential apparatus," which will be gone by then. No matter! I could sell books and albums, I'd get by. Although, sitting here in our big offices, behind doors guarded by KGB officers, we have lost touch with reality. The kind of sense of reality you feel with your skin. Society is on the verge of explosion... Who will start shooting? A Romanian option is quite possible...

What is to be done, what is to be done? I am beginning to develop an idiosyncrasy [*idiosinkaziya*] for newspapers. I am sick of this intellectual political poison. But I cannot distract myself with classics... too anxious.

March 29, Friday

It has been a week to remember... the RSFSR Congress... and Gorbachev's ban on Moscow demonstrations in support of Yeltsin (after his Leningrad escapades!). The Moscow City Council condemned the ban. All the press, including *Izvestiya*, condemned the ban. The RSFSR Congress that started yesterday morning also condemned it... They made an orgy of it. They sent Khasbulatov to speak with M.S. But he did not back down. He told Khasbulatov that troops will be removed tomorrow, but today they are staying and I will not allow any

demonstrations in downtown Moscow! The Congress was “indignant,” as was the USSR Supreme Soviet (Sobchak from the Interregional Group suggested drawing up a resolution...) The Congress suspended its work...

Meanwhile, the streets were flooded with troops, police, blocked with trucks...

My car was not allowed past Moskvoretsky Bridge... I boiled over inside: how is that, not to allow the car of the president's adviser to pass! But I did not say anything and presented my documents, which were studied at length. And I proceeded to work on foot. The same thing when I was going from work to the metro! But when I calmed down, I realized [the significance of this] and approved [of the action]... Whether Gorbachev did the right or wrong thing, once he banned demonstrations he had to follow it through to the end. Otherwise he would have lost everything. And in general... it worked. Demonstrations were localized and there were no casualties, no confrontations. To my great surprise, the Congress heard a rather constructive and “conciliatory” speech from Yeltsin today about the “Situation in the country—Russia.”

Yakovlev called in the morning. He cannot get over Shevardnadze's laurels. He feels that he should have done the same, “remained in history” at the right time! Vanity! He fancies himself the author of *perestroika*, the “author” of Gorbachev himself. And here he is—an adviser, his salary reduced by 400 rubles and the boys removed from his waiting room. He laments...

He told me, “I was walking down the street yesterday, between the military trucks, and I was embarrassed. We are regressing, going back to all the familiar things... it was all for nothing, etc.” I made a half-an-hour speech in response.

The gist of it was: if you plan to remain in politics, think in political terms. The opposition has all the means to use democracy to the end (up to forming a new government). M.S. finally said this openly in his interview. Yeltsin has had plenty of praise and glorification. Ninety percent of the press is on his side. But that's not enough for them; they want to show their force through mass actions. Well, M.S. still has means to counteract their force. And he did. Or, the other possibility is that the opposition has been acting until now (I'm hoping this will change with Yeltsin's report today) based on the principle of forcing its policies, which meant destroying the country. But then we would have no place to implement policies. Yes, M.S. made many grave—not tactical but strategic—mistakes. Right now we are no longer talking about *perestroika*, but about saving the country. If you do not save it, if you allow the State to be destroyed...

Yakovlev: “What? You mean use force against those who don't want to stay?”

I: “On the contrary. One of M.S.' fatal mistakes was not letting Lithuania, and then Georgia, go right away. I repeat, this is what created the festering in the entire organism. No! I am talking about the State that can still be preserved...”

Yakovlev: “But still, should we use the army again?”

I: "There is no State without an army."

Yakovlev: "But we shouldn't rely on the army?"

I: "Then on what?"

Yakovlev: "On democracy..."

I: "Where is it? Where is democracy? What does it consist of? This swamp elite... these mounds, which disappear from under your feet. We do not have democracy. We have *glasnost*, freedom, which in the Russian interpretation means practically lawlessness [*vol'nitsa*]. Democracy means an organized society: parties, institutions, rule of law, respect for the law. Democracy means leaders competing to be in the government, not struggling against the State!! Where is it here? And what is the President supposed to rely on in his attempts to save the country?!"

He continued to whine. This person is finished in politics. He is plucked, he lost his political coordinates.

Meanwhile, a catastrophe is approaching. On Monday M.S. convened the Security Council (seating arrangements—Yakovlev, Medvedev, Revenko at the main table, even though now they are supposed to be on the same level as Chernyaev, Zagladin, and Ignatenko, who sat along the wall).

M.S.: "In 2-3 months there we will not be able to feed the country, even though there is bread in the country. The situation is similar to 1927. Think on it. We will convene again on Saturday (i.e. tomorrow!) and see what people come up with."

Moskovskaya Pravda printed yesterday... An "Experimental Creative Center" on three pages, depicting an image of practically inevitable doom for the country, which is even more than an empire, it is a civilization, like Rome, Byzantium, the Great Mongols, Babylon, etc. The "seventh" version for salvation [sic] is the weakest point in this powerful analysis of the essence and consequences of *perestroika* and 73 years [of the USSR]. Yes! The seventh option, it's another scheme... I read it twice... I will tell M.S. to read it too. He needs to know where he and the others stand.

We started writing speeches for Japan. Ozawa was here... M.S. did not "give" him anything and made no promises. Why are we even going? Nothing will happen. It's not even that we won't get a billion for the islands. But we will not even be able to develop them. Nothing fits!

M.S. keeps making speeches. First at the Agrarian Front (same stuff as two-three years ago), then at the All-Army Party Rally. The army, the army! The last thing left.

March 31, 1991, Sunday

Yesterday the Security Council met. The problem of food... But now more specifically—bread. We are 6 million tons short of the average norm. In Moscow and other big cities, bread

lines are similar to the ones we had two years ago for sausage. If we don't procure it somewhere, we could have hunger by June. Out of the republics, only Kazakhstan and Ukraine (barely) can sustain themselves. The idea that there is bread in the country turned out to be a myth.

We've scraped the bottom of all the barrels to find some cash and credits to buy [grain] from abroad. But we are already insolvent. Nobody will give us credit; all our hopes are on Roh Tae-Woo (M.S. agreed to stop on Jeju Island on the way back from Japan, to speak with the President of South Korea about a 3 billion credit)... There is still hope that Saudi Arabia might come through. Looks like Kuwait is refusing, though Faisal promised Gorbachev all kinds of gratitude for supporting them against Iraq.

Discussion at the Security Council is the same as two years ago at the Politburo. Instead of arriving with prepared calculations and suggestions and immediately starting to work on solutions, for six hours we sat figuring out what we have and where we can get some. M.S. was sitting with a pencil and questioning people, while the ministers and Security Council members got confused in conflicting data.

And again: the government (before it used to be the Politburo) has to find everything and distribute it! Two-three years ago we already saw the fallaciousness of this approach against the background of our stated intention for market reform. But we are incorrigible! And M.S. is the same.

Yeltsin presented his program at the Congress of People's Deputies. Now you can no longer say that the opposition does not have a positive program and therefore it cannot compete with us (only a few days ago M.S. repeated this in a TV interview yet again!). The program is clever, thorough, and impressive.

But everything is falling apart... Because the most important thing for the opposition is to realize the Russian referendum and elect Yeltsin as president. It has come down simply to a vulgar quarrel. But they are getting away with it because it is presented as part of an uncompromising attitude towards Gorbachev. Even those who are against Yeltsin are demanding Gorbachev's resignation. An indicative example of this is Isakov (from "the six" who, headed by Goryacheva, spoke for Yeltsin's resignation at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet). Isakov was making a report, and by the way mentioned, "I am for both Yeltsin and Gorbachev's resignation. I would be happy if Gorbachev was given some honorary diplomatic post."

M.S. had included Isakov in his Japan delegation. When he found out about the speech, he asked me: "When he said that Gorbachev should resign, what was the reaction, was there tumultuous applause?" "Yes." "And when he suggested the diplomatic post, were people also applauding?" "Yes..." He immediately ordered Isakov to be removed from the delegation. And that's all there is to it. These are all the means the President has available.

March 31, 1991, Sunday evening

I went to visit N.N. She is still sick and asked me to buy some bread. Mikhail Mikhailovich and I drove around all of Moscow, starting with Maryina Roshcha. All the bakeries

are either closed, or the shelves are terrifyingly, absolutely empty. Not a piece of bread! Moscow hasn't seen anything like this probably in all of its history, even during the hungry years. They say this is happening because the prices are going to go up. But you can't buy bread in advance. On this day probably nothing was left of Gorbachev's image. He is spiraling down catastrophically, already below zero. After all, everyone, even a well-wisher, can only say one thing when looking at this—that's where he brought us with his *perestroika [doperestroil]*!

Poptsov published a mean article about Gorbachev in *MN [Moskovskie Novosti, Moscow News]*. He writes: "Shevardnadze made a choice between power and integrity, and he chose the latter." Alright. But what is power for Shevardnadze? Material wealth, luxurious accommodations, popularity, an "image" obtained through Gorbachev, who put him in that post and gave him new thinking policies to work with. Eduard Amvrosievich's actual power (i.e. his authority and subordination) applied only to the Smolenskaya-Sennaya. That is the only thing he lost when he "chose integrity." Everything else remained with him.

Now to consider integrity and honor. Yesterday Shevardnadze made an appearance in the TV show "After Midnight" (he gives interviews practically every week now). He was talking about fundamental mistakes, complaining about the "military equipment" on Moscow streets on March 28th.

Alright! You, Eduard Amvrosievich, made these fundamental mistakes together with Gorbachev. But you left him alone to pay for them, while you are sitting comfortably in front of reporters, or talking with your Western politician acquaintances at your house. Or you are philosophizing about what would have been, had this or that happened, etc. You are condescendingly "patting M.S. on the shoulder," saying that he may still be useful to the country. So you did not want to get dirty at the most difficult time, when "glory" could have disappeared, and you decided to "catch the moment" and remain as a good guy in history. You call this integrity? Is this the honor of a Caucasian man?!

Maybe he is really aiming for presidency after M.S.? A presidency like Weizsacker's, when you don't have to do anything, don't have to answer for anything, you just show off in front of the world and the liberal intelligentsia, confirming yourself as a historical figure. Possibly...

Maybe Yakovlev should follow Shevardnadze's example. It seems that is what tortures Alexander Nikolayevich—that he missed the right moment. He would have been at rest as the initiator of *perestroika*, the "father of Russian democracy," and a "giant of liberal thought." Ugh!

No! I would prefer to be in my "statute," to stay with the captain on a sinking ship. And to feast in time of plague, with our beloved women!

April 2, 1991, Tuesday

After several days of hesitation, M.S. suddenly decided to receive Nixon. Last night we started looking for him, but couldn't find him. M.S. condescended: "Fine, tomorrow at 2p.m."

He sat with Nixon for an hour and a half, arguing that our course is unchanged, but that we need to stabilize events...

Perhaps it was inevitable to speak with Nixon. After all, he presented himself as Bush's envoy and traveled to Lithuania and Georgia, he met with everyone.

I was sitting with them, recording, and thinking that M.S. is acting on his own and doing "what's required;" the RSFSR Congress is also acting on its own and putting on a brutal show for the whole country; the miners are acting on their own and ruining our economy. The working class (the hegemony) does not give a damn about anything! All of this is just one more example of the collapse of Marxism-Leninism, of Communism, of the myth of the "historic mission" of the working class.

All of this is depressing. It is time to write speeches for Japan, but I have neither "inspiration" nor any thoughts... My "ability" dried up because the policy dried up. All that's left of it are verbal husks. New thinking has done its job; and now... same as in the internal *perestroika*, what was begun by Gorbachev is continued by the Americans as they create "their" new world order.

My presence alongside M.S. is becoming pointless. There is no momentum... But it is shameful to flee, even though I am tired—not so much from work as from the realization of a dead-end and defeat. Although... We've done so much through "new thinking"... But, that is in the past.

April 9, 1991, Tuesday

M.S. is still bustling. He is preparing the economic program with Pavlov. Today they were talking the whole day, sat at a session of the Federation Council... Yeltsin, having led his "triumphant" Congress and received emergency powers (though *Izvestiya* wrote that nobody understands anymore exactly what that means), has left for the Caucasus resort "Krasnye Kamni" to play tennis...

The country is heaving with the cry, "Down with Gorbachev!" Miners continue to strike... Following Minsk, all of Belorussia presented the same demands. Yesterday I read information from a dozen cities around the country; they are all on the eve of strikes.

In a word, things are coming to a general political fallout.

M.S. was brilliant, sincere, direct (almost to the point of cursing) at his meeting with miners—a momentary flash of his former charm... Everything is going to hell...

Meanwhile, I & Co. continue to feverishly prepare for Japan. The Ambassador was here yesterday... I conveyed M.S.' message (on Sunday he called me at Uspenka) that he, as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the author of the idea of a world without nuclear weapons, cannot avoid going to the sites of atomic bombings... (The Japanese really did not want this to happen, so as not to offend the Americans). As a compromise, M.S. agreed to change Hiroshima for Nagasaki. He renewed his agreement to visit Roh Tae-Woo on Jeju Island, on the way back from Japan.

In a word, he is going to be showing that “things are going as usual,” and the President is doing his work no matter what...

He rejected the calls to include people in the delegation from among Yeltsin’s appointees. He chose Isaev... The dullest one, but one of Yeltsin’s opponents (his deputy as Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet).

I am reading Artsybashev (*Sanin*). I’m even a little “disappointed” in comparison to my reaction to him when I was in school. Almost classics: Kuprin, L. Andreev, even Chekhov... And no pornography in the modern sense... But that is not even the point. The point is that unlike so many generations “after me,” I’ve known about Artsybashev since my school days. Same with Sologub, Merezhovsky, Gippius, not to mention Blok... Our “Serdey”—the literature teacher—managed to initiate us into everything, though we could not always get our hands on the works themselves. Though many times we did get hold of them.

I am outraged at the ineptitude, unprofessionalism, and shabbiness of the materials produced by the MFA and others for the Japan visit (and for other occasions as well). Except now I’m pressed for time, plus I’m sick. But everything came down to me, again.

April 21, 1991, Sunday

About the visit to Japan. On the 14th we flew to Khabarovsk. Two nights and a day. On the 15th M.S. “discussed” with the local leaders possible ways out of the crisis. His meetings with the most active leadership was broadcast on TV for four hours. These men, who don’t want to (and don’t know how to) do away with the administrative-control style of government. The most impudent and primitive of them was the representative of the executive committee Danilyuk. Nevertheless, M.S. took him to Japan.

The city: old-style wooden houses. The streets have a provincial look... And plenty of goods in the stores! Moscow hasn’t dreamed of anything like this in a long time. They have three systems to distribute products: coupons, cooperatives, and commercial trade. There are no queues, no crowds in stores.

The facial features people have here—long or sharp noses—indicate they are the descendants of Ukrainian immigrants.

On Tuesday the 19th we flew to Tokyo... The first impression is the unnatural quality of their ultra-modern cities, as if they are somehow lifeless.

I did not go to a single reception or public meeting. I was only at the talks, which took up a solid twelve hours. At night or during breaks I prepared press releases and drafts for the next round. There were a total of seven.

It is impossible to convey the gist of the visit in the diary. It is in the records... Maybe for the future, for memoirs. There was a very uncomfortable feeling when the President of the superpower and the Japanese Prime Minister would argue for hours whether to use the verb-form

of a word or the noun.⁹ And this at a moment when everything is about to collapse! On the other hand, maybe it's good to "create an appearance" that the President is doing his job, no matter what?

We took a train to Kyoto, traveling at 250 km/h. M.S. had a banquet with the business world there. One of my classmates from Moscow State University was there as a translator, an unexpected meeting!

The flight to Nagasaki... the beauty of the bays. The road into the city at dusk was a fairy tale... The crowds in the streets were like Germany, America, Finland... Maybe a little smaller than in Italy! This was worth the visit (Dunaev did well by insisting that we stop here). It was especially "interesting" against this background that Yeltsin was shown the door in Strasbourg.

[We visited a] Russian cemetery from 1905. For some reason I am not moved in the depths of my soul by such things. I am not touched by it. I guess I am a deeply irreligious person, nontraditional. Metropolitan Pitirim, whom Gorbachev took in the delegation with him, is a beauty. Hallelujah in the chapel.

At night we flew to Jeju Island in South Korea. At the airport there was a scene because of Tamara and Dunaev. Security guards and the people with our protocol announced, "You are not expected!" I became exasperated and put them in my car. But the matter did not end there. When we got to the hotel, it turned out that they did not have rooms.¹⁰ I went into a rage and threw a loud scandal to the chief of security Plekhanov, and the chief of protocol Shevchenko, in the presence of their subordinates and the Koreans. However, they could not find a room. I put Dunaev in my room. And, "in protest" (against whom?) I did not go to the official evening reception given by President Roh Tae-Woo.

As soon as the reception was over, Gorbachev burst into my room. Dunaev barely had time to block with his broad shoulders the view of numerous empty little whiskey and gin bottles that Dunaev and I drank together with Tamara and Olga (Lanina, from the Secretariat of the President). Olga was lying on my bed. Tamara was bent over a typewriter, which stood on a chair—there was no other place to put it in my "apartment."

The scene, as Ostap Bender used to say, was worthy of the brush of Aivazovsky.¹¹ But M.S. immediately "assessed" the situation: "Aha! Now I see why Chernyaev did not show up at the reception. He is much cozier here than listening to those boring speeches, one of which he

⁹ Prime Minister Kaifu insisted that the communiqué contain the formula "stated in the Declaration" (Soviet-Japanese from 1956). Gorbachev resisted through "stylistics" ("it was declared..."). The point was that the Japanese cleverly wanted to "tie down" Gorbachev by mentioning the 1956 document, in which the islands were promised to them. Gorbachev eluded a reference to the document by changing the word into a verb. [Author's note]

¹⁰ Dunaev is a scholar of Japan and a journalist. He did a great deal to make me and Gorbachev pay attention to Japan, and to prepare this visit. So there was "no room!" for him and "no room!" for my assistant Tamara.

[Author's note]

¹¹ Ivan Aivazovsky (1817-1900), a Russian-Armenian painter. [Translator's Note]

wrote himself!” We laughed about it. He said some niceties to the girls. Then he said that “tomorrow will be busy” and mischievously wished us a good night.

In the morning of the 20th Gorbachev and Roh Tae-Woo had one-on-one talks. Before the talks, M.S. asked me if he should state our agreement to accept South Korea to the UN. He mentioned it, as we agreed. Roh Tae-Woo shone with happiness.

They made an agreement about a loan (3 billion). The delegations will negotiate it. All about grand projects for oil and gas. It’s hard to believe.

Impressions while returning to the airport by car: it is not Japan, but still...

The flight back was eleven hours. I dictated to Tamara about the meetings on the island, for the TV and newspapers.

As always, M.S. invited people to his section of the plane. We all sat around him: Pitirim, Katushev, Ignatenko, Brutents, Rogachev, Gusenkov, and I...

It was difficult to follow the conversation because of the noise of the engines. I am used to these conversations; M.S. gets intimate every time on the way back from abroad. But this time was a little different because the Metropolitan was involved. And... he drank plenty of cognac with us. I wonder, what was his impression of the President, who opens up in moments like these?

By the end, Pitirim whispered in my ear an invitation to his diocese near Volokolamsk.

April 27, 1991, Saturday

It has been a real “Passion Week” since returning from Japan. The joint statement with Yeltsin was a breakthrough. Although yesterday M.S. said that B.N. [Boris Nikolayevich] is beginning to weaken. The West is adding fuel to the fire by presenting this “compromise” too much as M.S.’ victory. We’ll be in trouble if Yeltsin breaks off the “joint obligation” and puts the blame on M.S., which he easily could do.

Then—the Plenum. The Politburo took place the night before, on the 24th. When M.S. saw the draft resolution of the Plenum, he exploded: it talked about the General Secretary’s “anti-national policies.” He said to Sheinin, “This is your work.” But the same can be said for all of these “young” politicians—Girenko, Luchinsky, Semenova, Kuptsov, Stroev, Falin—whom he advanced to CC secretaries. The majority of them are from the provinces, and he nursed and took care of them, gave them a pass into big politics, and what do they do? This means that at heart they must also blame M.S. for everything? As if they could solve all issues by removing him, or threatening to remove him in chorus with the obkom [oblast committee] resolutions? In any case, it is clear that they’re party to these sentiments; it was not for nothing that they kept their mouths shut at the Plenum when others threw bursts of insults and slander at M.S., demanded his resignation, presented ultimatums about the state of emergency in the country—“or else!” It was disgraceful to see these bunnies [*zajchikov*]... And the whole Plenum in general. They were driving the General Secretary out, but when he got up and said “Fine, I’m

leaving!” they all pooped their pants and voted to “remove the issue from discussion.” What wording! Are they removing it until the next Plenum, or something??

People like Vol’sky, Bakatin, not to mention Nazarbayev, were redeeming the honor of the CC. Though in general, I think M.S. should tell them all to go to hell... and the next day there would be nothing left of them. Truly, no one needs them, except the nomenclature. And without M.S. they would immediately find themselves on the sidelines and in the dumps. Actually, Vol’sky + Bakatin said so directly. And one worker came up to M.S. during a break and said, “They are suicidal idiots.”

Truly, they are pygmies. I was convinced that M.S. should have used the opportunity to resign as General Secretary before his concluding speech. I thought it would be a gesture to de-ideologize the highest state authority; it would have thrown off the final burden of Party membership, which everybody hates. And it would have given him some upsurge of, first of all, “everyman” sympathies, as well as compassion (like the effect Ryzhkov produced when he left)... Secondly, a significant part of the Communists would have to decide where they belong—with Polozkov or elsewhere. A “Gorbachev Party” would form... There would be a split in the CPSU, a much needed split... so individuals no longer cast away their Party membership (often for lousy reasons); instead, millions of Party members would leave the Party “out of principle”... And the rest would immediately turn out to be Polozkov-followers!!

But M.S. once again revealed his talent of an orator-politician (he can still do it when he flies into passion!). It will make the CC and the Party have some serious thoughts, at least for a while. The most important thing is that he clearly outlined his credo for all these Starovoitov’s and Stankevich’s, i.e. “democrats” who haven’t lost their common sense yet, have not exhausted their conscience in political games and fights! The former Gorbachev appeared before them and the West (like in Japan); the staunch and steadfast author of *perestroika*, grown wise from experience with its “destructive” nature!

Perhaps, this option will work better...

Last night he called me, saying: “Tolya, what should I do now?”

I was taken aback. I did not immediately know what to say. I told him, “The same thing you’ve been doing till now!”

We talked about the “pygmies” and “worthlessness” in the CC, around him... I advised him to take a week or two to rest, step into the shadows, let them bustle without him, and let the people think about where M.S. went, since right now he appears almost every day... I especially advised him not to go to the May 1st parade on Red Square... It will be a sea of people, tens if not hundreds of thousands of people cursing and insulting the President. It would smear the success achieved with the agreement of the nine republics (the Novo-Ogarevo process) and the outcomes of the Plenum. Plus, he really needs a rest, and should make use of such concentration of holidays between May 1st and 12th.

He did not respond... And he has a bunch of “events” planned during these days. In my line of work alone, he has a telephone conversation with Kohl, a reception for Mitterrand in Novo-Ogarevo, a group of significant Japanese [officials], the Bulgarian Lilov, the Vietnamese leader, etc.

Yesterday he made a speech at the Supreme Soviet on the outcomes of [the visits to] Japan and South Korea. He almost did not change the text I gave him. It’s a pity he threw out one “maneuver”—to say that he himself doesn’t know yet whether we will give up the islands or not... so as not to keep playing the fool. It would fit with his thesis of “let history do its job.” He did not have the courage.

What was I doing in the meantime? My job. By the way, I again got proof that the group of consultants that works with me has been giving me a semi-finished product... Which means that I am still necessary. That’s a nice feeling, though a load to bear. I wrote letters to Bush and Major—responses to their letters to M.S. Again, I had to re-write the drafts I got from the MFA. This was also the case for the response to Antall and a greeting to Walesa, who, by the way, is acting quite lousy, quite “Polish”—small-gentry and plebeian. But that’s ok... M.S. recently said that “we” did the right thing when we stopped paying attention to our former allies. Let them sort themselves out, whether they want to deal with us or not, whether they need it or not. We’ll be fine without them!

May 2, 1991, Thursday

Raisa Maksimovna wrote a book, with Pryakhin’s help. She called me about a translator... I recommended giving the manuscript to the American publishing house directly. For a long time, three times over, as only she can—as if she is speaking with a moron (although this time she wasn’t giving me “orders,” but “sharing” with me)—she told me, “I always avoided giving interviews or publishing articles, even though there were hundreds of requests. Now, when M.S. is being slandered and so much injustice is done to him, so many mean rumors and speculations spread about him—I can no longer keep quiet. I had to intervene... This book is my “biography” with him. I seem to be writing about myself, but in reality it is about him.”

I supported her wholeheartedly, and not just out of politeness. We have to talk about him “from the inside.” It is also my responsibility. To do that, I’d have to retire. But R.M. has plenty of time.

I only saw M.S. during these last few days during his phone conversation with Kohl. The same concerns, the latter wants to know, “Will you hold out?” And assures that he will “firmly support Mikhail” in everything, including... he is getting ready to go to Washington. But getting down to business—something is stalling the construction of apartments for the military. He asked that the contractors would be Germans!

M.S. was in a rush to get to the Security Council, so there was no chance to have a good talk.

On the 6th, I passed Mitterrand off to Zagladin, who has completely turned into a traveling (overseas) adviser. Sometimes he manages to get some interesting thoughts from [the foreigners]. By the way, these thoughts were useful for my idea to prepare an analysis and a view of the new (it's time!) stage of "new thinking policy." My team (Weber, Yermonsky, Malashenko) already wrote 40 pages based on my outline. But I "subjected" it [to editing], even though it was pretty good raw material. Still, there were no large, "strategic" thoughts. I presented a new broad outline to them. They seem to have gotten inspired... work for the holidays. As for me, in an hour I am going to visit Metropolitan Pitirim in Volokolamsk!

Out of the blue, M.S. gave me a present of a Japanese music system (radio, CD, and cassette player)... He sent it to my house while I was visiting friends, he found me. Joking, he says, "I made a special trip from the Kremlin to the CC (on the 30th, at 9p.m.) to give you a present. I've been meaning to do it for a long time, a memento."

I told him, "But you already gave me a memento. Remember, before some trip I couldn't find shaving lotion at the store, so you gave me your own. It was very touching. Now I think of you every morning."

"But that's not the same! With this one, you'll remember me every day."

It was very nice of him.

Yesterday he ended up going to the Red Square, standing on the Mausoleum, next to the Labor Union leader Shcherbakov and other "workers," who one after the other proceeded to criticize his policies in front of 30 thousand people. This meeting replaces the 73-year-old tradition of a mass demonstration. And when you see it, you somehow feel sad... After all, these May days are your biography. They may have been based on a big lie and the secret source of the country's ruin... There were no "personal" attacks like last May 1st and November 7th, when Gorbachev was insulted in print (on posters) and with shouts, and when he had to leave!... that didn't happen this time. Still, how he must have felt, standing there! Listening to what amounts to "people's" nonsense, total lack of understanding of his policies, his ideas. Their rejection, the heartrending facts! How bad things have become, how everything is "collapsing," and "caving in." And not one of them, including the Labor Union leaders, even hinted that there is no other way, that it is inevitable, that "his" policies are for the good of the country, for its salvation, no matter how disappointing his mistakes...

Yeltsin, who was also invited to the Mausoleum, preferred to remain in the Kuznetsk Basin. Popov did not show up, since his Party, the "Demorossy," did not advise him to go. This is also a politicking move—not to "smear" himself with Gorbachev's policies and not to share with him the rebukes and criticisms, and the appeals to assist in poverty and ruin. Meanwhile, M.S. honestly faces all of this... But from the point of view of the country's leader's prestige, he shouldn't have gone. I told him twice (he didn't respond). Because listening to these complaints and not doing anything (and you cannot do anything: you cannot raise salaries, return the old prices, provide funds and production links, etc.) means in the eyes of the public that you do not "heed" the people. It would have been better for the people if you, the President, showed with your absence that you know what you are doing and that shouts will not divert you from your

plans, because these cries are pointless, they are directed against the people themselves. Let them cry, so to say, while I will do what I planned... In general, he should "lay low" for a week or two, "Chapaev is thinking!" so to speak. Let the people get accustomed to the "inevitable." It is impossible to explain anything to anybody right now. He made a truly deep speech on this subject at the award ceremony for outstanding workers (April 30th). But who is reading it? Who is listening? It's all the same—beautiful words! They've had enough of them!

May 3, 1991, Early morning

Yesterday was a wonderful day. We visited the Volokolamsk Metropolitan Pitirim (his name is Konstantin Vladimirovich) and his "estate." [We saw] Volokolamsk itself—the cathedrals, Dubrosekovo, [the site of] the fabricated story of the Panfilov division in 1941, though Pitirim is a patriot and doesn't know the story is fabricated, so he "uses" this theme... the city and churches. Tea.

Kashino: "Ilyich's lamp." This time he knows that it's a fabricated story and cheerfully says that it, the lamp, existed even before "that time," at the estate of the landowner Chernyshev.

Yaropolets: estate of the mother of N.N. Pushkina-Goncharova, inherited after the exiled Hetman Doroshenko and from the Zagryazhskie...

Chernyshev's estate: a unique church, falling apart. The "Russian Versailles," a palace blown up during the war, also falling apart. By the way, the majority of skeleton-like churches that stand on those hills and in the valleys were also blown up by the Germans! Plus the filth of desolation. Pitirim plans to restore all of this and make it into a cultural belt with museums, hotels, camping, and tourism. He has already started.

The Iosif-Volokolamsky monastery is a wonder! The architecture is astonishing... Pitirim is hegumen there. Everywhere we went, he told us about his plans of economic recovery of the region and the economic expansion of his diocese into Staritsa, Ruza, and a part of the Tula "province"... He has a multitude of connections and uses all of his organizational and public relations talent for "worldly affairs." More and more I felt that it would be inappropriate to talk to him about God. Still, over lunch and vodka I got the nerve up to do it. He turned out to be commonplace... in this subject. Or maybe he did not want to start a serious conversation. He perked up again when we started talking about joint ventures, investments, connections with various authorities and economic players, etc. He knows a great deal about agriculture, ecology, transportation (he graduated from Moscow State University of Communications).

May 10, 1991, After Victory Day

What happened this week?

M.S. received the Japanese Minister Watanabe & Co.; this is along Volsky's line. Later I got from them as a souvenir a kilo of ham sausage and a big salmon-like fish. What have we come to! In the past, souvenirs like these were given to chauffeurs, not the President's advisers. Though, it came in very handy. Yesterday we tried them with my wartime friend Kolya.

Zagladin “accompanied” M.S.’ talk with Mitterrand. I asked Zagladin to do it without notifying M.S. It would seem natural for Zagladin to do it. M.S. was at the top of his form in the subsequent press conference. On May 6th I “organized” for Matlock to meet with M.S. Once again, the subject was the Treaty on Conventional Weapons, following Bush’s verbal request. Again M.S. talked a great deal about the significance of this treaty and especially of Soviet-American relations, which we should protect, nurture, keep at a high level; but there are signs, he said, not only in words but in deeds, which show... etc. If this is how you feel, then do things properly yourself! Why did he get stuck on this naval infantry, why does he add fuel to the fire of suspicions?! Or are Yazov & Co. really pressuring him? But in any case, at this point they won’t “forgive” or agree!

He will send Moiseev (Chief of Staff) to Washington (this is Bush’s proposal)... But without a political solution his visit is pointless. He will again be repeating things that are unacceptable to anyone!

Also... despite the fact that I twice almost convinced him not to receive the Bulgarian Lilov, he nevertheless met with him (at Ivashko’s request) and spent almost an hour with him. For what?! I did not go, made Gusenkov go instead.

On the 8th I had Braithwaite and the NATO representative Alexander, then Blech (the German Ambassador). Then Edamura—Japanese.

The Brits are trying to cajole us not to object to NATO, its existence and activities, despite the dissolution of the WTO. They’re suggesting we might find NATO useful ourselves. I replied, “We don’t object. Just don’t be impudent about it; after all, we also have generals, who are not supposed to understand the new thinking.”

Blech is going to a meeting of Eastern European ambassadors to Weimar. He came to get enlightened. I spoke frankly about Yeltsin (that we do not see him as an “enemy,” but as a person who presents a danger on the political platform...); that here in Moscow we are seeing a difference in how Kohl and other European leaders are treating us on the one hand, and the U.S. Administration on the other. On the phone with Gorbachev, Kohl says something like this: “You are in a tight spot; I am thinking how to help you.” Bush (despite all his personal qualities) says: “You are in a tight spot, Michael, I will think how to best use your weakness in my ‘national’ interests.” This, in my view, is the meaning of the hidden criticism of the U.S. from M.S.’ side that was noted in my report on his meeting with Matlock. That’s what Blech wanted to know.

Edamura asked us not to publicly “explain” our rejection of the 1956 Declaration as a whole. I promised not to... Especially since it is in our best interest. If you dot the i’s, what was the use of the negotiations at all?

During the day yesterday, Kolya Varlamov and I had our traditional walk. We walked down the streets... I kept talking about the trip to Volokolamsk—to avoid talking about Gorbachev. In general, I succeeded. At first we drank at my house. He mentioned his loneliness (it’s his second year of retirement). I replied that women are our salvation. I was surprised by his sincere response, in the past he would indulge in male boasting. “I,” he said, “probably used up

my resource, because I have no desire for them anymore. I tried to count them up the other day, and lost count at around thirty..."

I sympathized with him (about feeling no desire). For I am saved by women, and I have not spent my resource.

Then we went to Varlamov's on Bol'shaya Pirogovksaya Street. His two daughters are wonderful. His sons in law—Pavel (a doctor, nephrologist), and Volodya (an international businessman). It was impossible to avoid talking about Gorbachev. I got into a vehement and frank argument with the businessman: "You, Volodya," I told him, "Should go work for Polozkov." He insisted that before starting something, M.S. should have developed a theory and explained to the communists how to proceed. In a word, [he described] that very new model, which would be by force.... And this is coming from an intelligent person of European style! He is a banker, who worked for over ten years in London, Bangladesh, etc!

Doctor Pavel was wise, "nonpartisan," and deftly egged on his relative by agreeing with me.

Right now I am going to the funeral of Ira Miretskaya (my brother's wife)... She has been dead for four days now. And I keep thinking about our post-war youth in Maryina Roshcha, when she and Leva first got married. We had a good relationship...

May 17, 1991

The week was challenging and interesting. Because of the May holidays, it stretched on for 10 whole days. I was present at the talk between M.S. and the Vietnamese Nguyen Van Linh... it was curious...

I "gave away" the meeting with the Chinese to Ostromov. He is the General Secretary's adviser (I am the President's). Plus, he is "Chinese" himself—he studied together with Nelya at the Department of Chinese studies at MGIMO. And, like the Chinese, he is for "socialist choice"... unlike me.

My idea to use my new group to put together a treatise on the new stage of new thinking is postponed. It turned out not to be so simple. I re-worked it twice. Now it is 65 pages and still seems to be all wrong. After reading it, one wonders: "So what?! What is all this for?! We could have done without it." Instead, we have to make it so the writers themselves feel that something new, necessary, and inevitable has been done.

I started working on the Nobel speech. Neither Zagladin's nor Yermonskey's versions are acceptable in style, though they do contain some ideas and certain "approaches."

Yesterday all of a sudden M.S. assigned me to meet with two professors from Harvard (Allison and Sachs) together with Yavlinsky. M.S. met with the latter himself and agreed that he and the Americans create an "avant-projet" [sic] for the G-7 and for M.S. This project is to become the foundation (if M.S. accepts it, and later Yeltsin and others) of ongoing economic

reform, starting off from the 15, 30, or even 150 billion dollars we will get from the World Bank, the IMF, etc. after the G-7's approval.

"Why me?" I asked Gorbachev (i.e. why wouldn't he meet with them himself?) "Because," he replied, "it is too early for me to meet with them." Grishka (that's what M.S. calls Yavlinsky) is going to the U.S. with the group, and on the 27th Primakov and Pavlov's deputy Shcherbakov will join them, although Yavlinsky is objecting to this. I also tried to persuade M.S. against it today, when I was telling him about my impressions of the meeting with Yavlinsky and the Americans. It seems like I made him waver a little... At the same time, he defended Pavlov (to me!), whom Yavlinsky and the Harvard professors consider to be the main obstacle on the path of economic reform. He enlightened me: "For now we need precisely the kind of person like Pavlov, who is willing to sacrifice himself, ready to leave at any moment; but at the same time, since he started the job, he sticks to it like a bulldog. You can't get anything done with our people otherwise!" I agreed. Alas, this is the case!

This project is turning out to be bigger than the "500 day program..." Tomorrow M.S. will present his idea at the Security Council.

There are two dangers here: that the G-7 will not accept it and that M.S. will again get scared (like in the fall). Yavlinsky told me that Yeltsin approved it and said so to Gorbachev on the phone.

"The guys," as Yavlinsky called them, liked me. I really tried to encourage them in various ways, "on behalf of the President." Primakov, whom M.S. sent to accompany me in receiving them, tried to "teach" them. They regarded him ironically. Allison has a better feel for our specific character; Sachs is a pessimist, but also attracted by the grand idea (to save the USSR in order to save themselves—the U.S. and the whole world!). Professor-style, Sachs gave a rendition of the average-American's narrow-minded view of us: "If you don't become like us, you won't get any dollars!"

Jiang Zemin, the Chinese General Secretary, must have thought that I would be at his meeting with M.S. instead of Ostromov, so he gave me a gift, a two-cassette player...

I am again reading "Master and Margarita," in honor of Bulgakov's 100th anniversary. People are finally beginning to speak about him without mythology and breathlessness: he is a genius, but fundamentally not a hero.

May 18, 1991, Saturday

Today M.S. convened the Security Council. Formally, on the agenda was Pavlov's note on the USSR joining the IMF and the World Bank... Practically, this was Yavlinsky's (and the Harvard professors') "program," and whether Gorbachev should attend the G-7 in London. Although, he has not been invited yet, they are only "planning" on it.

The entire Security Council, except Kryuchkov, was "for" it... (M.S. later called such an approach jingoism, and primitive...)

Bakatin was surprised that he was not informed that our Premier is “so progressive and not a retrograde at all”...

M.S. said that there is no alternative; if we have a free market, it would be open to the world market... He imagined what he would say in London. In a word, he is for reform, for democracy... Pavlov added that the statement at the IMF would already confirm that we are for market reforms, etc.

When Bessmertnykh and I ran after M.S. to the Walnut Room (after the meeting was over), to insist that he resolve the naval infantry issue and the Conventional Weapons Agreement in Europe, he came down on me, saying that Shevardnadze already made 80 percent of concessions to the United States. He sided with Moiseev, who, according to an agreement between Gorbachev and Bush (over the phone), tomorrow will go to Washington and I’m afraid will knock out a 1.5 billion dollar credit for grain, and the invitation to the G-7... M.S. does not get it... “Emotions!” as he says. And if he is not “ruining” his “general line,” he is at least slowing it down or undermining it. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (Bessmertnykh) and I (he was a little shy, I was more forward) told him our predictions of what would happen. Gorbachev, red in the face, turned around and went to his office.

When I got back to work after this scene and tried to continue composing the Nobel speech, my pen would no longer listen to me, and I went home... But A. and L. are not taking care of me; they are taking care of their gardens at the dachas!

May 22, 1991

Yesterday M.S. went to Sakharov’s reading. Ignatenko and I convinced him to go. In the evening he told me on the phone that if Soares (President of Portugal) had not been sitting next to him, he would have gotten up and left. “This Bonner... she blames me for everything: Sumgait, Baku, Karabakh, Lithuania, blood, dictatorship, prisoner of the right-wing, prisoner of the nomenclature... Just to think that the country’s leader entered the room and nobody blinked an eye. They barely showed it on TV last night... After Bonner, Orlov criticized all my policies. These people praise morals and ethics, appeal to Sakharov’s image, and at the same time spew hatred, anger, provoke revenge... How can you deal with these people? Who do they think freed Sakharov? Etc.”

He was very upset.

On the other hand, when Ignatenko called, he was thrilled by what he saw there, at the Great Hall of the Conservatory. Anyway, [Gorbachev] had to go. If he hadn’t gone, “the entire intellectual power of Russia and its environs” would have been covering his name in mud for a long time.

Rajiv Gandhi was killed... Could this also be the outcome of new thinking in the world? Like Saddam, like our situation. M.S. got teary-eyed remembering his friend Rajiv at a meeting with Andreotti. The latter politely smiled at this moment... Descendant of Jesuits and Machiavelli!

I got another assignment. On the 28th M.S. is going to Kazakhstan. He wants to devote ten pages of the speech he will give there to international affairs. Today he met with Andreotti... He was extremely frank, practically forcing an invitation to the G-7 in London. He even admitted that he's been preparing his speech. I was only at the one-on-one, the rest I "gave" to Zagladin.

Vattani (Andreotti's assistant) said that the President will not pardon Dimitrov (who is suspected of an assassination attempt on the Pope) if we don't release Gordievsky's family in return. It turns out that Andreotti conspired with Major... There is a moral for you! They are pressuring us, using the hopelessness of our situation. I'm afraid they won't let M.S. attend the G-7.

General Moiseev is in Washington. Briefings from the White House read, "He came empty-handed," "disappointing results"... They are already connecting this to the "non-invitation" to the G-7...

May 28, 1991, Tuesday Morning

Thatcher was here yesterday. She is no longer Prime Minister, but acts as if nothing happened. Braithwaite probably did not tell her who I am and what I did for Soviet-British relations, nor did he mention the fact that I "adore" her and my office is decorated with her portraits. In any case, she viewed me as a minor official, a note taker (the British and Americans have a special term for people who only record the leaders' conversations). And I am hurt, though I shouldn't care.

It looks like Moiseev had to move towards a "solution" on conventional weapons. Late yesterday Bush called M.S. and said that Bessmertnykh and Baker will work out the final details in Lisbon (they are meeting there because of Angola). Then Bush's visit in June would be possible.

Why did they drag this on for so long? Why did M.S. put himself in such an undignified position? Why provide another occasion of us cheating and not abiding by the documents we signed? There is a great deal of dilettantism (and obkom stubbornness). Yesterday M.S. himself admitted to Margaret [Thatcher] that he does not have enough time to grasp everything, not to mention to "transform" it into policy, and he "has to improvise." But in this case... it was probably something else.

My 70th anniversary passed. At noon, when everyone gathered in my office at the CC, M.S. called me to the Kremlin. He hugged me and presented me with a huge, 70-stem bouquet of roses and a set of china, and gave me a day off. Bush's experts on grain credit (1.5 billion) were coming and I was supposed to be there.

Tamara and the "girls" + Dunaev had set a table with appetizers in my office in the morning. When I rushed in from the Kremlin, my "room" was full—starting with Yakovlev, to my friends, to people I barely know... There must have been around a hundred people. I started getting drunk as I walked from person to person and clinked glasses. There were no toasts or speeches, none of that anniversary rubbish... The official "group" (Party committee, local

committee, etc.) met me in the hallway when I was running to the Kremlin, and right then and there I said goodbye to them.

Bovin was in his usual manner... Read some witty "sketches" about me and *perestroika*. But everybody was already quite drunk and didn't really take it in, although there was a lot of laughter.

In the evening I was already writing the international section for M.S.' speech in Kazakhstan. He is flying there today. He gave me back the draft with some corrections (which make it a little weaker)... I started working on the Nobel speech.

I got so many presents, it is embarrassing: a sound system, VCR, a bunch of different liquors, trinkets and albums, pajamas, a jogging suit, even bed linens. We never did finish all the vodka, neither at home or at work.

Gorbachev will be in Kazakhstan for three days. A little break for me. A little rest. Maybe... although much remains unfinished—Oslo and Stockholm are coming up. Analysis of the second stage of "new thinking" is not finished. Neiman (Israel) is coming, "Control Dale" [sic], etc.

May 29, 1991, Wednesday

I have so much reading to catch up on, so many things to absorb in order to be well-informed. Then there are so many things I need to discuss with the MFA, to prepare for M.S... for his decision and consent. Plus, Thatcher asked for a record of her conversation with M.S., but the interpreter (Berezhkov) did a terrible job of recording it. I had to work on it myself, to send it to her today in Leningrad.

I talked with Weber about assigning roles in my small group... He and the other "members" are still in their offices in the CC International Department. Now they receive information (ciphered telegrams, TASS [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union], etc.) only from me, though it would seem that it should be the other way around. In general, they serve as speech writers and creators of semi-finished products for me... In a word, it's a mess, just like everywhere else—XVIII century on the presidential level... Dark and illiterate typists-stenographers, and so on.

June 2, 1991, Sunday

M.S.—Kazakhstan. He picked a good time and place (after "9+1") to consolidate the "shift" to agreement and calm, to patience and common sense, to rejection of political hysteria...

The next evening after his return (on Friday), M.S. called. He complained that he was sick. He got sick in Kazakhstan, from the water and unfamiliar food. He said he didn't eat anything for 24 hours, and he was "at the limit... about to break down at any moment, tired." R.M. said the same thing over the phone.

Yegorov (his new adviser “on culture”) is putting on airs. I gave him a rebuttal in front of M.S. He is a favorite, whom R.M. “on M.S.’ orders” for some reason asked to take to Oslo and Stockholm (on occasion of the Nobel Prize). I hate loafers who are favored by authorities for no reason...

Yeah... *Moskovskaya Pravda* recently published an article by “political scientist Mitrokhin”¹² (May 31, 1991) about Gorbachev and Yeltsin’s competing teams. It is mind boggling. Ozherel’ev—a rising star! He is a layman, who appeared on the scene through Medvedev’s connections. M.S. doesn’t even remember that Ozherel’ev is an advisor of his. When I suggested to M.S. to assign him to a meeting with some foreigners (Ozherel’ev is an economist), M.S. scornfully dismissed the idea! M.S. has never consulted with him. In general, he seems to do nothing at all... He asks me “what’s going on with the President”!

The other one, Golik, is aiming for the Supreme Soviet. For all intents and purposes, he is not part of the team; he does not participate in any closed meetings. So he can’t have any influence on M.S. or on policy.

Ignatenko is an interesting person... He’s a playboy, but with convictions, and a risk-taker. He is able to impose on M.S. gestures in favor of democrats and democracy... But M.S. does not involve him in forming policy... And he doesn’t invite him to meetings of the Security Council (like he does me and Shakhnazarov). Actually, when it comes to advisers, only Shakhnazarov and I, each with his portfolio (political process and international relations), mean something to M.S., he listens to us... And 9 times out of 10, he supports me if my opinion diverges from the Foreign Ministry’s. Not to mention the fact that I “form” the finished versions of his foreign policy speeches, the way they appear to the world. It was the same deal with Shevardnadze (who also tested his speeches on me, even though naturally I did not write them). It is still the case with Bessmertnykh, who consults with me on every step, move, and initiative, all foreign policy draft orders and resolutions. Together we work against the Generals and the military-industrial complex.

But political scientist Mitrokhin from *Moskovskaya Pravda* is not aware of this. To him, I am a “nomenclature cadre,” whom Gorbachev is planning to “replace with a star”... And the public eats this up!

Anyway, there is more and more nonsense in the news, now on international relations as well. Ignorance and incompetence no longer seem to be a problem... Even the people who can find out how things actually are, don’t bother about it: it’s easier to make up some dashing nonsense.

But I digress...

¹² The article reads: “Gorbachev realizes the need to replace titled nomenclature assistants with highly professional, energetic, competitive team members. So far, the President does not have a team. Only a few possible candidates can be named: V. Golik, V. Ignatenko, O. Ozherel’ev. A carefully selected team will undoubtedly contribute to the growth potential of M. Gorbachev.” [Author’s note]

Despite being sick yesterday, on Saturday, M.S. met with Kohl's messenger Köhler, and then with four bankers: Reber and Walter from Dresdner Bank and Krupp from Deutsche Bank, plus another one... Once again, he argued that if the West does not help us right now, it will later pay a higher price...

He gave a lecture to the bankers along the lines of his Kazakhstan lecture, from which it followed that his "socialist choice" was the "pure" capitalism of a free market. They had a good laugh.

Later I told him that if the bankers give us a loan, they will not give it on the guarantee of our entire all-Union state property, but on your guarantee. This time he laughed alone.

Last night I gave him the draft of the Nobel speech. It is a pity that he threw out my most powerful addition. He said he doesn't want them to think, or rather to have proof of, his "blackmailing" them with *perestroika*'s failure. The newspapers are already writing about it...

Yesterday I also prepared materials for talks with Brundtland and the text of the toast at the King's reception...

Today I worked on the toast at Carlsson's (Swedish Prime Minister) reception and material for negotiations in Stockholm. I sent it to M.S., he hasn't called back yet...

In the evening I decided to go for a walk. I ran into Tsukanov (Brezhnev's main and all-powerful adviser) by the Smolenskaya metro station. It is instructive how senile the majority of former powerful leaders become, how pathetic...

Mark Aldanov's *Samoubijstvo* [Suicide] was published in *Oktyabr* Nos. 3, 4, 5. His Lenin is as I always suspected he should be, when I read and studied him my entire life, sometimes even admiring him.

June 5, 1991, Wednesday

In half an hour I am going to Vnukovo, to fly to Oslo with M.S.—the Nobel speech.

There was a lot of fuss with preparations. And now, after rereading the text last night, I am not sure that we should have included the things that are in it now. M.S. threw out the main idea: that *perestroika* has given the world more than it has given our country, and if the West is civilized, it must repay the kindness when our country fell into such a crisis that could turn into a disaster for everyone. This idea is still implied, but I had finished that section on page 9 with the words: "I would like my warning to remain in the annals of the Nobel Committee"!!

Yesterday Dobrynin sent a message from Baker: Bush has made a final decision to invite M.S. to the G-7... Indeed, this event may be pivotal in the rejection of "socialist choice."

Primakov brought a letter from Bush to Gorbachev. It is one paragraph about nothing in particular, but it was written on a new computer, and the U.S. President boyishly decided to make this sign of friendship to "Michael"! After all they are quite ingenuous, these Americans.

The clever Andreotti, wise with a thousand years of culture, gave a similar condescending characteristic of them at a meeting with M.S.

I'm going to visit Ibsen¹³... Childhood, Maryina Roshcha...

June 11, 1991, Tuesday

Oslo on the 5th, Stockholm on the 6th.

The Nobel speech. An ovation. A walk around Oslo with Tamara Alekseyevna and Tamara Prokof'evna instead of the King's reception, as has become my established rule. The city. An amateur orchestra playing by the entrance to our hotel, "in our honor!" Very sweet.

I don't really want to record everything, because these days were filled with my "stories" about the events for the press, and in reports to M.S. I will come back at some later point to this trip to a wonderful country.

June 12, 1991, (day of RSFSR presidential elections)

Perhaps this is truly a historic day, and a new era will begin for Russia, a new national "paradigm."

In the end, M.S. was less far-sighted than Yeltsin and his animal instincts. M.S. was afraid that the Russian people would not forgive him for giving up the empire. It turned out the Russian people didn't give a damn (I had warned him about this two years ago). As the result, the non-Russian people turned away from M.S. and praise Yeltsin... And the latter promises that Russia will become a new center of gravity, a new "sun" of international greatness.

Russians don't know how to govern... And besides, the unity of Russia hinged on the autocracy of governors, i.e. on regionalism and the Cossacks. Both presented a purely Russian imperial beginning of the state's integrity, as well as the Russians' natural inclination and ability to merge with the local population. And of course, [Russia's unity also depended] on military supremacy and power in the center and the peripheries.

Yeltsin will probably immediately become President, though maybe they will have to have a second round, but with whom? It would be too bad if with Ryzhkov. It would be good with Bakatin. Out of the six contenders, he is the only one who is a decent person, sensible, smart, and informed. He does not seek victory at any cost; he is intelligent in his own right, not just through his team. And of course, he is progressive, a *perestroika*-man.

M.S. called me yesterday. "I spoke with Vadim (Bakatin). Cheered him up. I said that even if he doesn't win, his participation in the elections will be a plus for future work in the government."

¹³ The visit to Norway with Gorbachev "on Nobel business" is implied. [Author's note]

M.S.' messages to Kohl and Weizsäcker on the occasion of June 22, 1941. An exchange of public telegrams. I composed them yesterday, he signed them. It was a pretty tough job, to write them in the spirit of "reconciliation" as opposed to the "thunder of victory." To separate May 9th from June 22nd. I think I managed. He is also doing a TV appearance on this subject, but he assigned that to Shakhnazarov.

Yesterday M.S. told me over the phone: "Think about the idea that a new choice is before everybody—us and the world... There is a new choice because we have passed the first stage of the end of the Cold War. And overall, we passed it successfully, though not without some faults."

I will think about it... this will give me and Weber & Co. a chance to finish that treatise on the "new phase of new thinking" (it is 50 pages now). I persuaded M.S. to present this report to the group of advisers, and then to the Security Council.

On the 18th he is going to be in Kiev with Kohl. He is still being obscure about the venue... Materials need to be prepared again... a whole heap of them. Eighty percent of this work will go into the trash bin, because he conducts his conversation spontaneously, in his own way.

He has been invited to the G-7. Tomorrow Braithwaite will probably bring an invitation from Major. The formula of the invitation is important. Today I suggested to M.S. to use Andreotti's formula... and described it to Braithwaite.

R.M. "wrote" a book about M.S. Murdoch is publishing it in England. It is also published here. Palazhchenko is editing the translation. In general, he is a very sensible and well educated person. He will be my consultant. There is another candidate for my group... but I won't talk about him... I don't like very intellectual dumb people.

I voted for Bakatin for president of Russia and for Saikin and Kraiko for Moscow—this tandem is better than any other one, including Popov-Luzhkov. Kraiko is a politician, Saikin is a logistic manager.

Krymskaya Naberezhnaya with N.N. Numerous exhibitions and hundreds of paintings: "Russia today"... There is a great deal of talent. The main feeling is that you can look "beyond" the artist's soul, and find something interesting for you. As for the art itself, what can one say? It is the accumulation of all styles over the past 100 years, our own and Western. But the result is our own, and the impression is not imitation.

What should I do about Lyuda, who can tell me?

I am again reading Aldanov's *Samoubijstvo*, about Lenin and Russia from 1902-1917.

June 15, 1991, Saturday

What happened this week?

Yeltsin is the President of Russia. In general, he understood where the unseen forces unleashed by Gorbachev are taking the country, and he used them to his advantage. He was in the right place at the right time. The people who voted for him (I didn't) must be hoping that "with Yeltsin" we will have a recovery. And Gorbachev might try to assist [*sopospeshestvovat'*], curbing his desire to do everything himself or else everything will fail (although this belief may not be groundless right now).

The "democratic press" and the West are euphoric. Now everybody is thinking about Russia, not the Soviet Union. Maybe something will come of Russia. If this were the case, I, too, would be applauding. As for the Union—forget about it, if only Russia could make it. In his heart, M.S. thinks so too, but he did not trust his "heart," he trusted his "public responsibility" and... lost.

Gradually, with dignity, he should recede into the pages of history, taking his great place there. It is the law of grand upheavals.

Today I gave him the 46-page "Analytic note" about the new phase of new thinking. I am curious how he will react, whether he will present it for discussion by the advisers or the Security Council.

Today he received Braithwaite (the day before, Sir Rodric was visiting me, and gave me a copy of the official invitation to the G-7). So M.S. was prepared and gave the same reply as I gave Braithwaite, "without prearranging it": it would be strange if the outcomes of the G-7 were presented to Gorbachev before they heard his speech.

The invitation to London was accepted with pleasure, and followed by an energetic 25-minute conversation (without an interpreter). At the same time, M.S. agreed to stay in London on a "working visit" for a day and a half.

Afterwards, he received Attali (Mitterrand's adviser). I asked Zagladin to cover it and did not stay. This promoted intellectual at the French President's side leaves me very skeptical: he is a swindler who is playing games with us with his financial projects, while he is sure that we will fail anyway and it will be easy to make excuses. In the meantime, he can show himself around M.S. and the G-7... and I'm not sure that the G-7 authorized him to speak to Gorbachev about it at all.

Yesterday I finished M.S.' TV speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary since the beginning of the war. He only assigned me to compose the telegrams to Kohl and Weizsäcker, and a letter to Brandt. The TV speech was supposed to be Shakhnazarov's job. But when he brought it to me last night, it was such nonsense that I could not restrain myself from rewriting it. We'll see... Same as in the telegrams, we will try to aim it at reconciliation as opposed to self-congratulations and self-delusions about our victory.

It turned out very well that, without asking, I sent Brutents to Cooperation Council in Prague (Schmidt, Trudeau, Giscard, etc). M.S. couldn't be happier with the outcome. He ordered it to be published in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*.

Ambassadors have started frequenting me. The day before yesterday I met with the new Canadian one. He asked me to tell him “how foreign policy is formed [in the USSR].” I gave him an hour and a half lecture.

Today I met with the French Ambassador. He brought a letter from Mitterrand, who expects to meet with M.S. separately in London, and preferably to find out beforehand what M.S. plans to bring there.

I am being “pushed out” of the CC building... Yesterday the typists refused to work for me, even though I’ve known some of them for 25 years.

The telephone rang. M.S. He asked me the question that always confounds me: “What’s new? ... Have you thought of anything? I’m hearing rumors that the Administration in Washington is discussing inviting Yeltsin to London (to the G-7).”

I reply, “Really? If this is the case, then friendship is one thing, but it goes without saying that dirty politics are dirty politics!”

Gorbachev: “This only proves that ‘they’ are financing Yeltsin’s campaigns and all the ‘Russian’ affairs...”

He is suspicious, it is provincial of him! He cannot come to terms with the fact that a powerful democratic trend has formed in society, which “summarizes” itself in Yeltsin.

He said he gave an interview on the meeting with Braithwaite and Attali, and on the meeting on privatization.

In response, I told him about Nadezhda Alekseyevna Shulyat’eva—the Chairwoman of the Union of Small and Medium Enterprises. She is one of our “new people” who are planning to create our new economy. In addition, she is good-looking, smart, and charming.

“Yes,” he reacted, “but how many more impenetrable people there are!”

He complained that the Central Control Committee [CCC] is holding Shevardnadze responsible before the Party for saying something about the new party (Polozkov’s)... But when the General Secretary is insulted from the party stands, neither the CC nor the CCC bother to do anything.

June 16, 1991, Sunday Morning

I just re-read the speech that my friends gave at my 70th anniversary; back at the CC... they say Yermovsky wrote it. At the time I was drunk, and did not really hear it. But now, I re-read it with pleasure. They captured the role that I have been “playing” so well for many years. But what does it mean to “play”? It means that I can sustain myself in this role; consequently I have some fundamental principles that allow me to be this person in my interactions...

On the same shelf I found an old diary with excerpts from Lenin I wrote in 1964. It turns out that I noted down the things you need to know for *perestroika*, to understand it. But what is even more interesting is that the modern vulgar people who are throwing Lenin down from every pedestal, they don't know the real Lenin, they did not read him outside of what they were taught to read.

Yes, history has disproved him: in the concrete, creative sense he turned out to be an idealist, though he left an indelible imprint on the historical process. But he was a great political thinker. And when at the Moscow conference in honor of Lenin's birthday Giuseppe Boffa said that we should write an intellectual biography of Lenin, he was right. Also, we have to make a strong distinction between the period before 1917, when he was analyzing objective processes, from the period after 1917, when he tried to "create" history itself and got carried away... like in the card game 21, he went too far.

In any case, it is too early to take him off the shelves for any self-respecting intellectual. Although he is not really necessary right now to the masses and the practical politicians like Yeltsin. They don't need him because they are themselves in the current that is creating the history that Lenin so smartly "wrote" in 1908-1910.

Yesterday, after a meeting on privatization, M.S. gave a big interview to Kravchenko (director of TV) (why does he rub elbows with the likes of this Kravchenko, this Sevruk, whom it looks like he appointed as editor of *Novosti*?! It is equivalent to Mitterrand appointing the editor of *Paris Match*). Still, he was at his best. Logical, clear... He deftly avoided a question about the omission of the word "socialist" (Republics) from the Union Treaty, even though in name we are still a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He admitted that the people voted for a single state, rather than for "socialist choice."

But that's not all of it. The interview slipped into the subject of Yeltsin and the Russian presidential elections. M.S. barely restrained himself from giving himself away because of his hatred for Yeltsin. He started reasoning that 25 million people did not vote, that Yeltsin was elected by only 40 million out of 103! I froze, listening, afraid that any moment now things will spiral into a scandal... But he switched the train of thought to say that this reflects the presence of various positions, attitudes, and views in society. So these elections emphasize that we need **AGREEMENT**.

June 17, 1991

M.S. did not like the speech for TV about June 22nd of 1941. He wanted to "politely" blame it on Shakhnazarov, but said that I did him a favor by adding my signature to it. But I told him that no, there were a number of my own thoughts in it... Right now I'll have to re-do it. Though it is not clear what he wants... He didn't say anything. He must yearn for the "thunder of victory."

June 20, 1991, Thursday Morning

I've been getting up early. Mosquitoes were biting all night long. I'm not getting enough sleep, dreaming wild dreams—something like a duel with Vysotsky...??

In politics: there is a new counter wave in response to the “rapprochement” between M.S. and Yeltsin (like in the past, in August-September). Moreover, Pavlov “himself” started it when he adopted Yeltsin and Ryzhkov’s tactics, saying that he would get things under control, if only he had the authority (i.e. if M.S. did not get in the way). There was only one sensible thought in his Supreme Soviet speech—that the President does not have to get involved in everything. This got them started: Kryuchkov said that back in 1979 Andropov wrote a note to the PB, warning that imperialism has introduced its agents into the “upper echelons” of power, and now “we” regularly inform the leadership about this, but he doesn’t pay attention to “us.” Pugo announced that he is prevented from creating an effective structure to combat crime. Yazov said that we turned into a second-rate power. And off they went: Alksnis, Umalatova, Kogan... encouraged by Lukyanov (“He is playing a clever game, he knows what he’s doing,” Ligachev said in his circle about the latter, adding, “Misha will fare badly”). Again they demanded the President’s resignation and wanted to hold him personally criminally responsible for the anti-alcohol campaign (we lost 200 billion rubles on it). Pavlov said this, and only two people objected—Garbuzov and Voronin. Not Ryzhkov or M.S.

The CC of the Russian Communist Party and the CPSU are in session day and night, and, like in April, they are preparing resolutions from the provinces for the General Secretary’s resignation. I heard that they are even putting together a personal file on him and his advisers (my name included).

And what about M.S.? He launched another Novo-Ogarevo process; moved the Union Treaty forward, now in concept it is very close to the Russian Constitution (draft). Yeltsin and all the others initialed it. Moreover, he called Yavlinsky to Novo-Ogarevo, where he presented his report on discussions with Harvard and Washington.

He thoroughly prepared for the meeting with Delors today. The G-7 will find out from Delors, not Attali, about what exactly M.S. will bring to London.

Gradually and very clearly (even to the thick-skulled), M.S. is moving things toward a “coupling” of *perestroika* and world politics and economics. There can be no other interpretation of the inclusion of the country into the “common process of civilization.”

Yeltsin in the U.S.—with reservations about M.S. in the past—openly seems to be moving things toward reconciliation with the “Union” (i.e. preserving it). He always put the word “Union” next to the word “Russia.” What will we do if the rapprochement takes place? With whom, and how? Maybe this is a new method to get rid of M.S.? That is why the counter-*perestroika* powers are becoming furious—because there will be no place for them “there,” in the “Yeltsin Union.”

Meanwhile, M.S. cannot let go of his old methods. He went to the Peasants’ Congress, the “generals of collectivization,” potbellied Black Hundredists [*okhotnoryadtsy*]. They threw him a tantrum. Pavlov (!) told them bluntly: it’s either the market, or State subsidies again (but

the treasury has no money!) and then farewell to the whole economic reform program. They nearly threw him off the rostrum. They declared that they will crawl to the Red Square to starve. (Ligachev made an appearance; they worship the ground he walks on). They called Gorbachev on the carpet. He came and started reconciling: again the conciliation commission, again we'll "see what can be done," etc.

But what "can be done"?! Pavlov is right in this case... Again we are stalling. And again it is a point in favor of Yeltsin-Silaev, who will not reckon with these "generals of agriculture."

There was trouble with "another version" of the Nobel speech, a forgery. I called Yegor Yakovlev:¹⁴ "Why did you get involved?" He fussed, mumbled, apologized. He sent me this forgery—there is not a single matching phrase to the authentic text of the speech. I told Yegor, "What happened to the editorial office? Couldn't someone have collated it? If some paragraphs did not match, some things were added or thrown out—that is one thing. It would provide ground for speculations and suspicions. But these texts are completely different! How could this happen?!" He promised to name the person who organized this forgery (recorded from the words of a Dutch reporter). But, of course, the reporter urgently departed.

One should take them to court, if it were not for the President's name—it wouldn't be good to bring it up in a negative context yet again. But how great it would be to collect something like 100 thousand from each one of them!

I'm going to go and prepare materials for Koivisto's visit. There is nothing to say. We are squandering our friendly relations with them because of our sickly economy.

The weather is awful: 32 degrees Celsius, 98 percent humidity. Good thing that we have air-conditioning at work!

June 21, 1991, Friday

Yesterday was a strange and possibly a fateful day. M.S. recorded a TV appearance for the 50th anniversary of June 22, 1941. We managed after all to keep it in the spirit of reconciliation, though "with tears in our eyes" ... but without triumphal notes. Alright.

In the morning he received Delors. I got out of this assignment by sending Zagladin instead of me. But Gorbachev said quite a few things there... including that the Parliament started bristling as soon as they felt that the Supreme Soviet is losing power and society is starting to calm down and accepting the Gorbachev-Yeltsin agreement. Zagladin consulted with me whether to report this passage to the press. I said, "Of course!"

In the meantime, Matlock asked to see me; we met at 3:30 p.m. He had a proposal from Bush for M.S. to visit the residence of the U.S. Ambassador in London on July 17th between 3 p.m.-5 p.m., after M.S.' speech, so they could talk in private.

¹⁴ He published it in his *Moskovskie Novosti*. [Author's note]

At the same time Matlock asked me about what was going on. "Why is the Premier speaking at the Supreme Soviet against the President and Yavlinsky's program?"

I explained to him that Pavlov is a good financier and a man with character, and we need people like him right now. But he hasn't gotten experienced in politics yet, which explains yesterday's demand for more powers that was interpreted the wrong way. "Objectively" it appeared that Pavlov led the opposition and protests against M.S. This is another blunder on his part, an awkward situation. But everything will be fine.

I called M.S. and he immediately agreed to Bush's proposal, of which I informed Matlock.

Braithwaite called and said that on the 1st, a British sherpa will arrive on account of the G-7 in London, and that M.S. promised to meet with him. The Queen is inviting M.S. on the 17th from 5 p.m.-6 p.m.... etc.

Then, unexpectedly, at 8 p.m., I got another call from the U.S. embassy. Matlock requested an immediate audience with the President; he had a secret and urgent message from Bush.

M.S. called me right at the same time, and I told him about it. He said, "Let's do it!" I rushed to the Kremlin. I asked M.S., should I attend? "Absolutely," he said. Matlock hadn't come in yet when Pavlov called and started describing the disciplinary work he did with the chairmen of all the Republics. He invited Delors to the meeting of the Cabinet and the latter also gave them a lecture on how to manage finances if one wants a market system. And it was so harsh that their jaws dropped. Pavlov looked like a "liberal." M.S. laughed as he listened to this account, and before hanging up he threw an ironic remark at Pavlov: "this action was probably the most positive thing you've done in the last three days" (hint at Pavlov's Supreme Soviet speech!).

Matlock entered, pale as a sheet. As if we had agreed ahead of time, M.S. also started by saying all kinds of nice words to him (I had done the same when he visited me, with regrets that he is leaving). M.S. said that Matlock has done a good and honest job here, he was a real partner, and helped a great deal during this difficult period, that we value his work, etc.

Matlock stood and anxiously waited to deliver the message he came with. And this was his message:

"Mr. President, I just received a personal closed ciphered telegram from my President. He instructed me to meet with you immediately and convey the following message: the American secret service has information that tomorrow (i.e. today, on 06/21) there will be an attempt to remove you from power. The President considers it his duty to warn you."

M.S. started laughing (I did too!). Matlock became embarrassed, feeling like he brought such a silly idea to the very top. He started apologizing that he couldn't neglect to carry out an

order from his President, even though he told him (how?) that he doesn't have such information from Moscow and it was unlikely that was true.

M.S.: "This is 1000 percent unlikely. But I appreciate the fact that George warned me about his concern. If he received such information, it was his duty as a friend to warn me. Please reassure him. But I repeat, I see the confirmation of our real relationship in this message. It means that we have come very far indeed in our mutual trust. This is very important."

He spoke kindly, but with an internal irony, as if he was sure that all of this is nonsense. Then he got talkative. "You know, Mr. Ambassador," when Matlock entered, M.S. called him Comrade Ambassador, and he jokingly explained why he allowed himself such liberty, "Such talks are possible here. You see what's happening..." And he started telling him practically in the same words that I used a few hours before: in society, things are moving toward agreement and calm. We are moving toward a Union Agreement, participating in the G-7, i.e. we are moving toward a real economic emergence of the USSR to the outside world. This meets with approval. Yeltsin's election confirms this. Soon society will reject the confrontational approach, and the people behind it. But there are forces that do not like these developments. They exist in the Parliament, although not the entire "Union" faction is like this, there are some normal and sensible people. There are also the frenzied ones, who are ready to swallow the microphone—Alksnis, Kogan... They are backed by those who feel like they are losing their position in the echelons of power and privilege. And again they are rallying and plotting how to undermine the recovery process. It is not impossible that they engage in various discussions, including the kind that was overheard by your agent.

He told him about Delors... along the way characterizing Pavlov almost in exactly the same words as I used when Matlock visited me.

At home, Anya and Mitya packed their suitcases. I turned on Bach. At midnight there was a call from the reception room: Bush is asking to speak with M.S. on the phone. I told them to connect, if that was the case.

At 6 a.m. Anya and Mitya left. I walked them to the car. Then there was a call from the MFA.

I'll finish writing later... Right now I don't have time. Not to forget about Plekhanov's (Arbatov's deputy) "Shchit" [Shield]¹⁵

June 23, 1991, Sunday

Anyway, the fears continued. At night Bush called Gorbachev. The reception room asked me: what should we do? I told them to connect. But M.S. had been out for a walk with R.M. (it was around midnight). When he came back, he ordered to be connected to the White House. But Bush was already busy. And, it seems that Bush had lost hope of connecting with the other

¹⁵ Not to forget: before Matlock visited M.S. with his warnings, in the morning I got a call from Plekhanov—not to be confused with the Head of Security, General of the KGB, the future coup-participant... [Author's note]

“superpower” nearly at the turn of the XX century, and sent a telegram. It arrived early in the morning.

When I got a phone call at 6 a.m. from M.S.’ reception room with the same question, “What should we do with the telegram,” I replied indignantly, “Send it to the dacha!” “Should we wake him up?” “Don’t...” I decided that it is about the same thing as Matlock’s “warning” (though the MFA notified me that the telegram came after M.S.’ conversation with Matlock)...

Nevertheless... he got it only at 9 a.m., when he woke up.

I don’t know what was in the telegram. It did not reach me. But when M.S. got to work, he gave a dressing down to everybody who failed to secure a line with Bush at night: he put me, Kryuchkov, and Boldin on the selector. Kryuchkov made pathetic excuses, blaming it on the fact that there was no request on the hot line. M.S. cited from the telegram that initially they tried to use precisely the hot line. Kryuchkov bleated and promised to “investigate and punish.” Boldin received orders to immediately fire everyone in the reception room, without attempting to cover their tracks... “The lazy idiots... One of them still sometimes calls me Leonid Ilyich!” (I burst out laughing)...

He wanted to give me a piece of his mind as well, but I replied, “What do I have to do with it? They ‘consulted’ with me, and I told them to connect you.” “Fine,” he concluded, “if anything like this happens again, call me at home at any time of day or night.” He is embarrassed about our “technology” and our “services”...

Later he asked me, “Maybe I should call Bush myself?” “Of course,” I replied. “Alright, let’s do it at 5 p.m. What time would that be over there?” 9 a.m. They had a good talk.

Bush’s impressions from his meeting with Yeltsin were the main subject of conversation... with overtones to reconcile them even further. M.S. described how he just now subdued the Supreme Soviet. Bush already knew about it through his agents.

All the “fears” were immediately alleviated. M.S. showed that he was in charge. If he wanted to, he could dismiss all these babblers and provocateurs (and have another June 3rd Stolypin coup, when he dismissed the 3rd Duma!). He would have the support of the republics and of all of Russia, headed by Yeltsin. These idiots do not understand that the situation changed radically after the Novo-Ogarevo “1+9” and Yeltsin’s election as President. M.S. now has a home front, and he no longer will bow to these professional loudmouths. He gave them a serious punch in the jaw! There were probably only two or three such fierce, pivotal speeches during all of *perestroika*. And they submitted. They applauded. All of Moscow took a breath. Even the “enemies” spoke with admiration about his behavior, not to mention the West, which is just beating the drums, though it would seem that Gorbachev’s actions were not too democratic.

Now about the point I didn’t have time to record yesterday. In the morning, before Matlock visited Gorbachev, Plekhanov (Arbatov’s deputy at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies) called me. “I have to inform you,” he said, “representatives of the Shchit [Shield] (an

officers' opposition organization) came by and said that suspicious military unit movements have been sighted near Moscow." I took the story with a grain of salt and did not tell M.S. about it.

After Matlock in a conversation with me [M.S.] praised Bush "for the good work" and, laughing about the American's naiveté, said, "You know, yesterday Primakov told me: Mikhail Sergeyevich, take note! You are too trusting with the KGB and your security services. Are you completely confident in them?"

M.S. said, "So that one is an alarmist too. I told him, 'Zhenya, calm down! At least you don't panic.'"

In any case, I think these signals and Matlock's visit warmed him up and pushed him to give a real dressing down to the Supreme Soviet (the newspapers "smoothed over" the most savory parts of his speech).

He called me after this speech at the Supreme Soviet and railed at these scumbags in foul language.

Finally, today is a truly free day. Yesterday I managed to finish the materials for talks with Koivisto (he is coming on Monday). After all the MFA drafts and after my consultants worked on it, I still had to re-write it. They do not get the "moment," they don't know how to write "for Gorbachev": the ideas are the same, we don't have any new ones, but they don't know how to frame them so they don't look like banalities.

I also prepared a list of questions for the telephone conversation with Kohl tomorrow morning.

Yesterday was June 22nd... I remembered everything that happened that day, hour by hour. And I didn't look much at the TV—I was at work. They say they showed the movie "Bud' proklyata voina" [War be Damned] with Sasha Bezymenskaya and me, yesterday... they left only 5-7 minutes of my 40 minute speech they initially recorded!

June 24, 1991, Monday

Yesterday was an exceptionally dull day. I did not go to Uspenka. I listened to the record player, which I first spent a long time fixing (i.e. messing it up). Leshchenko, Vysotsky, Vivaldi! With a bassoon. Then a visit to the Manezh with N.N. A certain Kazatin. 1000 similar paintings—mostly of the artist's wife and a rooster. The style... like if you go and splash paint with a big brush from a bucket on the canvas or paper. It's unexciting and confusing... but he is exhibited in 30 countries and is our highest hard-currency earning [*valyutnyj*] artist.

We walked down the streets. It was hot, tiresome, irritating—especially with the accompaniment of her smart and highly intellectual discussions on various truly important themes.

I got extremely tired, and then had to stand in line for hours to get some milk... When I was close to the end of the line, the saleswoman yelled that they were out of milk, and I had to go to another store, across from the American Embassy (alas!).

Today M.S. had a conversation with Kohl. They agreed to meet in Kiev on July 5th. *Der Spiegel* published a highly secret letter from M.S. to Kohl from this March (where he is asking for a new loan and a lump-sum agreement regarding military equipment).

Koivisto was here at 3 p.m. Ninety-five percent of the time M.S. talked about our [internal] affairs. I am hearing this for the umpteenth time. Koivisto was extremely tactful and quiet... Although you could see that he felt such an ultra-frank explanation of our affairs was unnecessarily excessive. And it is not done without the additional intent of making it clear to the Finn that he should not expect us to repay our loans and to encourage him to be lenient on new deals.

When the conversation turned to delegations, Koivisto became more talkative, as much as it is possible for a Finn. He suggested an idea that M.S. did not pay attention to. Perhaps it was not intended for that: he said that the trade agreement from 1947 was created in a different era, when we (Finland) had great economic dependence on you (the USSR)... Now, he said, we can do away with the previous agreements. (In essence this is undermining the main Agreement of 1948).

On the subject of European affairs, M.S. for some reason started talking about the inviolability of borders as the sacred principle of the Charter of Paris. This is after he explained that we will have to separate from the Balts! Koivisto kept quiet. This was wise, because debating would be pointless.

June 26, 1991, Wednesday

Today I “took time off” from the meeting between M.S. and Maxwell (I passed it on to Gusekov). Maxwell was imposed on M.S. by Kryuchkov, they have some business going on! Every time he visits, he is “presented” to the top. He is impudent: Gusekov told me that he was lecturing Gorbachev on how to live in London, how to use the President’s time). When I found out from Primakov the day before that Maxwell wants to see M.S., I objected and decided not to tell Gorbachev. But he asked me himself. I tried to convince him that he should not meet. And he agreed [with me], but in a couple hours called and without any explanation set the day and hour of the meeting, openly referring to Kryuchkov...

In the meantime, the world press (ours partially also) is buzzing about his, Kryuchkov’s, speech at the Supreme Soviet—again about the fact that imperialism has “infiltrated its agents” into the highest echelons of power and that he is reporting this, but nobody is listening.

Ignatenko asked M.S. what he, the press-service, should say in response to this at the briefings. “Do not get involved, who knows what’s in those newspapers!” M.S. replied. But we are talking about a speech at the Supreme Soviet, in a closed (!) session! I.e. about strictly “confidential” information...

This is a mystery to me... Maybe he really does not want to “quarrel” and destroy the support base “just in case”... for him, or for the State?!

Today (Gusenkov told me) M.S. casually mentioned to Maxwell, “What makes you think that I will run for another presidential term?” Even if he decided not to, he shouldn’t spill the news to the West: they will completely stop reckoning with him, they will transfer their attention to Yeltsin even more than now.

Shakhnazarov and I wrote him a protest about Pavlov’ order on the “new” customs duties on import goods (as a result, it is pure highway robbery at customs)... We argued that it topped the “presidential” 5 percent sales tax. He did not reject our arguments, but assigned Orlov (Minister of Finance) to work on this... Does that mean it was done without him again? Against him?!

I have to prepare everything at once:

- For the British sherpa’s visit (July 1)
- For the meeting with Kohl in Kiev (July 5)
- For the Mexican president’s visit (July 3)
- For the G-7...

By the way, so far he has not involved me or Shakhnazarov in the work with of the group headed by Medvedev in Volynskoe. Meanwhile, they are writing “God knows what” over there. Primakov visited them, read their drafts, and was horrified. For example, there is a whole section berating separatism and nationalism in the Baltics. You have to be an idiot and a provocateur to “suggest” something like this for London. In the meantime, Primakov and I (and Shakhnazarov, but a little less) are the people who really know the material in the context of the G-7 (except for the strictly economic program). And we are the ones who are not there at Volynskoe.

Yesterday M.S. met with Allison (from Harvard) and Yavlinsky, at my insistence. As a result, he is even more engaged, even though he said that he will be considering not just them but other projects and programs as well, including the ideas of Schmidt’s “Cooperation Council” that recently had a meeting in Prague (Brutents attended).

Yesterday the French Ambassador Dufour invited me, Primakov, and Medvedev (and Zagladin ended up there as well) to the embassy for *dejeuner* [sic]—to “question” us about how we (M.S.) are preparing for the G-7... He already came to me for this before. We drank good wine, and vied with each other in “explaining”...

In *Izvestiya* Bovin is scathing the critics of Gorbachev’s foreign policy. He wants to join the team. I am trying to arrange it. It would be useful for them to have a chat as “old acquaintances.”

June 29, 1991, Saturday

Yesterday morning M.S. objected when I reminded him that he has a meeting at 11 a.m. with the Jewish activist Rappaport. How could I compare that to what is going to happen at 11

a.m., he said! What is going to happen is a discussion of the CPSU draft program at the Program Committee.

I shut up, but still interjected, “This person came here to see you after he was told the day and hour of the meeting. Just last night I reminded you about this and you didn’t say anything about any program...”

Five minutes before the meeting he called me: “You should come to the discussion too.” I am not sure if this was supposed to be a “compensation” for the dressing down I got (which was underserved) or because I’ll be useful for further work on this paper.

I did not regret attending. M.S. started with an attack on *Sovetskaya Rossiya* [Soviet Russia] and similar press media who are pursuing an unbridled persecution [of him]. This is not a free discussion! This is a sign of degradation in the Party. If this goes on, this Party will be thrown out of political life.

One Gusev from the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and another fellow tried to object. But Gorbachev “put them back in their seats,” and in the end told Gusev, “We’ll see if you remain in the Party.” In general, this gang that hangs around the CC corridors and the CC itself is embittered to the extreme... There can be no unity with these people, as Ivashko insists we should have. They say that this group got together before the Program Committee and were planning a caterwaul for today’s meeting. But Gorbachev anticipated it with his fierce attack.

Abalkin, the academician Pakhomov, Denisov, the Nizhniy Novgorod obkom secretary, and some others said a great deal of smart things. But the majority of it was primitive, ignorant, and reactionary aggressiveness. These were the people at whom M.S. directed his introductory speech, which he started with the words “Before you stands a bourgeois liberal, who is selling the country to the capitalists, and carries out Bush’s policy.” He read this quote from *Sovetskaya Rossiya* while pointing at Chikin, the editor in chief.

His concluding statement was a step forward (in his ideology). Probably for the first time he said to this “Party” public, as opposed to in our small circle, that—“We’ve had enough of this pagan worship of the founders. They were giants... for their time. If we do not liberate our thought from worshiping them, we will not find a theory to adequately deal with reality and with modern science.”

In fact, it is time for him to “do” a book—“*Perestroika-2*,” to explain it to the world, to our people, and to the Party after five years, and explain it before he hands over the reins.

I am immersed in preparations for a meeting with the Mexican President (July 3-4th)—a speech and negotiations materials, and an interview for their newspaper; meeting with Kohl (July 5th in Kiev); partial preparations for London. I don’t have time to read the newspapers, sometimes not even TASS and cables. On top of everything else, it is 32 degrees Celsius, and there are mosquitoes at night.

I don't want to read the policy papers (took them home with me!), but I must!

July 3, 1991, Wednesday

This day is a notable day because M.S. practically "approved" the emergence of a "movement"—the Yakovlev-Shevardnadze Party, and at the PB he succeeded in retiring Polozkov.

It turned out that Medvedev and his group, after spending two months in Volynskoe, created for the G-7 something that we cannot take there. And M.S. dumped this work on me... two days before he has to present it at the "9+1" meeting (to obtain the mandate).

I warned him that the Medvedev-Ozherel'ev team will produce something fit for the Party activists, not for the G-7 in London. Shakhnazarov also told him this.

In the meantime, "I" have the Mexican president tomorrow, Kohl in Kiev on the 5th, and Gonzalez on the 8-9th!

July 6, 1991, Saturday

Yesterday: Kiev, Kohl & Co.

The city itself... I haven't been there in 35 years. The "tour guide" chauffeur (Ignatenko and I were in the "Chaika" [car]). It feels like some large, Western-European (actually, more German) city of the XIX century, with green streets, tidy, clean, well maintained... And the chauffeur said there are generally enough goods in the stores. Compared to Moscow!

Maybe we are making a mistake when in the mass media we pretend to be poorer than we really are: saying that we are practically on the verge of starvation and total collapse... the State is still alive... and Ukraine can survive on its own, without us. But it wants to leave... the demonstrators' slogans are, "Kohl—Yes! Gorbachev—No!"

The country estate [we stayed at] used to be Shcherbitsky's dacha. Beauty of nature. Mosquitoes.

Negotiations... first "one-on-one," where they addressed each other informally. As for us, the entourage, it was much better than it used to be with Honecker's team, though they were good guys themselves. But this time we had closeness, understanding, trust, especially from us, from M.S. Kohl wants us to be successful at the G-7... But he is not sure that others will have the same outlook, especially Bush, Mulroney, Kaifu. He praised Major quite a bit, and scolded his "predecessor."

Later (when we were talking in a larger circle), Kohler (the "sherpa") kept trying to persuade us to submit to the IMF. M.S. said to him: "The USSR is not Costa Rica! 'Your' (the West's) behavior toward the USSR will affect the direction of history..."

In general, M.S.' arguments were the usual arguments he has been using with foreigners in the last few months. He did not read my version for the G-7. I kept trying to give him my copy... he used a little of the second part of the text, the cooperation program; but on the main range of problems with the "memorandum," he leafed through Primakov's text. Before the talk with Kohl I offered him my version, saying "Would you like it?" He responded, "It's alright, I have a copy... You sent it already." He said it in a way to let me know not to expect that he will take it as the main text. (Nevertheless, when we got back to Moscow, he called me to "Volynskoe-2" to "finish" the text for the G-7 before sending it to the heads of the republics. On the 8th he is convening the Federation Council to obtain a mandate for London... Will we manage to do it in one day? If he starts re-dictating Medvedev's version, it will be the end!)

M.S. and Kohl had a big discussion on Yugoslavia. They did not come to an agreement. Kohl was frowning, because M.S. pushed: non-interference in internal affairs, trouble if the CSCE becomes a tool for intervention, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders... overall our standard set with a view to the Baltics! Meanwhile, Kohl is proceeding from the fact that Yugoslavia no longer exists, and even tanks won't keep it intact.

Eastern Europe... M.S. pulled toward "cooperation"... and to get rid of the "super influence" complex: "They are sick of us. But we are sick of them, too!" he said to the Chancellor of the now-united Germany. "We had to have real self control to insist on the pause in relations with our former allies, to let time settle the new situation, to get used to dealing with them like with everybody else, and not have pretensions for 'special' relationships even in a new form."

When we were flying to Kiev, on the airplane M.S. said to Kvitsinsky and me: "Look at the hatred we stirred up with our "friendship" after the war. We freed them from the Nazis and then ruined everything!"

He argued with Kohl that bilateral treaties must have a paragraph on non-entry into "hostile alliances." Kohl, of course, shot back: where are these hostile alliances, Mikhail?" (Both Kohl and M.S. had one thing in mind—NATO!) "And in general, what are you afraid of? After all, Hungary in 2005 will become a member of the EU, and the EU will have close cooperation with the USSR!"

The joint press conference on the lawn was very successful. M.S. was in top form, very articulate...

In a word, the new friendship with the Germans got another big bucket of cement for its foundation. The refrain at the meeting for both of them was—if everything is alright with the Soviet-German relationship, it will determine the fate of Europe and world politics. Both of them are coming from this idea.

On the airplane on the way home, he told Kvitsinsky and me, "Kohl understands that he cannot have influence over us, the USSR. Moreover, without us, he cannot wield influence over Europe, and without us he cannot be free of the American influence. So he will do everything to

help us recover and stand together as a modern great power... As for Ukraine, of course he has his eye on Ukraine, but this is different from Hitler's Lebensraum."

By the way, yesterday Kohl met separately with Kravchuk, Fokin (Representative of the USSR Council of Ministers) and... Gurenko (First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine)... During lunch he clearly was condescending with them... And this public (both the president and especially the premier) is a dull and haughty mediocrity! But it thinks very highly of itself!

Walks with M.S. and without him... while Kohl was with the Ukrainians.

Dinner: a very "straightforward" spread, very open-hearted. Drank quite a bit. Toasts!

Departure: Kohl waited in the plane for half an hour for his journalists... In front of the ladder (as usual, I did not stand in the crowd, but to the side)... Kohl stepped out of the group and to everybody's surprise approached me and shook my hand for a long time, patted me on the shoulder and said... I did not understand everything he said, but I got that he was praising me: "You do good work!" Someone from his people must have told him about me, someone with whom I associate: Blech, Teltschik, Kohler, and others. They must have understood that it is not Zagladin but Chernyaev who is the key figure in "these matters."

Who is going to prepare materials for Gonzalez?! He is coming tomorrow! One of M.S.' pals.

July 7, 1991, Sunday

In Volynskoe... The people gathered: Pavlov, Shcherbakov, Minister of Finances Orlov, Academician Abalkin and the wise Yaremenko, a certain scandalous Yasin, director of IMEMO Martynov, of course Medvedev and Ozherel'ev... and for some reason Van'ka Frolov.

Turns out they already had a draft for London. But it was in the form of a letter from M.S. to the heads of the seven states. Nineteen pages long. So my draft was completely out of place.

Gorbachev arrived. They read the draft. He suggested to use it as the basis and to go page by page. I objected, saying that I have a comment of a general nature: the numbers and data embedded in the text create a sense that our economy is failing completely... and that we are uncertain whether we will be able to repay the loans. Why should we do this? Would this really encourage "them" to deal with us, if we admit our powerlessness to deal with our economy ourselves?

Abalkin, then Medvedev said that we should show the situation openly, otherwise they won't believe us.

I objected that they know the situation better than we do. It is a question of psychology and tactics. The heads of G-7 are interested in helping us politically and we should not put them in a situation where every "sherpa" can cite our own "stripping" to raise doubts... After the

political decision is made, it will be too late. Experts and financiers will calculate together with us, what to do with us.

Later, when M.S. and I happened to be one on one, I told him: “We should work on the wording. I did it with my draft, but this is a different text...”

M.S.: “We don’t have the time...”

I: “But it is impossible! For example, it says ‘we conducted work on...’ Sounds like a report for the CC Plenum!” He laughed. But during group discussion he spurned all my attempts to make a comment, correction, or to suggest alternative phrases and formulas. The same thing is happening: in front of high-level people he demonstrates his contempt for his advisers (not just me)—so they would not think that he “listens to them”...

In a word, the text is still so-so. There was a large debate whether to reveal our external debt figures and the national debt in general (240 billion). Abalkin was for it, to “move them to pity” and blackmail them a bit with the threat of a catastrophe. Shcherbakov was against it, out of the consideration that the next day [after seeing these figures] they will close the loans still available to us. So far we have not reached a consensus. I supported the idea to remove numbers from the letter in general—this is not a text for the “sherpas” but for the heads of state. There will be a live discussion and M.S. should have in his pocket all the data available... Yes, honest data... but only “upon request,” not as a striptease.

“Simultaneously,” the head of the Albanian parliamentary delegation was brought to see M.S. in Volynskoe. He is a handsome man, has a PhD in physics (graduated from the University of Paris, etc). They spoke as if the 30 years of hostility never happened... Normal people. Though M.S. did go a little overboard with the “kinship in the socialist idea.” The latter politely agreed and kept trying to explain the situation in Albania. M.S.’ growing overconfidence was telling: he does not read even one-page references before meetings. Sometimes he does not know the names of the people he is speaking to.

Later in the day, I got a call: Matlock was eager to see M.S. with an urgent letter from Bush. M.S. said he should come to Volynskoe. He arrived. The three of us sat down. The Ambassador, glancing at the English text, summarized the main point: Michael, if you still believe that we will manage to conclude the START Treaty, send Bessmertnykh and Moiseev to Washington on July 2nd, but with full plenary powers (!).

M.S. promised to respond within two days.

I sent the text to Bessmertnykh. M.S. called him and Yazov and ordered them to “get to work.”

I said to him, “Mikhail Sergeyevich, why are we dragging this on? The story with the Conventional Weapons Agreement is being repeated. Our behavior contradicts basic common sense. After all, if there will be no war, if we believe this... if you are really going to London to

“integrate,” then what meaning can this stupid telemetry have, or how many warheads on a missile, or the length of the first stage?! These are the games of bygone days!”

In a word, I got carried away.

He replied, “You are impatient, you have a temper like Eduard [Shevardnadze], he also kept rushing and rushing... But these are negotiations,” he pushed me mischievously, “they have their own laws.”

I: “What laws, when we are counting days, and you and Bush are meeting in a week in London? What will you say to him? Why these mannerisms like a general?”

M.S.: “Alright!... The all-explaining and all-concluding “alright.” By the way, I objected to the comparison of me and Shevardnadze—we might have similar temperaments, but the substance is different.

By the way, M.S. railed against Shevardnadze (on the plane from Kiev, with Ignatenko present). He said that Shevardnadze finally has shown his cards, he is eager for power, wants to become president, his ambition is devouring him!

Today from early in the morning I rewrote Gorbachev’s speech for the dinner with Gonzalez. Brutents & Co. had made a draft based on the MFA version while I was in Kiev... But it is not quite right... I don’t understand why people can’t prepare such essentially simple things “in the spirit of M.S.” After all, his style is well known, texts of his speeches, toasts, and interviews are available... All his mannerisms and his train of thought are known!

I sent it to be printed. Then I started working on materials for negotiations. I finished around 4 p.m.

July 9, 1991

Yesterday at Novo Ogarevo M.S. got approval from “9+1” for his “vision” for London. He won again. I had doubts that he would. I thought they would start chewing the fat, finding fault with the fact that they were not given a written text and that it was not done in advance.

This means that something is happening along the lines of settling down. Yesterday he agreed to Bessmertnykh and Moiseev’s trip to Washington, following Bush’s letter that Matlock brought to Volynskoe-2 on Saturday. I asked him, “Is there a real chance of a resolution on START?” “Yes,” he said. “Maybe a similar one as last time?” I asked. He looked at me askance.

Why are all the trump cards in Moiseev’s hands? He came out as the “savior” of the Conventional Arms Treaty, though he was the one who sabotaged it to the limit. And until he went to Washington, there was no progress. And now the same thing?! This is how “we” work.

Yesterday Gonzalez [was here]. They were mutually open to the extreme; to the point that M.S. told him that on the June [sic] 25th CC Plenum he will have to split the Party, it can no longer be maintained as it is. Gonzalez is the smartest of the world leaders I know “personally.”

He represents a true symbiosis of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza! He is a realist who doesn't suffer either from conservatism or radicalism. His strength is in his real common sense. I tried to embellish the press report about their meeting, hinting at some things that cannot be said openly.

Yesterday, after dinner with Gonzalez, M.S. wanted me to be present at the meeting with the Spanish businessman and philanthropist Konoe. They were imposed upon him by Yegorov + R.M. I did not go... Yegorov himself was already at his dacha. Sometime I'm going to have to tell Gorbachev that my age and position prevent me from being the "boy on call." Especially at the whim of Raisa Maksimovna. He got another favorite to replace Frolov—now it is the slacker Yegorov, and once again "through Raisa." Ugh!

July 11, 1991, Thursday

Yesterday at 10 a.m., while at work, I watched Yeltsin's coronation on TV. This is not just new power, not even a new government structure. It is a new system... The speech by the actor and deputy Basiashaili, written by Yeltsin's lieutenants, had something of Holy Vladimir the Baptizer, as well as Sergius of Radonezh, Peter the Great and Catherine II—the creators of the Russian state, the kind that fits modern Russia the most... There is something in the speech of the "events (!) of 1917"... There is no Great Patriotic War. After the October Revolution everything is black... it all deserves only to be trampled and cursed.

In his aggressive, vindictive farewell speech, Patriarch Alexy II blessed precisely this approach to the past... and the future. They assigned him this address "from all confessions," while they stood in the front row—from the Buddhist, to the Jew in his hat.

M.S. decided to speak after the anthem ("Glory to Our Russian Tsar"), the church bells, and Yeltsin's closing speech. It was a poor speech (written by Shakhnazarov and re-dictated by Gorbachev). It did not live up to the solemnity of the occasion, whatever it may mean, but it reflected a powerful (for how long?) current of Russian tendencies, the "rebirth of the Russian idea"... After all, without Russia there would be nothing. There would be no Union... and realistically Russia is the only support the President has... what else? Not Turkmenia and Nazarbayev! After all, he, President Gorbachev, resides in Moscow, which is now again the capital of Russia... The speech was political and would be more fitting for a Congress of People's Deputies, and a routine one at that! What a miss! He could not overcome the personal aspect (his inner surprise that someone like Yeltsin could get so high) and the Party-apparatus aspect—his inability to reject the "socialist choice," even in the past...

Against the background of this very symbolic performance (!), Gorbachev is concerned by the draft Party Program, which he will present at the CC Plenum on July 25th. I think it is a historic mistake for him to identify with a civic idea on a Union scale. It can be explained by the origin of his political thinking. He probably still believes that the Party can exist as a unifying support for the Union. Even as a support of "his cause."

He does not want to see (even though he does see it!) that all these Politburos, these Secretariats—nobody needs them, they have no power even over the Communists anymore. Unlike in the very recent past, their commotion and threats no longer scare anybody.

He asked me to “work a little” on the draft of the Program. Yesterday I spent some time on it... Cleaned it up even further of all the Communist and “socialist choice,” to the point that there’s practically none left. In the evening he called me: “How is it?”

I replied: “This is the best option to keep a sensible nucleus, the *perestroika* nucleus of the Party members... Everything else throws the CPSU into the camp of enemies of society, ‘enemy of the people’—a new people that formed over the last six years.”

M.S. was hesitant, “Georgiy (Shakhnazarov) told me it was a very good draft...”

In any case, against the background of Yeltsin’s inauguration and the “Russian current,” the Union Treaty and the London G-7, the very fact that he deals with this nostalgic Party nonsense only puts Gorbachev farther on the sidelines of pivotal events.

He told me that he talked with Yavlinsky for two hours. He said it was interesting and informative. But... Yavlinsky refused to go to London as a member of the Presidential team: he reserves his option for criticism in case Gorbachev’s plan to emerge from the crisis does not work (i.e. he is preparing a maneuver that he & Co. did when the “500 days” program failed). I said to Gorbachev, “This shows his character in a bad light. He is painfully ambitious... to the level of dishonesty, even though he appears to be honesty personified.”

Instead of him, M.S. included Kravchenko in the trip to London! One more proof that M.S. is afraid to find himself without “old and trusty levers.” He knows that everybody hates Kravchenko from left to right and all around, and that Kravchenko tarnishes Gorbachev’s image. Nevertheless... it’s the same as with the KGB, the Interior Ministry, and the Party...

Today he is receiving an envoy from Kaifu (Prime Minister of Japan). But he refused to see the Israeli Minister of Agriculture. He pushed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh on Yanaev. With scorn he refused to meet with the “impudent” Colonel Ochirov, even though he promised to do so in front of everybody in the lobby of the Supreme Soviet. He is a “democrat” from the army, and his army superiors hate his guts!

July 12, 1991, Early Friday Morning

Yesterday the Japanese Ambassador Edamura came together with the special envoy from Kaifu. The Japanese are very strict about their protocol: these meetings for us are no big deal, and whether we decide to receive them or not depends on Gorbachev’s mood, on “me” (the adviser), on chance... But for them, it is the development or decline of state relations!

It is clear that the Japanese don’t want to lag behind the world in relations with us. Kaifu is reacting to the fact that the press started to contrast him to everyone, even Bush, not to mention the Europeans, in the question of inviting M.S. to the G-7.

In the Hasidim affair (the transfer of the Lubavitcher manuscripts) M.S. won’t budge! He listened to Yegorov, who got involved without knowing the essence of the matter, and repeated Gubenko’s position, as opposed to... mine, and I’m the one who “studied” this issue. We will

lose quite a bit on these “trifles.” Bush, Andreotti, Major, and the Western Jewish lobby are already behind the Hasidim!

M.S. spoke tenderly about Frolov. I suggested: *Pravda* is working against you. He replied, “It is reflecting the situation in the Party.” I said that was no excuse. He replied, “Ivan is probably tired, and doesn’t want to deal with it. He is either in the hospital, or abroad.” This is how he treats his favorites!

July 14, 1991, Evening

About to leave for Uspenka (dacha).

M.S. called, shared his thoughts about what he will say at the G-7. We are not the only ones in a transition period—the entire world is, he said. They also moved away from one system, but haven’t developed a new one. Meanwhile, all the mechanisms were created for a [new] “Cold War.” Yugoslavia showed us that we are not ready to meet new challenges. (He is referring to the fact that gathering in London will be heads of state, not ministers of finance).

I told him: maybe we made a mistake when we said in the “concept” that we sent to members of the G-7 about consolidation of debts. Back in Volynskoe, Shcherbakov and I loudly objected to including this. But he listened to Abalkin and Medvedev. And now he got worked up, because he knows it was wrong, because Bush wrote him (before receiving our “concept”) and advised against doing this, as did Mitterrand after receiving our “concept,” and Andreotti long before receiving it. There is a certain psychology of bankers...

M.S. started to argue that we have to be entirely honest and truthful... That we cannot avoid this (i.e. the situation with debts).

I objected, “The whole world knows about this situation, but when we acknowledge ourselves to be bankrupt, it means something to the creditors!” He tried to convince me for a long time that I do not understand anything.

I went for a walk in Uspenka... went around Novo-Dar’yino. I made a circle in the woods and lost my way: I entered the same village from which I left, only from the other end, imagining that I was somewhere far away.

In the morning (before M.S.’ phone call) I prepared materials for the meeting with Bush in London. I suggested to make it analogous to the meeting in Helsinki (on Saddam Hussein), and also to make a joint statement on Yugoslavia to mark the “presence” of the two superpowers in the conflict. This would show the flag and give a warning to the Yugoslavs and the Western Europeans.

I remember Gonzalez told Gorbachev: “Maybe we will have to call Uncle Sam to save Europe because of the Yugoslavs...” So it would be better for us to present ourselves as the saviors together with “the Uncle.”

July 16, 1991, Tuesday

Today we are leaving for London. Most likely I again won't get to see anything or go anywhere in this city I've grown to love.

Yesterday I finished preparing material for talks (with Bush, Mitterrand, Kaifu, Andreotti, Mulroney, possibly Kohl, Lubbers, Kinnock, Thatcher... and of course for the visit to "England itself"—Major and Elizabeth II).

Primakov called (and it is clear from the TASS): the press is building up the negative vibes in relation to the G-7's ability to help Russia. There are leaks about the G-7's "negative" attitude (at least from four members) toward M.S.' "concept" that was sent to the members.

Rutskoi announced that he is creating his own party: "Communists for Democracy," and leaving the CPSU... M.S. is late with his Program (for the CC Plenum on July 25th). Well, no, not late... he just cannot let go of the umbilical cord. Shakhnazarov told me yesterday that M.S. again tried to inculcate into the draft a "return to Lenin, NEP," etc. My god!

But, actually, it is time for me to decide too. He asked me the other day, jokingly: "Have you left the Party yet?" But for the last five years at least, the extent of my Party membership was paying the dues, though I was even a member of the CC... The only thing that keeps me there is Gorbachev. It's like in "Chapaev": "Who are you for, Vasiliy Ivanovich, the Bolsheviks of the Communists?"

"Who is Lenin for? That's who I'm for," Chapaev told the orderly.

July 20, 1991, Saturday, 5 a.m.!

We were in London from July 16-19th. It was a historic event. It feels as though a country hostile to the President does not want any of this. As soon as we saw our newspapers on the flight home, things turned upside down: a photo in *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, was captioned "7+1" and showed the seven leaders facing forward, and Gorbachev in profile and with his back turned... Everybody, right up to Khasbulatov, had a reserved reaction to the President's visit to London. From tabloids to statesmen, nobody hides the fact that he went to get billions, so to speak, but did not get them! Thus, Gorbachev continues his revolution of "leading the country into the world," while the country reacts with suspicion and hostility.

Meeting with Kaifu, all smiles. Only later will the Japanese Prime Minister tell Andreotti (who in turn told M.S.) that he believed in Gorbachev only after the London meeting.

Zagladin was present at M.S.' meeting with Mitterrand.

Bush. Breakfast at the U.S. Embassy (more on that later). After breakfast, the two presidents retreated into an adjoining room, where they finally resolved the "details" impeding progress on the START Treaty. Again we dragged it out until the last moment, we resisted, but Gorbachev's "world-historical method" did not yield any results.

The G-7 itself at Lancaster House. We, the entourage (except for Primakov), sat “behind the scenes” in a luxurious private room... Four hours non-stop, who knows for what. Instead, I could have been walking around my “favorite city.”

The results: I never doubted that Gorbachev would be invited. It would have been impossible to deny “him.” To think otherwise is equivalent to being influenced by stereotypes about “socialist morality” on the one hand, and “capitalism” on the other.

But it is surprising... that all of them, with the possible exception of Mitterrand, de facto recognize his “greater” significance than their own. Even though he no longer represents a superpower that is “obedient” to him, he is a historical figure, while they are merely elected officials, and will remain in history as statesmen of the “Gorbachev era.”

Bush did not come to visit “Michael” at our embassy, but invited him to the U.S. Embassy. He sincerely and “in a comradely way” believed that Gorbachev would understand it “correctly”: you Michael, so to say, can understand me, but my public opinion at home, the Americans, will never understand if I visit you. Plus, they agreed [on these arrangements] through Matlock back in Moscow, and Bush didn’t know that in Paris there would be a “pilgrimage” to Gorbachev (except for Mitterrand, on account of his age...).

Thus, M.S. appeared in London as the center of attention, symbolizing the meaning of the event: without him, the “seven” would become routine fodder for journalists for 2-3 days, if not less.

The reception on Downing Street. The chattering club, the elite. Major’s speech was worthy of the event, with high and “historic” praises of Gorbachev... I was mistaken in Moscow: Gorbachev’s speech sounded grander than Major’s (and was twice as short!), but I did not think it would be appropriate to mention “my favorite” Thatcher, I thought our host would not like it. But Major mentioned her himself. M.S., who spoke after him, also acknowledged her in the course of his speech. However, our newspapers did not have time to include this addition in the text (which they received ahead of time). It’s a good thing Thatcher doesn’t read *Pravda*, although other people will read it and report to her and to the whole world! I asked Kravchenko to include the change in the TV report. Alas! I have such an “apparatus” that while I was tied up with the scheduled events, I did not have an opportunity to “give orders” to TASS in time, and our stupid rules make it impossible to add changes to the TV program otherwise.

My neighbors at the table (at the reception): the Minister of Transportation, a nice, lively Scotsman. One can appreciate the British tact: despite my terrible English, he had a vigorous conversation with me about “this and that,” as if it was no big deal. And I got used to it pretty quickly, my linguistic shyness dissipated and we had a good chat.

The same thing happened with the lady on the left, though she sometimes switched to very bad French and, this way, we were quite satisfied with each other. She is the wife of some high official.

When we came to Major's office on 10 Downing Street, I got confused during greetings and said "Goodbye"[instead of "hello"]! Awful!

In the evening, M.S. threw a celebration party at his residence for his "close" circle. There were around 20 people! A "reminiscence" ... of how he and Raisa came to "this" ... Geneva, Reykjavik, childhood, youth, and so on. Zamyatin (the Ambassador) said a toast for the author of a new book (R.M.) with a "great feeling"!

In the morning of the 18th, before the meeting with Major, Andreotti visited. His conversation with M.S. was one between two close, trusting friends. As I expected, as they were finishing up he again brought up the Lubavitcher Manuscripts. Oh, we are going to lose big time with those... All the renowned rabbis are here to meet with M.S. Bush brought up the Manuscripts. Andreotti begged: "It would make it much easier for me to work to your benefit with the Jewish lobby in the U.S...." Mulroney whispered about it... But no! "There is a problem," M.S. replied to everybody, using the words of Yegorov-Gubenko!

Now, of course, there will be a noisy and vicious newspaper campaign.

Meeting with Mulroney. At first "our sources" reported that he had turned on us and supposedly objected to Gorbachev's invitation to the G-7. But it turned out that he firmly defended this idea before Bush. This conversation was also extremely friendly, open, and to the point: "I will do everything I can to help you."

I did not go to Major's reception in the Covent Garden and the Admiralty. In the evening, after finishing up my work, I took a quick trip to Soho...

In the morning M.S. had breakfast with Kinnock. I haven't seen him in a long time. He is quite grown up. Nothing is left of his playboy mannerisms: he is serious, smart, aphoristic, and statesmanlike. He is preparing for the Prime Minister's position in January.

During M.S. and Thatcher's meeting, I spent time with her former adviser Powell, my colleague. He is a true Brit. A great guy, smart... We had a meaningful, interesting conversation. I was very open (about *perestroika*, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze). He called my analysis "profound."

Around 11 a.m. we left for Heathrow.

On the plane, Zagladin and I wrote up the results of the meetings, and then joined the drinking in the President's section. But I took a "modest" seat at the second table and did not hear anything over the roar of the IL-62, except maybe for toasts.

July 22, 1991, Monday

In an hour Mitsotakis will be here... The whole week was spent on preparations for Bush's visit to Moscow. I'm exhausted. Not to mention how much Gorbachev has on his plate: tomorrow there is Novo-Ogarevo—the Union Treaty; on the 25th he has the Plenum, which could turn out to be "historic"...

I finished reading Aldanov's *Samoubijstvo*—terrific insight into *perestroika* from the experience of 1917-18. One to one. Bunin knew what he was doing when he tried to nominate him for a Nobel Prize.

July 23, 1991, Tuesday

Yesterday, during the conversation with Mitsotakis, Gorbachev opened up again. "You know," he said, "I put up a question for the referendum—should there be a Union or not. And I decided for myself, if it's a "no," I am leaving. You are the first person I am telling this. Even my adviser," he pointed to me, "doesn't know this..." I did, by the way!

After Mitsotakis, I stepped into [Gorbachev's] lounge near the Kamerger Hall. He said to the waiter, "Leave us alone." Then he said to me, "You know, I received some information. After my breakfast with Bush in London, he said to his team: 'Gorbachev is tired, he is nervous, does not control the situation, he is not confident... that is why he suspects that I am unfaithful and seeks more support. We need to switch our attention to Yeltsin.'"

I responded: "I don't believe this, Mikhail Sergeyevich. Bush cannot be so shallow. This contradicts the entire logic of his recent behavior, and the meaning of the G-7... I think this 'information' is similar to the one you received about Mulroney, when you heard those negative things about him before coming to London. It turned out to be false. Why are they feeding you this?!"

But to myself, I thought: Bush got this feeling not because somebody "tossed" (to use M.S.' expression) him the idea. This feeling came about as the result of the conversation in the U.S. Embassy at lunch, before the G-7 meeting.

Afterwards, Gorbachev was proud (and mentioned it more than once) of how he asked Bush an "uncomfortable" question, which made Bush embarrassed. It turned out that the question had quite a different effect.

The question was as follows:

"Based on the information I have," M.S. said, "I know that the U.S. President is a solid man, that his decisions are the decisions of a serious politician, as opposed to improvisation. Based on these decisions we have already moved toward great perspectives in our dialogue, in the sphere of security."

At the same time, one gets the impression that my friend the U.S. President has not yet come to a final decision on the main question—how the United States would like to see the Soviet Union. Until we have a final answer to this question, we will continue to stumble on various questions in our relations. Meanwhile, time is slipping away.

In this context, the G-7 meeting is a good setting for an important conversation. The main issue is the organic integration of the Soviet Union into the world economy. Of course, a great deal here depends on us.

So I ask you: what is George Bush waiting for? If after this lunch, at the G-7 my colleagues will mostly tell me that they like what we're doing, that they support it, but that in essence we have to boil in our own pot, I will tell them that everybody eats the soup!

This is what perplexes me: you found 100 billion dollars to deal with one regional conflict (meaning the Persian Gulf); money is available for other programs, too. But here we are talking about such a project—to change the Soviet Union, to allow it to reach a new state, to become an organic part of the world economy and world community not as an opposing force or a possible threat. This is an unprecedented task.” (I later checked my notes of this with the interpreter's. They matched).

At this lunch I was sitting next to Gorbachev, i.e. almost across from Bush. As M.S. was presenting this lengthy question, Bush turned crimson before my eyes, his eyes darkened, he did not look at Gorbachev but at me or Primakov, or he would turn around and look at his people—Baker, Scowcroft—as if bewildered. He stopped eating but kept chewing with his lips, or rather, working his jaws.

I felt uneasy. I remember well the thoughts going through my mind at the moment: “What do you want from the American?! You asked him this question three times already. After all, there was Malta; there was your visit to Washington and Camp David, where you rode around the lawns together in golf carts, taking turns at the wheel; there was Helsinki (because of Hussein). Do you need more proof of what the current American President is willing and able (in his circumstances) to do for us?! Once again, if it wasn't for Bush, you would not be here at the G-7. Why are you being so mindlessly tactless?”

The question was posed in the context of Gorbachev's long speech—he was explaining the situation in the country, etc. But after this question, nobody was interested in the rest of the speech. The Americans were eating and whispering among themselves.

Gorbachev finished. There was a pause. Bush started speaking with restrain, suppressing his agitation, in a measured tone: “It appears I have not laid out my policies convincingly enough, if doubts arise regarding how we would like to see the Soviet Union. I could understand if there was a question about what the United States could do to help the Soviet Union. But if we are again discussing the question of how the United States would like to see the Soviet Union, I will try to answer one more time.

We would like the Soviet Union to be a democratic country with a market economy, dynamically integrated into the Western economy.

Finally, I don't want to appear to be meddling in your internal affairs, but I am speaking in terms of economics—[we would like to see] a Soviet Union that successfully resolves the problems between the Center and republics. This is fundamentally important for the inflow of private investment.

So: firstly—democracy, secondly—market, thirdly—federation.”

I think at the time, Gorbachev did not understand that he had been “rebuffed” (to use Soviet terminology).

Time was running out. Lunch was over. Taking only the interpreters, the two presidents stepped into the adjoining room for a minute, which I already mentioned. The Americans walked us down to the cars.

So, when I reacted to the “information” M.S. conveyed to me, I knew what was going on. At that lunch, M.S. created an impression of a man who tries to hide with verbal aggressiveness his uncertainty and confusion in the face of the situation in his country. The Americans understood this.

Gorbachev switched the conversation to... Mitsotakis. Then he said he will receive General Powell tomorrow at 10.15 a.m. In the evening he called and assigned me to write him a text for a speech before the obkom secretaries and members of the CC—on the outcomes of the G-7.

Tomorrow he will try to “convince” them. Three quarters of them probably hate him, in the spirit of today’s appeal to fellow citizens, published in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. A hysterical cry with the message to drive out Gorbachev & Co. before they ruin Russia completely. It was signed by Bondarev, Varenikov, Gromov, Zykina, Rasputin, Zyuganov, Prokhanov, Klykov (a sculptor), and some other people. Once again, the majority of them are people he praised and indulged, and promoted. One more example of betrayal. Does he see this? He does. But why then does he not retire at least two deputy ministers of defense, Generals Varenikov and Gromov? No, he will not do that.

Mit’ka (my grandson) writes in a letter from Copenhagen to grandma and Misha Medvedev: it is better to live in hungry Moscow than in well-fed Copenhagen. Denmark is the most boring nook of heaven. He is reading *War and Peace*. His impressions—“Lev Nikolayevich [Tolstoy] is the greatest...” Etc. These are his selected thoughts.

July 25, 1991, Morning

The Plenum is today... As I was leaving the entrance to my apartment building, I ran into Shaposhnikov, my former colleague from the CC International Department, also Ponomarev’s deputy. He was carrying cognac and some cans in his hands. He asked me, “What’s going to happen to the Party?” “It’ll probably fall apart,” I replied. “Isn’t that something!”

After a telephone conversation with Kohl (about Konigsberg), M.S. kept me in his office. He connected Prokofiev (secretary of the Moscow City Committee) to the selector. They discussed Yeltsin’s decree (de-partisation of enterprises and institutions). Prokofiev said, “This means we are switching to a territorial principle of Party work.”

M.S. said, “I already received 100 telegrams. Obkom secretaries are demanding that we issue a decree to nullify Yeltsin’s decree.”

I interjected: “Don’t do that... Such a decree would not work, but the Novo-Ogarevo trend would be disrupted. Your prestige would decline again.”

But I could see that without my help, he already made the decision not to meddle. He discussed with Prokofiev why Yeltsin did this right now. It seems he had good intentions: we need to work right now, we need calm conditions, while the Communists are stirring unrest at enterprises and in collectives! And how would he, the President, look if he interfered with Yeltsin’s attempts to restore order?!

Prokofiev did not press the issue...

But the Plenum! “It will be a merry affair,” he said that day when receiving Barón Crespo (President of the European Parliament).

He told Prokofiev how Yeltsin fidgeted at Novo-Ogarevo, how he kept asking everybody present about their reaction to his decree. People kept quiet. He asked Gorbachev: “What are you going to do at the Plenum?” Gorbachev replied, “We will discuss the Party Program.” “What Program, who needs it?” B.N. reacted with irritation. Gorbachev repeated with emphasis, “We will discuss the Program!”

It seems M.S. decided to topple the Party. He even told Barón, “whoever is not for it (i.e. the new Program], can leave, either to the left or the right!”

Prokofiev objected to “voluntary Party dues.” M.S. urged him to resolutely replace Polozkov, otherwise, he said, “another party” might arise; a party within the party. It already exists, I said “as an aside.”

July 28, 1991, Sunday Morning

Yesterday I slaved away at materials for the M.S.-Bush meetings. I went through piles of departmental materials, though even I could not read them from beginning to end. Palazhchenko turned out to be my most helpful consultant, though his main job is to translate for Gorbachev. He has a fantastic knowledge of the English language and is widely educated. I put him on the staff of my group from the MFA. My “old men” and Kuvaldin... they are losing their form, and Kuvaldin especially seems to be doing everything reluctantly and is looking for greener pastures... same as Malashenko, who already ran off to Ignatenko.

M.S. is happy with the Plenum. Shakhnazarov prepared a brilliant report for him... It was a threshold that M.S. finally stepped over—into a de-ideologized period... *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* ran a caustic headline: “Gorbachev defeated Marxism-Leninism.” The orthodox and vulgar members of the Plenum did not dare overthrow him... Especially in the face of Yeltsin’s decree on de-partisation. They grumbled self-indulgently... in resentment and hatred.

In the *perestroika* sense, the Plenum is yet another belated “overcoming,” carried out personally by Gorbachev. But right now we do not need a “renewal” of the Party. Rather, we need a new party to be created, a road already taken by Rutskoi and others.

Speeches for Bush. M.S. corrected them over the phone yesterday, toning down the zest and making it more “balanced” from the perspective of compliments to his friend George. Too bad! He is stingy with praise and gratitude... It would not hurt, especially where it's deserved.

August 1, 1991, Thursday

Today Bush goes to Kiev, and then leaves for home. Yesterday we were in Novo-Ogarevo. My main observation: the historic significance of this visit is not in the START Treaty—this matter will proceed regardless, because nuclear weapons ceased to be a political element, now it is about economics, psychology, and the social sphere. The global observation is this: the U.S. and USSR have practically begun following the same policies in the world (Iraq, the Middle East, Europe, Yugoslavia)... But this happened when the U.S. became convinced that we are not a threat to them.

The contact between them was closer than back in the day with our “friends” from socialist countries. There is no hypocrisy, self-righteousness, no paternalism, pats on the back and obedience.

During lunch at Novo-Ogarevo, M.S. suddenly raised a toast to me... and Scowcroft. But in general, Bush and Baker are indifferent to me. Maybe somewhere deep inside they have a sense that I play some role... But there is no contact and recognition because, alas, I “have no language” (compared to Dobrynin and the rest!).

I really do not want to go to the Crimea with M.S. It will be hard labor in a hot and sweet setting. Plus, it seems like they will downgrade our comforts: [hotel] “Yuzhnyi” costs 4000 rubles per person!

To come back to the visit: the toasts written by Palazhchenko and me were stronger than Bush's. We are not so bad as speechwriters! I wonder, who will replace me in this?

August 3, 1991, Saturday

Tomorrow I am leaving with M.S. for the Crimea. Again.

Yesterday, after the conversation with the Yugoslavs (which by the way smacked of the former “friendship” that we had with our Warsaw Pact Allies... except this time, it was sincere comradeship, complete openness and some kind of closeness) he sat down on the edge of his chair, and said: “There you go, Tolya, I am tired like hell! Tomorrow I still have to hold a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers—harvest, transportation, debt, industrial communications, no money, the market... Pavlov said, “if you don't come (to the meeting), nothing will work out. Everyone pulls in a different direction, and it is all ‘give give give!’ Everywhere things are in a bad shape.” He remembered Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, how he was drinking with them till 3 a.m. in Novo-Ogarevo and discussing the Union Treaty and the next elections. “Oh, Tolya. What shallow, vulgar, and provincial people. Both of them! You look at them and think, with whom am I doing this work, and for whom? I wish I could just abandon it all. But I would have to leave

it to them. I am tired.” Nevertheless, yesterday he gave an interview about the Union Treaty and said everything... he practically committed to a free confederation.

If you think deeper... it is not Yeltsin who is using Gorbachev (in the historical-*perestroika* sense), but Gorbachev who is using Yeltsin as a bulldozer to clear the field for his ideas. After all, neither Yeltsin nor his team have come up with a single major idea that wasn't already conceived by Gorbachev (I would know) or publicly said by him. The smarter ones among his enemies and opponents understand this. And they make do for themselves... at his expense, his nerves, his mind and tactical skill...

August 4, 1991, Morning, before leaving for the Crimea with M.S.

Ignatenko came over yesterday, we “made up.” He brought three bottles of wine, “for the road.” We talked about the uselessness of the presidential apparatus, about Boldin, who absolutely does not fit. Ignatenko told me about his conversation with Sununu and Scowcroft at a Spaso House reception. They asked him, “Why is Chernyaev not here?” He made an excuse that I was working on the results of Novo-Ogarevo and in general had many things to take care of before the vacation with M.S. The Americans replied that they recognize three figures close to the President: Ignatenko, Chernyaev, and Revenko. “What about Shakhnazarov?” Vitaliy asked... “Well, he too, but he seems to be too sickly and very old. We don’t know him as well...” (They are crafty, because Matlock visited Shakhnazarov pretty often, and journalists visit him all the time).

I think their opinion comes from Baker and Matlock; the latter has been visiting me often lately, and he might be “repaying” the compliments M.S. and I paid him.

We talked about Yakovlev, who is “resigning” as the President’s adviser and going to... the Moscow Duma?! M.S. said the following about him recently: “I don’t understand... he is a [political] figure with a name. There is varied public opinion about him, both good and bad. For what it’s worth, he is number two among the initiators of *perestroika*. He could become a scholar or retire and remain in history in this position. Instead, he fusses, goes as a henchman to Gavrila Popov. Together with Shevardnadze, he started working on a new party, some kind of movement for democratic reform... Both of them appear at all the opposition meetings, including Rutskoi’s. He gives interviews to opposition newspapers practically every day... In short, vanity rules over common sense and even respect for what was really achieved by Yakovlev and Shevardnadze to transform the state. Amazing!”

A.G. Kovalev has an ulcer, he is in Barvikha. I talked him out of transferring to a hospital. He agreed, mainly so he wouldn’t be absent from the MFA for months... Already they don’t take his opinion much into consideration. And, regrettably, his absence is not really noticeable. “His game is finished,” as M.S. said about Abalkin, when I recently suggested him for the role of the Soviet “sherpa.”

Brutents visited. He still has his hangups. It is probably because I don’t really need him... more and more I’ve been sending him on “independent” trips: Prague, Rome, Kuala Lumpur. And I don’t want to make him the head of my consultants, because as a boss he becomes rude

and exploits people... He is no longer used to writing himself... But I need people to write, even semi-finished products, instead of just “expressing their opinion” of how people should write.

He keeps asking to be named assistant to the President, as opposed to deputy adviser to the President! Oh-ho-ho! It is time for him to start thinking about his eternal soul, but people keep fussing... except for me. Because I know that the deep meaning of life is in its feminine beginning! And... my constant contact with it.

It's time to go. Oh, how I don't want to... I'll have to live in [hotel] Tessel this time, not in [hotel] "Yuzhnyi."

Three Days in Foros

Soon after I got back to Moscow, I related what I saw and heard while I was with M.S. in Foros¹⁶ from August 18-19th, 1991, in interviews to Sasha Bezymenskaya for *Der Spiegel*, A. Lyubimov for the TV program “Vzglyad” [The View], as well as the newspaper *Izvestia* and the American magazine *Time*. Here I will try to bring everything together.

A few preliminary explanations. I should decipher some names before I begin. Olga—Olga Vasilievna Lanina, an assistant in the President’s Secretariat. Tamara or Toma—Tamara Alekseyevna Aleksandrova, my assistant as the President’s adviser. Shakh—Georgy Khosroevich Shakhnazarov, who was also the President’s adviser at the time. The initials M.S. and R.M. do not require explanation. “Yuzhnyi” is a sanatorium, 12km from “Zarya,” where Olga, Tamara and I spent the nights and where we also went during the day for lunch. We worked in an office around 50 meters away from Gorbachev’s house.

While I made entries into my diary, I would turn on “Mayak” (a continuous information radio program) every half an hour. In between new broadcasts, “Mayak” played symphonies and music from Tchaikovsky’s ballet *Swan Lake*, which became sickening in that atmosphere. For millions of listeners afterwards, this music became forever associated with the coup. The information I heard on “Mayak” I immediately recorded in my diary; I reproduce these entries here in a different font, even though they interrupt the text.

Thus, to the diary.

August 21, 1991, Crimea, Dacha “Zarya”

Looks like it is time to start recording the events. If I don’t do it, nobody else will. And I happened to witness a turning point in history.

On the 18th, Sunday, after lunch at “Yuzhnyi,” Olga and I came back to work. Tamara asked to stay at the hotel, since it was Sunday. We really did not have any urgent work to do. The two of us would have managed without a problem. The speech for the occasion of signing the Union Treaty was ready. Gorbachev altered it a couple times, kept asking Shakhnazarov and me to “increase the scope” of it, and from me he wanted more “style,” too. G.Kh. is on vacation in “Yuzhnyi” here, he did not join us in our work at Gorbachev’s dacha, though he was in contact with M.S. over the phone.

So, around 4 p.m., Olga and I entered the dacha grounds.

At the entrance, as usual, there were two police cars and a spike strip on the ground,¹⁷ which was moved away for us.

¹⁶ After the coup, “Foros” became the proper noun [associated with the events]. In reality, it is a beach town located 5-6 kilometers (along the coast) from the Presidential dacha, which is called “Zarya.” [Author’s note]

¹⁷ By the way, this spike strip was there from the moment of the President’s arrival in the Crimea (though it hadn’t been there in the two previous years), not from the start of the coup. [Author’s note]

Around 5 p.m., Olga ran into my office, saying, “Anatoly Sergeyevich, what’s going on? Boldin is here, together with Baklanov and Shenin, and another general, tall and in glasses, I don’t know him.” (Later we found out it was Varennikov). I looked out my door... there was a congregation of cars at the entrance to our building, all of them with antennas, some with emergency lights... and a crowd of drivers and security personnel. I looked out the window facing M.S.’ house and saw a gloomy Plekhanov walking down the path. From a distance, I could see Boldin on the balcony.

Olga said, “Anatoly Sergeyevich, something is going on here... You know that communication lines have been disconnected?” I picked up the receiver... the first, second, third, including the secure line¹⁸ –silence. We started guessing. Aloud, I brainstormed that there might be some new power plant accident (because Baklanov was among those present), recently there was a report of some failures at the Tiraspol power plants, and on one of the Chernobyl blocks...

But it turned out to be much worse!

Four people were with M.S.

Plekhanov, Generalov (his deputy), and Medvedev were sitting on the stairs under my window... They glanced when I approached the window. I turned on the transistor radio: it played normal programming. Then it was reported that M.S. greeted some conference, that he conveyed a message to Najibullah on the occasion of “their” holiday (I made the drafts)...

In about an hour, the four departed. Plekhanov also left, taking Medvedev with him. Medvedev was the President’s personal guard; on all the official photographs and on the TV screen he stood at his back and never left him anywhere. This time he went to Moscow, abandoning and betraying “his President.” This already was a sign. Even when I was telling Olga about the power plant, I understood that this was actually about Gorbachev.

The phone lines were disconnected completely.

Earlier, when we were on the way to the office, Olga asked to be released early, around 5 p.m., so she could go for a swim, etc. Now, the car did not arrive to get her. I told the driver to pick me up at 6:30, but he did not come for me, either. I asked the security guard on duty to get whoever was in charge to explain to me what was going on.

About 10 minutes later, Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Generalov showed up. We became well acquainted during Gorbachev’s trips abroad, where he usually was in charge of security. He is very polite. He asked Olga to leave us alone and took a seat. “Anatoly Sergeyevich, don’t get me wrong. They left me in charge here. I have orders not to let anyone out. Even if I allowed you to leave the premises, you would be immediately detained by the border guards: there is a triple semi-circle [of guards] from one sea shore to the other. The road to Sevastopol-Yalta is closed off around here. You can see, there are three ships already at sea...”

¹⁸ A government communications point, located in Mukhalatka, 20 km from “Zarya” in the direction of Yalta. There was a connection through the telephone operators working in the KGB. [Author’s note]

I asked him an innocent question: “What about signing the Union Treaty tomorrow?”

He replied: “It will not be signed. The plane that came for M.S. was sent back to Moscow. The garages with his cars are sealed, and they guarded not by my people, but gunmen who were sent over here. I cannot even allow the extended service staff (local people—gardeners, cooks, cleaning ladies) to go home. I don’t know where I’m going to house them.”

I again asked a naïve question: “But how can this be—my things are in “Yuzhnyi,” and finally, it is time for dinner! Tamara Alekseyevna is there, she is probably worried and doesn’t know what’s going on.” I understood what a terrible position she was in when we did not return to the sanatorium in the evening. Later she told me how worried she was, and how she tried to contact us. But phone lines were cut off there as well. And she was refused a car.

He said: “There is nothing I can do. Please understand me, Anatoly Sergeyevich. I am a military man. I have my orders... nobody is to leave the premises! And no calling.”

He left. Olga came back. She is lively, sharp, and smart (recently married, has a 1.5 year old child, and her husband Kolya is here, he is a driver for one of the presidential cars). She started to rail against Boldin, who was her boss a long time ago. She cannot stand him: “Why did he show up here? To show that he’s already kissing ... off his bosses?” And more along those lines. Time was passing by stupidly.

It was getting dark when handsome Boris, Gorbachev’s new guard (replacing Medvedev), told me that M.S. is asking me to come outside. He was nearby, Boris said, taking a walk around the dacha.

I quickly got dressed. As I walked out, I was thinking: in what state will he be when I see him? How is he?

(10 a.m.¹⁹ “Mayak” is broadcasting the message from the commandant of Moscow. The first clashes took place at night; attacks on the armored vehicles and patrols on Smolenskaya Square (by the way, near the building where I live in Moscow. What my family must feel!) and by the building of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the hotel. There are some killed and wounded. This means first blood. The Commandant is blaming everything on “disorderly elements” and criminals...).

(12 p.m. on “Mayak”: Ivashko said in an address to Yanaev: the PB and the CC Secretariat cannot make a judgment about the events until they meet with the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Gorbachev! This is something! Especially after the spilled blood).

To continue: M.S., R.M., their daughter Ira and her husband Tolya were standing by the entrance to the dacha. We joked—some people are cold, some hot: M.S. was wearing a warm sweater, because two days ago his back acted up again, old sciatica came back. When he was

¹⁹ This is the morning of August 21st. As I mentioned earlier, I started recording the events in my diary on the 21st, and every now and then I interrupt the narrative to record what I heard on radio “Mayak.” [Author’s note]

young he swam in an ice-hole and was a winter-swimmer, from which he got this ailment. M.S. mentioned that “doctors told him to take care of himself.” In general he is afraid of drafts.

He was calm, even-tempered, and smiling. “Do you know what happened?” he asked.

“No, how would I know! I only watched from my window. I saw Plekhanov, Boldin. I heard there was another one, some general, tall and in glasses... and Baklanov.”

“The general was Varennikov. He was the most active of the group. Listen, I want you to know what happened.”

R.M. said, “They walked in without asking, without warning. Plekhanov was leading them and the guards stepped out of his way. It was completely unexpected. I was sitting in an armchair, they walked by me and only Baklanov said hello. Not Boldin! We were on the best of terms for 15 years! He was like a relative to us, we trusted him with everything, even the most intimate things!!!”

M.S. stopped her, and said to me, “Listen. They sat down, I asked them ‘What have you come to me with?’ Baklanov started speaking, but Varennikov talked the most. Shenin was quiet. Boldin tried to say something once—‘Mikhail Sergeyevich, don’t you understand what kind of the situation this is!!’ I told him, ‘You’re a scumbag [*mudak*] and better keep your mouth shut. You came here to give me a lecture on the situation in the country.’” (He said the word scumbag [*mudak*] in front of the ladies. Ira laughed and interpreted it as “mutant” [*mutant*], which was very fitting. She is very smart and educated in general).

M.S. continued, “In a word, they offered me two options: either transfer my powers to Yanaev and agree to a state of emergency, or renounce the presidency. They tried to blackmail me,” he did not explain how, “I told them, ‘You could have guessed that I would not agree to either option. You are trying to arrange a coup d’état. What you want to do with this Committee and such—it is unconstitutional and illegal. It is a gamble that will lead to blood and a civil war.’ The general started to argue that they will ‘ensure’ that it does not come to that. I said, ‘Excuse me, Cde. Varennikov, but I don’t remember your full name...’

He replied, ‘Valentin Ivanovich.’

‘So, Valentin Ivanovich—society is not a battalion. No ‘Left and march step,’ for you. Your undertaking will resound with a terrible tragedy, all the things that started coming together now, they will be broken. Let’s suppose you put everyone down, you disband the government, you install troops everywhere... and then what? You caught me as I was working on an article.’²⁰

²⁰Judging by the article, he foresaw the possible scenarios, including the “emergency” option. It contained an extensive, detailed analysis of our economic, social, and political situation. There was also an understanding of the deep dissatisfaction and tension in society, as well as the danger that this tension would spill out. Gorbachev analyzed which methods of emerging from the crisis were acceptable, which should be chosen, and which should be rejected immediately, despite the severity of the situation. The process of agreement through the “9+1”

Gorbachev continued relating the details of how he rebutted the unwelcome guests.
“‘Well,’ I said, ‘In the article I consider the course you are pursuing now—the emergency situation. I thought through everything. I am convinced that this is a disastrous path; it could turn into a bloody path... And it would lead not just to nowhere; it would lead right back to pre-*perestroika* times.’ With that they left.”

Everybody wanted to know what would happen next.

M.S.: “Tomorrow they are supposed to disclose their plan. How will they explain ‘my situation’?”

We talked about the people who came. I did not fail to throw in: “These are all ‘your’ people, M.S., you nurtured them, raised them, trusted them... Take even Boldin.” “Well, Plekhanov,” M.S. said, stepping around Boldin, “it goes without question, he is not a good person! Is he thinking about his motherland when he betrays me?! No, about his own skin!”

M.S. started to think aloud about the other “members” of this operation: the visitors named some members of the State Emergency Committee to him. He could not reconcile with the fact that Yazov was among them. He did not want to believe it: “Maybe they wrote in his name, without asking him?” I shared his doubts of the old marshal’s involvement. But with regard to Kryuchkov, I “assuaged” his hesitations: “He is quite capable of something like this...

formula was underway; we were on the verge of signing the Union Treaty that would change the situation in the country radically. It would become the turning point in the development of the state and society; a point when new structures could be created, and the decisions could be implemented more quickly. The most important thing at the moment, Gorbachev thought, was to secure this process of agreement, to keep it from “going off the rails,” as he said.

He saw that the forces resisting *perestroika* took into account that the country approached the point of no return, which is why they decided to undertake this venture. These forces had long made themselves felt at the CC CPSU Plenums, the USSR People’s Deputies congresses, and at the Supreme Soviet. They had been asking for an emergency situation at meetings and in print for a long time.

In the article, Gorbachev examines in detail what the outcomes of each course of action would be. Since society had changed and “the people grew used to the air of freedom” (he has that expression in there), people would never agree to turn back, and they would never agree to a dictatorial regime. Perhaps they could achieve some success in certain areas—after all, the people are at the breaking point and there are some sentiments along the lines of—to hell with it, with the dictatorship, with the junta, let it be anyone, as long as there is immediate relief from the daily troubles and improvement in life. The Russian people have a tendency to look for a savior in the supreme power that would come, bring justice and improve everything. These sentiments are dangerous. And yet, the people as a whole, the country would not want to go back and lose the atmosphere of freedom created by *perestroika*. This was M.S.’ reasoning.

That is why a state of emergency, in his estimation, would be a step towards civil war with countless victims across the country. After all, there were some democratic institutions already in place, and they would rise up against the dictatorship. But the most important factor would be the spontaneous resistance of many thousands of people.

In a draft of the article, Gorbachev described some of the powers that would be likely to act according to the “emergency scenario,” naming Party structures that carry a great reactionary charge—the military-industrial complex, which is heavily tied to the old regime and wants to regain its former status and privileges. He referred to other reactionary categories of society. Specific names were not named, of course. [Author’s note]

Plus, it would be unthinkable to contrive such a plan without the KGB chairman's involvement, not to mention acting upon it!"

"What about Yanaev?" M.S. was outraged. "Two hours before these guys' arrival I talked with him on the phone. He went all out, telling me how they are waiting for me in Moscow, how he will come to meet me in Vnukovo tomorrow!"

We walked around like for this about 15 more minutes.

I got back to my room, and started worrying about Tamara. She was over in "Yuzhnyi" ... in a panic, probably running between Primakov and Shakhnazarov, Shakhnazarov and Krasin,²¹ begging them to find out at least something.

The next day I asked Generalov to come to my office. He showed up, though I did not expect him to. I told him it is wrong to torture a woman like this, and asked him to help her get a ticket to Moscow. He replied that it is impossible to get a ticket right now (? – impossible for him!) But after some thought, he suddenly asked:

- How ready is she to leave?
- How should I know? Why?
- A military plane is going to Moscow today. It is taking some communications equipment and signalers, and one sick man from the security guards.²²
- Take Tamara with you then!
- Alright. I will send a car for her right now.
- Tell her to pack my suitcase as well and have it delivered here. I don't even have anything to shave with here...

I got my suitcase late at night. The next day I found out that Tamara got a seat on that plane.

What was the level of our isolation in "Zarya"? This was a question I got often from journalists and friends after we got back to Moscow.

The people Generalov brought, "his" men, were not very many. Some of them he put by the garages, which contained the presidential cars with autonomous communication systems. Some men were stationed by the gates, and they also had guns. The border towers on the beach

²¹ Yu.A. Krasin was the Head of the former Institute of Social Sciences, we've known each other for a long time. He was vacationing in "Yuzhnyi." [Author's note]

²² I guessed immediately what "communications" he was talking about. Generalov had said too much. He was talking about what in popular language is called "the nuclear button" ... Later this was confirmed. The officers who constantly accompany the famous "suitcase," were returned to Moscow on Moiseev's orders, he was the Chief of Defense. [Author's note]

were already there—at both ends of the semicircle of the dacha's territory. Border guards were on duty there. But two or three days before the coup, their numbers increased along the highway. Only later, Olga and I recalled that we did not attach any importance to it at the time. Also, people in unusual uniforms appeared along the highway—in sailor's striped vests, with trousers worn over high boots, and wearing shoes instead of boots. They looked like the riot police. Later we figured out what this meant. It was enough to step out from our office and look at the edge of the cliffs along the Sevastopol-Yalta road to see that border guards stood every 50-100 meters along the road, some of them had dogs.

We were closely monitored. Below are some episodes to prove this.

On the 19th during the day I went to visit Gorbachev. The guard in the booth on the way to the dacha stopped me.

“Who are you?”

“I'm an adviser.”

“Where are you going?”

“It's easy to guess,” I said, pointing at the presidential dacha.

“It is not allowed.”

I lost my temper and started cursing at him. Suddenly, Oleg (one of the bodyguards) jumped out from behind me and told him: “You—get back in your booth! And never get in his way again (pointing at me). Go ahead, Anatoly Sergeyevich.”

I will digress, because this is an important point. This helped to maintain an atmosphere of some minimal reliability. At least the hope that they will not be able to take us with their bare hands. And if they try, it will be costly. “The public” usually looks at the bodyguards with contempt. But these guys proved to be real knights. When their superiors, Plekhanov and Medvedev, betrayed the President, they betrayed these boys, too. But they did not falter. Day and night they changed shifts. They were calm, intense, strong guys, with guns and walkie-talkies, some of them picked up machine guns... They were in all the “vital” points around the dacha, sometimes hidden in the bushes. They were ready to fight to the death: because it is their job and their duty, but more than anything because they are good people and noble in spirit. There were only five of them.

The second episode. On the morning of the 20th, Olya told me, “A.S., why do you sit in your office all the time. Let's go for a swim. The boys (i.e. the security guards she knows through her husband) are forbidden from going to the water. But it is unlikely that they will stop you, though they won't let us go without you.”

“Where would we go?”

“Behind the house, where the cafeteria and garages are located, and where most of the guys live, there is a path down to the water. It is steep and rocky; one could slip and fall. But people go there.”

I agreed. Nikolai Fedosievich²³ brought something on a plate from the cafeteria. I ate. Olya came by with Larisa (nurse) and Tatiana—a big and good woman, she’s a masseuse.

We went. The first guard we passed looked at us suspiciously. He did not stop us, but immediately reported on his walkie-talkie: “Chernyaev is going somewhere.” When we passed by the staff housing, the security guard we are friends with ran over to us, with a ball (there is a sports court nearby). I asked him, “Having fun?” “What else is there to do, A.S.? They won’t let us go anywhere. It’s hot. It’s awful!”

We made it to the path and to the sharp descent down some makeshift stairs. The descent was around 100 meters. Halfway down, Olga said, “Look behind us!” I turned around and saw that a man was following us. We descended to the beach. In between large boulders there was access to the water and a small open area with three wooden mats. Larisa lay down to sunbathe, the rest of us went into the water—you could break a leg before getting to a spot deep enough to swim. I made a few strokes and then turned on my back. The man who was following us was on the phone. Larisa later told us that he said, “Chernyaev is here. I’m at the post.” (The security guards swim on this beach, so there is a telephone in a booth here, for emergencies.)

To the right of us was a border guard tower. Two soldiers fixed their telescopes and binoculars on us. In front of us there was a patrol boat and a speed-boat... they started their engines. About a hundred meters away loomed a frigate.

Why was the security guard necessary then? To catch me, if I try to swim to Turkey? He wouldn’t be able to: I swim too well (compared to him, he was a chubby guy). It was clear that they wanted us to know that we have no control, we are being watched everywhere, we are half-prisoners. Psychological pressure.

After 30 minutes, we got out of the water. The security guard turned away. As we went up, we heard him say behind us on the phone: “Chernyaev is going up!”

The girls persuaded me to go swimming again the following day. We went, but I told them: “It is disgusting; I don’t really feel like going.” Tanya responded: “Same here, I would not go, but I want to annoy those bastards.”

It was the same “procedure” as the first time: a different security guard followed us down. Before we had time to take our clothes off, he loudly said over the phone: “The object under observation is here. I am staying...” But this time, an additional border patrol guard with a dog showed up at the top of the path.

As we swam, we could see the dacha’s balcony, and Ira and Tolya watching us from there. Below them, closer to the “presidential” beach, there was Generalov and about five more

²³ N.F. Pokutnij, the President’s second personal doctor. [Author’s note]

people, all lined up and watching us through binoculars. Later, Generalov “found it necessary” to bring to Olga’s attention that he saw how we swam.

After the second day, M.S. told me not to go far from the house, or at least not without his knowledge. What did he mean? Maybe he was only “showing concern”...

At 3 p.m. on August 21st, news on TV: Yeltsin made a statement in the Russian parliament that Gorbachev is in isolation in the Crimea. They made a decision to send Rutskoi, Silaev and other deputies here. Bakatin made a speech. The announcer excitedly gave a detailed account of this speech: This is a coup d'état. At least as of Sunday, Gorbachev was perfectly healthy, save for some sciatica (he must have found out from Primakov). This is lawlessness. We should invite the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies to the Russian parliament; they are currently being heavily influenced.

The parliament held a minute of silence for the people who died during the night “next to the building.”

Mikhail Sergeyevich, this is where people are tested: Bakatin, whom you pushed away, fearing all those Lukyanovs and Yanaevs, and the rest!

[Following is a record of] my communication with M.S. during these days.

On the morning of the 19th, as soon as I heard about the emergency situation over “Mayak,” I started thinking how to act toward M.S.—to wait for summons? That is, follow the same chain of command? No, that will not do: he must be convinced of my loyalty. I went to him. I wandered around the house for a long time, until his granddaughter saw me and took me upstairs to her grandfather. He was lying in bed after a routine procedure for his sciatica.

“You know, Anatoly,” he said right away, “when I spoke with them, I did not flinch. I was completely calm. Even now, I am calm. I am certain that I am right. I am certain that this is a gamble, and God forbid there will be blood...”

He was quiet for a while. Then, “They will not be able to restore order, nor to harvest, nor get the economy going... They will not succeed! It is a criminal gamble! Think about what we should do, and come by after lunch.”

I came over as we agreed. We went to the beach with the whole family. It was impossible to talk in the house anymore, because it was bugged everywhere, as Raisa Maksimovna kept constantly warning us in a panic.

A memorable moment: when we were going down to the beach, M.S.’ youngest granddaughter clung to me and took me by the hand, saying, “I have some cards.” She held a deck in her small hands, “This is a king, this is a queen... no, a Jack, and this... oh! I forgot...” (it was a ten). I said, “That’s fine. But what suit is it?” (I did not expect her to know this word).

“It is wormy!”²⁴ This child’s mistake struck close to the heart, reminding me of the situation that even this little girl was a part of.

R.M. took M.S. and me into a small pavilion and sent everyone else to the sea. Feverishly, she ripped a couple clean pages from a notebook and handed them to me, then for a long time she searched in her purse for a pen. Finally she found a pencil and gave it to me. “I will leave you,” she said. “Yes, yes,” M.S. said impatiently (which is unusual for him when talking to her), “we have to work.” She smiled pitifully and waved to me.

M.S.: “Tolya! We have to do something. I will pressure this scoundrel,” (he was talking about General Generalov). “I will make demands every day, and I will increase them.”

I: “Yes M.S., I agree. I doubt that the gang in Moscow will react to it, but you cannot let them think that you’ve resigned to this situation.”

M.S.: “Write this down. Firstly, I demand the immediate restoration of government communications. Secondly, I demand an immediate dispatch of the presidential plane, so I can get back to work. If they don’t respond, tomorrow I will insist that they send journalists, both Soviet and foreign.”

I wrote it down. He said, “Watch out that they don’t confiscate this from you on the way back!”

“They won’t,” I said confidently.

On the 20th, I went to see M.S. immediately after the swim I described earlier. Again I walked around the house for a while until the cook told me that he was in the office. He walked out to meet me, and at the same time Raisa Maksimovna did too, from another room. She immediately dragged us to the balcony, pointing to the lamps, the ceiling, the furniture, indicating that they’re bugged. We stood for a while, leaning on the railing. I said, “R.M., you see that cliff with the border patrol tower. Beyond it, after a turn is Tesseli (which is a subsidiary of the “Foros” sanatorium, it contains a dacha in which Maxim Gorky lived in the Crimea in the 1930s). Before “Zarya” was built, there was a wild, deserted “beach” here. In reality, it wasn’t much of a beach, just some large rocks and it was difficult to get in the water. So... I vacationed in Tesseli several times. And I swam here from that cliff. I would lie here, and then swim back.

R.M. listened absentmindedly. She was startled when I went on, “You probably know that I am a very good swimmer? It would be no problem for me to swim 5 km, and probably even 10 km. Perhaps we should risk it?”

I smiled as I said this. But she became alert. She looked directly at me for a long time, seriously thinking that such an “option” was possible. Before this, she was rapidly whispering to me about how at 3 a.m. they hid in an internal room in the house and took pictures of M.S.’ statement with Tolya’s camera. “We’ll cut it from the film,” she said (but she concealed the fact

²⁴ In the Russian, the suit of hearts is called “chervi,” which is literally translated as “worms.” The granddaughter calls the suit “chervivaya”—wormy. [Translator’s note]

that they made two copies, plus also took pictures of the doctor Igor Anatol'ievich's statement). "So, I will package the film into a small bundle and will give it to you in the evening. But, for God's sake, please do not keep it on you. You could be searched. And don't hide it in your office." M.S. interjected here and suggested to hide it in my swimming trunks. I dry them on the balcony near Olya and Toma's room, where their typewriters and other office supplies are kept.

M.S. was skeptical of the idea that I should swim to Tesseli, Foros, or even "Yuzhnyi": "Even if they don't fish you out of the water, when you come out you'll be practically naked. And then what? They will send you to the nearest police station, and the film will be lost." But they discussed it in earnest, though the idea was clearly absurd. And I suggested it as a joke, to somehow relieve their nervous tension.

R.M. gave me the film later. In the meantime, M.S. asked her to look after the children. We went to a different balcony, stood by the railing and immediately saw how the telescopes from watchtowers turned toward us, and the border patrol on the nearest cliff caught us in his binoculars. At the same time, we heard from the booth below the house: "The object under observation is out on the balcony, second from the left." M.S. and I looked at each other, I laughed and cursed at them... He gave me a look: I had not allowed myself to curse in front of him before. (I regretted it, afraid that he would think that now I can allow myself to do this!)

We sat at a table; he put a notebook in front on him. He offered me to sit across from him, with my back to the sun and in the sun. I said, "Would it be alright if I sat next to you? I don't like the sun, unlike you and Bush... Remember how in Novo-Ogarevo he changed seats to where I had been sitting, when the sun came from around the wall and I moved to sit near you in the shade?"

M.S. smiled, probably remembering the meeting with Bush as an episode of ancient history, though it took place only three weeks ago.

He began to dictate a statement—an address to the nation and the international community. We talked. Discussed and formulated every point. I went back to my office, where Olya typed it on the special thick stationery intended for presidential notes. In the evening I asked him to sign it and add the date and place. At the top he added a note, requesting anyone who finds this statement to make it public through any means possible. When I was leaving, R.M. again gave me strict instructions to hide it well and manage to hold on to it if I am searched on the way. I think these fears are the fruit of nervous strain. Ever since the war, my sense of physical danger has atrophied somewhat.

The day before she gave me her book, "Ya nadeus" [I hope], it was an advance copy that she got on the 17th. She asked me to read it overnight... I did, and praised it highly. Mikhail Sergeyevich was very happy about this, his eyes even watered. I assured them that the book will be in demand all over the world... and at home, as well. "They will not be able to keep it quiet, no matter what happens," I said confidently. In general, with my entire appearance and behavior I tried to convey to them that things will be alright.

He met me with some kind of heightened hope that I might bring some good news. They asked me what I heard on “Mayak” (I caught a signal through some antediluvian radio we found in Olga and Tamara’s room), what I think about what I heard, and in general what are my thoughts on what will happen tomorrow, the day after, or in a week. In a manner that is usual for me, I answered cheerfully and confidently. The entire time, R.M. was extremely tense; she did not smile even once. Her daughter Ira, on the other hand, was full of determination, fearless, sharp... and ruthless in her words and “epithets” about “what was done to them.” We exchanged words on “abstract” literary themes... which would seem out of place. And her husband Tolya—a surgeon in city hospital No.1—is also smart, confident, a real man, a support.

In any case, I did not bring them any news. All our discussions centered on the consequences of the arrival of Boldin & Co. We discussed the possible reactions of the world community. We guessed what Kohl might be thinking, or Bush. Gorbachev believed unequivocally that there would be no support for the junta. All the credits would be withdrawn in a moment. And our banks would immediately go bankrupt. Without these credits, which were given practically under the security of his name, our light industry would be emaciated. Everything will come to a halt. He called the conspirators mouse brained, because they could not calculate basic things.

We discussed the republics’ possible reactions. Gorbachev believed that the coup members’ actions would lead to a rapid disintegration of the Union. Because the republics could take the following position: you, Russians, are fighting in Moscow, while our business is on the side. We will separate and do our own thing. This is what happened, actually. Some even wanted to support the junta, but only in order to leave Moscow to deal with its own problems.

The Gorbachevs’ mood changed depending on the news from the radio. For example, when some guys from the personal security unit turned on the TV with the help of some wires, we saw Yanaev & Co.’s press conference and heard them say that Gorbachev is gravely ill. This made a terrible impression. Everybody became guarded. The common opinion was that if “those people” allow themselves to utter such wild lies for all the world to hear, that means they’ve closed off any way back and will go through to the end; they burned all bridges. I told M.S. that Yanaev is looking for an alibi in case “something” happens to Gorbachev. He added: “Now they will make reality fit the lie they told publicly.”

But when the BBC reported on the events around the White House, the Russian parliament, that the people are protesting in defense of Gorbachev, and that Yeltsin took the lead in organizing the resistance, naturally the mood sharply improved. Actually, even on the 19th, before we knew any of this, M.S. told me that Yeltsin will not give in and nothing will break him down. Russia and Moscow will not allow the coup members to emerge victorious. I remembered his words, “I am certain that Boris Nikolayevich will show his character to the full extent.”

Below, I include excerpts from my interview to Sasha Bezymenskaya on Gorbachev’s moods and assumptions from those days. This was the first interview after I got back to Moscow, while the memory was fresh. The interview also reflects my own naiveté about what would happen with Gorbachev, and with all of us.

Sasha asked me: How did Gorbachev feel about Yeltsin coming to his defense?

“That is simply not how the question stood,” I responded. “We were talking about the fate of the State, the fate of the country. There could be no personal accounts here. If a person is ready to do whatever it takes to fight for democracy, for the rule of law, and to save everything that Gorbachev did over the course of six years, then “extraneous” motives do not mean anything. I think you are asking a question that could not have arisen in Gorbachev’s mind.”

“Gorbachev was sure that Yeltsin...” the journalist insisted.

“He was absolutely sure that Yeltsin would not back down.”

“Did he really feel from the very beginning that in these five years people have changed, and that they would not swallow or accept the junta? Was there confidence about this?”

“I spoke with him for the first time when Boldin & Co. had just left. Both then and in the morning, Gorbachev reasoned completely calmly. He said that the worst thing that could happen is if the coup d'état would gain momentum and receive support from some people. Then there would be a civil war with major losses—the thing that Gorbachev has been trying to avoid all these years. When the conspirators abolished glasnost, when they silenced the newspapers, he understood that on the international arena, the junta would lose. By the way, he never doubted the position of the world community. That was clear from the very beginning.

We got our bits of information from the small Sony radio transistor²⁵ that Tolya had on him. We sat in a circle: M.S. and I on the couch, Tolya squatting, Ira sitting right on the floor, and Raisa Maksimovna across from us on a chair. With our heads close together, we tried to make out the voices. The transistor was very bad and the batteries nearly dead. Tolya moved it around to try to catch a signal. This is where I heard the BBC. It is also where I found out that Tamara Alekseyevna was taken away, but it was not clear where.

R.M. carried a small silk purse on her the entire time. It must have contained the most private things that would be confiscated after all the others. She was very afraid of a humiliating search. She was afraid for M.S., who would be shaken to the core by this. The entire time, R.M. was in a state of nervous tension. In this condition, she gave me the bundle with film, wrapped in paper and taped with scotch tape.

“We’ve given similar [bundles] to others. I better not tell you whom, though. This one is for you. Well, no, not for you...”

“Why not me? I keep pushing for my rights as a people’s deputy, that I want to be present at the Supreme Soviet session on the 26th, that Lukyanov announced.”

²⁵ Afterwards, in Moscow, I was asked more than once how it happened that at this entire magnificent presidential dacha, there was nothing better than this “matchbox”?! That’s just it—there was nothing else! Because all the electronic equipment installed in the rooms was turned off the moment the “gang of four” arrived. The same went for the TV antenna, which serviced the entire “prison camp.” [Author’s note]

M.S.: “Is that so?!”

I: “Of course. But even these cretins will know that I, as a witness of your terminal illness and incapacity, cannot be allowed to take the podium...”

R.M.: “Anatoly Sergeyevich! This should be delivered through Olya. She has a child, her parents are sick, you said... Would she agree? This is very dangerous...”

I: “She will agree. She is a desperate woman and hates these people, all the more so because they separated her from her beloved Vasya...”

R.M.: “But you should warn her very thoroughly. Let her hide it... in some intimate spot—maybe her bra or panties. And right now, when you go to your lodgings, where are you going to keep the film? Don’t put it in your pocket, carry it in your hand and hide it. But not in the safe. Somewhere in the hallway, under the rug.”

I put it in my pocket, and only told Olga about it in the evening. She was sitting in an armchair, subdued. “Mayak” was playing classical music, enough to drive you mad! But silence was even worse. I turned it on only to hear the news, though often the news was about sports or cultural events. Yesterday, there was one piece about the Bolivian President’s wife’s visit to Peru, where she did either charity work, or attended a festival... The pinnacle of idiocy! At the moment I thought, or rather keenly felt, that the gang is returning us to an information environment of the worst stagnation years.

Four thirty p.m. Again breaking news. The “Mayak” broadcast started with the announcer’s anxious voice: “We, the employees of TV and Radio, refuse to carry out orders and submit to the so-called Committee on the State of Emergency. We have been deprived of the opportunity to report objective and complete information, and we demand that the totally discredited leadership of TV and Radio be removed from their posts. If we manage to go on air again, we will honestly fulfill our professional duties.”

Bakatin and Primakov (good job Zhenya, he made it to Moscow!) as members of the Security Council, declared that the State Emergency Committee is illegal and unconstitutional. And all its decrees are as well. Gorbachev is healthy and being held against his will. It is necessary to immediately ensure his return to Moscow or give him an opportunity to meet with the press.

Nishanov and Laptev—chairmen of Supreme Soviet Chambers—held an emergency meeting of the Committees. Lukyanov flew to the Crimea to meet with Gorbachev. And the best thing: the Ministry of Defense, upon analyzing the situation resulting from the introduction of the state of emergency in some areas, decided to immediately withdraw troops from those areas (i.e. not just the armored vehicles, but troops as a whole, meaning the paratroopers and all the others).

Who is left with Yanaev, Pugo and their General Kalinin, the commander of Moscow, to face the people?!

At 6 p.m., the “Orbita” channel announced that it will broadcast the full session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet!

It was around 11 p.m. on August 20th when I turned on the TV at full volume and took a seat near Olga... by her knees.

“Olya! A serious matter has come up. Are you ready to hear me out? But it is very serious. You can say no right now, before I say anything.”

“What are you talking about, Anatoly Sergeyevich! As if you don’t know me. Please speak.”

I told her about the film and Gorbachev’s statement, which she herself typed up, and about the plan to get them “to freedom.”

“Alright,” she said, “let’s suppose I get to Moscow. What’s the next step? I will probably be followed.”

“Yes, of course. We discussed this with M.S and R.M. We decided that it would be quite natural if you visit my wife. I will write her a letter... the kind people probably write from prison: everything is alright, don’t worry, I’ll be back soon, the circumstances... etc. Just in case they search you on the plane, or at the airport. You will have to hide the bundle with the film in some truly “private” place. The next step, if you manage to get it to Moscow, is to go to Vesnina Street to my apartment. Give my wife the letter and the bundle. Tell her to call Lena—Bovin’s wife. They know each other. She will come. Just her, not Bovin, he is too notable of a figure, plus he is under suspicion after the question he asked at Yanaev & Co.’s press-conference. My wife will give this thing to Lena, who will give it to Sasha [Bovin]. And he will immediately know what to do with it.”

Olga put the bundle in her jeans after all. There, the bundle constantly protruded. I chuckled at it sometimes, pointing my finger at the place...²⁶

Now it was my job to get Generalov to let her go to Moscow. I started pressuring him beforehand, on the 19th: is he not ashamed of himself, he—an officer—allowing such mockery of a young mother. She has a sick little son. Her parents don’t know what happened to her. We will not be sitting here forever, I tried to scare him. He will have to answer for such behavior towards a woman, who is worried sick because she cannot find out about her son. And more of the same.

But he kept repeating: he only has one-way communication with Moscow, they can call him, and his superiors have called. But he cannot call Moscow. He lied, of course.

After discussing the “plan” with Olga, I decided to pressure him once again. By the way, my earlier attempts to push for my rights by pointing out that I’m a USSR People’s Deputy and he, Generalov, is breaking the Constitution and violating my parliamentary immunity by holding

²⁶ She ended up bringing the bundle to Moscow in this manner, when we all “escaped” together. She gave it back to me, and I to Gorbachev, who demonstrated it at the press-conference. [Author’s note]

me de facto under house arrest, were futile. I invited him again. And again he dared to come. I began to shame him about Olga. But he... outwitted me. He offered to take her to Mukhalatka, which is a government communications point about 20 kilometers from "Zarya" in the direction of Yalta, so she could call home to Moscow.

The following thing happened. A little while after Generalov offered this "option," which undermined all our plans to transfer information about Gorbachev, the driver "Volodya" came to my office. I put his name in quotation marks because it is difficult to say what his name really is, he is from the KGB. But it's the same guy who drove Olga, Tamara and me between "Zarya" and "Yuzhnyi" two-three times a day until August 18th.

He did not say hello. "Where is Lanina? I was told to drive her to the telephone." I got up, offered my hand to him... He hesitated and listlessly shook my hand. I noticed a change in him even when he was sent for my suitcase. For him, I was already a criminal, a prisoner. When Olga got back she had the same impression. She said that in the car, he moved away from her as if she was a leper. Another KGB agent accompanied her—a communications guy. He sat opposite from her when she was on the phone with Moscow, ready to disconnect her any second if she said too much. "I started crying," she said, "my brother was yelling into the phone—are you alright? And I was crying, chocking on my tears. Overall it was just distressing. They did not let me call your wife." (I had asked her to call).

In general, they let us know once again who we were to them.

It is worthwhile to note that the State Emergency Committee member Lukyanov, when he emerged from the "Matrosskaya Tishina" detention facility, said in one of his numerous television interviews that "it was all Gorbachev's lies that they were isolated and had no communication lines. Two feet away from Chernyaev's office, in the next room there was a telephone from which he could have called anywhere he wanted." If this was the case, then why did they have to drive Olga over 20 kilometers to make a call, with security, and forbid her even from saying two words to my wife?!

By the way, about our isolation. When Olga returned, I asked her about what she saw on the way. "The road is blocked off to all traffic," she replied. "There are no cars except military vehicles. Border patrols are at every step. From above (the road is about 20-25 meters above the "Zarya" territory) you can see better that there are not two frigates in the harbor as there were before the 18th, I counted at least 16 various ships. In the haze it was hard to tell, maybe there were more."

This is how our imprisonment ended.

Around 5 p.m. on the 21st, all three women burst into my office: Olga, Larisa and Tatyana, extremely excited. "Anatoly Sergeyevich, look, look what's happening!" We rushed out on the balcony... Several cars were coming from the ramps at the entrance of the dacha's territory. Two boys from security came out to meet them, with Kalashnikovs at the ready. "Stop!" they called out. The cars stopped. "Stop!" more security guys came out from the bushes. A driver and somebody else came out from the first car... They said something. The security's

response was “Don’t move!” and one of the guys ran toward Gorbachev’s dacha. Soon he returned, and the cars moved to the left, behind the service building where my office is located.

I stepped out from my office, which is on the second floor. There is a stairway that goes directly from my door to the main entrance to the house. I was standing there in a rumpled undershirt and worn-out sports pants. A thought flashed through my mind—I look like an inmate in a prison camp!

Lukyanov, Ivashko, Baklanov, Yazov, Kryuchkov filed into the door downstairs. They looked beaten, their faces gloomy. Each one bowed to me!! I understood what was going on—they came to plead guilty. I stood there, stony faced, boiling over with anger. Even before they disappeared in the room on the left, I turned around and showed my back to them. Olga was standing next to me, all red, devilish triumph playing in her eyes.

Larisa and big Tatyana ran into the office. Tatyana is usually so dignified, strong and calm—suddenly she wrapped her arms around me and started sobbing. Then there was nervous laughter, various unmemorable exclamations... In a word, it was a feeling that our imprisonment was over. The scum failed with their schemes.

I got dressed and ran over to M.S. I have to admit, I was afraid that he would receive them... Which must not be done, because we saw on TV that a delegation from the Russian parliament was on their way here. Gorbachev was sitting in his office and giving orders over the phone. He paused for a second to tell me: “I gave them an ultimatum: if they don’t connect the phone lines, I will not speak with them. And now I won’t speak with them anyway.”

While I was present he ordered the commandant of the Kremlin to take the entire Kremlin under his protection and not to allow any of the coup-members in under any circumstances. He got the commander of the Kremlin regiment on the phone, and ordered him to follow orders only from the commandant of the Kremlin. Then he summoned the chief of government communications and the Minister of Communications to the phone, and ordered them to turn off all the coup-members’ communications. Judging by their reaction, they were standing at attention on the other end of the line. I pointed out that the cars that brought the State Emergency Committee members had autonomous communications... He summoned Boris (one of the bodyguards) and ordered him to “disconnect the passengers” from the cars.

Then he spoke with George Bush. It was a joyful conversation. M.S. thanked him for his support and solidarity. Bush welcomed Gorbachev’s release and return to work...

M.S. also had a conversation with V.I. Shcherbakov (First Deputy Premier) and somebody else... I didn’t understand who. The gist of the conversation was—I’ll come and we’ll figure it out. Before I came in he spoke with Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, and Kravchuk. He told me about this.

He dispelled my fears immediately: “What are you talking about! How could you think something like that. I had no intention of receiving them. I might only speak with Lukyanov and Ivashko.”

Boris reported that the Russian delegation entered the territory of the dacha.

"Invite them in," M.S. said, "let them go to the cafeteria." A couple minutes later we joined them there. The scene that followed I will remember for the rest of my life. Silaev and Rutskoi rushed to embrace Gorbachev. There were exclamations and some big words. They interrupted each other in a rush. Bakatin and Primakov, the deputies, were there as well. I looked at them. Some of them had railed against Gorbachev in the parliament and in the press more than once; they had argued with him, and indignantly protested against him. But now, the misfortune instantly brought to light that they are a part of a whole, and that the country needs exactly this whole. I even said, while watching this collective joy and embraces, "Thus finally the Center and Russia have united, without any Union Treaty..." [Here and below I reproduce my diary entries made immediately after arriving in Moscow].

We sat down at a table. We vied with each other in telling what's been happening in Moscow and here. It turned out—for some reason I was surprised by this—that they did not even know who came to the President with an ultimatum, or what kind of an ultimatum it was.

Silaev and Rutskoi were against Gorbachev receiving Kryuchkov & Co., who were in essence sitting under guard in the service house below my office. M.S. replied that he will most likely receive only Lukyanov and Ivashko, who seem to have come separately.

It was a long conversation. It was already nearing 10 p.m. when Rutskoi took initiative. He is a strong and handsome man; it's a pleasure to observe him. "Mikhail Sergeyevich," he said, "it is time to discuss what the next step will be. We will not let you go on the (presidential) airplane on which those types (!) got here. We shall take my airplane. It is at the same airport, but far from yours. It is securely guarded. I brought 40 lieutenant-colonels with me, they are all armed. We'll make it."

I should say a word about these lieutenant-colonels. According to Rutskoi's plan, M.S. was supposed to make a false exit from his car near the presidential plane. He did this, and then quickly got back in the car, which rushed toward Rutskoi's plane, standing 3-5 km away. When M.S., in his wool sweater that people saw on TV when he appeared at Vnukovo, came toward Rutskoi's plane, these officers stood with guns in the open until he was inside the plane. Looking at this scene, I thought: there is still genuine officer's honor in our army. There is a high intelligence in the army, too. One only has to talk to someone like Colonel N.S. Stolyarov, who came with the group of deputies to rescue his President. We drove to the airport in one car.

Then there was the flight. Rutskoi was in charge of the flight, he kept summoning the pilots [to discuss the details]. M.S. and his family settled in a small bay of the plane, and called me over. There was so little space that the little granddaughters lay down on the floor and quickly fell asleep.

When I came in, he cheerfully asked me, "So, who are you now?" I replied, "I am a simple Soviet prisoner, but an ex-prisoner." Everybody laughed excitedly. Silaev, Rutskoi, Primakov and Bakatin came over, the doctor Igor' Anatol'evich Borisov was also there. R.M. was telling us what happened to her when they heard that the coup-members are coming over to

ascertain the condition of Mikhail Sergeyevich's health... now she was feeling better, but still had poor command of her arm. There was an animated conversation about people, and how they are tested in such circumstances, about immorality, which is the source of all crimes and misfortunes. There were toasts to continuing life... For the first time then, M.S. said the words: "We are flying to a new country."

Many magazines printed the photograph of Ira coming down the ladder from the airplane (in Vnukovo airport), carrying her daughter wrapped in a blanket. She walked past the crowd surrounding the President. I noticed there were people who were sincerely happy to see him, as well as those for whom it would have been better if things worked out "otherwise." So, Ira took her daughter to the car, near which I was standing, away from the people crowding around M.S. She lunged for the car seat and started shaking with sobs. I leaned over and tried to say something. Her husband was near her, hugging her and stroking her hair, trying to calm her, but it was no use. This final episode at the airport came to symbolize for me the tragedy that happened not only at the dacha in the Crimea, but with the whole country. Irina, a young Russian woman, who was totally energetic, composed, and ready for anything in the face of danger, broke down in tears of joy and despair when "it" was over. It was a release. But then... everyday life resumes and you have to do your job. Alas! Things did not go as we had hoped at the time.

September 14, 1991, Saturday

It's time to resume my diary. After the 3-day confinement in "Zarya," after the coup, after the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the CPSU was liquidated, after the monstrous, all-encompassing and yet not unexpected betrayal... and after Gorbachev finally became what he should have become two years ago, and what he wanted to be for a long time, for 3-4 years, but did not dare... And now he "became" this, but he lost his power and authority.

I should have kept a daily journal after getting back from the Crimea. This is truly history in the making. But the workload was unbelievable.

Now it is too late... I will note down some things as we go along... In the meantime, I will describe today's events.

There was a meeting with Revenko on re-organizing the presidential apparatus. We fantasized... while it would be better to be more modest but actually to help Gorbachev to make it somehow, since he is so set... since he wants this "at any cost."

[After a while] only the three of us remained—Revenko, Shakhnazarov, and I. Revenko told us some things, for example that Kryuchkov and Boldin listened in on all of us, including the President. Right now Russian investigators are deciphering the tapes and looking through the transcribed materials. Well, I am even pleased: at least they will see how I was at odds with the generals, how I argued with M.S., and how Shevardnadze sometimes looked less than progressive with me, etc.

Revenko said that the entire Kremlin is bugged, and that it would take a month to extract all of them! The same deal as with the American Embassy in Moscow. The U.S. Congress is

right when they say that it is impossible to neutralize this, the whole building has to be destroyed. We underestimated our scientific-technological capabilities in this regard.

I will describe at some later point my epic expulsion from the CC building on August 27th. Only three days ago was Tamara able to transfer to [my new office in] the Kremlin my papers from the old office, including the entire “New Thinking” as recorded in M.S.’ conversations with foreign statesmen. I am planning to write a history based on these records of the year between September 1990-September 1991—through M.S.’ thoughts and assessments. About how the coup became possible... (Only now I am getting around to this).

Also, I am planning to put together a book about the two weeks from August 23-September 12, with M.S.’ “own” analysis of the events. Again, it would be based on records of dozens of M.S.’ meetings with foreign statesmen over these weeks.

Yesterday I received the Spanish Ambassador. He reported that Gonzalez wants to come to Moscow as a friendly gesture. M.S. agreed for October 1st.

The Cuban Ambassador in connection with M.S.’ statement in a talk with Baker about our decision to withdraw our [brigade] from Cuba... (he got confused and said 11,000 people, while there are only 3,000). The Cubans are protesting pitifully. Yet another symbol of the collapse of an era.

M.S. took pity on Dubinin (our ambassador in France, who behaved disgracefully during the emergency situation and confused Mitterrand). He did not remove him. I “stood up” for him; but privately, I gave him a piece of my mind. I told him his excuses were at the level of a petty official while he is a political figure representing the State and the President (not the government), even though our ambassadors do not swear an oath. Moreover, he knows about M.S.’ personal relations with Mitterrand and Dumas! Why couldn’t he come to them and “consult” on what to do, saying that a message from the junta came in, but he did not believe it. But, instead of helping Mitterrand to figure out what’s going on, he practically pushed him to take an anti-Gorbachev position at first. And more of the same. It is pathetic... and theoretically, these are the “new thinking” diplomats... But their selfishness and the habit of a comfortable life, as well as the fear of losing it—these traits played a cruel joke with these elite characters. They include Zamyatin, Loginov, Slyusar (Greece), and Uspensky (Norway), toward whom M.S. showed particular care. However, the behavior of each one of the people named above, as well as many others, does not surprise me. Perhaps with the exception of Bessmertnykh. He really found himself in a difficult situation.

Two days ago I had a bad cardiogram. But I feel nothing.

I’ve gotten more worn out in these post-coup days than during the actual coup. At the time, my special trait, which I got to know so well in myself during the war, kicked in: during moments of real danger I am extremely calm and composed, and there is not a shadow of fear—whatever will be, will be. So, in front of M.S. and R.M., I did a good job playing a cheerful fellow who has a gut feeling that everything will turn out alright, thereby encouraging the presence of mind in others.

I wrote a beautiful speech for Gorbachev for the CSCE international conference on the humanitarian dimension (September 9-11, in the Hall of Columns). This was probably his first public speech not only “without,” but even in contrast to the “socialist choice” that hindered him so much in the last two years.

September 15, 1991

I exhausted myself repairing the commode. Read a bunch of newspapers. There will be no Union. I think the Supreme Soviet will not meet either, the republics don’t need it. Gavril Popov is right (his article “Doubts” was in the newspaper today): not everyone should sit at the round table of the State Council, but only the people who accept the minimum of democratic rules.

I went to the Crimean embankment. Thousands of people stood in line to see Roman Afonin’s porno-exhibition. I decided not to. Nearby, under the open sky, the “sculptures of a totalitarian era”—the toppled statues of Dzerzhinsky, Sverdlov, Kalinin, Stalin... People are climbing on them, taking pictures, sitting on Dzerzhinsky’s face, giggling, yelling at pedestrians who interrupt the picture-taking... It is disgusting, this necrophilia. “The people” are monstrously dark and immoral, and the worst part is that they do not realize this, unlike the people of 1917, who realized it and “knew their place.” It is terrible!

September 19, 1991

Yesterday was a month since the day we got imprisoned in “Zarya.” By the way, on the 16th there was a vile TV program, set against a background of a dummy of Nixon at the time of his impeachment, that went on for 1.5 hours. Ol’shansky, Bukovsky, and Ryzhkov + two more milksop bastards were arguing that M.S. was the head of the coup. And in the morning there was an article by Obcharenko in *Pravda*, about the same thing.

In general, a week ago there arose a new wave of Gorbachev-trampling... But Ignatenko organized a “round table,” where they tried to restore his image by being overly familiar with him... It is pretty unpleasant to watch how Yegor Yakovlev, Len Karpinsky, Potapov (editor of *Trud*) and others, whom in the early stages of *perestroika* M.S. rescued and promoted, now easily bring him down to the level of an “ordinary citizen.”

However, Ignatenko told me that afterwards, behind the scenes (i.e. without TV), they had a 1.5 hour-long close get-together, which left M.S. “inspired.”

Today he received Brady (U.S. Secretary of the Treasury). Brady rather arrogantly stated the conditions for their assistance. M.S. kept speaking abstractly that it is the “historical task to help a great country, this will change the whole world,” etc.

In the evening he received an envoy from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia... He brought 1.5 billion... without any of the American-West European antics and concealed humiliation of the receiving party.

Today I finished “The August Coup” book (cause and effect), which is compiled from M.S.’ conversations. He is hesitant about it... It seems that he does not want to release it. But it should be released, to state his position and to safeguard him against a new wave of trampling, politically intended to remove the symbol of the Union (the President)—the last, weak symbol, but there is no other left...

Or maybe they just want to kick him while he’s down... This is our new, *perestroika*-era intelligentsia.

September 20, 1991, Friday

I gave M.S. the 80-page “August Coup” book. In the West, it would sell like hotcakes.

I recommended that he give it to the newspaper in installments, and publish it as a book at the same time. Plus, he should include the August essay, which was already called on TV “the instruction manual for the State of Emergency”... Why, then, is he hiding it, they ask.

I talked with him on the phone three times today; he did not say a word about the book. As if he did not receive it, even though I know that it was placed on his desk on top of the other papers. But such is his manner.

The U.S. charge d’affaires Collins visited. He brought a memorandum about creating a joint working group to explore the issues of qualitatively new Soviet-American relations. I gave it to M.S. and urged him not to put it off.

I offered him to go to Kiev for the 50th anniversary of Babi Yar... I told him about it back in “Zarya,” before the coup... No word from him.

A week ago, the Korean Ambassador in the name of Roh Tae-Woo asked M.S. not to receive the leader of the opposition. The entire Moscow Korean lobby has been pressuring me for days, insisting that he should receive him. But I did not even report this to Gorbachev. Roh Tae-Woo is more important to us right now than this “Jung,” though he may become president next year.

Dzasokhov has been pestering me. It turns out that he is still acting as chairman of the International Committee of the Supreme Soviet, as if nothing has happened. He is preparing the ratification of agreements on conventional weapons and START!!! So much for a recent secretary of the CC CPSU, an editor of CC letters to the provinces, demanding that they support the State Emergency Committee!

Today, investigators brought me a record of my testimony and the transcript. For two hours I watched and listened to myself, checking it against the text. I “liked” myself better than in the TV show with Olga and Tamara. In general, I appear to be detached and somehow stronger and more confident than I feel in real life.

On the way home in the metro I read in *Izvestia* a conversation with M.S. over a cup of tea. This is after the “round table” organized by Ignatenko. In his humanness, M.S. is returning

to what he was like at the beginning of *perestroika*, casting off his self-confidence, which arose from international fame and the corrupting nature of power.

I want to get out of the city. Tamara is inviting me to go to Snegiri, where Dunaev is trading dachas with her... But I want to go with Lyuda, or at least with Irochka, or N.N.? No, I am not confused. It's just that my body wants to live to the fullest before giving out... I guess it will become old soon. Vera Valer'evna (my doctor) explained to me that something in my heart has been irreversibly damaged, since the professor started talking about surgery...

Ozherel'ev came to visit. He is pitiful; he found himself on the sidelines. He says that Medvedev is in a similar position, they are not needed. I "advised" him (as his senior!) not to fuss... saying that we exaggerate the place we occupy in the "life and work" of the President: he remembers about us only when he needs us. I did not say it, but I thought to myself—he does not even remember that I was with him during the three days in Foros... though back then he sought my support and relied on my "certainty"... He willingly talks about what happened there, but he speaks with emotion only about his family...

Yes... also at the "round table" in *Izvestia* two days ago, and even over a cup of tea later in the close circle, not for the TV cameras, the conversation touched upon the "closest circle" more than once. But nobody remembered about me—neither he nor anyone in the company! But if someone other than I had been in this position, the "new thinking" and Gorbachev himself, its initiator, would not have the image he attained in the eyes of the world. For here, more than anywhere else, form is meaningful. Plus the supporting ideas to the major ones, which were, of course, his own.

September 21, 1991, Saturday

This really turned out to be a "day of rest" from the everyday, the burdensome, the nerve-wracking, the uncertain, the tiresome—from politics and service.

I stopped by work... there were cables. M.S.' responses to my notes: he agreed to go to the 50th anniversary of Babi Yar, asked me to prepare a speech (without publicity). He agreed to have Yakovlev patronize our part of the joint group with U.S. on strategic thinking—on how to build a new world order... Today Yakovlev stopped by [to say] he does not want Martynov or Kokoshin, whom I suggested for the group as a "working" manager... The Americans are assigning Ross, Baker's adviser.

Yakovlev asked me: "Do you find Arbatov completely unacceptable?" "Yes... ever since he started to look for a new boss to stay afloat. From Gorbachev to Yeltsin, the turncoat. He's got a good nose."

"I will think about this," Yakovlev said.

"Do that."

M.S. agreed to a treaty with Czechoslovakia without Kvitsinsky's demand "not to enter into hostile alliances."

Nezavisimaya [Independent newspaper] is quite in a rage today. Tretyakov himself is railing against the nomenclature of the “fourth power” (the press) at M.S.’ “round table” meetings.

And I am sorry to say that I thought about yesterday’s *Izvestiya* publication of the close-circle conversation over a cup of tea: “we are all friends,” he complains to them. He looks like a poor guy: I lost everything, so to say, but I am still a good person, feel sorry for me.

Then N.N. and I strolled on the Crimean embankment. They are flaunting Afonin, the German Shermush, his women... There are plenty of sculptures... In general we have a great deal of various kinds of art. This is not normal, if one compares it with simple work that provides people a normal life. We went on our way: N.N. to the 42nd²⁷, and I to the Kremlin.

September 24, 1991, Tuesday

Today M.S. told me that it was discovered that his “secret” conversation in Novo-Ogarevo with Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, their work on “it” before 9+1 until 2 a.m., was “recorded” by Plekhanov... [During this conversation], they had assigned all the positions, and the Kryuchkovs, Baklanovs, and Boldins were not allocated a spot. This was the last straw... Apparently, it was then that they made up their minds.

I prepared an agreement to publish M.S.’ book on the August coup, in English and in German, with Murdoch (his representative Bell will come) and Bertelsmann (Teltschik). The Novosti publishing house (with Pushkov) will publish it here. M.S. again corrected the draft...

I decided to publish my “diary” of the three days in Foros. I made an agreement with Golembiovsky (*Izvestia*). I also want to offer it to *Stern* or *Time*.

At midnight, a courier brought from M.S. the “August Coup” book with final corrections (?). He kept that article in. It means things are moving along! It is too bad he removed some of the juiciest parts.

Today he offered me to become a State Adviser on international and foreign economic issues... In line with Yakovlev and some others. I refused—citing my age and the fact that “in general” I am tired. I’ve built up momentum to keep doing what I’ve been doing. But I cannot take up a job which mainly deals with organizational matters. I won’t manage, it will only discredit the reputation I’ve built up over the years in the role of the foreign policy adviser (I also thought to myself that my ECG is getting worse every day, and the degree of my freedom is decreasing). But in my heart I was hurt. I would be placed alongside people who have served less than I have. And he was happy I refused!

“You know,” he said, “I was thinking along the same lines. This would only be one more burden on your shoulders, and you are so conscientious... It would be best if we stay together, work as we’ve been working this whole time, travel together (is this supposed to be a

²⁷ 42nd km is a stop of the commuter train on the Kazan railroad, where my friends lived at their dachas. [Author’s note]

reward?!)... We're used to it. And there is not a great difference in salary... I will appoint Primakov as the adviser on international and foreign economic issues." I approved the idea, and praised Zhenya [Primakov]. And I thought to myself: "M.S., you are happy that I refused because you are torn—it would seem I should be rewarded somehow, but who is going to do the work that Chernyaev does every day!" So that was decided, and we were both pleased with ourselves...

Today M.S. received Waigel and Koehler (German Minister of Finance and the "sherpa"). Like everybody else, they are repeating the same thing: "With whom should we deal when providing assistance? We were in Ukraine, they clearly want to separate. How are you going to exist?" But M.S. is an optimist. He keeps talking about the effectiveness of new Union bodies. He believes in the economic agreement and even assured them that there will be a Union Treaty!

September 27, 1991, Thursday

Yesterday the BBC filmed me (it turns out Masha Slonim is Litvinov's granddaughter) for a TV series called "The Second Russian Revolution" (they had interviewed me for it before, for the second episode. This is the seventh episode—about the coup and Gorbachev's circle). For two hours they asked broad questions about *perestroika*, about Gorbachev. Some of the questions were about our imprisonment in the Crimea. They are very tactful people... and they really want to know the truth. They are also putting together the materials very well.

In the evening, Braithwaite (the Ambassador) invited us to the magnificent Shekhtel mansion. We watched the sixth episode of the series, which ends with a stopframe from an amateur recording of Gorbachev in "Zarya" on the evening of August 19th. A striking, doomed face!

Yakovlev, Laptev, Shakhnazarov, and various Englishmen were there. It was a wonderful evening, followed by a dinner with fancy silverware... Intelligent company... Everything revolved around the coup. And, it turned out, they found me interesting. The filmmakers were very sorry that they had not reached me sooner, though they tried. Masha called me at 7 a.m. She is a smart, chiseled Jewish woman, though she knows how to work hard and earn an honest living. I was sitting next to her, discussing different topics, showing off like a peacock. But I could feel that in her mind she was only selecting the things that will be useful for her work at the BBC (she has been a British citizen for a long time).

It was a good evening.

Today, I sent Yavlinsky on his way to meet with Major and Kohl. I wrote messages for him (from M.S.) to give to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor, as well as to Bush...

Alongside that, I was editing the material that M.S. assigned the day before yesterday for his meeting with Mubarak.

Alongside that, I was writing M.S.' message for the gathering at Babi Yar, where he after all does not want to go himself, but is sending Yakovlev.

I met with a journalist from *Time*, we discussed the publication of my diary about Foros. I will also give it to *Izvestiya* at the same time. It came out to 23 pages.

I'm jittery and stressed. I stopped by the clinic: my ECG is worse than the time before last, but better than last time. My blood pressure is 110, this never happened before! I'm going to croak...

M.S. and I were sitting in his office. He told me how he and R.M. watched [a theater performance of] "The Ides of March" on their 38th wedding anniversary. He isolated the relevant bits: the murder of a dictator, poetry, etc.

He signed the letters to Major, Kohl, and Bush... and the preface for the "August Coup" book. Tomorrow Bell is coming on behalf of Murdoch Books.

Bovin and I finally made plans to go to a pub together (the one in Maryina Roshcha, on Oktyabr'skaya Street). But I was late (because of M.S.) and he did not wait for me. I did not find him even in that Armenian pub, though theoretically people know him there. He must have gotten offended after he called me and looked for me.

I recommended General Batenin to Gorbachev as an adviser on defense, Petrakov to replace Voronin in the EU, and V.I. Shcherbakov as an adviser on international economic relations. M.S. replied that he will not get approved because he got "smeared" with the State Emergency Committee.

Primakov gladly accepted the position of head of the Soviet "CIA," which is being branched off from Bakatin. A.I. Yakovlev, in the meantime, keeps frequenting the rallies, and does not go a day without giving an interview!! I suspected him to have inordinate vanity, but I thought it would be checked by intelligence. Turns out, vanity is stronger than all his other qualities and trumps everything.

In the morning Collins called me: Bush wants to talk to M.S. But he was assigned to first inform M.S. what the conversation would be about. I called M.S., at 11 a.m. he had a meeting with Mubarak. At 10:30 a.m. he received Collins, who outlined "Bush's initiative" that will be unveiled today: a universal reduction of nuclear weapons, even the Tomahawks, which the U.S. never agreed to before... Advantageous... Well done... Especially since they are ahead of us in conventional weapons.

But this is not the point. M.S. tried to call Marshal Shaposhnikov to assign him to prepare a "position" for the talk with Bush at 4 p.m. But alas! He could not reach him. M.S. went to his meeting with Mubarak, and assigned me to gather the generals + Karpov and tell them to formulate our response.

Lobov + some general + Karpov came over. For an hour and a half they discussed it... From the outset, they started digging: what, why, and how much... like the years of nonsense in Geneva and Vienna: a dead-end, and lucrative for the negotiators.

I told them: do you think that this initiative was made only to “beat” us, to deceive and humiliate us, and to show that we are no longer a superpower? Let’s disarm completely, so to say? There is no beginning of a new U.S. policy here, new relations with us, the outcomes of new thinking—you do not see any of this? How will our President look when the entire world will be astonished by this initiative, but all M.S. will have to say to Bush is that they have more of this, and we still need to discuss that? After Bush straightforwardly says that he will disarm unilaterally, and calls on us to follow his example?

They changed their tune and tried to show that “of course, they understand.” But they are so outdated... Again M.S. found a Chief of General Staff who, with God’s help, is fit to command a division... We do not have politician-generals, like Bush has...

They left. I dictated to Tamara a “cheat-sheet” for talking with Bush: a major initiative, a match for Reykjavik, which you, the Americans, did not accept at the time. Support. Let’s start, and figure out the details as we go along: where we will meet you, where we will work in parallel, and what will be figured out through negotiations.

Though I have to say that by 3 p.m. Shaposhnikov (he is smarter, more modern, and more politically aware than the previous group I met with) brought over a concept of the conversation similar to my own.

They gathered in M.S.’ office... Lobov, who came late, tried to “push” that it is unprofitable to us, that they will deceive us, that he does not see any unilateral action, etc. Despite the fact that M.S. kept pointing at Bush’s text and proving the opposite. He kept the generals in his office when he spoke to Bush on the phone. It was a pretty good move. He said things along the lines of “it is a historic step, I welcome it, in principle we see this positively, we will discuss the rest and agree on how best to do it”...

They also agreed on what M.S.’ public reaction to it would be; he already filmed his TV appearance.

Earlier I mentioned that Gorbachev and R.M. watched Thornton Wilder’s “The Ides of March” in Vakhtangov’s theater. Suddenly, he started telling the generals about his impressions, and analogies!! He took from the shelf a volume of the encyclopedia and started reading about Caesar: a mixture of innocence and a clever play at having confidence in his new generals! Shaposhnikov appreciated the references, but I believe Lobov completely missed it.

In the morning I sent *Izvestiya* my “Diary of the President’s Adviser.” On Monday they will run a page of it. A correspondent of *Time* came over with a photographer, a young woman. She took many pictures of me—against the background of Gorbachev’s portrait, then with Ivan the Terrible in the background, then she made me sit on the windowsill with my notepad (i.e. the

original diary) in my hands... The correspondent noted that Hollywood would pay big bucks to get that notepad...

At 5 p.m. I met with Bell, from Murdoch. We agreed to publish Gorbachev's book ("August Coup") over the course of four weeks: with a \$100,000 advance, and \$500,000 when they publish, the first part of the fee. They are really snatching up this sensation... They will make good money off of it.

I re-wrote the address for Babi Yar... M.S. is not going, after all, but sending Yakovlev. I wrote straightforwardly about anti-Semitism, and about the exodus of talented citizens, and a great people, and the fact that we have to learn lessons from our own anti-Semitism, not just the Nazi version. I am not sure whether Gorbachev will accept all of this. Yakovlev told me: if he takes it out, I will add it from myself.

Today in the TV show "Vzglyad," Yavlinsky revealed that we have 240 tons of gold reserves left. In letters to Major and Kohl, M.S. did not write down the number, he only allowed Yavlinsky to convey it verbally and confidentially. In any case, Kohl will find out the number from our TV show rather than from the President's closed letter. This is how we do things.

But the figure is appalling... We were operating on the brink... It turns out we sold off as much as 400-500 tons per year. The U.S. has 4,200 tons, and we have 240!

September 28, 1991, Saturday

I wrote down the date to start the diary, but got a call from M.S.: "Send a telegram to Yavlinsky to London or Bonn, tell him to be here for the meeting at 10 a.m. on Monday."

He told me that he is editing the "August Coup" book... I said, "How is that possible? The text is already in London, if not America?"

"So what," he responded, "That's how it always works, you edit as you go..."

"Are there a lot of changes?"

"A fair amount. For now...."

I went through the books on my bookshelf. My God! How much I have not read! And how much I did not read at the right time... And I'm talking about me, who actually managed to read some things outside the obligatory minimum for the regular Soviet intellectual... What about others?! The intellectual process was perverted, stifled, until all that was left was a small, barely passable channel... How could one expect culture from society that lost its connection to history for half a century at least?!

October 1, 1991, Tuesday

It has been hot for days.

Yesterday *Izvestiya* published my “essay”—the diary of the assistant to the President during three days in August. Today everyone is talking about it... some people are emphasizing the political significance, some the journalistic “success,” some the literary talent “buried in the ground,” some the human aspect of the blockade... etc.

French and German newspapers and journals asked for permission to reprint.

But M.S. did not like it. He pretended that he did not read it. “I hear you published some diary of yours in *Izvestiya*!?” Andrei Grachev was there, and he started to praise it... but M.S. changed the subject. This means R.M. didn’t like it... It’s true that I am not too “polite” to her in the diary...

On Sunday I went to 42nd... N.N. and I took a short walk to the Ramenskoe railway station. While we were eating, Kira uttered a striking thought: something else might have happened and a coup wouldn’t be necessary. Gorbachev could have had a heart attack and died suddenly, or he could have drowned or chocked, etc. Then what? Who would we be left with? Yanaev, Yazov, Kryuchkov and Co. It would have been quite legal, and not immediately with tanks. And then the tanks—legally and lawfully... In reality, what kind of successors did he pick for himself... to continue *perestroika*!

Conversation with M.S. in the presence of Grachev, immediately after he met with Christophersen (EC): whom should he take as the State adviser on international economic issues? Maybe Adamishin? Andrei and I praised Adamishin...

Then I said: “There is Obminsky (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs). He was just present at the meeting with Christophersen, he is an ace at what he does (i.e. foreign economic affairs).”

M.S.: “But he is only an economist, I need a politician-foreign affairs specialist... Of course, one who knows about economics.”

I: “So take both of them, Adamishin and Obminsky, and I will ‘coordinate’ them...” (I said this as a joke, of course).

M.S.: “No. You and I will keep working as we have been.”

What does this mean? Either he is tired of me, or he wants to change the image of his circle, or he truly only needs me to write his speeches, these kinds of pamphlets, various letters to leaders, greetings, responses, and congratulations.

Most likely it is a mix of the first, second, and third. And a general “disregard for the individual.” You can’t make him respect you until you show him your teeth... Maybe it’s time. The more so because I am suffocating in these texts: materials for talks, notes and responses after the talks, materials for a phone call to Bonn, London, where else... a draft order, drafts for an opinion, and endless greetings and addresses. Only today I had to write something for the first anniversary of German unification and for a telephone conversation with Kohl. And I clean up texts again and again after his edits. My meeting with the new U.S. Ambassador Straus, for

example: I have to write a report on it to Gorbachev, as well as suggestions, including on a joint Soviet-American group on strategic security.

By the way, Collins, who brought “Bush’s initiative” on Friday, had an edema of one lung. He nearly died. But he was saved at Granovsky. Straus said that in America, Collins would not have made it. Bush sent his thanks and asked M.S. to thank the doctors.

In general, the meeting with Straus was nothing special. It looks like he came to make sure that he can work with me. Many people are drawn to me right now, because of the MFA’s dropping prestige. In their eyes, I appear to be much more important than I really am.

For example, Braithwaite wanted to meet again, Bell (from Canada), Nikolaenko (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, just got back from Cuba). Zemtsov (Israel) and Velikhov got around me and met directly with M.S. They tempted him with practically free billions of credit... Though there are rumors that the money actually comes from the arms trade.

I managed to convince M.S. to meet with the New York Rabbi Scheier and Madame Karden—the chairwoman of the American organization for Soviet Jews. He agreed to meet with them to compensate for not going to Babi Yar.

Yavlinsky stopped by yesterday. He is in despair: the fall of 1990 is repeating... M.S. is again beginning to steer from the course... He said that there won’t be an economic agreement until there is a Union Treaty.

I: “Is he mad? Just in September he told all the foreigners that we will have an economic agreement soon, while the Union Treaty will happen at some point in the future, when it becomes possible. Two days later, at the press-conference following the meeting with Mubarak he said the same thing... And now what? Why?”

Yavlinsky: “I don’t know. It’s as if he made an agreement with Yeltsin. Silaev and Rutskoi were present at their conversation. Rutskoi echoed him, while Silaev was quiet. This would be another failure. I told him that I will leave again if things go this way. I will go to Alma-Ata with to work on a draft agreement with the premiers of the republics. And if he moves away from it... I will leave.”

I: “This would be a failure in the eyes of the West, as well. A failure all around. There won’t be a Union Treaty! Does he not see that ‘Russia’ is provoking him, so everyone will run away and it will be left in ‘splendid isolation,’ and later will dictate its conditions to the others, ‘save’ them while bypassing Gorbachev, who will be completely useless!”

Yavlinsky: “Probably he does not see it. But I will act like a professional and a citizen. I don’t need anything else. If there is no economic agreement, there is no point in dragging my feet... because there will be neither a market economy, nor integration with the West.”

I: “But how do you like M.S.! Does he not understand how symbolic this will be for everyone that he recruited Yavlinsky for the second time, and for the second time turned away from him! Who will he be left with?”

In addition, Yavlinsky told me what he “informed” Major about—namely, that the 240 tons of gold is not the end of the story. (He said he was recorded for “Vesti” before leaving for London, so our people would find out before the foreigners do. According to their customs, if the world finds out about something like this before people at home, the Prime Minister would have to resign the next day).

But the gold, Yavlinsky said, is for the layman. The fact that all our assets are empty—that is truly catastrophic. This means that the Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs] does not have a penny. Ryzhkov and Pavlov have spent everything... We are completely bankrupt. And I told Major about this. Major’s reaction was—if England found out something like this about itself, there would be a revolution the next day!

In the meantime, today at a meeting with Christophersen, M.S. was extremely self-confident (like in that anecdote): “No need to dramatize... If we’re talking about revolution, then it is impossible to have complete order, take us for who we are, so to say. We will pay off the debts. We don’t need handouts and such.” He made an impression on Christophersen, who will go to London with that impression. This is Nozdrevshchina²⁸ already. Or maybe the only thing left to do is hope for the best.

October 2, 1991, Morning, Before Work

I was thinking about the “Assistant’s Diary.” I was a little cunning in some things there, but not so much as to put a fly in the ointment. The *Time* correspondent was right when he said that the notepad, captured on film by the girl accompanying him, could be sold for thousands of dollars.

I tried to reproduce exactly what was written there, exactly how it was written there, with 95 percent accuracy.

October 2, 1991, Evening

Gorbachev met with Shoshanna Karden. She is a rather elderly Americanized Jewish woman; maybe she was even beautiful in her day. She is smart and businesslike, but within the limits of “diplomacy.”

He started by saying that *perestroika* was intended to benefit all people, including the Jews. She tactfully tried the entire time to insist that the Jews are a “special case” after all. During the conversation she asked him directly, why the “Soviet leadership” has not in the process of democratization officially condemned anti-Semitism. He evaded the question (as he has done with others), saying: “I have decisively condemned all versions of chauvinism and nationalism in my official speeches. But to single out anti-Semitism... You know that we have 120 nationalities in the Union. To single out one would mean to give preference. Nationalistic manifestations are not directed just at the Jews.” Nevertheless, Karden smiled and asked

²⁸ A reference to the character Nozdrev from Nikolai Gogol’s *Dead Souls*. Nozdrev symbolizes unruly, violent behavior and impudence. [Translator’s Note]

Gorbachev to find an opportunity and a convenient moment to “once again” publicly condemn anti-Semitism.

M.S. assured her that “the atmosphere has improved greatly in the recent years,” and in general “we don’t have this anymore,” though one cannot deny...

Karden reminded him about the anti-Semitic newspapers that have been appearing, and about the everyday manifestations of anti-Semitism. M.S. responded “with understanding”: our inter-ethnic situation is difficult, but not hopeless. To solve these problems we need further democratization and an elevation of the “cultural identity of the people.”

The American raised the issue of “refuseniks;” there are still a significant number of them left, even though “You, Mr. Gorbachev, have done a great deal to remove the problem of leaving the country.” M.S. said that he is against people leaving, but now it is a matter of voluntary choice. He tied the “refuseniks” to state secrets. Shoshanna made an ironic remark: “maybe if you look at them, it will turn out these aren’t secrets at all? Why do all Western countries have a limit of 5 years on their secrets, and you have 10? Do you have some special secrets from the world community?” M.S. promised to think everything over.

I could see that he was most concerned about how to use the “gratitude of the Jews” that Karden kept bringing up, to encourage the U.S. Jewish community to contribute investments into our economy.

Karden reminded him that the World Jewish Congress and “Jews in general” sharply condemned the State Emergency Committee from the outset. M.S. thanked her and said that the outflow of Jews from the USSR has increased because of the coup.

How would I rate this meeting? M.S. had met with prominent Jewish figures before (Rappaport, Reichman, Israeli ministers) but the subject matter was always “business,” economic ties, although the public did not overlook the fact that he “did not disdain” to meet with them... This time he met with a woman who officially represented a Jewish organization and spoke in the name of all Jews and about the “Jewish question.”

Probably this meeting and Gorbachev’s message for the “memorial prayer” at Babi Yar, can put an end to Soviet state anti-Semitism.²⁹

And still, still I am upset that M.S. did not go to Babi Yar himself, even though the President of Israel invited him to go... thereby hoping to give this action a political tone. Gorbachev did not follow the example of Willy Brandt, who stood on his knees in Warsaw to ask forgiveness of a nation so terribly wronged by his people, despite the fact that he, Brandt, personally had nothing to do with it.

²⁹ This “end” was solidified by Gorbachev’s meeting with the Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Shamir in Madrid on October 30th, 1991. It was a truly friendly and sincere meeting, as if both of them (and everyone present) breathed a breath of relief and said to themselves and to each other—finally! We are done with the absurd hostility that Stalin raised to State level and that was continued and expanded during the Brezhnev era. [Author’s note]

October 6, 1991, Sunday

Yesterday M.S. met with Camdessus. They formalized the “USSR’s” entry into the IMF (all the time now in official tests and especially in public addresses I feel like avoiding the name of the country. Damn it! There was probably no other case in history when the state remained, but was stripped of its name. Anyway...) Both Camdessus and M.S. called it a “historic event.” In terms of symbolism, this is probably the case. They exchanged letters, and at their request I “witnessed” that the exchange took place...

Camdessus was very polite, talkative, and uncharacteristically for a businessman—full of enthusiasm and optimism for us. He said that on behalf of the G-7, his people have been studying us and “constantly monitoring the course of events” since last fall, and he is sure that if we “get” (i.e. create with the help of the IMF and the G-7) the technology and incentives, the USSR would become an economic superpower not just someday, but within a few years. I wrote this in the press report of the meeting... but who publishes anymore this “genre” I created?! My reports about M.S.’ meetings do not appear on the TV or in the newspapers.

Prior to this, for two days Weber, Yermovsky and I prepared the text for M.S.’ televised response to Bush’s initiative... Also working on this was the group M.S. created, headed by Silaev (Shaposhnikov, Petrovsky, Ryzhkov, Bakatin, Yakovlev, generals and Karpov from the MFA). Yesterday we put it together: my political text (assessments) and their “counter-offers.” Quite strong. But they decided against liquidating our nuclear bombers—a part of the strategic nuclear arms triad (Shaposhnikov, who is an aviator, objected to it). Though Shaposhnikov + Ryzhkov “informed” us that our TU-160 are flying coffins (like the TB-3 at the beginning of the war! I remember them). If, God willing, they manage to get to the coast of the United States or Canada, it would be only to drop the bombs. Getting back—that’s another question! They constitute only 3 percent of our strategic nuclear forces... but each bomber costs 50 million and carries only 8 missiles, while the American B-2 carries 48 missiles, not to mention the electronics, speed, etc.!

Nevertheless (even though they almost agreed to it), this point was removed. If they had accepted it, it would liquidate one leg of the triad of strategic nuclear weapons.

M.S. talked with Yeltsin, who agreed to the statement in general. M.S. promised to send Obukhov + a general to Yeltsin in Kislovodsk, to “acquaint him with all the details”... But it seems he forgot about this later. He did not find it necessary to inform the other heads of “our” states: “They can go to hell... some presidents they are!”

He spoke with Bush. Pankin gave our response in writing to Bartholomew (U.S. Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs), who arrived in Moscow. That is why we rushed M.S. to appear on TV yesterday, so it does not look like we acted at the Americans’ bidding.

On Thursday we “saw off” Primakov to “our CIA”... The people gathered in his office: Bakatin, Yakovlev, Revenko, and I. M.S. also came by. We had a good deal to drink... Talked about loyalty to each other... shared “information” about the betrayals. Yakovlev was particularly verbose. I looked at him and thought: I, for one, do not like your petty-vain activity

in public. Our offices are close by in the Kremlin, and every day near his office I see crowds of TV crews and journalists... Every day he makes an appearance somewhere, speaking about morality. Whether it be at an opening of a Fund (Krasin and Shakhnazarov created a Fund in the former Lenin School), or at the presentation of his book (yet another collection of the same articles and new interviews).

By the way, last week, in the course of a conversation with Shoshanna Karden (chairwoman of the American Confederation of Soviet Jews) M.S. for the first time made a straightforward statement on the Jewish question. It was sincere and good. I think he must have used the text of the 50th anniversary of Babi Yar address (the ceremony took place yesterday in Kiev), which was supposed to be delivered by Yakovlev, whom M.S. sent there. I don't know how much he changed the text before giving it to Yakovlev. And will it be published? Nowadays nobody publishes the President's speeches, they only comment on them...

On Friday, October 3rd, Horst Teltschik visited (he is Kohl's former adviser and my friend). He is now in the leadership of the global publishing house Bertelsmann. He is undertaking to publish M.S.' book in German-speaking countries.

Evening. R.M. called me. "Did you read *Pravda* from yesterday?" "No," I replied." "Read it, it talks about the diary you published." And off she went: "How could you have said such things about me! As though I called Boldin 'family' [*rodnoi*] and shared intimate family secrets with him. I have never called anyone 'family' besides M.S., my daughters and granddaughters. How could you deliver such a blow to me, and to Mikhail Sergeyevich? I knew that your diary would be used to harm us. You didn't risk anything (?!!), for you it is an event, but for my husband, children, and grandchildren it was a question of life and death. You should have thought before writing something like this... I did not say these things, and Ira and Tolya (son in law) are my witnesses. M.S. also confirms this," etc. And, in her usual didactic manner, she repeated it several times. This lasted for about half an hour. And M.S. was present [on the other end of the line]. It became completely obvious when she lost steam and asked, "Do you have any questions for Mikhail Sergeyevich?" I did not.

I thought to myself: what the hell do I need this for? And why should she... or any other woman who takes advantage of the fact that she is speaking to a "gentleman" who will not be able to tell her to go to... why should she be allowed to say such things to me? I told her that I could no longer be silent when from all sides people were "arguing" that there was no blockade, arrest, and disconnecting of the telephone lines... And that it was practically Gorbachev himself who thought this up and got it going. I could not allow myself to publish "the appropriate version" and still call it my diary. Perhaps she did not say those exact words about Boldin, but the gist of her reaction to Boldin at the time, in the evening of August 18th in "Zarya," was precisely as I described it. That was my impression and that is how I portrayed it.

I find it really unpleasant that Yakovlev and Shevardnadze can say whatever they want about M.S., even suspect him of organizing a conspiracy (as E.A. has said publicly), and it's no big deal! But when Chernyaev steps out of the shadow and asserts "his individuality," she doesn't like it. She could have taken into account the fact that I have given these six years to his cause... devotedly and selflessly. As for the idea that "I didn't risk anything"... She and M.S.

can't come to terms with the fact that I didn't piss my pants. This is why I was "cheerful" in front of the "Vesti" TV camera. It turns out not only R.M. noticed this, but various people watching the program, including Mark Zakharov, who appeared on TV the next day.

I don't care! But it's time to leave. It's time! And I don't need to explain anything...

October 7, 1991

Met with old friends from various academic institutes at 42nd... Sitting on the terrace, talking. About the same old thing: what's going to happen to us... I assure everybody that there will be a Great Russia, and who cares about everything else...

We gossiped about R.M.'s interview from yesterday, where she mentioned me: "It's fiction," she said (about my diary in *Izvestiya*), "I don't know for what purpose"...

I drank wine and talked... about R.M., too. Why people find her disagreeable, and why I, too, echoed this in my "diary." I talked about the "Ides of March," having remembered that M.S. saw the production, and about Shakespeare and Ibsen, about Julius Caesar... Recently I glanced at an old book about him by Utchenko, a university professor whom I knew in my day.

Kravchuk. They are showing him on TV. He is trying to appropriate the nuclear missiles, the Donets Basin, and the Crimea... the idiot... Does he think that Sevastopol' belongs to him, too?! Not so fast... This is when the "democrat," if he is Russian, will protest... and what a protest it will be!... It won't be a matter of taking Sevastopol' from Kravchuk. No, it will be a matter of "let him try and take it!"³⁰

October 12, 1991, Saturday Morning

Things evaporate from my memory very quickly with all these fleeting events and "circumstances." I will try to reproduce the basic outline from memory.

I did not go to the meeting between M.S. and Riesman & Co. (representing 120 "sharks" of U.S. pension funds—400 billion dollars). I did not go to the meeting between M.S. and the President of the Italian Confindustria—the number one man in Italian business... I did not want to go to the meeting with Madigan, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture. I was "demonstrating" my displeasure with R.M.'s "action," and with M.S.' reaction to it.

He noticed my absence: called me seven times a day for trifles reasons, sometimes immediately forgetting why he called me. Maybe one could add to this the "awkwardness" of him having made Shakhnazarov a State secretary, but not me. But I had refused it myself! Still... it stung...

M.S. argued with Madigan that we have people to do business with... And optimistically assured him that on the 11th the State Council will convene, and then we will have the economic agreement, and a food agreement, and a Union Treaty... By the way, Madigan—on behalf of

³⁰ This is how naïve I was. I measured things by different standards, by an intellectual's standards. [Author's note]

Bush—truly offered to help... (it still doesn't get through to us that this is guided by morality and decency, as well as friendly feelings)... For example, they are ready to install for free their managers in our food processing plants, so that through “correct,” i.e. American, management, we could increase our production of meat, milk, bread, vegetables, and potatoes by as much as 25-70 percent using the equipment and personnel we already have. He also promised to create a model farm in the St. Petersburg district, again for free. M.S. kept trying to find out how much such a farm would cost in the U.S. For a while Madigan thought M.S. was asking him how much it would cost to him, and assured that it would not cost anything. Finally, he “got it,” and gave a number—1.5 billion.

I had to go to the meeting with Madigan, because Gusenkov was busy escorting R.M. and the children for questioning by a prosecutor; and Zagladin, as usual, was either in Brussels or in Rome...

Some really unexpected things happened at the State Council. After the confusion in the Russian parliament, government, and presidential power, the press is beginning to suspect a split in the new, post-coup democracy. Yeltsin came to the State Council, though three days before neither Rutskoi, nor Khasbulatov could reach him in Kislovodsk, which they mentioned publicly. People say he was on a heavy drinking bout, and the only ambulance in town was parked at his dacha the entire time...

During the six hours of the State Council, B.N. sat without opening his mouth, sulking as he used to at the Politburo. But at the end he did open his mouth to say “yes” on all three issues: the economic agreement, the food agreement, and the continuation of work on the Union Treaty.

On the first item Yavlinsky made a brilliant report—an educational program, cultural enlightenment for the basically illiterate presidents of the republics. He was not shy with them. For example, his response to the Central Bank, which they want to make inter-republic-collegiate, was to throw up his hands in bewilderment. “This is a law of nature... If the ruble-zone remains, if you are for a single economic space, then the law of nature makes “your” collegiate management impossible. What can I do? What you are suggesting would be akin to having a central hospital in Moscow, where you demand that a board of 12-15 different doctors operate on you, and there is no way around it. I think nobody except for you would go to such a hospital.” And so on.

It was strikingly primitive. PB members (in their own system) were far more intelligent and qualified!

Kravchuk is getting worked up about the Union Treaty. Despite the fact that M.S. has again seriously backed down. Now there no more talk of having the Union Treaty before the economic agreement. Now we are only talking about continuing work on the text of the Treaty in inter-republic working groups. But the Ukrainian keeps saying: my Supreme Soviet decided not to participate until December 1st (Ukrainian referendum)...

Then M.S. suggested that the State Council address the “workers of Ukraine.” The word “workers” was immediately shot down. The Kyrgyz suggested “people,” others the Supreme

Soviet, since it made the resolution. Kravchuk protested: it would truly look silly if he, a member of the State Council, together with other members, would address his own Supreme Soviet to overturn a decision they made together. And this is while he is running for president. Nevertheless, M.S. “assigned” himself to prepare such an address!

In a word, things are unwinding in every direction. But what will happen in the “White House” when Yeltsin, gloomy and dulled by vodka during his vacation, will be taken to task by the likes of Burbulis and Lobov & Co.??!

On the 8th I visited Pankin: we had agreed to talk... He is in the MFA building, right here near my house. I hadn’t been in this high-rise in a while. Their reception was stiff and servile... policemen and officials bowing...

We walked through an enfilade suite to get to a remote “compartment” and sat down over some whiskey. Talked... it is difficult to say about what. More or less that we will be making the “new thinking” policies together now. We reminisced about the last 20 years. Picked the bones of the turncoats during the coup. We relegated Kvitsinskiy “into the shadows,” so as not to lose him... I “praised” Borya, saying that the MFA finally has a politician rather than a simple official.

But even though we made an agreement, the next day he bypassed me, and “without me” met with M.S. and offered him to invite Milosevic and Tudjman to Moscow: to reconcile the Serbs and the Croats. When I found out, I started objecting to M.S.—why should he stick his nose out and bless Croatia’s separation (the first of world leaders), not to mention that we have our own people to reconcile, at home. It would look strange. And most importantly, it is a hopeless affair. M.S. already agreed to invite them, and ignored me... Once again he put me in my place: write your memos for texts, so to say. Although he was gentle about it this time.

I have to leave, and soon.

My wife’s second operation on her eye went well. This is good. She will be able to read. In return, Slava Fedorov demands that I get M.S. to remove the 40 percent exchange tax he has to pay. That’s how it is, dear Chernyaev! But I am not going to do it.

I want to go to the forest, out of the city... The autumn is beautiful, but it is passing me by this time.

The other day I bought an original illustration to *The Master and Margarita* on Arbat for 400 rubles. Here it is on my wall. It is nice to wake up in the morning and “pray” to this beauty, which takes you away somewhere...

Evening of the same day

I was preparing a “memo” for Nakayama. Brutents distracted me with his conversation... Why did he come over? Maybe he is avoiding his wife, or maybe he is preparing for the visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where I “arranged” for him to go with a message from M.S., “in secret” from Pankin, who refused to take him to Syria and Israel.

The MFA's background for Nakayama is weak verbiage. I improved it, made it in Gorbachev's style. But there is still no position.

Weber came... I transferred the memo on him, and asked him to pull up a "dossier" on Khasbulatov's trip to Japan... about the meetings and the press against giving up the islands.

I got back to work. Weber showed me how he finished up the memo. I fell into despair, and called Pankin. "We don't have a position," I told him, "what are we taking to the President?" He started saying something routine.

"Borya! It's time to stop stalling," I said, "Everything we could have said to stall has already been said. We have to choose: either give up the islands and go to the people (either in the Russian or the USSR Supreme Soviet) and justify this decision... Or tell the Japanese: you'll never have these islands and take a hike with your good intentions, with your 'friendship' and your billions! And then we should straightforwardly tell our people: is this what you wanted?"

I did not hear anything worthwhile from the Minister in response.

M.S. will try to talk his way out of this subject: "history will be the judge," "let's create an atmosphere"... it's pointless and pathetic. There is no policy. All that's left is empty talk.

It's the same deal with inviting Milosevic and Tudjman. Pankin could not explain why he dragged M.S. into this affair. To be the first world leader to bless Croatia's "withdrawal" from the SFRY? Or to persuade Serbia and Croatia to avoid bloodshed? It's a joke! Do we not have our own Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Armenians, and others to reconcile??!

Once again, this is not policy but empty talk. M.S. must be engaging in it to appear to be participating in "real world politics"...

Yesterday I wrote him my opinion about the Yugoslavs. In response he called me and said: "This is what we're going to do: schedule Milosevic on the 15th at 3:00 p.m., and Tudjman on the 15th at 5:00 p.m." This is the extent of his conversation with the international affairs adviser to the President of what is still a superpower.

What the hell do I need this for?!

The day was wasted at work, we didn't get anything done. So I will have to do it tomorrow... But I wanted to get out in nature...

M.S. told me about a conversation with Yeltsin yesterday after the State Council. Yeltsin told him, "Mikhail Sergeyevich, were you not a little hasty with your book ("August Coup")?" "No," Gorbachev replied, "and I recommend that if you have anything to say about those days, you should say it now."

He commented the exchange: "Yeltsin was probably jealous and decided to 'warn' me, since he seems to have made no progress on his book in Kislovodsk..."

There is a scandal about the stolen transcripts of interrogations of Yazov, Kryuchkov, and Pavlov... They were published in *Der Spiegel*. This is the extreme collapse of the State. But this is not the point... I said to M.S.: "This confirms what you say in the book—that your refusal to accept the ultimatum upset all their plans. The coup fell apart at that point. This entire farce depended on you showing weakness..."

October 13, 1991, Sunday

By the way... I just realized that today it is exactly 50 years since the day I joined the army and went to the front. The student volunteers from the History Department joined at the recruitment office in Stolovy Pereulok, near the Nikitskiy Gate (the building is still there). I remember how because of my nose and hearing I was disqualified from being a pilot, which was my first choice. Then they shaved my head and I did not take off my hat when we were getting on the bus (to the train station) so my mother and Jenya would not see how awful I looked... I still had my moustache...

So, half a century has gone by... Look where fate has taken me...

The last issue of "Rodina" [Motherland] is devoted entirely to the lies about the war that have accumulated over half a century—the white spots that we are only now beginning to fill... But they are being filled and replaced with other lies. For example, take V. Astaf'ev's article in which he curses the Communists, the commissars and political instructors who supposedly spent the war in triple-reinforced dugouts. There were some like this... the same goes for non-partisan commanders! But I remember another kind, for example our battalion commissar, Ljubutin from Byelorussia, who never left the front lines and died in the trenches from a shell-splinter wound to his head. Yes, "all of us" became Communists there: it was like swearing an oath together with something of a death-warrant: if we were taken prisoner or if the Germans won, it would mean certain death, there was no way back. And it is very bad that some veterans are strengthening the "democrats'" revanchist hysteria with their "testimonies."

I had to go to work today. I finished the memo for Nakayama. But I attached a personal note to M.S., saying that this "verbiage" and repetition. There is no policy here. Policy is a choice. And we have to choose instead of shifting form foot to food (an expression he uses). We either agree to transfer the islands, in which case I suggested that he should make an agreement with Yeltsin and go to the Supreme Soviet or the Russian Congress with this and get the sanctions in spite of local "patriots." Or we have to tell Nakayama: we cannot give them to you; the people are "against" it, so to say. But then we have to tell the people at the Supreme Soviet: "This is what you wanted—to disregard our friendship with the Japanese for two cliffs and some barely populated islands, at a time when we 'gave away' the entire Baltic region (which is also a legacy of the war) and will be giving away some other things, too."

I wrote it pretty sharply. I thought he would get mad. But he just called me, saying: "I discussed this with Pankin, tomorrow I will talk to Yeltsin. Indeed, it is time to make up our mind."

We discussed the article in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* that Yeltsin will not agree to the radical reforms, since they contradict his populist nature, and he will lose his base quickly. He is doomed to hold on only through applause. (At this point M.S. noted that we already went through this and can act rationally and reasonably). By the way (I just thought of this): the Japanese islands will be touchstone whether *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* is right in its analysis. To give them away would be very unpopular, though it would help Russia's economic revival. But it is like the proverbial two birds in the bush.

October 16, 1991, Wednesday Morning

Yesterday M.S. once again surprised everybody, including me. He got Milosevic and Tudjman on the fact that despite all their enmity and intransigence, they agreed to have dinner together (in the mansion on Alexei Tolstoy Street) and accepted a joint memorandum (which I dictated to Tamara 5 minutes before going to this Shekhtel palace). And the three of them appeared before the camera together, while Andrei Grachev read the text (which we "collectively" edited in the Vrubel reception room).

In a word, it is the miracle of Gorbachev's charm, "trusting" persuasiveness and skill... It is disarming... above all by common sense and the thing that nowadays is called openness.

However, I think in the Yugoslav conflict, that will be about the limit [of this "miracle"]. I keep arguing with myself—was it worth it?! M.S. won more for himself here (in the sense of his international and even domestic image). He announced that tomorrow he will bring together "the same way!" Mutlibov and Ter-Petrosyan! As for Yugoslavia, I will be wrong only if they themselves have become exhausted from smashing and shooting at each other: there are 1000 dead soldiers, 10 thousand civilian casualties, 388 historic landmarks destroyed, and Croatia's economy is completely devastated.

Nevertheless, on this question I was mistaken from the point of view of M.S.' interests as a statesman, I underestimated his abilities.

As for Japan and Nakayama, even though my position was extreme and I insisted that we should announce right now (even if in private, confidentially) that we are ready to give them the islands, my persistence was not futile. It made M.S. stop and think that we should not tread water. And he made a little step, giving Nakayama to understand that we have one goal with Japan: to give them the islands through the peace treaty. But we have to "get there," without jumping over things and disturbing the process. Because now we too have a democracy, and in our Far East it is vigorously against transferring the islands!

Rosenthal from *Time* came by. He told me that I will get \$5,000 for my text about August 18-21st! It will give us some peace of mind to have this sum, in today's world. Maybe we will be able to buy an apartment, as Anya insists we should. But Mayor Gavrila Popov changes property regulations every week.

We agreed with Rosenthal that “maybe” I could keep giving them materials about “my service to Gorbachev”... I really should... Much of this will disappear with me, until 50-100 years later some historian will find my diary.

I have a pain behind my ear. What could it be? Usually all such “illnesses” I have go away on their own... for example, like the hernia in September... Maybe this will also go away on its own? Like on a dog.

October 19, 1991, Saturday Morning

Yesterday the Economic Agreement was signed, without Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. The day before, on the occasion of his “100 days,” Yeltsin once again took credit for finishing the job of collapsing the center... When asked how he and Gorbachev are doing, he said: “Better, but if he again... (gesture!), I will deal a blow in response (gesture—smashed his first on the table).

Yesterday on TV the Russian Minister of Finances said that “they” are ready for currency reform and to exchange the Soviet currency for the Russian ruble.

M.S. keeps asking about the progress of my work on materials for his speech at the opening of the Supreme Soviet on October 21st. By the way, deputies from Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan are not attending. The Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan passed a resolution not to participate or sign anything in Moscow until the Center provides some guarantees on the border with Armenia. Moreover, no governing bodies for the Supreme Soviet have been set up to replace the former Supreme Soviet Presidium and Presidents of the Chamber. Laptev and Nishanov are in the offside, since their chambers no longer exist. The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine declared that it is subordinating all armed forces on its territory and taking over all their property. This is some kind of madness.

Why am I saying all of this? To point out that all we have left is the semblance of a Union.

Every day I prepare for him texts for addresses—such as for a Paris Conference on Cambodia, or the UNESCO General Conference, or a letter to Bush (with Akaev)...He appeared as the magician-mediator between Serbia and Croatia. But before the world could utter a word, they resumed clobbering each other with even greater fury.

He received the Japanese and practically promised them the islands, though right now he does not have the power to transfer them absolutely.

He received Voscherau, the Mayor of Hamburg, to please the Mayor of Saint Petersburg Sobchak. But the latter, after getting his way, did not even consider it necessary to come to the meeting. Instead, he sent his “Minister of Foreign Affairs.” We have those now in Leningrad.

Moskovskiy Komsomolets printed a large picture of the President’s brother-in-law, R.M.’s brother, who is an alcoholic and has been in a Voronezh mental institution for many years. It’s

terrible! Afterwards, the editorial staff got off with an apology. But Gusenkov told me that the Presidential couple has been in shock the whole two days since it happened!!

The press has switched to serious criticism of Yeltsin. They remind him that since there is no longer a Center, or at least the Center is not holding him back—he will soon have to make good on his promises... And that he hasn't done anything since the "great victory" in August. Meanwhile, they write about Gorbachev in passing, ironically, with ridicule and mocking condescension. They no longer make demands or throw accusations at him.

So... my worst fear was that M.S. would become pathetic as he clutches at the remains of power and position. He did not manage to make a good exit at the right time and with dignity. And when you talk to him, especially when you see how confidently he holds himself with foreign interlocutors, how he speaks to them (in style and manner) the same way as he did a year or two ago, you don't know what to think: either it's his nature, or some feeling of self-preservation, or he is a good actor.

But I feel his uncertainty (and wretchedness) when I see how interested and involved he is in the publication of his book "The August Coup"—the contracts, fees, translations, deadlines, etc.

In the beginning, he said to me about the fees: "It doesn't matter; it's a wasted effort anyway. They didn't value it before and now the more so, nobody will notice..." I think he understood that it's time to secure his rear.

Which is a serious issue now. Yura Zhilin (the former head of a consultant group in the CC International Department) stopped by. His pension is 200 rubles. Is it enough to live on?! And many from the International Department, even those who were on the barricades on August 19th, ended up without a job. The day before yesterday Lisovolik jumped out of a window (my former subordinate, head of the U.S. Sector in the International Department).

If we barely signed the Economic Agreement, we will never get the Union Treaty... The Center will disappear. Yeltsin is claiming the role of "President-coordinator." He publicly stated that he will allocate the Union budget only to maintain the Ministry of Defense, Atomic Energy, and the railways. Even the MFA is not on the list!

There definitely will not be funds for the presidential staff. Although Revenko told me that he set up some "firms" that are pumping out currency, so the presidential apparatus will have some funds for now. But this is nonsense, that the President of a "superpower" is funded through some practically underground business!

Yesterday we restored diplomatic relations with Israel... This would truly be a major event... if there was a Union left... though, Russia will inherit it. A Conference on the Middle East has been scheduled in Madrid. M.S. will go... While here at home we have people killing each other every day in Karabakh, Ossetia, Chechnya, Georgia, etc.

October 20, 1991, Sunday Morning

Yesterday was a peculiar day. I went to work, almost sure that I would have to spend the day with M.S., working on the speech for the opening of the Supreme Soviet (on Monday). Last night Shakhnazarov gave me a text that was a conglomeration of pieces on different subjects, prepared by different people. Though, he told me, Medvedev and Ozherel'ev never finished the economic section. So the text consisted of the "legal" part (Shakhnazarov), the international part on the foreign policy of the new Union (mine), and a section Shakhnazarov's team improvised on social-economic themes.

I went over everything... changing a lot of things, removing attacks (Ukraine, Georgia), and most importantly removing the moralizing, lecturing, and sermonizing (though they were written in Gorbachev's style). The time for such things has passed. I gave it back to Shakhnazarov...

At noon, M.S. was again engaged in something that's not his job: he gathered entrepreneurs and labor groups to teach them how to proceed after everything that has happened. It would seem: you have given everything over to the republics, associations and corporations, so let everything take its course, let them be responsible. But no, his hands are itching to organize everybody like in the olden days, which he consciously brought to an end. And that is his historic accomplishment.

By the way, *Kultura* [Culture] ran a 1.5 page opus: "Who is Gorbachev?" (The editor, Albert Belyaev, notified me about it in advance). It is a psychoanalytical (Freudian) essay about Gorbachev's personality and motives. It was written by a doctor, psychotherapist. It's written "beautifully"... And I, who knows Gorbachev closely (unlike the article's author), agree with 90 percent of it. It's published in the October 19th, 1991, issue.

By around 3 p.m. I found out, however, that M.S. already started working on the text with Shakhnazarov and Yakovlev. This means they "did not deem me necessary"...

Oh, I forgot: on Friday Bruno Malov visited me. The one who was the deputy head, and then the head of SED's International Department, who flashed across our TV screens as Honecker's interpreter. Now he is 55 years old, and he is "living it out" in the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] apparatus in Berlin. He told me that not all his former friends with whom for so many years we "consolidated the International Communist Movement [ICM]" now wanted to meet with him. We talked about life, *perestroika*, the old days... we've known each other for 20 plus years. We discussed what we did, while we understood the absurdity of it all, and that it would lead to a dead end. We remembered how Ponomarev would gather officials at his level from five socialist countries and teach them how to rebut the French and Italians with their Eurocommunism, or the Romanians (I remember in Poland, at night before Warsaw we were in some old castle from the Mickiewicz era, we met secretly from the Romanian delegation to conspire!)... Bruno understands everything and did not argue with me when I started to "justify" the inevitability of what happened... That it was natural for revisionism to be born in such units as the International Department... because we knew the world and we knew that nobody was going to attack us, we knew what the ICM was in reality, and that it was a lost cause... It was not without reason that in the SED and especially in the apparatus of the CC CPSU, the international affairs workers were considered revisionists from Trapeznikov's days, and they were endured

only because “technically” it was impossible without them to maintain relations with other Communist Parties, and to keep them on our bandwagon.

He told me that people in his apartment building treat him decently. They say nice things to his wife (she is from Kiev), and try to reassure her, saying: “You lived with privileges for a while, but you’ll survive without them. We made do without them!” And these are Germans. But it is probably because Bruno is a “good person,” he did not abuse his proximity to Honecker and his position.

I wish I could take a week-long vacation and go “to the village” with Lyuda!! Like in the movies.

Yesterday I had this conversation with Revenko (Chief of Presidential Staff). The day before I had written him a note about my own “apparatus”: about the women who for two months now have been sitting practically on top of each other in a 14-meter room; about Brutents—that he cannot be my deputy and he should be appointed somewhere, like Zagladin was.

He responded point by point. The point that was important to me is this: my last question was “What should I be called now?” That is, considering that Shakhnazarov was made a State adviser. I refused this position, but on the condition that I don’t want to remain at the level of Yegorov or Ozherel’ev. (Revenko agrees: “I don’t even know what they do,” he said. “M.S. gives assignments only to two people: you and Shakhnazarov. I told Gorbachev—there are 18 advisers, and I, the Chief of the Presidential Staff, don’t know what they are doing!”). In any case, Revenko continued: “I told M.S.—let’s appoint Chernyaev as the ‘Special Adviser on international affairs’ and another guy as the ‘Special Adviser on security issues.’ But M.S. did not respond. You probably know better than I do, what this reaction of his means. I repeated the suggestion, but again, he changed the subject.”

What conclusions can I draw? The following: we were always “scribes” for him, as Yakovlev and Shakhnazarov like to say (more precisely, in older Russian, we are clerks [*d'yaki*]). And it is in this capacity that he needs us...

By the way, I should note: I like Pankin’s decisiveness and readiness to take matters into his own hands... For example, he went ahead and established diplomatic relations with Israel while he was in Jerusalem, not after the start of the Conference in Madrid, as had been planned, but before?!

Maybe I should request to be sent as an ambassador to Israel?! Heh-heh. How surprised M.S. would be!! And it would be a “soft” challenge... in response to his “respectful” attitude.

I am thinking about retirement. It is time. My days have passed... Some of the genres I created are no longer necessary and are not used. Plus, my ECG is getting worse by the week. I am ready to file my resignation even today.

I wonder what his reaction would be... But what reaction am I talking about! He is “busy,” he has to win victories every day, or at least have a semblance of victories. This requires tremendous effort. The author of the psychoanalysis in *Kultura* is right.

October 21, 1991, Early Monday Morning

My Italian friend Bianca and I visited Karyakin. They (Yura and Ira) haven’t seen Bianca since 1967, since “their second Prague.” They’ve been in their new apartment three months: the living quarters of intellectuals! We talked for about three hours, while drinking good tea... they didn’t have any alcohol at home. We had a fierce discussion of the coup and the people involved... Yura and Ira know some details that are worth remembering. By the way, it turns out that a crowd of people was waiting for M.S. outside the White House upon his arrival from Foros. The people had posters, chants, etc. They waited until 4 a.m. He did not show up. But I don’t remember Silaev or Rutskoi telling him while we were in Foros or on the airplane that people were waiting for him. On the contrary, Rutskoi was very concerned about his safety, even after arrival. In the airplane he kept asking, “Where are you going to go?” M.S. said that he is going to the dacha. “Is it safe? Perhaps you should go to your Moscow apartment? I installed covert security guards there just in case!” But M.S. replied that there is probably security at the dacha now as well, and the family is tired, so they will not go to different places, etc. But it turns out that people were waiting for him, and they say that his failure to appear caused resentment and disappointment... even the Italians felt this way, as Bianca told us: she was also waiting by the TV at night, back at home, in Livorno.

What followed afterwards was gross blunder—when he did not attend the “victory rally” on the “Free Russia” square the next day... Instead, he was busy writing decrees to appoint... Moiseev, Shebarshin, and other deputy ministers to replace the cabinet members who were at fault.

Although, maybe they made an “agreement” with Yeltsin, who did not want to share a single iota of his victory glory with anyone, and who set M.S. up to be torn apart by his parliament a few hours later.

Karyakin assumes that’s what happened. He warned about two things. Firstly, that Yeltsin’s entourage, headed by Burbulis, hates Gorbachev with a fierce, animal hatred. Secondly, that the RSFSR Congress is preparing some kind of action (he doesn’t know what kind) against M.S. I bet they’ll call the CPSU a criminal organization.

I am reading Pushkin’s letters. This is probably the first instance of the use of the living and quite modern Russian language (well, with the exception of some expressions and “outdated” words). His manner is the same as of Moscow’s intellectuals today.

I read in Rozanov: Tolstoy is a genius, but not intelligent... Pushkin is both—which is very rare. I wonder, what about Lenin? He is clearly intelligent, but his genius turned out to be “wrong,” although perhaps genius is determined by the effects “in its field”...

November 2, 1991, Saturday Morning

I glanced in my diary and turns out I haven't written since October 21st. I didn't mention that I had a big talk with M.S. about my position and apparatus, after the Deputy Chief of the Presidential Staff told me that as an adviser (according to the new structure) I get only a secretary, and no consultants...

There was a conversation over the intercom with Revenko... "He (i.e. me) won't let me alone," Revenko said, when he did not know that I was listening. And this is after all the polite conversations and praise in my address, in comparison to the other advisers.

M.S. told him sharply: "Sort it out. And the resolution is to give Chernyaev whatever he asks for."

The preparations for Madrid (on the Middle East). Gorbachev's and others' speeches at the opening of the conference sounded "better" than Bush's. The Americans were elbowing me (Scowcroft from the right, Sununu from the left, and then Ambassador Straus), and giving me a thumbs-up.

I tried to refuse to go to Madrid. M.S. looked at the list I compiled. He glanced at it, saw what was there, and asked; "Are you seriously planning on not going?" and included me in the delegation (as opposed to the accompanying party). He understood that I do not want to associate closely with R.M.

What happened in Madrid?

Before the start of the conference on the Middle East, Gorbachev and Bush, the co-chairs of the conference, talked thoroughly about everything in the presence of Baker, Scowcroft, Pankin. I was there too.

M.S. started by praising both of them—this conference is another example of the effective partnership between the USSR and the U.S. in world politics. For M.S., this is especially important at a moment when, as he told Bush himself, both here and in the U.S. people are asking: does the Soviet Union exist, and what does Gorbachev represent? He expressed his appreciation to the President and to Baker, and to the US Administration for the "balanced approach" in this matter.

They agreed on behavior tactics for each of them and for both of them together during the opening of the conference and afterwards: to act in a way so the sides (the Arabs and Israel) assume the responsibility for resolving these issues, as opposed to shifting this on the superpowers.

M.S. agreed and said that he recently met with the President of Cyprus in Moscow. He called him a good person (with which President Bush agreed) and relayed the Cypriot's request: "to demonstrate (U.S. and USSR) a joint commitment to resolving the Cyprus problem." "We cannot allow the use of force (by the Turks)," M.S. said. He relayed Vassiliou's opinion that if things remain the same, it would set a bad precedent. M.S. commented on this information by saying that in other similar cases we would not accept the use of force.

That was the end of the discussion of the Cyprus problem.

They discussed Yugoslavia, establishing that the situation is deteriorating. M.S. suggested returning to the Yugoslav issue at the UN Security Council.

Bush reacted skeptically, along the lines of: some members of the Security Council and staff of the UN Secretariat believe that it is an internal affair, and they do not want to get the UN involved.

Gorbachev agreed that intervention is unacceptable. "But if the UN states its position, it could have certain consequences."

"The UN has already stated its position," Bush objected, "We support the EC's [European Council] efforts. You spoke with representatives of Serbia and Croatia. Do you think it was helpful?" he asked, not without a hint of malice.

Baker joined in the conversation, "Regrettably, there are disagreements among members of the EC, as well. It is difficult for them to maintain a unified approach. Some Europeans want to recognize the independence of the republics. I tried to oppose this, but Germans ran ahead of us."

"I also spoke about this with Kohl when we met near Kiev," M.S. noted. "I am worried about this. After all, we are not talking only about Yugoslavia. How can we continue the European process, if we can't solve problems like these?"

"Let's keep in touch on this matter," Bush concluded.

What the American President and Secretary of State were impatient to hear from Gorbachev, and what he himself wanted to share with them, were our domestic affairs. "Today, the main question for us is how to recover from the crisis," Gorbachev began. "We need to speed up the reforms and move ahead on the path of political and economic freedom, within the framework of a common market economy for all the republics."

"The central issue," he explained, "is statehood. The August events spurred the desire to declare independence. But, they did not change anything in principle," Gorbachev declared, to my surprise. "They only created the foundation to move toward the creation of a truly voluntary Union of Sovereign States. Yeltsin spoiled the situation when he brought up the territorial question of boundaries. This strengthened the separatist tendencies in Ukraine. They started talking about Russia's imperial pretensions."

Together with Boris Nikolayevich, we are conducting major work to reform our State. We prepared and sent to all the republics a draft Union Treaty. We are talking about creating precisely a union state, not some association or community. It will be a state with unified armed forces, a coordinated foreign policy, and a unified market. The Union will be responsible for a unified energy system, transportation, communications, ecology, essential research and some other areas. On November 11th the State Council will review the draft, subject to comments and amendments.

Unfortunately, Yeltsin is under pressure from certain people who claim that Russia must shed the burden of other republics and go forward on its own. I spoke with Boris Nikolayevich and he assured me that he understands what this would lead to. It would result in great difficulties for Russia, it would mean several years of turmoil. For the other republics it would be catastrophic."

"For the other republics?" Bush asked with some surprise.

"I repeat, it would cause serious shocks even in Russia. And Yeltsin understands this, but unfortunately, he is influenced by a certain kind of people. Analyzing his speech from yesterday, I see two sides in him, two parts. One side confirms the position for the Union. The other side moves away on some specific issues from the provisions included in the draft Union Treaty, on which we worked together. He makes rash, biting remarks about statehood. Obviously, it will cause a reaction from a number of the republics."

But on the whole, I have to support him right now. Because if reforms start in Russia, they will start in the other republics as well."

"The key question is this," Bush interrupted. "Do you think that Russia, and Yeltsin, are trying to take over the center? What do they want? Do they want to narrow even further the role of the center, and your role? This makes it difficult for us to determine positions. We are having a hard time making sense of the situation."

Gorbachev acknowledged that such attempts are taking place. But he is certain that Russia needs a new Union center. This is the only legitimate format through which Russia could have a leading role in the republics. They will not accept direct control from Russia. That is why they support a Union center. The majority of them support a general election for the president. "I thought I had an understanding with Yeltsin about this. But his last speech is disappointing. If he isolates Russia and destroys the Union, it would have devastating consequences for Russia. I," M.S. said, "remain optimistic. I continue working with the republics together and separately. I would like to emphasize: today it is a fundamental, life-changing question not only for us, but for the West and the United States as well. You have to make a strategic choice. Right now we need support to continue the reforms, for the future of the Union depends on it, the kind of Union that I am convinced the United States and other countries need."

Turning to specifics, M.S. asked [the American side] to decide the question of a food credit for 3.5 billion dollars and debt payments. For the latter, we require emergency assistance in cash in the amount of 370 million dollars, plus the financial loan from Saudi Arabia and South Korea (1 billion).

"I think we all understand," M.S. pressed, "what is at stake. What happens with the Soviet Union will have repercussions for the entire world process."

In response, Bush made a meaningful speech, which I will try to reproduce in detail (especially since it helped when writing it down to hear first the English version and then the translation).

"I will be extremely frank with you," Bush started. "I hope you know the position of our government: we support the Center. Without giving up contacts with the republics, we support the center and you personally. Even before the coup, I made a speech in Ukraine, for which I had some price to pay at home. I was criticized for allegedly 'selling' Ukraine. Of course, there was no such thing. But I spoke out against mindless nationalism."

We maintained contact with Yeltsin and will continue to do so, as well as with leaders of the other republics, but we are not doing it behind your back. I asked this question because in the Congress and in the Administration, many people were surprised by his speech, they cannot understand what it means. The issue of the Soviet Union's creditworthiness is tied to this matter.

According to our laws, I have to attest to Congress that our borrowers are creditworthy. I cannot circumvent the requirements of our legislation. We believe that we can meet you halfway with loans, but not fully. We must have confidence that the republics are fully aware of their responsibilities. We want to help you, but we need certain additional guarantees regarding the republics' positions."

Gorbachev interrupted. "Let us speak frankly. Ten-fifteen billion dollars is not such a great sum that we would not be able to pay it back. If we miscalculate right now, we will have to pay a much higher price down the road. We are not talking about something ordinary and routine. We are talking about an enormous country that is going through great transformations, and routine approaches are unacceptable here. References to the Congress and experts do not convince me. We need a political solution."

Bush: "I want to assure you of our understanding. That is why I am asking you once again: do you consider a return to a totalitarian regime a possibility? This would be bad for the entire world, and for the United States, because it would put an end to our fruitful cooperation."

"Precisely for this reason we need concrete action," M.S. chimed in.

"Nevertheless, I have to take into account public opinion at home in the U.S. I cannot argue with the figure you named for food credit. But we cannot fully satisfy this request. Right now we can make a decision only to allocate an agricultural credit in the amount of 1.5 billion dollars, and a part of it would be available now, while the second part only after January 1st. We hope that this will help you to get through the period when you finally decide the relations between the center and the republics."

You know how strongly the Secretary of the Treasury Brady spoke in support of the Soviet Union at the IMF session in Bangkok. It even irritated other members of the G-7. If you prefer that this question is not discussed openly right now, let's do that. A billion and a half is the maximum of what we can do right now. We could come back to the question of an agricultural loan later, when the republic's level of participation is more defined. But the present sum should allow you to get the process started.

I don't want the announcement of a sum that may seem inadequate to cause you difficulties at home. Perhaps it would be better not to announce anything, but this is the

maximum that we can provide at this time. And while Secretary of State Baker can sometimes work wonders in Congress, we have to be realistic.”

After assurances from M.S., James Baker took the floor. “Allow me to make a general statement. I think you know that we support and will strive to continue to support your efforts to reform the Soviet Union. You know that we influenced the other donors, particularly Saudi Arabia. The President in essence went as far as providing direct U.S. government loans, which means they are guaranteed in full. We believe now it is necessary to have the republics’ signature on the loan documents. This will give the President the legal basis to raise the issue before Congress.

At the moment we can provide approximately 1.5 billion dollars: 250 million as a gift in food aid and provided free of charge. The rest as credit guarantees. Out of that, 250 million would be available right now, and 1 more billion in 60 days. This is what we can do right now.

With regard to new projects on food, we will pursue them, but they will not give a quick effect. We understand that our proposal does not fully cover your needs. But in these circumstances, this is what we can do.

I will tell you one thing that the President cannot say. You know that we were in contact in June of this year, when there were rumors of Pavlov’s coup. We stressed that we are interested in the stability of the Soviet Union, and in letting the Soviet people determine their own future. And we believe that this is a significant argument to show that we understand the need for a Center. Last week we received alarming signals about the content of Yeltsin’s upcoming speech, including the fact that there will be a call to liquidate the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and a statement that Russia will protect Russian minorities wherever they might be, etc. We appealed to RSFSR officials and asked: what is happening, why is such a speech being made on the eve of a peace conference on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict? This would undermine the Soviet Union’s efforts. We expressed the hope that it would not happen. We were surprised that on the question of minorities there was no mention of the Helsinki process. It appears that the republics will be concerned, and you will have to regulate this process. We will try to do something from our side; it is possible that we may be able to help in some way. We would be interested in receiving specific information on what parts of the speech deviate from the agreements you reached in the development of the Union Treaty.”

“Yeltsin called me the day before his speech at the Parliament of Russia and did not say that the speech will have controversial positions,” Bush noted.

“He said only good things,” Baker added.

“You must take into account,” M.S. explained, “that the leaders of the republics want to demonstrate that they have contacts with the U.S. President, they want to play this card to satisfy their ambitions. I think we can straighten out this situation, it will be a challenge. But that is why I am raising the question of food credits and financial support so persistently. I need it right now.”

"I would just ask you to consider that I am in a different situation than I was before. Of course, I will speak with our representative at the G-7," Bush summed up.

At the end of the conversation, Gorbachev raised the issue of Bush's unilateral initiative on weapons reductions.

Bush asked: did Gorbachev get his letter about this? "Yes," M.S. replied, "and I consider it to be very constructive and useful." He reported that we prepared a counter-initiative, approved by the State Council, and related it to the Americans.

I am attaching this paper.³¹

A joint press conference followed. Bush tried not to show the disparity of their political weight, and M.S. is not the kind of person who would have "allowed" it... He behaved as if nothing has happened... But he was "realistic"... and in general he spoke well at the interviews and press-conferences.

Shamir! It is an event!

³¹ - Five-hundred-three ICBMs, equipped with 1154 warheads all together, are to be taken off combat alert.

- Six SSBNs and 92 SLBMs have been decommissioned.
- All heavy bombers have been taken off combat alert.
- All 36 rail-based ICBM launchers have been permanently stationed.
- The following development programs have been discontinued: compact mobile ICBMs, modified nuclear short-range missiles for Soviet heavy bombers, modernization of ICBMs for rail missile systems.
- The timetable for reducing strategic offensive arms has been adjusted to the total level of 5000 nuclear warheads (instead of 6000 units according to the Treaty).
- We are starting to withdraw the following types of weapons from their places of permanent deployment: nuclear ammunition of the atomic artillery, nuclear warheads from tactical ground-based missiles, nuclear bombs and nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles.
- Tactical nuclear weapons are being removed from ships and attack submarines, as well as naval aircraft for accommodation in central storage sites in ground-based facilities. As in the U.S., the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the fleet will take us approximately 8-9 months.
- The following deadlines have been established for the completion of the liquidation: tactical nuclear weapons in the naval forces—1995; nuclear warheads of anti-aircraft rockets—1996; nuclear mines—1998; nuclear warheads of tactical missiles and nuclear artillery projectiles—2000. It should be noted that the scope of our work surpasses the U.S.' efforts.
- We declared a moratorium for one year (from October 5th of the present year) on nuclear testing.
- We developed a timetable to downsize the USSR Armed Forces by 700 thousand people in 5 years.
- We are creating a special coordination committee involving ministries and republics (RSFSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus) to oversee the implementation of the program of unilateral measures and to develop positions for negotiations and consultations.

The program has been approved by the State Council. [Author's note]

Dinner with the King (plus Bush and Gonzalez). M.S. still cannot settle after all the impressions: they were outraged by Yeltsin's speech at the Congress in the Kremlin... and they made it clear that it would be difficult for them to imagine the country that used to be called "Soviet Union" without Gorbachev.

On the 30th there was a meeting with Gonzalez. Passionate and intelligent speeches... It would be good for our Ukrainians and "Kozyrev's" to hear them...

Then there were a few hours in the company of the Crown Prince in Barcelona: Olympic facilities, Pablo Picasso's house. Then, on to France.

The trip to Lache (October 30th)—President Francois Mitterrand's farm in the Pyrenees. This was a remarkable event in many respects. I looked at my notes a week after the event and saw that they look like, if not a will, then parting words to my political descendants. I have a duty to record as much of it as I can recall.

The flight from Barcelona was short. From the airport we drove through the beautiful scenery of the Pyrenees foothills. By the way, we drove past Biarritz, where I was 20 years ago during my first visit to France... It was an evening meeting, arranged for the five of us Soviets by the local Communist Party cell. I had to make an impromptu speech in French, which surprised me and my colleagues. I remember I was very pleased with myself. I did not recognize the city from a distance: now it looks more like an industrial center, back then it was a quiet resort town.

The cars turned from the highway into the woods. The road became narrow, paved at first, but then just a dirt road for village carts (or so it seemed). Branches of bushes lashed the car windows. After 10-15 minutes we drove into a meadow. There was a garden fence made out of ledgers, the kind you see in our poorer villages. There were three huts—I can't call them anything else—squat houses with small windows and straw roofs. It was damp, dark, green, and cool. Goats and chickens walked about the grounds. Wide-branching trees surrounded the "huts."

There were only a few of us with Gorbachev: Raisa Maksimovna, Andrei Grachev, myself, the interpreter, and security. The rest of the people who accompanied him to the conference in Madrid flew directly to Moscow from Spain, or were dropped off on the way to Lache in the district town of Soustons.

Mitterrand came out to meet us. He gave us a tour of his "estate," and with obvious relish told us where he got such a family farm, founded as early as 1793, which he bought from a peasant 28 years ago. He prefers it to the three other countryside residence that are more "appropriate" for his rank. "Sometimes," he said, "I used to go there to receive foreign guests." (I noted the past tense of the verb). "Perhaps my successors will make better use of these official residences. In the meantime, the staff there doesn't know what to do with itself."

The madam led Raisa Maksimovna away. The Presidents, two advisers, and the interpreter retired to the hut—a chalet that served as the office. There were sofas and armchairs. A few bookshelves. A fireplace.

[The conversation started with] the protocol jokes. Mitterrand explained how he envisions the “program” of their interaction. He warned that in the morning, Gorbachev and Raisa will be awakened by the cock-crow. (Later I stepped into the room they occupied for the night. It reminded me very much of the corner in village huts where in my childhood, “at the dacha,” I spent my summer vacations).

The conversation started. Further I will quote from my notes.

Gorbachev began talking about the Madrid conference, and congratulated Mitterrand as one of its initiators. F.M. (hereafter for the sake of brevity I will use only their initials) interrupted him to express his regrets that the conference did not follow the formula he offered: five permanent members of the UN Security Council, under the auspices of the UN. Then the questions would have been “to the point” (occupied territories, Israeli settlements, the West Bank of the river Jordan, the Gaza Strip, the division of Jerusalem...). This did not happen because of the “too close ties” between Israel and the U.S. Shamir does not want the Europeans to participate, because they maintain relations with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. So it turned out that the conference became limited only to the question of procedure (for future talks)... But this is already good. The fact that there is a place where the opponents can talk—and, incidentally, the love to talk, both of them—is already an achievement, F.M. concluded.

M.S. talked about the difficulties of preparation. Until the last moment they were not sure whether the Palestinians would show up. He told how he, Bush, and Baker had agreed to “pressure” Shamir, how at the meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister he prevailed upon him to “take a constructive position.”

M.S. “shared” that he liked the conversation with Shamir in Madrid, it was open and friendly. It is good that Shamir is concerned about the supply of weapons to the Middle East. He requested that the USSR stop supplying them, to which M.S. responded: then let the U.S. stop as well. Shamir agreed. M.S. liked that the Israeli did not limit himself to theme of the conference, but spoke about major regional problems: energy, fresh water, and environmental hazards. In all of these issues he would like to have relations with the USSR.

M.S.’ final impression on Shamir: he wants to run the show in this entire process. But this won’t work.

F.M. expressed his readiness to help the “process,” if France is consulted. But he is of a rather pessimistic view about this: “we are dealing with fanaticism, fanaticism on both sides, and it is difficult to make it see reason.”

“There are two types of fanaticism there,” M.S. commented.

“No, this is one type. Especially since they have similar temperaments,” the Frenchman objected and... asked Gorbachev to tell him what is going on at home.

“We are in the most critical period right now,” M.S. said. “It came sooner than we expected. We had prepared programs to move toward a market economy, toward a new Union,

we had a draft for Party reform. That is why I did not leave the post of General Secretary—I could not abandon that power in its condition. But the August coup ruined everything. It tore the mechanisms of power. The coup brought confusion into the political process.

So, on the one hand, we had a victory for democracy, but on the other an aggravation of all contradictions.

Separatist tendencies grew stronger after the coup. Certain forces used it to further undermine the internal relations in our country.

A great deal depends on Russia. With the help of the State Council we managed to relieve some stress, including stress around Yeltsin. This allowed us to sign the Economic Agreement. Now we are facing the problem of signing the Union Treaty. We came to an agreement with Yeltsin. We prepared the draft together. But he is surrounded by very difficult people. They throw this and that his way, complicating his decisions. Additionally, his circle is dominated by people who think that Russia should throw the burden of the former Soviet republics off its shoulders.

Yeltsin's position is full of conditions for the Union Treaty. But we need a negotiation process, not ultimatums. You cannot solve problems this way. Yes, Yeltsin is in favor of decisiveness in implementing reforms, and basically this is in line with what I am proposing. But we cannot disregard the other republics. That is not politics. We cannot provoke rejection. Seventy-five million people live outside of their republics. We have such a division of labor that we all depend on each other. This applies not only to economy and ecology, but also to science, culture, and human relations.

In the context of the global situation, I put the question this way: what is the West interested in, what is the world interested in? That the Soviet Union continue to exist. Reformed, democratic, dynamic, economically healthy—in other words, completely new—but a Union."

"What I think about it," F.M. started to respond, "you already made the decisive action, you destroyed the system that had been out of order for a long time. Your second action is this desire to resolve the issue of the Union and the republics. A certain mentality has formed that creates a centrifugal tendency. It is encouraged from the outside. France's position is not to succumb to opportunistic circumstances. I am using absolutely cold reasoning: it is in France's interest to have an integral force in Eastern Europe. If there is a collapse, we will go back to what you had before Peter the Great. It would be a historic catastrophe and would contradict France's interests.

Centuries of history teach us that France needs an ally to maintain a balance in Europe. Any collapse of integrity in the East would bring instability. That is why we do not want to encourage separatist ambitions.

Furthermore, we are great friends of today's Germany. But it would be very dangerous if there would be a soft underbelly in the North or East of Germany. Because the Germans will always have a tendency and a temptation to penetrate these areas."

“And they would not have to use military force. It would be an economic empire with all the ensuing consequences,” M.S. added.

“What might we find?” Mitterrand continued. “A number of small states around Germany and, beyond that, a vacuum. This is dangerous. I am one of those who wish to have a strong partner in you, a new Union.”

If this is how things go, then my distant successors will have to establish strong relations with Russia, because it will be the most powerful country of what is left of the old Union. But until then we could all find ourselves in a state of anarchy. I am for your country’s rebuilding in 2-3 years on a federal-democratic basis. This is the best scenario for the rest of Europe.

You, Mr. Gorbachev, are guided by patriotic considerations. I, in this case, am guided by the facts of historical logic in the development of our continent.”

“What you are saying is very important,” M.S. responded. “And it is also important that Gonzalez, with whom I spoke at length yesterday, came to the same conclusions. He used practically the same expressions.

I see it as my duty to reach a new Union through the Union Treaty. And I would like to be able to count on the West’s support, guided by their real interests. Instead, I see that some people are looking to take advantage of our collapse.”

“France will not contribute to the centrifugal forces. And I think,” F.M. said, “that this position is shared by all old European countries with long history, which have ancient traditions and deep European experience. I am talking about England, France, Spain, and Portugal.”

“The people at home should know the positions of the main actors of world politics on this key issue,” M.S. responded. “Last night the Spanish King hosted a dinner for me and Bush. Gonzalez was present. At this dinner, he fiercely defended his point of view, which is similar to what you told me right now, for a few minutes even forgetting the protocol and that the King was present.

They unanimously expressed surprise at some passages in Yeltsin’s speech at the Congress of the People’s Deputies. Especially over the idea that the MFA should be reduced tenfold, which would call into question the very need for a common foreign policy mechanism for the Union. At the press-conference before the King’s dinner, President Bush took a very strict position and very clearly expressed his support for the Union policy.”

“This is very good,” F.M. said, “I remember how in April of last year Bush and I met in Miami, and the conversation touched upon the Baltic problem. I told him then: yes, the Baltic States have to become independent. This is a position of principle. But do not rush to recognize them. We need to give Gorbachev time for constitutional reforms. Everything must be done consistently and gradually, not vice versa. Bush supported this approach, even though it was very difficult for him, because the Congress and the public demanded an immediate recognition of the Baltic States. So President Bush understands the situation well.”

Bush supports a democratic Union, and its incorporation into the global economy. But he listens to public opinion and he is cautious, while from all sides people whisper in his ear: don't lose, so to speak, you have elections coming up. I keep telling him: a new Union in Eastern Europe is an issue that has to be viewed globally, not in the context of a political situation. Preserving the Union is a vital issue for Europe. It seems that I have his understanding on this point. But Bush is somewhat indecisive and cautious."

"I have told Bush repeatedly," M.S. joined in, "that this is an extraordinary situation and that we must not act in a routine manner, but take into account the uniqueness of the events. I think he understands me. After all, he decided to offer us a large food credit."

"I understand that to deny you substantial aid right now would mean to make the process of reforming the Union very fragile."

"If," M.S. summarized, "it is our common goal to have a new Union as the largest bastion of democracy and peace, then we must not waste time on trifles. Especially because we are not talking about handouts. Everything will be returned. But we need the help right now, right this moment."

Then there was a break. In the neighboring house the TV crew set up their equipment. M.S. and F.M. went there to give a joint interview. I did not go: there simply was no space to perch oneself without getting in someone's way. Sometimes I glanced in through the window—how cozily they were sitting together in low armchairs, two great Europeans at the end of a terrible century, so different yet understanding each other so well.

I wandered the overgrown paths in total darkness: two lanterns near the houses could barely be seen through the dense greenery.

The second conversation took place over an evening meal in the other chalet, which served as the dining room and bedroom. The composition of the group was "extended": Raisa Maksimovna and Danielle, Danielle's sister, the Mitterrands' youngest son, Gorbachev and I, and Pierre Morel—F.M.'s adviser.

We were all apologizing as we squeezed through to our seats around a round table in a room that was around 14 square meters. Entirely like a village. Naturally, I could not take notes as I was sitting at dinner next to the President of France. I reproduced the conversation already on the airplane. I probably did not remember every detail and will not try to reproduce it word for word. Nevertheless, I will vouch for the general sense of the conversation. They talked about the fate of Europe in the context of the Yugoslavia crisis and the USSR's collapse. Mitterrand said whole speeches. He ardently supported M.S.' opinion that the people who supported the centrifugal forces in Yugoslavia from the outside did a disservice to Europe.

"Separatism was always there," F.M. said in his measured and impressive manner, "But the Germans immediately moved in favor of recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. As for myself, since June I had been against these republics' independence. The majority of other countries, EC members, followed my example. It is not that I view the idea of

independence negatively. But my point of view stems from the idea that independence should be proclaimed in accordance with international agreements; in particular, the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. In my opinion, we can hardly welcome the other option—the proclamation of independence under pressure from nationalist forces.

It is clear why the Germans adhere to a different position. The fact is that Slovenia and Croatia at one time were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Besides German influence, they also felt the impact of the Roman Catholic Church and the Vatican.

I once discussed the subject of Yugoslavia with Major. He asked me what would happen next. I replied: It would seem that Croatia will seek help from the armed forces of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Turkey. Serbia, in turn, will send an analogous request to Great Britain, Russia, and France. Thus, our armed forces will be in Yugoslavia and a situation will arise like at the beginning of World War I in 1914. Major was clearly surprised. He declared that he will not send his soldiers anywhere. I am not sure whether he took my words seriously... We must not recreate the conditions of competition like we had at the beginning of the century. This option would mean enormous drama for Europe.

So, life itself is bringing the EC countries to establish a political union. You cannot avoid history.

“... Of course, you know,” F.M. moved his thought in a different direction, “that the Americans are tempted to extend the functions of NATO and turn it into a political, rather than military, alliance. I take a different view on this subject. I think that NATO should continue to remain faithful to the foundation on which it was created. If NATO was vested with functions that are in principle under the jurisdiction of the CSCE and the EC, it would be very bad. The European process was largely made possible by the concerted efforts of the Soviet Union and France. You, of course, remember that France was practically the only country to support your initiatives in the sphere of European cooperation. Our collaboration yielded good results. So let us not allow the fruits of our cooperation to be eliminated. If we give NATO excessive powers, the non-NATO members will feel ill at ease. In addition, the role of the Paris Charter for New Europe will decrease.”

Responding to M.S.’ remark about the U.S.’ European role, Mitterrand continued his verbal essay: “Europe is also America. This situation will persist for some time. I agree that the U.S. will continue to play an important role. It’s simply the recognition of existing realities. But in the future, Europe should be in Europe proper. It is important that the transformations in the Soviet Union contributed to the politico-economic rapprochement between East and West, and the creation of what you call the common European home.”

“A great deal here depends on how America sees the future united Europe, and how it sees Japan,” M.S. joined the conversation. “These are two sore spots for the Americans, especially if we are talking about Europe as the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. After all, this is a vast expanse with almost 600 million inhabitants, and with enormous scientific-technical, economic, and intellectual potential. This is where we should seek

the answers to the major questions of world politics. This is also where we can find the answer to the positions of different countries on the changes in the Soviet Union; including an explanation to the adjustments that can be seen in Germany's European policy. I am talking about what recently came up in the Baker-Genscher statement. This is also why Germany supports the new idea for NATO, which you mentioned earlier. It is not impossible that the Germans are planning to increase their influence in the East this way, and get a free hand in regard to Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and further east.

...This is my view, and it is tied to my assessment of the future. There are two pillars. One of them is the European Community, which is acquiring a system of political institutions. The other is a Union of sovereign states on the basis of the former USSR. There is also interaction between them within the framework defined by the documents of the European process and disarmament agreements. The roles and presence of Europe, the USA, and Canada fit into this concept. But this has to be a European policy, not an American policy towards Europe."

"Of course, it would be important to have the support of both these pillars," F.M. supported the idea. "But one of the pillars has been created already. As for the other pillar, it is still not clear what exactly is happening. If all the people in your republics (and that's almost 300 million people) were Gorbachevs, then the issue would be resolved."

"That's fine," M.S. laughed, "This is how I understand the task before me: I have to strengthen the second pillar."

"We also want this," F.M. cheerfully assured him. "Did you notice that in my statement for the TV cameras I just spoke in favor of a Union that is strong, cohesive, and reinforced by federal ties? This would be very important not just for your countrymen, but for the interests of France, and Europe in general. France will never, under any circumstances, encourage the destruction of the Union. Under Stalin, this position was fraught with certain problems. But even then, at the time of de Gaulle and Stalin, France and the USSR were allies. This is even more important now, when your country is becoming truly democratic."

I repeat, I am convinced that Europe will form. All our policies are aimed at reaching this goal as soon as possible. If this does not happen as quickly as we would like, then a situation will arise the consequences of which Europe will suffer for centuries."

This was followed by a merry drinking of "coffee and cognac" in the adjoining room, which did not have enough space for everyone to sit down. They talked about whatever came to mind. M.S. could not stop talking. Mitterrand, sitting in a large chair, would occasionally "stop" the disorderly conversation with significant remarks... with a kindly-indulgent smile on his tired face.

Andrei Grachev and I went to Soustons to spend the night, to a tourist hotel where the rest of Gorbachev's team was staying. In the morning we returned to Lache. There was a breakfast meeting, with a discussion of urgent financial and food assistance to the USSR. A

young woman, the lovely Anne Lauvergeon (an expert in these affairs, she is also the “sherpa”) was present, she had just flown in from Moscow to report to her President.

I think this just about covers this, I think quite remarkable, meeting between two presidents.

November 3, 1991, Sunday

These will probably be the decisive days, after all. After a thoroughly inebriated vacation, Yeltsin woke up and sobered up, and showed what he is capable of. And it was to be expected... Only M.S. did not expect it. He kept thinking that through persuasion and friendly terms Yeltsin could be “channeled,” as he likes to say.

Yeltsin’s report at the Congress of the RSFSR is, of course, a breakthrough to a new country and a new society. Although all the ideas and plans for this breakthrough were laid in the “philosophy” of Gorbachev’s *perestroika*. But Gorbachev could not break his habits in time, even though more than once he confessed: “we are all from the past.” Alas! Not everyone had the strength to break with the past completely, and most importantly—in time!

Yeltsin did make the break, and surrounded himself with people of different motivations—careerists, impudent scoundrels, sincere democrats, true intellectuals, skilled administrators, old and new businessmen—all of whom made the change [*perestroivshimisia*]. He was able to use them to break with the era of 1917 once and for all.

His report was either all or nothing. But this is how great things were always done in Russia. M.S. did not go beyond Mirabeau. Yeltsin will go on to be a Napoleon, stepping over Dantonism, Robespierreism, Barrasism, and even the Enrages...

He threw people a sliver of hope... This is a sign of charisma, despite his primitivism as a person... As a person, he is mediocrity and dullness, but as a leader in this particular situation he is exactly what is needed.

And he is betting on Russia. Again and again I repeat that Gorbachev’s historic mistake was that he was tied by the psychology of “internationalism” and did not understand Russia’s role. On a human level I feel sorry for him, but it is a sorry sight for me... Instinctually he understands that it is not only pointless to oppose himself to Yeltsin right now, but from the standpoint of the country’s interests—it is impermissible. He has no alternative... Neither Yavlinsky, nor the State Council, nor the interstate economic committee is an alternative.

The only way out is through the irrational nature of Russian consolidation, in the desperation that brings people together. When Moscow was without bread and milk before, people would yell at Gorbachev. Nowadays there is practically none of either, and people are rallying around Yeltsin... and Popov!

Yeltsin announced: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to be cut tenfold! Why by 10, and not 2, 5, or 20? It doesn’t matter... The point is to liquidate this expensive central department, the last pillar of Gorbachev’s real activity... And Kozyrev, when he “convened” his colleagues

from the republics for a meeting, openly said: no Union, no President. We will leave him with protocol functions. Yeltsin said last spring that, "We will leave Gorbachev this much, even though he wants this much!" (he gestured with his hands). "His position will be like that of the Queen of England." Now Yeltsin achieved that goal.

Our neighbors on Smolenskaya are in a panic: some are hurrying to bow to Kozyrev, some are going off to JV (joint ventures), some are off to protest demonstrations, etc.

Yagodin (Minister of Education) called me, saying that Lazarev (RSFSR Minister of Finance) closed the accounts for institutions subordinate to the Union (Moscow State, Bauman, Mendeleev Universities, the Pedagogical Institute, the Moscow Aviation Institute, the Moscow Power Engineering Institute, etc.), which means that hundreds of thousands of students did not get their stipends in October! We are going to have a "Tiananmen," they say... I told M.S. about this... I don't know what he will do. This is all to say, what actions can one take here! It seems to be a provocation... But at the same time, kind of "logical"!

Yavlinsky reports that on November 4th, the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs will declare bankruptcy: it has no means to pay for our embassies, trade missions, and other representations abroad. They won't have means to come home... M.S. assigned me to write to Major, who is the coordinator of the G-7 right now: "Dear John! Help!"

Tomorrow the State Council is meeting, they will have another discussion about the Union Treaty and the fate of the MFA—i.e. "common foreign policy." I wrote texts for M.S.' theses on the MFA question. What will happen? Nothing will happen in M.S.' favor, even if they part in peace. At the Congress, Yeltsin obtained authoritarian powers. He promised the people that in the summer there will be an improvement. And he will push his way through, without looking back either at Kravchuk or Nazarbayev... he will tolerate M.S. on the sidelines for now. He is no longer an obstacle. But since Gorbachev is "respected" in the West and in some decent, honest intellectual circles, why offend him too much! Let him fuss... within the bounds that Yeltsin will provide from his budget.

I think that tomorrow he might even keep quiet at the State Council again, with a smirk: let them play their games... they already don't matter! Even the 100,000 Soviet officials who are losing their jobs no longer expecting anything from the State Soviet or from Gorbachev!

By the way, Baker whispered to Pavel Palazhchenko in Madrid, already on the way out: "Take the 1.5 billion—it is hard cash. Take it before we change our mind! It's not enough? But we can't give more than that." M.S. told about this to the people meeting him at Vnukovo airport (Silaev, Yakovlev, and others). And nothing! Even Moskovsky (director of Moscow City Bank) and Gerashchenko don't know about it, and did not reach for this money immediately, even though already on November 4th they are facing bankruptcy. And I am the one writing the letter to Major. So we can't even operate on the principle of "the rescue of the drowning is in their own hands," even after someone threw us a life-buoy, though it's a small one.

M.S.' mistake was that he did not create an apparatus to replace the Politburo. Boldin's apparatus is designed to work completely differently... He kept thinking to adapt the Party apparatus for his new government. But revolutions have laws!

In the evening M.S. was on the phone with Kohl, talking about the MFA, the State Council, about Kohl's son who was in an accident, and about 1.5 billion and the "SOS" to Major. There was an attempt to contact Yavlinsky, but we were not able to locate him while he was "visiting friends." The same happened with Moskovsky and Nosko: our bankers are not in a rush to save the country, someone else will take care of it, they think... In a word, a nerve-wracking evening on the telephone. Afterwards, Mit'ka and I listened to Mozart on a laser disk.

The book "August Coup" came out... Yesterday I re-read the article that was written in "Zarya"... historically it would be more interesting (if anyone will read it!) than what was written about the coup and its consequences: that's done and over with, we have passed into... the Yeltsin era!

November 5, 1991, Tuesday

Today Gorbachev met with Preston. They signed an agreement on joining the IBRD... it seems in the name of the "Soviet Union," which all our nwespapers and other media outlets are calling "former"... while heads of foreign states are congratulating the "USSR" with the 74th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution!

Yesterday there was a session of the State Council. Gorbachev made an emotional introductory speech about "the current, most difficult moment," but the heads of sovereign states (former Soviet republics) refused to discuss it... He strongly urged them to exchange views and to "work together"... they kept mum. Yeltsin, who arrived 15 minutes late, rudely demanded that they "stick to the agenda."

The agenda included the question of implementation of the Economic Agreement, on which nothing has been done... The memorandum on external debt, to which M.S. referred to Madrid and in Lache, turned out to be signed only halfway... Mutalibov and Karimov declared that they don't have to pay, it is the Center that has to pay them... And try as he might, Yavlinsky failed to convince them not to follow the Bolsheviks of 1917, who stated that the Tsar made the debts so he should pay them. They did not heed...

About 80 Union ministries have been eliminated. In Moscow alone, around 50,000 officials are out on the street.

Today Gerashchenko cut off funds for government officials (following students and university professors). I, for example, did not get my salary today.

At the closed part of the State Council, Gorbachev managed to salvage the MFA (it will not be reduced tenfold, as Yeltsin wanted, but only by 1/3), the Interior Ministry, and the unified armed forces. When it came to the MFA, his information on Bush's, Gonzalez', and Mitterrand's positions probably had an effect.

In the same vein, today I gave a message to the TASS on the “West’s desire” to deal with a Union, and their appalled reaction to the demands to abolish the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Today we (Ignatenko, Grachev, and I) finally persuaded M.S. to give an interview to the BBC’s Masha Slonim, for the series “The Second Russian Revolution.” He was magnificent. He spoke for 1.5 hours... Bright, decided, eloquent, profound, sincere. He slipped neither in language nor in his assessments, even of Ligachev and Yeltsin. Incredible. Afterwards, we praised him a great deal and even drank some gin for the occasion.

But immediately after that, Turbin (Prosecutor General) told him that some lawyer from the former KGB³² initiated a criminal case against him under Article 64 for treason—for tearing away the territories of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Totally perplexed, he clutched the phone and was going to call various people: to stop *Pravda*, which was going to publish this, to forbid, disable, warn... in a word, the General Secretary in him was coming out: how dare they! If the three of us hadn’t been nearby, there would have been trouble. Unanimously we told him that this a story for the “horns and hoofs” section of a comic magazine. He calmed down and went to his dentist appointment.

November 8, 1991

The second day of the “holiday”... Yesterday morning, the TV showed “November 7th on Red Square in 1980,” as a mockery. Brezhnev, Ustinov, Suslov, Ponomarev... and... Gorbachev... in the background! This is awful: you feel horrified that we lived in that atmosphere... But we did! and... and one feels sad! I was at 42nd kilometer, on the occasion of Yura Plam’s 70th anniversary. His relatives from Kaliningrad were there. They live in harmony with the Lithuanians and feel completely fine in their environment; they even set their lifestyle as an example. They regret that Lithuania did not get its independence two years ago.

I wrote a letter from M.S. to Bush, which Yakovlev will take there—he is going with lectures and as the head of the “Group on Strategic Stability.” I tried to finish up a letter of instructions to our ambassadors in the G-7 countries, so they would not rub shoulders too much with envoys from our sovereign new-states, which may interfere with creating a Union. But it is not coming together. Plus, I am certain that it will not go anywhere.

November 9, 1991, Saturday morning before work

I spent the night in a strange state of half-sleep. Only in this state did I understand what I heard on TV yesterday at 9 p.m.: Yeltsin imposed a state of emergency in Chechnya, appointed Burbulis as his first deputy in the Russian government; Kravchuk declared that the Center has completely exhausted itself and there can be no question of any political union. Ukraine will be independent. He expressed his confidence that 85 percent will vote for this at a referendum. And more along these lines.

³² Later we found out that it was Iljukhin, who became Zyuganov’s assistant and a deputy of the Russian State Duma. [Author’s note]

What does this mean? That Russia has set its course for the Burbulis line: one and indivisible, and without those who want to be independent—cast off their burden! It also means that Russia will be ruled with an iron fist... in the name of democracy and the market. And that Ukraine will go... As for the Crimea + Sevastopol, and maybe the Donets Basin and Odessa... they will have to deal with Burbulis... and the Ukrainians will have to tuck their tail between their legs!

Plus, there are the Cossacks... Yesterday, their “all-Union” rally in Stavropol was broadcast on TV. They swore to serve Russia, like centuries ago...

And the heir to the throne visited St. Petersburg. This is a circus, of course. But with such tricks people are being acclimatized to “new life”... against the background of the fact that someone from abroad has already offered 14 million dollars for the coffin with Lenin’s body. Only the old ladies gasped. Orthodoxy brazenly tramples people’s brains—stupid, ignorant, sullen and desperate.

Meanwhile, Gorbachev is totally in the offside... Nobody needs him... Even though he tries as hard as he can to get food and loans from his Western “partners”... But in the ruin that is spreading, nobody will notice this drop in the ocean, and certainly nobody will give him credit for it...

But does dream = night? Because I suddenly acutely felt that this concerns me personally... Now only Gorbachev needs me, but nobody needs him.

That is why I must hurry up and live... Yesterday I was reading at the same time Aldaranov’s “Istoki” [Origins], Bunin’s “Zhizn’ Arsen’eva” [Life of Arsen’ev], and re-reading Bunin’s “Okayannye dni” [Cursed Days].

I have to figure out my women... What is a game and should it continue, and where is the only support in life, its meaning...

November 10, 1991, Sunday

Yesterday M.S. called me in to work for routine matters. When I got there, he was on the phone: Barannikov, Shaposhnikov, Bakatin... He was persuading them not to accumulate forces and send troops into Chechnya... i.e. to block the execution of Yeltsin’s state of emergency decree. In between calls he cursed at B.N.: “What is he doing, what is he doing! If this starts, there will be hundreds of casualties! I am informed that the governor he appointed there (Islamov) refused to carry out his duties... the Parliament (which is against Dudaev) too. All the factions and groups out there who have been arguing and fighting among themselves, now united against the ‘Russians.’ Idiots!” Barannikov, Bakatin, and Shaposhnikov completely support Gorbachev’s position... and are offering options for how to avoid clashes...

He told me: “I just spoke with B.N. After a couple seconds I could tell that it’s useless talking right now. He is too drunk to make sense.” In front of me, he called Khasbulatov, who demanded that he “get things straightened out!” M.S. told him, “Calm down. I wanted to gather

the appropriate people right now, but B.N. is ‘not feeling well,’ so we’ll meet tomorrow at 10 a.m.”

Rutskoi called and started ardently proving something. M.S. took the phone from his ear and started reading some papers on his desk. He “listened” like that for about 10 minutes! Then he said, “Aleksandr, relax, you are not at the front—to surround them, besiege them from the mountains, blockade so not a single Chechen could crawl through, arrest Dudaev, isolate others. What are you talking about? You don’t see how it will end? I have information that nobody in Chechnya supports Yeltsin’s decree. They are united against us, don’t talk nonsense.” Rutskoi again spoke vigorously for a long time. M.S. got tired of it, “Alright, bye.” And put down the phone. He said to me (about Rutskoi): “He is a good, honest fellow. But people like him should not be allowed anywhere near politics.”

Yakovlev came. We sat at the round table over coffee. M.S. started telling us about his “Stavropol” experience with people from the Caucasus. The refrain was: “Idiots. What kind of policy is this! They want to show their power, teach Tatarstan and Bashkiria a lesson... They will get something worse than Karabakh.” We talked about Burbulis, who will now determine Russia’s policy.

M.S.: “Here is what troubles me. It seems that Yeltsin’s circle is consciously trying to make a drunkard out of him. We could have a very serious turn of affairs... He will become their instrument...”

Then M.S. “corrected” the letter I wrote to Bush for him, which Yakovlev is supposed to take over there... He crossed out the praises and compliments to Yakovlev I put there “for diplomacy’s sake.” The latter grinned: “I brought you what Anatoly wrote, I did not add a word to it.” M.S. also crossed out the elegant criticism of the leaders of our republics, who are, I wrote, “just learning about international responsibility.”

He said that on Tuesday he will have a meeting with his advisers and consultants. He will put everyone in their proper place. He said that he will name me (to set me apart from the rest) as the “special adviser”...

It seems I persuaded him to make Brutents a consultant and take him away from me. Let him be a la Zagladin, except on issues dealing with the East.

We persuaded M.S. to go to the presentation of the book “The August Coup” (November 12th). I considered what he might say there.

By the way, when the conversation turned to consultants... and to Medvedev, he added: “I can see that he is not pulling his load, but as a friend I cannot dismiss him. After all, we started out together—you, him over there (pointing to me and Yakovlev) and Vadim too (Bakatin)... We have to stick together.” In general, it looked like the country needs him... Yeltsin’s blooper with Chechnya “inspired” him, even though to us he said: I will try to save him; we cannot allow this matter to hurt his authority.

He mentioned something from which I understood that Silaev won't remain the head of the IEC (Inter-republican Economic Committee)... Yeltsin, who removed [Silaev] from himself, is probably against it! Back in Madrid, Lukin whispered in my ear: how is it possible that the Union government is headed by a person who was rejected by Russia... That means M.S. "disposed" of him, even though "in Russia," Silaev worked for Gorbachev. This is how it works out. One more example of a "betrayal" and leaving the group (there are people behind Silaev) for the M.S. opposition camp... purely on moral grounds.

I took a long walk to the Kremlin. When I got to my office, there were immediately papers and phone calls.

November 11, 1991, Monday

The Russian Parliament not only reversed Yeltsin's decree on Chechnya, but appointed a commission to investigate how such a decree could have appeared in the first place.

Is this a blow, or just a slap? I think it's probably a slap—for the Russian masses Chechnya is a trifle, they don't care about it... The masses will wait before deciding about Yeltsin—to see what he does with prices, bread, and milk!!

M.S. didn't succeed yesterday in convening a meeting with Yeltsin on Chechnya. The latter was drunk throughout the "holidays." Although, Pankin visited him yesterday and got approval for the "Ministry of External Relations" project.

Tolya Kovalyov visited Shevardnadze to consult on the draft.

Novoe Vremya ran an article stating that on June 20th in Berlin, Baker had told Bessmertnykh about the conspiracy and the latter notified M.S. A rumor spread in connection with this article—that Chernyaev hid the notice...

Analysis = speculation... in a serious journal! How primitive these democratic-sensational journalists of ours are, how superficially they see things—Agatha Christie-style. The reality is both much simpler, and more psychological... There was no conspiracy... There was an intent and calculation that it would be possible to reel Gorbachev in... There was a conspiracy maybe 3-4 days before August 18th, not earlier than that. And as soon as M.S. "gave them a kick in the ass," everything crumbled. From the start, the nature and makeup of the State Emergency Committee made it unfit to play Pinochet!! They had the old line of thinking and belief that all "normal" people think like them. Indeed, we have tens of millions of normal people all around the country. They really were ready to dutifully follow the State Emergency Committee... but these kinds of things are done with hundreds, not millions...

Vattani (Andreotti's assistant) visited M.S. and told him about the NATO meeting in Rome on the 7th-8th. Indeed, they are fixing the "new era" policies. This was M.S.' view of it... Only the components of this era are not what he thinks... In this, he is diametrically at odds with NATO, led by Bush. They lost an enemy... But from M.S.' point of view, they obtained a new partner, just as powerful (in the future).

After meeting with US governors, M.S. rushed to the Column Hall for the celebration of Dostoyevsky's 170th anniversary, where Karyakin is making a report. Yura invited me, too... I both wanted to go, and didn't. The public was a "nuisance." M.S. went there because it is a part of R.M.'s "Cultural Fund."

November 13, 1991, Wednesday

Yesterday the presentation of the book "August Coup" took place. The MFA's press center was full of diplomats, activists, and journalists.

M.S. made a good speech. The questions were commendable, he replied readily. But the most important thing: it would seem this is a major political event, Gorbachev is talking about the things that are most important right now—the fate of the Union, the new structure of society, new layers and their interaction, freedom to the peasant, and what will happen to the separatists. But after I got back to the office, I found out that Yegor Yakovlev (TV) ordered to give only 2-3 minutes of airtime to this event on the program "Vremya." I tried to locate Yakovlev and called his driver, who told me: "Yegor Vladimirovich stopped by the House of Cinema, and now he left in a private car, I don't know where, and he ordered me 'not to look for him until morning.'"

M.S. called me: "How are they presenting me?" Grachev and I reached Lazutkin (Yakovlev's deputy on TV), persuaded him to give it some airtime after "Vremya." He did...

In the morning I found out that Yakovlev is furious that Lazutkin went "against orders" and demanded Lazutkin's resignation. I reached M.S. in his car... he invited Yakovlev to talk... They talked for an hour. I saw Yegor when he left M.S.' office, he had a satisfied look, which means M.S. again reached a compromise.

Grachev, Ignatenko and I called all the newspapers to get them to publish Gorbachev's speech from the book presentation. The result is that *Izvestiya* ran only his response on Chechnya-Ingushetia. And even that is only to bait him against Yeltsin... No other paper even mentioned the event and the fact that the President spoke about the situation in the country.

The previous morning he gathered his aides and advisers. This happens rarely. He assigned our roles, and started talking about the information blockade of the President. It boiled down to M.S. saying irritably, "Yeltsin's circle is 'running' from microphone to microphone, while you are sitting in your offices. You are used to the CC, where everything that 'came from us' was printed, no questions asked!"

It was a demonstration of his impotence... Even though he boosts himself by appealing to history, which will "have the upper hand."

Tomorrow the State Council is meeting... I am afraid that they might inflict the last blow, especially after a financial swindle was discovered in the Supreme Soviet. The machinery of State has no means to pay people's salaries. The 30 billion that M.S. requested can only be printed on a printing press.

The Union Treaty, which will be on the agenda in Novo-Ogarevo, will not pass. I read the new version. But Kravchuk isn't going to show up at all... nobody from Ukraine will. Revenko tried for a long time to persuade each of the republic's presidents to come... but toward evening it was still not clear, whether they would! All of this looks like Gorbachev's rearguard undertaking...

November 14, 1991, Thursday

Today *Pravda* published Bol'shakov's second opus, exposing Mr. Chernyaev on a passage about Mitterrand in Gorbachev's book... There is an obvious forgery: two photocopies were imposed upon each other, crookedly. One of them has Gorbachev's writing: "To A.S. Chernyaev," it is on an article (you can see the text!) and the signature dates to August 15th, before the coup. The second one reproduces the phrase about Mitterrand... The visual impression is that the signature authorizes the book's text, while in reality it has to do with something completely different. What morals and manners! My friends advise me not to get involved—if you do not touch it, it doesn't stink!

I got some calls on my private phone line: "Have you read *Pravda*? See how they got you!"... "They got you good, eh? There's more to come!" Then he hung up... This is on government phones! Some people!

All day today I was working on the meeting M.S.' has tomorrow with the Minister of External Affairs of India Solanki. I included Kutsenkov's urgings and re-worked the drafts from the MFA and Brutents.

I met with Hewitt, special assistant to Bush. I had seen him before, but this was the first time we met and talked. About the same thing—the fate of the Union, Gorbachev's intentions, nationalism in the republics, the armed forces and nuclear weapons!

November 15, 1991, Friday

This morning M.S. met with Solanki. He is a dull, gray man. M.S. explained the situation to him and called for patience... and to preserve the capital of relations accumulated under Rajiv Gandhi.

Then Solanki went to Yeltsin, who instructed the Minister: "Do not bother with the Union, it doesn't have anything. I have everything—oil, equipment, weapons, and transportation. And I will take from you what Russia needs. Make a political union with us, and everything will be good for you... No? You don't want to? Then take a hike to your Gorbachev!"

And this is after Novo-Ogarevo, after they agreed to a "confederative democratic state."

In the morning Andrei Grachev gave me an "artistic reenactment" of what happened in Novo-Ogarevo... ("Van'ka in a village") Later M.S. told us about it even more eloquently and colorfully... with his gestures and expressions... I should reproduce it. But not right now, I am too tired.

November 17, 1991, Sunday

M.S. kept Andrei and me in his office and, standing behind his desk, began to describe what happened in Novo-Ogarevo. Yeltsin started with the previous scandal before the meeting even began. He said that yesterday M.S. again attacked Russia and its President. “I told him—where did you hear this? On the contrary, I defended you.”

Yeltsin: “I was told. There you go, starting a confrontation again... You won’t get anywhere without Russia, anyway.”

M.S.: “Come to your senses, it is the other way around. Andrei, show him the transcript.”

Andrei did not have one handy; he sent a car to Moscow... Later, at lunch, M.S. showed it to Yeltsin. He looked at it, then looked at the newspaper from an arm’s length, as if admiring it: “Well, this is a different story!” (They were talking about the part where M.S. discussed Chechnya).

M.S. continued: “I decided for myself—I put everything on the line—to achieve the main goal. It is either a state or something vague, amorphous—and then I am leaving! In the draft Union Treaty this subject is in the Preamble... And off they went, each offering some kind of ‘flexible’ terminology... Yeltsin (with the words of his Burbulis), [suggested] ‘A Union with some government functions’...”

I asked him, ‘What is that?’ He said, ‘Something with no Center.’ I said, ‘I am also against the old Center, but I demand that we have a State, i.e. something with power functions.’

I exhausted all my arguments... But overall, not one of our republics’ leaders, not even Nazarbayev, actively supported the argument. Mostly it was between me and Yeltsin.”

Kudryavtsev (academician) and V.M. Yakovlev (not A.N., but another one, his legal adviser), who were present at the meeting, suggested to use the word “confederative.”

Yeltsin: “So what! Where there is a confederation, there is a federation, and then we are back at the Center! This won’t do.”

Kudryavtsev: “But it is a democratic formation!”

Yeltsin: “Oh, well, if it’s democratic, then alright.”

M.S.: “Then let’s call it a ‘Confederative democratic state’”...

They chatted about it... and agreed. This took four hours, all before lunch.

Andrei commented on Yeltsin’s behavior this way: “You know, it is like big Van’ka in the village. ‘Come on Van’, let’s do it, it would be nothing to you, it’s for your own benefit...’ ‘I don’t want to do it, I don’t want to and that’s it, this doesn’t suit me!’ ‘But Van’, think about it, we are all asking you, look—people are staring, waiting for you, everything depends on you!”

‘But I don’t want to.’ ‘But think about it, when you sober up, you will regret that you did not agree. Tonight you’ve had a little too much to drink... But tomorrow things will be clearer.’ ‘Alright, fine, I agree. But watch it!’”

M.S.: “Next, we talked about the power structures. About the president. I told them that the president should be elected by the people. All of them responded ‘why is that? After all, each one of our republics will have a president, why do we need another one? It would be dual power...’

I told them: ‘It would not be dual power, but a clear separation of powers and complete control over delegated rights and duties.’

They: ‘Fine, but let the president be appointed (or elected) by the parliaments of the sovereign states.’

I told them: ‘No... I will not agree to be a puppet or a ceremonial bystander, so everyone could walk all over the president. And it’s not about me. Whoever it might be, if we are talking about a State that would be the subject of international relations, with unified armed forces and a foreign policy, with a common market, financial system, and so on—there has to be a plenipotentiary and powerful head of state, who has a mandate from the people.’”

He prevailed upon them in the end: the president would be elected by the citizens of sovereign states—members of the Union. There would be a triple citizenship (“automatic” former citizenship, the citizenship of the sovereign state, and Union citizenship)... This is so a person would have equal rights on the entire territory of the Union, there would be one overall “Union” citizenship for everybody. The elections would be held according to the law, meaning that the sovereign states could lead them differently, possibly through electors. Still, it would be a mandate from the citizens themselves, not from parliaments or some other authorities.

Yeltsin threw out a comment: “The electoral college is nice, like in America!” M.S. remarked: “Doesn’t he know that in the U.S., the president is quite something!”

Then, in the same spirit, they went at it again—how the common parliament should be structured. Yeltsin insisted that it should have one chamber, composed of the delegations of the states’ parliaments. “I spoke sharply against this,” M.S. said. “Because once again, it would turn the president into a puppet. Yeltsin objected, but I won him over. I said—but Boris, then Turkmenistan would have 50 representatives, and Russia would have 50 representatives!!”

“What?!” Yeltsin bellowed.

“Well, if you are for that kind of parliament, then...’ And you know,” M.S. laughed, “I said this in front of everybody, in front of Niyazov (the future President of Turkmenistan—“Turkmenbashi”). We quickly came to an agreement that the second chamber would be elected by all citizens.”

They got through discussing the situation with the Ministry of External Relations, the Defense Ministry, and the unified armed forces without further scandals.

But, they got stuck on the budget—on M.S.’ request for 30 billion for the quarter until the end of the year. Here again, Yeltsin began to play the Van’ka. “I won’t give you the printing press, and that’s final. Money is practically not worth anything right now as it is”... Gerashchenko and other financial experts were called to the floor. One after another they tried to explain to Yeltsin that a State, no matter what kind, cannot operate even a day without money. And there is no money in the State Bank. After all... something is left of the government: the Army, the Academy of Sciences... people have to get their salaries, and students their stipends...

“I’m not giving it and that’s that!” Yeltsin responded.

They argued for two hours... Among other things, they appealed to him not to disband the Ministry of Finance tomorrow (November 15th is the deadline), because then there would be nobody to distribute the money, even if it became available.

“Fine! Let them live until December 1st!” Yeltsin was so kind.

At the end, nobody wanted to participate in the press-conference. “You, Mikhail Sergeyevich, should tell them what we agreed.” “No way,” Gorbachev objected, “Let’s do it together, if we really have an agreement...”

Everybody moved toward the exit. But there was no guarantee that they would turn in the direction of the crowd of journalists. However, Andrei channeled the crowd so there would be no way to escape. Only one got away—Mutalibov. The rest were forced to say that “There will be a Union.”

However, the next day Yeltsin announced that he was not satisfied with Novo-Ogarevo: “We had to make more compromises than we should have.”

And he said to the *Die Zeit* magazine before his trip to the FRG—“I can resolve practically all the issues without Gorbachev!”

M.S. “complained” to me about this over the phone in the evening the day before yesterday, already after his interview to *Stern*. I reassured him. We talked about the “decline of morality in politics.” Starting with *perestroika*, M.S. began to raise the ethical bar in political activity (honesty, trust, truth, the inviolability of agreements, etc). Now everything is peddled away, but under the guise of democracy, pluralism, and *glasnost*. This plague is spreading into international relations, where M.S. created an atmosphere of trust and faithfulness to one’s word. But now, Bush and Mitterrand, and Kohl... betray him “under the pressure of *real politik*;” they betray their assurances to support his policies, they quickly change course for the new “real” centers of power—Russia, Ukraine. Even Uzbekistan...

In this regard, Kohl’s behavior towards Yeltsin, who is going there on the 21st, will be a test.

November 19, 1991, Tuesday

Yesterday I was at lunch with Braithwaite, at the British Embassy. All the talk was about us—what will happen after the State Council on November 14th? Russia—Yeltsin—Ukraine, debt... Sherpas, the seven of them are here right now... Did M.S. foresee that this would happen with the CPSU? When did he understand, that they are going in different directions?

But, even though it was barely noticeable, the Ambassador behaved differently toward me—less deferentially, since I no longer represent a superpower and the world-respected Gorbachev.

Today, Ambassador Blech... Before Yeltsin's visit to Germany... I told him about a great deal... And, by the way, I told him (confidentially), alluding to M.S., that [this visit] will be a test of his Chancellor's friendship with Gorbachev, and the Chancellor's own statements regarding support for Gorbachev's policies and the integrity of the Union... even though M.S. supports Yeltsin's policies, does not see an alternative, and sincerely tried to save him in the Chechnya incident!

About Honecker... Yeltsin was ready to agree to sell him for marks or something like that... but if M.S. gives him up, even the most notorious anti-Communists will condemn him, though nobody here ever particularly liked Honecker.

Today M.S. signed an order to name me “Special Adviser for International Affairs.” This is to compensate for my refusal to become a State Adviser.

Today there was an epic affair with naming Shevardnadze a Minister, and assigning Pankin as an ambassador to London. M.S. called me, saying “Connect me with Major, urgently. (I thought it would be to pressure the “G-7” sherpas who are in Moscow right now.) Major could not be located... M.S. called me again: “Give me your Braithwaite...” I replied, “He is at lunch right, it is a sacred thing for an Englishman!” M.S. cursed. Finally, they found Major. It turns out M.S. wanted an agrément (at once!) for Pankin. Major promised, breaking all diplomatic canons, to do it immediately. Just as soon as he could speak with the Queen, he said. In an hour, Braithwaite called me and said: Her Majesty approves!

All of this took place in the presence of Shevardnadze and Pankin, both of whom were sitting in M.S.’ office... He offered Pankin to position of State Adviser on International Relations to the President, and a member of the Political Consultative Committee. But Pankin—with a stony face and his protruding jaw—asked to be returned to the embassy post.

M.S. in his presence praised him very highly to Major: he is my friend, a wonderful person, who has done so much in three months.

What's going on? At the State Council, when they were approving the Ministry of External Relations, they agreed on Shevardnadze. I doubt that it was Yeltsin's initiative... (his Kozyrev is a whelp next to E.A. Shevardnadze, but he would have been equal with Pankin). Most likely the republics wanted it so their ministries would have a patron, a figure that was not “accidentally at the top.” And Gorbachev needed it even more, because if E.A. agreed, it would

be a signal that the Union structures are viable and the “coordinated” common foreign policy has a future. It is most welcome right now, to show the West...

November 21, 1991

It has been exactly three months since our rescue from “Zarya.” How long ago it was!

M.S. flew to Irkutsk after another unsuccessful session on the budget at the Supreme Soviet. All the newspapers are making fun of the Supreme Soviet session (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Rossiyskaya Gazeta*).

But let us talk about Gorbachev.

He easily parted with Pankin: *real politik*! He returned E.A., who until the last day was giving the press degrading assessments of Gorbachev, and, of course, elevating himself.

Back in the day, he pushed away Yakovlev (for Ligachev and Ryzhkov...)—for the sake of *real politik*. Because of *real politik*, he held on to Ligachev until the last drop, out of fear to lose what seemed to be one of the unshakeable pillars—the CPSU. In the meantime, if he had not lingered with the 5th article of the Constitution and left the General Secretariat immediately after it was repealed, the Party would have split. But the most intelligent and progressive part of it would have been preserved—for him, for *perestroika*. Instead, not only did he lose it entirely, but he made it into his fierce enemy.

Now Kohl is doing *real politik* with Yeltsin. But the ethics that M.S. introduced into world politics are also a reality. Without it, there would be no trust, and without trust there wouldn’t be anything, including the German unification.

So far it doesn’t look like the Chancellor has gotten this, either himself or through Blech. We’ll see whether he will call Gorbachev. Bush did. If Kohl doesn’t, he sold out.

And the issue is not that we have to adjust to the environment, such is the fate of politics; it is that looking ahead is also the ability to take reality into account.

I do not believe that the kind of Union M.S. envisions right now is viable. And I doubt that the initialing ceremony will take place tomorrow. Not to mention that yesterday, Kravchuk publicly stated that he will never sign any Union Treaty. There is already a joke going around: one fur cap with earflaps + five [Central Asian] skull caps = the new Union. It’s sad, but true... But later, in the future... We are going to take the European way = the way of the common market.

However, it is possible that the Muslim republics will join the Muslim world in the South. But that would mean war in Kazakhstan. The Cossacks are already preparing. And war in Ukraine—for the Crimea... We cannot give it away, it would be a disgrace to the national consciousness of Russia. And it is the only “ideological” pillar of Russian policy. Otherwise, the people will not withstand the economic reforms.

But let us return to Gorbachev. According to the logic imposed on him (M.S. realized it and therefore took E.A.), he has to quickly and markedly shift into the sphere of foreign relations... and became a Weizsäcker, Cossiga , even the “Spanish King” with his army (a very limited and professional one, although he is ill fit to command the respect of the military and the officers—not based on his personal qualities, but based on his rank)... And later, he should become a figure from the past, like Giscard, Schmidt, Kissinger, Vance, Thatcher... Although that is not done here. But let him pave the way. The Roman Club is offering him honorary membership and even the position of honorary chairman. Why not?!

If the trip to Irkutsk (to the military factories and a garrison) is a step in the direction of the army, it is the right move... But he has to do it sooner, he cannot allow Yeltsin to take the Russian army into his own hands. M.S. should become its patron, including the Cossacks... After all, he is from there, even though he is a “non-Cossack.”

What do I have to do with this? I promised to be with him until the end. He offered me this when two times I hinted at retirement. We had a falling out over Foros (and over of my TV interview—because of R.M.), there was a chill, but it seems to have disappeared... Revenko really resisted making me the Special Adviser for international affairs, but M.S. did it anyway...

So, I will serve until the end. What else have I left to do?

But on Saturday Belikov visited me, from the editorial office of *Red Square*, a presidential newspaper that has been trying to get off the ground for a year now. Finally, it looks like it is going to start getting published, even though it has no means or sponsors. Belikov suggested that I should open the first issue with an article on Gorbachev, or an interview. I think I will decline...

I am not afraid of apologetics: he deserved it as a historic figure of the XX century... But against the background of the load of psycho-Freudian publications (for example, Professor Belkin’s article in *Kul’tura*) and just the yellow press portraiture of him, I would look pathetic, like an obedient official, unless I say everything or almost everything that I know and think about him.

No way! Once I retire, then we’ll see... And even then—for posthumous notes...

A few days ago Yulia Drunina committed suicide. It means that for some people, the shock of our lives makes them want to slam the door on their way out. Or... is it the collapse of the entire past of socialist spirituality? Maybe not even the “socialist,” but in the ‘30s, and during the war, and afterwards, in the ‘80s—there was life, there were passions, struggles, ideas, and a “way of life”... Everything collapsed. And to replace it (so far??!)—absolutely nothing, not even store shelves with goods.

That is why Gorbachev represents the loss of hope in the eyes of the people.

November 23, 1991, Saturday

Yesterday, while M.S. was in Siberia and Kyrgyzstan, I was preparing his interview for Kyodo News, working on a platform for a conversation with Janitschek,³³ greetings for Dubcek's 70th anniversary, materials for the meeting with the Spanish parliamentarians, materials for a meeting with Velayati (Iran). In other words, my regular work. Overall, I did get to enjoy myself while he was traveling, as I had planned to...

Gorbachev is being shown in a sarcastic light on TV... His actions are portrayed as convulsive attempts to keep his position... It looked that way especially against the background of Yeltsin in Germany, where Kohl embraced him the same way as he had Gorbachev just a little while ago.

I wonder, will Kohl call his friend in Moscow about the outcomes of Yeltsin's visit. He did not call before the visit. Only Blech came to visit me, and even that was on his own initiative.

November 24, 1991, Sunday night

I was waiting for a call from M.S. He called only at 12:30 a.m. It is not certain whether the State Council and the initialing will take place tomorrow, which M.S. promised to the whole world. And what will he do, if it goes wrong... threaten to leave once again?!

Right now... at 11 p.m. "Vesti" broadcast an interview with M.S. from Vnukovo airport. He flew in from Kyrgyzstan yesterday. His view on Yeltsin's visit to Germany: he considers it normal... And, he said, they should not oppose Russia—the largest state—(!) Usually he called it a republic, along with the others—which cements this enormous (silence) organization (instead of the word Union!). And again: do not oppose them. There are common interests... And a common policies (again!) instead of 12 and 8 foreign policies (I "gave" that phrase to him, it's from some newspaper). He keeps referring to this "image." He looked sad, tired... in that hat of his. With sad eyes.

He should tell them all to go to hell!!

He probably did not bring much from Siberia and Kyrgyzstan...

We'll see tomorrow...

November 25, 1991, Monday

As could be expected, the Union Treaty was not initialed at Novo-Ogarevo. We know what Gorbachev told the journalists on TV. Even though he lost his temper sometimes, he made the best of a very bad bargain. He just called me at home and told me, "It was harder than on the 14th, it was an exhausting struggle, I flogged them, I left them"...

I said: "But on TV you seemed to mention that they feel the need to put an end to the maneuvering... That the country can't take much more..."

³³ Hans Janitschek, Secretary of the Socialist International from 1969-1977. [Translator's Note]

M.S.: "That's what I want them to finally realize."

I: "Who was the main (saboteur)..."

M.S.: "He is the main one (i.e. Yeltsin)."

For the TV, M.S. tried to present the collective communiqué on the transfer of the draft to the republics' Supreme Soviets as a form of initialing... But even the terminology (the meaning of the word) is different.

I am certain that the parliaments will bury the draft... In the best case scenario, they will postpone it "indefinitely"...

M.S. is facing a choice—to carry out his threat to leave, or to keep dragging it on (and be everyone's laughing-stock). This is not just defeat. It is worse: one more humiliation on the most important issue, which still carried a symbol of his power—statehood.

November 26, 1991, Tuesday

Details from Novo-Ogarevo.

Yeltsin was the ringleader of the disruption. He brought a heap of comments on the draft Union Treaty.

M.S. said to him: "What is this, didn't we agree on everything last time? And before that, we developed this draft together."

B.N.: "What of it? Some time has passed, we discussed it in groups and the Supreme Soviet committees... people are saying this draft won't do. The main question again is that it is not a State, but just a Union... or a 'Confederative Union.'"

M.S. once again started to prove his point. Only the Kazakh supported him—Nazarbayev's deputy, a Dr. of Law, the one who used the metaphor from Mayakovski—"a cloud in trousers." The rest hesitated... Almost all of them, except Akayev, who felt uncomfortable objecting since M.S. had just been his guest .

M.S. got completely worked up. Three hours later he told them, "As you wish. I am leaving. Stay here without me. And decide. Whatever you decide, that's what you'll do."

And he went to his office.

An hour later, a "deputation" came to him: Yeltsin and Shushkevich.

B.N. came in, averting his face, practically spitting with disgust (Grachev's words), saying, "We came, cap in hand, to our prince, our Khan..."

M.S. to him: "Stop it, tsar Boris. Let's get down to business."

He came back to them... And they agreed on a joint statement, which in front of the journalists M.S. tried to equate to initialing.

Later, at a strictly closed meeting [they discussed] how Yeltsin will carry out his economic program. His colleagues from the republics tried to persuade him to go easier, saying that he is putting them in a terrible position. He told them, "We are already late; on December 16th I am introducing free-market prices."

M.S. reacted sluggishly... Only warned about social upheaval.

Yavlinsky in his report, after bowing to Yeltsin's courage, said that the main question is what all of them will do after February, when people will take to the streets. The old, dying system will keep "developing" on momentum until February. But this will only last until the end of February. Then there will be a collapse. Are you ready for this? Are you thinking about this? Nobody replied.

In the evening, M.S. gathered his advisers and consultants and set them before the task of thinking about what we should do!

Yesterday I had a long conversation with Yakovlev. He came back from the U.S... He came over and, sitting across from each other, we went over everything for about two hours. Our conclusion: whether we like it or not, there is no alternative to Russia's breakthrough path on its own. Gorbachev's attempts to save the Union are hopeless convulsions.

And in general, the situation wouldn't be too bad if it wasn't for Ukraine, for the Crimea, which it is impossible to give up.

November 27, 1991, Wednesday

M.S. met with Japanese businessmen. They talked business... They know more about our industry than we do. And yet, they want to "work" with us.

M.S. still remains a world-leader on the world stage. And he should "shift" his presidential role precisely in this direction. He should engage in political and "spiritual-ethical" affairs of the modern world... And take a distanced position on domestic affairs, warning about dangers now and then.

In this spirit, I held a meeting with my consultants. I made a speech; we talked and decided that they will put together a draft of this image with such a "shift."

The eloquent and not very clear, impetuous Yermonsky; the practical and cautious Gusekov; the active and very knowledgeable Palazhchenko; the strained Kovalyov (the son); the calm and skeptical Weber; the show-off, pseudo-scientific and self-assured, but, it seems, really "prepared" Kuvaldin.

November 28, 1991, Thursday

Today M.S. met with Ernst Neizvestny. This is “my work.” By the law of pairs—his article was published in *Voprosy Filosofii* [Questions of Philosophy] No. 10.

The company: Yu. Karyakin, Andrei Grachev, Ignatenko, and I.

M.S. opened up to the limit... As if he was at a fraternal banquet. And politically he said some things for the first time... He called himself a dissident since 1953. Ernst and Yurka burst into my office three hours before the meeting. And with me, Ernst was more interesting than with M.S. We'll see how this meeting will resound tomorrow. It was recorded by dozens of reporters and TV operators. They say that after leaving M.S., Ernst was “dignified and reserved,” without euphoria (I didn't hear it myself)... Even though M.S.' openness seemed unusual even for me. [Imagine what it was like] for an “outsider”... after all, Ernst was speaking with “The Man of the Century,” the man who changed the world!

M.S. (to me): “If you write an address to the parliaments, maybe something will work out.”

Together with Andrei, we engineered a “retort” to the White House regarding the U.S.’ promise to diplomatically recognize Ukraine after the December 1st referendum... The MFA again proved to be flimsy (E.A. + Petrovsky).

November 29, 1991, Friday

This was a remarkable day in many respects.

In the morning I gave an interview to *Newsweek*, for an end of the year review, mostly on M.S.’ motives and actions from March of 1985 until now... About his “ideological” evolution... I shot down the myths and primitive thoughts that Fred Coleman suggested... even though he is smart and knowledgeable.

The USSR Supreme Soviet blocked the emergency budget until the end of the year, and the State Bank has closed all payments to the army and to us poor sinners, the officials. We are left without our salaries.

I sent M.S. an “exploratory paper” with a recommendation to change his role toward international relations and culture... to use his world-wide prestige at home and hold on to this position, not trusting in the Union Treaty, nor in the Congress’ decisions, which elected him and confirmed the election after coup, nor the Constitution of the USSR!!

I wrote a draft address to the parliamentarians, urging them to ratify the Union Treaty, even though I don’t believe in it myself... But I found the words!

I told Ernst that I was disappointed with his interview. It was his job to support M.S. “in this situation.” He needs it. Ernst replied: “Tolya, what are you talking about? I am not a prostitute. I am grateful to you for bringing us together; and to him for being so open and sincere. That’s all!”

Yeltsin transferred the Ministry of External Relations to his “jurisdiction” and his expense... Petrovsky complained to me. I “objected”: you have Shevardnadze now, let him “tell” Yeltsin!

I am afraid the Ministry of Defense is going to face the same fate...

But what can we do? Right now, Russia still has the means to pay, and M.S. has nothing!

Izvestiya gave a dressing down to the advisers—why did they “offend” Bush for wanting to diplomatically recognize Ukraine. The newspaper poses a rhetorical question: “Which adviser suggested this?” Grachev suggested it, and I supported him and wrote the text.

Golembiovsky has no shame...

December 1, 1991, Sunday

There is no whiff of winter... Nothing is right anymore. Yesterday I expected to have a quiet day at work. In the morning I started editing the address to the parliamentarians (on ratifying the Union Treaty), instead of the version I gave M.S. on Friday.

But a report came in that he is going to meet with Yeltsin. They sat for four hours + Burbulis and Gaidar. Their conversation centered on the fact that it is impossible to leave the “Center” like this, without means [for existence]. They came to some agreement...

But at 6 p.m. the experts were still sitting in the Walnut Room, formulating a “document.”

I got a call from the MFA (pardon me, the MER): Bush wants to call M.S. at 4 p.m. I reported this to Gorbachev. He replied: “For what?! I won’t be here... (he thought for a moment)... Let them connect us, wherever I will be.”

That’s the reaction. On the one hand, the trigger went off (Grachev and mine report to the TASS about recognizing Ukraine); on the other hand, he was angry and offended... And it was unpleasant for him to speak with Bush.

The conversation started exactly at 4:00 p.m. (he wasn’t able to go anywhere). And M.S., in his usual “friendly and open” manner he started greeting George (“my dear” and so on). The latter congratulated him on the achievements in relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia (the State Council’s resolution), and moved on to Ukraine. He explained for a long time... M.S. in turn suggested our concept to him: “independence means separation,” and separation is “Yugoslavia” squared, “Yugoslavia” x 10! Bush was very careful, twice assuring M.S. that he will not do anything that would put “Michael” and “the Center” in an awkward position. Once he even said [he would not do] “something that would impede the process of the Union’s reunification.”

It was clear (he said that he will call Yeltsin immediately) that he was particularly concerned about the possibility of “violent processes” over the Crimea and the Donets Basin.

When M.S. mentioned this issue, Baker commented (he and Scowcroft were on parallel lines): “Yes, yes, this is very dangerous...” You could see that Baker has more freedom in his judgments, he is less influenced by the pressure of various lobbyists, he is more frank.

The conversation ended with Bush wishing Michael success in his difficult mission of “reunification.”

Palazhchenko translated. Yakovlev and I were present during the conversation. We discussed what we would give to the press. M.S. and A.N. threw out some common phrases, and then I had to rack my brain to write something that wouldn’t “sell-out” Bush, while at the same time would cool off Kravchuk & Co. I came up with a page. I don’t know how people will react to it.

Yakovlev said (I should find out the details) that at the Political Consultative Committee on Friday, which met from 3 p.m. – 10 p.m., everyone—Popov, Sobchak, Yavlinsky, A.N., Yegor Yakovlev, in a word, everyone—spoke in favor of the Union and condemned Yeltsin’s line, which will lead to social upheaval and is very clearly authoritarian beyond all measure. A.N. said they were ready on the spot to create a formal opposition and put together a declaration to state their views. Shatalin offered to “personally” appear on TV and “expose” all of Yeltsin’s moves.

However, so far it resulted only in Sobchak’s very definite and even sharp address on TV the same evening...

Yegor Yakovlev complained that the TV³⁴ was being “taken away” from him. He is no longer the boss there. “The Russians” are running the show... “Vesti” on Friday had some downright insulting passages about M.S. and his “Ukrainian” policy.

By the way, in the heap of information, nobody noticed that in an interview to *Izvestiya* on November 25th, Yeltsin openly said that he will not sign a Union Treaty, unless Ukraine signs it as well.

Could M.S. be right in his long-held suspicions that Yeltsin and Kravchuk conspired to collapse the Union from both sides?!

December 3, 1991, Tuesday

Yesterday he called on us to “go over” the address to the parliamentarians... urging them to approve the Union Treaty. We came up with three versions—mine, Shakhnazarov’s, and Yakovlev’s. He rejected Shakhnazarov’s right off the bat. He wanted to accept mine, but Yakovlev asked to read his out loud, with feeling. M.S. gave me a sly look, and then said: “Let Chernyaev use it as the basis and then give us the final product directly.”

I replied (also giving Shashka a sly look): “Without getting it verified by Alexander Nikolayevich?”

³⁴ Yegor Yakovlev was chairman of the All-Soviet Television Company in 1991-1992. [Translator’s Note]

M.S.: "Without!" (Everybody laughed).

In the evening I made a symbiosis... I took a great deal from Yakovlev (he had a long text), but removed the sap and flashy passages. M.S. accepted it without corrections.

Today he spoke on TV. It looked like he was speaking freely, not reading from the text. But he glanced at it every now and then. The text has been sent to each parliamentarian.

The problem is—who is going to publish it? It seems Andrei got *Izvestiya* to do it.

Shakhnazarov presented a draft of an appeal "To the citizens of Ukraine." M.S. tore it up demonstratively: it had "historic choice," and "Ukraine's great role," "congratulations with victory," "independent, self-sufficient," "Hurrah!" And more of the same.

He ordered me to write it, along the lines of "everyone has independence, but not everyone turns it into a weapon against the Union... The Ukrainians will be in trouble, both the people who live in the country, as well as those who are scattered around the Union... This is even more true for Russians... Borders, nuclear weapons..." In a word, alarms and warnings, and a list of consequences...

In the morning I gave it to him. He still hadn't decided.

Today he spoke with Kohl on the phone. The latter called. The same thing about Ukraine. And warnings—do not rush with recognition; do not jeopardize what was developed in our relations "on the basis of friendship."

Yeah... In the evening he spoke about the same thing on the phone with Yeltsin. The latter was going somewhere in a car and was already drunk. M.S. tried to persuade him to meet, or for the three of them to meet (+ Kravchuk), or the four of them (+ Nazarbayev). Yeltsin drunkenly disagreed: "Nothing will work out anyway. Ukraine is independent."

"What about you, Russia?!" M.S. objected.

"What about me! I am Russia. We'll manage. It won't work out with the Union... On the other hand, if we go back to the idea of a union of four—Russia + Ukraine + Belorussia + Kazakhstan?"

"Where would my place be then? If that's the case, I will leave. I am not going to dangle underfoot. I am not doing this for myself. But understand: without the Union, you will all fail. And you will destroy the reforms. You have to decide. To a great extent, things depend on the two of us."

"What would we do without you, Mikhail Sergeyevich!" Yeltsin drunkenly taunted.

"Well, what would I be, if there was no Union?"

"Don't worry... You can stay," Yeltsin graciously agreed.

Yakovlev and I looked at each other: how much patience M.S. has! But he is also clearly ready to leave... Without regrets... Without drama... Quietly!

It looks like that's the direction we are headed in.

Today he met with Janitschek, the former General Secretary of the Socialist International. Tim (Timofeyev, Director of the Institute of the Labor Movement) suggested him, and I convinced Gorbachev to meet. And then I took time off... and sent Weber to attend the conversation, as an "encouragement." I don't know what took place there. Timofeyev begged to have the guest visit him, but I got out of it.

December 6, 1991, Friday

You miss a day and important things disappear from your memory. For example, after the address to the parliamentarians, he made me write an address "To the Citizens of Ukraine." We spent the entire evening with him + Yakovlev and Revenko. The latter called himself an "ardent Ukrainian nationalist" and objected to the very idea of the address, saying that it "will have the opposite effect," and is "too much." "You seem to have said everything already..." and more along those lines.

Yakovlev supported Revenko. I defended the "desirability" [of the address]. Also, I proceeded not from the possible results, which are obvious. I was thinking about what is necessary for Gorbachev. He made a bet... They took everything away from him—control of the economy, management over the leaders, influence over the press... The only thing left is the idea of unifying the Union. He is its symbol and its advocate. Otherwise, he has nothing left to do... And this is clear from his agenda. He is seeking sorts of meetings, with our people and with foreigners. He gives interviews almost every day; he goes to reporters after meetings, etc. He spends hours talking with people from whom he might expect any small measure of influence over the process: either Yegor Yakovlev, or Alexander Yakovlev, or Grachev and Chernyaev, or Shevardnadze... And so on.

After composing the "Address to Ukraine," which turned into a statement that he scrapped again the next morning (I changed my point of view and convinced him that it would not be a good idea), we got together with the same group to work on his meeting with Yeltsin (on the eve of tomorrow's meeting of the three Slavic presidents in Minsk)... We did manage to go over the options because he listened listlessly and then made us listen to his monologues. There was nothing new, just more and more arguments in favor of the Union. There are dozens of them and they are all reasonable and irrefutable, but they cannot overcome the gut feeling of "We want to do it ourselves, and we are sure that it will work!"

His refrain is—if they do not agree to the Union, I will leave, there will be no place for me. At the same time, he is coming up with a plan to convene the State Council, a Congress of the People's Deputies + a direct address to "the people" (on TV)... and demand a referendum: are you for the Union, or not? These are all illusions—he won't be able to convene a Congress, or have a referendum if the republics don't want it. Plus, who will pay? And who will carry it

out, even if it's a "yes"? After all, the "reality" right now is that real power is in the hands of the elites—the Kravchuk, Yeltsins, and Burlusines.

I said all of this openly. He won't let go. And in a sense, he is doing the right thing, because this is the only "visible" activity he has left, even though the newspapers are making fun... Although, especially in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow, there is some shift toward unity.

And I, with all my lack of faith in the Union—when I met with Braithwaite and Dufourcq these last two days, I ardently used Gorbachev's arguments.

Today he met with Antall, the Hungarian President [sic]. The talks were "normal," friendly... even though with some skepticism on the Hungarian's part ("such a vast country cannot be controlled from the center")... M.S. did not bat an eyelid regarding the fact that it was his mistake to refuse to invite Antall for so long. When he finally did invite him, it was only under the threat of a "Bulgarian" option, because he still would have come at Yeltsin's invitation... Once again, there was a flow of arguments (in the conversation) in favor of the Union, even more expressive. And in front of reporters he even presented Hungary as an example to Ukraine—look, it is "joining" as associate member of the EU, and Ukraine doesn't want to be in a political union with the people it has been intertwined with for centuries!

He went to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier for the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow... The President and who else? Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Shaposhnikov, Bakatin, Primakov, Silaev, Medvedev, and Grachev and I. Those are all the people close to the highest authority, the "Soviet (central) government" at the moment!! It's not much.

I felt sad, after all. I remembered how on these days 50 years ago our 203rd ski battalion of the shock army was brought by train to Skhodne-Kryukov (from where the remains of the unknown soldier were transferred)... How cold it was, and few kilometers from us there was shooting on the front line, my first encounter with the war. [I remembered] how my mother and Lyuba Artishevskaya, my first, ill-fated woman, almost miraculously made it there. For about twenty minutes we sat in some hut, the owner let us in. It was so "awkward" (Lyuba no longer loved me and was serving a charity number) and my mother, who also had "cut me off" by then, was doing her motherly duty. I don't remember that she cried. Our goodbyes were quick... accompanied by the non-stop crackle of machine guns somewhere nearby. But our battalion did not go into battle, and the next day we again were in the echelons going toward Moscow, then on the circular line, from there to Savelovskaya railroad (Leningradskaya was cut off) to the North-Western front near Staraya Russa—to surround Demyansk.

I was still given a medal "For Defense of Moscow" later. Tolmachev presented me with it... And I remember how I didn't feel too comfortable about it, since it seemed like I didn't deserve it. Although, I did spend that summer digging anti-tank trenches near Roslavl', and so on... retreating from the Germans... under fire.

December 7, 1991, Saturday

M.S. met with American businessmen, who together with Velikhov are organizing a program to teach out guys about business. Marvel! The “sharks of imperialism” are investing billions in us, for nothing!

M.S. again started on his pet subject, he was at his best, talking about “unpredictable consequences” of the collapse and rejection of the Union. And this is while the three “Slavic” presidents already decided “this question” in Minsk!

Next week both M.S. and I might find ourselves unemployed.

In the meantime... I sent him agreements between the “USSR” and Finland and Greece to sign; a greeting for the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Dakar; an address “To the readers of *Rynok* [Market] journal” (organized by MN); and some other nonsense.

More importantly, I’ve begun work on the theses that M.S. assigned me to create for his “1+4” meeting this Monday (with Yeltsin, Kravchuk, Shushkevich, and Nazarbayev). He gave this assignment to each of his advisers, according to their profile...

I fell behind. I had to finish it at night, and I’ll read it over tomorrow.

However, however... Next week, it is difficult to imagine that I will become unnecessary... Although, even now I am useful only to M.S. personally, not to politics.

I wonder, how will my women react to this?!

December 8, 1991, Sunday morning

I used a courier to send in my “essay” on why we need the new Union from the international relations respective. Now this is my work, idling, for him personally.

There is still no information from Brest. Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Shushkevich probably all got drunk in Belovezhskaya Pushcha! But judging by what Yeltsin told journalists in the Byelorussian Parliament, it is clear that they will not agree to the Union. And they will leave no place for Gorbachev... Of course, he will linger, using the fact that he still has the army. For some reason, Lobov was removed the other day and replaced by Samsonov, from the Petersburg Military District. Of course, Lobov is a blockhead from Yazov’s old cadres... But a change at a time like this? That is...

M.S. “gets” everything, and it seems he is ready for everything. Yesterday he made the Americans laugh when he said: “Reporters keep asking me, you are the President of what country?”

But on Monday at the “1+4”... the question has to be decided. Because they will not allow him to convene a Congress, and they won’t finance a referendum.

Ogonyok published yet another verbal “portrait” of M.S., written by a certain Leonid Gazman. It too has a great deal of guesswork, successful “deductions,” but also a great deal of rubbish...

Lyuda invited me to meet two of her acquaintances, Dutch journalists, to discuss this subject...

By the way, Masha Slonim from “The Second Russian Revolution” gave an interview to *MN* on how the series was created by the BBC. Unpleasant. It turns out that I and the others were simply the object of a cynical business. She boasts that for a year and a half, she regularly called me at half past seven in the morning, trying to get a meeting with M.S... She spoke with disdain about the advisers to the main players: “Well, they said what was permissible.” That means she is talking about me, too! We Russians are such simpletons. We’re gullible. Nothing teaches us a lesson... Maybe this is good from the point of view of “high morals,” which are ruining our country... Because this gullibility is compensated *post factum* by barbarity, rudeness, and senseless brutality.

Speaking of morals... Brutents made me think about it through his indignation at Krasin’s behavior. Krasin declared that he will not take anyone from the apparatus (to his Fund, which was formed in the former Lenin School... by the CC International Department, by the way). He said he always hated Party apparatchiks (even though he came from them, under Ponomarev’s wing!).

Where am I going with this? I have a trifling relationship with morality... from a narrow-minded point of view. It is enough to look through my full diary, especially its “women” parts, to see this. But what really is true (no wonder Bovin nicknamed me the Count), is that dignity and honor stand above all else for me. That is why people rarely succeeded in humiliating me. And never did I live my life at somebody else’s expense, or elbow someone to the side!!

Sunday Evening

Just heard on the radio: Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Shushkevich agreed to establish a Commonwealth of Independent States... And tomorrow (+ Nazarbayev) they will discuss it with Gorbachev. It is an open agreement, others may join... That’s it! When Nazarbayev arrived, at the airport he said that he regrets the loss of the Union, he appealed to conclude at least a defensive alliance with central command...

M.S. finally has to decide. A clip from an interview he gave yesterday to a Ukrainian journalist was broadcast on TV. Again, he said: “Who knows if I will offer my candidacy for elections?” This is inadequate, once again. Where will he offer it? Is anyone planning to have elections? What presidency is he talking about? For whom?

In a word, I was right when I said a long time ago: there will be Union. I did not believe it even before the coup.

I went to work. I finished the international aspect of arguments in favor of the Union (for tomorrow's meeting of the four and maybe for the State Council)... Who needs this? The interstate agreement has already been made... What Union Treaty are they going to discuss? It's a joke!

I decide to talk a walk in the frosty cold. Walked out to the Manezh... And came across a thousand people demonstrating, under red and black-and-yellow flags... "Hands off Lenin!" "Hands off Socialism," "Down with (or put on trial) the traitor of the motherland, Gorbachev!"... "We are selling ourselves to the Jews with 'Patriot' Rostropovich," "Russia for Russians," etc. There were also some against the Lithuanians, in support of the Special Forces commander who bombed the TV tower in Vilnius. All kinds of "economic demands." Someone handed me a leaflet: "Everybody to the demonstration on December 22nd, out of the hungry queues!!"

Midnight. The radio just broadcast: Yeltsin, Kravchuk, Shushkevich just announced that the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a subject of international law, and all the laws pertaining to it as a state are now invalid. They agreed on how to co-finance defense... They will work out the economic mechanism over the course of December.

And I had just listened to a 1.5 hour interview with M.S. on Ukrainian TV, recorded yesterday. In it, he passionately argues that it is impossible to "separate," and that a rejection of the Union would mean ruin for us all. He did not let the Ukrainian interviewer get a word in... [He said] he would go over the heads of these "newly minted politicians, who surfaced over the last two years," he would address the nation and supposedly he still has some "means, about which I will not talk right now!"

In a word, from this moment I am living in another country—Russia. And in this country I am unemployed.

December 10, 1991, Tuesday

How did I spend yesterday, when I became "nothing"?

In the morning, in a Kremlin hallway I ran into four people: Kudryavtsev, Veniamin Yakovlev, Sergey Alekseyev, Kalmykov—the main men of law. They were coming from Gorbachev. Kudryavtsev lingered. He told me, "Mikhail Sergeyevich is in a rage, he is saying that he will leave, he'll tell everyone to go to hell, he'll 'show them,' etc. We tried to persuade him not to clash with them, but instead to say 'Alright, you passed this stage, let's discuss what to do next.' Now we are going to make him a draft statement along these lines, which he plans to present after the forthcoming meeting with Yeltsin and others. What is your point of view on this, Anatoly Sergeyevich?"

"I am for it."

"Support this line then."

"Definitely."

Alas! I wasn't "summoned," neither personally, nor to the various meetings he had during the day.

At noon, M.S. spoke with Yeltsin. Kravchuk and Shushkevich did not come. Before that, he spoke with Nazarbayev. Then the three of them met. I don't know what happened there. After that, he met in turn with Nabiev (Tajik), Niyazov's representative (Turkmen). Presidents Akayev and Karimov also did not come. Ter-Oganesyan publicly supported the Belovezhskaya Pushcha threesome, which sentenced the Soviet Union to death.

In the second half of the day he had a long session with the Political Consultative Committee in the Walnut Room: Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Bakatin, Primakov, plus V. Yakovlev, Shakhnazarov, Revenko, and somebody else. They gave birth to the statement that was read by the announcer at 9 p.m. on TV. It's a good thing they realized not to let M.S. himself appear on TV. There would have been another lecture...

He announced the convening of the Congress of People's Deputies, and the possibility of a referendum. But I've already written about that here. Even if the People's Deputies collect 1/5 of the signatures, still nothing will come of it. Nicholas II has the courage to abdicate after a 300-year dynasty. M.S. does not understand that his job is done. He should have left a long time ago... preserving his dignity and respect for what he has done in history.

Travkin and the Democratic Party of Russia are going to Manezhnaya Ploshchad' to lead a mass rally for the Union... Maybe it will end in speeches... But if they go to the White House and Yeltsin's police intervenes, that would be another story.

The worthless Kozyrev said today at a press-conference, "There are two ways out of this situation—the self-liquidation of the Union organs (starting with the President) and voluntary transfer of property, or the uncivilized option like the one in August." Threats. I thought to myself, what would we take to the barricades for? We, Gorbachev's team, shat ourselves [*obosralis'*] "not at this stage." Of course, seeing this intellectual gang around Yeltsin (all of those Burbulises, Kozyrevs, etc.) is disgusting. In the same way, the intellectual cadets, Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, not to mention the monarchists, were disgusted with the intellectual Bolsheviks in 1917-20. But they also shat themselves. I do not believe that Yeltsin will lead "Russian cause" on the right path. But I also do not see an alternative to "surrendering to Russia." The Union is dead...

I will go to work... which in essence no longer exists. I wonder, how will they empty out the offices—same way as in the CC CPSU?

December 11, 1991, Wednesday

A boring day. I found out that M.S. met with Yeltsin. Before that, he gave an hour and a half-long interview to V. Tretyakov (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*). Nobody knows what he talked about with Yeltsin. In the evening, Grachev said, "Same old." Ambassador Blech asked to see me. For over an hour I explained to him what's going on, without knowing myself what's going on. M.S.

did not call me today or yesterday... Today there was no Political Consultative Committee; instead, he met with various people in turn, mostly Yakovlev and Revenko.

When I found out that he is going to speak at the Supreme Soviet tomorrow, I (with Kuvaldin's help) created a draft with 12 bullet points—an anti-confrontational one, with readiness to fit into the post-Belovezha "reality"... And to legitimize its "growth" through others.

I offered to call the country "Eurasian Commonwealth of Independent States." I don't know how he will react. Most likely, he will see it as disloyalty: right now he does not tolerate diverging opinions, much less positions, from anyone who is in office under him.

Grachev and I talked. M.S. should concentrate on leaving with dignity. All of Yeltsin's power (plus Kravchuk and Shushkevich) is directed at toppling him right now. And in fact, Yeltsin has already done so, depriving M.S. of all means of resistance. Yesterday Yeltsin took all government communications under his control, which means he could just turn off all of M.S.' telephones, not allow his apparatus to enter the Kremlin, or just lock the doors of the offices.

Every day that he spends clinging to the Kremlin—and that's what his actions look like right now—he is delaying the day when history will place Gorbachev in the position of a great man of the XX century.

He should not look for "work"... He should just retire and continue the "tradition" of the greats and the not-so-greats—De Gaulle, Churchill, Thatcher...

True, we are not France or England, but... it is time to create "this model" of leaving. Not to fuss, not to contradict everything that he considered necessary for every decent and courageous person.

I suggested that he should use Mitterrand's idea and insist on calling together the "four nuclear powers," to confirm where our button is and therefore the statute. He returned it without notes, or maybe he said something about it Eduard Amvrosievich before his trip to Brussels.

By the way, Kozyrev said, "Gorbachev is not a leper, we'll find work for him." Grachev told him off at a briefing.

December 12, 1991, Thursday

It is the first time that I got to my office on a normal, ordinary day, and saw that there is no work to be done... and if there are papers, I don't have to carry them out. And the whole day I did not get a single work-related call.

M.S. is getting reports of hot rumors, by one person and the next. He is sending off parting responsibilities. Grachev got together 20 journalists for him; he said practically a farewell speech. He was completely not at a state level, frank and unnecessarily detailed in telling them about how Yeltsin, Shushkevich, and Kravchuk "got around him" on December 8th-9th.

Closer to evening he summoned me. He was sad. Asked me about my impressions of the Russian parliament, which ratified the Belovezha Accords... He wondered about the insults from astronaut Sevastyanov, who said from the rostrum of parliament, "The document is weak, but it's a good thing that "the Gorbachev era" has come to an end." Shallow simpletons! The Gorbachev era is just beginning!

He asked me to make a handwritten draft of his farewell speech for the nation. I started it, but it is still only a rough draft.

December 14th, 1991, Saturday

Yesterday M.S. surprised the Englishmen (Braithwaite and Appleyard—Hurd's deputy) by his cheerfulness, presence of mind, irony, and self-confidence, as if nothing is happening. He greeted them with the words, "So what? Have you come to find out, what country you are visiting, and who am I nowadays?" This immediately created "an atmosphere," because the Englishmen had walked in with glum, funereal expressions, looking apologetic. M.S. led the conversation confidently, brightly, figuratively, defending his ideas, but without excepting the option of looking for a solution (on the Commonwealth) that would open the brackets on many problems that appeared as the result of amateurism and ambition.

After the Englishmen left, he kept Yakovlev and me in his office. Once again, we started going over what to do. The trouble with him is that he, knowing that everything is being done to oust him from the presidency, keeps grasping at the slightest excuses to "think" that not all is lost...

For example, Kravchuk declared himself commander in chief... M.S. calls him: "What are you doing? Do you realize what this could lead to?!" Kravchuk replies, "Oh, Mikhail Sergeyevich, this is no big deal. The Supreme Soviet insisted on it, so I issued a decree... But I have no pretensions to the army!" And so on. In a word, pulling wool over his eyes.

Then M.S. relates it to Yakovlev and me, this is what happened, so to speak, in reality it is no big deal.

Or, another example: he met with Yeltsin. They had a "peaceful" conversation, as B.N. told reporters. But afterwards, he said to the leaders of his parties, "I named Mikhail Sergeyevich some dates—December, January at the latest—in which we (!) will finish with one era and go into the next one." A child could understand what this means—that he has two-three weeks left in the Kremlin!

By the way, I reminded him about these words. And of the fact that we have already gotten wind that the presidential apparatus has to clear out the premises by December 20th. His countenance changed, but he still kept "thinking about two options."

The first option is to go on TV and say farewell to the nation. The day before yesterday he assigned me to work on the text. I made it and yesterday gave him the handwritten version (Tamara helped me to made a typed copy for myself). But, he says, we will not rush with this.

The second option is (if today in Ashgabat and Alma-Ata the heads of the “sovereign states” reach an agreement, or do not reach it) to put forward the conditions of his agreement to “help” them solve the problems they created with their Commonwealth. These conditions are—for him to have a post, and not of a ceremonial bystander or a man on duty by the button, but... in a word, he wants a fitting position.

However, judging by the results of Ashgabat and the prospects from Alma-Ata, nobody is going to offer him a position today, or any position at all. So the second option is an illusion.

Although, when we were talking about it, I was sitting twiddling my thumbs, like Yakovlev, when he threw a remark at me, “Why are you just sitting there? Take notes. You are the one who will have to write this.”

Yesterday late in the evening he told me that Bush called him. M.S. gave him a dressing down for his behavior. He dictated to me a message to transfer to the mass media that Bush proposed to maintain regular contact. Morel (Mitterrand’s assistant) called me from the Elysee Palace, to say that his boss wants to speak with M.S. The conversation will take place today. These are all straws M.S. grasps at.

This morning I talked with Grachev. He is also in favor of M.S.’ immediate and “proactive” departure. But he paints a grim picture. We are not France (who later again called on de Gaulle), Grachev thinks, and everything won’t be “forgotten” as soon as he leaves. They won’t write off [all the problems], rather, they will start a process (together with the CPSU) to find a scapegoat (after the Honecker model).

I doubt this will happen. “The people won’t allow it.” We are not Germans. Already after his meeting with reporters the other day, “the people” began to feel sorry for him.

Although, you never know. In any case, there will be no second option. He should leave as soon as possible... Otherwise they will drive him out even harder, they will insult and humiliate him... Even Nazarbayev said, “We’ve had enough of Gorbachev’s intimidation.” Everyone perceives his “perseverance” for the Union as a struggle to keep his seat.

December 15, 1991, Sunday

Yesterday I started the day at the Kremlin by writing in my diary. I filled a few pages with thoughts on Gorbachev and his last two days. I forgot to take my actual diary notebook, so I will insert the pages here later. In the meantime, I’ll write about myself.

My consultants (Weber, Yermonsky, Kuvaldin) took bags of papers to their office on Razin Street (they have temporary rooms there)... to sort them, organize them, and destroy some of them. Because we may be driven out of the Kremlin at any moment!

Olga (Lanina) told me that they summoned Pestov, chief of M.S.’ bodyguards, and told him that starting tomorrow, Gorbachev’s security will become subordinate to Yeltsin’s!

And M.S. keeps dragging it on, hoping for something... Tonight Starovoitova asked to see him, she probably came to sympathize with him... In general, the people now "loyal" to him are mostly those from the Interregional Deputy Group, which was created under Sakharov!

December 18, 1991, Wednesday

Tonight M.S. called me, "It's not working out." This is regarding the text of his message to participants in Alma-Ata. In the morning he told me that he worked on it, and that Yakovlev and I should go over it. But then he gave a two-hour interview to *Komsomolka* (he gives interviews every day. Today at 4 p.m., he is giving another one to NBC!), then he met with Shaposhnikov and Barannikov, then summoned me and Yakovlev. He "confronted" my text a little bit, totally rejected Shakhnazarov's banal and clearly unacceptable draft, which was put together in purely "constructive" tones—blessing, conciliatory, with good wishes for success... But also with advice and hints that "his way" would have been better...

Before that, we were having a conversation in passing... He asked Yakovlev, "Why are you so gloomy?" The latter anxiously began to argue that Yeltsin is afraid of serious opposition (A.N., Shevardnadze and the like!). When M.S. went to call R.M., A.N. leaned toward me and said, "I think they are going to kill me. I will ask Gorbachev to send me somewhere, for example as ambassador to Finland. Yeltsin will agree—I am a threat to him here..."

I responded with a "?" expression and an inward "smile." M.S. came back to the table... Started talking (at my suggestion) about the intellectual level of the heads of the "sovereign states." "Sometimes," he said, "you get dumber when you talk to them. And you really want to escape such 'collaboration.'"

Then he started to think about the "New Thinking Foundation"—the Gorbachev Foundation... It seems he and Yakovlev came up with it before me. M.S. started to "develop [the thought]," thinking of how this matter could be done on a large scale... I supported the idea, but suggested starting the Foundation not here, but in America.

Suddenly he said, "I got \$800,000 for the book." (Yakovlev immediately calculated that it would be 80 million rubles). "You know, Anatoly... I want to keep \$200,000 for myself, and give you \$30-40,000."

I: "You should not do that. I don't need it."

Yakovlev: "Keep around \$600,000 to start up the Foundation... And afterwards you will get various sponsors."

A.N. and I told him in unison not to give anything to all sorts of hospitals and such, because it will disappear like your previous subsidies, while "you need to live decently and no go around begging Yeltsin"...

I raised the question of my "boys"—my own and other consultants. Yakovlev and I vied in suggesting to give everyone "severance pay" (for two months), and assign Revenko to find work for them... But M.S. was in a hurry and we did not finish the conversation.

I myself began to “place” my boys: Weber to Krasin, Yermonsky to *Izvestiya*... I quarreled with Shakhnazarov, who snatched up the Lenin School with his Foundation... and doesn’t want to hear anything about giving people jobs, except for “his own”! I swore at him and hung up.

“The boys”: Weber, Yermonsky, and Kuvaldin are sorting through bags with my archive from these six years. Some things (quite a bit) I am taking home. I’m going to write a “book”—“My Six Years with Gorbachev.” But they + Grachev warned me not to rule out the possibility that my house might be searched when they open a “case” against Gorbachev. Actually I don’t believe such things... But who knows. If things go badly for Yeltsin, he will need “spectacles” and scapegoats. Then I will be the primary candidate (at first) as a witness... Although, there is nothing “criminally” compromising in my archives... But they could find materials to smear Gorbachev with the liberties of post-totalitarian behavior... as well as excessive candor in private conversations.

Today I “arranged” for Tamara to go to Bovin, to Israel. He promised me a long time ago, but he did not want to “insist” at the MFA, he folded... So I had to do everything myself, through Kovalyov and Avdeyev. I wonder if we will get it done in time, before Kozyrev gets his paws on all these procedures.

Yeltsin’s entourage, unlike the Interregional Deputy Group (“Sixtiers”), is not tied to the intelligentsia. And the intelligentsia is beginning to “understand” what it did, when it rose against Gorbachev... They sympathize, now that stones are raining down on him.

In two days I will have to be out of the Kremlin.

December 20, 1991, Friday

Today I got my last paycheck. Yesterday some people were already searched when leaving the Kremlin. When a warrant officer tried to search the Chairman of Committee on Afghan Affairs Aushev (Hero of the Soviet Union), Aushev punched him in the face. Gusenkov threatened to go back and “complain” to the President, and they let him go. They didn’t touch me, even though for many a day now I do not leave the place without a thick briefcase. Today I asked a courier (they respect me), to take a whole bag of documents from my personal archive. Government cars have been taken away from everybody except M.S. and his aides and advisers. But it is a matter of days. Yesterday, Kozyrev’s clerk came to Shevardnadze and conveyed Yeltsin’s decree on the liquidation of his ministry, and asked E.A. to “clear the premises.” Revenko also passed on to us Burbulis’ order to “finish up.” My phone numbers have already been transferred—I get calls, but they ask for someone else. At least I can still make outgoing calls...

In a word, this is Yeltsin-style banditry. And M.S. keeps insisting on a “civilized” transfer of power.

Today he twice went back to his final declaration... I “finished it up” twice. But in the evening it turned out that there is an alternative version, from Yakovlev. The three of us sat to

work on it. I stated my explicit disagreement with Yakovlev's version—it was defeatist and whiny. I don't know which one he will ultimately choose. M.S. was tempted by Yakovlev's... Although I strongly discredited it. We agreed that A.N. will use my text as the basis, work on it, and present something tomorrow.

Kohl called M.S. today. He asked, "What are you going to do?" M.S. explained his vision for a long time (based on the letter to participants in Alma-Ata), and said that he will leave if they approve the Commonwealth... Even though he does not agree with it, he will not confront them.

He said that he will engage in "social" (not political) work. He revealed his plan to me (again, full of enthusiasm): to create a "RAND Corporation" on the basis of Krasin-Shakhnazarov's foundation, and "expand it." Money will flow (from abroad), partners will come from other foundations... It will be a powerful intellectual center, which will help form a truly democratic society in Russia. If necessary, this Foundation will take on the role of a powerful opposition to these "amateurs, smug mediocrities"...

Kohl invited M.S. to Germany—to rest, give lectures, live... M.S. did not refuse... He gets many such invitations.

Karyakin visited him (I brought them together). "The Sixtiers" are washing themselves clean... "Moral support." Yurka even promised to make a loud exit from Yeltsin's Presidential Council. We'll see!

Tretyakov's article in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*: Belovezhskaya Pushcha was a coup d'état.

I am finding places for my boys... I have to take care of my own pension. I hear I will have to do some footwork to get all the paperwork...

December 22, 1991, Sunday

Yesterday the Alma-Ata pogrom took place. It seems this turn of events is comparable to October 25th, 1917, and with the same uncertain outcomes.

Gorbachev was crudely overthrown. They did not even adopt a special document about the "abolition" of him as the head of state. Nicholas II at least got an "authoritative delegation" of the Duma to issue him a request to resign and abdicate. But for Gorbachev, all that Yeltsin did was explain when asked in an interview, "Yes, we discussed what would happen to him. We won't do what we did with our previous leaders—bury him, and then re-bury him, calling him a criminal. We will behave like a civilized country. We agreed on a pension for him, and 'in general' discussed his 'position after resignation.'" By the way, this took place exactly 4 months after the coup, and on Stalin's birthday!

The Soviet Union no longer exists. Russia a member of the UN Security Council... Our "Europe" and "Asia" are going to go their different ways, as well as the so-called "Slavic" world... Russia will have to be rebuilt... hardly in accord with the Tartars, Buryats, and the descendants of Shamil.

In the meantime in the Kremlin: at 11 p.m. M.S. gathered Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and me... We sat down to finish up the farewell address. E.A. did not support Yakovlev's version (two paragraphs, snotty and whiny). My version is practically accepted. It is especially important that they kept my "dashes" that signify *perestroika*'s historical significance... Alas! They castrated the emotional aspect...

As we were editing, we got carried away, as if we were in Volynskoe or Novo-Ogarevo, working on yet another speech for the Supreme Council or something like that. We argued about words as if we forgot that we're working on an obituary.

While we were talking (after all, we sat there for two hours), E.A. declared that "they won't get anywhere"... He insisted on his latest predictions that there will be a coup; there will be a ruthless mass upheaval. He talked about the cynicism and impudence of Yeltsin's cohort. "They promised to keep the 'valuable' parts of the Foreign Ministry. But I don't believe them. The most important thing for them is to occupy the seats. They are admiring themselves and boast in front of each other over what offices they got on Smolenskaya-Sennaya!"

M.S. chimed in on this subject. He said that B.N. reminds him practically every day to vacate the "good office" for him in this (Kazakovsky) building. He had been admiring Ryzhkov's former office on the 2nd floor. Yes... the most important thing for them is to occupy the Kremlin, everything else comes after, M.S. concluded.

The day before (on the evening of December 20th) M.S. cheered up when Ignatenko told him that the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopted an "interpretation" of Belovezha Accords that is incompatible with the concept of the Commonwealth. He demanded to see the text, and read it to us with pleasure. Yeltsin's whole idea with concessions for the sake of "keeping" Ukraine in the CIS is falling through, he said. A.N. and I cooled his enthusiasm, saying that they had a different goal—to knock out the USSR with Kravchuk's help, and to eliminate him, Gorbachev. That was the most important task. The next step will be to advance Russia everywhere... Others will adapt, and if someone falls away, they don't care. M.S. agreed with that, too... But he was still happy about the "failure"... And again he railed against the amateurs and mediocrities, their complacency and irresponsibility. Then he said, "They will accept the document, even if it's a sham, but they cannot afford not to demonstrate their victory right now. Gorbachev barely got 7 republics for his Union Treaty, so to speak, but we got all 11, and Georgia will join, which means 12! But still, they will fail."

Yakovlev "predicted": God willing, Yeltsin will last until spring.

Mitterrand's call (scheduled ahead of time) interrupted our "thoughts." He "took off his mask" of grandeur and pomposity and said all kinds of words about Gorbachev's significance, the immortality of what "they accomplished together." In response, M.S. kept expounding his "conception" again and again: he will not get in the way; he will try to "enrich" the CIS process... If B.N. does not retreat from democratic reforms, he will provide assistance (which Yeltsin does not want and will not allow).

Mitterrand invited him to France, saying that although M.S. has been there several times, he never really saw the country...

Well, it is noble of him!

It would have been good for Andreotti to call Gorbachev right now too, especially after Yeltsin's visit to Italy.

And Bush? He... looks around all the time, and spoke somewhat dryly a week ago. And the first thing he did was to invite Yeltsin to the U.S.

That's fine... But what will I do? I did not even take care of my pension. Tomorrow M.S. will say his farewell, and immediately we will be kicked off the premises. Where do I go to get my pension, to which regional social security office?

When M.S. was talking about his "RAND Corporation" he said that there will be a spot for everyone there. He got carried away with his daydream. And the money will start coming in, he said... I don't believe it. Plus, I don't really want to. I want to feel free. But what will I live on? "My verse has brought me no rubles to spare"³⁵... What is that? Am I disinterested in money? Indifferent to myself and my "home"? Lazy to deal with commonplace matters? Is it a habit of nomenclature services? But even before the nomenclature I could not take care of myself... It is probably a mix of everything...

I should start getting used to "freedom"... But while I have a "family," I won't be free, even in the sense of leaving the house without "glancing over my shoulder!" Will I be strong enough to damn it all and be with the woman I love? But she needs me when I visit her, cheerful, self-confident, interesting, with status... not a dependent and miserable suppliant for kindness and consolation... And I want to live...

December 23, 1991, Monday

Even last night, over the phone, M.S. started to mutilate the text of his Farewell speech. I did what I could to "ennoble" it... I toned down the places that will rouse nothing but irony or mockery. He is stubborn, and I don't feel comfortable arguing sharply with him nowadays, lest he think that I'm becoming insolent because he is no longer President.

But he wasn't even planning to read it out today, although "everyone" can barely wait.

From 12-6 p.m. he was in the Walnut Room with Yeltsin + A.N. Yakovlev... And from the start, they were getting cognac "for their coffee," and they also had lunch.

³⁵ A quote from Vladimir Mayakovsky's poem "At the Top of My Voice." The source for the verse translation is *The bedbug and Selected poetry*, translated by Max Hayward and George Reavey. Meridian Books, New York, 1960. Accessed at <http://www.marxists.org/subject/art/literature/mayakovskv/1930/at-top-my-voice.htm> [Translator's Note]

At 6 p.m. M.S. had a scheduled conversation with Major, for which he went to his office, and he was already pretty tipsy... A corresponding conversation with the British Prime Minister followed. It was touching. The latter was probably completely stunned by such sincerity... I will definitely reproduce that conversation.

Then M.S. went back to Yeltsin, who had been "having it out" one-on-one with A.N.

Tomorrow M.S. will bring together the apparatus "team" to say goodbye. They already assembled today, but M.S. postponed because of his meeting with Yeltsin. I noticed that 70 percent of the people there I was seeing for the first time, even though only the command staff was present.

Today NBC filmed me. Together with Yegor Yakovlev, they are making a movie on "Gorbachev's Last Days." I spoke with them for an hour and a half... Yakovlev and Grachev later told me that they loved it! They were sorry that they hadn't gotten to me sooner. And later I was so sorry that I did not say many things to them. But, I did intrigue them about my future book.

Eidlin, the publisher of *Novosti* came over... He brought the first two orders for Gorbachev's future book. They are ready to put down 1.5 million dollars right now, and wait two years! Today *Izvestiya* already reported about the future "Gorbachev Foundation"... That's what the foundation should start with. First and foremost, he should publish the records of his conversations with foreign statesmen, between 1985-1991... It is invaluable material for history. I told him about it. He shrugged it off. As always...

December 27, 1991, Friday

Today is the first day that I am unemployed (although I'm not yet a pensioner, I did not get that taken care of in due time).

I need to gather my wits. But first of all, I'll try to recollect the events of these days.

On Wednesday, the 25th, M.S. decided to make his last "Address"... At first we prepared it as a Statement. I already wrote about some episodes of this process. In the end he used my text as the "basis," and actually he used almost all of my text, he even restored some things from the previous versions (for example, that a State should be dissolved with the people's will)... But he also stuffed it with details that the newspapers didn't "accept" anyway... Not a single newspaper printed the Address in its entirety! Everyone is afraid of Yeltsin.

In the morning he asked to be connected with Bush (at 5 p.m.). And even though it is their Christmas, Pavel Palazhchenko located Bush in Camp David... And the latter agreed.

M.S. conducted the conversation on the verge of familiarity—"Russian-style," "like friends"... But Bush also for the first time "stepped away" from restraint and said many words of praise, many of which ended up in his speech about the end of the Soviet Union and the importance of Gorbachev.

Genscher asked for a telephone conversation, and before that Blech brought me a letter from him. My conversation with Blech was more interesting than M.S.' conversation with Genscher... Although this was literally half an hour before the last speech by the "President of the USSR."

Many reporters gathered in room No. 4! (next to his office), where he usually appeared before the TV-cameras... Overall, if in these last few days Yegor Yakovlev hadn't attracted the NBC crew—who practically spent all their time in the hallways, filming everything that had anything to do with M.S.—if it wasn't for them, M.S. would have been in an information blockade until his last days at the Kremlin. It is symptomatic and shameful for us that only the Western TV-journalists hung around him, symbolizing Gorbachev's importance for the whole world, which the Western public rightly attaches to him.

Thus... I stood to the side, around 8-10 meters from him. It was a live broadcast. He was calm. He did not hesitate to look into the text. And it turned out well "right off the reel." Afterwards, all the informal assessments I heard from the people watching at home, agreed that he appeared dignified and noble.

Indeed, he is a tragic figure, even though for me, who is used to seeing him in everyday life, it is difficult to attach this term to him, with which, of course, he will go down in history... *Izvestiya* after all printed "quotes" from the appraisals of him by "outstanding statesmen of the West."

He got back to his office. I stayed in the waiting room. Two men in civilian clothes were sitting inconspicuously on the couch in the corner. I thought one of them looked familiar (later Shevchenko, the Chief of Protocol, explained it to me: that man had been on all the foreign trips with us... He sat in the back of the airplane and minded his own business). Next to him stood a "briefcase" and something that looked like a portable telephone. It turned out that even before I came in, Shaposhnikov was already in M.S.' office. After fifteen minutes these two were summoned to his office... One of them soon left. But two others came in, men I don't know, and they were escorted into the office. Then they all came out. About 10 minutes later Shaposhnikov also came out, "smiling" like always, he greeted me. But he was (visibly!) embarrassed, too.

Two Yakovlevs and I went in to M.S. He was clearly agitated, red in the face. We sat down at the oval table. He told us what happened: Yeltsin really did not like his speech. After listening for a minute, he turned off the TV and told Burbulis to get him the "complete text." M.S. told Andrei to send it over...

Then we found out that Yeltsin said, "if that's how he wants it," he, Yeltsin, would not come to personally receive the "button," let Gorbachev come to him. Gorbachev refused. Then Yeltsin sent Shaposhnikov... And what happened then, see above, as they say!

But Yeltsin started acting like a dick even earlier. Before the conversation with Bush, Andrei and I were sitting with M.S. while he was adding the final touches to his last speech. Suddenly, R.M. called, in a panic: people came to the apartment (the one on Kosygin Avenue) and demanded that she gather all her belongings and clear out in two hours. M.S. flew into a

rage, his face covered with red spots, he called one person, another... cussed them out. He was able to stop the highway robbery. But yesterday, on the 26th, they had to clear out after all. And for a long time were refused a truck to move their things!

Yesterday morning (I am running ahead)... his security barely managed to get a car to come to M.S.' dacha, the car that Yeltsin "condescendingly" left him...

In the morning of the 25th M.S. still did not know (Grachev and I told him) what was published in many newspapers—Yeltsin told newspaper editors (on Staraya Ploshchad'!) about the "outcome" of his 8-hour meeting with Gorbachev and Yakovlev, "I cut his security tenfold (which is a lie, Gorbachev did not ask for 200 people), gave him a 'smaller' dacha than the current one, minus the apartment in the city... Immunity is out of the question, if he is guilty of something, he should acknowledge it now, while he is still President. I gave him a 4000-ruble pension." And some other vile things of this sort.

Meanwhile, the illusionists Gorbachev and Yakovlev spoke about this meeting, which lasted from noon until 11 p.m. (with only one break for the conversation with Major), in serene tones, saying that they had a normal, friendly conversation, as if nothing had happened. So much for what happened!

After the "button" had been transferred, we drank some cognac (M.S., two Yakovlevs, and I), then relocated to the Walnut Room, where Grachev joined us... and until midnight we "had a party." It is impossible to remember everything that was said, which is too bad. Some things were said in the course of conversation that were worthy to be set in stone. Although mostly we talked about the past, even about Suslov... and about how when M.S. came to Moscow in 1978 he was appalled at the political and other mores... and how "politics are done in Moscow." Some of these things I had heard from him many times before. By the way, he said that the first book he would like to write for the Foundation would be on how and why the *perestroika* idea appeared in his mind.

As we went along, he gave me two assignments: to arrange for Grachev to go to UNESCO, and to tell Teltschik not to send the money (for the "August Coup" book) to Moscow.

By the way, yesterday... Grachev organized a display of courage [*gusarstvo*], he invited all the press to the Hotel *Oktyabrskaya* on Dimitrov Street. A farewell party. For two hours, the reporters clung to Gorbachev, barely giving him a chance to drink from his glass... It was an outburst of feeling... not toward a head of state, for which journalists get paid large fees and get recognition, but on a human level... He said everything he wanted to say. And the journalists questioned us, poor sinners, along the way.

By the way, Krepostnoi (that's his last name), the director of the hotel, a protégé of the late Kruchina, for a long time did not want to allow the meeting to be held there. He gave the excuse that the President's accounts were "closed." But we put cash in front of him, which came from M.S.' personal account. Still, he ran to his superiors and again tried to get out of it. But since the hotel is now a private enterprise, not government-sponsored, he had to give in... At least there is some benefit to privatization!

Yesterday I received two ambassadors, the Spanish and the Norwegian. They brought letters from their heads of state. To the first one, Cuenca, I told about Grachev (about getting him into UNESCO). The Ambassador's countenance changed. Despite the fact that he knows Grachev pretty closely and is friends with Mayor (Director-General of UNESCO), he said, "This is impossible, it is not done (for an ambassador to intercede for someone)." Fine, it is not done... I know that myself. But why did he get so scared? Is he afraid of Kozyrev, that he'll drive him out?

I should set Grachev up through Attali—to the EBRD in London. I'll have to call Peissik (Counselor of the French Embassy).

I will take care of the second assignment through Sanya. She will be flying to Germany soon. I already told her about it, I stopped by in the morning (taking the metro, now). She outlined all the mechanics of the banking services... with great knowledge of the subject. It turns out she has a large account there... But she hasn't paid taxes, so she is a "candidate for jail." Yes... Papa Leva has his own account. Mama Ronnie—her own. Sanya—her own.

Gusenkov just called, saying that M.S. arrived at his office at 11 a.m. for an interview with Japanese journalists... But an hour before that, Yeltsin had settled into his office. And M.S... received the Japanese in Revenko's office! Why does he humiliate himself like that, why does he "go" to the Kremlin... the flag has already changed over the dome of the Sverdlovsk room, and he is no longer President!

It's a nightmare! And Yeltsin is becoming more and more impudent, stomping his feet louder and louder... He must be taking revenge for yesterday's meeting with the press!

At 8.15 a.m. Yeltsin and his entourage showed up in Gorbachev's reception room. He commanded to the secretary on duty, "Well, let me see it!" And went into the office...

"There was a marble desk-set here... Where is it?"

The secretary, trembling, explained, "There was no desk-set... Mikhail Sergeyevich never used those kinds of pens. We always put a set of markers on his desk..."

"Alright... What's in there?" and he proceeded into the back room (the "lounge"). He started opening the desk drawers. One turned out to be locked.

"Why is it locked? Call the commandant..."

The commandant ran over, with a key. He opened it, it was empty.

"Alright, fine..."

They got back into the office, sat at the oval table... He, Burbulis, Silaev (?), and somebody else.

"Give us some glasses!"

Instantly, a man appeared with a bottle of whiskey and glasses. “The main party” knocked back a glass.

“That’s better. As for the Walnut room and the State Council premises, the Politburo used to meet there. I’ve been there, I’ve been there...”

Laughing, the crowd walked out of the office. He told the secretary before he left, “Watch it! I’m going to be back today!”

December 28, 1991, Saturday

Yesterday I convinced M.S. not to give an interview to NHK (Japan)—it is dishonorable to go to the Kremlin, where Yeltsin “made merry” in his office... It is even more dishonorable to look for some other place. Revenko reproached me afterwards: the Japanese had promised \$1 million for the interview.

I sent Gorbachev a letter from Major (Braithwaite gave it to me), for which I made a handwritten translation myself; a letter from Miyazawa (Tamara went to the embassy); a book signed by members of Vachtangov theater, which Yulia Khrushcheva gave to me. M.S. called me, excited. Such signs of attention are like a balm for him right now. He told me he is getting sick, probably the flu. But he was given only three days to move out of the dacha... So he has to sort his books and things... He told me to go ahead and start working on a “chronicle of New Thinking,” from the records of his conversations between 1985-1991.

Weber and Yermonskey seem to be leaving...

I started to sort my own books today; I already took two suitcases of them to the dumpster... Some things are only good for the trash bin, even though I feel sorry to part with them, there is some significance attached to each one. But nobody will read them, neither I nor my grandson. This is hard work. And time-consuming.

December 30, 1991, Monday

Yesterday Yeltsin gave the New Year’s speech. One could agree with it, if he had “reported” to whom he owes the fact that he can speak like this right now, and to “conduct business” like this... But, not a word... On the contrary, he is saying that the Russia he inherited is in a state as if it had been run by an enemy for 70 years...

And everything is going smoothly in Minsk, but the Commonwealth will not amount to anything, it is only a screen for the Union’s collapse.

Afterword to 1991

This is the year of the State's disintegration, the collapse of the economy, social chaos, and Gorbachev's and the Center's loss of authority and power over the country.

It is the year of "Vilnius" and the subsequent desperate attempts to save the Union—through a referendum, the Novo-Ogarevo process, a new Union Treaty, and alas! The CPSU's resuscitation on a "democratic platform," despite the fact that it was not capable of anything besides creating a noisy, destructive opposition once Gorbachev deprived it of its political and ideological monopoly.

It was the year of the coup, which sent the process of the Soviet empire's self-destruction down a landslide. The finale was in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, where Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Shushkevich usurped all the rights and institutions of power, and signed the Soviet Union's death sentence.

What happened in the Soviet Union during this year is in essence what happened "in due time" to other empires, when the potential given to them by history was exhausted.

The emergence of Gorbachev was inevitable in the Soviet Union of the 1980s. He became "an instrument of history." He did not understand right away that history wanted something different from him than he wanted from it. That is his tragedy as a statesman and outstanding figure.

The empire disappeared in a unique, original way. The way this objective-inexorable process affected Gorbachev's work, how the unpredictable changes reflected in his thoughts, ideas, feelings, behavior, and interactions with people—all of this is interesting not only as a historical source. It is also a rare opportunity to observe the role of a major figure in history through the nitty-gritty details of how he initiated processes and events, and then lost control over them.

However, this is the fate of all great leaders, revolutionaries, and reformers in particular. It does not matter what capabilities they possess at first, even if dictatorial.

These people's thoughts about themselves and others, about their mission, their country and the world, even their reactions to the seemingly particular and little things—they always have independent value, regardless of the outcomes of their work. This may be even more true for Gorbachev than for anyone else of his ilk. For he is at the root of a landmark turning point in the course of world events.

The international aspect of Gorbachev's *perestroika* once again repeated the Russian paradox: the revolutions in this country tend to bring more benefits (even through a negative experience) to the outside world than to this country and its people. The year 1991 made this very clear. The Soviet Union's approach to catastrophe did not undermine Gorbachev's authority as a world leader. He continued to make original, long-lasting and beneficial contributions to the development of the situation in the world.

However, the use of foreign policy for the so-called “national interests” did not achieve what Gorbachev expected. “New Thinking” was too much ahead of its time. People were not ready to perceive it as a fundamental guide in international relations. A compensation for this can be our certainty that at some point the future, the main principles and fundamental ideas of Gorbachev’s political philosophy will become the norm of existence in his own country and the international community as a whole. Otherwise we will not survive.

As for the specifics reflected in this collection of the year’s events, their author still believes that he was right about many of his fears and misgivings, expressed or unexpressed, about the possibilities and outcomes of *perestroika*.

However, I have to acknowledge that as an adviser and close associate, and as a human being, I was at times severely unfair in assessing Gorbachev’s behavior, views, and mode of action when I considered them unworthy or inadequate to the position and deserved grandeur of such a figure. The more so because, although in practical terms the objectives Gorbachev put forward turned out to be unfeasible or deliberately illusory, in the historic perspective, his mission was objectively necessary, and many aspects of it became irreversible. He is right when he refutes his adversaries who say that the “Gorbachev era” is over. No, in reality he laid the foundation of a new era.